05000272/LER-1980-025, Forwards LER 80-025/03L-0

Forwards LER 80-025/03L-0

ML18082A567
Person / Time
Site:	Salem
Issue date:	06/12/1980
From:	Librizzi F Public Service Enterprise Group
To:	Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
Shared Package
ML18082A568	List: 05000272/LER-1980-025, Forwards LER 80-025/03L-0 05000272/LER-1980-025-03, /03L-0:on 800516,during Containment Entry,Steam Noticed Coming from Area Where Reactor Coolant Sample Lines Pass Through Containment Wall.Caused by Failure of Sample Line & Seal Weld on Penetration.Penetration Weld Repaired
References
NUDOCS 8006170664
Download: ML18082A567 (3)

LER-1980-025, Forwards LER 80-025/03L-0

Event date:
Report date:
2721980025R00 - NRC Website

text

JO PS~G Public SeNice Electric anc Gas Company 80 Park Place Newark, N.J. 07101 Phone 201/430-7000 Mr. Boyce H. Grier Director of USNRC Off ice of Inspection and Enforcement Region 1 631 Park Avenue King o~ Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

Dear Mr. Grier:

LICENSE NO. DPR-70 DOCKET NO. 50-272 REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE 80-25/03L June 12, 1980 Pursuant to the requirements of Salem Generating Station Unit No. 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1, we are submitting Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence 80-25/03L.

This report is required within thirty (30) days of the occurrence.

Sincerely yours, l

1

/

! / /,

/

"'-i..-......-'l. '. --.......

F. P. Libriiz 1i General Manager -

Electric Production CC:

Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement (30 copies)

Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control (3 copies)

Report Number:

80-25/03L Report Date:

6/12/80 Occurrence Date:

5/16/80 Facility:

Salem Generating Station Public Service Electric & Gas Company Hancock's Bridge, New Jersey 08038 IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE:

Loss of Containment Integrity CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE:

Mode 1 Reactor Power 100%

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE:

During a containment entry, it was noted that steam was coming from the area where reactor coolant sample lines pass through the: contain-ment wall.

It was determined that the seal weld between the hot leg sample line and its penetration sleeve had failed.

Action Stati9n 3.6.3.1 was entered at 1830 hours0.0212 days <br />0.508 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.96315e-4 months <br />.

It states, "Containment isolation valves specified in Table 3.6-1 shall be operable.

With a valve inoperable, restore the valve or isol;ite the penetration within four hours or be in hot standby in six hours."

Investigating the design of the containment penetration furthe~

revealed containment integrity had been compromised and Action State-

' ment 3.6.1.1 was entered at 1957 hours0.0227 days <br />0.544 hours <br />0.00324 weeks <br />7.446385e-4 months <br />.

The Action Statement states that Primary Containment Integrity shall be maintained.

Without primary containment integrity, restore integrity within one hour or be in at least hot standby within the next six hours and in cold shutdown within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

The penetration was declared inoperable due to the failure of the seal weld inside the containment.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE:

Failure of the sample line and the seal weld on the penetration.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE:

While performing routine watchstation functions, an increase in con-tainment activity was noted.

A containment entry was made at 1700 hours0.0197 days <br />0.472 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.4685e-4 months <br /> in an attempt to determine the cause.

At 1830 hours0.0212 days <br />0.508 hours <br />0.00303 weeks <br />6.96315e-4 months <br />, the

i,_§S?_lation valve on the reactor coolant sample line was declared inoperable and at 1938 hours0.0224 days <br />0.538 hours <br />0.0032 weeks <br />7.37409e-4 months <br />, the penetration was isolated.

Repairs were effected and the Action Statements were terminated at 2347 hours0.0272 days <br />0.652 hours <br />0.00388 weeks <br />8.930335e-4 months <br />.

LER 80-25/03L 2 -

CORRECTIVE ACTION

At 2057 hours0.0238 days <br />0.571 hours <br />0.0034 weeks <br />7.826885e-4 months <br />, after determining the exact extent of the problem, power was reduced at a rate of 20% per hour as required by the Action Statement.

The sample line was cut and a manual isolation valve was installed down stream of the solenoid operated isolation.

The other end of the sample line, inside of the containment, was capped.

The penetration was seal welded and both the sample line and the penetration were pressure tested satisfactorily.

A design change request is being prepared to modify the design to prevent recurrence.

FAILURE DATA:

Not Applicable Prepared By M. J. Murphy Manager -

Salem Generating Station SORC Meeting No.

37-80