ML16321A468

2016-10 Draft Outlines

ML16321A468
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	11/03/2016
From:	Vincent Gaddy Operations Branch IV
To:	Arizona Public Service Co
References
Download: ML16321A468 (56)

Text

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline - RO Form ES-401-2 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 10/28/2016 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G* A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Total

1. 1 3 3 2 3 5 2 18 Emergency &

Abnormal 2 1 1 2 N/A 1 2 N/A 2 9 Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 4 4 4 4 7 4 27 1 4 3 3 3 1 2 2 3 2 3 2 28 2.

Plant 2 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 10 Systems Tier Totals 5 4 5 4 3 2 2 3 2 4 4 38

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 Categories 3 3 2 2 10 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 Radiation Control K/A is allowed if the K/A is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 Category).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G* Generic K/As PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 EK2.2 Knowledge of the interrelations between 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor X the (Reactor Trip Recovery) and the following: 3.5 1 Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 Facilitys heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

AA2.23 Ability to determine and interpret the 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space X following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor 3.6 2 Accident / 3 Space Accident:

Criteria for throttling high-pressure injection after a small LOCA.

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

EA2.36 Ability to determine or interpret the 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X following as they apply to a 4.2 3 small break LOCA: Difference between overcooling and LOCA indications (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

EK3.13 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 X following responses as they apply to the 3.8 4 Large Break LOCA: Hot-leg injection/recirculation.

(CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

AK1.02 Knowledge of the operational 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 X implications of the following concepts as 3.7 5 they apply to Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): Consequences of an RCPS failure.

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret the 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 X following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor 3.1 6 Coolant Makeup: Failures of flow control valve or controller.

(CFR 43.5/ 45.13) 2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X indications to verity the status and operation of 4.2 7 a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12)

AA1. 07 Ability to operate and / or monitor the 000026 Loss of Component Cooling X following as they apply to 2.9 8 Water / 8 the Loss of Component Cooling Water: Flow rates to the components and systems that are serviced by the CCWS; interactions among the components.

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AK2.03 Knowledge of the interrelations 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control X between the Pressurizer Pressure Control 2.6 9 System Malfunction / 3 Malfunctions and the following: Controllers and positioners.

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

EK2.06 Knowledge of the interrelations between 000029 ATWS / 1 X the following and an ATWS: Breakers, relays, 2.9 10 and disconnects.

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7) 2.4.31 Knowledge of annunciator alarms, 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 X indications, or response procedures. 4.2 11 (CFR: 41.10 / 45.3) 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12)

Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 EK1.1 Knowledge of the operational 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main X implications of the following concepts as they 3.2 12 Feedwater / 4 apply to the (Loss of Feedwater): Components, capacity, and function of emergency systems.

(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

EA1.07 Ability to operate and monitor the 000055 Station Blackout / 6 X following as they apply to a Station Blackout: 4.3 13 Restoration of power from offsite.

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AK1.01 Knowledge of the operational 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 X implications of the following concepts as 3.7 14 they apply to Loss of Offsite Power:

Principle of cooling by natural convection.

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AA1.01 Ability to operate and / or monitor the 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 X following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC 3.7 15 Instrument Bus:

Manual inverter swapping .

(CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret the 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 X following as they apply to the Loss of DC 3.5 16 Power:

DC loads lost; impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems .

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

AK3.02 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 X following responses as they apply to the Loss 3.6 17 of Nuclear Service Water:

The automatic actions (alignments) within the nuclear service water resulting from the actuation of the ESFAS (CFR 41.4, 41.8 / 45.7 )

AA2.08 Ability to determine and interpret the 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 X following as they apply to the Loss of 2.9 18 Instrument Air: Failure modes of air-operated equipment.

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances / 6 K/A Category Totals: 3 3 2 3 5 2 Group Point Total: 18 PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 X 3.2 19 following responses as they apply to the Continuous Rod Withdrawal :

Manually driving rods into position that existed before start of casualty.

(CFR 41.5 / 41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 AA2.02 Ability to determine and interpret 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 X 3.9 20 the following as they apply to the Emergency Boration:

When use of manual boration valve is needed.

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 2.1.32 Ability to explain and apply system 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 X 3.8 21 limits and precautions.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.12) 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 AK3.01 Knowledge of the reasons for the 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 X 2.8 22 following responses as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum:

Loss of steam dump capability upon loss of condenser vacuum.

(CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13) 000059 Accidental Liquid Radwaste Rel. / 9 AK2.02 Knowledge of the interrelations 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 X 2.7 23 between the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Release and the following:

Auxiliary building ventilation system.

(CFR 41.7 / 45.7) 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 EK1.01 Knowledge of the operational 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 X 4.3 24 implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Inadequate Core Cooling :

Methods of calculating subcooling margin.

(CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

AA2.01 Ability to determine and interpret 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 X 2.7 25 the following as they apply to the High Reactor Coolant Activity: Location or process point that is causing an Alarm.

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 AA1.2 Ability to operate and / or monitor BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 X 3.1 26 the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Operations):

Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 2.4.35 Knowledge of local auxiliary CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 X 3.8 27 operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

CE/E09 Functional Recovery K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 2 1 2 2 Group Point Total: 9 PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 K6.02 Knowledge of the effect of a 003 Reactor Coolant Pump X loss or malfunction on the 2.7 28 following will have on the RCPS:

RCP seals and seal water supply.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45/5)

K1.06 Knowledge of the physical 004 Chemical and Volume X connections and/or cause-effect 3.1 29 Control relationships between the CVCS and the following systems: Makeup system to VCT.

(CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

A4.06 Ability to manually operate 004 Chemical and Volume X and/or monitor in the control room: 3.6 30 Control Letdown isolation and flow control valves (CFR: 41/7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

A4.02 Ability to manually operate 005 Residual Heat Removal X and/or monitor in the control room: 3.4 31 Heat exchanger bypass flow control.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the 005 Residual Heat Removal X impacts of the following malfunctions 2.9 32 or operations on the RHRS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

RHR pump/motor malfunction (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

K2.04 Knowledge of bus power 006 Emergency Core Cooling X supplies to the following: 3.6 33 ESFAS-operated valves.

(CFR: 41.7)

A1.03 Ability to predict and/or 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench X monitor changes in parameters (to 2.6 34 Tank prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRTS controls including: Monitoring quench tank temperature.

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a 008 Component Cooling Water X loss or malfunction of the CCWS will 3.4 35 have on the following:

Loads cooled by CCWS (CFR: 41.7)

K2.04 Knowledge of bus power 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control X supplies to the following: Indicator for 2.7 36 code safety position (CFR: 41.7)

A3.06 Ability to monitor automatic 012 Reactor Protection X operation of the RPS, including: Trip 3.7 37 logic (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

2.4.9 Knowledge of low 012 Reactor Protection X power/shutdown implications in 3.8 38 accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

K4.01 Knowledge of ESFAS design 013 Engineered Safety Features X feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which 3.9 39 Actuation provide for the following:

SIS reset.

(CFR: 41.7)

A1.02 Ability to predict and/or 022 Containment Cooling X monitor changes in parameters (to 3.6 40 prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the CCS controls including: Containment pressure.

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.5) 025 Ice Condenser K1.01 Knowledge of the physical 026 Containment Spray X connections and/or cause effect 4.2 41 relationships between the CSS and the following systems: ECCS (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K5.01 Knowledge of the operational 039 Main and Reheat Steam X implications of the following 2.9 42 concepts as the apply to the MRSS:

Definition and causes of steam/water hammer.

(CFR: 441.5 / 45.7)

K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a 059 Main Feedwater X loss or malfunction of the MFW will 3.6 43 have on the following: AFW system.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

K4.02 Knowledge of MFW design 059 Main Feedwater X feature(s) and/or interlock(s) 3.3 44 which provide for the following:

Automatic turbine/reactor trip runback (CFR: 41.7) 2.1.23 Ability to perform specific 061 Auxiliary/Emergency X system and integrated plant 4.3 45 Feedwater procedures during all modes of plant operation.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.2 / 45.6)

K2.01 Knowledge of bus power 062 AC Electrical Distribution X supplies to the following: 3.3 46 Major system loads (CFR: 41.7)

A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the 062 AC Electrical Distribution X impacts of the following malfunctions 3.4 47 or operations on the ac distribution system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Types of loads that, if de-energized, would degrade or hinder plant operation (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic 063 DC Electrical Distribution X operation of the DC electrical system, 2.7 48 including:

Meters, annunciators, dials, recorders, and indicating lights (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

K4.02 Knowledge of DC electrical 063 DC Electrical Distribution X system design feature(s) and/or 2.9 49 interlock(s) which provide for the following: Breaker interlocks, permissives, bypasses and cross-ties (CFR: 41.7)

K1.03 Knowledge of the physical 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X connections and/or cause effect 3.6 50 relationships between the ED/G system and the following systems:

Diesel fuel oil supply system (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K6.07 Knowledge of the effect of a 064 Emergency Diesel Generator X loss or malfunction of the 2.7 51 following will have on the ED/G system: Air receivers.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

A4.02 Ability to manually operate 073 Process Radiation Monitoring X and/or monitor in the control room: 3.7 52 Radiation monitoring system control panel (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

K1.09 Knowledge of the physical 076 Service Water X connections and/or cause- effect 3.0 53 relationships between the SWS and the following systems: Reactor building closed cooling water (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a 078 Instrument Air X loss or malfunction of 3.4 54 the IAS will have on the following:

Systems having pneumatic valves and controls (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the 103 Containment X impacts of the following 3.5 55 malfunctions or operations on the containment system and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations Phase A and B isolation (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

K/A Category Point Totals: 4 3 3 3 1 2 2 3 2 3 2 Group Point Total: 28 PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 001 Control Rod Drive K5.08 Knowledge of the operational 002 Reactor Coolant X implications of the following concepts 3.4 56 as they apply to the RCS:

Why PZR level should be kept within the programmed band.

(CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

A4.05 Ability to manually operate and/or 011 Pressurizer Level Control X monitor in the control room: 3.2 63 Letdown flow controller (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8) 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation X indications to verify the status and 4.2 57 operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12) 017 In-Core Temperature Monitor K5.01 Knowledge of the operational 027 Containment Iodine Removal X implications of the following concepts 3.1 58 as they apply to the CIRS:

Purpose of charcoal filters.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and X to the following: 2.5 59 Purge Control Hydrogen recombiner (CFR: 41.7)

K3.02 Knowledge of the effect that a 029 Containment Purge X loss or malfunction of the Containment 2.9 60 Purge System will have on the following:

Containment entry.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 Fuel Handling Equipment 035 Steam Generator 2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass X indications to verify the status and 4.2 61 Control operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12) 045 Main Turbine Generator PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

K3.01 Knowledge of the effect that a 055 Condenser Air Removal X loss or malfunction of the CARS will 2.5 62 have on the following:

Main condenser (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6) 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal 072 Area Radiation Monitoring K4.01 Knowledge of circulating water 075 Circulating Water X system design feature(s) 2.5 64 and interlock(s) which provide for the following:

Heat sink.

(CFR: 41.7) 079 Station Air K1.02 Knowledge of the physical 086 Fire Protection X connections and/or cause-effect 2.7 65 relationships between the Fire Protection System and the following systems:

Raw service water (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 2 Group Point Total: 10 PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 10/28/2016 Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

Knowledge of criteria or conditions that require plant-wide 2.1.14 announcements, such as pump starts, reactor trips, mode 3.1 66 changes, etc.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)

Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such as rotating 2.1.26 equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, 3.4 67 1.

Conduct of caustic, chlorine, oxygen and hydrogen).

Operations (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Knowledge of primary and secondary plant chemistry limits.

2.1.34 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12) 2.7 68 Subtotal 3 Ability to perform pre-startup procedures for the facility, 2.2.1 including operating those controls associated with plant 4.5 69 equipment that could affect reactivity.

(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10 / 43.5 / 43.6 / 45.1)

Knowledge of tagging and clearance procedures.

2. 2.2.13 4.1 70 (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Equipment Knowledge of the process for managing troubleshooting Control 2.2.20 activities. 2.6 71 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Subtotal 3 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to 2.3.12 licensed operator duties, such as containment entry 3.2 72 requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc.

(CFR: 41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10) l

3. Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed 2.3.15 radiation monitors and alarms, portable survey instruments, 2.9 73 Radiation Control personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

(CFR: 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.9)

Subtotal 2 Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation.

2.4.3 3.7 74 (CFR: 41.6 / 45.4)

4. Knowledge of general guidelines for EOP usage.

2.4.14 3.8 75 Emergency (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)

Procedures / Plan Subtotal 2 Tier 3 Point Total 10 PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A 1/1 025 G 2.2.12 The only surveillance procedure associated with a loss of RHR essentially boils down to asking what constitutes operability of the RHR system based on surveillance results, which would be SRO level knowledge. Reselected 025 G 2.2.44 1/1 009 EA2.38 Unable to create plausible distractors for EA2.38, Ability to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a small break LOCA: Existence of a head bubble.

Reselected 009 EA2.36.

1/1 027 AK3.04 Unable to create an operationally valid question with plausible distractors for 027 AK3.04, Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunctions: Why, if PZR level is lost and then restored, that pressure recovers much more slowly. Reselected 027 AK2.03.

Additionally, changed from a K3 to a K2 which makes the Tier 1 total for K2 and K3 4 items each instead of 3 K2 and 5 K3.

2/1 004 A4.04 Calculating boron concentration changes is not an evolution performed by ROs are PVNGS. KA is not operationally relevant to the RO position at PVNGS. Reselected 004 A4.06.

2/1 010 K2.03 PVNGS does not have PORVs. Reselected 010 K2.04 for pressurizer code safeties (in lieu of PORV).

2/1 078 K3.03 PVNGS does not have the ability to cross tie IA between units and none of the systems which can be cross tied are cross tied using air operated valves.

Reselected 078 K3.02.

2/1 005 A2.01 PVNGS does not have any RHR related components in which a transmitter failure would require action to be taken (in all cases, enhanced monitoring would be all that is required), therefore the correct answer to any written exam item would effectively be no action required. Reselected 005 A2.03.

2/1 073 A4.03 PVNGS does not have the ability to perform or observe source checks for operability demonstration from the control room. Additionally, this task is not performed by operations. Topic does not apply to PVNGS and is not operationally relevant.

Reselected 072 A4.02.

2/1 062 A2.06 PVNGS electric plant is designed such that one class bus can be powered from the opposite side EDG or ESF transformer as there are always 2 breakers separating the buses, making 062 A2.06 non-applicable. Reselected 062 A2.01.

2/1 103 A2.04 PVNGS does not have a Containment Evacuation alarm (retired in place).

Reselected 103 A2.03.

2/2 068 A4.02 PVNGS is a zero liquid radwaste release plant. The other A4 topics in liquid radwaste were not applicable and/or operationally relevant at PVNGS. This was the only A in Tier 2 Group 2 so KA was replaced with an A4 from 011 Pressurizer Level Control System. Reselected 011 A4.05 due to recent plant OE regarding misoperation of the Pressurizer Level Control System, specifically in regards to swapping the letdown flow controller between remote/auto and local/auto control.

2/2 086 K1.03 PVNGS has no direct connections between the Fire Protection System and the AFW System. Reselected 086 K1.02.

2/2 041 G 2.2.3 PVNGS has no design, procedural, or operational differences between units in regards to the Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control system. Reselected 041 G 2.2.44.

PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Written Exam Outline Rev 2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline - SRO Form ES-401-2 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 10/28/2016 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G* A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 Total

1. 1 3 3 6 Emergency &

Abnormal 2 N/A N/A 2 2 4 Plant Evolutions Tier Totals 5 5 10 1 2 3 5 2.

Plant 2 1 1 1 3 Systems Tier Totals 4 4 8

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 2 2 1 2 Note: 1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each K/A category shall not be less than two). (One Tier 3 Radiation Control K/A is allowed if the K/A is replaced by a K/A from another Tier 3 Category).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +/-1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted with justification; operationally important, site-specific systems/evolutions that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7. The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to Section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable K/As.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in a category other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note #1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43.

G* Generic K/As PVNGS 2016 NRC SRO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

ES-401 2 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000007 (BW/E02&E10; CE/E02) Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery / 1 000008 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 000009 Small Break LOCA / 3 X EA2.33 Ability to determine or interpret the 3.8 76 following as they apply to a small break LOCA: RCS water inventory balance and Tech-Spec limits (CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 000011 Large Break LOCA / 3 000015/17 RCP Malfunctions / 4 X AA2.10 Ability to determine and interpret the 3.7 77 following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): When to secure RCPs on loss of cooling or seal injection.

(CFR 43.5 / 45.13) 000022 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 000025 Loss of RHR System / 4 X 2.2.42 Ability to recognize system parameters 4.6 78 that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications.

(CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.2 / 43.3 / 45.3) 000026 Loss of Component Cooling Water / 8 000027 Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction / 3 000029 ATWS / 1 000038 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 000040 (BW/E05; CE/E05; W/E12) X 2.4.6 Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies. 4.7 79 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat Transfer / 4 (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13) 000054 (CE/E06) Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 000055 Station Blackout / 6 X 2.4.21 Knowledge of the parameters and logic 4.6 80 used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc.

(CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12) 000056 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 000057 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 000058 Loss of DC Power / 6 000062 Loss of Nuclear Svc Water / 4 000065 Loss of Instrument Air / 8 W/E04 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 W/E11 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 PVNGS 2016 NRC SRO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

BW/E04; W/E05 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of Secondary Heat Sink / 4 000077 Generator Voltage and Electric X AA2.05 Ability to determine and interpret the 3.8 81 Grid Disturbances / 6 following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: Operational status of offsite circuit.

(CFR: 41.5 and 43.5 / 45.5, 45.7, and 45.8)

K/A Category Totals: 3 3 Group Point Total: 6 PVNGS 2016 NRC SRO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

ES-401 3 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

E/APE # / Name / Safety Function K K K A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 1 2 000001 Continuous Rod Withdrawal / 1 000003 Dropped Control Rod / 1 000005 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 000024 Emergency Boration / 1 000028 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 000032 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 X 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant 4.7 82 performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12 / 45.13) 000033 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 000036 (BW/A08) Fuel Handling Accident / 8 X AA2.03 Ability to determine and interpret 4.2 83 the following as they apply to the Fuel Handling Incidents: Magnitude of potential radioactive release (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 000037 Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 000051 Loss of Condenser Vacuum / 4 000059 Accidental Liquid Radwaste Rel. / 9 000060 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 000061 ARM System Alarms / 7 000067 Plant Fire On-site / 8 X AA2.16 Ability to determine and interpret 4.0 84 the following as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: Vital equipment and control systems to be maintained and operated during a fire.

(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13) 000068 (BW/A06) Control Room Evac. / 8 000069 (W/E14) Loss of CTMT Integrity / 5 000074 (W/E06&E07) Inad. Core Cooling / 4 000076 High Reactor Coolant Activity / 9 W/EO1 & E02 Rediagnosis & SI Termination / 3 W/E13 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 W/E15 Containment Flooding / 5 W/E16 High Containment Radiation / 9 BW/A01 Plant Runback / 1 BW/A02&A03 Loss of NNI-X/Y / 7 BW/A04 Turbine Trip / 4 BW/A05 Emergency Diesel Actuation / 6 BW/A07 Flooding / 8 BW/E03 Inadequate Subcooling Margin / 4 BW/E08; W/E03 LOCA Cooldown - Depress. / 4 BW/E09; CE/A13; W/E09&E10 Natural Circ. / 4 PVNGS 2016 NRC SRO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

BW/E13&E14 EOP Rules and Enclosures CE/A11; W/E08 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 CE/A16 Excess RCS Leakage / 2 CE/E09 Functional Recovery X 2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room 4.4 85 indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.12)

K/A Category Point Totals: 2 2 Group Point Total: 4 PVNGS 2016 NRC SRO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

ES-401 4 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 1 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal 006 Emergency Core Cooling 007 Pressurizer Relief/Quench X 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and 4.5 86 Tank limitations in the facility license.

(CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) 008 Component Cooling Water 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control 012 Reactor Protection 013 Engineered Safety Features X A2.06 Ability to (a) predict the 4.0 87 Actuation impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the ESFAS; and (b) based Ability on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations; Inadvertent ESFAS actuation (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 022 Containment Cooling 025 Ice Condenser 026 Containment Spray 039 Main and Reheat Steam 059 Main Feedwater X A2.04 Ability to (a) predict the 3.4 88 impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Feeding a dry S/G.

(CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 061 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 062 AC Electrical Distribution 063 DC Electrical Distribution 064 Emergency Diesel Generator 073 Process Radiation Monitoring X 2.1.28 Knowledge of the purpose 4.1 89 and function of major system components and controls.

(CFR: 41.7) 076 Service Water 078 Instrument Air PVNGS 2016 NRC SRO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

103 Containment X 2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency 4.6 90 action level thresholds and classifications.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)

K/A Category Point Totals: 2 3 Group Point Total: 5 PVNGS 2016 NRC SRO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

ES-401 5 Form ES-401-2 ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Plant Systems - Tier 2/Group 2 (RO / SRO)

System # / Name K K K K K K A A A A G* K/A Topic(s) IR #

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 001 Control Rod Drive 002 Reactor Coolant 011 Pressurizer Level Control 014 Rod Position Indication 015 Nuclear Instrumentation 016 Non-Nuclear Instrumentation 017 In-Core Temperature Monitor X 2.1.27 Knowledge of system purpose 4.0 91 and/or function.

(CFR: 41.7) 027 Containment Iodine Removal 028 Hydrogen Recombiner and Purge Control 029 Containment Purge 033 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 034 Fuel Handling Equipment X K6.01 Knowledge of the effect of a loss 3.0 92 or malfunction on the following will have on the Fuel Handling System:

Fuel handling equipment.

(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7) 035 Steam Generator 041 Steam Dump/Turbine Bypass Control 045 Main Turbine Generator 055 Condenser Air Removal 056 Condensate 068 Liquid Radwaste 071 Waste Gas Disposal X A2.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts 3.6 93 of the following malfunctions or operations on the Waste Gas Disposal System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Use of waste gas release monitors, radiation, gas flow rate, and totalizer (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13) 072 Area Radiation Monitoring 075 Circulating Water 079 Station Air 086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals: 1 1 1 Group Point Total: 3 PVNGS 2016 NRC SRO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

ES-401 Generic Knowledge and Abilities Outline (Tier 3) Form ES-401-3 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 10/28/2016 Category K/A # Topic RO SRO-Only IR # IR #

2.1.15 Knowledge of administrative requirements for temporary 3.4 94 management directives, such as standing orders, night orders, Operations memos, etc.

1. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)

Conduct of 2.1.42 Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures. 3.4 95 Operations (CFR: 41.10 / 43.7 / 45.13)

Subtotal 2 2.2.21 Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability 4.1 96 requirements.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.2)

2. 2.2.38 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility 4.5 97 Equipment license.

Control (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13) 2 Subtotal 2.3.11 Ability to control radiation releases. 4.3 98

3. (CFR: 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10)

Radiation Control 1

Subtotal 2.4.8 Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used 4.5 99 in conjunction with EOPs.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

4. 2.4.9 Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident 4.2 100 Emergency (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat Procedures / Plan removal) mitigation strategies.

(CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)

Subtotal 2 Tier 3 Point Total 7 PVNGS 2016 NRC SRO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A 1/2 067 AA2.05 Ventilation alignments are primarily directed by the Fire Marshall, therefore KA is not operationally relevant to the SRO job function. Reselected 067 AA2.16.

2/1 103 G 2.4.8 Already a Tier 3 question on the SRO exam testing G 2.4.8 and could not find or create a question to address G 2.4.8 which was significantly different than the other G 2.4.8 question. Reselected 103 G 2.4.41.

1/1 077 AA2.09 No grid disturbances would result in an LCO entry regarding the EDGs (changing the operational status of the EDGs) resulting in all questions we attempted to write being at the RO level. Reselected 077 AA2.05.

1/1 009 EA2.14 Violations of P/T limits is only determined from a chart (RO knowledge) and the actions to be taken in the event of a P/T limit violation are also RO knowledge. No knowledge of this event meets the criteria in 10CFR55.43 for SRO knowledge.

Reselected 009 EA2.33.

PVNGS 2016 NRC SRO Written Exam Outline Rev 2

Administrative Topics Outline Facility: PVNGS Date of Examination: 10/28/16 Examination Level RO Operating Test Number: 2016 NRC Administrative Topic Type Code* Describe Activity to be Performed (see Note)

JPM: Determine actual Pressurizer levels in MODE 5 and determine if reference leg backfills are required.

Conduct of Operations D, R K/A: 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as (A1) graphs, curves, tables, etc.

IR: 3.9 / 4.2 JPM: Determine the minimum required flash protection boundaries and EPE to rack out a breaker.

Conduct of Operations K/A: 2.1.26 Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such M, R (A2) as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen, and hydrogen).

IR: 3.4 / 3.6 JPM: Determine if acceptance criteria is met for PPS instrumentation channel checks.

Equipment Control N, R (A3) K/A: 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

IR: 3.7 / 4.1 JPM: Determine the valves which should be used for a clearance which will result in the lowest dose to the workers.

Radiation Control M, R K/A: 2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards (A4) that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

IR: 3.4 / 3.8 Emergency Plan NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Admin JPM Outline ES-301-1 Rev 0

Administrative Topics Outline Task Summary A1 The applicant is provided with indicated Pressurizer level from three level instruments as well as current RCS temperature and pressure. The applicant will compare the data to graphs with a variety of data lines which they will use to interpolate the actual Pressurizer level per 40OP-9ZZ01, Cold Shutdown to Hot Standby Mode 5 to Mode 3. The applicant will then compare the three values to determine if reference leg backfills are required. This is a bank JPM.

A2 The applicant will use 01DP-0IS13, Palo Verde Electrical Safe Work Practices, to evaluate a series of matrices listing a variety of electrical evolutions and voltage ranges and their corresponding safety requirements. This is a modified JPM. The bank version of this JPM uses a 4.16kV breaker and this JPM was changed to a 480V breaker. Both the flash protection boundary and the minimum required EPE are different from the original JPM.

A3 The applicant is provided a list of indicated values for PPS related parameters which they will use to determine the maximum deviations between any two channels, and determine if the deviations are within the listed acceptance values per 40ST-9ZZM1, Operations Mode 1 Surveillances. This is a new JPM.

A4 The applicant is provided a drawing with sets of valves (both upstream and downstream) which could be used to isolate a valve that has a point source hot spot. The applicant will utilize the curie-meter rem rule and point source equations to determine total expected dose for each possible isolation and select the isolation resulting in the lowest dose. This is a modified bank JPM. JPM was modified by changing the distances of the potential isolations from the valve to be isolated resulting in a different answer than the original JPM.

PVNGS 2016 NRC RO Admin JPM Outline ES-301-1 Rev 0

Administrative Topics Outline Facility: PVNGS Date of Examination: 10/28/16 Examination Level SRO Operating Test Number: 2016 NRC Administrative Topic Type Code* Describe Activity to be Performed (see Note)

JPM: Determine the active/inactive status of 3 licensed operators.

Conduct of Operations N, R (A5) K/A: 2.1.1 Knowledge of conduct of operations requirements.

IR: 3.8 / 4.2 JPM: Determine the minimum required flash protection boundaries and EPE to rack out a breaker.

Conduct of Operations K/A: 2.1.26 Knowledge of industrial safety procedures (such M, R as rotating equipment, electrical, high temperature, high (A6) pressure, caustic, chlorine, oxygen, and hydrogen).

IR: 3.4 / 3.6 JPM: Determine LCOs entered and exited given a timeline of events.

Equipment Control D, R K/A: 2.2.40 Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a (A7) system IR: 3.4 / 4.7 JPM: Determine the valves which should be used for a clearance which will result in the lowest dose to the workers.

Radiation Control K/A: 2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards M, R (A8) that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

IR: 3.4 / 3.8 JPM: Determine EAL classification and fill out NAN Emergency Message Form.

Emergency Plan D, R K/A: 2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level (A9) thresholds and classifications.

IR: 2.9 / 4.6 PVNGS 2016 NRC SRO Admin JPM Outline ES-301-1 Rev 0

Administrative Topics Outline Task Summary NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank ( 3 for ROs; 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank ( 1)

(P)revious 2 exams ( 1; randomly selected)

A5 The applicant is provided a list of all watches stood by three licensed operators during the previous quarter. The applicant must compare the watches stood by each individual to the requirements in 40DP-9OP02, Conduct of Shift Operations, and determine whether or not each of their licenses are active for the current quarter. This is a new JPM.

A6 The applicant will use 01DP-0IS13, Palo Verde Electrical Safe Work Practices, to evaluate a series of matrices listing a variety of electrical evolutions and voltage ranges and their corresponding safety requirements. This is a modified JPM. The bank version of this JPM uses a 4.16kV breaker and this JPM was changed to a 480V breaker. Both the flash protection boundary and the minimum required EPE are different from the original JPM.

A7 The applicant is provided a timeline of events during which various related pieces of plant equipment are declared inoperable and restored to operable status. The applicant must determine which LCO conditions are entered and exited, and at what times those conditions are entered or exited, based on the provided timeline. This is a bank JPM.

A8 The applicant is provided a drawing with sets of valves (both upstream and downstream) which could be used to isolate a valve that has a point source hot spot. The applicant will utilize the curie-meter rem rule and point source equations to determine total expected dose for each possible isolation and select the isolation resulting in the lowest dose. This is a modified bank JPM. JPM was modified by changing the distances of the potential isolations from the valve to be isolated resulting in a different answer than the original JPM.

A9 The applicant is provided with plant conditions which require an EAL classification to be declared. They will utilize all associated E-Plan procedures to determine the correct EAL.

They will have 15 minutes to make the official declaration. When the event has been declared, they will fill out the NAN Emergency Message Form for the post-declaration notifications. They will have 13 minutes to complete the EP-0541 form (to allow time for the notifications to be made within the 15 minutes window). This is a time-critical, bank JPM.

PVNGS 2016 NRC SRO Admin JPM Outline ES-301-1 Rev 0

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: PVNGS Date of Examination: 10/28/16 Exam Level: RO SRO(I) SRO (U) Operating Test No.: 2016 NRC Control Room Systems (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function S1 001 (RO ONLY) Perform CEA Operability Check N, S 1 S2 013 Verify Recirculation Actuation Signal actuation A, D, EN, L, S 2 S3 006 Raise Safety Injection Tank pressure N, S 3 S4 003 Operate RCPs and seal bleedoff in response to a loss A, M, S 4P of NC S5 061 Loss of Turbine Water Cooling, Reducing Heat Loads A, D, L, S 4S on TC S6 022 Restoration of Containment Cooling D, L, S 5 S7 062 Perform contingency actions for verification of vital A, D, L, S 6 auxiliaries in SPTAs S8 015 De-energizing startup channels (40OP-9ZZ03, App D, L, N, S 7 section D.2.2)

In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)

P1 004 Align borated water source A, D, E, R 1 P2 006 Minimize release to the environment - condensate E, N 3 cross-tie isolation P3 028 Place Purge Exhaust in service E, D, R 5 RO: Will perform all simulator and in-plant JPMs SRO(I): Will perform all simulator and in-plant JPMs with the exception of S-1 SRO(U): Will perform S-2, S-4, S-5, P-2, P-3 1 of 4 PVNGS 2016 NRC RO & SRO JPM Outline ES-301-2 Rev 1

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature 1 / 1 / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow Power / Shutdown 1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/1/1 (S)imulator NRC JPM Examination Summary Description S1 The applicant will perform 40ST-9SF01, CEA Operability Checks, Section 6.1, Exercising CEAs at Power, following the replacement of an ACTM card for CEA 66. The applicant will select the correct CEA, select the correct mode of operation, insert the CEA a minimum of 5 (minimum required for the ST) not to exceed 6.6 (TS limit for CEA deviation) and withdraw the CEA back to the upper electrical limit. This is a new JPM and is covered by safety function 1.

S2 The applicant will be directed to perform 40EP-9EO03, LOCA, step 58, verification of RAS actuation. The applicant will determine that not all RAS actuated equipment automatically aligned to their actuated position and will take contingency actions in response to this condition. The applicant will have to identify the Train B ESF pump suction valve from containment, SIB-UV-675, did not open and stop the Train B HPSI and Train B CS Pumps. This is a time critical, alternate path, bank JPM and is covered by safety function 2.

S3 The applicant will be directed to raise pressure on Safety Injection Tank 1A per 40OP-9SI03, Safety Injection Tank Operations, Section 6.1, Pressurizing the Safety Injection Tanks to Establish or Maintain Normal Pressure. The applicant will align nitrogen to SIT 1A and commence raising pressure. The applicant must stop raising pressure after exceeding 615 psig (directed in cue) and prior to exceeding 625 psig (TS limit), and restore the normal nitrogen lineup. This is a new JPM and is covered by safety function 3.

S4 The applicant will be directed to perform 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water, Section 4.0, Nuclear Cooling Water, steps 5 and 6. The applicant will be required to perform the procedural diagnostic steps to determine what the cause of the loss of NC was (an 2 of 4 PVNGS 2016 NRC RO & SRO JPM Outline ES-301-2 Rev 1

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 inadvertent closure of an NC containment isolation valve), attempt to mitigate the event by reopening the containment isolation valve (wont reopen), and take the contingency actions to close the other two NC containment isolation valves, trip the reactor, stop all of the RCPs, and isolate seal bleedoff. One of the seal bleedoff isolation valves will fail to close and the applicant will have to isolate bleedoff using alternate means (closing the inside and outside seal bleedoff containment isolation valves and closing the bleedoff relief isolation valve). This is a time critical, alternate path, modified bank JPM and is covered by safety function 4P.

S5 The applicant will be directed to perform 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water, Appendix B, Minimize Cooling Load on TC, following a complete loss of Turbine Cooling Water.

The applicant will isolate SG blowdown, transition to auxiliary feedwater, trip the Main Feedwater Pumps, stop all Condensate Pumps and stop both Heater Drain Pumps. In the setup of the JPM, both TC pumps will be tripped, the reactor will have been tripped, and Auxiliary Feedwater Pump B will be tagged out. The cue will direct transitioning to Auxiliary Feedwater Pump N, which will not be able to be started due to one of the suction valves being seized closed. The applicant will determine that Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A is the only viable option and will manually start Auxiliary Feedwater Pump A to supply feedwater and allow tripping of the Main Feedwater Pumps. This is an alternate path, bank JPM covered by safety function 4S.

S6 The applicant will be directed to perform 40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendices, Appendix 17, Restoration of Containment Cooling. The applicant will have to restore chill water to containment, ensuring valves are operated in a particular sequence to ensure chill water reliefs do not lift, and reset and restart the appropriate Air Cooling Units to restore containment cooling. This is a bank JPM and is covered by safety function 5.

S7 The applicant will be directed to perform the Vital Auxiliaries verification per 40EP-9EO01, Standard Post Trip Actions. The applicant will determine that the Train B Class 4kV bus is de-energized with the B EDG running and EDG output breaker open. The applicant will utilize the Standard Appendix 115 hard card to take contingency actions to re-energize the Train B Class 4kV bus. Upon restoration of the bus, the applicant will then have to recognize that the associated Spray Pond Pump has not started automatically and start the pump manually within 2.6 minutes (time critical action). This is a time critical, alternate path, bank JPM covered by safety function 6.

S8 The applicant will be directed to de-energize startup channel NIs per 40OP-9ZZ03, Reactor Startup, Appendix D, Checking NI Overlap and Turning Off Startup Channels.

The applicant will de-energize high volts from the NIs, transfer detector display from startup channels to control channels, reset all trouble and high CPS alarms, and reset the Boron Dilution Alarm System (BDAS) alarm. This is a new JPM covering safety function 7.

P1 The applicant will be directed to align Charging Pump suction to the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) per 40AO-9ZZ19, Control Room Fire, Appendix G, Upper Auxiliary Building Actions. The applicant will enter the aux building and attempt to realign the Charging Pump suction by operating valves from their associated load centers, however CHE-HV-536, RWT Gravity Feed to Charging Pump Suction Valve, will not open at the load center 3 of 4 PVNGS 2016 NRC RO & SRO JPM Outline ES-301-2 Rev 1

ES-301 Control Room / In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 requiring local manual operation of the valve. The other valves in the sequence will operate as expected from their load centers. This is a time critical, alternate path, bank JPM covered by safety function 1.

P2 The applicant will be directed to isolate the Condensate Cross-Tie during a SGTL per 40AO-9ZZ02, Excessive RCS Leakrate, Appendix C, Minimize Release to the Environment, Attachment C-1, Condensate Cross-Tie Isolation. The applicant will locate and close or check closed nine condensate and/or auxiliary steam valves to ensure the contaminated water in the affected unit is not transferred to the other units. This is a new JPM covered by safety function 3.

P3 The applicant will be directed to place the Train A Purge Exhaust Unit in service per 40EP-9EO10, Standard Appendices, Appendix 19, Containment Hydrogen Control, Attachment 19-J, Placing Purge Exhaust in Service. The applicant will align air to the hydrogen recombiner, unisolate service air purge line to containment, and energize the purge unit duct heater to place the purge exhaust unit in service. This is a bank JPM covered by safety function 5.

4 of 4 PVNGS 2016 NRC RO & SRO JPM Outline ES-301-2 Rev 1

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: PVNGS Date of Exam: 10/28/16 Operating Test No.: 2016 A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T S A B S A B S A B S A B I C A R T O R T O R T O R T O M A T L O C P O C P O C P O C P U N Y M(*)

T P E R I U RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 3,4,5 3 5 4 4 2 R1 ,8 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 3,4,5 3 5 4 4 2 R2 ,8 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 3,4,5 3 5 4 4 2 R3 ,8 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 3,4,5 3 5 4 4 2 R4 ,8 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T S A B S A B S A B S A B I C A R T O R T O R T O R T O M A T L O C P O C P O C P O C P U N Y M(*)

T P E R I U RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 3,4,5 3 5 4 4 2 R5 ,8 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 R6 I/C 2,4,7 2,3,6 6 4 4 2 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 3,4,5 3 5 4 4 2 R7 ,8 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 R8 I/C 2,4,7 2,3,6 6 4 4 2 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T S A B S A B S A B S A B I C A R T O R T O R T O R T O M A T L O C P O C P O C P O C P U N Y M(*)

T P E R I U RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 2 1 1 1 I/C 3,4,5 3 5 4 4 2 R9 ,8 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I1 I/C 2,4,7 2,3,4 6 4 4 2 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I2 I/C 2,4,7 2,3,4 6 4 4 2 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I3 I/C 2,4,7 2,3,4 6 4 4 2 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T S A B S A B S A B S A B I C A R T O R T O R T O R T O M A T L O C P O C P O C P O C P U N Y M(*)

T P E R I U RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I4 I/C 2,4,7 2,3,4 6 4 4 2 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I5 I/C 2,4,7 2,3,4 6 4 4 2 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 3,4,5 2,3,6 8 4 4 2 U1 ,7,8 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2 0 2 2 RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 3,4,5 2,3,6 8 4 4 2 U2 ,7,8 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 4 T M P E O I L N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T S A B S A B S A B S A B I C A R T O R T O R T O R T O M A T L O C P O C P O C P O C P U N Y M(*)

T P E R I U RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 3,4,5 2,3,6 8 4 4 2 U3 ,7,8 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2 0 2 2 RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 3,4,5 2,3,6 8 4 4 2 U4 ,7,8 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2 0 2 2 RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 3,4,5 2,3,6 8 4 4 2 U5 ,7,8 MAJ 6,9 5,8 4 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 3,4,5 5 4 4 2 U6 ,7,8 MAJ 6,9 2 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Date of Exam: Operating Test No.:

A E Scenarios P V 1 2 3 - Spare 4 T M P E O I L N CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION T N I T S A B S A B S A B S A B I C A R T O R T O R T O R T O M A T L O C P O C P O C P O C P U N Y M(*)

T P E R I U RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 U7 I/C 2,3,4 3 4 4 2 MAJ 5,8 2 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 I/C 3,4,5 5 4 4 2 U8 ,7,8 MAJ 6,9 2 2 2 1 TS 2,5 2 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 U9 I/C 2,3,4 3 4 4 2 MAJ 5,8 2 2 2 1 TS 3,4 2 0 2 2 RX 0 1 1 0 All NOR 0 1 1 1 for I/C 1,2,3 2,3,7 1,2,3 5/3 4 4 2

,5,6 ,6 /4 Scn MAJ 4 4 4 1 2 2 1 3 TS 3,4 2/0 0 2 2

/0 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: PVNGS Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: 2016 NRC Exam Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 2% power, MOC, AFA-P01 OOS Turnover: Maintain steady state operations, transfer from B EHC Pump in service to A EHC Pump in service.

Event No. Malf. Event Type* Event Description No.

1 N (BOP) Transfer from EHC Pump B to EHC Pump A in service 2 I (ATC), TS (SRO) Pressurizer Level Transmitter RCA-LI-110X fails to 100%

3 C (SRO, BOP) Plant Cooling Water Pump trips, standby pump fails to auto start 4 I (SRO, ATC, BOP) Reactor Regulating System Thot fails high 5 I (SRO, BOP), TS Inadvertent MSIS (SRO) 6 M (ALL) Loss of Off-Site Power (trip initiator) 7 C (ATC, SRO) Full Strength CEA fails to insert on trip - emergency boration 8 C (BOP, SRO) B EDG Output Breaker fails to close 9 M (ALL) Aux Feed Pump AFN-P01 shaft shear

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 8 Total malfunctions (5-8) 3 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 4 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 2 Critical tasks (2-3)

PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 1 2016 NRC Exam Scenario 1 Overview Event 1 The BOP will transfer from EHC (Electro-Hydraulic Control) Pump B to ECH Pump A per 40OP-9CO01, Electro-Hydraulic Control System, Section 6.7, Shifting from Hydraulic Fluid Pump B to Hydraulic Fluid Pump A.

Event 2 Pressurizer level transmitter RCA-LI-110X will fail to 100%. The ATC will address the ARP due to level being ~ 70% higher than setpoint and letdown will isolate in ~ 45 seconds. The ARP will direct selecting the unaffected channel of level control. If letdown isolates, the CRS will direct the restoration of letdown after the unaffected channel has been selected.

The CRS will also address TS due to LT-110X being a PAMI indication.

Event 3 The running PW pump will trip on 86 lockout (overcurrent trip). The standby pump will fail to auto start. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water, and direct starting the standby pump manually.

Event 4 A Thot input to the RRS System will fail high. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ16, RRS Malfunctions, and direct the BOP to determine the failed transmitter at the RRS cabinet and select the unaffected channel. The CRS will also direct the ATC to take either MANUAL or LOCAL / AUTO control of pressurizer level since the remote setpoint will be failed high as a result of the Thot failure.

Event 5 A train A MSIS will occur resulting in a loss of Feedwater to both SGs. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Actuations, and direct the BOP to restore Feedwater using Aux Feedwater.

Event 6 When feed has been restored, a loss of off-site power will occur. This will result in a reactor trip. The CRS will enter 40EP-9EO01, SPTAs.

Event 7 The CRS will direct the ATC to commence emergency borating to the RCS. The ATC will have to use an alternate boration path due to the loss of power on the trip.

Event 8 The train B class 4kV bus will be de-energized due to the B EDG output breaker failing to close. The BOP will attempt to close the output breaker but will not be successful. As a result, he will have to direct an AO to emergency stop the EDG within 15 minutes due to running with no cooling water.

Event 9 8 minutes after the reactor trip, AFW pump AFN-P01 will experience a sheared shaft putting the crew in a LOFW event. Due to the B AFW pump being available (only AFW pump available) and power available on only the A train, the CRS will enter the Functional Recovery procedure. The CRS will direct energizing the B 4kV bus from the A EDG and restoring Feedwater with the B AFW pump.

PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 1 Critical Task # 1: Commence borating to the RCS at rate of 26 gpm within 15 minutes of the reactor trip due to less than all full-strength CEAs being fully inserted.

Safety Significance: Per the Time Critical Action Program, commence emergency boration (MODES 3

- 5) within 15 minutes due to minimum shutdown margin less than limit in COLR. With less than all full strength CEAs fully inserted, the SDM is assumed to be less than minimum required. Justification for the 15 minutes is from 40DP-9ZZ04, Time Critical Action Program. Justification for the 26 gpm limit is from Technical Specification Bases for LCO 3.1.1, SDM - Reactor Trip Breakers Open.

Cueing: The crew will have indication of the stuck CEA from the Rod Bottom Light for the CEA failing to illuminate on the trip as well as the CPDS (CEA Position Display System) indicating one CEA failed to insert on the reactor trip.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew will align Charging Pump suction from the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) and ensure adequate Charging Pump flow of greater than or equal to 26 gpm.

Adequate boration flow can also be seen using the CVCS System Diagram using an ERFDADS computer display.

Performance Feedback: The crew will have indication of boration flow by ensuring the Charging Pump suction has been aligned to the Refueling Water Tank and Charging Pump flow is 26 gpm.

Critical Task # 2: Restore power to Train B Class 4kV bus PBB-S04 and restore feed to at least one SG prior to reaching 0% wide range in both SGs.

Safety Significance: The crew will have to restore feed water to at least one SG to ensure adequate inventory in the SG(s) to remove decay heat from the core.

Cueing: The crew will have indication of a complete loss of feed water due to the MSIS stopping both Main Feedwater Pumps, AFA-P01 is OOS, AFN-P01 will experience a sheared shaft ~ 8 minutes after the reactor trip, and the loss of power to AFB-P01. There will also be indication provided by all feed water flow indicators indicating 0 gpm to each SG.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew will have to close breakers to connect the Train A and Train B 4kV buses, start AFB-P01, and open flow control valves to commence feeding at least one SG.

Performance Feedback: When the crew has restored power to AFB-P01, started AFB-P01 and aligned a feed path to at least one SG, the crew will have indication of feed flow to at least one SG as well as a rising trend on SG level(s), and depending on feed flow rate, a lowering trend on RCS temperature.

Critical Task # 3: Operate Auxiliary Spray and/or ADVs as necessary to prevent lifting primary safety valves.

PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 1 Safety Significance: Due to the loss of all feedwater and the requirement to maintain boration flow to ensure the reactivity safety function is satisfied, auxiliary spray and/or ADVs will be required to maintain RCS pressure less than the lift setpoint for primary safeties. Lifting of the primary safety valves would unnecessarily complicate the event, challenging the RCS inventory and pressure control safety functions.

Cueing: The crew will have indication of a loss of all feed water as well as the running Charging Pump (which they cannot secure due to the requirement to maintain a boration to satisfy the reactivity control safety function), and PZR level and pressure rising. The crew should recognize that action is needed to prevent lifting a primary safety valve.

Measureable Performance Indicator: The crew will operate controls for the Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray and/or Steam Generator ADVs as necessary while observing board indications for pressurizer level and pressure.

Performance Feedback: Board and computer indications of RCS pressure (primary safety valve lift setting of 2475 psig) as well as Primary Safety Valve position indicators on B04. The crew will demonstrate satisfactory performance by maintaining primary pressure less than the lift setpoint of the Primary Safety Valves (2475 psig).

PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 1 Turnover Plant Conditions:

2% power, MOC AFN-P01 supplying feed to both SGs Main Generator output breakers are closed to re-ring the bus, the MOD is open.

Equipment Out of Service:

AFA-P01 is OOS for bearing replacement.

Planned Shift Activities:

Maintain power stable as preparations are being made to place a MFW Pump online and perform a power ascension.

PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 1 DRIVER INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP RESET to IC-10 and run Scenario 2016 NRC Scenario 1 EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATOR VALUE 1 None None Transfer from B EHC Pump to A EHC Pump None None 2 MF CV14A RCA-LI-110X fails to 100% 100 Key 1 MF SW01B Plant Cooling Water Pump B Trip (10 sec delay) Trip Key 2 3 CM CPSW01 Plant Cooling Water Pump A fails to auto start FTAS Key 2 PWNP01 A_5 4 CM TRRX05 RCS Thot transmitter TT-111X fails to 650°F 650 Key 3 RCNTT1 11X_1 5 MF RP06B1 Train B MSIS actuation Actuate Key 4 5 MF RP06B2 Train B MSIS actuation Actuate Key 4 6 MF ED02 Loss of Offsite Power Loss Key 5 7 MF RD03K CEA 57 fails to insert on trip As-Is Setup 8 MF EG09B B EDG output breaker fails to close As-Is Setup 9 CM CPFW07 AFN-P01 sheared shaft (8 min delay) Sheared Rx Trip AFNP01_

1 PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 1 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: PVNGS Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: 2016 NRC Exam Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOC, AFA-P01 OOS Turnover: Maintain steady state operations, transfer house loads from the unit aux transformers to the start up transformers.

Event No. Malf. Event Type* Event Description No.

1 N (ATC) Transfer of House Loads from Unit Aux Xfmr to S/U Xfmrs 2 I (CRS, BOP) SG level transmitter fails to 53%

3 C (CRS, BOP, Inadvertent Train B CSAS ATC)

TS (CRS) 4 R (BOP, ATC) CEA 66 drop C (CRS)

TS (CRS) 5 M (ALL) ESD inside containment 6 C (BOP) SIAS/CIAS/MSIS fail to auto actuate 7 C (ALL) Train A CS Flow Control Valve SIA-UV-672 seized closed 8 M (ALL) Train B CS Pump sheared shaft

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 7 Total malfunctions (5-8) 3 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 Abnormal events (2-4) 2 Major transients (1-2) 2 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 4 Critical tasks (2-3)

PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 2 2016 NRC Exam Scenario 2 Overview Event 1 To support maintenance, transfer house loads from the Unit Aux Transformer to the Start-up Transformers. This is accomplished by energizing NAN-S01 from NAN-S03, and NAN-S02 from NAN-S04.

Event 2 SG #2 level transmitter LT-1122 will fail to 53%. The DWFCS will respond by reducing feed flow to SG #2 in an effort to lower level to the setpoint of 50%. The crew will take action per the ARP to place the faulty transmitter in bypass, restore SG level to the normal program band and place SG level control back in auto.

Event 3 An inadvertent CSAS will occur on Train B. The crew will enter 40AO-9ZZ17, Inadvertent PPS-ESFAS Actuations, to stop the CS pump, close the CS flow control valve and restore NC flow to containment, and set blowdown constants to zero. The CRS will address TS for the actuation and the containment isolation valves which were overridden and opened in response to this event.

Event 4 CEA 66 will fall to the bottom of the core. The crew will enter 40AO-9ZZ11, CEA Malfunctions, and commence a power reduction within 10 minutes. The crew will continue the power reduction to comply with the Core Operating Limits Report by reducing turbine load and commencing a boration.

Event 5 An ESD will occur inside containment. The crew will trip the reactor and enter 40EP-9EO01, Standard Post Trip Actions.

Event 6 SIAS/CIAS/MSIS will all fail to auto actuate at either 3 psig in containment or 960 psia SG pressure. The crew will manually actuate all 3 ESFAS actuations which will result in the BOP having to transition to AFB-P01 for feeding and ADVs for steaming.

Event 7 When containment pressure reaches 8.5 psig, CSAS will actuate. The crew will have to recognize that the Train A CS flow control valve is seized shut and the B CS Pump will not auto start due to actions taken in the earlier inadvertent CSAS. The crew will have to manually start the B CS Pump and open the B CS flow control valve. Additionally, the crew will have to manually close the Train B NC containment isolation valves which were overridden open in during the inadvertent CSAS earlier in the scenario.

Event 8 10 minutes after the reactor trip, the B CS Pump shaft will shear. The crew will have to recognize that they no longer meet the safety function for containment temperature and pressure control. The CRS will transition to the Functional Recovery procedure due to no containment spray flow and direct aligning the Train B LPSI Pump to the Train B CS header to regain spray flow into containment.

PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 2 Critical Task # 1: When the Main Steam Isolation setpoints are exceeded, ensure Main Steam Isolation has actuated prior to automatic AFAS actuation.

Safety Significance: MSIS ensures acceptable consequences during an MSLB or FWLB (between the steam generator and the main feedwater check valve) either inside or outside containment. MSIS isolates both steam generators if either generator indicates a low pressure condition or a high level condition or if a high containment pressure condition exists. This prevents an excessive rate of heat extraction and subsequent cooldown of the RCS during these events.

Cueing: The crew should recognize the failure of MSIS to actuate when containment pressure exceeds 3.1 psig OR when either SG pressure lowers to less than 960 psia (both are setpoints for MSIS).

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew will have to manually actuate MSIS by taking the four handswitches for each ESFAS channel actuation (on B05) to the actuate position. This can be confirmed by the red MSIS lights on the vertical section of B05 as well as the actuation logic lights for each actuation extinguishing on the horizontal section of B05. The AFAS actuation will occur at 25.2%

wide range in either SG and will be indicated by the red AFAS-1 (or AFAS-2) light on the vertical section of B05.

Performance Feedback: The crew will have indication of successful actuations by observing the red SIAS/CIAS/MSIS lights on the vertical section of B05 as well as the actuation logic lights for each actuation extinguishing on the horizontal section of B05, as well as by observing the actuated equipment for each ESFAS actuation going to its actuated position.

Critical Task # 2: Following a plant overcooling event, stabilize RCS Temperature and operate Safety Injection to prevent lifting the primary safeties.

Safety Significance: Following an ESD and subsequent SI injection into the RCS, if RCS temperature is not stabilized when the affected SG reaches dryout conditions, the subsequent heat up and repressurization will create a potential for PTS as well as raise RCS pressure to the point where primary safety valves lift, challenging the RCS inventory and pressure control safety functions.

Cueing: SG dryout will be indicated by a rise in affected loop Tcold and pressure in the affected SG approaching containment pressure. At this point, the crew should set and maintain a pressure band in the unaffected SG corresponding to the lowest Tcold reached in the affected RCS loop, +/- 50 psig.

Measurable Performance Indicator: When the crew identifies dryout in the affected SG, they will lower and maintain pressure in the unaffected SG to saturation pressure for the lowest Tcold observed in the affected loop, +/- 50 psig, and/or by throttling SI flow to minimize the addition of inventory to the RCS.

This critical task is satisfactory if pressure is controlled in the unaffected SG such that primary safeties remain closed.

Performance Feedback: The crew will have indication of RCS Tcold and pressurizer pressure being stabilized and under control. SG dryout will be indicated primarily based on Tcold starting to rise in the PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 2 affected loop as well as affected SG pressure approaching containment pressure. The status of primary safety valves can be observed using the safety valve position indicators on B04 as well as by observing primary pressure < 2475 psig.

Critical Task # 3: Manually close NCB-UV-401, NCW Containment Upstream Supply Isolation Valve, to ensure the containment isolation safety function is satisfied within 30 minutes of the CSAS actuation.

Safety Significance: Due to overriding and opening NCB-UV-401 in response to the inadvertent B CSAS earlier in the scenario, NCB-UV-401 must be manually closed to ensure containment isolation.

This will stop a potential degradation of any barrier to fission product release. Although in the ESD the containment isolation is due to steam pressurizing the containment, there is the possibility of steam generator tube leakage in the affected steam generator. Failure to adequately isolate the containment in the event of a failure of the RCS boundary to fission product release, may increase the potential for fission product release to the environment.

Cueing: Indication of the SESS alarm for the CSAS actuated valve failing to reposition due to being overridden. Manual action taken earlier in the scenario should also alert the crew that this valve will not reposition upon a CSAS signal.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew must take manual operator action on the B07 control switch for NCB-UV-401 to close the valve. Valve position on B07 will indicate the valve is closed following manual operator action to close the valve. The SESS alarm on B02 will also clear when the valve is taken to the closed position.

Performance Feedback: Valve position on B07 indicating the valve is closed following manual operator action to close the valve. The SESS alarm on B02 will also clear when the valve is taken to the closed position.

Critical Task # 4: Align LPSI for CS prior to exceeding Containment design pressure of 60 psig.

Safety Significance: Failure to maintain containment temperature and pressure control directly relates to the maximum pressure the containment might possibly reach after a large break LOCA.

Cueing: The crew will recognize the failure of the Train A CS flow control valve and the sheared shaft on the B CS Pump, resulting in zero CS flow.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew will lineup the B LPSI pump to the B CS header and start the LPSI Pump to initiate CS flow. Flow will not be indicated on the CS flow transmitter and will be verified using trends on containment pressure to validate adequate flow.

Performance Feedback: The crew will validate LPSI is providing adequate CS flow by observing a lowering trend of containment pressure using the ERFDADS computer terminal.

PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 2 Turnover Plant Conditions: 100% power, MOC.

Equipment Out of Service: AFA-P01 is OOS for bearing replacement.

Planned Shift Activities: Transfer NAN-S01 and NAN-S02 from the Unit Aux Transformer to the Start-up Transformers. Maintain steady state operations.

PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 2 DRIVER INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP RESET to IC-20 and run Scenario 2016 NRC Scenario 2 EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATOR VALUE 1 None None Transfer NAN-S01 and NAN-S02 None None to Offsite power 2 CM TRFW04SGNLT1122_1 SG Level Transmitter LT-1122 53 Key 1 fails to 53%

3 MF RP06H1 Inadvertent Train B CSAS Actuate Key 2 RP06H2 4 MF RD02I CEA 66 Drops to bottom of core 100 Key 3 5 MF MS01B ESD inside containment (5 10 Key 5 minute ramp) 6 CM BSRP01BSSG1PRLOAT_1 SIAS/CIAS/MSIS fail to auto Fail to auto Setup actuate actuate CM BSRP01BSSG1PRLOBT_1 CM BSRP01BSSG1PRLOCT_1 CM BSRP01BSSG1PRLODT_1 CM BSRP01BSSG2PRLOAT_1 CM BSRP01BSSG2PRLOBT_1 CM BSRP01BSSG2PRLOCT_1 CM BSRP01BSSG2PRLODT_1 CM BSRP01BSCNTPRHIAT_1 CM BSRP01BSCNTPRHIBT_1 CM BSRP01BSCNTPRHICT_1 CM BSRP01BSCNTPRHIDT_1 7 CM MVRH03SIAUV672_6 Train A CS Flow Control Valve Seized Rx trip SIA-UV-672 seized closed 8 CM CPRH05SIBP03_1 Train B CS Pump sheared shaft Sheared Rx trip (10 minute delay)

PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 2 Rev 0

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: PVNGS Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: 2016 NRC Exam Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOC, AFA-P01 OOS Turnover:

Event No. Malf. Event Type* Event Description No.

1 C (CRS, BOP) A Nuclear Cooling Water Pump trip, B fails to auto start 2 I (CRS, ATC, BOP) Loss of Non-Class Instrument Bus NNN-D15 3 C (CRS, ATC, BOP) B Nuclear Cooling Water Pump trip, Cross-Tie NC and EW TS (CRS) 4 M (CRS, BOP, 2B RCP HP Seal Cooler Leak (trip initiator)

ATC)

TS (CRS) 5 C (ATC, BOP) All actions to trip the Reactor from the Control Room fail 6 I (CRS, BOP) RRS Tavg fails low 7 C (CRS, ATC) Train A Class 4kV Bus PBA-S03 fault 8 C (CRS, ATC, BOP) B Train BOP-ESFAS Sequencer failure

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor, (TS)Technical Specifications Actual Target Quantitative Attributes 8 Total malfunctions (5-8) 3 Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 3 Abnormal events (2-4) 1 Major transients (1-2) 1 EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 0 EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 3 Critical tasks (2-3)

PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 3 2016 NRC Exam Scenario 3 Overview Event 1 The A Nuclear Cooling Water Pump will trip on 86LO. The B Nuclear Cooling Water Pump will fail to auto start. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water, and direct manually starting the B NC Pump to restore cooling flow to NC cooled components.

Event 2 A loss of Non-Class Instrument Bus NNN-D15 will occur. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ14, Loss of Non-Class Instrument or Control Power. As a result of the loss of NNN-D15, the crew will manually trip the A MFP.

Event 3 The B Nuclear Cooling Water Pump will trip on 86LO, causing a loss of all Nuclear Cooling Water. The CRS will enter 40AO-9ZZ03, Loss of Cooling Water, and direct cross-connecting A Essential Cooling Water with Nuclear Cooling Water to restore cooling water to the Nuclear Cooling Water essential loads. The crew will have 10 minutes to complete the cross-tie, and if this time requirement is not met, the crew will trip the reactor. As a result of the loss of NC, letdown will isolate and cannot be restored, requiring entry into 40AO-9ZZ05, Loss of Charging or Letdown, and the ATC will perform actions for extended operation without letdown.

Event 4 A HPSC leak will develop on the 2B RCP. The CRS will initially enter 40AO-9ZZ02, Excessive RCS Leakrate and 40AO-9ZZ04, RCP Emergencies, but when trip criteria is exceeded due to RCP 2B seal temperatures, the crew will trip the reactor and enter Standard Post Trip Actions.

Event 5 On the manual reactor trip, the reactor trip pushbuttons will fail to trip the reactor and actions at B01 (opening breakers for Load Centers L03 and L10) will be unsuccessful in tripping the reactor. The crew will dispatch an Area Operator to manually open RTCBs, which will successfully trip the reactor.

Event 6 On the reactor trip, RRS Tave will fail low, which will generate a Quick Open Block in the Steam Bypass system. Also, the Low Tave signal from RRS to DFWCS RTO Refill Demand will result in the SGs not being fed until manual operator action is taken to restore feed.

Feed can be restored either by taking manual control of downcomer valves, or manually starting AFB-P01 and aligning feed flow valves to restore feed water.

Event 7 One minute after the reactor trip, a fault will occur on the A Class Bus PBA-S03, de-energizing it and also leaving only one charging pump running.

Event 8 Once a SIAS occurs (either manually or automatically), the B Train BOP-ESFAS sequencer will fail to sequence the require loads onto the bus. The CRS will direct manually starting the B Train ESF equipment and auxiliaries.

PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 3 Critical Task # 1: Trip the 2B RCP within 30 minutes of the RCP 2B TRBL alarm due to the 2B RCP HP Seal Cooler Leak.

• NOTE: The reactor must be tripped prior to tripping the 2B RCP, and due to the failure of the reactor to trip from the control room, local breaker operation will be required to trip the reactor.

Safety Significance: Failure to trip the RCP within 30 minutes of a loss of cooling to the RCP will result in seal degradation and a maximum RCS leak rate of ~ 17 gpm from the degraded seal.

Cueing: The RCP 2B TRBL alarm on B04, 2B RCP HP Cooler Inlet Temperature > 250°F, procedural direction from 40AO-9ZZ04, RCP Emergencies.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew must take the 2B RCP handswitch to the STOP position.

T=0 will start when the RCP 2B TRBL alarm comes in due to the HP Seal Cooler Leak.

Performance Feedback: The 2B RCP handswitch taken to the STOP position, red START light extinguished, green STOP light illuminated.

Critical Task # 2: Restore feed water flow to at least one SG prior to lifting a primary safety valve and prior to reaching 0% wide range in both SGs.

Safety Significance: Failure to restore feed water to at least one SG will result in degradation to the RCS barrier due to the loss of heat removal and resultant lifting of primary safety valves.

Cueing: The crew should recognize the loss of all feed water flow due to RRS Tave failing low (MFPs will not feed in auto due to indication of low RCS temperature), the loss of Train A class 4kV bus (AFN-P01 loss of power), AFA-P01 being OOS, and the B sequencer failure which will prevent the auto start of AFB-P01 in the event the AFAS setpoint is reached. The total loss of feed water is also indicated by feed flow transmitters indicating 0 gpm on all available indications.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew can restore feed by either taking manual control of downcomer valves and manually feeding the SGs using Main Feedwater Pumps, or manually starting AFB-P01 and manually operating the B AFW flow control valves. Verification of primary safety valves remaining closed can be made using the safety valve position indicating lights on B04 or a primary pressure trend on ERFDADS. Verification of SG level can be made using SG level board indications or a SG level trend on ERFDADS.

Performance Feedback: The crew will have indication that they have restored feed water flow by observing feed flow indicators as well as observing a lowering trend in RCS temperature and rising trend in SG levels.

Critical Task # 3: Stop the intersystem LOCA from releasing to the environment by closing the NC containment isolation valves within 30 minutes of entry into 40EP-9EO03, LOCA.

Safety Significance: The longer the loss of coolant is not isolated, the greater the magnitude of the PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 3 unmonitored release of radioactivity to the external plant atmosphere. 30 minutes is based on the 15 minute requirement for Safety Function Status Checks in the ORP, one pass of SFSCs to identify the condition and one pass to correct it.

Cueing: The crew will have indications of an unmonitored release in progress due to radiation monitor alarms on RU-2 (A EW RM) and the NC Surge Tank Relief Valve will be lifting due to the in-leakage of RCS coolant.

Measurable Performance Indicator: The crew will close NC Containment Upstream Supply Isolation Valve NCB-UV-401, NC Containment Downstream Return Isolation Valve NCA-UV-402, and NC Containment Upstream Return Isolation Valve NCB-UV-403 to isolate the RCS leak from external atmosphere.

Performance Feedback: The crew will see the green CLOSE lights illuminate for NCB-UV-401, NCA-UV-402 and NCB-UV-403 as well as indication that the NC Surge Tank Relief Valve has stopped lifting.

PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 3 Turnover Plant Conditions: 100% power, MOC, 250EFPD Equipment Out of Service: AFA-P01 is OOS for bearing replacement.

Planned Shift Activities: Maintain power operations.

PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 3 DRIVER INSTRUCTIONS for SIMULATOR SETUP RESET to IC-20 and run Scenario 2016 NRC Scenario 3 EVENT TYPE MALF # DESCRIPTION DEMAND INITIATOR VALUE 1 MF CC01A Trip of the A NCW Pump Trip Key 1 CM PCC01N B NCW Pump fails to auto-start FTAS Key1 CNP01B

_5 2 MF ED13C Loss of NNN-D15 Loss Key 2 3 MF CC01B Trip of the B NCW Pump Loss Key 3 RF CC34 Throttles closed EWA-HV-53 to 90% open 90 Key 13 4 CM HXCV16 RCP 2B HPSC Leak 100 Key 4 RCEE05 D_2 5 MF RP04A ATWS Fail In Setup MF RP04C ATWS Fail In Setup MF RD12 ATWS Fail In Setup RF RP02 Open RTCB A Rack_Out Key 40 RF RP03 Open RTCB B Rack_Out Key 40 RF RP04 Open RTCB C Rack_Out Key 40 RF RP05 Open RTCB D Rack_Out Key 40 6 MF RX01 RRS Tavg Instrument Fails Low 0 Rx Trip 7 MF ED11A 86LO Fault on PBA-S03 (1 minute delay) Loss Rx Trip RF EG04 Emergency Stop the A EDG Trip Key 31 8 MF RP07B Train B BOP-ESFAS Sequencer Failure Fail SIAS CR B4CV16 Energizes the RCP 2B HPSC Inlet Isolation Valve Close Key 32 RCNHV4 49_1 CR B4CV16 Energizes the RCP 2B HPSC Outlet Isolation Close Key 33 RCNHV4 Valve 53_1 RF SW26 Normal Chiller B Panel Reset Depressed Key 12 RF SW27 Normal Chiller B Panel Local Depressed Key 12 RF SW28 Normal Chiller C Panel Reset Depressed Key 12 RF SW29 Normal Chiller C Panel Local Depressed Key 12 PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 Rev 0

Scenario Event Description NRC Exam Scenario # 3 CR MVCC04 Manually Closes NCA-UV-402 0 Key 14 NCAUV4 02_9 CR MVCC06 Manually Closes EWA-UV-145 0 Key 15 EWAUV1 45_9 CR MVCC06 Manually Closes EWA-UV-65 0 Key 16 EWAUV6 5_9 PVNGS 2016 NRC Exam Scenario # 3 Rev 0