ML17207A721

Advises That Mh Hodder & Tj Anderson,Counsel & co-counsel for Intervenors,Will Take Part in 791211 Visit to Util Sys Control Ctr

ML17207A721
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	12/07/1979
From:	Hodder M HODDER, M.H.
To:	Bauser M LOWENSTEIN, NEWMAN, REIS, AXELRAD & TOLL
References
NUDOCS 8001090102
Download: ML17207A721 (13)

Text

1131 N. E. 86 Street Niami, Pla. 33138 December 7, 1979 H1chael A. Bauser, Esquire Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, Axelrad and Toll 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036 Re: Plorida Power and Light Company (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2)

Docket Ho. 50-389

Dear Hr. Bauser,

Regarding the Dec. 11, 1979 visit to the FPL System Control Center, please be advised that, for the Intexvenors, only their attorneys plan to malice the visit. They are: myself and my co-counsel Terence J. Anderson.

7 rs tr ly, ~

rtin i. Hodder Counsel for Intervenors cc: Norman A. Coll, Esquire William D. Paton, Esquire Docketing and Service Branch I t c

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO>1NISSION BEF RE THE ATONIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Natter of )

)

FLORIDA POWER 5 LIGHT COMPANY ) DOCKET NO. 50-389

)

(St. Luci e Nucl ear Power Pl ant, )

Unit No. 2) . )

FLORIDA POllER 8( LIGHT CONPANY'S ANSlIERS TO INTERVENORS'NTERROGATORIES TO FLORIDA POWER 8( LIGHT COMPANY

1. How may system wide power failures or major electrical blackouts have occurred in the FPL system during the past 10 years'? For purposes of evaluation, please list any electric system disruptions that were either system wide, were considered major outages, consisted of so many scattered blackouts in close time sequence constituted a substantial system disruption, involved tripping off line of 'hat one or more power generating stations in the FPL system or resulted in the failure of on site power to any FPL generating plant. Please provide the date of the occurance or sequence of occurances, the duration of the outage and,the location of the affected areas.

The following is a summary of major disturbances on the FPL system during the past ten years:

FPL Date Duration Load Shed Area Affected 1/28/69 1 hr. 08 min. 255 Nll SM (system wide) 8/05/69 5 hr. 22 min. 568 I'1W SF (South Florida) 8/18/71 17 min. 131 NW SF 4/03/73 6 hr. 33 min. 1230 NM SF 4/04/73 3 hr. 36 min. 1330 NW SF 6/23/73 1 hr. 45 min. 2190 HW SW 12/08/73 2 hr. 22 min. 216 NM SF 3/01/74 2 hr. 04 min. 197 HW SW 4/25/74 1 hr. 39 min. 850 I'1W SW 6/28/74 56 min. 2250 NW SF 5/16/77 4 hr. 36 min. 1544 NW SF 5/14/78 8 min. 180 NW SF 3/17/79 20 min. 105 NW SM 4/04/79 20 min. 470 NW SW 5/04/79 43 min. 250 HM SW 6/21/79 17 min. 128 NW SF 8/03/79 18 min. 240 NW Sll

2. (Interrogatory ¹2 treats off site power failures with emphases on their effect on FPL power generating plants.) Please list all electric blackouts or power failures in the past ten years that caused an interruption in the flow of offsite power to any FPL electric generating plant site, whether operational at the time or under construction, repair, or in cold shutdown or standby condition. Identify with particularity, the date of the occurance, the identity of the plant so affected, the duration of the outage and the scope of the power failure in the FPL system as related to outage at the other FPL plants.

The following is a list of the disturbances which resulted in the loss of .

off-site power to power plants together with the restoration times, in minutes,

. encountered, in each instance.

Disturbance Power Plant 4/3/73 4/4/73 ~5/16 77 5/14/78 Cutler '30 40 Ft. Lauderdale 17 13 318t 98I 20 Pt. Everglades 22 43 15 5 17 Riviera 30 32 8t 17 St. Lucie 1* 8 17 Turkey Point 20* 23 5 43 53 5 77

• Restored off-site power to station bus though Plant Operator elected to remain on diesel power.

3. Please state, why, in its efforts to achieve greater system reliability the Florida Power and Light Company fails to provide a 500 kv intertie 'or greater to the Georgia Power Corporation and the eastern United States electrical grid system. Mould such an intertie or system of interties provide greater system reliability in the FPL system? If not why not?

A 500 kV tie with Georgia is still in the planning stages.. A 500 kV'intertie or system of interties would not provide greater system reliability'n the FPL system until additional transmission expansion now under way and planned is completed.

Transmission expansion now under way and scheduled for completion in 1980,-

includes a 230* kV tie to Georgia and 500 kV lines from Levee in the Miami area northerly through Andytown and Hartin (the sites for two new fossil generators) to Yiidway. These 500 kV lines will closely tie the entire South Florida area from our St. Lucie Plant to Dade County into a strong, tightly integrated network with further improvement in system reliability.

A further expansion of the 500 kV grid in Florida is presently scheduled for completion in 1985. A'ew 500 kV line will tie our Midway station to'a new" 500'K station.'to be built around Lake Poinsett.

4. Would provision of the 500 kv intertie to the Eastern U. S. electrical grid obviate the need for any additional generating capacity in the FPL system.

If the answer is affirmative, in increments of 250 kv per interties, how many megawatts of base load generating capacity in the FPL system would be obviated or a 250 kv interties, a 500 kv interties, a 750 kv interties?

Objection. This question appears to relate to the issue of need for power, which has been previously decided in these proceedings and 'is not presently pending before the Board.

5. The testimony of NRC Staff witness R. Fitzpatrick indicates the startup record of auxiliary diesel generators to provide emergency on site power at the St.

Lucie Unit 1 Power Plant is sub-standard. llhat reasons are known to the FPL Company for the existence of this sub-standard startup record. To what extent does the plants proximity to the oceanic marine environment affect the perfor-mance reliability of these diesel generators and what if any protective or remedial measures are being taken by the utility company?

The testimony of Robert G. Fitzpatrick does not indicate that the St. Lucie Unit 1 diesel generator startup record is "sub-standard". The testimony stated that the unavailability of the Unit 1 onsite systems had been greater than that considered acceptable by NRC staff guidelines which had been developed subse-quent to the licensing review of Unit 1 (Fitzpatrick Affidavit June 12, 1978,

p. 6).

Seven (7) failure to start incidents at St. Lucie Unit 1 are described in FPL prefiled testimony (Flugger P. 21).

The reasons for each of these incidents include a clogged air solenoid valve and air line, incorrect air valve alignment, turbocharger malfunctions (2),

dirty fuel rack linkage, overspeed trip not reset by operator, and dirty tie breaker relay contacts.

There have been no performance problems with the Unit 1 diesels as a result of proximity to a marine environment. The same type of engine is routinely used in marine service.

While Hurricane David approached South Florida, Charles Scheer, FPL corporate, spokesman is reported in the press to have stated "the Company would continue to operate the plants during a hurricane". (See Palm Beach Post, Thursday, August 30, 1979 P. C 2). Yet, during the pre-dawn hours as the hurricane approached, the Hutchinson Island site, FPL personnel decided to shut down the St. Lucie Unit 1 reactor. Why did this discrepancy in FPL point of view exist. Has the company changed or established policy such that it will shut down reactors during hurricanes? What is the FPL policy concerning reactor operation during passage of a major hurricane where landfall is projected to be in close proximity to the plant site? Specifically; why did the company shut down St. Lucie Unit 1 during the passage of Hurricane David?

'I FPL bases its decision on whether or not to operate its nuclear plants during a hurricane upon an evaluation of the storm's path and the forecasted qrid load. Hr. Scheer's statement was reported on August 30, 1979, before the path of the storm had been evaluated. A subsequent evaluation indicated the desirability for low generating capacity with the flexibility to accept rapid load changes and that these requirements could be better met by the fossil plants.. Therefore, the nuclear plants were placed in cold shutdown.

tl

~

7. It is reported in the Palm Beach Post of September I, 1979, that during the passage of Hurricane David at the St. Lucie site on Hutchinson Island, a construction crane segment toppled from the Unit 2 containment building and knocked out Unit 1's lead-in auxiliary transformer line. 1Jhat are the implications of this event as relates to plant safety and availability of on site power?

On September 3, 1979 during the passage of Hurricane David, a cable from the 2 construction crane fell across the lines between the "B" startup

'nit transformer and the switchyard. St. Lucie 1 is equipped with two startup transformers so offsite power was not lost.

At the time of these events the plant was in a cold shutdown condition (See response to question 6).

A sticking relay did not allow the "B" diesel generator to start automatically.

An immediate manual start could have been effected but was not required. A .

conservative procedure was followed to place the "B" diesel back in service.

The sticking relay was subsequently replaced.

Sufficient AC power was available onsite at all times via the "A" startup

'I transformer. The "A" diesel generator was available but was not required to start since offsite power had not been lost.

a

8. Please provide the test results and performance records of the St. Lucie Unit 1 auxiliary diesel generators for startup reliability up to the present date.

Please provide results originating from the first in-service date and notate all relevant date.

Objection. The terms "test results and performance records" are not defined.

The information to which they apparently refer is reflected in a substantial amount of material, some maintained at the plant site and some in Miami.

These include Licensee Event Reports, records of surveillance tests, and logbook entries. Provision of "test results and performance records", as requested, would therefore require the compilation of a substantial amount of materials Licensee Event Reports are available for inspection in the local Public Document Room.

FLORIDA POl<ER 8I LIGHT COMPANY Ey (

Orin F. Pearson, Director Licensing and Environmental Planning STATE OF FLORIDA )

) ss.

COUNTY OF DADE Orin F. Pearson, being first duly sworn, deposes and says:

That he is Director of Licensing and Environmental Planning of Florida Power 5 Light Company, the Permittee herein; That he has executed the foregoinq document; that the statements made in this said document are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief, and that he is authorized to execute the document on behalf of said Permittee.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this g~ nay ot 1979 I

t) I NOTARY PUBLIC, in and for the County of Da)e, State of Florida NOTARY WDLIC STATE OF FLORIDA a lLAIlGC~

AIY COMMISSION EXPIRES AVCOST', ii1%1 My COmmiSSiOn eXPireS: ~

DollDED THRU 11AY1IARD Bello!I4G AG-xcY

UNITED STATES OF ANERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COYif~iISSION BEFORE THE ATONIC SAFETY 5 LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Platter of: )

) "

FLORIDA POWER 5 LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-389

)

(St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, )

Unit 2) )

'CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I HEREBY CERTIFY that true and correct copies of the foregoing have been served this 7th day of December, 1979, on the persons shown on the attached service list by deposit in the United States mail, properly sta ped and addressed.

NO bl 'N A. COLL STEE HECTOR 5 DAVIS 1400 S.E. First National Bank Building Hiami, Florida 33131 Telephone: (305) 577-2863 December 7, 1979

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the Matter of: )

)

FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-389

)

(St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, )

Unit 2)

SERVICE LIST Mr. C. R. Stephens Edward Luton, Esquire Supervisor Chairman Docketing and Service Section Atomic Safety & Licensing Office of the Secretary Board Panel of the Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Michael C. Farrar, Esquire Michael Glaser, Esquire Chairman Alternate Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Appeal Board 1150 17th Street, 'NW Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20036 Washington, D. C. 20555 Dr. W. Reed Johnson Dr. Marvin M. Mann Atomic Safety & Licensing Technical Advisor Appe'al Board Atomic Safety & Licensing Board Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Washington, D. C. 20555 Richard S. Salzman, Esquire Dr. David L. Hetrick Atomic Safety & Licensing Professor of Nuclear Engineering Appeal Board University of Arizona Nuclear Regulatory Commission Tucson, AZ 85721 Washington, D. C. 20555 Alan S. Rosenthal, Esquire Dr. Frank F. Hooper Chairman Chairman Atomic Safety & Licensing Resource Ecology Program Appeal Panel School of Natural Resources Nuclear Regulatory Commission University of Michigan Washington, D. C. '20555 Ann Arbor, MI 48104

Mr. Angelo Giambusso William J. Olmstead, Esquire Deputy Director for Reactor Nuclear Regulatory Commission Projects Washington, D. C. 20555 Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 William D. Paton, Esquire Local Public Document Room Counsel for NRC Regulatory Indian River Junior College Staff Library Nuclear Regulatory Commission 3209 Virginia Avenue Washington, D. C. 20555 Ft. Pierce, FL 33450 Martin Harold Hodder, Esquire James R. Tourtellotte 1130 NE 86 Street Counsel for NRC Regulatory Miami, FL 33138 Staff Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C. 20555 Harold F. Reis, Esquire Lowenstein, Newman, Reis, Axelrad 5 Toll 1025 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D. C. 20036