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Category:LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (SEE ALSO AO
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:RO)
MONTHYEARML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0081998-12-24024 December 1998 LER 97-001-01:on 970215,failure to Perform TS Surveillance of Component Cooling Water Sys Check Valves Occurred.Caused by Inadequate Communication Between EOP Group & IST Reviewers.Procedure Revised.With 981224 Ltr ML18106B0021998-12-17017 December 1998 LER 98-015-01:on 980924,improper Installation of Test Equipment to RPS Occurred.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Reviews During Past Revs.Revised Procedures. with 981217 Ltr ML18106A9551998-11-0303 November 1998 LER 96-013-01:on 960711,concluded That Current Gain & Bias Settings Had Rendered Overtemperature Delta Temp Protection Channels Inoperable.Caused by Scaling Error.Licensee Will Revise Scaling Calculations.With 981105 Ltr ML18106A9451998-10-30030 October 1998 LER 97-004-01:on 970408,failure to Comply with TS Action Statement,Dg Start & Inadequate Surveillance Testing,Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Tracking of Inoperable Equipment. Discussed Event & Lessons Learned.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9491998-10-22022 October 1998 LER 98-015-00:on 980924,identified Improper Installation of Test Equipment to Rps.Cause Indeterminate.Procedures for Installation of Test Equipment for Collection of State Point Data Were Placed on Administrative Hold.With 981022 Ltr ML18106A9301998-10-21021 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980725,noted Improper Calibr of Liquid Radwaste Effluent Line Radiation Monitor.Caused by Inattention to Detail by Maint Personnel.Channel Calibr Was Successfully Performed on 1R18 on 980821.With 981019 Ltr ML18106A9071998-10-0101 October 1998 LER 98-014-00:on 980918,discovered That Fire Barrier Matl for HVAC Ducts Does Not Meet Required Level of Fire Resistance.Cause Indeterminate.Established Appropriate Compensatory Actions for Fire Barriers.With 981001 Ltr ML18106A8951998-09-28028 September 1998 LER 98-012-01:on 980725,noted That Afs Was Operated with Less than Required Number of Operable AFW Pumps.Caused by Improper Procedure Implementation.Runout Protection Pressure Device for 22 AFW Pumps Was Returned to Svc.With 980928 Ltr ML18106A8821998-09-21021 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980820,noted Surveillance of Containment Penetration Overcurrent Protection Devices Missed.Caused by Human Error.Satisfactorily Tested Apprpriate Breakers & Disciplined Involved Personnel.With 980921 Ltr ML18106A8791998-09-16016 September 1998 LER 96-006-01:on 960717,determined That non-radioactive Liquid Basin Radwaste Monitor Inoperable During Low Head Conditions.Caused by Inadequate Design Change Package.Design Change 1EC3663-01 Has Been Installed.With 980916 Ltr ML18106A8801998-09-0808 September 1998 LER 98-013-00:on 980806,operation with TS Required Equipment OOS Was Noted.Caused by Human Error.Reviewed Processes & Practices Re Safety Sys Status Control,Procedure Rev & Extra Training.With 980908 Ltr ML18106A8531998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Cause of Event Has Not Yet Been Determined.Assembled Root Cause Team & Replaced Affected tubing.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8521998-08-27027 August 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980803,ESFA During a 4KV Automatic Transfer Test Was Noted.Caused by Premature Release of Control Console Pushbutton Due to Inadequate Procedural Step.Revised procedure.W/980827 Ltr ML18106A8421998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980725,discovered That Plant Had Operated in Modes 1 & 2 w/twenty-two AFW Pumps Inoperable.Caused by Failure to Restore Pump Runout Protection Pressure Device to Svc.Returned Subject Device to svc.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8431998-08-24024 August 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980810,failure to Post Continuous Firewatch as Required by Fire Protection Plan Noted.Caused by Failure to Recognize Concurrent Conditions.Continuous Firewatch Was Posted Immediately & Repaired Smoke detectors.W/980824 Ltr ML18106A8141998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 980714,determined That Leakage from Boron Injection Tank Exceeded Max Allowable ECCS Leakage from Sources Outside Containment.Caused by Leaking 2SJ404 Manual Sample valve.2SJ404 Valve repaired.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A8201998-08-13013 August 1998 LER 98-012-00:on 980715,potential to Exceed Rating of Piping Due to Isolation of Overpressure Protection Line Was Noted. Caused by Inadequate Procedural Guidance.Appropriate Operations Dept Procedures Have Been revised.W/980813 Ltr ML18106A6931998-06-29029 June 1998 LER 98-003-00:on 980122,inappropriate Plugging of Tubes R9C60 & R10C60 in Salem Unit 2 Sg,Was Performed.Caused by Failure of Qualification,Verification & Validation Process. Tubes Reviewed to Verify No Others Inappropriately Plugged ML18106A6471998-06-0404 June 1998 LER 98-011-00:on 980505,improper Isolation of Single Cell Battery Charger from 125 Vdc Battery Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate 10CFR50.59 Applicability Review.Placed Procedure SC.MD-CM.ZZ-0024(Q) on Administrative hold.W/980604 Ltr ML18106A6421998-06-0101 June 1998 LER 98-010-00:on 931019,reactor Pressure Vessel Insp Plugs Were Out of Configuration,Was Noted.Caused by Personnel Error.Proper Configuration Was Restored Shortly After Discovery Prior to Entering Mode 2.W/980601 Ltr ML18106A6431998-05-29029 May 1998 LER 98-006-01:on 980227,determined Incorrect Scaling Error of First Stage Pressure Transmitter Existed.Caused by Human Error.Revised Setpoint Calculation SC-MS002-01 & Revised Associated Instrument Calibr Database info.W/980529 Ltr ML18106A6141998-05-18018 May 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 970814,failure to Test 21 & 22 AF 40 Valves in Closed Direction as Required by TS 4.0.5 Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Design Mod Process.Motor Driven 21/22 AF 40 Valves Were Tested IAW Revised procedure.W/980518 Ltr ML18106A5901998-05-0101 May 1998 LER 98-009-00:on 980405,epoxy Missing from Terminals of H Analyzer Was Noted.Caused by Inadequate Development of Procedure.H Analyzers Were Repaired & Review of Other Safety Related Equipment in Containment Was performed.W/980501 Ltr ML18106A5611998-04-20020 April 1998 LER 98-008-00:on 980323,inadequate Testing of Salem Unit 1 Containment Air Locks Resulted in Entering TS 3.0.3.Caused by less-than-adequate Work Practices During Replacement of Equalizing Valve.Salem Unit 2 Airlocks Were Inspected ML18106A6061998-04-0101 April 1998 Corrected LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Comply W/Tss 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Have Been Taken to Correctly Document Safety Factors.Corrects Prior Similar Occurrences ML18106A4451998-04-0101 April 1998 LER 98-004-00:on 980302,failure to Perform TS 4.11.1.1.2 & 3.3.3.8 Was Noted.Caused by Organizational Deficiency.Steps Were Taken to Correctly Document Safety factors.W/980401 Ltr ML18106A4351998-03-30030 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980227,incorrect Scaling of First Stage Turbine Impulse Pressure Transmitters Noted.Cause Indeterminate.Implemented Procedure Changes & re-scaled Affected Turbine Impulse Pressure transmitters.W/980330 Ltr ML18106A3961998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of Twelve EDG Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (FOTP) Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Installed Correct off-auto-manual Switch & Verified Operability of Twelve FOTP.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A5781998-03-20020 March 1998 Corrected LER 98-005-00:on 980219,inoperability of 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Pump (Fotp),Noted.Caused by Installation of Incorrect Control Switch.Field Insp Performed to Verify Configuration of Switches for 11,21 & 22 FOTPs ML18106A4021998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-007-00:on 980218,failure to Establish Containment Integrity (Closure) Prior to Fuel Movement Was Noted.Caused by Failure to Identify & Include Condensate Pot Vent in Appropriate Valve Lineup.Valves identified.W/980320 Ltr ML18106A4031998-03-20020 March 1998 LER 98-006-00:on 980221,ESF Actuation of 11 & 12 Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Occurred.Caused by Human Error.Operators Promptly Established Feedwater to All SG & Restored Proper Water levels.W/980320 Ltr 1999-08-26
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913 ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF). ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF). ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716 ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1 ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11. ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999 a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr 1999-09-30
[Table view] |
Text
Pub.lie Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038-0236 Nuclear Business Unit OCT 2 7 1995 LR-N95188 U. s. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT NO. ~5-019-01 This Licensee Event Report entitled uOperability Functional Test Not Performed Prior to Mode Entry" is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulation 10CFR50.73(a) (2) (i) (B). Attachment A contains a listing of those commitments made as a result of the investigation into this issue.
Sincerely, rli,C~
~~ c. Warren General Manager Salem Operations Attachment A Attachment LER SORC Mtg.95-123 RJB c Distribution LER File 3.7 9511030090 951027 PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR l l1e power is in your hanus.
95-2168 REV. 6/94
Attachment A PSE&G commitments The commitments below have been made by PSE&G as a result of the investigation into LER 272/95-019-01. These commitments supersede those commitments contained in the previous revision of this LER and apply to both units.
Completed Actions
- 1. The procedure which governs the requirement for entering tracking LCO's against equipment that is unavailable or inoperable for future modes has been revised. When operability issues exist, specific direction has been provided to ensure consistency in the tracking of the affected systems/equipment.
- 2. A tracking AS was entered for the lVCl and 1VC2 for Mode 6 to ensure that the open and inspect work orders are completed in determining the cause for the leak rate failures. The OD was revised declaring the valves operable in modes 5 & 6. In addition, a review of open ODs was performed to assure degraded conditions imposing mode restrictions are incorporated into the tracking log.
- 3. MMIS has been revised to include an "Affects Mode change? Y/Nu entry in the OD section of the Action Request. This information will be determined by an SRO during the review of the request.
- 4. The requirement to comply with the LCO for the containment purge system was incorporated into the !OP on 9/22/95.
- 5. The procedure, "Removing and Returning to Service of Safety Related Equipmentu was revised to incorporate the process for tracking action statements.
Specifically, this revision includes the requirement to specify equipment that is removed from service for normal scheduled maintenance and equipment that becomes inoperable for other reasons (i.e. degraded conditions, ODs, failed surveillances, etc.). This revision includes modifications to the TSAS tracking form. In particular, the form includes entries for applicable TS and Modes; associated action requests and status, work orders, condition reports, design changes, and other documents/actions to be performed while the equipment is inoperable. Included also are those actions required prior to operability restoration.
The above revision was implemented on 9/1/95.
completed Actions (Cont'd)
- 6. The OD process was revised to include a mechanism to track additional/ contingency actions and identification of responsibility for those actions.
This was completed on 8/30/95.
- 7. The IOPs applicable for defueling and refueling have been revised to include the requirement to review outstanding items that may impact an associated Mode change (i.e., OD log and Action Requests). The procedures for unit restart are currently on hold.
Future Actions
- 1. System Engineering will establish improved program controls to monitor the performance of the containment purge valves. These program controls will be implemented prior to restart.
- 2. The planning/scheduling process will be revised to clearly address action requests that are conditionally tied to specific plant evolutions and incorporated into the scheduling process. The process will be changed as part of our ongoing efforts to support restart.
- 3. A Unit Coordinator (UC) position will be established in the revised work control process. The UC will review action requests with an SRO and specify conditional limitations (i.e. Mode restrictions, system operability, etc.), and schedule the work request accordingly.
- 4. The applicable IOPs will be revised to include the requirement to review outstanding items that may impact an associated Mode change (i.e., OD log and Action Requests). The procedures for unit restart are currently on hold.
- 5. Required reading of the LER by all Licensed and Non-Licensed Operators and maintenance planners and schedulers will be conducted after issuance of the Supplemental LER. This is expected to be completed by 12/9/95.
NRCFORM366 (4-96)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 04/30/98 ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COUECTION REQUEST: 50.0 HRS.
REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPORATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND FED BACK TO INDUSTRY. FORWARD COMMENTS REGARDING BURDEN ESTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND (See reverse for required number of RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH g-e F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGT N, DC 2055!Hl001, AND TO THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION PROJECT (3150-0104), OFACE OF digits/characters for each block) MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, WASHINGTON, DC 20603.
FACILITY NAME (11 DOCKET NUMBER (21 PAGE (31 SALEM - Unit 1 05000272 1 Of 8 TITLE (41 Operability Functional Test Not Performed Prior to Mode Entry EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
FACILITY NAME , DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR 05000 07 26 95 95 - 019 - 01 10 27 95 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 05000 OPERATING THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more) (11)
MODE (9) 6 20.2201(b) 20.2203(a)(2)(v) x 50. 73(a)(2)(i)(B) 50. 73(a)(2)(viii)
POWER 20.2203(a)(1) 20.2203(a)(3)(i) 50. 73(a)(2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(x)
LEVEL(10) 000 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 50. 73(a)(2)(iii) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(4) 50. 73(a)(2)(iv) OTHER 20.2203(a)(2)(iii) 50.36(c)(1) 50. 73(a)(2)(v) Spec~ln Abstnict below or in C Form 366A 20.2203(a)(2)(iv) 50.36(c)(2) 50. 73(a)(2)(vii)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)
NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Ara11 Code)
Bob Gallaher, Operations Engineer (609) 429 - 5200 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER REPORTABLE TONPRDS l!;tlilllJlttll, TONPROS N
ll!il1il'll,lll
~~~1~1lj~!l~1~1~
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION
'YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE). XINO DATE (15)
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)
On June 20, 1995, while in Mode 5, containment purge valves, lVCl and 1VC2, failed an "in series" Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) . 1VC2 was then cycled open and closed and the valves were tested satisfactorily. An Operability Determination (OD) was issued on 6/21/95 which stated: "the valves are considered to be inoperable, although the penetration... (due to the satisfactory LLRT) is operable for containment integrity". On July 5, the OD was amended to document the operability of containment purge while in Mode 5 but cautioned "prior to Mode 6, further testing and/or inspections are to take place to investigate the valve seals. The
,operability of these valves will be re-evaluated at that time". On 7/25/95, Unit 1 entered Mode 6 with containment purge in service and the valves inoperable. This is contrary to the OD requirement and interpretation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.9.9. This event is reportable per 10CFR 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B) . This condition was discovered on 7 /26/95 and the purge valves were stroke checked (same day) to verify closure. The lack of managerial oversight and organizational interface allowed for inadequate procedures, inadequate tracking of system operability status, and inadequate tracking and follow through of corrective maintenance activities. TS Action Statement tracking logs, OD procedures, and the Operating Procedures are being revised.
NRC FORM 368 (4-95)
NRC FORM 366A
(+115)
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COlllllSSION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (8) PAGE (3)
YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I RElllSION NUMBER SALEM - Unit 1 05000272 95 - 019 - 01 2 OF 8 TEXT (If more space ia required, uae additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Containment Purge and Pressure Relief System - EIIS Identifier {BF}
Manufacturer Name - Masoneilan International Inc - M120 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE Event Date: .July 25, 1995 Discovery Date: July 26, 1995 Report Date: August 25, 1995 Supplemental Date: October 27, 1995 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE Operational Mode: 6 Reactor Power 0% of Rated Thermal Power
.DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE
.On June 20, 1995, containment purge isolation valves lVCl and 1VC2 were leak rate tested in series to comply with Technical Specification (TS) Action Statement (AS) 3.8.2.2 which requires "containment integrity" to be established within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> with less than 2 AC buses operable (e.g., more than one Unit 1 diesel generator unavailable) . The containment penetration associated with valves lVCl and 1VC2 failed its Local Leak Rate Test (LLRT) . Valve 1VC2 was cycled open and closed to assist in seating the valve, and the LLRT was re-performed satisfactorily.
Based on this failure, the operability of 1VC2 was then questioned as no cause was identified nor corrective maintenance performed to determine why it had failed its initial LLRT. Both lVCl and 1VC2 were addressed since they were both cycled to obtain a satisfactory LLRT two weeks prior to this occurrence. An Operability Determination (OD) was issued on 6/21/95. The valves were considered inoperable for containment purge purposes until the cause for the failed LLRT was determined and/or corrected. However, the OD stated "the valves are considered to be inoperable, although the penetration... (due to the satisfactory LLRT) is operable for containment integrity" (i.e., valves remain in a closed position) .
On July 5, 1995 the OD was revised to document the operability of containment purge while in Mode 5 but cautioned "prior to Mode 6, further testing and/or inspections are to take place to investigate the valve seals. The operability of these valves will be re-evaluated at that time". Work requests were initiated to check the stroke of the valves to verify valve closure when NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COlllllSSION FACILITY NAllE (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I RE\llSIOH N.1iEER SALEM - Unit 1 05000272 95 - 019 - 01 3 OF 8 TEXT (If more space ia required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Description of Occurrence (Cont'd) demanded. These work requests indicated that the check be performed prior to Mode 6.
On July 24, 1995, while in Mode 5, containment purge was placed in service. At 1435 on July 25, 1995 Unit 1 entered Mode 6 upon detensioning of the first Reactor vessel head stud. The containment purge system was in service during the transition from Mode 5 to Mode 6. This is contrary to the OD requirement and interpretation of TSAS 3.9.9 which states, "With the Contairunent Purge ... System inoperable, close each of the Purge ... penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere."
On July 26, 1995, at 1716 hrs., it was realized that the contairunent purge was in service but inoperable, contrary to the OD requirements. The valves were subsequently stroke tested to verify closure with no abnormalities identified.
On July 27, 1995, the OD was amended and recommended that the valves be declared operable for Modes 5 and 6 since they are capable of performing their specified safety function for "containment closur~" as identified in the TS bases and the functional requirements of TS 3/4.9.4 and 3/4.9.9. It further specified that should "contairunent integrity" be needed in Modes 5 and 6 (e.g., due to less than the two operable vital buses per TS 3/4~8.2.2, 3/4.8.2.4 or 3/4.8.2.6),
leak tightness will be verified by performance of another LLRT in accordance with TS 3/4.6.1.2."
ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE The contairunent purge system is normally isolated. The contairunent purge valves are administratively locked closed and tested in Modes 1-4. In these modes, they are LLRT'd every 6 months. One supply air penetration (lVCl and 1VC2) and one exhaust penetration (1VC3 and 1VC4) are provided for purging the containment atmosphere. In modes 5 and 6, this purging mode is designed to refresh the containment atmosphere to acceptable levels and minimize the accumulation of any long-lived radioisotopes in the containment. In Mode 6, these penetrations are required to be operable which includes automatic closure of the valves. The operability and closure restrictions are sufficient to restrict radioactive material release from a fuel element rupture based upon the lack of containment pressurization potential.
The ISI procedure requires compliance with 10CFR 50, Appendix J and the Technical Specifications. Appendix J requires recording of as-found test data.
These valves are tested prior to entering mode 4 following a shutdown and every 6 months while at power. Once these valves are seated, as determined by a satisfactory LLRT, the penetrations have not failed the as-found administrative NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION U .s. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3).
YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION
~
SALEM - Unit 1 05000272 95 - 019 - 01 4 OF 8 TEXT (If more apace ia required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Analysis of Occurrence (Cont'd) or Appendix J leak rate acceptance criteria. Therefore, the valves performed their intended function to maintain containment integrity during power .
operation.
In modes 5 and 6, certain TS Action Statements such as inoperability of all AC Busses or Emergency Diesel Generators require that containment integrity be established. In these cases, a LLRT is required. These are the Action Statements under which the initial test of these valves are susceptible to failure since the valves are likely to have been cycled for purging operations.
This is the mode under which the initial failure occurred on June 20, 1995.
When attempting to establish containment integrity due to electrical action statements in modes 5 and 6, these valves are stroked and tested, and if the LLRT fails, the valve is stroked (i.e., no maintenance) and tested again. An unsuccessful second test would result in a corrective maintenance work order (WO) being generated for rework. Since 1988, two corrective maintenance WOs were generated for lVCl, and 2. Based on the LLRT satisfactory leak rate test values, interviews with ISI personnel, and a recent vendor inspection and durometer reading on 2VC4, no trend is apparent which indicates a degradation of the seal due to aging or other factors.
The resilient rubber seats of the valves have not been replaced. To our knowledge, no other power plant uses these valves. The butyl rubber is heat treated and molded into the seat. The vendor originally estimated the installed life to be ten (10) to fifteen (15) years. More recent vendor estimates indicate that seal life may be higher depending on the frequency of cycle, environmental conditions, maintenance history, and radiation exposure. For these valves, the frequency of valve cycle is low, temperature conditions are mild, maintenance history is primarily actuator related only, and radiation exposure is low.
IE Circular 77-11, dated 9/6/77, addressed numerous reports on unsatisfactory performance of the resilient seats for the isolation valves in containment purge and vent lines. Generic Issue B-20, "Containment Leakage Due to Seal Deterioration" was established to evaluate and establish appropriate testing frequencies for these valves. Excessive seat leakage in these valves is typically caused by severe environmental conditions and/or wear due to frequent use. As a result of Generic Issue B-20 and the long term resolution of Generic Issue B-24 "Containment Purging During Normal Plant Operations," it was determined that passive purge lines shall be administratively controlled during Modes 1 through 4 and tested at least once every six months to demonstrate their leak tight integrity.
NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION U'.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
VEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION MJMBER SALEM - Unit 1 05000272 95 - 019 - 01 5 OF 8 TEXT (If more space i* required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Analysis of Occurrence (Cont'd)
A survey was performed of other nuclear power plants to determine what options were available for improved valve performance. The review of these options resulted in the determination that improved program controls to monitor the performance and reliability of the containment purge valve is the best available option at this time.
PRIOR SIMII..AR OCCURRENCES A review of previous LER's identified two instances of Mode changes with required safety systems inoperable due to administrative process deficiencies.
The processes consisted of the "control of EQ surveillances" and "TS amendment implementation." Neither event had causes similar to this event. For further information, refer to LER 272/88-004 and 311/90-013. It is assumed (no validation review performed) that the IOP inadequacy may have caused previous similar occurrences.
There are similarities between the causes of this event and several other events at Salem. These events were discussed in the Enforcement Conference dated July 23, 1995. In particular, these causes include a less than adequate program implementation for ODs and the failure to promptly resolve component reliability issues. Specifically, in this case, the OD (dated 7/5/95) did not undergo proper peer reviews and the OD process was not properly coordinated with the IOP's. Similarly, prompt action was not taken to disposition the condition report (dated 6/21/95) associated with the containment purge valves. The lack of prompt action necessitated a supplement to this LER. The Station response to the Enforcement Conference issues will further address the corrective actions associated with these programmatic issues.
CAUSE OF THE CONDITION The lack of managerial oversight and organizational breakdowns allowed for the existence of an inadequate Integrated Operating Procedure (IOP) . The cause of this event was an inadequate !OP mode entry procedure (from Mode 5 to Mode 6) .
While the IOP does address the TS LCO for assuring purge system operability prior to core alteration, it does not require assuring that the containment purge and pressure/vacuum relief system valves are closed or operable prior to entry into Mode 6. In addition, the !OP does not require that the operator verify the impact of active ODs prior to mode change.
A significant causal factor included the inability of the containment purge valve to meet the LLRT acceptance criteria This led to several administrative actions (e.g., ODs) to ensure valve operability for TS "Closure" and "Integrity" Action Statements. The revised OD process was relatively new and its application had resulted in a less than adequate OD.
NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
_I
HRC FORll 366A (4-95)
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COlllllSSION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I RElllSION NUMBER SALEM - Unit 1 05000272 95 - 019 - 01 6 OF 8 TEXT (If more space is requir.ed, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Cause of the Condition (Cont'd)
Other contributing causal factors included:
- inadequate procedures governing entries into the TSAS tracking log. This log was not updated to reflect the status of the degraded containment purge system nor was it used to record tracking action statements for a future mode. Consequently, the NSS and NCO were not aware of these restrictions.
The tracking action statements are also currently logged in the "Control Room Unit Status" report by the Shift Supervisor; however, this computerized system was not available at the time the ODs were completed.
- lack of a clear procedural interface between the ODs and the TSAS tracking log. As a result there is inconsistency in the mar..ner in which the interface is employed by each individual/shift.
- the planning/scheduling process failed to control or identify a Mode-restricting maintenance activity. Action requests were written on July 6 to perform stroke checks on lVCl and 1VC2 to ensure ,the required closure was obtained prior to entry into Mode 6. Mode 6 was entered on July 25 without any planning/scheduling restrictions or requirements. The work orders for lVCl and 1VC2 were initiated and planned, yet no outage schedule or "priority list" identified the need to perform the work prior to Mode 6.
- the absence of a mode change requirement to perform additional actions or reviews (e.g., Tech Specs, unavailable equipment, components off-normal (tagged) report) other than those specified in the IOP table for the mode change.
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE The reactor head was on the vessel at the time the containment purge system was in service and the purge system valves were closed prior .to core alterations.
The containment purge valves were closed at approximately 1716 hrs. on 7/26/95.
The reactor head was lifted on 7/28/95 at approximately 0525 hrs. There were no industrial safety or radiological impacts associated with this event.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS The following Corrective Actions apply to both units.
- 1. The procedure which governs the requirement for entering tracking LCO's against equipment that is unavailable or inoperable for future modes has been revised. When operability issues exist, specific direction has been provided to ensure consistency in the tracking of the affected systems/equipment.
NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
l NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. *'*~..; ... EAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER 12} LER NUMBER 6} PAGE (3)
SALEM - Unit 1 05000272 95 - 019 - 01 7 OF 8 TEXT (If more space ia required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Corrective Actions (Cont'd)
- 2. A tracking AS was entered for the lVCl and 1VC2 for Mode 6 to ensure that the open and inspect work orders are completed in determining the cause for the leak rate failures. The OD was revised declaring the valves operable in modes 5 & 6. In addition, a review of open ODs was performed to assure degraded conditions imposing mode restrictions are incorporated into the tracking log.
- 3. The procedure, "Removing and Returning to Service of Safety Related Equipment" is being revised to incorporate the process for tracking action statements. Specifically, this revision includes the requirement to specify equipment that is removed from service for normal scheduled maintenance and equipment that becomes inoperable for other reasons (i.e. degraded*
conditions, ODs , failed surveillances, etc.). This revision includes modifications to the TSAS tracking form. In particular, the form includes entries for applicable TS and Modes; associated action requests and status, work orders, condition reports, design changes, and other documents/actions to be performed while the equipment is inoperable. Included also are those actions required prior to operability restoration. The above revision was implemented on 9/1/95.
- 4. MMIS has been revised to include an "Affects Mode change? Y/N" entry in the OD section of the Action Request. This information will be determined by an SRO during the review of the request.
- 5. System Engineering will establish improved program controls to monitor the performance of the containment purge valves. These program controls will be implemented prior to restart.
- 6. The requirement to comply with the LCO for the containment purge system was incorporated into the IOP on 9/22/95.
- 7. The planning/scheduling process will be revised to clearly address action requests that are conditionally tied to specific plant evolutions and incorporated into the scheduling process. The process will be changed as part of our ongoing efforts to support restart.
- 8. A Unit Coordinator (UC) position will be established in the revised work control process. The UC will review action requests with an SRO and specify conditional limitations (i.e. Mode restrictions, system operability, etc.),
and schedule the work request accordingly.
- 9. The OD process was revised to include a mechanism to track additional/
contingency actions and identification of responsibility for those actions.
This was completed on 8/30/95. I NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
NRC FORM 366A (4-95)
- LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3)
YEAR I SEQUENTIAL NUMBER I REVISION NUMBER SALEM - Unit 1 05000272 95 - 019 - 01 8 OF 8 TEXT (If more space i* requirud, use additional copiea of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Corrective Actions (Cont'd) 10.The applicable IOPs will be revised to include the requirement to review outstanding items that may impact an associated Mode change (i.e., OD log and Action Requests). The procedures for unit restart are currently on hold.
These IOPs will be revised prior to their respective mode change. The IOPs applicable for defueling and refueling have been revised.
11.Required reading of the LER by all Licensed and Non-Licensed Operators and maintenance planners and schedulers will be conducted after issuance of the Supplemental LER. This is expected to be completed by 12/9/95. j NRC FORM 366A (4-95)