ML18095A784

LER 91-003-00:on 910209,steam Generator 14 Steamline Flow Channel I Transmitter Sensing Line Isolated During Investigation of Erroneous Readings.Caused by Personnel Error.Event Reviewed w/personnel.W/910306 Ltr

ML18095A784
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	03/06/1991
From:	Labruna S, Pollack M Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
LER-91-003-02, LER-91-3-2, NUDOCS 9103150028
Download: ML18095A784 (5)

Text

,_

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box 236 Ha.ncocks Bridge; New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station March 6, 1991 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 UNIT NO. 1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT-91-003-00 This Lic~nse~ Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations 10CFR *

• 50.73(a) (2) (i) (B). This report is required to be issued within thirty* (30).days of event discovery.

Sincerely yours, S~ LaBruna General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution 9103150028 910306 .

PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR

-~ ft * . r.: ~-.-~. ~-; 95-2189 i10M) 12-89

NRC FO<m 3N (9-83)

• LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

• U.I. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APP.ROVED OMll NO. 3150...,0104 EXPIRES: 8/31185 DOCKET NUMBER (2) I rAuc. 131 I

FACILITY NAME (1)

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Salem Generating Station - Unit l 0 I5 I 0 I0 I 0 I 21 71 2 1 IOF () 14 TITLE (4)

Tech. Spec. 3.0.3 *Entry; 2 Stm Flow Channels f<;>r l Steamline Inop. Due To Personnel Error EVENT DATE(&) LER NUMBER (81 REPORT.DATE (7) OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (I) .

MONTH *CAY YEAR . YEAR  ;:;:;:;:;: SEQUENTIAL !:::::::: REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(Sl

NUMBER  ::::::::: NUMBER o 1s1010101 I I ol2 ol 9 9 l 9~1 olo '3 * - olo 013 q6 911 o 1s1010101 I I THll REPORT 11 IUBMITTED PURIUANT TO THE REOUIREl\IENTI OF 10 CFR §: (Chtck ont or mon. of rht fol/owing} .1111 OPERATING MOOE Cll POWER I .. l 20.402(bl 20.40IC*lC1lCll -- 20.40ll(cl ll0.311lclC1 l -

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LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THll LER (12) ll0.73CalCZICYtHlCll ll0.73(1lC2lC*l NAME TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA COOE M. J. Pollack - LER Coordin~tor COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. MANUFAC.

TUR ER TUR ER I I I I

• I I I I I I I I I I I I. I I I I I I I I I *I ~ I !lll!llllll!l!!!l!llllllllllilllllllllllllliliilll IUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED 114! MONTH . DAY. YJAR EXPECTED

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n*YES (If yn, compl~r. EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE} DATE (151 .

I I I AISTRACT (Limit ID 1400 *Po*"* l.t., 1pproxlm1r.ly fifrHn 1in11!1-1pac1 tyPowritr.n linft} 1111 On 2/9/91 at 0845 hours0.00978 days <br />0.235 hours <br />0.0014 weeks <br />3.215225e-4 months <br />, during reactor shutdown (in support of the upcoming ninth refueling outage), a No. 14 Steam Generator (S/G) steaml~ne* flow channel t transmitter serising line was isol~ted. during investigation:of a 14 S/G steamline flow channel II erroneous ~eading.

Subsequently, Tech. Spec. Action Statement 3.0.3 was entered since the Action Statements for Tech. Specs. 3.3.2.1 *nd 3.3.3.1 do not address required actions with more than one inoperable steamline flow channel for any one S/G. The root cause of this. e~ent is personnel error as attributed to inappropriate supervisory direction. The supervisor involved acted upon an invalid assumption without fully assessing an unusual situation. When the transmitter sensing line would not stop venting (after the root valve was closed) the supervisor. incorrectly assumed either the schematic was not read correctly, the valves were mislabled 9r the schematic was incorrect. The supervisor did not consider that the correct transmitter sensing line root valve was _

• closed but was leaking by _(due to it not being closed tight enough).

Contributing to this event~was that the schematic drawing, which details component alignment, (for the transmitter sensing lines) was not taken to the job site. Upon notification of the isolation of the Channel I sensing line, the supervisor reopened the wrong root valve and successfully closed the correct root.valve (i.e., the tirst one closed) and vented the subject sensing line. This event has been reviewed by Maintenance management. Corrective. disciplinary action was taken with the supervisor involved in this event. This event will be revi~wed with applicable Maintenance personnel.

l.t'l';C Fa.m JW-8 t\!1-1131

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 1

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

5000272 91- 0 0 3-: 0 -~----=2---=o-=f--"4'---_

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PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse - Pre~suriz~d Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xxJ IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Technical Specification 3.0.3 Entry; Two.Steam Flow Channels for One Main Stearnline Inoperable Due To Personnel Error Event Date: 2/9/91 Report Date: 3/06/91 This report was initiated by Incident Report Nos.91-088 and 91-087.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 Reactor Power 18% - Unit Load 145 MWe Unit in the process of shutting down in support of the upcoming gt h.

refueling outage DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On February 8, 1990 at 1955 hours0.0226 days <br />0.543 hours <br />0.00323 weeks <br />7.438775e-4 months <br />, during reactor shutdown (in support of the upcoming ninth refueling outage), Operations shift personnel observed that No. 14 Stearn Generator (S/G) stearnline steam flow channel II was greater th~n 10% above its corresponding feed flow.-

The channel was declared inoperable and Technical Specifications

• 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.3.1 Action Statements 14 and 7 (respectively} were entered. In accordance with the Action Statement, the channel bistables were tripped. Maintenance-I&C was issued a work order to investigate (and correct) the cause of the invalid reading.

On February 9, 1991 at 0845 hours0.00978 days <br />0.235 hours <br />0.0014 weeks <br />3.215225e-4 months <br />, during reactor shutdown, a transmitter sensing line, for No. 14 S/G stearnline flow channel I, was isolated during the channel II investigations. Subsequently, Technical Specification Action Statement 3.0.3 was entered since -the Action Statements for Technical Specifications 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.3.1 do not address required actions with more than one inoperable ch'annel per steamline.

Technical Specification Action .Statement 3.0.3 states:

"When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within one hour

_action shall be initiated to place the unit in a. MODE in which the specification does not apply by placing it, a~ applicable, in:

1. At least HOT STANDBY within the next. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />,

2. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, and

3. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

LICENSEE EVENT. REPORT {LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE

• Unit 1 . 5000272 91-003-00 3 of 4*

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE: {cont'd)

Where corrective measures are completed that permit operation under the ACTION requirements, the ACTION may be taken in accordance with the specified ti~e limits as measured from the time of failure to meet the Limiting Condition of Operation.

Exceptions to these requirements are stated in the individual s~ecifications." .

• APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The root cause of this event is personnel error as attributed to inappropriate supervisory direction. The supervisor involved acted upon an invalid assumption without fully assessing an unusual situation.

• To support troubleshooting No. 14 S/~ steamline steam flow channel II, the transmitter sensing lines were to be isolated. The high side sensing line was isolated first by closing its root valve. The line was then vented; no difficulties were encountered.* When the low side sensing line root valve (14MS5) was closed (see schema.tic below), the line would not stop venting. The supervisor, thinking that he had closed the wrong valve, reopened the 14MS5 root valve and closed a different root valve {14MS4). When this occurred, the Control Room received indication of the Channel I high *:failure. The 14MS4 valve isola_tes a Channel I transnii tter sensing line.

Upon notification (from the Operations Shift) of the isolation of the Channel I sensing line, the supervisor had the 14MS4 valve reopened and the 14MS5 valve reclosed. The Channel II sensing.line was then successfully vented *.

• It should be noted that, prior to closing the low side sensing line valve, the supervisor did have a ~echnician review the schematic to determine which valves were to be closed_. This information was relayed (via telecon) to the supervisor. The correct valves were identified; however, when the low side sensing line would not stop venting, the supervisor incorrectly assu~ed that either the schematic was not read correctly, the valves were mislabled or the schematic was incorrect. The supervisor did not consider that the correct valve was closed but was leaking by (due to it not being closed tight enough).

14MS4. 14MS5 Fl.ow Fl.ow

.Transmitter Channel. I )( Transmitter Channel. II 14MS2 14MS3 No. 14 S/G

.t LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT .CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER

• LER NUMBER PAGE u__n_i_t~1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~5_0Q0272 91-003-00 4'of*4

~~~~~~~~~-

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

Main Steam steamlirie flow inputs to S/G Feed Pump speed and water level control. In addition, steamline flow signals are used as input to steamline isolation, safety injection (SI), and steam flow/feed flow mismatch .. Steam flow/feed flow mismatch when coupled with "Low SIG Level" will.initiate a reactor trip signal.

When the No. 14 Steam Generator *cs/G) steamline steam flow channel II failed, .its associated bistables were pl_aced in the tripped condi.tion in.accordance with Technical Specification Action Stat~ment requirements. When the other channel's {No. I) sensing lines were blocked, Technical Spe6ification Action Statement 3.0 .* 3 was appropriately entered *.. Approximately one ( 1) -minute after entry, Action Statement 3.0.3 was exited upon restoration of sensing line flow. Therefore, this event .did not affect the health or safety of the public. However, this event is reportable to.* the Nuclear Regulatory Commi~sion (NRC) in accordance with* code of Federal Regulations 10CFR 50.73(a}(2) (i) (B).

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

This event has been reviewed by Maintenance Department management.

Appropriate corrective disciplinary action was taken with the

• supervisor involved.in this event~ .The n~ed to fully a~sess (i.e.,

understand} and discuss unusual situations prior to taking action and to not manupulate plant components without appropriate *documentation review was disctissed with the su~ervisor involved.

This event will be reviewed with applicable Maintenance Department personnel. The need to communicate unusual situations (as they arise) with other appropriate.personnel, prior to manipulating components, will be stressed.

• p,hi?/)"~~r~

General Manager -

Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg .. 9.1-022