ML18093A255

LER 87-009-00:on 870619,discovered That Cabling for Three Electrical Trains of Svc Water Sys Did Not Meet Separation Requirements of 10CFR50,App R.Caused by Inadequate Design Review.Fire Watch established.W/870720 Ltr

ML18093A255
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	07/20/1987
From:	Mel Gray, Zupko J Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM)
References
LER-87-009-02, LER-87-9-2, NUDOCS 8707250261
Download: ML18093A255 (5)

Text

NllC Fer111

• U.I. NUCLEAll llEGULATOllY C01mm10N l~I APPllOVEO OMI NO. 31ll0-011M EXPlllES. lf.1111!1 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT CLER)

..,._________, . ~-* ---~-------------_,..;.----....~=~:--

FACILITY NAME 111 DOCKET Nl.1.'t!IEll 12l I rau~ 1;si

'"-~~

Salem Generating Station - Unit 2 o 15 I o IO I o 13 I 111 1 loF o i~*-,

TITLI l*I Accendix R criteria Non-Confonnance '

MONTH IVINT DATI 1111 DAY YEAR YEAR Liii N..-E11 Ill t:t H~~~=~~AL }\ :.: MONTH lllPOllT DATE 171 DAY YEAR OTHEll FACILITIEI INVOLVED Ill FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMDERISI o1s1010101 I I CIPlllATING THll lllPOllT 11 IUIMITTED l'UlllUANT TO THE llEOUl.ltMENTI OF 10 CFll §: (Cltcl< o,,. _or mOtW of IN followin1J 111 I MDDI Ill tt--~

'°"'" I

........~.........--+--1

• • • • ~*.,,(11 - 20.*lcl

-1L I0.7:11all:Zllhrl

- 73.711~1 LIVIL NIA I I0.*1*1111 llO.*lall21

...7Slall:ZIM I0.7:11all:Zllwlll -- 7:1.711*1

.DTHEll ISll<<lfy in ~r 1101 :aa.*1a11111u1

~~~~~~.....+---! Wlow ond In To*r, NRC Fonn

-~ll=

. . . .11111111111 ll0.7:1111121111 I0.7:11all211nllllAI MAJ 20.*lall1lll*l I0.7:11allZlllll I0.7:11811211wtHllll

20. . .lalltll*I I0.711all21111il I0.7:11811211*1 LICENIEE CONTACT FOR THll LEll 1111 NAME TELEl'HONE NUMllER AREA CODE M. K. Gray - Licensing Engineer 6 10 I 9 3 13 I 91- 14 I 317 10 COWLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILUllE DEICllllED IN THll lllPOllT 11:11 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. MANUFAC.

TUR ER SYSTEM COMPONENT TUR ER I I I I I I I I I I I I I. I I I I I I I I I I I l I I I IUl'PLEMENTAL REPOllT EXl'ECTED 11*1 MONTH DAY viAR EXPECTED n YES l/f ""* compllrl EXl'ECTED $VIM/SS/ON DATEJ SUBMISSION DATE 1151 I I I AalTllACT fl.imir "' ""° --* i.*.. -l'O*irnlt91y flffwn liffil**-** ty-in*n final 1111 On June 19, 1987 at 1515 hours0.0175 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.764575e-4 months <br />, it was discovered that the cabling for the three (3) electrical trains of the Unit 2 Service Water (SW) System

{BI} did not meet the separation requirements of the Code of Federal

• .Regulations, 10CFR .50 Appendix R. Upon discovery, a continuous fire watch was _established at: the. entrance to the SW Pipe Tunnel. This cable configuration was identified by a PSE&G task force established to review and evaluate Salem Station's compliance with 10CFR 50 Appendix R. The root cause of this deficiency is inadequate design review. The current design meets the* original electrical separation requirements for Salem Station Unit 2, however, it does not meet the 10CFR 50 Appendix R requirements as published in the Federal Register on September 8, 1981. The Appendix R criteri~ was not applied to the SW Piping Tunnel because of its restricted access and confined space. Pue to this oversight, the SW Pump cabling configuration was not modified.

PSE&G is reviewing design modification options to correct this deficiency. The Fire Protection Task Fotce is continuing its review.

llllllC"-*

IM31

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 2 5HJ0311 a1-e09 .... 00 2 of 4 PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION:

Westinghouse - Pressurized Water Reactor Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as {xx}

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Appendix R Criteria Non-Conformance Discovery Date: 06/19/87 Report Date: 07/20/87 This report was initiated by Incident Report No.87-241 CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

N/A DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

On June 19, 1987 at 1515 hours0.0175 days <br />0.421 hours <br />0.0025 weeks <br />5.764575e-4 months <br />, it was discovered that the cabling for the three (3) electrical trains of the Unit 2 Service Water (SW)

System {BI} did not meet the separation requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, 10CFR 50 Appendix R. These cables are located in the SW Pipe Tunnel located between the Auxiliary Building and the SW Intake Structure. Upo~ discovery, a continuous fire watch was established at the entrance to the SW Pipe Tunnel. The fire watch periodically walks down the length of the tunnel. This discovery was reported to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission by telephone on June 19, 1987 at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br /> in accordance wfth the requirements of 10CFR s0. 12 Cb> c2> (iii) (D).

This cable configuration was identified by a Public Service Electric

& Gas (PSE&G) task force established to review and evaluat~ Salem Station's compliance with the requirements of 10CFR 50 Appendix R.

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

The root cause of this deficiency is inadequate design review. The current design meets the original electrical separation requirements for Salem Station Unit 2, however, it does not meet the 10CFR 50

. Appendix R requirements as published in the Federal Register on September 8, 1981. The Appendix R criteria was not applied to the SW Piping Tunnel because of its restricted access and confined space.

Due to this oversight, the SW Pump cabling configuration was not modified.

18CFR 50 Appendix R, Section G(2) requires cables and equipment of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station_ DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE Unit 2 5000311 87-009-00 3 of 4 APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE: (cont'd) shutdown be protected by one of three (3) options to ensure that one redundant train is free from fire damage. The three (3) options are:

(1) separation of cables and equipment of redundant trains by a three (3) hour fire barrier; (2) separation of cables and equipment of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than twenty (20) feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards along with fire detection and an automatic fire suppression system in the area; or (3) enclosure of cables and equipment of one redundant train in a one hour rated fire barrier along with fire detectors ~nd an automatic fire suppression system in the area. The current design does not meet any of these options.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

The SW System supplies cooling water to both safety related and non-safety related heat loads. The system utilizes six (6) pumps.

The 4.16 KV Vital Busses (trains A, B, and C) provide power to two (2) SW Pumps per bus. The cabling for these trains runs through the SW Pipe Tunnel to the SW Intake Structure. These cables do not meet Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10CFR 50 Appendix R separation criteria (for Fire Protection)

• If a fire were to occur in this area a possibility exists of damaging all SW Pump electrical trains, thereby losing all SW flow. The Unit could be maintained in Hot Standby (Mode 3), which is a subcritical mode.

While SW Pump Cabling does not meet 10CFR 50 Appendix R separation criteria for fire protection, it does meet the separation criteria to which Unit 2 was originally licensed. The cabling is separated by a horizontal distance of approximately five (5) feet. Also, there is an unrated partial wall between two of the three SW Pump cables. The combustible loading in the area is only approximately six (6) minutes of burn time. Also, access to the SW Pipe Tunnel is restricted, thereby limiting the possibility of adding uncontrolled combustible material to the area. Therefore, it is unlikely a fire would occur that could impair all SW Pump cabling.

This discovery was reported in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission 10CFR 50.72(b) (2) (iii) (D) within four (4) hours of discovery (at 1530 hours0.0177 days <br />0.425 hours <br />0.00253 weeks <br />5.82165e-4 months <br />). Also, this discovery is being reported in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission 19CFR 50.73(a) (2) (v) (D) via this Licensee Event Report.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

Upon discovery of the SW Electrical Trains configuration in the SW Pipe Tunnel, a continuous fire watch was established at the entrance to the SW Pipe Tunnel. The fire watch periodically walks down the length of the tunnel. PSE&G is reviewing design modification options to correct this deficiency. The Fire Protection Task Force is continuing its review.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION Salem Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER LER NUMBER PAGE

. Unit 2 5000311 87-009-00 4 of 4 CORRECTIVE ACTION: (cont'd)

If the Task Force identifies other reportable 10CFR 50 Appendix R deficiencies, in the course of its review, they will be incorporated into this Licensee Event Report as a "supplemental" report.

G0:at:!:9:

Salem Operations MJP:pc SORC Mtg.87-052

PS~G Public Service Electric and Gas Company P.O. Box E Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038 Salem Generating Station July 20, 1987 Ue Se Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

SALEM GENERATING STATION LICENSE NO. DPR-75 DOCKET NO. 50-311 UNIT NO. 2 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 87-009-00 This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR 50.73(a) (2) (v) (D). This report is required within thirty (30) days of discovery.

Sincerely yours,

~µ?f--

J. M. Zupko, Jr.

General Manager-Salem Operations MJP:pc Distribution The Energy People 95-2189 11 i M1 12-84