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Category:GENERAL EXTERNAL TECHNICAL REPORTS
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18106A6821998-06-24024 June 1998 Revised Charting Our Future. ML18106A6681998-06-17017 June 1998 Charting the Future. ML18106A2571998-01-19019 January 1998 Nuclear Business Unit Future Objectives. ML18106A2131997-12-15015 December 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Rev to TS to Adopt Option B of 10CFR50,App J,For Type B & C Testing & Modify Existing TS Wording for Previous Adoption of Option B on Type a Testing ML18102B3331997-02-28028 February 1997 Rev 0 to Cfcu Return Piping Inside CTMT,221F Temp Effect. ML20133D2201996-12-0606 December 1996 Root Cause Analysis of Struthers-Dunn Operate-Reset Relay Latch Failures for Salem Generating Station ML20133D2251996-10-30030 October 1996 Struthers-Dunn Model 255XCXP Relay Root Cause Evaluation for Salem Nuclear Generation Station ML18102A3231996-07-0101 July 1996 Reg Guide 1.121 Assessment of Indications at Salem Unit 2. ML18102A1591996-06-0404 June 1996 Fuel Handling Accident Analysis Radiological Evaluation. ML20101M6601996-03-24024 March 1996 Supplemental Submittal in Response to NRC GL 87-02/USI A-46, 'Verification of Seismic Adequacy of Mechanical & Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors.' ML18102A1321996-03-15015 March 1996 Change 2EC-3332 to Rev 0 to Design Analysis, 125 Vdc Battery Charger Replacement. ML18102B0201996-02-28028 February 1996 Rev 0 to Evaluation of Structures for Increased Temps Due to Updated Main Steam Line Break. ML20129K1031995-07-10010 July 1995 Exam of Fasteners from Salem Nuclear Generating Station ML18101A7481995-05-19019 May 1995 Safe Shutdown Equipment List Rept for Salem Generating Station Units 1 & 2 ML18101A7491995-04-25025 April 1995 Relay Evaluation Rept, Volumes 1 & 2, for Salem Generating Station Units 1 & 2 ML18101A7501995-04-20020 April 1995 Seismic Evaluation Rept, for Salem Generating Station ML20134K1031995-03-24024 March 1995 Organizational Effectiveness Assessment Rept for Sngs, ML18102B6541995-03-24024 March 1995 Organizational Effectiveness Assessment Rept for Plant, Redacted Version ML18101A4391994-12-21021 December 1994 Fire Protection Review of Salem Reactor Coolant Pump Oil Collection Sys, Dtd 941221 ML20134C5791994-10-23023 October 1994 Salem/Maint SC.MD-GP.SW-0001(Q) Svc Water Silt Survey, Rev 5 ML18106B0541994-01-31031 January 1994 Criticality Analysis of Salem Units 1 & 2 Fresh Fuels Racks. ML18100A7971993-12-23023 December 1993 Simulator Four-Year Certification Rept. ML20069M2221993-10-15015 October 1993 Flux Thimble Thermocouple Ultrasonic Profilometry & Eddy Current Encircling Coil Insp of Stored Thimble Tubes Jul-Aug 1993 ML18100A6281993-09-16016 September 1993 Updated Page A4-4 of Boric Acid Concentration Reduction Effort Technical Bases & Operational Analysis, Changing Figure Numbers A5-1 & A5-2 to A4-1 & A4-2 at End of First Paragraph ML18100A6801993-08-20020 August 1993 Engineering Evaluation of Sgs 1 & 2 Control Room Evacuation for Fire Induced MOV Hot Shorts as Discussed in NRC Info Notice 92-018. ML20045B8801993-05-21021 May 1993 Boric Acid Concentration Reduction Effort Technical Bases & Operational Analysis for Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1 & 2. ML18100A3401993-04-28028 April 1993 Licensing Rept for Spent Fuel Storage Capacity Expansion Pse&G,Salem Generation Station,Units 1 & 2. ML18096B3561993-02-11011 February 1993 Cycle 8 Peaking Factor Limit Rept. ML20135A8141992-12-29029 December 1992 Control Room Overhead Annunciator Lock-Up of 921213 ML18096B1661992-11-13013 November 1992 Rev 1 to Fracture Toughness Analysis for Salem Units 1 & 2 Reactor Pressure Vessels to Protect Against Pressurized Thermal Shock Events,10CFR50.61. ML18096B0081992-09-0202 September 1992 Analytical Data Rept, for Project 28173 ML18096A8061992-06-17017 June 1992 Rev 0 to Salem Unit 2 Response to Generic Ltr 92-01,Rev 1, 'Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity.' ML18096A8051992-06-17017 June 1992 Rev 0 to Salem Unit 1 Response to Generic Ltr 92-01,Rev 1, 'Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity.' ML18096A5831992-03-31031 March 1992 Rev 1 to Estimated Frequency of Loss of Off-Site Power Due to Extremely Severe Weather & Severe Weather for Salem & Hope Creek Generating Stations. ML18095A5151990-07-31031 July 1990 Vol 1 to Spring 1990 NDE of Selected Class 1 & Class 2 Components of Salem Generating Station,Unit 2. ML18095A3691990-07-26026 July 1990 Unit 1 Decommissioning Rept. ML18095A3681990-07-26026 July 1990 Unit 2 Decommissioning Rept. ML18095A3791990-07-20020 July 1990 Decommissioning Rept of Philadelphia Electric Co. ML18094B2241989-12-28028 December 1989 Simulator NRC Certification, Vols I-III ML18094A3551989-04-30030 April 1989 Assessment of Impacts of Salem & Hope Creek Generating Stations on Kemps Ridley (Lepidochelys Kempi) & Loggerhead (Carretta Caretta) Sea Turtles. ML20086U2571989-03-31031 March 1989 Estimated Frequency of Loss of Offsite Power Due to Extremely Severe Weather & Severe Weather for Salem & Hope Creek Generating Stations ML18093B2021988-09-30030 September 1988 Special Rept on Spare CRD Mechanism Weld Refurbishments. ML18093A7601988-02-18018 February 1988 Appendix R/Breaker Coordination as-Found Review (Pre-Audit 1987). ML18093A5471987-12-10010 December 1987 Breaker Coordination W/Respect to External & Internal Hazards. ML18093A4531987-10-14014 October 1987 Justification for Continued Operation of Salem Units 1 & 2 W/Outstanding Fire Protection Concerns. ML18093A4131987-10-0101 October 1987 Justification for Continued Operation of Salem Units 1 & 2 W/Outstanding Fire Protection Concerns. ML18093A3781987-09-16016 September 1987 Rev 7 to, Westinghouse Engineering Svcs Rept for Salem Nuclear Generating Station Units 1 & 2 Concerning RHR Sys Mid-Loop Operation Re NRC Generic Ltr 87-12. 1999-09-30
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20217A9931999-09-30030 September 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data ML18107A5581999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5571999-09-30030 September 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 991014 Ltr ML18107A5301999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990913 Ltr ML18107A5311999-08-31031 August 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Aug 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990913 ML18107A5031999-08-26026 August 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990729,determined That SG Blowdown RMs Setpoint Was non-conservative.Caused by Inadequate ACs for Incorporating Original Plant Licensing Data Into Plant Procedures.Blowdown Will Be Restricted.With 990826 Ltr ML18107A5201999-08-12012 August 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#9) Second Interval,Second Period, First Outage (96RF). ML18107A4811999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4821999-07-31031 July 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for July 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990813 Ltr ML18107A4691999-07-28028 July 1999 LER 99-008-00:on 990714,determined That Limit Switch Cables Were Subject to Multiple Hot Shorts in Same Fire Area.Caused by Inadequate Original Post Fire Safe Shutdown Analysis.All Limit Switch Cables for MOVs Were Reviewed.With 990728 Ltr ML18107A4441999-07-0606 July 1999 LER 99-007-00:on 990605,surveillance for Quadrant Power Tilt Ratio (QPTR) Was Missed.Caused by Human Error.Qptr Calculation Was Performed & Personnel Involved Have Been Held Accountable IAW Pse&G Policies.With 990706 Ltr ML18107A4211999-07-0202 July 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990605,11 Containment Declared Inoperable. Caused by Valves 11SW72 & 11SW223 Both Leaking.Procedure S1.OP-ST.SW-0010(Q) Was Enhanced to Provide Specific Instructions to Ensure Proper Sequencing.With 990702 Ltr ML18107A4331999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-002-01:on 990405,determined That 2SA118 Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Found in 2SA118 valve.2SA118 Valve Was Cycled Several Times & Seat Area Was Air Blown in Order to Displace Foreign Matl.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A4321999-07-0101 July 1999 LER 99-006-01:on 990501,determined That There Was No Flow in One of Four Injection Legs.Caused by Sticking of Valve in Safety Injection Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve Was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990701 Ltr ML18107A5211999-07-0101 July 1999 Rev 0 to Sgs Unit 2 ISI RFO Exam Results (S2RFO#10) Second Interval,Second Period,Second Outage (99RF). ML18107A4351999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990713 Ltr ML18107A4341999-06-30030 June 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for June 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990713 Ltr ML20196H8621999-06-30030 June 1999 NRC Regulatory Assessment & Oversight Pilot Program, Performance Indicator Data, June 1999 Rept ML18107A3951999-06-17017 June 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990520,reactor Tripped from 100% Power,Due to Negative Flux Trip Signal from Nuclear Instrumentation. Cause Has Not Been Determined.Discoloration Was Identified on One of Penetrations.With 990617 Ltr ML18107A3661999-06-0909 June 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990513,unplanned Entry Into TS 3.0.3 Was Made.Caused by Human error.Re-positioned Creacs Supply Fan Selector Switches & Revised Procedures S1 & S2.OP-ST.SSP-0001(Q).With 990609 Ltr ML18107A3551999-06-0202 June 1999 LER 99-005-00:on 990504,failure to Meet TS Action Statement Requirements for High Oxygen Concentration in Waste Gas Holdup Sys Occurred.Caused by Inability of Operators. Existing Procedures Will Be Evaluated.With 990602 Ltr ML18107A3441999-06-0101 June 1999 Interim Part 21 Rept Re Premature Over Voltage Protection Actuation in Circuit Specific Application in Dc Power Supply.Testing & Evaluation Activities Will Be Completed on 990716 ML18107A3541999-06-0101 June 1999 LER 99-006-00:on 990501,HHSI Flow Balance Discrepancy Was Noted During Surveillance.Caused by Sticking of Check Valve in SI Discharge Line to 21 Cold Leg.Valve 21SJ17,was Cut Out of Sys & Replaced.With 990601 Ltr ML18107A3681999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A3721999-05-31031 May 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for May 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990611 Ltr ML18107A2931999-05-12012 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990413,determined That Number 12 Auxiliary Bldg Exhaust Fan Was Rotating Backwards.Caused by mis-wiring of Motor Due to Human Error by Maint technician.Mis-wiring Was Corrected & Fan Was Returned to Svc.With 990512 Ltr ML18107A2781999-05-10010 May 1999 LER 99-004-00:on 990411,automatic Actuation of ESF Occurred During Reactor Vessel Head Removal in Support of Refueling Operations.Caused by High Radiation Condition.Containment Atmosphere Was Monitored.With 990505 Ltr ML18107A2791999-05-0404 May 1999 LER 99-003-00:on 990406,all Salem Unit 2 Chillers Rendered Inoperable.Caused by Human Error.Lessons Learned from Event Were Communicated to All Operators by Including Them in Night Orders.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A2741999-05-0303 May 1999 LER 99-002-00:on 990405,determined That Containment Isolation Valve Failed as Found Leakrate Test.Caused by Foreign Matl Blocking Valves from Closing.Check Valve Mechanically Agitated.With 990504 Ltr ML18107A3711999-04-30030 April 1999 Corrected Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1 ML18107A3151999-04-30030 April 1999 Submittal-Only Screening Review of Salem Generating Station Individual Plant Exam for External Events (Seismic Portion), Rev 1 ML18107A2991999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2971999-04-30030 April 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990514 Ltr ML18107A2351999-04-23023 April 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990330,MSSV Failed Lift Set Test.Caused by Setpoint Variance Which Is Result of Aging.Valves Were Adjusted & Retested to Ensure TS Tolerance.With 990423 Ltr ML18107A2881999-04-0707 April 1999 Rev 0 to NFS-0174, COLR for Salem Unit 2 Cycle 11. ML18107A1821999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 1.With 990414 Ltr ML18107A1831999-03-31031 March 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1999 for Salem,Unit 2.With 990414 Ltr ML18106B1471999-03-29029 March 1999 LER 99-001-00:on 990228,reactor Scram Was Noted as Result of Turbine Trip.Caused by Operator Error.Lesson Plans Revised to Explicitly Demonstrate Manner in Which Valve Functions. with 990329 Ltr ML18106B1021999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 2.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B1011999-02-28028 February 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1999 for Salem Unit 1.With 990315 Ltr ML18106B0931999-02-25025 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack Due to Improper Location of Heated Bar.Only One Part Out of 7396 Pieces in Forging Lot Was Found to Be Cracked.Affected Util,Notified ML18106B0701999-02-16016 February 1999 LER 98-015-00:on 981208,inadvertent Discharge Through RHR Relief Valve During Startup Was Noted.Caused by Operator Performing Too Many Tasks Simultaneously.Appropriate Actions Have Been Taken IAW Policies & Procedures.With 990216 Ltr ML18106B0551999-02-0101 February 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Matl Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee,Part Number SS-6-T.Defect Is Crack in Center of Forging.Analysis of Part Is Continuing & Further Details Will Be Provided IAW Ncr Timetables.Drawing of Part,Encl ML18106B0561999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 2.With 990212 Ltr ML18106B0571999-01-31031 January 1999 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1999 for Salem Generating Station,Unit 1.With 990212 Ltr ML20205P1671999-01-31031 January 1999 a POST-PLUME Phase, Federal Participation Exercise ML18106B0441999-01-29029 January 1999 Part 21 Rept Re Possible Defect in Swagelok Pipe Fitting Tee Part Number SS-6-T.Caused by Crack in Center of Forging. Continuing Analysis of Part & Will Provide Details in Acoordance with NRC Timetables ML18106B0491999-01-28028 January 1999 LER 98-007-01:on 980730,reactor Coolant Instrument Line through-wall Leak Was Noted.Caused by Transgranular Stress Corrosion Cracking.Replaced Affected Tubing.With 990128 Ltr ML18106B0401999-01-18018 January 1999 LER 98-016-00:on 981219,ECCS Leakage Was Outside of Design Value.Caused by Leakage Past Seat of 21RH34 Manual Drain. Valve 21RH34 Was Reseated.With 990118 Ltr ML18106B0251998-12-31031 December 1998 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1998 for Salem Unit 2.With 990115 Ltr 1999-09-30
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A REPORT ON A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS COMPANY CORRECTIVE ACTION PROGRAM RELATED TO REACTOR TRIP BREAKER FAILURF.8' AT SALEM _GENERATING STATION, UNIT NO. 1 CONDUCTED BY BASIC ENERGY TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATES, INC.
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA APRIL 14, 1983 8305020160 8304~27-PDR ADOCK 05000272 S PDR
. . ~,.. ..
- l. BACKGROUND On April 5, 1983, Basic Energy Technology Associates, Inc. (BETA) was contracted by Public Service Electric and Gas Company (PSE&G) to conduct an independent evaluation of the corrective actions taken or planned by PSE&G as a result of the events surrounding the reactor breaker trip incidents of February 22 and 25, 1983.
BETA was requested to initially concentrate its efforts on the short term actions taken by PSE&G as they would apply to the restart of Unit 1 and to provide an interim report outlining its findings and re_commendations by April 14, 1983. Due to this tight time constraint, BETA in its initial review, has focused its effort on those short term actions taken by PSE&G as outlined in its Supplement I Report dated April 8, 1983.
This phase of the review was performed by two BETA associates, Robert S. Brodsky and William Wegner. In addition, BETA engaged the services of Jack C. Grigg, an independent consultant with over thirty years of reactor electrical control and instrumentation experience and specifically with reactor trip breakers, to assist in the performance of this evaluation.
This report provides recommendations resulting from the BETA review to date. A more comprehensive report will be provided to PSE&G upon completion of the final review.
ll.
SUMMARY
OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Based on the limited review conducted by BETA as previously described, the following summary of findings and recommendations are provided. Section Ill provides more detailed findings and recommendations.
- 1. The identification of the known and probable causes leading to the breaker failures as outlined in the April 8 Supplement I Report appears to be reasonable. At this time BETA has not identified any additional problem areas that have not already been identified by PSE&G or the Nuclear ReIDJlatory Commission relating to this problem. BETA also con~iders that the, actions listed as being short term (prior to restart) are adequate. Two additional short term actions, as outlined in Section III of this report, are recommended. , * ,
- 2. The short term actions taken by PSE&G as outlined in the April 8, 1983 Supplement I Report are appropriate, and should, along with the two short term actions recommended by BETA, provide reasonable assurance that the immediate problems associated with the events leading to reactor breaker' trips on February 22 and 25, should not recur prior to completion of the long term actions.
- 3. Interviews, conducted by BETA of 16 PSE&G people at the site indicate a good understanding and appreciation of the problems which lead to the breaker trip incidents. The scope of the longer term actions would indicate there is also an appreciation for how these problems reflect on broader issues of the plant's overall operation. At this point, BETA is not in 1
~ ') .
a position to comment on the adequacy or completeness of the long term actions or on how deeply into the organization these understandings prevail There is some concern by BET A that the majority of corrective actions taken so far have concentrated specifically on problems directly associated with the breakers rather than on some of the broader aspects. This is an area that BETA will pursue in greater detail in subsequent evaluations.
- 4. While post-incident investigations correctly identified a number of weaknesses throughout the PSE&G operation 9 BETA is of the opinion that there still exists a possible generic problem with breakers of this design and used in this application. Specific recommendations relating to additional long term improvements with respect to the breakers themselves are contained in Section Ill of this report.
- ill. DETAILED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS A. Short Term Findings and Recommendations
- 1. PSE&G should obtain confirmation in writing from the reactor trip breaker vendor that the installed breakers are satisfactory for plant operation and that Salem Maintenance Procedure M3Q-2 will provide the necessary basis to assure continuing operational reliability.
- 2. PSE&G's Station Operations Review Committee and the Nuclear Review Board should complete their reviews of the short term aspects of the trip breaker failures. Written reports should be available documenting their concurrence with restart.
B. Long Term Findings and Recommendations (Interim)
- 1. The manual trip switch trips both the under voltage and shunt
. trips. In order to provide a greater assurance of breaker action, it is suggested that the automatic trip also use the shunt device. The automatic trips use only the under voltage* trip *. A safety grade battery power supply .
will be required to support the. shunt trip. It is understood that PSE&G is investigating the feasibility of providing a shunt trip.
- 2. In order to further decrease the possibility of a common mode failure,. consideration should be given "to replacing one of the two sets of installed breakers with breakers or contactors . of another design . or manufacture. If possible,_ the breaker design should incorporate a molded case. If an alternate device is selected it should be included in the PSE&G and NRC test programs.
- 3. The Salem breaker maintenance procedure, M3 Q-2, will use periodic.
measurements of trip and release forces to identify degradation of breaker performance. As another indicator of possible breaker degradation, PSE&G should consider the use of the periodic data obtained from the* voltage drop-out measurements which are also in the breaker maintenance procedure (step 9.7 .3*.10).
2
.,. ,.. **Ii.I
- 4. The PSE&G specifications for trip breakers should be modified to indicate that mounting brackets for over current trips should not be installed.
So Additional experimental data is necessary to confirm that maintenance procedure M3Q-2 testing will provide a satisfactory indication of breaker degradationo This data should be obtained from the planned PSE&G and NRC testirigo
- 6. Breaker maintenance procedure M3Q-2 will result in the trip breakers undergoing a large number of cycles. The PSE&G 7 NRC and vendor test programs should confirm that these tests will not result in the breaker exceeding breaker design cycle limits. In addition, the number of breaker cycles should be determinable and recorded.
3
BASIC 9 ROSSLYjl.j CENTER. 'SUITE 82.5 1700 N. MOORE STREET ARLINGTON. VIRGINIA 2.2209 ENERGY ( 703 ) 243-4600 TECHNOLOGY
~ ASSOCIATES, INC. April 26, 1983 Mr. Richard M. Eckert Senior Vice President Public Service Electric & *Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, New Jersey 07101
Dear Mr. Eckert:
This letter is in response to your request of April 22, 1983 asking whether or not BET A continues to support our letter to you of April 14, 1983, in light of the discovery on April 20, 1983, of the broken tab on a newly installed undervoltage trip assembly in Unit 2. The April 14, 1983 BETA letter contained findings and recommendations concerning the reactor trip breaker incident.s at the Salem Generating Station.
As a result of your request, three representatives of BETA visited the Salem site on April 25, 1983, in order to review the circumstances surrounding this broken tab. This review consisted of interviewing PSE&G people, reading the investigative reports, and viewing the physical evidence, including photographs of the broken trip device.
Based on this review, BETA continues to support its findings and recommendations as contained in our April 14, 1983 letter to you. In addition, we do not have any additional short term action items which, in
_ our . opinlon, ~~ed to be accomplished prior . to restart.
~his conclusion is based on the following considerations:
,,f'**
- ,.. 1. In BET A's opinion, the newly established procedures for installing
- and testing reactor trip breakers and equipment attached. thereto would, and in fact did prevent the use of the malfunctioning device.
DiSregarding the question of when the breakage actually occurred, i.e.,. in shipment from the vendor or elsewhere, the ultimate test is. performed with the unit installed, and,. as presently written, this test would have detected the broken device prior. to its actual use.
- 2. The evidence surrounding the broken trip device strongly supports the theory that it was improperly packaged and handled, and was probably damaged sometime between leavirig the vendor's plant and installation by PSE&G.-~ Based on this evidence- and tests performed by Franklin Research Center and the vendor on the broken and u*nbroken devices, there is no reason to suggest that there is an inherent design or manufacturing deficiency in the tab lever.
\. .
2 BETA is of the further op1mon that this incident provides additional support for the need for PSE&G to accomplish a number of the previously identified long term fixes. From PSE&G's viewpoint, it would have been beneficial had this broken device be~n discovered prior* to installation. This would have been the case had there been a requirement for a PSE&:G Quality Control inspection upon receipt at the site even though PSE&G QA inspec!ors witnessed the testing of these devices at the vendor's plant prior to shipment.
At the present, commercial grade devices such as this, are inspected by PSE&G warehousemen for obvious shipping damage, counting and proper shipping papers only. It is our understanding that PSE&G procedures are being rewritten to accomplish this change.
Notwithstanding the above comment, BETA continues to support fully the findings and recommendations contained in our April 14, 1983 letter to you.
Sincerely,
- LI u W.Weg~
Associate