ML18064A632

Forwards Plant Project Plan Re Issues Surrounding Use of Alloy 600 Components

ML18064A632
Person / Time
Site:	Palisades
Issue date:	02/27/1995
From:	Haas K CONSUMERS ENERGY CO. (FORMERLY CONSUMERS POWER CO.)
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
Shared Package
ML18064A633	List: ML18064A632 ML18064A634
References
NUDOCS 9503070124
Download: ML18064A632 (84)

Text

'*~ *..

consumers Power* KurtM. Haas Plant Safety and Licensing Director POWERING MICHl&AN-S PIUl&llESS Palisades Nuclear Plant: 27780 Blue Star Memorial Highway, Covert, Ml 49043 February 27, 1995 Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR PALISADES PLANT PROJECT PLAN FOR ADDRESSING ALLOY 600 ISSUES On September 16, 1993, a primary coolant system (PCS) through wall crack developed in the pressurizer power operated relief valve (PORV) nozzle safe end. During subsequent inspections, evidence of leakage was identified at two of the pressurizer temperature elements. The material defects at all three leak locations were later determined to have been initiated as a result of Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) near the heat affected zone of the Alloy 600 nozzle associated with each leak location.

Our October 7, 1993 letter to the NRC contained the engineering analysis *and root cause evaluation for the pressurizer safe end crack. This letter stated that Palisades would develop a comprehensive program to deal with Alloy 600 components in the PCS. This commitment was later reiterated in subsequent correspondence and the October 21, 1993 meeting with the NRC to discuss Palisades and Industry experience with Alloy 600 issues.

The NRC's January 18, 1994 letter contained a safety evaluation regarding cracking of Inconel Alloy 600 components in the Palisades Pressurizer, and requested that we submit our plan for addressing the PWSCC of Alloy 600 components in th~ P~l.isades PCS to the NRC three months b~fore the beginning of the next refueling outage.

,,_________ ________ ~ ,......

- l 9503070124 950227 .

PDR ADOCK 05000255

,;; II I ~~ii p PDR  ;*j. IA CMS' ENERGY COMPANY

.* c-.

2 Attachnient 1 contains the current Project Plan for Alloy 600 components at the Palisades Plant.

SUMMARY

OF COMMITMENTS This letter contains no new commitments. Future activities regarding Alloy 600 components at the Pali sades Pl ant will be based on our analysis of the results of the 1995 refueling inspections.

I Kurt MHaas Plant Safety and Licensing Director CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC Project Manager, NRR, USNRC NRC Resident In~pector - Palisades Attachment

,j' PROJECT PLAN ALLOY600 PALISADES NUCLEAR PLANT Revision 1 February 27, 1995

• EXECUTIVE

SUMMARY

ALLOY 600 PROJECT PLAN

, PALISADES PLANT During plant start-up from the 1993 refueling outage, a leak was identified in the Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) nozzle safe-end. Subsequent investigation discovered that two temperature element penetrations on the pressurizer also exhibited evidence ofleakage. Evaluation of the situation determined that Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) was the most probable cause for the through wall defects in these Alloy 600 components. Repairs were performed on these three Pressurizer Alloy 600 components.

Consumers Power Company initiated an effort to understand and control Alloy 600 issues at the Palisades Plant. This endeavor is documented in the Alloy 600 Project Plan. It is a comprehensive effort to identify all the Alloy 600 components in the Primary Coolant System (PCS); rank them with respect to PWSCC susceptibility; and develop a plan for inspection, repairs and PWSCC mitigation of these components.

The Alloy 600 inspection program discussed in the attached Plan was developed based on the ranking provided by a prioritization scheme developed specifically for Palisades Alloy 600 components. The primary NDE method used to detect and size PWSCC flaws is ultrasonic examination utilizing

• diffracted longitudinal wave transducers at various angles. Calibration blocks and mockups with implanted flaws will be developed to verify the PWSCC detection capability of this technique.

Replacement of the Pressurizer PORV safe-end with a stainless steel transition piece is scheduled for 1995 refueling outage. A Mechanical Stress Improvement Process (MSIP) is being applied to three highly susceptible Alloy 600 nozzle safe-ends for PWSCC mitigation.

The intent of this comprehensive inspection program is to establish a baseline condition of the most susceptible Alloy 600 penetrations in the PCS during the 1995 refueling outage. Based on this information, a long term maintenance and inspection schedule will be established.

We are confident that the Alloy 600 project plan for the Palisades Plant provides the safety assurances needed for continued safe plant operation.

Revision 1 February 27, 1995

ALLOY 600 PROJECT PLAN

• • PROJECT TEAM ENDORSEMENT Project Schedule Engineer Operations NECO Systems Engineering Radiological Services Maintenance Technical Support NECO Engineering Programs (NDE)

Project Manager Construction* Supervisor Engineering Mechanics Support NECO Plant Support Engineering (Welding)

NECO Plant Support Engineering (Mechanical)

NECO Design Engineering Licensing NECO Plant Support Engineering (Procurement)

Project Cost Engineer MANAGEMENT ENDORSEMENT Palisades Plant Manager NECO Manager PMC&T Manager

• • Revision 1 Februacy 27, 1995

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 MISSION STATEMENT ............................................ 1 1.1 STRATEGY ................................................ 1 1.2 GOALS & OBJECTIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1.3 SUPPORT OF NOD BUSINESS PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2.0 PROJECT TEAM AND RESPONSIBILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.1 PROJECT TEAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.2 PROJECT TEAM RESPONSIBILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 2.3 OTHER CPCo RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 3.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 3.1 PRIOR TO 1995 REFOUT ................................... 18 3.2 1995 REFOUT: HOT SHUTDOWN MODE ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . 34 3.3 1995 REFOUT: POST-DEPRESSURIZATION PREPARATIONS

.......................................................... 34

• 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 1995 REFOUT: ACTIVITIES IN REFUELING SHUTDOWN MODE ....................................................

1995 REFOUT: ACTIVITIES IN STORED REACTOR HEAD . . . . . .

1995 REFOUT: ACTIVITIES REQUIRING LOOP DRAINAGE . . . .

1995 REFOUT: INSPECTIONS NOT BEING PERFORMED . . . . . . .

34 37 38 39 3.8 1995 REFOUT: POST-INSPECTION ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.9 AFTER 1995 REFOUT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 3.10 REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 4.0 LIMITATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS ....... : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4.1 ALARA CONSIDERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

4.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4.3 SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 4.4 UNUSUAL PERMIT/REGULA TORY/ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.5 REGULATORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 4.6 NRC COMMITMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4.7 PLANT CONDITIONS ...................................... 45 4.8 FACILITIES AND SITE LOGISTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 4.9 COORDINATION WITH OTHER ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

• 5.0 6.0 PROJECT BUDGET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 5.1 5.2 COST ESTIMATE .......................................... 47 COST CONTROLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 PROJECT SCHEDULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• 6.1 6.2 6.3

SUMMARY

SCHEDULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 DETAIL SCHEDULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 PROJECT SCHEDULE CONTROL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 7.0 APPROACH TO WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 7.1 MANAGEMENT ........................................... 51 7.2 ENGINEERING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 7.3 PROCUREMENT .......................................... 55 7.4 CONSTRUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 7.5 HEALTH PHYSICS ......................................... 55 8.0 ATTACHMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 8.1 PROJECT COST ESTThiATE ................................ 58 8.2 PROJECT

SUMMARY

SCHEDULE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 8.3 1995 REFUELING OUTAGE WORK TABLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• 1.0 MISSION STATEMENT To understand and control Alloy 600 issues at Palisades to ensure nuclear safety and reliable plant operations while minimizing economic consequences.

1.1 STRATEGY Pressurized Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC) in Alloy 600 material is a recognized problem within the international nuclear industry. It was first observed in steam generator tubing, and it later appeared in United States pressurizer heater sleeves and nozzles. Most US efforts have been directed towards those components. Reactor vessel head nozzle cracking was first discovered in France, and the bulk of head inspections have occurred in Europe. Considerable experience has been gained from worldwide efforts to date. American utilities are beginning to assess the effects of PWSCC throughout primary systems.

The Palisades Alloy. 600 program is based upon industry experience and recommendations, and is tailored to assess and respond to plant specific issues including unique design characteristics and long range unit strategic planning. This program evaluates all Alloy 600 penetrations in the primary coolant system at Palisades.

Inspections of the reactor vessel head penetrations will benefit long range planning for the Palisades unit. Palisades experienced pressurizer penetration throughwall cracking at three locations and an assessment of pressurizer penetrations is aimed at preventing a recurrence of any additional such* event. Alloy 600 is also used in safe ends connecting stainless steel clad carbon steel primary system components to stainless steel accessory systems, and a study of these penetrations will be performed.

Palisades recognizes that nuclear plants are configured differently and thus have varying degrees of susceptibility to PWSCC in Alloy 600 components. This plan is tailored to suit the needs of Palisades. The general strategy for Palisades is shown in the figure on the next page. This strategy is summarized briefly as follows:

• A general understanding of the issue and its implications will be established.

• Palisades will capture industry experience through its involvement and participation in CEOG, NEI, EPRI, ASME, ANS meetings and other industry forums. Active interactions with other utilities that are planning Alloy 600 inspections will be maintained. Vendors are an important source of information.

• Information gained through thethese interactions will be used to focus this effort and help implement inspections and perform any necessary repairs in an optimum manner .

• 1

• PALISADES ALLOY 600 STRATEGY PALISADES *INDUSTRY EXPERIENCE EXPERIENCE I I

... 1 l ..

PLANNING Issues Establish Scope Strategy Database Pr1orttlzatlon Contingency Development Resources Short Tenn Long Tenn (next outage)

L I OTHER PLANT CORPORATE/NOD ECONOMIC PREPARATION PROGRAMS GOALS EVALUATION Establish Outage Scope I Resource Allocation I Prior to OWge Procurement Contingency Availability Scheduling

-*- L 11 1 Personnel Qualification EVALUATION Long-Ran~e Options Plant Life lanning 1 ISi Program Adjustment PERFORMANCE Inspect Repair I

Contln'1encles as r~ulred 11*-

Mitigation as require l

Post OWge EVALUATION I I 2

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• This strategy has both a short-term and a long-range focus. In the short term, the project must accomplish the necessary inspections and corrective measures to support the project mission. In the long-term, a structured program will be developed and this working program will be turned over for continuous implementation.

• Information gained through inspections will be utilized to establish a baseline from which plaruung will proceed for future inspections and other possible corrective actions.

• Successful implemention of this strategy and continuous tuning of the immediate actions based on experience and knowledge gained will .help ensure the accomplishment of the project mission.

• In the larger scheme, it is essential to share this knowledge and experience with any other plant that is planning to implement a similar program, and support the coordinated industry effort in this area.

1.2 GOALS & OBJECTIVES The goals "a" through "f' below support the short term strategy. Goal "g" will be studied for use in Refout 1995 and has long term implications. The longer term strategic actions will be better defined after Refout 1995, and will be tracked by goal "h" on a continuing basis. Closeout of this project into a long-term program wiil be determined by goal "L"

a. Goal Identify online leakage in adequate time and respond to throughwall Pressurized Water Stress Corrosion Cracking (PWSCC).

Objectives

• Define Palisades leak rate detection capability

• Evaluate critical leak rate and leak detection margin once a through wall crack initiates

• Evaluate available leak monitoring devices, procedures and systems.

b. Goal

• Establish an inspection program to identify and characterize PWSCC in Alloy 600 .

3

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 Objectives

• Complete a prioritization *study including 1) inspection ranking, 2) status by location, and 3) schedule of inspections.

• Identify Non-Destructive Examination (NDE) methods for PWSCC inspection.

• Develop preferred inspection techniques for each location.

• Identify sys~em conditions required for each inspection.

• Identify training and qualification requirements for new NDE methods and inspection program.

c. Goal Resolve existing pressurizer penetration concerns and meet Palisades commitments toNRC.

Objectives

• Develop repair or replacement plans, material procurement schedule and necessary procedures. Establish personnel requirements and cost estimates.

• Determine specific resolution steps for the Power Operated Relief Valve (POR V) safe end.

• Determine specific resolution steps for the pressurizer temperature element (TE) nozzles.

• Obtain concurrence from NRC for planned actions.

• Implement actions.

d. Goal Establish inspection acceptance criteria.

Objectives

• Research PWSCC acceptance criteria developed by the industry.

• Correlate NDE sensitivity versus acceptance criteria.

• Determine whether or not the Palisades circumferential crack in the PORV safe end butt weld is an isolated occurrence or could conceivably occur elsewhere.

4

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• Develop an approach to assess leak detection margin of Alloy 600 components

e. Goal utilizing the concept of Leak Before Break (LBB).

Establish appropriate methods to repair emergent PWSCC.

Objective

• Develop repair or replacement plans, material procurement schedule and the necessary procedures for locations with a high probability of succumbing to PWSCC. Establish personnel requirements and cost estimates.

• Identify* which contingencies should be pre-staged, 11;nd which need only to be available within a predetermined time.

f. Goal Establish a database of all primary Alloy 600 components.

Objective

• Establish, review and update database for Palisades Alloy 600 components.

g.

Pursue appropriate mitigation options where evaluation shows them to be prudent.

Objectives

• Identify possible mitigation techniques for each Alloy 600 location.

• Identify locations that warrant mitigation or preventive replacement.

• Implement appropriate mitigation techniques where warranted.

h. Goal Develop near-term and long-term strategic actions for the 1995 Refout and beyond.

Objective

• Implement strategic actions defined in Section 1.1 of this plan .

• Maintain communications with other strategic plant initiative organizations.

5

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• Develop plans for subsequent outages based on prior outages/experience.

1. Goal Effect a transition from Alloy 600 team to a long-term Alloy 600 program.

Objective

• Develop and implement an Alloy 600 transition plan.

1.2.1 Budget

a. Complete project at or under the annual and total project budget.

x $1000 Prior Years 1994 1995 1996 O&M Approved Budget 0 865 1700 -

O&M Requested Budget 0 865 2000 900

• 1.2.2 Schedule Capital 0 121 - -

a. Achieve Pre-Outage Milestones

1. Initial Outage Scope Identified (July 6, 1994)

2. Project Responsibilities Defined (July 15, 1994)

3. Outage Work Request Initiated (August 3, 1994)

4. Work Scope Frozen (August 17, 1994)

5. Licensing Submittals (October 12, 1994)

6. Procurement Documents Issued (December 1, 1994)

7. Detailed Engineering Complete (April 15, 1995)

• 8.

9.

Training Requirements Identified (February 1, 1995)

Work Orders AFS (March 1, 1995) 6

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• 10.

11.

12.

All Materials Onsite (April 12, 1995)

Pre-Outage Work Complete (May 10, 1995)

Commence 1995 Refueling-Outage (May 28, 1995) 1.3 SUPPORT OF NOD BUSINESS PLAN During development of this project plan, the team was cognizant of Consumers Power Company (CPCo) and Nuclear Operation Department (NOD) goals. The goals of this project support the NOD goals (which in turn support CPCo goals) and all actions will be guided by the established priorities: 1) safety, 2) quality, and 3) cost and schedule.

1.3 .1 Safety The most important aspect of this project is to accomplish all work with the highest regard for nuclear, personnel, and radiation safety.

Objectives

• Zero (0) recordable injuries

• Zero (0) lost time accidents

• Zero (0) forced outages challenging nuclear safety due to PWSCC in Alloy 600 components

• Plan, train and practice ALARA 1.3 .2 Economic Performance Project goals support continued reliable operation of Palisades and minimize the risk of a forced outage due to PWSCC in Alloy 600 components.

Objectives

• Do not exceed project O&M budget and Capital budget.

1.3.3 Reliability A comprehensive inspection plan will be implemented to detect PWSCC in Alloy 600 penetrations and respond to such events as appropriate.

Objective

• Limit rework rate.

7

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• Meet schedule commitments.

1.3.4 Human Performance Each member of this project team represents a specialized function and is the point of contact for his or her area. *Decision making will involve all pertinent members and functions.

Objectives

• The team holds itself accountable for the success of this project.

• Conflicting opinions or ideas will be expediently resolved through effective communication and increased interaction.

1.3.5 Communication The basic purpose of this project team is to cultivate ideas through active and productive interactions. Apart from frequent project team meetings, discussion between various subsets of this team is encouraged and will occur frequently.

• Objectives

• Encourage open, honest, and empathic communications.

• Keep Palisades Plant Management updated on project status on a quarterly or more frequent basis and as warranted by significant changes.

• Keep NRC informed on project status.

1.3.6 It is a goal of Palisades Nuclear Operation Department (NOD) that teamwork be promoted and cultivated. The project team has attended team building modules to enhance effectiveness. The increased familiarity between the team members is intended to encourage greater and more wholesome interactions. Modules are designed to boost the communication and cooperative skills of each team member .

• 8

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 2.0 PROJECT TEAM AND RESPONSIBILITIES 2.1 PROJECT TEAM Project Schedule Engineer NDBarry Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . BCBauer NECO Systems Engineering ................................... DABemis Radiological Services ....................................... NACampbell Maintenance Technical Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SCCedarquist NECO Engineering Programs (NDE) ............................. THFouty Project Manager ......................................... AGangadharan Construction Supervisor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SRGuidry Engineering Mechanics Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . PHHoang NECO Plant Support Engineering (Welding) ....................... JCNordby NECO Plant Support Engineering (Mechanical) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SSOverway NECO Design Engineering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . SCRamalingam Licensing ................................................. WLRoberts NECO Plant Support Engineering (Procurement) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . TCSaarela Project Cost Engineer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . GEWalker 9

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• 2.2 PROJECT TEAM RESPONSIBILITIES Project Team Members are responsible for the development and execution of the project plan. This includes the completion of assigned actions, identification and resolution of project concerns and representation of the needs and goals of their respective departments. In representing a department, the respective team member is responsible for effectively communicating the project status and intentions to his/her department. This should be done in conjunction with the solicitation of input from other members in his/her department.

2.2.1 Project Manaiement - Anand Ganiadharan As Project Manager, I have the overall responsibility for the project and am accountable to the Manager of Project Management, Construction and Testing for all aspects of the project.

My responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

• Providing direction on company policies and professional requirements

• Being cognizant of the company's legal and financial limitations and preventing the company from being exposed to any unreasonable risks

• Leading, planning, organizing and determining project resources

• Leading development of the Project Plan and ensuring that the Plan is communicated and clearly understood by the Project Team and management personnel

• Monitoring adherence to t_he established scope, schedule, and budget and promptly implementing corrective actions when trends indicate that activities are deviating from prescribed bounds

• Scheduling Project Team Meetings and distributing* status reports as appropriate*

• Conveying problems that could affect the completion of the project to management so that appropriate corrective action or assistance can be provided 2.2.2 Eneineerin&

a. NECO Plant Support Eneineerine - Steven Overway As Project Engineer, it is my responsibility to provide the modification packages

• • required in support of the team's goals and objectives. These packages provide the means of incorporating all the vendor's supporting information for a repair or replacem~nt into the Palisades Plant system as well as technically evaluating and approving the processes to be used.

10

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• My responsibilities include, but are not limited to:

• Developing and implementing a schedule for the modification packages approved for the 1995 outage.

• Developing and implementing any modification packages required as a result of the Alloy 600 'inspection performed during the 1995 outage.

• Coordinating with other members of the Alloy 600 Project Team for the review and approval of the drawing, analyses and procedures supplied by vendor(s) for the planed modifications to the plant.

• Coordinating with the vendor(s) to ensure high quality design and implementing methods for the modifications to the plant.

• Providing technical expertise and evaluation of contingency plans for materials associated with activities in conjunction with the Alloy 600 inspections.

• Providing owner's review and approval of all vendor supplied design documents .

• b. NECO Engineering Programs {NDE) - Tom Fouty Assisted by NDE Level ill - Richard Humphrey My responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

• Determining nondestructive examination techniques that may be applied for each Alloy 600 penetration *

• Assisting in the priority ranking for each penetration

• Determining the nondestructive examination frequency for each penetration

• Developing and procuring mock-up configurations for ultrasonic examinations

• Managing the implementation of the nondestructive examinations

• Serving as technical advisor to the Project Team for NOE methods

c. NECO System Engineering - Don Bemis As the Palisades representative on Combustion Engineering Owners Group (CEOG)

• and NEI (formerly NUMARC) Alloy 600 groups, I maintain communications and interface with Alloy 600 programs outside Palisades, and keep the Project Team updated. I will maintain direct responsibility for the Alloy 600 database as it is 11

PROJECT PLAN .

Rev. I

• developed and verified. I will also participate in development of a prioritization program, including weighing of risks and consequences.

My responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

• Keeping updated on industry experience as it relates to Alloy 600 and cracking issues

• Reactor head and primary system penetration inspection and evaluation of technical support

• Acquisition of information on leak detection systems

• Participation in CEOG,-NE( and otheroutslae Alfoy- 600 forums____ - - --- -- -- - - ---

• Technical assistance from vendors and prospective vendors, in return for familiarization with their capabiliti~s

• Keeping historical Alloy 600 files

• Close coordination with other Systems Engineers on Alloy 600 Project Team

• Maintaining LAN directory for data interchange

• Perfonrting system walkdowns each time the reactor is shutdown as necessary.

d. NECO Design Engineering - Dr. Suresh Ramalingam It is my responsibility as the NECO Civil/Structural Engineer to maintain communications and interface between the Project Team and the NECO Civil/Structural Engineering section. I will maintain responsibility for providing the required Mechanical and Civil/Structural engineering support for any aspect of the project. This responsibility includes communicating all of the engineering needs of the Project Team to the Department and, if required, help in allocating more engineering resources for the progress of the project. It is my responsibility to coordinate the engineering support activity with my department in providing engineering analyses support for all Alloy 600 components consistent with the requirements of the Project Team.

My responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

• Coordinating with Engineering Support Personnel to provide detailed engineering analyses on service life estimation of various Alloy 600 components.

• Providing engineering evaluations on postulated/detected cracks or failures and their impact on continued operation 12

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• Providing engineering analyses that are required as a part of modification packages for repair/replacement of Alloy 600 components

• Providing detailed technical review of engineering analyses or calculations performed by outside design organizations, owner's groups and other vendors before they are issued for modifications or project records

• Closing out all Alloy 600 related calculations and filling them with Palisades

• Document Control Center.

• Providing engineering judgment from a structural engineering point of view on repair/replacement of failed Alloy 600 components

• Interfacing with other engineering disciplines to share information on progress -

and/or difficulties faced by Engineering pertaining to the project

• Providing engineering analysis as required for other emergent efforts identified by the Project Team relating to Alloy 600 issues

e. NECO Plant Support Eneineerine - Jerry Nordby

• My responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

• Reviewing welding documentation (Welding Process Specifications, .welder qualifications, etc.) needed for repair/replacement of nozzles/safe-ends

• Evaluating nozzle/safe-end repair/replacement options from an able-to-weld standpoint including material selection and design

• Assisting in root cause analysis and disposition of future nozzle/safe-end failures

• Providing general welding and code assistance to team members

f. Plant Maintenance Technical Support - Scott Cedarquist My responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

• Assisting other departments or team members with modification packages or analysis

• Assisting, as necessary, with vendor efforts concerning this project; this may be

• during or in preparation for the 1995 Refout

• Reviewing all pertinent procedures affecting the system.

13

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• Maintenance Department contact for the Alloy 600 Project Team.

g. - Engineering Mechanics Support - Dr. Phuong Hoang My role on this team is to provide Engineering Consultation services in the general area of Engineering Mechanics. I am accountable to the NECO Design-CiviVStructural Supervisor at Palisades regarding analyses and to_ the Project Manager of this project for all other activities. My responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

• Providing engineering support in the area of fracture mechanics and fatigue analyses

• Developing PWSCC susceptibility analysis and inspection prioritization ranking

• Initiating and reviewing structural safety, service life, leakage analyses for potentially degraded components

• Providing engineering support for component modifications

• Providing engineering support for component inspection and development of inspection acceptance criteria

• Providing engineering support in coordination with other Project Team members for project plan development.

2.2.3 Plant Operations - Bruce Bauer My responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

• Providing operational information to the team

• Communicating team needs and information to the operating crews

• Ensuring team's knowledge and commitment to meeting planned/scheduled commitments 2.2.4 Licensing - Bill Roberts As the representative of licensing, it is my responsibility for communicating the project status and intentions in conjunction with the solicitation of input from other members of my department .

• My responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

14

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• Helping track and interpret NRC commitments within the project to assure that they are adequately addressed in a timely manner

• Preparing for and coordinating meetings and presentations to the NRC on Alloy 600 issues

• Preparing and obtaining management approvals on any NRC submittals 2.2.5 Plant Radiological Services - Ned Campbell The Health Physics member communicates radiological data and related information for the purpose of minimizing the total radiation exposure for the project.

My responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

• Attending team meetings to gather information and pass it along to the Radiological Services Department. Bring Radiological Services Department input and requests to the team meetings. This circuit is intended to identify and resolve potential radiological problems early in the planning process.

• Looking for ways and propose methods for reducing radiation exposure. Documenting

. methods accepted and rejected.

• Predicting the total radiation exposure. Providing the team with* dose reports throughout the life of the project.

2.2.6 NECO Plant Support Engineerini= {Procurement Engineer) - Tom Saarela My responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

• Preparing and/or reviewing procurement documents.

• Helping evaluate bids and selections of suppliers

• Inspecting and/or verifying acceptability of procured parts

• Coordinating the evaluation and disposition of any material deficiencies.

• Coordinating with supplier evaluation for approved suppliers evaluation

• Performing surveillance, audits, etc.

• Communicating to my department the activities of this team 15

PROJECT PLAN Rev. I

• 2.2.7 NECO Project Controls (Cost Engineer) - Gary Walker The primary responsibilities of the Project Cost Engineer are overseeing and reviewing all matters that affect project cost and keeping the Project Manager apprised of project cost matters.

My responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

• Coordinating the development of the project budget

• Monitoring expenditures

• Forecasting future project costs

• Coordinating and providing cost estimates

• Reviewing cost benefit analysis

• Proje.ct interface with Plant and General Office Accounting Department 2.2.8 NECO Project Controls (Schedule Engineer) - Norm Barry

• As the Project Schedule Engineer it is my responsibility to develop, maintain/monitor various levels (i.e., Level I, II, and/or III schedules) of project schedules. Design, procurement, construction and testing activity status will be reviewed against target dates with potential impacts communicated to the Project Team.

My responsibilities include, but are not limited to the following:

• Identifying potential future shortcomings related to schedule performance and communicate them to the Project Team

• Developing contingency plans and other project work.scenarios on an as-needed-basis

• Integratingfmterfacing with other plant activities through the use of the Palisades Plant Daily Schedule and Outage Planning

• Providing/applying necessary project management techniques/tools for meeting, presentations and/or project manager analysis

• Maintaining action item list (includes initial development and soliciting of status information) 16

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 2.3 OTHER CPCo RESOURCES 2.3.1 NDE Services CPCo NDE Services would be used extensively to support the project inspection needs where applicable. Richard Humphreys (NDE Level III) will assist the project and help follow PWSCC inspection activities.

2.3.2 Metallureical Support- Dr. Bill Pavlichko My responsibilities include providing the following:

• Providing technical support in the area of material science

• Providing metallurgical, and corrosion PWSCC expertise to team

• Providing failure analysis oversight

• Evaluation of project strategies

• Evaluation of material specifications to support Team procurement efforts-2.3.3 Nuclear Performance Assessment Department (NPAD) - Phil Flenner

• NP AD is the third level of defense in the Palisades review process. By attending Project Team meetings* and keeping up to date on Project activities, NPAD has online opportunity to ensure optimum results to Palisades .

17

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 3.0 PROJECT DESCRIPTION 3.1 PRIOR TO 1995 REFOUT 3 .1.1 Plan Outline

• Develop an Alloy 600 plan

• Secure management approval

• Ensure adequate funding

• Present the plan to the NRC

• Execute the plan 3 .1.2 Eneineerine Analysis

• Objectives 0

Develop an inspection program to identify and characterize PWSCC in Alloy 600 components.

0 Resolve existing pressurizer penetration concerns.

0 Assess reactor vessel head CRDM and ICI penetrations.

0 Assess PCS loop penetrations and safe ends.

0 Establish inspection acceptance criteria.

0 Identify repair and replacement methods.

0 Develop a long-term PWSCC mitigation program.

• Inspection Proeram Development Palisades Nuclear Plant has developed a comprehensive inspection program to support safe, reliable, and cost-effective operation of all 251 Alloy 600 penetration nozzles and safe ends in the primary coolant system (PCS). To support this comprehensive Alloy 600 program an inspection prioritization scheme (Reference 3.10.1) was developed .

This prioritization scheme formed the basis for ranking the 251 Alloy 600 components with respect to PWSCC susceptibility. Four criteria were used to develop the susceptibility rank of each penetration. A brief explanation of these criteria is provided below.

18

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 0

. Susceptibility: Alloy 600 PWSCC susceptibility contributors are fairly well understood from considerable worldwide studies and field experiences. The Palisades susceptibility ranking considers material heat treatment temperature, c~rbon content, fabrication process, material yield strength, weld configuration, postweld heat treatment and service temperature as main susceptibility variables.

The Palisades method yields results comparable to those of other ranking schemes.

° Consequence: Postulated PWSCC induced failures in Alloy 600 are bounded by existing large and small break LOCA analyses. PWSCC induced control rod ejection is also bounded by analysis. Failure consequences range from permanent plant shutdown to simple repair during a unforced outage. Contributing factors include core damage potential, plant conditions required for repair, axial or circumferential cracking, component location, difficulty of post-event cleanup prior to restart, and public and regulatory perception.

0 Detectability: A simplified ranking criteria based on component leak detection.

margin using the Leak-Before-Break concept was developed for potential circumferential crack in Alloy 600 girth butt welded components. Leakage through axial cracks at J-groove welded penetrations can be effectively detected by the Boric Acid Walkdown Program well before the cracks become critical (Reference 3.10.2) .

• 0 ALARA: Radiation exposure to personnel is generally lower for inspection than*

repair. However, indepth inspection of components with low PWSCC susceptibility and low consequence profiles can incur unnecessary exposure in high dose areas.

Table 1 shown* below summarizes the prioritization results. The components are ranked from high to low priority for inspection. On a relative scale, Group I represents the most susceptibility, Group II represents average susceptibility and Group ill represent the least susceptibility to PWSCC of all Alloy 600 components at Palisades.

Appropriate examination methods have been identified for each component based upon configuration, expected flaw type and critical flaw size. Additionally, planned inspection methods are listed by location in Attachment 8.3. The 1995 inspection results will be used in conjunction with the susceptibility study to develop future Alloy 600 plans .

19

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• GROUP I

COMPONENT DESCRIPTION Pressurizer PORV Nozzle Safe End Pressurizer and Hot Leg Surge Nozzle Safe Ends Pressurizer Temperature Element (TE) Nozzles Primary Relief Valve (RV) Mounting Flanges Pressurizer Heater (EH) Sleeves with 44 ° < Setup Angles < 58 ° Pressurizer Heater (EH) Sleeves with Setup Angles < 44 ° Hot Leg Shutdown Cooling (SDC) Outlet Nozzle Safe End Pressurizer Level Indicator (LT) Tap Nozzles II Pressurizer Spray Safe Ertd Reactor Head CRDM Nozzles with Setup Angles > 45 ° Reactor Head Incore Instrumentation (ICI) Nozzles Cold Leg Safety Injection/Shutdown Cooling (SDC) Inlet Nozzle Safe Ends Hot Leg Pressure (DPT) and Sampling (SX) Tap Penetrations Reactor Head CRDM Nozzles with 22. 5 ° < Setup Angles < 45 ° Reactor Head Gas Vent Nozzle m Hot Leg Drain Penetration Hot Leg RTD Nozzles Reactor Head CRDM Nozzles with Setup Angles< 22.5 ° Cold* Leg R TD Nozzles Cold Leg Drain, Charging, Letdown and Spray Penetrations Cold Leg Pressure (DPT) and Sampling (SX) Tap Penetrations Table 1: PWSCC Inspection Prioritization Index for Palisades Plant

• Resolution of Existing Pressurizer Penetration Concerns 0

PORV Safe End Evaluation A failed portion of the PORV safe end was independently examined by Brookhaven National Laboratory (Reference 3.10.3) and Consumers Power metallurgists (Reference 3.10.4). Several factors combined to render the originally installed PORV safe end the most susceptible Alloy 600 component for PWSCC at Palisades. Removal of this susceptible material was determined to be appropriate for this location.

20

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• i) Material Susceptibility to PWSCC The unusually large grain size, high hardness, and high yield strength that were observed are all possible results of overheating during material forging.

ii) Highest temperature in the PCS environment The PORV nozzle safe end is located on the top of the pressurizer where the operating temperature is approximately 640°F. The.reactor vessel head, hot leg and cold leg temperatures are approximately 590-595°F, 585°F, and 535°F respectively.

iii) High residual surface stresses Investigations showed that the original PORV safe end to pipe weld had been field repaired from the inside. The weld root had been ground out and rewelded with no post-weld stress relief being performed. This created very high residual stresses on the interior surface.

iv) Circumferential failure mode The PORV nozzle safe end circumferential crack did not appear to

• ~ propagate rapidly. Over a long period of time, such a circumferential crack could pose a safety concern in the form of a small break loss of coolant accident.

0 TE-0101 and TE-0102 Penetration In October of 1993, an axial through wall crack was detected on two temperature element nozzles (TE-0101 and TE-0102) on the pressurizer. A pad weld repair was performed at that time to permit Palisades to operate safely for one fuel cycle, during which time Palisades performed further evaluation of the situation. After extensive evaluation, it was decided to leave the TE nozzles in their present '

configuration for the following reasons:

i) The 1993 weld pad modification met ASME Section III for Class I component fatigue stress allowable (Reference 3.10.5 and Reference 3.10.6).

ii) CPCo (Reference 3.10.7) and B&W Nuclear Technologies (BWNT) analyses have determined that pressurizer base metal exposed to primary coolant at existing cracks will corrode at a very slow rate. Hence it is judged to be acceptable for remaining plant life. Industry experience and recent base metal examinations at Arkansas Nuclear One (AN0-1) and Southern California Edison (SCE) along with other utilities inspections of instrumentation nozzles support this conclusion. Therefore, further base 21

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 metal corrosion inspection is not necessary.

iii) The TE nozzle repaired welds are less susceptible to PWSCC than the original welds for the following reasons:

- The pad weld on the pressurizer outer wall is cooler than the original cracked weld on the pressurizer interior.

- Residual stress in the nozzle at the pad weld is judged to be less than at the original J-weld.

iv) Possible axially oriented PWSCC is not a safety concern.

• Assessment of Other Pressurizer Nozzles 0

Spray Nozzle Safe End i.) The pressurizer spray nozzle safe end is made of the same heat of material as the PORV safe end, but it operates at lower temperatures. For an operating temperature of 540 °F and initial PWSCC of 0. O1O inch depth, the time to failure of the spray nozzle safe end exceeds 40 years.

ii.) Critical leak rate is more than 70 times the plant Technical Specifications limit for primary coolant system unidentified leakage. This provides margin against potential catastrophic failure by ensuring any leakage would be detected long before the break would occur.

0 Surge Nozzle Safe End i.) Time to failure with postulated initial PWSCC of 0.010 inch depth exceeds 40 years. Therefore, inspection results could be used to justify continued servtce.

ii.) The critical leak rate at failure is more than 100 times the plant Technical Specifications limit for PCS unidentified leakage. This provides margin against potential catastrophic failure.

0 Safety Valve Flanges i.) The flanges are made of the same heat of material as the PORV and Spray safe ends. The flange to nozzle girth butt welds, however, were shop welded

• and post-weld stress relieved, so the safety valve flanges are less susceptible to PWSCC than the Alloy 600 safe ends.

22

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 ii.) In 1993, the three flange girth butt welds were thoroughly examined by internal and external PT, RT, and a special UT technique to detect IGSCC (intergranular stress corrosion cracking). UT examiners were qualified by EPRI to detect and characterize stress corrosion cracking (SCC) indications, and they observed no indications.

iii.) The leak detection margin of the safety valve nozzles is expected to be as large as of the spray and PORV nozzle safe ends. This provides a leak-before-break protection against potential catastrophic failure of the safety valve flange welds.

0 Heater Sleeve Service Life Evaluation Visual inspection for boric acid accumulation is an effective method to detect PWSCC leakage before catastrophic failure (Reference 3 .10.2).

i.) Industry experience and analyses show that PWSCC in heater sleeves is typically axial, with cracks controlled by residual hoop stresses which dissipate a short distance from the J-welds. Crack length has been found not to exceed twice nozzle thickness. Circumferential cracking is unlikely at J-welds due to comparatively low axial stress. Nozzles are shrink fitted into the vessel, which resists crack opening. PWSCC cracks at J-welds are therefore not a safety concern. Furthermore, in a CEOG evaluation, the Palisades pressurizer heater sleeves were determined to be one of the lowest susceptible heater sleeves of all Combustion Engineering (CE) Plants.

ii.) :Palisades operates with more heaters in full-time operation than most plants, due to historical difficulties in maintaining pressure control when backup heaters are cycled on and off. Benefits include improved equalization of PCS loop and pressurizer chemistry, enhanced thermal homogeneity in the surge and spray lines, less thermal cycling of heater elements, and maintaining lower pressurizer spray inlet nozzle safe end temperature.

0 Level Tap Safe End i.) Although the same heat of material is used as in the pressurizer temperature element nozzles, level tap safe end PWSCC susceptibility is considerably lower due to an entirely different design. The safe ends are butt welded onto carbon steel nozzles, and residual stresses are expected to be less than for the temperature element nozzle J-welds. Destructive mockup testing has confirmed acceptable residual stress levels in this design.

• ii.) Level tap safe end butt welds are cooler than pressurizer internal temperature because welds are several pipe diameters outside the pressurizer inner wall.

Fluid is essentially stagnant inside taps during normal operation due to 23

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

' minimal pressurizer level fluctuations and no flow through level transmitters.

iii.) Upper level tap safe ends were radiographed and their external surface was inspected using dye penetrant examination during the 1993 outage and no indications were detected.

• Assessment of Reactor Head Penetrations No industry issue except for Alloy 600 PWSCC warrants consideration of internal inspection, and reactor head nozzle Alloy 600 PWSCC is not a safety issue for reasons documented in NUREG/CR-6245 (Reference 3.10.8).

0 Incore Instrumentation (ICD Nozzle ICI penetration geometry and size are similar to CRDM penetrations. However, the ICI nozzles are more susceptible to PWSCC than the CRDM nozzles due to larger setup angle (slope of the vessel head at the penetration).

• Control Rod Drive Mechanism (CRDMl Nozzle 0

Risks incurred in internal inspection of CRDM penetrations outweigh anticipated near-term benefits. Future inspection planning will be deferred 'until ICI inspection results are evaluated.

i.) Palisades CRDMs are rack-and-pinion design, nearly unique to the industry.

Internal inspection would require one of the following scenarios:

a) Inspection from below: Removal of internals, plus reactor head elevation to allow room for tool insertion.

b) Inspection from CRDM attachment flanges: Removal of the entire CRDM including housing and thermal sleeve. The Omega seal weld attaching nozzle and housing flanges would have to be cut and replaced. These seals have never required any maintenance since construction. Like-for-like seal replacement may not be possible.

c) Inspection from CRDM service platform: CRDM support tube internals removal, inspection tool insertion from the catwalk 15-20 feet above the inspection zone, and inspection through the thermal sleeve.

• ii.)

• CRDM internals are highly contaminated. Removal of internals or entire units would result in an increase probability of failure of mechanical seals during the next fuel cycle unless mechanisms were thoroughly disassembled, cleaned and rebuilt. Palisades is not equipped to store or rebuild several 24

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 CRDM's simultaneously. Such a job would extend outage critical path at considerable expense to the company and radiation exposure to workers.

Prudence, cost recovery, and lost generation could be state regulatory issues.

iii.) Palisades CRDM nozzles are restrained from ejection due to interconnection beneath the reactor head. Each CRDM nozzle is welded to an extension sleeve, and all 45 sleeves are welded to a common latticework approximately 17" above the head flange attachment plate.

0 Reactor Head Gas Vent Penetration Evaluation i.) The reactor head vent line is an Alloy 600 nozzle which is welded to an Alloy 600 pipe approximately 6 feet long with 2 bends. The penetration cannot be internally accessed from the top, and bottom access is limited by CRDM extension tubes and latticework. External access is severely restricted due to location in the midst of the CRDM penetrations.

ii.) Vent penetration PWSCC susceptibility is the lowest of all head penetrations due to lower yield strength material, near-center installation and no postweld cold work. Leakage risk is also less than for the original TE-0101

• -* and TE-0102 nozzle due to lower operating temperature and lower yield strength material.

• Assessment of PCS Loop Penetrations and Safe Ends PWSCC growth rate in Alloy 600 components is highly temperature dependent.

Palisades operates at relatively low temperatures compared to other PWRs, and primary system cold and hot legs are cooler than the reactor and pressurizer. Table l shows that all hot and cold leg RTD penetrations, drain, charging, spray, pressure and sampling nozzles. are among the least susceptible to PWSCC in the PCS. Intensive examination of some components in high radiation areas is not warranted due to low likelihood of PWSCC.

0 Safe End and Full Penetration Welded Nozzle i.) Hot leg surge, shutdown cooling outlet and safety injection safe end field welds are the PCS loop components most susceptible to PWSCC in that order. They are similar in size (12" OD and 1" thick), and their time to failure after postulated initial PWSCC depth of 0. 010 inch is conservatively calculated to exceed 40 years. Critical leak rate at failure is more than 100 times the plant technical specification limit for PCS unidentified leakage, providing adequate margin against potential catastrophic failure .

• ii.) Repairs of some of the field welds during initial construction were indicated in Bechtel records (Reference 3.10.9); however, weld inner surfaces cannot be internally inspected for evidence of root repair similar to that which was 25

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 stated as a root cause for the PORV safe end crack. An examination to detect PWSCC will be performed utilizing ultrasonic examinations.

Additionally, a Mechanical Stress Improvement Process (MSIP) is scheduled for surge and shutdown cooling outlet nozzle safe ends. The process will eliminate high tensile stress in the weld root area, thus mitigating potential PWSCC at these locations.

0 PCS loop J-Welded Nozzle PCS loop RTD nozzles are not highly susceptible to PWSCC. They belong to the lowest susceptibility group; (Group III in Table 1). Potential cracks are axially

• oriented, which is not an immediate safety concern .. VT-2 inspections will be performed. Any repair would possibly require PCS drainage below the loop centerline.

• Inspection Acceptance Criteria and Contin~ency Plannin~

0 Pressurizer

- Surge and Spray Nozzle Safe Ends and Temperature Element Nozzles:

• Fracture mechanics analyses were performed for pressurizer surge, spray nozzle safe ends and TE nozzles. Conservative PWSCC and fatigue crack growth data and loading conditions were employed to generate service life curves for various flaw sizes and shapes (Reference 3.10.10). Allowable flaw sizes for one fuel cycle are also included.

Inspection results are expected to justify continued operation of existing pressurizer surge, spray and temperature element nozzles; and hence no replacement is planned. However, Alloy 690 material will be procured for replacement of any Alloy 600 safe end which cannot be justified for continued seTVIce.

- Safety Valve Flanges: No indications are expected for reasons stated in 3.1.2.

If indications are discovered and cannot be repaired, and continued operation cannot be justified, stainless steel flanges can be attached in the same manner as the replacement PORV piece.

- Heater Sleeves: Leaking heater sleeves will be plugged unless the number of leaking sleeves exceeds the allowable number of plugged heaters, in which case sleeve repair or replacement will be performed as necessary. Alloy 690 nozzle

,. plugs and replacement sleeve material are available.

- Level Tap Safe Ends: No indications are expected. Alloy 690 replacement material is available if leakage is detected.

26

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 0

Reactor Vessel Head

' - ICI penetrations: NUREG/CR-6245 flaw acceptance criteria will be used for indications characterized by ECT and sized by UT examinations from inside the ICI nozzles. Penetrations exceeding flaw acceptance criteria will be repaired.

- CRDM and Head Vent Penetrations: Leaking penetrations will be repaired.

0 PCS Loops Fracture mechanics analyses are being performed for all PCS loop penetrations and nozzle safe ends. Conservative PWSCC and fatigue crack growth data and loading conditions were employed to generate service life curves for various flaw sizes. Inspection results are expected to justify continued operation of existing PCS loop nozzle safe ends and penetrations; thus replacement is not planned.

However, replacement material has been identified to support any emergent repair needs.

• Mitigation Evaluation 0

Weld Overlay

• 0

- Weld overlay can be used either for repair or stress reduction as a mitigation -

technique. No additional development is currently being pursued.

Mechanical Stress Improvement Process (MSIP) i.) Mechanical Stress Improvement Process (MSIP) has been an accepted stress reduction technique for austenitic stainless steels in BWRs under NUREG-0313 (Reference 3 .10. 11) since the early 1980's. The technique is also applicable to Alloy 600 components in PWRs for stress improvement of welds.

ii} MSIP is effective, simple and code allowable. It is also irreversible. MSIP would be most beneficial for reducing tensile stress in safe end girth butt welds. The surge nozzle safe ends and the shutdown cooling (SDC) outlet nozzle safe end are scheduled for MSIP application in the 1995 refueling outage.

iii.) NUREG/CR-6245 refers to axial MSIP for reactor head penetrations, but that process is still under development and will not be available for near-term use at Palisades.

• 27

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 I 0 Zinc Addition to PCS

- Studies indicate that addition of zinc to primary coolant can slow Alloy 600 PWSCC and may also reduce source term exposure. Consumers Power is evaluating zinc addition for possible future use.

3 .1.3 Procedures

• Develop qualified welding procedures for Type 52/152 weld materials Welding Procedures for Type 52/152 weld material will be reviewed and accepted for use at Palisades to support the PORV nozzle safe end repair.

• Develop loop draining procedures Full core offioad and loop drainage are necessary to perform internal inspections or repairs ofloop penetrations. Full offioad is planned for the 1995 outage to support the 10-year vessel ISi.

Loop drainage may be performed either by plugging loop connections to the reactor and draining the piping while reactor fluid level remains higher than loop elevations, or

• by reassembling the defueled reactor and then draining the system to the necessary level. Consumers Power is evaluating both approaches.

• Identify PWSCC inspection methods and procedures The primary NDE method to detect and size PWSCC flaws is ultrasonic examination utilizing diffracted longitudinal wave transducers at various angles (NUREG/CR-6245).

This method will be used in conjunction with EPRI IGSCC detection and sizing guidelines.

BWNT is contracted to perform ultrasonic examinations of Alloy 600 components at Palisades during the 1995 outage. The ultrasonic examination techniques are to be verified for the detection and sizing of PWSCC of Alloy 600 components.

In order to develop and verify the ultrasonic examination procedures and techniques, NDE mockups were fabricated. The intent of the mockups is to demonstrate to CPCo the capabilities of the NDE techniques, procedures and equipments and to assist in justifying the examination approach to the NRC.

The design of the mockups included considerations for component geometry, examination limitations, component size (diameter and thickness) and flaw size. The mockups consist of four configurations containing seven welds and 22 implanted flaws. The mockups consist of:

1. Pressurizer spray nozzle to safe-end (shop weld)/safe-end to elbow (field weld),

28

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

2. A charging inlet nozzle to PCS loop (full penetration shop weld)/nozzle to pipe

' 3.

(field weld),

Shutdown cooling outlet nozzle to safe-end (shop weld)/safe-end to pipe (field weld), and

4. Pressure measurement nozzle to pipe (field weld).

The selection of these four mockups encompasses the more complex and difficult geometries to be examined at Palisades.

A flaw matrix was developed for the flaws to be implanted into the NDE Mockups. A fracture mechanics assessment of Palisades Alloy 600 components was used to determine the critical flaw size for each component that would be acceptable for continued operation for an additional fuel cycle. This flaw matrix utilized the fracture mechanic assessment and ASME Section XI, IWB-3514 Acceptance Standards to determine the dimensions of the flaw implants. The flaw sizes implanted within the NDE Mockups were selected to be less than the calculated critical flaw size. In addition, flaws which are considered to be acceptable in accordance with the IWB-3 514 acceptance tables have also been implanted.

• As discussed earlier, the NDE mockups will be used to develop and demonstrate the ultrasonic examination procedures and techniques. An acceptable demonstration of accurate flaw detection and sizing capabilities using these mockups would indicate that flaws of similar size would have a high probability of being detected in the plant with these procedures and techniques, thus assuring the integrity of the Alloy 600 components at Palisades.

• Develop deep crack repair procedure Consumers Power is evaluating two different deep crack repair methodologies: the jointly funded CE Owners Group (CEOG) Task 822 (in progress); and a BWNT procedure utilizing European experience. Both methods employ internal excavation and weld overlay. Surface stress mitigation is performed immediately after repair or at a future outage. Considerations include residual stresses, repair-induced deformation, as-repaired surface condition, and excavation depth.

• Ensure that CRDM removal and repair procedures are current CRDM seal housing assembly removal and repair procedures are current to support planned seal maintenance activities outside the scope of the Alloy 600 project. Seal housing assemblies are not made of Alloy 600 .

• CRDM support tube removal and repair procedures will be required only in the unlikely everit that visual examination reveals CRDM nozzle leakage. Support tube removal, 29

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 reconditioning, and reinstallation procedures are undergoing major revision but will be

' 3.1.4 completed during the 1995 outage if they should become necessary.

Materials

• Procure penetration and safe end mockups.

• Ensure availability and operability ofloop plugs.

• Ensure availability of stainless steel or Alloy 690 replacement material:

- CEOG has acquired adequate 2" OD and l 1h OD Alloy 690 round bar for fabrication of replacement RTD penetrations, heater sleeves and heater penetration plugs.

- Consumers Power is pursuing procurement of an Alloy 690 piece of adequate size to fabricate replacement safe ends or full-welded penetrations.

• Ensure availability of CRDM support tube spare parts.

A spare support tube assembly is in stock .

3.1.5 Personnel

• Qualify NDE personnel for PWSCC inspection techniques.

• Identify work groups and ensure their availability.

3.1.6 Modification Packages

• Planned Activities 0

Insulation will be readily removable and replaceable for quick visual inspection of Alloy 600 penetrations at many locations where new insulation is being installed.

0 PORV safe end replacement 0

MSIP applications for surge nozzle safe ends and shutdown cooling outlet nozzle

.safe end.

• Contingency 0

TE-0 I 0 I and TE-0 I 02 nozzle replacements .

0 Pressurizer spray nozzle replacement.

30

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• Pressurizer heater sleeve penetration plugging and weld repair.

0 0

Generic pad weld procedure for leaking R TD and head vent penetrations.

0 Repair of butt welded Alloy 600 safe ends.

° CPCo has researched various repair techniques to remediate any PWSCC related failure.

- Removal of the failed portion of the Alloy 600 material and rewelding to the unaffected metal as was done on the PORV line in 1993.

- Replacement of the original Alloy 600 safe end with an Alloy 690 safe end.

- Elimination of the Alloy 600 safe end and welding stainless transition piece to the cladded carbon steel nozzle in the same manner as the planned PORV safe end replacement in the 1995 outage.

° CRDM flange Omega seal replacement Omega seals may be very difficult to duplicate due to material loss from seal cutting

• 3.1.7 and restricted access, so an alternate installation method is preferred .

Procurement of Services CPCo employed a bid process to identify competent vendor support to provide qualified PWSCC inspection methods and suitable repair options. The following vendors are contracted for work in the general areas listed below:

• PWSCC Inspections BWNT

• Repair and Replacement BWNT

• Contingency Support BWNT

• Engineering Support Sargent & Lundy

• Mitigation AEA O'Donnell 3.1.8 Licensing

• Ensure all commitments are satisfied.

• Participate in NRC presentations.

31

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• 3.1.9

• Evaluate licensing acceptability ofMSIP at Palisades.

Industry Interface

• Continue active participatiqn in CEOG Alloy 600 Working Group.

0 Palisades has been actively involved with CEOG Alloy 600 Working Group since initial reports of Calvert Cliffs pressurizer heater sleeve penetration failures in 1989.

• Continue active participation in NEI .(NUMARC) Alloy 600 Ad Hoc Advisory Committee (AHAC).

0 Palisades joined the AHAC in December 1993.

• Monitor US reactor head inspections at Point Beach, DC Cook, & Oconee. Palisades participated in the DC Cook and the Oconee vessel head inspections.

• Cooperate with other plants contemplating development of Alloy 600 programs.

• Evaluate Alloy 600 incidents reported around the world.

0 See below for a summary of world Alloy 600 activities .

Alloy 600 cracking incidents known through October 1994 Reactor head nozzles with axial indications PWSCC Total 103 nozzles with indications among 4,300 inspected.

77 foreign 1 through wall crack found by leakage on head Point Beach 0 indications DC Cook 1 nozzle with cracks; analysis justified 1 cycle operation without repair Oconee 1 nozzle with multiple indications; analysis justified 1 cycle operation without repair Reactor head nozzle with axial multiple cracks Chemical IGA Zorita 1 through wall crack found by leakage on head; Numerous indications found later in various nozzles Axial pressurizer heater sleeve cracking PWSCC

• ANO Calvert Cliffs 1

20 or more 32

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• Axial pressurizer instrument nozzle cracking SONGS St. Lucie ANO

• Palisades 7

6 2

2 PWSCC Axial hot leg instrument nozzle cracking PWSCC Palo Verde 3 SONGS 1 Circ. reactor head nozzle weld cracks Lack of Fusion Ringhals 1 later found in other reactor heads Circumferential pressurizer heater sleeve cracks PWSCC, Calvert Cliffs 1 Stuck tool Circumferential Alloy 690 pressurizer nozzle indication Machine mark St. Lucie 1

• Circumferential pressurizer nozzle weld cracking St. Lucie 1 Lack of Fusion.

PWSCC Circ PORV safe end cracking Weld flaw.

PWSCC Bettis 1 Palisades I 33

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• 3.2 3.3 1995 REFOUT: HOT SHUTDOWN MODE ACTIVITY

• Perform primary system walkdown to inspect for active leakage.

1995 REFOUT: PREPARATIONS AFTER DEPRESSURIZATION 3 .3 .1 Pressurizer Access and Venting The pressurizer manway is used as a primary vent path when the PCS is depressurized and the reactor head is installed.

• Remove pressurizer manway.

• Erect scaffolding to provide access to pressurizer lower head area.

• Remove surge line safe end insulation to allow examination.

• 3.3.2 Loop Penetration Access

• Erect scaffolding as needed to provide access to loop penetrations.

• 3.4 3.4.1

• Remove insulation where required for access and modification .

1995 REFOUT: ACTIVITIES IN REFUELING SHUTDOWN MODE Pressurizer 0

PORV Safe End Replacement The existing Alloy 600 PORV nozzle safe end and adjacent stainless steel pipe sections will be replaced by a single Type 3 l 6L stainless steel transition piece. An Alloy 690 weld will attach the piece to the existing Alloy 182 butter on the pressurizer nozzle end. An Alloy 690 overlay weld will b.e applied to the inner surface to isolate the existing Alloy 182 butter from the primary environment.

Qty OD1s1 OD211d ID 0

PORV Safe End 1 6 3.500 3.000

• Butt Weld Inspections PWSCC-qualified UT will be performed on the pressurizer spray *nozzle safe end.

Also, a visual inspection of the safe end internal surface is planned to be performed by remote camera to inspect for weld root abnormalities.

• PWSCC-qualified UT will be performed on the pressurizer surge nozzle safe end.

34

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 PWSCC-qualified UT will be performed on the three pressurizer safety valve flanges.

The eight pressurizer level indicator safe ends will be VT-2 inspected.

Qty ODIS! OD2nd ID 0

Spray Line Safe End 1 4.813 4.813 3.188

- ODPT

- PWSCC UT

- ID Remote Visual 0

Surge Line Safe End 1 13.00 13.00 10.50

- ODPT

- PWSCCUT 0

Safety Valve Flanges 3 6.000 n/a 3.000

- PWSCCUT

• 0 0

Upper Level Tap Safe Ends

- VT-2 Lower Level Tap Safe Ends 4

4 2.375 1.375 0.957 2.375 1.375 0.957

- VT-2

• Pad Weld Inspections Baseline inspections of pad weld root geometry will be performed on the TE-0101 weld pad. This will be used in conjunction with future NDE to detect PWSCC initiation at repair weld sites. The service condition of TE-0102 is bounded by those of TE-0101, and hence no inspection of TE-0102 is required. A VT-2 inspection of TE-0102 is planned.

0 TE-0101 I 1.315 1.315 .815

- VT-2

- Remove the temperature element

- Internal .UT to establish root weld geometry base line

- Reinstall the temperature element 35

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• 0 TE-0102

- VT-2 Qty 1

OD1st OD2nd ID 1.315 1.315 .815

• J-Weld Nozzle Inspections Pressurizer heater sleeves will be visually inspected for boric acid leakage.

0 Pressurizer Heater Sleeves 120 1.158 1.250 .905

- VT-2 after insulation at surge nozzle is removed.

Plug or repair leaking heater sleeves.

- Reconfigure heater circuits if warranted by analysis.

3.4.2 Loops

• Safe End Butt Weld Inspections External dye penetrant examination and PWSCC qualified UT are planned for loop safe

• ends.

0 SDC Inlet (cold leg)

Qty 4

OD1st OD2nd ID 13.00 13.00 10.50 0

SDC Outlet (hot leg) 1 14.25 12.75 10.563 0

Surge Line (hot leg) 1 13.00 13.00 10.50

- ODPT

- PWSCCUT

• Full Penetration Weld Nozzle Inspections External dye penetrant examination and PWSCC qualified UT are planned for full welded penetrations.

36

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• 0 Spray Outlets (cold leg)

° Charging Inlets (cold leg) 0 Loop Drains (cold leg)

Qty 2

2 4

OD1s1 OD2nd ID 6.188 6.250 6.188 3.500 2.375 2.375 2.563 1.689 1.689 0

Loop Drains (hot leg) 1 6.188 2.375 1.689 0

Sample & Pressure Taps 8 3.375 1.250 0.625 (cold leg) 0 Sample & Pressure Taps 10 3.375 1.250 0.6 (hot leg)

- ODPT

- PWSCC UT

• I-Weld Nozzle Inspections 0

RTD penetrations (hot leg) 10 3.375 1.250 0.625 0

RTD penetrations (cold leg) 12 3.375 1.250 0.625

- VT-2

• 3.5 1995 REFOUT: ACTIVITIES ON STORED REACTOR HEAD

• I-Weld Nozzle Inspections The eight ICI penetrations will be subjected to internal Eddy Current inspection (ECT) by personnel experienced in PWSCC examination methods. Indications will be characterized with EPRI qualified UT techniques developed for PWSCC.

The reactor head gas vent penetration and all 45 control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) penetrations will be VT-2 examined for evidence of leakage. The examination may be performed by camera beneath installed reactor head insulation or, if that is impractical, after insulation is removed.

0 ICI Nozzles 8 4.500 4.500 3.625

- VT-2 (bare metal)

- ECT

- If indications from ECT, perform UT for depth sizing

• ° CRDM Nozzles 45 3.500 3.500 2.728

- VT-2 (Remote video camera, or direct visual with head insulation removed)

- If penetrations pass visual inspection, no further examination is required.

37

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

- If a CRDM penetration leaks, internally inspect and repair: .

- Cut Omega seal weld ofCRDM to be inspected, as well as any others required to gain access.

Remove CRDM assemblies as required.

- Remove thermal sleeve of penetration to be inspected.

- Perform internal inspection from above.

- Disposition indications.

- Repair flaws as necessary.

- Disassemble, clean and rebuild all CRDM assemblies removed.

- Reinstall all CRDM assemblies rempved.

Qty OD 181 OD2nd ID 0

Reactor Head Vent 1 1.050 1.050 0.742

- VT-2 (Remote video camera) for indication ofleak

- If vent penetration leaks, inspect and repair from above. CRDM removal may be necessary for access.

3.6 1995 REFOUT: ACTIVITIES REQUIRING LOOP DRAINAGE 3.6.1 Loop Drainaee

• Defuel reactor.

• Install dams in loops.

• Drain loops to required level.

3.6.2 Inspection and Repair A VT-2 inspection of hot leg RTD penetrations is planned. If hot legs are drained below penetration elevations and inspection tooling is available at an early enough window during the 1995 refueling outage, an internal ECT examination will be performed.

Qty OD 1s1 OD2nd ID 0

R TD penetrations (hot leg) 10 3.375 1.250 0.625

- Remove RTD's and thermowells.

- Perform ECT.

• 0 If indications are found, disposition and repair as needed .

Reinstall thermo wells and R TD's.

Other penetrations requiring repair 38

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

- Disposition and repair as needed.

3.6.3 Loop Restoration

• Fill loops.

• Remove dams.

3.7 1995 REFOUT: INSPECTIONS NOT BEING PERFORMED Qty OD 1st OD2nd ID 0

Reactor Flange 2 1.050 1.050 0.742 Leak Detector Taps Reactor flange leakoff tubes are not primary system pressure boundaries due to their location downstream of the reactor head 0-rings. They are not highly susceptible to PWSCC due to relatively low yield (42 ksi) and rare exposure to primary coolant at operating temperature. The lower welds, where stainless leakoff piping is attached, are cooler than the reactor flange .

• 0 Steam Generator Primary Bowl Drain Plugs 4 1.050 n/a n/a Worker dose accumulation for this task alone is not warranted, as inspection would require steam generator isolation and primary side entry. Future internal inspection may be performed at the same time as tube inspections. If a leak develops, it can be identified during boric acid walkdowns by boric acid crystal buildup at primary bowl insulation seams. Maintenance can be performed whenever steam generator dams are installed. Drain plugs are only 5 years old and are of solid construcfam similar to tube plugs. Although they are manufactured of very high yield material, classic internal axial PWSCC cannot occur due to their shape. Plugs are installed from inside the steam generator bowls, and their tapered upstream end prevents ejection.

0 Steam Generator Tubes Steam generator tubes are included in the Steam Generator Reliability Program.

3.8 1995 REFOUT: POST-INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

• Disposition indications. *

• Perform repair and post weld inspection .

• Reinsulate.

39

PROJECT PLAN Rev. I

• Remove temporary scaffolding.

3.9 AFTER 1995 REFOUT

• Document inspection results.

• Use inspection results, PWSCC susceptibility and service life curves to:

0 Project service life of all Alloy 600 components.

0 Determine required frequency and scope of future inspections.

0 Plan scope of future PWSCC mitigation.

• Evaluate need for enhanced leak detection system.

• Revise plan as needed for future Alloy 600 activities.

3.10 REFERENCES 3.10.1 EA-A600-03, "Alloy 600 Primary Water Stress Corrosion Cracking Inspection

• 3.10.2 Prioritization Report", Rev. 0 .

Correspondence from W.T. Russell ofNRC to Rasin ofNUMARC transmitting "Safety Evaluation for Potential Reactor Vessel Adaptor Tube Cracking", dated November 19, 1993.

3.10.3 Czajkowski C.J., "Palisades Nuclear Plant Safe End to Pipe Cracking", Brookhaven National Laboratory, January 1994.

3 .10.4 Pavlichko W. , "Palisades Metallurgical Failure analysis of Pressurizer (T-72, Line CC-11)

PORV Penetration Inconel Safe-End to Type 316 Stainless Steel Piping Weld", December 1, 1993.

3.10.5 EA-A600-0l, "Service Life Analysis of Pressurizer Temperature Element TE-0101 Weld Modification", Rev. 0.

3.10.6 EA-A600-02, "Service Life Analysis of Pressurizer Temperature Element TE-0102 Weld Modification", Rev. 0.

3.10.7 CPCo Internal Correspondence from Pavlichko W.R , "Evaluation of Pressurizer Corrosion Rate Due to Exposure to Borated Water", sent to Anand Gangadharan on October 23, 1994 .

40

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• 3.10.8 3.10.9 NUREG/CR-6245, "Assessment of Pressurized Water Reactor Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle Cracking 11 , Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, EG&G Idaho, Inc.

Bechtel Record, "Inconel Welds", DCC, Cartridge No 67, Frame No. 2219-2226.

11 3.10.10 EA-A600-09, BWNT Document 32-1235177-00, FM Assessment of Palisades Alloy 600 Components", Rev. 0.

3 .10 .11 NUREG/CR-0313, "Technical Report on Material Selection and Processing Guideline for BWR's Coolant Pressure Boundary Piping", Final Report, Rev. 2 .

41

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 4.0 LIMITATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS 4.1 ALARA CONSIDERATION All the Alloy 600 locations ~nder consideration are located on the primary coolant system. The plan calls for inspections to detect PWSCC related cracking and for contingency repair if necessary. These actions will require the movement of personnel and equipment in the radiologically controlled areas. In order to limit the dose and minimize contamination, all personnel should exhibit and practice the ALARA principles of time, distance and shielding.

It is essential to have a high level of understanding and optimize the inspection or repair process to perform the work efficiently. Measures to support this process are described in Section 7.5.

4.2 ENVffi.ONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS The entire primary coolant system is located inside the containment building and is isolable from the outside environment. Waste products will be processed in accordance with established Plant procedures for radioactive and hazardous materials as appropriate.

Procedures and modifications will not:

• Control or modify any system with a potential for release to Lake Michigan or groundwater

• Change volume, quality, or monitoring of waters discharged to the environment

• . Disturb site soils, vegetation, or shoreline ecology

• Affect plant heating boiler stack emissions

• Modify or affect any plant system that contains oils, salt, or nonradioactive pollutants Nonradioactive liquid and hazardous wastes are expected to be zer~ to minimal. If any such wastes were to exist, they would most likely consist of metallurgical enchants and dye penetrants and would be treated as contaminated liquids.

Consumable materials will be procured, controlled, and removed in accordance with the Palisades Consumables Control Program.

4.3 SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION All of the inspections and repairs associated with this project are located within the containment. This requires a variety of personnel performing the various tasks to go into the protected area of the Palisades Plant. Training, escort and contractor control are the 42

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• 4.4 issues that the project will have to plan for in conjunction 'with security and property protection.

UNUSUAL PERMIT/REGULATORY/ENVIRONMENTAL REQUIREMENTS The Project Team should gain NRC approval of the Mechanical Stress Improvement Process tool that is being used during the 1995 Refout. This item is also recognized under Section 4.5.1.

4.5 REGULA TORY 4.5.1 NRC Interface

• NRC Acceptance of Methods and Analysis 0

To support the project's plans to use MSIP as a stress improvement technique for Alloy 600 components, gain NRC approval of this method to obtain inspection interval concurrence.

• NRC Acceptance of Alloy 690 0

In July of 1993, Regulatory Guide 7.85 Rev. 29 was issued which endorsed the use of Alloy 690 material through the approval of Code Case 47 4-1. Therefore no plant specific approval of Alloy 690 at Palisades is required.

• Submittal of Palisades Alloy 600 Project .Plan 0

Submit the Palisades plan for addressing the PWSCC of Alloy 600 components in the Palisades PCS three (3) months before the next refueling outage. The plan should include the technical basis for planned inspection, modifications, repairs, and replacements, particularly for the pressurizer PORV, surge line and spray line nozzles.

• 4.5.2 Safety vs. Nonsafety Components Two modes of Alloy 600 PWSCC have been observed in PWR's around the world: axial and circumferential. Safety concerns are basically issues that could conceivably challenge plant safety systems' ability to protect the public from radiological exposure in excess of legal limits.

All 3 US PWR manufacturers have independently determined that axial cracking is not a safety concern because of the long time interval between through-wall propagation and possible sudden catastrophic failure. The US-NRC and foreign regulators have accepted this conclusion as demonstrated by their allowance of continued operation of plants which could conceivably develop such cracking. Axial cracking is nonetheless an economic concern due to repair and cleanup expenses. Untreated axial leaks may eventually lead 43

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 to externally initiated circumferential cracking and boric acid wastage of vessel material.

Both of these are safety concerns but are very slow processes that will be identified in time while dealing with axial leakage.

Internally initiated circumferential cracking is a safety concern because it might rupture suddenly before detection. Evaluation of critical leak rates indicated that leak detection margin ofa typical large bore (4" and above OD) Alloy 600 component is more than 10

. times of the plant leak detection capacity per the technical specifications. This provides a leak-before-break safeguard against a potential LOCA. Other small bore components have been shown to be less susceptible to PWSCC but failure may result in small break LOCA. The FSAR has concluded that the plant is capable of safely responding to such incidents. However, event prevention is preferable to reliance upon plant safety equipment for event mitigation, so challenges to safety system are to be avoided.

The failure of the Palisades PORV safe end in 1993 is probably the first and only reported circumferential PWSCC in a girth butt weld in a commercial nuclear plant. The incidence of such cracking is unique, and no other safe end at Palisades is more susceptible based upon known PWSCC contributing factors. The safe end material yield strength value is the highest for Alloy 600 at Palisades and one of the highest known in the industry. The material was apparently overheated during fabrication, which caused unusually large grain structure. The PORV safe end operating temperature is the highest in the primary coolant system. Furthermore, the back gouge weld repair at the weld root after weld fabrication caused extremely high residual axial tensile stress. This stress condition is a primary

• contributor to circumferential PWSCC initiation and propagation. There was evidence of crack initiation sites along only the heat affected zone of the repaired weld root portion. With the current Alloy 600 inspection program and enhanced UT techniques, potential circumferential cracking can be detected long before it becomes critical.

,4.6 NRC COMMITMENTS As of mid-1994, a total of 43 commitments had been made. A listing of all the commitments and their status is available through the Palisades Licensing Department.

Of the 43 commitments, 39 have been closed out, with actions continuing on 4 open commitments. A brief statement of the open commitments are listed below.

• E-PAL-93-030R dated 10/15/94 Implement changes to the Plant Inspection Program to address deficiencies identified as a result of the failure of the June 1993 NDE inspection to find the crack indication.

• A-NL-93-098 dated 10/01/94 As part of the evaluation and qualification of NDE examination techniques for detection ofPWSCC, develop an appropriate mock-up and qualification of ultrasonic examination techniques for PWSCC.

44

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• E-P AL-93-032C Evaluate pennanent repair of instrument nozzles TE-0 I 0 I and TE-0 I 02 prior to the next refueling shutdown and complete modifications as necessary to assure long-tenn integrity of the instrument nozzles. NOTE: TE-0101 and TE-0102 were modified under SC-93-087 to allow continued operation until a complete nozzle replacement can be perfonned (Reference E-P AL-93-032B).

• A-NL-94-004 dated 11/24/94 Submit Palisades plan for addressing the PWSCC of Alloy 600 components in the Palisades PCS three (3) months before the next refueling outage.

The plan should include the technical bases for planned inspection, modifications, repairs, and replacements, particularly for the PORV, surge line, and spray line nozzles.

4.7 PLANT CONDIDONS

• Plant to be in cold shutdown Almost all of the inspections and repairs are planned for the 1995 refueling outage.

• - The plant will be placed in cold shutdown. However, a walkdown is planned when the PCS is pressurized and will be perfonned during the very early stages of the outage.

• Potential need to drain loops If any repairs need to be perfonned on any of the loop penetrations, then the affected loop will have to be plugged and drained. Palisades outage management is aware of this possibility.

• Benefits offered by other plant conditions A full core offload is scheduled for 1995 Refout. This will support making necessary repairs to the loops because of a much lower shutdown risk.

Additionally, the 10 year ISi is also planned. Advantages from the construction side (scaffolds, removal of insulation, etc) and personnel requirements are recognized .

• 45

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 I 4.8 FACILITIES AND SITE LOGISTICS In support of Refout 1995, close coordination is required with Palisades Facilities Department. Trailer, office space requirements, equipment laydown area and training areas have to be planned in advance. Close attention should be paid to the following areas:

• Personnel overtime limitation

• Containment space constraints

• Equipment transport/setup and storage, maintenance areas

• Lack of accessibility - under head

• Lifting head due to crane considerations 4.9 COORDINATION WITH OTHER ACTIVITIES In order to best utilize our resources, the team will understand the major activities that will occur during Refout 95. This may allow cost sharing for certain elements of the

• project, or identifying actions that are common to multiple projects such as scaffold erection or common NDE inspections. These may impact or influence us primarily because of common work areas. Some of the major projects that are scheduled during the refueling outage of 1995 are shown by title below.

• WBS 35001 - Primary ISi Program

• WBS 61005 - CRD Seal Housings

• WBS 93510 - Vessel Fluence Monitoring Program

• WBS 40001 - Scaffolding Setup and Removal

• WBS 45050 - Insulation Removal

• WBS 40302 - Outage Shielding

• WBS 65010 - Install Radiation Reduction Shielding in Containment

• WBS 60065 - Permanent Shielding for 607' Containment

• Fuel Failure Root Cause

• Refueling (Fuel handling) 46

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 5.0 PROJECT BUDGET 5.1 COST ESTIMATE The cost estimate and supporting details are provided by the NECO PMC&T Project Controls Section and reviewed by the Project Manager and the Project Cost Engineer for scope and costs, respectively. See Section 8.1, "Project Cost Estimate." The Project Controls Section will review all estimates for adequacy and completeness and add owner's costs, contingency and other costs necessary to provide a complete estimate for budgeting purposes.

5.2 COST CONTROLS 5.2.1 Budgeting The Project Cost Engineer will be responsible for reviewing all costs associated with this project and will advise the Project Manager on all matters that affect project costs; This includes recommending budget revisions to the project with input from Project Team Members.

• 5.2.2 ReportinK Requirements The Project Controls Section will issue the following document to report job progress:

Project Cost Summary Analysis Report Frequency: Once each month.

Transmittal: Project Manager, Manager ofPMC&T, Project Controls Section Head and any person designated by the Project Manager.

Conterits: An analysis of the present budget status, expenditµres and revised forecast if necessary.

5.2.3 Accounting Department Interface The Project Cost Engineer will be the project's interface with the General Office and Palisades Plant Accounting Department.

5.2.4 Contractor Cost Reportin& Requirements The contractor(s) will be required to provide a detailed cost estimate of their work prior to commencement of work on cost plus contracts or a lump sum bid. Each week the contractor will issue a cost report indicating current and total expenditures, percent complete, productivity and revised forecast on cost plus contracts.

47

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 5.2.5 Cost Trending and Analysis

' The Contractor(s) will report trends and deviations on a timely basis as they occur for revised quantities, higher prices, changes in labor productivity, changes in scope and other requirements as necessary for all aspects of the project. These trends will be reviewed by the Project Cost" Engineer and included in any revised forecast, as well as providing recommendations to the Project Manager.

Memorandum of Changes on all contracts and purchase orders will be reviewed by the Project Cost Engineer prior to approval by the Project Manager.

5.2.6 Cash Flow Forecasting The Project Cost Engineer will provide an annual cash flow projection in the Monthly Project Cost Summary Analysis Report.

5.2.7 Material and Equipment Pricing Analysis Material and equipment pricing analysis will be provided by the Project Controls Section when appropriate.

• All requisitions* and purchase orders will be copied to the Project Cost Engineer for verification with the project budget.

48

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

' 6.0 6.1 PROJECT SCHEDULE

SUMMARY

SCHEDULE The Project Summary Schedule, or Level 2, depicts an overview of the entire project including design, procurement, construction, testing and project completion. See Section 8.2, 11 Project Summary Schedule."

• 6.2 DETAIL SCHEDULE The Detail Schedule, or Level 3, will evolve from the Project Summary Schedule. This schedule will use the Critical Path Method (CPM) to layout the project's activities in detail. Once a detailed schedule has been developed and reviewed by the project team, portions ofit may be "frozen". Freezing the schedule provides a guideline against which future progress can be compared. The Project Scheduling Engineer is responsible for developing and maintaining detail schedules for both engineering and construction phases of the project which will be integrated into the o~tage system window.

6.3 PROJECT SCHEDULE CONTROL

• 6.3.1 Method Artemis, or an equivalent scheduling software system, will be used to maintain the project schedule as a network of logically constrained activities. Project milestones or action items may also be tracked.

6.3.2 Update Frequency The Project Summary Schedule will be updated on a monthly basis for tracking overall project status. Project team members will report any schedule changes to the Project Scheduling Engineer prior to* the monthly project status meeting. As the project progresses, the Level 3 detail schedule(s) will be updated at intervals determined by the project team.

6.3.3 Monthly Schedule Analysis The Project Scheduling Engineer will report schedule performance to the project team on a monthly basis, throughout the project. This report will consist of a comparison of the current schedule and/or milestones to the baseline, or target, schedule.

6.3.4 Reportine Methods

• Progress reports and management graphics will be generated using Artemis or other software. Reports may be in the form of text, histograms, bar-charts or other graphics.

49

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• 6.3.5 Contractor Reporting Requirements The contractor will report progress at regular intervals to the Project Scheduling Engineer. Specific reporting requirements and time intervals will be determined by the project team. Additionally, the contractor is required to provide detail schedules on request.

50

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 t 7.0 APPROACH TO WORK 7.1 MANAGEMENT This project will strive to accomplish all its goals efficiently and meet its mission.

Management of this project will be focussed on achieving the mission by employing the developed strategies. Effectively implementing this plan in the areas of Engineering, Health Physics, Procurement and Construction will ensure the success of this project.

Additionally, a Self-ASsessment effort will also be undertaken to monitor and properly focus the project.

7.2 ENGINEERING 7.2.1 NDE Application for each type of Alloy 600 penetration The following groups of penetrations may be e~amined by the following NDE methods when they are scheduled for examination:

• Penetrations at the Primary Loops 0

Safety Injection Penetrations (4) to the cold legs are 12" nominal penetrations with butt welded Alloy 600 safe ends. The exam technique for these welds will be an enhanced ultrasonic examination and a dye penetrant examination of the exterior surface.

0 The shutdown cooling outlet nozzle safe ends and surge nozzle safe ends on the hot legs are of the same configuration as the safety injection nozzle safe ends. The exam technique for these welds will be an enhanced ultrasonic examination and a dye penetrant examination of the exterior surface.

0 RTD Nozzles on the hot legs and cold legs are welded at the loop ID with a "J" weld. These nozzles are in the less susceptible category and will be inspected by VT-2 only.

0 Letdown and drain nozzles are solid Alloy 600 nozzles which are full penetration welded directly into the primary loop piping. The exam techniques for these welds will be enhanced ultrasonic examination and a dye penetrant exam of the exterior surface.

0 The pressure measurement and sampling nozzles are full penetration welded directly into the primary loop piping. These welds will be examined by using enhanced ultrasonic techniques and a dye penetrant exam of the exterior surface.

• 51

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• 0 0

The spray nozzles on the primary loops are full penetration welded directly into the primary loop piping. These welds will be examined by using enhanced ultrasonic techniques and a dye penetrant exam of the exterior surface.

The charging inlet nozzles are full penetration welded directly into the primary loop piping. These welds will be examined by using enhanced ultrasonic techniques and a dye penetrant exam of the exterior surface.

• Penetrations of the Pressurizer 0

The new PORV nozzle safe end will be examined by ultrasonic examination techniques, radiography, and dye penetrant examination of the external surface.

0 The spray nozzle safe end will be examined by enhanced ultrasonic examination techniques, and dye penetrant examination of the external surface. The ID is planned to be remotely visually inspected for root weld repairs using a remote video camera installed through the spray head.

0 Safety valve nozzle flanges will be examined by enhanced ultrasonic examination techniques, and dye penetrant examination of the external surface .

0 Temperature element TE-0101 nozzle weld pad will be examined by ultrasonic examination techniques to establish the weld root geometry base line for use in future assessment. The pressurizer base metal corrosion within the TE-0101 penetration will be examined by ultrasonic examination technique. The temperature element TE-0102 will be examined using VT -2 examination.

0 The surge nozzle safe end at the pressurizer is of the same configuration as the surge nozzle safe end at the hot leg, and the same examination techniques will be used.

0 The heater penetrations on the pressurizer will be.examined by VT-2 examination.

• Penetrations on the Reactor Head 0

ICI flanges will be examined by eddy current to identify any indications. If indications are found, ultrasonic examinations and dye penetrant examinations will be performed to size the depth of the indications.

° Control rod drive penetrations will be examined by VT -1 for* leak indication using remote video camera. if possible; otherwise insulation removal and direct visual inspection will be performed .

• 7.2.2 Analysis

• Evaluate the continued service life of the repaired TE-0101 and TE-0102 nozzles.

52

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 0

Study and evaluate applicability of similar repairs 0

Revise the existing Code analysis for the TEs.

0 Provide assessment for boric acid corrosion in exposed pressurizer base material.

0 Provide PWSCC service life assessment for TE nozzles at the weld pads.

0 If replacement is required, support the modification package for replacing the TEs by providing the required stress analyses, 0

Provide engineering analysis support for the inspection acceptance criteria prior to the inspection process.

• Engineering analysis of the PORV safe-end replacement.

0 Perform design analysis for the new PORV transition piece.

0 Evaluate the results of Brookhaven National Laboratory's inspection of 1993 PORV safe end crack.

0 Assess degradation of carbon steel pressurizer shell (exterior) exposed to boric acid accumulation in the insulation caused by the leak identified in the 1993 REFOUT.

0 Provide engineering support for the modification process.

• Perform PWSCC service life assessment and inspection acceptance criteria of the pressurizer spray and surge nozzle safe-ends.

0 Perform PWSCC and fatigue life of various postulated initial crack sizes 0

Establish the allowable crack size for operation to the next refueling outage.

• Pressurizer Heater Capacity Study and Assessment of Heater Sleeves.

0 Explore the approach utilized by Calvert Cliffs for plugging some heater penetrations. Evaluate minimum number of heaters required per the Technical Specification for operation at Palisades.

• Evaluate Alloy 600 loop penetrations for repair/replacement.

0 Investigate industry experience on Alloy 600 loop penetration failures .

• ° Categorize and prioritize the various loop penetrations based on appropriate criteria.

53

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 I 0 Align with inspection/walkdown team and provide the necessary analysis support for criteria development and/or leak/crack detection.

0 Provide engineering analysis support for modification. packages as required.

• Assessment of CRDM penetrations 0

Evaluate leak detection requirements.

° Collect industry experience data on failure ofCRDM penetrations and probable root causes ..

0 Assess leak rate to establish expected boric acid accumulation from postulated reactor head penetration leaks.

• Engineering support for Mechanical Stress Improvement Program (MSIP) 0 Investigate industry experience in MSIP.

0 Provide engineering analysis to justify this stress enhancement process for licensing.

Evaluate the effectiveness of such a process on the service life estimation. Support

• 7.2.3 any effort to gain NRC approval of this method to obtain inspection interval relief Specification Chanee (SC)

SCs will be written to incorporate the modification design and implementation procedures for the contingency plans. It is expected that the Outside Support (see below) will provide the majority of the design calculation work and the procedures for installing the designs. The SC preparerwill be tasked with assembling all the required information and packaging per the plant procedures for a SC. The preparer will also be responsible for the reviews of the SC packages, i.e., 10CFR50.59 review, ALARA review, EEQ review, fire protection review, etc.

7.2.4 Outside Support Outside Support consists of design information from other CPCo personnel/departments and/or vendors that will provide the bulk of the analysis to support the modification.

Included in the information will be calculations to verify that design meets AS.ME code, ASME code reconciliations (as appropriate), installation instructions, etc. It is expected that there will be significant interfacing between the support and SC preparer to smoothen the inclusion of the design information into the modification packages. It is important that the vendor who would perform the modification be identified early in the project to allow sufficient time for the necessary design information to be developed and transferred to SC packages.

54

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• 7.3 PROCUREMENT The equipment and systems affected by this project are safety related, ASME Class I components. Therefore the procurement of materials and services to support inspections, evaluations and repairs will be subject to the most stringent quality requirements.

In support of the project Procurement Engineering will participate as an active member to help in defining the requirements, identifying qualified suppliers and assisting with the development of the overall procurement documents. These materials and services will be subject to acceptance under the CPCo Quality Program.

• 7.4 CONSTRUCTION The work implementation for this project will be managed by the NECO Construction Department. The work will include scaffold installation and insulation removal to the extent necessary to support both the replacement work and the inspections. Temporary shielding will also be included as directed by the Health Physics Department. The replacements will be completed as directed by the work authorizing documents and then insulation will be reinstalled and the scaffold removed. This will be sequenced as necessary to support required testing. The scaffold and insulation work will be performed by the onsite maintenance/modification contractors and the replacement work will be performed by BWNT. The NECO Construction Department will maintain overall responsibility for coordination of the work between contractors and other plant departments.

• 7.5 HEALTH PHYSICS

• Develop a database containing on-contact radiation dose rate measurements and general-area dose rates (12 inches) for each Alloy 600 location. It is intended to include man-hour estimates into this database when the information is available. Once man-hour estimates have been entered into the file, it will be possible to make person-rem dose estimates for any part or all the work.

• Videotape for each Alloy 600 location assists work planning and minimizes radiation exposure for work planners.

• Coordinating.Alloy 600 project actions with the In-Service Inspection (ISI) program to eliminate duplication of actions.

• Evaluate the utilization of remote video cameras to perform visual inspections. This may allow inspectors to perform their task from lower dose rate areas than those present in the area surrounding the penetrations.

• Evaluate the radiation shielding requirements for each location.

55

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

• Utilize mock-ups, pre-job briefings, and training to minimize the time spent in high radiation areas.

• ALARA reports written at other plants will be reviewed to glean lessons learned from their experiences.

• Evaluate a CRDM penetration visual inspection technique which does not require reactor head insulation removal. This method could potentially help limit personnel exposure ..

• New PCS loop insulation will be designed so that quick removal and replacement can be achieved which will minimize radiation exposure for future inspections.

• Locate the ICI penetration inspection control station out of the shine of the reactor head and utilize radiation shielding.

• The inspections of PCS loop pressure I

and sampling nozzles are scheduled after the removal of root valves for replacements on the sampling lines. These valves have high radiation dose'exposure. Removal of the hot spots associated with these locations will save considerable exposure for the subsequent inspections .

56

0 00

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1

' 8.1 PROJECT COST ESTIMATE 58

ATTACHMENT 8.1 PAGE 58.1

' PCS INCONEL PENETRATION INSP/REPAIR 1995 COST DATA

SUMMARY

REPORT

($X1 ,000) 1995 1995 1995 1995 EXPENSE BUDGET FORECAST VARIANCE ANALYSIS 0 0 S&L TECH SUPPORT 0 95 95 0 AE.A 0 75 75 0 BWNT ANALYSES 0 0 MOD/INSPECTIONS-BWNT 323 1000 1000 0 BWNT-EMERGENT REPAIR SUPPORT 0 250 300 50 TE NOZZLES 0 40 40 0 CONTR SUPP-T&B/PCI 0 350 350 0 CONTINGENCY ACTIONS 0 0 0 0 PRESS WALL-REPLACE INSULATION 0 100 100 0 CONSTRUCTION SUPPORT - NECO 0 100 100 0 ADV BOOKING -353 -323 -323 0 CEOGTASK 29 50 50 OTHER-EXPENSES 1 13 13 0 TOTALO&M COST 0 1700 1800 100 PCS INCONEL PENETRATION INSP/REPAIR PROCUREMENT OF CALIBRATION TOOLS

($X1,000) 1995 1995 1995 1995 EXPENSE BUDGET FORECAST VARIANCE MATERIAL-BWNT 0 0 TOTAL DIRECT COST 0 0 0 0 E&S OVERHEADS 0 0 0 0 G&A 0 0 0 TOTAL CAPITAL COST 0 0 0 0

PROJECT PLAN Rev. I

• 8.2 - PROJECT

SUMMARY

SCHEDULE 59

COMSUKllS 10Wll COK1AMY IUCllAI llGlllllllG AID COISTIUCTIOI OIGAlllATIOI PIOJlCT COITIOLS DlPAITKllT ALLOY 600 PROJECT SCHEDULE u~ Ul,.HT ACTIVITY ACTIVITY OUR. CURR START CURR FINISH 1995 NUMBER DESCRIPTION CAL ORIG START ORIG FINISH IAAY 15 122 ?q I II I~

., T? 1q ?(,

I I II 3 1n 17 ?4 43085040 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 6 5-JUN-95 5-JUN-95 I REPLACEMENT: MOVE EQUIPMENT IN CNMT 44 I I AND SETUP 43085070 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 6 5-JUN-95 6-JUN-95 2 REPLACEMENT: CUT EXISTING SAFE END 44 I D 2 INDZ ENDI I

43085080 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 6 6-JUN-95 6-JUN-95 I 3 REPLACEMENT: CUT EXISTING SAFE END 44 I 3

!PIPING ENDI 4 43085090 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 8 6-JUN-95 7-JUN-95 REPLACEMENT: PREP NOZZLE END 44 I D 4 5 43085100 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 6 7-JUN-95 8-JUN-95 I REPLACEMENT: PREP PIPE END 44 I D 5 6 43085110 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 16 8-JUN-95 9-JUN-95 I 0 6 REPLACEMENT: OVERLAY NOZZLE 44 43085120 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 16 9-JUN-95 12-JUN-95 7 REPLACEMENT: OVERLAY SPOOL PIECE 44 ~

D 7 8 43085130 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 6 12-JUN-95 12-JUN-95 I REPLACEMENT: CUT SPOOL TD LENGTH 44 I I 8 I

43085140 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 16 13-JUN-95 14-:JUN-95 9 REPLACEMENT: PREP SPOOL PIECE 44 0 9 43085150 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END I 14-JUN-95 14-JUN-95 I I0 REPLACEMENT: PT NOZZLE 44 I 10 I

43085160 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 2 14-JUN-95 14-JUN-95 I 11 REPLACEMENT: PT SPOOL PIECE 44 I 11 I

12 43085170 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END I 14-JUN-95 14-JUN-95 I 12 REPLACEMENT: PT PIPE END 44

~

43085180 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 3 15-JUN-95 15-JUN-95 13 REPLACEMENT: FIT SPOOL PIECE 44

• I 13 43085190 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 3 15-JUN-95 . I 5-JUN-95

• 14 REPLACEMENT: ESTABLISH ID PURGE 44

• I 14 15 43085200 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END REPLACEMENT: WELD ROOT !BOTH PIPE 44 4 15-JUN-95 15-JUN-95 *I I 15 END AND NDZ ENDI 16 43085210 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END REPLACEMENT: WELD NOZZLE TO l/2T 5 16-JUN-95 16-JUN-95

• I 16 44 17 43085220 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END REPLACEMENT: RT AT l/2T 44 4 16-JUN-95 16-JUN-95

• I 17 43085230 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 5 16-JUN-95 17-JUN-95 I 18 REPLACEMENT: WELD PIPE TO l/2T 44 I D 18 43085240 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 5 17-JUN-95 17-JUN-95 I 19 REPLACEMENT: COMPLETE NOZZLE WELD 44 I I 19 20 43085250 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 5 17-JUN-95 19-JUN-95 I I

• REPLACEMENT: COMPLETE PIPE WELD 44 20 I

I Att11c~~~~to;~'f

CONSUKllS row11 COK1ANY IUCLUI llOIMlllllO AID COllTIUCTIOR OIUAllZATIOI PIOJlCT COITIOLI DlPAITlllT ALLOY 600 PROJECT SCHEDULE

, ~~ vi= UAT~T ACTIVITY ACTIVITY DUR. CURR START CURR FINISH 1995 I II I! 11 II NUMBER DESCRIPTION CAL ORIG START ORIG FINISH \AAY t 5. ?2. ?CJ IS 12 19 126 3 10 L7 ?4 43085260 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 3 26-JUN-95 26-JUN-95 I 21 REPLACEMENT: FINAL RT EXAM IPERFORM 44 I 21 ON A SUNDAY IF POSSIBLEI 43085270 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 3 26-JUN-95 26-JUN-95 22 REPLACEMENT: FINAL PT 44 I 22 43085265 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 10 26-JUN-95 27-JUN-95 23 REPLACEMENT: SECTION XI IUTI EXAM 44 D 23 43085280 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 4 29-JUN-95 29-JUN-95 24 REPLACEMENT: CLEAN AREA 44 I 24 43085290 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - SAFE END 12 29-JUN-95 30-JUN-95 25 REPLACEMENT: REMOVE/PACK EQUIPMENT AND DEMOBILIZE FROM SITE 44 D 25 I

I I

I I

,_ Attechment 8.2

~~~-

-- P,,a,., 59 D. * * ' .~ *

.z

""111111111 CONSUHllS row11 COH1iNY IUCLEAI EHOINEEllHO AID COISTIUCTIOH OIUAllZATIOH rlOJECT COHTIOLS DEPAITNEHT ALLOY 600 PROJECT SCHEDULE ACTIVITY ACTIVITY DUR. CURR START NUMBER DESCRIPTION CAL ORIG START 43085810 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 10 30-MAY-95 30-MAY-95 26 INSPECTIONS: MOVE EQUIPMENT INTO 44 26 CNMT AND SETUP 43085930 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 50 31-MAY-95 5-JUN-95 27 INSPECTIONS: CROM ICI AND ICI VT-2 44 27 INSPECTION ITN TN-541 43085835 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 10 2-JUN-95 3-JUN-95 28 INSPECTIONS: TE-0101 BASE LINE 44 CORROSION INSP G WELD PAD ROOT D 28 GEOMETRY 43085820 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 20 3-JUN-95 5-JUN-95 29 INSPECTIONS: PZR. SPRAY NOZZLE 44 D 29 ITN-601 43085830 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 10 6-JUN-95 6-JUN-95 30 INSPECTIONS: PZR. SURGE NOZZLE 44 30 ITN-61 I 43085840 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 10 7-JUN-95 7-JUN-95 31 INSPECTIONS: PCS SURGE NOZZLE ITN-2031 44 a 31 43085850 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 10 8-JUN-95 B-JUN-95 32 INSPECTIONS: PCS SHUT DOWN OUTLET 44 32 NOZZLE ITN-204 I 43085940 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 40 8-JUN-95 12-JUN-95 33 INSPECTIONS: ICI EDDY CURRENT 44 33 INSPECTION IBe11l ITN TN-Bl 43085860 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 10 9-JUN-95 9-JUN-95 34 INSPECTIONS: PCS LOOP DRAIN NOZZLE, 44 34 HOT LEG ITN-2051 43085870 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 50 IO-JUN-95 15-JUN-95 35 INSPECTIONS: PCS SHUT DOWN INLET 44 C:::J 35 NOZZLE 14e11I ITN-232 - TN-2351 43085880 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 60 16-JUN-95 22-JUN-95 36 INSPECTIONS: PCS PRES./SAMPLING, 44 i==J 36 HOT LEG I I Oe11 I ITN-193 - TN-2021 43085890 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 10 23-JUN-95 23-JUN-95 37 INSPECTIONS: PCS SPRAY OUTLET 44 37 NOZZLE 12e11I ITN-218 - TN-2191 43085900 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 10 24-JUN-95 24-JUN-95 38 INSPECTIONS: PCS CHARGING INLET, 44 38 COLD LEG 12e11l ITN-216 - TN-2171 43085910 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 20 26-JUN-95 27-JUN-95 39 INSPECTIONS: PCS DRAIN NOZZLE, COLD 44 D 39 LEG 14e11l ITN-228 - TN-231 I 43085980 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 20 27-JUN-95 29-JUN-95 40 INSPECTIONS: TE-IOI UT 44 INSPECTION/EXAM !AFTER PORV SECT. D 40 XI UT EXAM!

CONSUKElS lOWEl COKlANY IUtLUI llOIMllllMO AMD COMSTIUCTIOI OIOAlllATIOM PIOJlCT COITIOLS DlPAITMllT ALLOY 600 PROJECT SCHEDULE TNqPf I IN ACTIVITY ACTIVITY DUR. CURR START CURR FINISH 1995 TITTi\

NUMBER DESCRIPTION CAL ORIG START ORIG FINISH lAAY LI II l 5. 22 129 1'1 I? Fl ?h 1 1n 17  ::>4 43085920 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NDE 50 28-JUN-95 3-JUL-95 41 INSPECTIONS: PCS PRES./SAMPLING, 44 c:::::J 41 COLD LEG l8e11I ITN-220 - TN-2271 43085950 WBS 43085 ALLOY 600 - NOE 120 9-JUL-95 14-JUL-95 42 INSPECTIONS: PCS RTD J-WELD, HOT 37 42 LEG llOe11I ITN-206 - TN-2151 Att11chment 8.2 p,,Cl .. i;g_4 IUM o*** ' .r '

Layout: RPT1A-T8 Project: project_name

- Activity O.Crtptlon - 23 95 13 20 March 06 13 20 27 A rll 03 10 17 24 Ma 08 27Fcb~

15

.............. ENGINEERING - GENERAL: .............

ALLOY 600 ANALYSIS INPUTS (DRAFT)

ALLOY 600 ANALYSIS INPUTS (FINAL)

TE - SERVICE LIFE ASSESSMENT (FINAL)

TE - PAD FLAW EVALUATION (DRAFT)

---

'*4 .! j

~--;!!!!1-L__j__ _)ll1,2dy TE - PAD FLAW EVALUATION (FINAL)

FRACTURE MECHANICS CRACK GROWTH ASSESSMENT (DRAFT)

FRACTURE MECHANICS CRACK GROWTH ASSESSMENT (FINAL) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .,cb*

SPRAY/SURGE NOZ SERVICE LIFE ASSESSMENT (DRAFT)

SPRAY/SURGE NOZ SERVICE LIFE AsSESSMENT (FINAL)

L_J+v Project Miiestone: Englnurtng Completa

! Od1

...... POWER OPERATED RELIEF VALVE (PORV): .......

REPLACEMENT MATL ASSESSMENT SAFE END STRESS ANALYSIS DRAFT SAFE END STRESS ANALYSIS FINAL Project Miiestone: sc Package Developmen1 Complm SC PKG DEVELOPMENT ISSUE SC PKG FOR REVIEW PERFORM SC PKG TECH REVIEW INCORP FINAL SC PKG COMMENTS INSTALLATION PROCEDURE (PORV)

WELDING PROCEDURE (PORV)

ISSUE INSTALLATION PROCEDURE (PORV) FOR REVIEW ISSUE WELDING PROCEDURE (PORV) FOR REVIEW INCORPORATE INSTLN PROCED (PORV) COMMENTS INCORPORATE WELDING PROCED (PORV) COMMENTS CODE RECONCILATION DOCUMENT ISSUE CODE RECONCILATION DOCUMENT FOR REVIEW INCORPORATE CODE RECONCILATION DOCUMENT COMMENTS PROCUREMENT OF PORV MATERIALS Projec1 Miiestone: Material on Site/Receipt Inspected ;c--+l Od1 I

Attachment 8.2 Page 59.5

PROJECT PLAN Rev. 1 8.3 1995 REFUELING OUTAGE WORK TABLE This work table consists of preliminary information and is currently being updated to support Palisades Refueling Outage 1995 .

60

CONS~~~~~~~ PALISADES ALLOY 600 PROJECT Attachment 8.3 Page 60.1 PCS LOOP, RV HEAD PENETRATION DISTRIBUTION

.Revision Date: February 17, 1995 Loop 2B Loop IA 195 206 196 2rrl 202 e 199, 200 Hot Leg Hot Leg B A 208 193 209 210 194 E-50B I satety Injection Nozzle Loop 2A I RTD Pen-ons E-50A Steam

• I Steam Oen. Bowl Plugs Pressure & Sampling Steam Generator @ Smge Nozzle Generator*

e Hot Leg Drain B <ll o

Cold Leg Spray Nozzle I.onp Drain No7.7.le A

I C.old J.cg Charging l\07.7.lc

• ICIPcnctralion

+ CRD Penetration XYZ PCS Root Valve Loe.

CONSUMERS POWER CO. Attachment 8.3 PALISADES PLANT Page60.2 PALISADES ALLOY 600 PROJECT Pressurizer Penetration Distribution 65 62.

59. 57 I

• 63

• 60

• 64 67 Top Head

• 61

CONSUMER POWER CO.

PALISADES PLANT ALLOY 600 PROJECT REACTOR VESSEL HEAD ATTACHMENT 8.3 Page 60.3 INSPECTION TABLE Total Number of Components= 56 ORGANIZATION NECO SYSTEM ENGINEER NECO Pl.ANT SUPPORT B'IMT PC\ T&B CPCo E&TS RADIOLOGICAL SERVICE TASK~ER DA BEMIS J. C.NORDBY T. H. FOUTY R. lfJMPHREY D.L. RACINE R. lfJMPHREY N. A. CAMPBELL Component OuterDia Side I Weld Side2Weld Inspection Center line Insulation Contact Dose 12" Dose Component (Quantity) Location Scaffolding Weld Prep Weld Etching Shielding Notes ID (lnehe) Type Type Method Stamping Removal Rate(mR) Rate(mR) 11,.~1u... 11"''"'""'-'"'

1

,__ PENETRATION IC~1 Reactor Vessel Hlad 4.50 J BUTT ECT/UT NONE NONE YES NONE NONE 1200 600 2

,__ \C~2 Rn.ct or Vessel Head 4.50 J BUTT ECT/UT NONE NONE YES NONE NONE 1500 700 3 (8)

,__ IC~3 Reactor VnHI Had 4.50 J BUTT ECT/UT NONE NONE YES NONE NONE 1500 llOO 4

,__ IC~ Reactor VHsel Head 4.50 J BUTT ECTIUT NONE NONE YES NONE NONE 1000 llOO 5

,__ IC~5 Reactor Vessel Hud 4.50 J BUTT ECT/UT NONE NONE YES NONE NONE 1500 500 8

,__ IC~ Reactor VHHI Hlad 4.50 J BUTT ECT/UT NONE NONE YES NONE NONE 1500 500 1 YES NONE 1500 700 IC~7 Reactor Vessel Head BUTT ECT/UT NONE NONE NONE

- 8 4.50 J IC~ Reactor Ve*sel Head 4.50 J BUTT ECT/UT NONE NONE YES NONE NONE 1000 500 VVl'I I nvL "VU L.11"\.IVC 9

,__ PENETRATION CRD-01 Reactor Vusel Head 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE 10 Reactor Vnsel Head BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 11 (45)

CRD-02 3.50 J CRD-03 Reactor Vessel Head J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 12 3.50

- 13 CRD-04 Reactor Vettel Hu.d 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 14 CRD-05 Reactor VHMI Hlad 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 15 CRD-Oe RHctorVnHI Hud 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE* YES YES NONE NONE

- 18 CRD-07 CRD-OB Reactor VHMI Head Reactor Vettel Head 3.50 J BUTT BUTT VT-1 VT-1 NONE NONE YES YES YES YES NONE NONE NONE NONE

- 17 3.50 J

- 18 CRD-09 Reactor Vessel Head 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 19 CRD-10 Roador VuHI Head 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 20 CRD-11 Reactor Vassel Head 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 21 CRD-12 RHctorVnselHud 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- CRD-13 ReactorVosselHnd 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 22 23 24 CRD-14 CRD-15 Reactor Vetsel Head Reactor Vessel Head 3.50 3.50 J

J BUTT BUTT VT-1 VT-1 NONE NONE YES YES YES YES NONE NONE NONE NONE

..._ CRD-18 Ructor VHHI Hoad 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 25 28 27 CRD-17 CRD-18 Reactor Vesset Head Reactor Vo1HI Hoad 3.50 3.50 J

J BUTT BUTT VT-1 VT-1 NONE NONE YES YES YES YES NONE NONE NONE NONE

,..._ CRD-19 Reactor Vessel Head 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE 28

..._ CRD-20 Reactor Vessel Head 3.50 J BU1T VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE 29 VT-1 YES NONE NONE CRD-21 Reactor Venctl Htad 3.50 J BUTT NONE YES

PALISADES PLANT CONSUMER POWER CO.

ALLOY 600 PROJECT REACTOR VESSEL HEAD ATTACHMENT 8.3 Page 60.4 INSPECTION TABLE Total Number of Components= S6 ORGANIZATION NECO SYSTEM ENGINEER NECO PLANT SUPPORT ev.wr PCI T&B CPCaE&TS RADIOLOGICAi. SERVICE TASK~ER D.A.BElllS J.C. NORDBY T.H. FOUTY R.HUMPHREY D.L.RACINE R. HUMPHREY N. A. CAMPBELL Component OulerDia Side I Weld Side2Weld Inspection Centerline Insulation Contact Dose 12" Dose Component (Quantity) Location Scaffolding Weld Prep Weld Etching Shielding Notes ID (Inche) Type Type Method Stamping Removal Rate(mR) Rate(mR)

-- 30 31 CRD-22 RudorVnHI Head 3.50 J BUTT VT-I NONE YES YES NONE NONE CRD-23 RuctorVHMI Hl*d 3.50 J BUTT VT-I NONE YES YES NONE NONE 32 CRD-24 R1actor VnMI Hud 3.50 J BUTT VT-I NONE YES YES NONE NONE 33 CRD-25 RuctorVHMIHl*d 3.50 J BUTT VT-I NONE YES YES NONE NONE 34 CRD-211 ReactorVHHIHud BUTT VT-1

>-- 3.50 J NONE YES YES NONE NONE 3000 1000 35 CRD-27 ReactorVnwlHNd 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE 38 CRD-28 RHdor VHMI Head 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE 1800 700 37 CRD-211 RnctorVnMIHud 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE 2000 1000 3B CR[).30 Rnctor VnMI Hlad 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE 3000 BOO 311 CRD-31 RactorVntalHNd 3.50 J BUTT VT-I NONE YES YES NONE NONE

'° CR[).32 RudorVnHIHud 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE 41

-- CRD-33 RoadarVnHI Head 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE 42 CRD-34 RudarVnHIHud 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE 43 CR[).35 RuctorVnHI Had 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE 44 CR[).38 RoadorVnHIHud 3.50 VT-1 NONE YES NONE NONE

>-- J BUTT YES 45 R11dorVnHI Hud BUTT VT-I NONE

- CRD-37 3.50 J NONE YES YES NONE 48

- 47 CRD-38 RudorVnHIHoad 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 4B CRD-311 RudorVnHIHud 3.50 J BUTT VT-1 NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 411 CR[).olQ RHdor Vnoal Head 3.50 J BUTT VT-I NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 50 CRD-41 RoadorVnHIHud 3.50 J BUTT VT-I NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 51 CRD-42 R11ctor VnMI Head 3.50 J BUTT VT-I NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 52 CRD-43 Roador VHMI Head 3.50 J BUTT VT-I NONE YES YES NONE NONE

- 53 CRD-44 CRD-45 RHctorVnMIHud RaadorVHNIHud 3.50 3.50 J

J BUTT BUTT VT-1 VT-1 NONE NONE YES YES YES YES NONE NONE NONE NONE ll'Cl'\VIVR n~v~ ....

54 wa VENT Rtactor Venal Hlad 1.05 J BUTT VT-I NONE YES YES NONE NONE 55 LEAKOFF FLANGE

- se (2)

Olfort.O lmorl.O Rxf Rxf 1.05 1.05 J

J BUTT BUTT NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA

CONSUMER POWER CO.

PALISADES PLANT ALLOY 600 PROJECT PRESSURIZER NOZZLE INSPECTION TABLE ATTACHMENT B.3 Pogo 60.5 Total Nwnber ofCompononbl = 136 ORGANIZATION NECO SYSTEM ENGINEER NECO PLANT SUPPORT BWNT PCI T&B T&B CPCoE&TS RADIOLOGICAi. SERVICE Natn TASK OWNER DA BEMIS J.C. NORDBY T.H. FOUTY R. tfJMPHREY D.L. RACINE R. tfJMPHREY N. A. CAMPBELL Component OuterDia Wold I Weld2 lnspeclion Method Center lino lnlulBtion Weld Contact Dote 12* Dote Component ID Location Scaffolding Weld Etching Shielding (Quantity) (lnchc) Type Type Weld! 1111d Weld 2 Stamping Removal Prep Rate(mR) Rste(mR) rL" TE.0101 PRZ'.......,Hoad NO YES YES NO

~ TEMPERATIJRE 1.32 J PAD NA VTIUT YES 58 TE.0102 PRZ Sllol 1.32 J PAD NA VT-2 NO YES YES YES NO

• w***n RT/PT/UT-PSI YES YES

........... - -...................... Wiii'~

58 ~oco*=n PORV PRZ*-Hoad e.oo BUTT BUTT YES NO NO 200 120 ,,_.,,,cemert rL""rrv\1 60 *---*cm SPRAY PRZl....,Hoad 4.81 BUTT BUTT UT/PT UT/PT SIDE-1 YES YES" YES YES 1000 150 Refl'IOVW and romtd cnn.v head rLn~n~c e1 *-~*cm SURGE PRZLDMt"Hoad 13.00 BUTT BUTT UTIPT UT/PT YES YES YES YES YES

-,n "c**c*

,.B... VALVE NOZZLE RV-1039 PRZ*.._Hoad e.oo BUTT - UT YES NO YES NO YES NO 100 50 V.M> rwmovod ""w.o. 24413'08

~ RV-1040 PRZ*-Hoad 8.00 BUTT - UT YES NO YES NO NO NO 250 140 114 "L>*w< *en RV-1041 PRZ ,..._Head e.oo BUTT - UT YES NO YES NO YES NO 300 120 VaM> rwmovod bv W.O. 24413'05

~ LEVEL TAP LT.0103 PRZ*-Hoad 1.38 BUTT BUTT VT-2 VT-2 NO NO NO NO NO RT/PT In NOY.11193

~ LT.0102 PRZ*-Hoad 1.38 BUTT BUTT VT-2 VT-2 NO NO NO NO NO

..£.. LT.OIOIB PRZ.-Hoad 1.38 BUTT BUTT VT2 VT2 NO NO NO NO NO 118 LT.OIOIA PRZ ,._.Head 1.38 BUTT BUTT VT-2 VT-2 NO NO NO NO NO r L n w. . cn

~ LEVEL TAP LT.0103 PRZLowwH9ad 1.38 BUTT BUTT VT-2 VT-2 NO NO NO NO NO

,_!!!... LT.0102 PRZLoworHoad 1.38 BUTT BUTT VT-2 VT-2 NO NO NO NO NO

...IL LT.OIOIB PRZLoworHoad 1.38 BUTT BUTT VT-2 VT-2 NO NO NO NO NO 72 LT.OIOIA PRZLoworHoad 1.38 BUTT BUTT VT-2 VT-2 NO NO NO NO NO

'L' "~***

.E... SLEEVE (120) HEATER SLEEVE PRZLCMWHoad 1.1e J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.Ji. HEATER SLEEVE PRZ L1MW Head ue J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..1!.. HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHoad 1.1e J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..1!. HEATER SLEEVE PRZL-Hoad I.le J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..IL HEATER SLEEVE PRZLCMWHoad I.le J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..1!. HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHoad I.le J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..1!.. HEATER SLEEVE PRZL-Hoad 1.1e J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

...!!.. HEATER SLEEVE PRZLCMWHoad I.le J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

...!!.. HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Head I.le J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

...!!!.. HEATER SLEEVE PRZLowerHoad I.le J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHoad I.le J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

...!!.. HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHoad I.le J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

...!!. HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHoad ue J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

...!!!!.. HEATER SLEEVE PRZL-Hoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL

• YES NIA NIA

...!!.. HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lowor Head 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA BB HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHoad I.le J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

PALISADES PLANT CONSUMER POWER CO.

ALLOY 600 PROJECT PRESSURIZER NOZZLE INSPECJ10N TABLE ATTACHMENT B.3 Page 60.6 Total Number of Component.= 136 ORGANIZATION NECO SYSTEM ENGINEER NECO Pl.ANT SUPPORT BWNT PCI T&B T&B CPCo E&TS RADIOLOGICAL SERVICE NolH TASK Cl\MlER DA BEMIS J.C. NORDBY T. H. FOUTY R.HUMPHREY D.L. RACINE R. HUMPHREY N. A. CAMPBELL Component OuterDia Weld! Weld2 lnlpection Method Centerline llll11lation Weld Contact Dooe 12* Dose -

Component ID Location Scaffolding Weld Etching Shielding (Quantity) (Inch*) Type Type Weld! and Weld 2 Stamping Removal Prep Rate(mR) Rate(mR)

...!!. HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Hud 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..l!!... HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Head 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA JL HEATER SLEEVE PRZLowerHoad 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

,.lL HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Head 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Hud 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA J!_ HEATER SLEEVE PRZLowtrHud 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA J!L HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHud 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA J!L HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHud 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Head J SLIP VT-2

...E- 1.16 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA J!L HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Hud 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA J!L HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Hud 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZ LoworHud 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA J.Q!. HEATER SLEEVE PRZ LoworHud 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHud 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

,JJ!! HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Hud 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

...12! HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Head 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

...w. HEATER SLEEVE PRZLowwHud 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHead 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA t-1.QI HEATER SLEEVE PRZLowerHoad 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Hoad 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZLowtrHoad 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.JJ_Q. HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Hood 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA t-1!! HEATER SLEEVE PRZLowwHud 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

...ill. HEATER SLEEVE PRZ LoworHoad 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

,_ill. HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Hoad 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..!.!! HEATER SLEEVE PRZLowerHoad 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..!..!§. HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Head 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

,J1! HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Head 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.ill. HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Hoad 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

...!.!! HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Head 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Head 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA 120 HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Head 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

• lncludet mer platform for wcxk mide prasstrizer

CONSUMER POWER CO.

PALISADES Pl.ANT ALWY 600 PROJECT PRESSURIZER NOZZLE INSPECllON TABLE AlTACHMENT 8.3 Pago eo.7 TolBI Nwnber of Components= 136 ORGANIZATION NECO SYSTEM ENGINEER NECO Pl.NIT SUPPORT BV\ffT PC! T&B T&B CPCoE&TS RADIOLOGICAi. SERVICE Nol..

TASKO'l\INER DA BEMIS J.C. NORDBY T.H. FOUTY R.KJMPHREY D.L. RACINE R.KJMPHREY N. A. CAMPBELL Component OlllcrDia Weld I Weld2 lnlpeclion Method Center line lnlulalion Weld Contact Dole 12"Dol0 Component ID Localion Scaffoldins Weld Etching Shielding (Quantity) (Inch*) Type Type Weld! and Weld 2 Stamping Rem owl Prep Rate(mR) Rate(mR)

.fil HEATER SLEEVE PRZL-Hoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

_m. HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.m. HEATER SLEEVE PRZL_.Hoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.lli. HEATER SLEEVE PRZL-Hoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA Jl! HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Head 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA Jl!. HEATER SLEEVE PRZL-Head 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.ill. HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHead 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA Jl!. HEATER SLEEVE PRZL-Head 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZL-Head 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZL....,Head 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..ill HEATER SLEEVE PRZLaworHead 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA JR HEATER SLEEVE PRZL-Head 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.m HEATER SLEEVE PRZLowwHead* 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lowor Head 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..m. HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lowor Hlad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZ LowwHead 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.ill. HEATER SLEEVE PRZLowwHead 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA J.l!!. HEATER SLEEVE PRZLowarHead 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..lli. HEATER SLEEVE PRZL....,.Head 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZLowwHead 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.ill HEATER SLEEVE PRZLowwHead 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

_fil HEATER SLEEVE PRZLowwHead 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA Jil HEATER SLEEVE PRZLCNll<Head 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZ L..,...Head 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHead 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHead 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..ill HEATER SLEEVE PRZL-Head 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHead 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA jg_ HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Loww Head 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lowor Held 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.ill HEATER SLEEVE PRZL-Head 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES" NIA NIA 152 HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lower Head 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

" Includes inr platfonn !orwollc - prnswlzef

CONSUMER POWER CO.

PALISADES PLANT ALLOY 600 PROJECT PRESSURIZER NOZZLE INSPECilON TABLE Total Nwnber ofComponento = 136 ATTACHMENT 8.3 PagollO.B ORGANIZATION NECO SYSTEM ENGINEER NECO PLANT SUPPORT B1lllNT PCI T&B T&B CPCoE&TS RADIOLOGICAL SERVICE Notu TASK~ER DA BEMIS J.C. NORDBY T.H. FOUTY ft.HUMPHREY D.L. RACINE ft.HUMPHREY N. A. CAMPBELL Component OulerDia Weld! Weld2 bupodion Method Centerline Jnaulation Weld Conlact Dooe 12" Dooe Component ID Location Scaffolding Weld l!t.:hing Shielding (Quantity) (Inch*) Typo Typo Weld I and Weld 2 S-ping Remowl Prep IWe(mR) Rate(mR)

..!E HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.lli HEATER SLEE.VE PRZL-Hoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHud 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEE.VE PRZL.-Hoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.ill HEATER SLEE.VE PRZ LoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

...!.§!! HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEE.VE PRZ LoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

-1!! HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLawwHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

_!!! HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..ill HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..m HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA JM. HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLowwHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

_ill HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..w. HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..ID. HEATER SLEE.VE PRZ L....,.Hoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEE.VE PRZL-Hoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.lli. HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..!!! HEATER SLEE.VE PRZL-Hoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..lli. HEATER SLEE.VE PRZ LoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

...!11. HEATER SLEE.VE PRZ LUWW<Hoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.ill. HEATER SLEE.VE PRZ L....,.Hoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.ill. HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.J1! HEATER SLEE.VE PRZ LoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..ill. HEATER SLEE.VE PRZL-Hoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

...!.!! HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..ill. HEATER SLEE.VE PRZL-Hoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

._!!!!. HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

,J!l HEATER SLEE.VE PRZtoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

,JR HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHoad 1.16 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

,.!!! HEATER SLEE.VE PRZLoworHoad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA 18' HEATER SLEE.VE PRZ Lower Hlad 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

CONSUMER POWER CO.

PALISADES PLANr ALLOY 600 PROJECT PRESSURIZER NOZZLE INSPEc:nON TABLE Total Nwnber ofComponenll = 136 ATTACHMENT 8.3 l'oll"ll0.9

/

ORGANIZATION NECO SYSTEM ENGINEER NECO Pl.ANT SUPPORT BWNT PCI T&B T&B CPCo E&TS RADIOLOGICAL SERVICE. Noles TASK O'.l.WER DA BEMIS J.C. NORDBY T.H.FOUTY R.HUMPHREY D.L. RACINE R.HUMPHREY N. A. CAMPBELL Component OutcrDia Weld I Weld2 JmpeotionMothod Centerline lmulation Weld ConlBct Dooe 12' Dooe Component ID Location Scaffolding Weld EtchiJl3 Shielding (Quantity) (lnche) Type Type Weldl and Weld 2 Stampinjj Remowl Ptei> Rate(mR) Rate(mR)

.m HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHud 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA* PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZLoworHud 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.m. HEATER SLEEVE PRZL-Hud 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

..!!!!!. HEATER SLEEVE PRZLcMwHud 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

~ HEATER SLEEVE PRZL-Hud 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

...!.!!!.. HEATER SLEEVE PRZLDMrHud 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

.ID. HEATER SLEEVE PRZ Lowor Hud 1.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA 192 HEATER SLEEVE PRZ LoworHud t.18 J SLIP VT-2 NIA PARTIAL YES NIA NIA

CONSUMER POWER CO.

PAIJSADF.S PLANT ALLOY 600 PROJECT PCS LOOP N01Zl.E INSPECTION TABU!

ATIACHMENT 8.3 Pago 60.10 Tau1Nwmaof~=59 ORGANZATION IECOSYSTEllEJQEER RADIOl.OGICAI.

IECO PLANT SUPPORT BWNT PCI T&B CPCoE&TS t£ALTH PHYSICS SERI/ICE TASKOW£R DA.IBIS J.C. NORDBY T.H.FOUTY R.~ DJ..RACINE R. HUllPHR£Y N. A. CAMPUELL Cocq>onat Oula'Dia Oriaulion Weld I Inspection Mclhod Caurline Jnsulatioo CodactDosc ll"Dosc Ccxq>oocD(QuatiitY) Locatioo Weldl'f>>>c Scalfoldq Weldl'Rp Weld Eldling Shielllq Noles ID (Indio) Aqjle(DEG) 1)pc Weld I ond Weld2 Slan1'~ Ranowl IWc(mR) JWc()nll)

~_ .. ii;;...,,-"...~"~"

,fil. SAMPLING DPT-Ot12A HolleaA 1.26 OODEO. FULL BUTT UT..T UTO'T -n..1 YES YES YES WEl.J>.I llODO 6GO Smll--hwlhollN

~

(10) DPT-01128 IMnlL.,.A .... 135~0. FULL BUTT UT..T UTO'T -n..1 YES YES YES WEl.J>.I 200

~

..!!!§.

DPT-OU2C DPT-01120 Hol LIMA HolleaA

• - 225N=G.

1.26 IJ11SDEG.

FULL fill BUTT BUTT UTO'T UTn:>T UT.-Y UTA'T

-~.

YES YES YES YES YES YES

, WEl.J>.I WEl.J>.I 2000 lllOOO 200 1000 J!1 DPT-0122A Hol Lea II 1.26 '5DEO. FULL BUTT UT..T UT..T -~. YES NO YES WEl.J>.t

- 1000

,.!!!. HolleaB 1.26 13&DEO.

FULL BUTT UT..T UT..T DPT..01228 ~n..1 YES NO YES WEl.J>.I 300 200

~o.

1-e .-.n..,

~ DPT-0122C 1 ... 1.26 1. . . BUTT UTO'T UT..T YES NO YES WEl.J>.I 1000 200 I ..wL.,.11

,l!'J!. DPT-01220 1.26 310DEO. BUTT UT..T UT..T -n..* YES NO YES .-.n.., 10000 6GO

.... ,_a

~ Sl-tlmA 1.26

.... 'A\JTT UT.-T UT.-Y .-.n..1 YES NO YES WEl.J>.I 100 200 202 SURGE(1)

---*:::::..*',:,,_..._..,,,... ~

Sl-1012 SU<OE I HolloaA Hal loaA 1-9 1.20 ODEO.

13.DD tooe:o.

~o.

BUTT BUTT BUTT UT.-T UTO'T UTO'T UT"'7

.-.n..1

.-.n..1

.. - - 1 YES YES NO YES YES YES WEl.J>.I WEl.J>.I ...

1000 100 100 SDCOUT 1 .... 12.75 1. . . . BUTT BUTT UT..T UT"'T YES NO YES WEl.J>.I 200 205 HOT LEG DRAIN ( 1 ) DRAll I "'"LoaA 2.38 2701'lFO. FULL BUTT UT..T UT..T YES YES WEl.J>.I 2000 6GO NO l.!2!.

HOTLEGRTD TE-0111H l .... looA 1.25 ODEO, J SEAL VT-2 VT-* ND ~

NO ND NO ,,. 100 TE- ... -~

(10)

,.m. TC-lltt2HA I .... Loa& 1.28 o~n. J SEAL VT-2 VT-2 ND ""S NO NO NO 100 10

.a 1-n::_nt"- Hal LoaA 1.26 ODEO. J SEAL VT*2 VT-2 ND YES NO NO NO

""" 1211

~ 1E-Ott2HC HolLoaA .... IDDEO, J SEAL VT-2 VT-2 NO YES NO NO NO ,,. 100

~

~1t.,...,, HolloaA 1.25 ODEG. J SEAL VT-2 VT-2 NO YES NO NO NO 12" 100 I.ill. TE-Gt21H Hol*-a .... OOEO. J SEAL VT*2 VT-2 NO YES NO NO NO I.ill. TE-Ot22tiA Ho1*-e 1.26 QDEr:a. J SEAL VT-2 VT-2 NO ""S NO NO NO 200

..,!!!. TE-ol ...... Ho1*-e 1.26 ODEG. -~** VT*2 VT-* NO YES NO NO

.... ooeo.

.!l! TE-ol.....,, Hal*-~ J SEAL VT-2 VT-2 NO YES NO NO NO 1m

~

lwUL.u ........,_.'"""'"'..,.

NOZZLE TCJl122tc)

OIARGING HolloaB IA~--

1.26 ODEG.

2.38 *SDFO.

J FULL SEAL BUTT VT-2 UT..T VT-2 UT_.,T ..-~1 NO YES YES NO YES NO YES NO WELD-I 100 100 10 217 i-1!!

219

..m (2)

COLD LEG SPRAY NOZZLE CV-1057

( 2)

..................,.,.. ......._..... a.

SAMPLING OIARGING CV-1059 DPT-0112NC IA~-~

2A ............

18 ...........

2.38 415DEG.

) ... OD DEG.

UD 900EG.

1.26 415DEO.

FULL FULL FULL FULL BUTT BUTT BUTT BUTT UT..T UT..T UT..T UT"'7 UT.-Y UTAIT UT..T UT..T WEl.J>.I

-~1 YES YES YES YES NO NO YES NO YES YES YES YES WEl.J>.I WEl.J>.I WEl.J>.I WEl.J>.t 100 1000 300 200 ~-~

(8)

..m DPT-0112AIC 1 e - - 1.26 OODEO FULL BUTT UT..T UT"'T

.. - - 1 YES NO YES WEl.J>.I

..m. DPT-0112M> IA<>...., 1.26 1HN=G FULL BUTT llT. .T UT*T YES NO YES WEl.J>.t

.m.

.,,. OPT-0'129.0 IB<>"°"

1.26 1MDEG

'**~~

FULL

~

BUTT

-*~

UT..T

• ~-*

UT"'T

'~-*

WELD-I YES

-~

NO YES WEl.J>.I

• • ~*-

CONSUMER.POWER.CO.

PAIJSADF.S PLANT ALWY 600 PROJECT PCS LOOP NOZ2ll! INSPECl10N TAlllJl TolllNUJd>crof~cS9

• ATTACHMENT 8.3 Page60.11 RADIOLOGICAL ORGANZATION NECO 8'ISTEll B<<llEER NECO Pl.ANT SU'PORT B'MIT PCt T&B CPCoE&TS HEALTH PHYSICS SERI/ICE TASK OVl'NER DA. BElolS J.C. NORDBY T.H.FOUTY R. tf.M'HREY Dl..RACINE R. tf.M'HREY N. A. CAMPllEl1.

c_.(Qullllity) c_.

Loc&lion OWrDia Oriaulion Weld!

Wcld21)pc lnspc<tioo Mdhod ca... line Insulation Salfoldq Wcldi'rq> WcldElchq CodadDosc ll"Dosc Sbicldq NOies ID {lndlC) ~*(DEG) 1)pc Weld I llld Wcldl ~ing Rcmowl Ralc(ril) Ralc (mR)

..m.

..m.

DPT..0122NC DPT-0122&0 2 A - , .. 4150ER 1Uhf!G FLU FLU llUTT BUTT UT..T UT..T UT..T UTO'T WELJ).1 WELJ).t YES YES YES NO YES YES WELJ).t WELJ).t 211**- , ..

227 FLU

.. BUTT ur..r UT..T

""" YES WELJ).1

~o DPT-0122&0 1.20 WElD-1 YES LOOP DRAIN NOZZLE

..m. DRAIN tA- 2.311 270DEO. ~

BUTT UT..T UTO'T WElD-t YES NO YES WELD-1 20000 tOOO (4) ........

..m.

.m DRAIN 1B"'....._

2A"'.......

2.ll 27DDEG.

.... 27QnP'ft. ....

FLU lllUTT BUTT UT..T UT..T UT..T WEl"-t UT..T 1**-.,.,

YES YES NO NO YES YES WELD-1 1l!OOO tOOOOO 000

_ 29-- ur..r WELJ).1 1~-1

... ,, . ....... ,"'" llUTT

...,~.~

23t 2.30 27DDEG. ~* UTO'T NO YES l!OOO 100

.m.

NOZZLE SDCIT-42A 1A-- t>.OO DDEG. llUTT 1-~ ur..r UT..T WEll).t

""" YES

.m.

.Bi (4) ~w~

~W-42C

<N"W-420 ta---

2A--

13M ODEG.

t>.00 ODEO.

t>.00 ODEO.

-~

llUTT BUTT bWT

.mw.

UT..T UT..T UTO'T 1...... .,.,

UTO'T 1......... ,

YES YES YES YES -.............,

1--* 200 200 100 UT..T UTO'T

""" YES 100 llUTT ""S

.... ..... .... re.-..,-...-

COLDLEGRTD

..m. n:..n1t1a 1A.....,.__ 13"DEO J SEAL "'*2 VT-2 Nn NO NO

.m

.m

( 12) TE-G11t8 TE..0112CA

'TC-11,t.,,....

18""'....._

1A........._ .... '"""'"*

45DEO.

J J

SEAL SEAL

"'*2 VT-2 VT-2 VT-2 NO NO

""S NO NO NO NO NO .. . 40

..m. 18""'....._

1A _ _ _

. . DEG. J SEAL VT-2 VT-2 NO YES NO NO NO 120

~

.fil T&0112CC TE~n12CO 1e---

1.26 4&DEG.

1.26 13&DEG.

J J

SEAL SEAL VT-2 VT-2 VT-2 VT-2 NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 100 100 .

45

,.ID.

,2!! 1 TE-Gl21A TE-111218 28--

2A--- 1.26 '5DEG.

1.26 1l!IDEO.

J J

SEAL

~~

VT-2 VT*2 VT-2 VT-2 NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 100 100 100 100

,l!!

,l!!

TE-Gt~*

TE-01-.ro 2A--

29--

1.26 46DEG.

1.26 UDEG.

J J

SEAL SEAL VT-2 VT-2 VT-2 VT-2 NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 100 100 .

too

~

247

~*~--- '-**--**-

TE~t22CC TE-0122CO 2A---

29---

1.26 135DEG.

1.26 45DEG.

J J

SEAL SEAL VT*2 VT-2 VT-2 VT-2 NO NO YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO 120 100 .

100

~ PLUG BOWi.PLUG SGA 1.115 NEWl990 J NA VT-2 NA NA NA NA NA

.1!!

(4)

SGA 1.00 NEWtOM J NA NA NA ... NA NA NA NA

~ SOB 1.00 NEW1990 J NA NA NA ... NA NA NA NA 251 SOB 1.00 NEWl990 J NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA