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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML22335A2802022-11-0404 November 2022 11-4-2022 Email Transmitting Draft Questions Pertaining to Pilgrim ISFSI Exemption Request ML22270A0422022-09-26026 September 2022 Acknowledgement Email for Holtecs Request for Reporting Exemption with Regards to the Pilgrim ISFSI Annual Radioactive Effluent Release Report (Docket No. 05000293) ML22154A1622022-05-26026 May 2022 Letter and Email from Save Our Bay/Diane Turco Regarding Irradiated Water Release from Pilgrim ML22007A2602021-12-0606 December 2021 E-mail from P. Obrien, Holtec, to A. Snyder, NRC, on Pilgrim Effluent Discharge ML21287A6192021-10-14014 October 2021 E-mail from S. Phillips, MEMA, to A. Snyder, NRC, Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Consultation Response to Amendment Review for Emergency Preparedness ML21266A2512021-09-23023 September 2021 Consultation with Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Amendment Application for Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Levels ML21267A0012021-09-23023 September 2021 E-mail from A. Snyder, NRC, to A. Sterdis, Holtec, - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 20, Appendix G, Section Iii.E Acceptance Review ML21266A2772021-09-23023 September 2021 HDI Clarification of Exemption Requested from 10 CFR 20, Appendix G, Section Iii.E ML21257A3832021-09-15015 September 2021 E-mail from A. Snyder, NRC, to A. Sterdis, Holtec, - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Follow-on Request Re Request for Additional Information 2 Pilgrim - License Amendment Request Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Only Emergency Pl ML21211A5162021-07-22022 July 2021 Consultation Response from Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Pilgrim ISFSI Only Physical Security Plan ML21211A5912021-07-22022 July 2021 Consultation Response from Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Pilgrim ISFSI Only Technical Specifications ML21200A2352021-07-13013 July 2021 Consultation Request to Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Pilgrim ISFSI Only Technical Specifications ML21200A1522021-07-13013 July 2021 Consultation Request to Commonwealth of Massachusetts Regarding Proposed Pilgrim Isfi Only Physical Security Plan ML21176A1842021-06-25025 June 2021 Email from HDI Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Training ML21180A0582021-06-17017 June 2021 Email from Region I Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Inspection - EA-13-132 ML21097A0402021-04-0606 April 2021 E-Mail Consult with Commonwealth of Mass Re - Amendment Application - Physical Security Plan for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station L-20-092, Email Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station-Exemption from Annual Force-On-Force Exercise Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B,2020-12-10010 December 2020 Email Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station-Exemption from Annual Force-On-Force Exercise Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix B, ML20328A2982020-11-16016 November 2020 Response from Commonwealth of Massachusetts on No Significant Hazard for Pilgrim ISFSI Amendment to Address ISFSI II Dated November 16, 2020 ML20297A2372020-10-22022 October 2020 Request for Additional Information - HDI Fleet Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program ML20266G4032020-09-22022 September 2020 Acceptance Review Email - Request for Approval of HDI Fleet Decommissioning Quality Assurance Program, Revision 0 ML20163A6802020-06-11011 June 2020 Confirmation of the Scope of the Requested Regulatory Relief for Pilgrim Security Qualifications ML20280A1912020-04-17017 April 2020 Request for Additional Information- Clarifying Information for Pilgrim ISFSI Physical Security Amendment Application ML20269A3542020-03-0505 March 2020 CFR 26.717 Reports 2019 Transmittal Email ML19336A0302019-11-27027 November 2019 OEDO-15-00479 - Re 2.206 Petition Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Stations Current Licensing Basis for Flooding ML19336A0332019-11-26026 November 2019 OEDO-15-00479 - E-mail to Petitioner - 2.206 Petition Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Stations Current Licensing Basis for Flooding (CAC No. MF6460; EPID L-2015-CRS-0002)- Issuance of Final Directors Decision ML19331A1952019-11-21021 November 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - (External_Sender) Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Commonwealth Consultation Response - Amendment Regarding Site Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme ML19331A1732019-11-12012 November 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station -Consult with Commonwealth - Amendment Regarding Cyber Security Plan ML19331A1642019-11-0505 November 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station -Consult with Commonwealth - Amendment Regarding Site Emergency Plan and Emergency Action Level Scheme ML19331A1792019-11-0505 November 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - EA and Fonsi for Pilgrim Emergency Planning Exemption CY-19-007, LTR-19-0441 Henrietta Cosentino, E-mail SECY-19-0078 Request by Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station2019-11-0404 November 2019 LTR-19-0441 Henrietta Cosentino, E-mail SECY-19-0078 Request by Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc. for Exemptions from Certain Emergency Planning Requirements for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML19275H1962019-09-24024 September 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Consult with Commonwealth - Amendment Regarding Permanently Defueled Technical Specifications (PDTS) ML19239A0372019-08-26026 August 2019 E-mail from Entergy Dated August 26, 2019, Notification of Pilgrim License Transfer ML19239A0262019-08-23023 August 2019 LTR-19-0330 Janet Azarovitz, E-mail a Plea for More Time and Reasonable Discussion Including the Citizens of the Commonwealth in the Sale of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station ML19234A2072019-08-20020 August 2019 LTR-19-0328 Lawrence Delafield, President, Six Ponds Improv Assoc., Plymouth, Ma, Ltr Requests NRC to Postpone Consideration of Transferring the Licenses for the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Until the NRC Has Answered Concerns by Pilgrim Watch, Se ML19232A4032019-08-20020 August 2019 LTR-19-0322 Diane Turco, Director, Cape Downwinders, Massachusetts, Letter/E-mail Requests Suspension of the Pilgrim License Transfer from Entergy to Holtec Until the Adjudicatory Hearing Is Held and Raised Contentions Are Resolved ML19308A9942019-08-19019 August 2019 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. Confirmatory Order Rescission Supplemental Information ML19226A3912019-08-14014 August 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - EA and Fonsi for Pilgrim Decommissioning Trust Fund Exemption (Holtec) ML19226A3962019-08-14014 August 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station -Consult with Commonwealth - Conforming Amendment in Support of Pilgrim License Transfer Application ML19226A1212019-08-13013 August 2019 OEDO-15-00479-2.206 Petition Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station'S Current Licensing Basis for Flooding - Status (CAC No. MF6460; EPID L-2015-CRS-0002) ML19227A1032019-08-0707 August 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Draft Wording for Potential Condition of License Transfer Order ML19207B3662019-07-26026 July 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim - RAI Direct and Indirect Transfer of Lic.; Conforming Lic. Amend.; Req. for Exemption 10 CFR 50.82(A)(8)(I)(A) for Holtec Decom. International, Llc ML19176A3452019-06-25025 June 2019 2.206 Petition Regarding Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station'S Current Licensing Basis for Flooding - Information (OEDO-15-00479) (CAC No. MF6460; EPID L-2015-CRS-0002) ML19154A0652019-06-0303 June 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim - Permanent Cessation of Power Operations ML19154A5242019-06-0303 June 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - RAI - Pilgrim Post-Decommissioning Technical Specifications (PDTS) License Amendment Request (LAR) ML19161A2122019-05-20020 May 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Acceptance of License Amendment Request to Remove Cyber Security Plan Requirements ML19123A0332019-05-0101 May 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Logbook Entry: 05/01/2019 Endangered Species Report Regarding a Confirmed Sighting of North Atlantic Right Whale(S) (Balaena Glacialis) ML19122A4912019-04-29029 April 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Logbook Entry: 04/29/2019 Regarding the Confirmed Sighting of Ten North Atlantic Right Whales (Balaena Glacialis) ML19108A2362019-04-18018 April 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action, Proposed Exemptions from 10 CFR 140.11(a)(4) - Primary and Secondary Liability Insurance ML19108A2372019-04-18018 April 2019 NRR E-mail Capture - Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station - Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action, Proposed Exemptions from 10 CFR 50.54(w)(1) - On-Site Property Damage Insurance ML19108A0122019-04-17017 April 2019 Notification of Change in Review Schedule - Oyster Creek License Transfer Application (L-2018-LLM-0002) 2022-09-26
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ML16182A014 From: CLINE, LEONARD M Sent: Wednesday, June 29, 2016 2:08 PM To: Mary.lampert
Subject:
Violation of the SSW pump bearings
Dear Mary:
Please see the results of our review of your concerns regarding Pilgrim salt service water that you provided to Art Burritt and Bill Dean on May 26, 2016. Our responses to your questions are provided below.
- 1. Testing Protocol: I understand that when an SSW pump is declared inoperable and removed from service Tech Specs require that the other pumps and some other equipment be tested ASAP. If the testing fails the plant must be shutdown in 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. If the testing is OK the plant can continue to run and the pumps must be tested daily.
- a. Did Entergy follow the testing protocol? Did NRC check? If Entergy did not follow the protocol, what was NRCs response?
- b. We understand that the testing is a challenge to the plant equipment; is this correct and if so what follow up is required to assure the testing did not cause a problem?
The salt service water (SSW) system at Pilgrim consists of two subsystems, each containing two SSW pumps, the A and B pumps in the A subsystem, and the D and E pumps in the B subsystem. The system also includes a swing pump, the C pump, which can be connected to either subsystem to support subsystem operability if one pump is inoperable. The technical specification limiting condition for operation for the SSW system requires two operable subsystems. With less than two operable pumps in a subsystem, the associated SSW subsystem is not operable. In accordance with Pilgrim technical specifications, with one SSW subsystem inoperable, the inoperable subsystem must be restored to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. If an inoperable subsystem is not restored within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or both subsystems are determined to be inoperable, the unit must be shut down within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
The testing that you described in your email does not apply to the Pilgrim SSW pumps. Therefore, Entergy was not required to perform additional testing for SSW. We are also not aware of challenges caused by SSW system testing or challenges that adversely impact the SSW systems ability to meet its testing requirements.
- 2. Selector Switch: There is a selector switch in the control room that sets which loop of SSW the C SSW pump will then go to in the event of a loss of plant power.
- a. Is it in Pilgrims procedure for loss of a SSW pump? If it is not in the procedure, why not and will NRC require it to be put into Pilgrims procedures?
The normal SSW operating configuration is SSW Pumps A, C, and D operating, B and E pumps in standby and the A and B SSW subsystems cross-connected via the two C pump discharge isolation valves that are both open during normal operation. As discussed in our response to your previous questions, for a SSW subsystem to be considered operable - capable of supplying adequate flow to all its loads - it must include at least two operable pumps. As described above the A and B pumps are aligned to the A subsystem and powered by A train of electrical power, the D and E pumps to the B subsystem and powered by the B train of electrical power. The C pump power supply can be aligned to either subsystem and either train of electrical power. It is preferentially powered from the A train, but includes degraded and
undervoltage relays to transfer it to its alternate power source when necessary. The SSW subsystem that the pump is aligned to is controlled by the loop selector switch.
The purpose of the C pump loop selector switch is to ensure that at least one SSW subsystem remains capable of supplying adequate flow to all subsystem loads when a loss of offsite power occurs. During a loss of offsite power, the position of the switch determines to which subsystem the C pump is assigned. The system control logic assumes that the C pump is assigned to a loop in which one of the normal SSW pumps is out of service and the system operating procedure directs that the system be aligned in this way. In this alignment, with a loss of power to the pumps of the subsystem to which the C pump is assigned, the system logic isolates that subsystem. This leaves the C pump and the remaining operable pump to supply that subsystem. When there is a loss of power to the pumps in the subsystem selected by the C loop selector switch, no automatic action is required. The SSW system retains three operable pumps capable of supplying the loads on both loops The C pump loop selector switch is not mentioned in the procedure for loss of a salt service water pump because the normal salt service water system operating procedure provides the necessary guidance for operating the switch. In accordance with the site procedure, during normal operation, with all pumps are available, the C pump loop selector switch can be placed on either loop, but when all pumps are not available the procedure states that the switch should be placed on the loop with an inoperable pump. Considering this procedure guidance and the purpose of the switch as discussed above, there is no need to direct manipulation of this switch in the procedure for the loss of an SSW pump. The position of this switch is not changed during the immediate response to a loss of a SSW pump, however, it may be repositioned during the recovery from a loss of one pump in accordance with the guidance in the systems normal operating procedure. Following a loss of one pump, this guidance ensures that the system recovered alignment will meet is design basis, even with a loss of power to one train of pumps.
I hope that this addresses your concerns regarding operation and testing of the SSW pumps at Pilgrim. However, if you do have additional questions or concerns regarding these issues, please feel free to contact me at leonard.cline@nrc.gov.