ML16072A035

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Nrc'S Report for the Audit of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc'S. Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report Submittal Relating to the Near-Term Task Force Recommendation 2.1-Flooding for James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant
ML16072A035
Person / Time
Site: FitzPatrick Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/12/2016
From: Victor Hall
Japan Lessons-Learned Division
To:
Entergy Operations
References
CAC MF6106
Download: ML16072A035 (15)


Text

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 April 12, 2016 Vice President, Operations Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.

P.O. Box 110 Lycoming, NY 13093

SUBJECT:

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REPORT FOR THE AUDIT OF ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC'S. FLOOD HAZARD REEVALUATION REPORT SUBMITTAL RELATING TO THE NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1-FLOODING FOR JAMES A FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT (CAC NO. MF6106)

Dear Sir or Madam:

By letter dated June 1, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15146A282), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) informed you of the staff's plan to conduct a regulatory audit of Entergy Nuclear Operations, lnc.'s (the licensee) Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR) for James A FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick). The audit was intended to support the NRC staff review of the licensee's FHRR and the subsequent issuance of a staff assessment.

The audit conducted on July 7, 2015, was performed consistent with NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Office Instruction LIC-111, "Regulatory Audits," dated December 29, 2008, (ADAMS Accession No. ML082900195). Therefore, the purpose of this letter is to provide you with the final audit report which summarizes and documents the NRC's regulatory audit of the Fitapatrick FHRR submittal.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-2915 or by e-mail at Victor.Hall@nrc.gov.

Sincerely, Victor Hall, Senior Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Japan Lessons-Learned Division Hazards Management Branch Docket No. 50-333

Enclosure:

Audit Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AUDIT REPORT FOR THE AUDIT OF ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC'S.

FLOOD HAZARD REEVALUATION REPORT SUBMITTALS RELATING TO THE NEAR-TERM TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 2.1-FLOODING FOR JAMES A FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT BACKGROUND AND AUDIT BASIS By letter dated March 12, 2012, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRG) issued a request for information to all power reactor licensees and holders of construction permits in active or deferred status, pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR),

Section 50.54(f) "Conditions of license" (hereafter referred to as the "50.54(f) letter"). The request was issued in connection with implementing lessons-learned from the 2011 accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant, as documented in The Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident. Recommendation 2.1 in that document recommended that the NRG staff issue orders to all licensees to reevaluate seismic and flooding for their sites against current NRG requirements and guidance. Subsequent Staff Requirements Memoranda associated with Commission Papers SECY 11-0124 and SECY-11-0137, instructed the NRG staff to issue requests for information to licensees pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(f).

By letter dated March 12, 2015, Entergy Nuclear Operations, lnc.'s (Entergy, the licensee) submitted its Flood Hazard Reevaluation Reports (FHRRs) for James A FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick) (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System Accession No. ML15082A250). The NRG is in the process of reviewing the aforementioned submittal and has completed a regulatory audit of the licensee to better understand the development of the submittal, identify any similarities/differences with past work completed and ultimately aid in its review of the licensees' FHRR. This audit summary is being completed in accordance with the guidance set forth in NRG Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Office Instruction LIC-111, "Regulatory Audits," dated December 29, 2008 (ADAMS Accession No. ML082900195).

AUDIT LOCATION AND DATES The audit was completed by document review via a webinar session in conjunction with the use of the licensee's established electronic reading room (ERR) and teleconference on July 7, 2015.

Enclosure

AUDIT TEAM Title Team Member Organization Team Leader, NRR/JLD Vic Hall NRC Technical Monitor Laura Quinn- NRC Willingham Technical Staff Lyle Hibler NRC Technical Division Director Andy Campbell NRC Projects Branch Chief Mohamed Shams NRC NRC Contractor Eugene Yan Argonne National Laboratory (ANL)

NRC Contractor Vinod Maht ANL NRC Contractor John Quinn ANL A list of the licensee's participants can be found in Attachment 2.

DOCUMENTS AUDITED of this report contains a list which details the documents that were reviewed by the NRC staff, in part or in whole, as part of this audit. The documents were locatetj in an ERR during the NRC staff's review.

The documents, or portions thereof, that were used by the NRC staff as part of the technical analysis and/or as reference in the completion of the staff assessment, will be submitted by the licensee and docketed for completeness of information, as necessary. These documents are identified in Table 1.

AUDIT ACTIVITIES In general, the audit activities consisted mainly of the following actions:

  • Review background information on site topography and geographical characteristics of the watershed.
  • Review site physical features and plant layout.
  • Understand the selection of important assumptions and parameters that would be the basis for evaluating the individual flood causing mechanisms described in the 50.54(f) letter.
  • Review model input/output files to computer analyses such as Hydrologic Engineering Center -

Hydrologic Modeling System (HEC-HMS) and FL0-2D to have an understanding of how modeling assumptions were programmed and executed.

Table 1 summarizes specific technical topics (and resolution) of important items that were discussed and clarified during the audit. The items discussed in Table 1 may be referenced/mentioned in the staff assessment in more detail.

EXIT MEETING/BRIEFING On September 4, 2015, the NRC staff closed out the discussion of the technical topics described above.

Table 1: FitzPatrick Information Needs - Audit/Post-Audit Summary INFO INFORMATION NEED DESCRIPTION ACTION (POST-AUDIT)

NEED 1 All Flood Causing Mechanisms - Com~arison of In response to this information need the licensee stated that for the Reevaluated Flood Hazard with Current Design Basis purposes of the FitzPatrick FHRR, the two terms, design-basis and licensing basis, can be considered to have the same meaning.

Background:

The Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report (FHRR) for The licensee provided in the electronic reading room (ERR) an the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (FitzPatrick) site amended FHRR Table 4-1. The amended table headings refer to provides comparisons of the reevaluated flood hazards with the "design-basis flood height" rather than "CLB Flood Height". The current licensing basis (CLB) for all flood causing mechanisms amended table explicitly states the combined effect design-basis for which a CLB had been established. In FHRR Section 4.1 of flood heights associated with "PMSS [probable maximum storm the report is a summary of this comparison. The 50.54(f) letter surge] +PMP [p~obable maximum precipitation] +Waves" and requested a comparison with the current design~basis. "Screenwell PMSS+PMP" are "262 ft USLS35 (Design-Basis Flood Level)" and "255 ft USLS35 (Design-Basis Flood Level)

Request: The licensee is requested to provide clarification "respectively.

regarding the inconsistencies identified in the FHRR with regard to the comparison of the reevaluated flood hazard to the current The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff concluded design basis and submit a revised hazard comparison that the information provided by the licensee was sufficient to consistent with the instructions provided in the 50.54(f) letter. address the information need request.

The NRC staff has requested that this information be provided on the docket for their use in the development of the FitzPatrick staff assessment.

2 All Flood Causing Mechanisms - Location of Site Features In response to this information need, the licensee included in the ERR an annotated figure (Figure 2.1) with all the drainage, storm

Background:

The FHRR for the FitzPatrick site includes a site drainage, and requested building locations requested in the layout (Figure 2-2) that shows some of the site locations that are information need.

mentioned but lacks annotations or figures that show all of the site locations that are referred to in the FHRR. The NRC staff concluded that the information provided by the licensee was sufficient to address the information need request.

Request: The figure should be modified or additional similar figures provided that show all of the site feature locations

INFO

. . INFORMATION NE.ED DESCRIPTION.* . .. ACflON:{POST-AUDl'f)

NEED.

culverts, drainage ditches and storm drains (including those The NRC staff has requested that this information be provided on treated as non-functional), the Interim Waste Storage Facility the docket for their use in the development of the FitzPatrick staff Building, and the Main Parking Lot. assessment.

3 Local Intense Precipitation In response to this information need, the licensee explained that Manning's n was adjusted to control stability. The licensee

Background:

Calculation package 32-9227045 includes Table 3 updated the ERR to include an assessment of the model and the which lists Manning's n values for paved/concrete, grass, basis for making model adjustments to Manning's n to control trees/brush, and water. In that calculation package, Figure 11 stability. In its response the licensee stated that portions of the site shows the distribution of the n values across the study area, and within the immediate power block were modeled as paved, and no areas with an n value associated with grass surfaces are was considered a reasonable representation of the power block shown. Yet the power block vicinity and other site areas contain area based on site observation and available orthoimagery for the many large grassy areas (Figure 10) treated as paved/concrete. following reasons: 1) in past experience with FL0-20 large changes in Manning's n may cause artificial undulations in water Request: Examine and verify whether the n values were surface profiles, 2) the rougher grass areas are not anticipated to conservatively assigned over the entire model domain and affect water surface elevations at the majority of the critical correct the~ needed. If revised or additional modeling is structures, 3) the grassy areas modeled a paved are well-necessary, provide electronic versions of any associated maintained (short grass) and therefore would have Manning's n modeling input and output files. values for grasses which are close to the upper range of the Manning's n values for paved surfaces and hence the effect would be inappreciable, and 4) while higher (grassy Manning's n) would potentially increase water surface elevations in those grassy areas the increases would diminish rapidly space due to the general openness of these areas.

The NRC staff concluded that the information provided by the licensee was sufficient to address the information need request.

4 Local Intense Precipitation In response to this information need, the licensee explained the approach for modeling based on model capabilities. The results

Background:

The approach used with FL0-20 did not use the were described as realistic. The licensee stated that other code's area reduction factors (ARF) or width reduction factors reasonable approaches would not significantly change the result.

(WRF), but instead increased the ground surface elevation of grid cells located at buildings in order to make the buildings The licensee did not assumed water storage on roofs and no roof serve as obstructions. Flat roofs result in ponding of water and parapet walls were included in the model to allow water to shed from roofs other than an amount equivalent to 0.05 ft, which is

INF0.

INFORMATION NEED DESCRIPTION ACTION (POST-AUDIT)

NEED I less conservative results for flood depth along building consistent with that allowed for the entire model domain. The perimeters. licensee verified that at the end of the simulations the depth of water stored on the roofs was the 0.05 ft as expected. The Request: Describe how the LiDAR data was used to determine licensee described the rationale for their approach for modeling appropriate cell elevations, especially along building edges roof drainage rather than the use of ARF and WRFs. The licensee where a grid cell contains LiDAR points representing both the described their justification for not conducting sensitivity analyses ground and the building. Provide justification that the local based on ARF and WRFs, which was based on the FL0-20 intense precipitation (LIP) analysis using water storage on the capabilities at the time that the flood reevaluation was being structures with a flat rooftop is a conservative approach. The completed. In the licensee's response, their approach was justification should include a sensitivity analysis using ARF and qualitatively compared with that of newer versions of FL0-20 with WRF to remove water storage from grid cells covered by respect to roof drainage and found the approach used in the building structures entirely or partially and routing water to the reevaluation was consistent with the updated FL0-20 approach.

grid next to building grid cells. If revised or additional modeling is necessary, provide electronic versions of any associated The NRC staff concluded that the information provided by the modeling input and output files. licensee was sufficient to address the information need request.

5 Stream and River Flooding In response to this information need, the licensee stated that the same FL0-20 model was used to estimate flooding from the 72-

Background:

The Licensee used FL0-20 to simulate water hour duration flooding (caused by the overflow from the local depth due to stream flooding. Calculation package 32-9227045 stream during a PMF) and the short duration 6-hour PMP, which includes Table 3 which lists Manning's n values for encompasses the 1-hour LIP (flooding caused by rainfall directly paved/concrete, grass, trees/brush, and water. In that on the site areas), as discussed in Section 2.2 of the Local Intense calculation package, Figure 11 shows the distribution of the n Precipitation Calculation (Calculation No. 32-9227045-000). This values across the study area, and no areas with an n value calculation package is discussed in further detail in response to associated with grass surfaces are shown. Yet the power block Information Need No. 3.

vicinity and other site areas contain many large grassy areas (Figure 10) treated as paved/concrete. It is noted however, the flow generated by the PMF is generally flowing away from the small unnamed stream (i.e., the source of Request: Examine and verify whether the n values were the flooding) and toward the power block structures. Additionally, conservatively assigned in the model and correct them if there is no runoff from rooftops during the 72-hour PMF (rainfall needed. If revised or additional modeling is necessary, provide was not modeled) which could potentially increase the water electronic versions of any associated modeling input and output surface elevation if backwater effects were anticipated to occur due files. the grassed areas. Therefore, the conceptual issue of small grassed areas with higher Manning's value prevented flow away

INFO INFO~MATION NEED DESCRIPTION A'flON (POSTO:AUDIT)

NEED from critical locations and potentially increasing the water surface elevation is not pertinent to the PMF flood mechanism.

The NRC staff concluded that the information provided by the licensee was sufficient to address the information need request.

6 Stream and River Flooding In response to this information need the licensee explained that this was less of an issue for Stream and River Flooding analyses

Background:

The Licensee used FL0-20 to simulate water than for LIP because this application of FL0-20 did not include depth due to stream flooding. The approach used with FL0-20 precipitation draining onto site roofs. The licensee's refers to the did not use the code's ARF or WRF, but instead increased the response to Information Need No. 4 to explain their use of ground surface elevation of grid cells located at buildings in elevation data to configure the FL0-20 site model. However, the order to make the buildings serve as obstructions. Flat roofs licensee noted that no direct precipitation was used in the FL0-20 result in ponding of water and less conservative results for flood model; rather, the HEC-HMS model was used to provide depth along building perimeters. precipitation-induced flow from the upper watershed to the FL0-20 model and, therefore, roof drainage calculations were not included Request: Describe how the LiDAR data was used to determine for the flood analysis for the flood-causing mechanism.

appropriate cell elevations, especially along building edges where a grid cell contains LiDAR points representing both the The licensee explained that the possibility of water storage on the ground and the building. Provide justification that the LIP rooftops (which is restricted when assigning a completely blocked analysis using water storage on the structures with a flat rooftop cell with FL0-2D's area reduction factors) was reassured to be is a conservative approach. The justification should include a minimal as the storage depth was specifically set to 0.05 ft. The sensitivity analysis using ARF and WRF to remove water licensee explained that impact from this minimal storage would be storage from grid cells covered by building structures entirely or insignificant, especially when compared to the conservative nature partially and routing water to the grid cells next to building grid of not modeling the parapets. In the response for the audit, the cells. If revised or additional modeling is necessary, provide licensee created an analysis comparing the two methods for electronic versions of any associated modeling input and output modeling structures within the FL0-20 model and provided files. technical evidence that the difference in calculation methods is negligible. It was also confirmed in the audit that manual adjustments and inspections were done by the licensee to ensure that there was no incorrect interpolation in cell elevation rendering between building cells and ground elevation cells.

The NRC staff concluded that the information provided by the licensee was sufficient to address the information need request.

INFQ

,INEORMATION NEED DESCRIPTION' ACllON (PQ~T'-AUDrl;)

NEED 7 Combined Effects In response to this information need, the Licensee provided in the ERR a detailed discussion to support the conclusion regarding the

Background:

The FitzPatrick FHRR, Section 3.9.2.1, contains a extent that the Lake Ontario surge backwater effects landward and figure reference (Figure 3-45) to support the conclusion that the upstream of the mouth of the unnamed stream. The response backwater from the maximum Lake Ontario storm surge is included a figure of the FL0-2D results in the vicinity of the limited within the unnamed stream and does not affect PMF unnamed stream mouth and another figure showing the bed hazards. elevation profile of the stream with a depiction of the lake water surface elevation. The discussion and the figures adequately Request: The licensee is requested to provide a clearer support support the licensee's evaluation of the insignificance of the for this conclusion using a revised figure or a more detailed backwater effect on the flood hazard evaluation. The response narrative. stated that there is an area of high ground approximately 60 feet upstream of Lake Ontario within the stream. The PMSS plus wave set up elevation is 253.9 feet NAVD88 and the high areas is approximately elevation 255. 7 feet NAVD88. This flood elevations during the combined events would not be expected to be higher than those computed.

The NRC staff concluded that the information provided by the licensee was sufficient to address the information need request.

8 Flood Event Duration Parameters In response to this information need the FitzPatrick FHRR Tables 4-2 and 4-4 were updated in the ERR. The licensee made the

Background:

The March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 2, following statement in their response:

requests the licensee to perform an Integrated Assessment of

  • Warning time information for the two flood mechanisms was the plant's response to the reevaluated hazard if the not developed to support the FHRR. Significant plant reevaluated flood hazard is not bounded by the current design preparation for the beyond design basis flood events basis. Flood scenario parameters from the flood hazard postulated in the FHRR is not credited or deemed reevaluation serve as the input to the Integrated Assessment. necessary at FitzPatrick. The only plant action assumed in To support efficient and effective evaluations under the the FHRR was a procedure to close the exterior doors Integrated Assessment, staff will review flood scenario during periods of intense precipitation, which is not parameters as part of the flood hazard reevaluation and predicated on significant advance warning.

document results of the review as part of the staff assessment of the flood hazard reevaluation. The FHRR does provide flood

  • During plant operation, only two exterior entrances are duration parameters in FHRR Table 4-2 and Table 4-4 but some potentially left open unattended. Door C from the FHRR is a roll-up door to the Screenwell BuildinQ which may be left

,INF'Q.

. NEEo** INFORMATION N~EI::>' DESCRIP11]Ql")I ACTION. (POST ~AU[)IT)

I parameters (warning time, period of site preparation and period open unattended. Water intrusion through this door will not of recession) are lacking. impact any equipment important to safety. The other door potentially left open unattended is Door G, which is a rollup Request: The licensee is requested to provide the applicable door on the northwest side of the Turbine Building. The flood event duration parameters (see definition and Figure 6 of door would be closed per the severe weather procedure the Guidance for Performing an Integrated Assessment, JLD- during a period of intense precipitation (FitzPatrick, 2015).

ISG-2012-05) associated with mechanisms that trigger an The maximum water level of flooding that could enter this Integrated Assessment using the results of the flood hazard door location is below equipment important to safety.

reevaluation. This includes (as applicable) the warning time the site will have to prepare for the event (e.g., the time between The licensee referenced "FitzPatrick, 2015. Procedure Change notification of an impending flood event and arrival of Request PCR# 1224 for "Severe Weather AOP-13, 2015."

floodwaters on site) and the period of time the site is inundated for the mechanisms that are not bounded by the current design The NRC staff concluded that the information provided by the basis. The licensee is also requested to provide the basis or licensee was sufficient to address the information need request.

source of information for the flood event duration, which may include a description of relevant forecasting methods (e.g., The NRC staff has requested that this information be provided on products from local, regional, or national weather forecasting the docket for their use in the development of the FitzPatrick staff centers) and/or timing information derived from the hazard assessment.

analysis.

Because the Integrated Assessment will include LIP, the probable maximum flood (PMF) on the local unnamed stream, the licensee is requested to provide clear information on all flood duration parameters.

9 Flood Height and Associated Effects In response to this information need the licensee provided the following explanations in the ERR:

Background:

Flood scenario parameters from the flood hazard reevaluation serve as the input to the Integrated Assessment. Wind Waves and Runup: "Due to limited duration, shallow flood To support efficient and effective evaluations under the water depths, and limited fetches, no significant wave effects are Integrated Assessment, the staff will review flood scenario anticipated to occur on the inundated areas including near the parameters as part of the 50.54(f) FHHR and document results critical structures." And "Wind Wave effects on the unnamed of the review as part of the staff's assessment. The March 12, stream water surface elevation are negligible due to the narrow 2012, 50.54(f) letter, Enclosure 2, requests that the licensee channel and high frictional losses with the restricted fetch." The perform an Integrated Assessment of the plant's response to the updated summary FHRR Tables 4-2 and 4-4 for LIP and PMF that

  • 1NFO I flNF'.PRMATION, NEED DESCRIPTION I . ACTl(;)t,I (POST~AUDIT)

.NEED reevaluated hazard if the reevaluated flood hazard is not were loaded into the ERR state that "Wind/wave interaction was bounded by the current design basis. Specifically, not considered to be a credible mechanism coincident with the LIP hydrodynamic loading and sedimentation are not discussed for [and PMF] event due to site constraints, including shallow depths, either LIP or the PMF. The FHRR states that the erosion is not obstructed fetches, and frequent barriers to wave formation and anticipated due to low velocities over paved areas, but it does action."

not discuss the potential for sediment to be transported into paved areas and deposited there. FHRR Tables 4-2 and 4-4 Hydrodynamic loading, including debris: "The maximum hydrostatic state that "hydrodynamic loading was not evaluated" for both lateral force (per linear foot of surface) including the additional LIP and the PMF. equivalent hydrostatic portion attributed to the dynamic effects of moving water acting on the critical door with the largest flood depth Request: The licensee is requested to provide the flood height is calculated" using methods outlined in Minimum Design Loads for and associated effects (as defined in Section 9 of JLD-ISG- Buildings and Other Structures, ASCEISEI 7-10, American Society 2012-05) that are not described for the LIP and PMF on the of Civil Engineers.

unnamed stream. This includes the following quantified information for each mechanism (as applicable): LIP: The licensee determined the maximum hydrostatic force (including a correction for dynamic effects) to be 16.2 lbs/ft. The

  • Wind waves and run up, maximum hydrostatic pressure was determined to be 69.9 lbs/ft2 .
  • Hydrodynamic loading, including debris, Regarding the Streams and Rivers PMF, the maximum hydrostatic
  • Effects caused by sediment deposition and erosion (e.g., force (including a correction for dynamic effects), was determined flow velocities, scour), to be 21.0 lbs/ft. The maximum hydrostatic pressure was
  • Concurrent site conditions, including adverse weather, determined to be 63.6 lbs/ft. The updated summary FHRR Tables
  • Groundwater ingress 4-2 and 4-4 in the ERR for LIP and PMF states hydrodynamic loading was not formally evaluated as velocities were found to be Provide the analysis used to support the conclusions for so low as to create only minimal loading.

associated effects. It is requested that the licensee provide analysis of associated effects for these flood causing Sediment deposition and erosion: Average velocity were computed mechanisms or a clear statement with justification why these using Manning's equation and characterization of a the flow effects are excluded. channel with a trapezoidal cross-section, slope of 0.006, and cross-sectional area of 64 ft, hydraulic radius of 2.6 ft, Manning's n of 0.4, yielded a channel velocity of 0.6 ft/s. This characterization was equivalent for both LIP and PMF. After consideration of grain size dependent settling velocities and the computed water speed, only sediment with grain sizes smaller than coarse sand (0.3 ft/s settling velocity). The expected level of transported material was

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NEED determined to be insufficient to alter flood hazard elevation and the degree of erosion minor related to structures important to safety.

Groundwater Ingress: The thin layer of till was stated as not being capable of significant storage. Groundwater water is collected in the drain at the base of the Reactor Building and removed by two perimeter drain pumps (one active and one spare) to routing collected water to Lake Ontario. Due to low permeability of the surrounding soils and rock, and the dewatering systems groundwater ingress is consider an insignificant hazard. The updated summary tables (FHRR Table 4-2) for LIP states that "groundwater ingress due to LIP is not considered a significant hazard for the FitzPatrick site."

The update summary tables for LIP and PMF state that 1) "warning time information for the two flood hazard mechanisms was not developed to support the FHRR.", 2) "Significant plan preparation for the beyond design basis flood events postulated in the FHRR is not credited or deemed necessary at FitzPatrick."

The NRC staff has requested that this information be provided on the docket for their use in the development of the FitzPatrick staff assessment.

ATTACHMENT 1 FitzPatrick Audit Document List

1. AREVA. 2014a. James A. Fitzpatrick Flooding Hazard Re-Evaluation Report. Document No. 51-9227066-000. January 30, 2014.
2. AREVA. 2014b. James A. Fitzpatrick Flood Hazard Re-Evaluation - Local Intense Precipitation.

Document No. 32-9227045. January 30, 2014.

3. AREVA. 2014c. James A. Fiztpatrick Flooding Hazard Re-Evaluation - Combined Events. Document No. 32-9227062-000 Revision 018. January 30, 2014.

ATTACHMENT 2 List of Entergy Audit Participants Name Organization

1. Don Bentley Entergy
2. Al Porch Entergy
3. Mark Hawes Entergy
4. Dan Brown Areva
5. Chad Cox GZA
6. Christine Stonier GZA

If you have any questions, please contact me at (301) 415-2915 or by e-mail at Victor.Hall@nrc.gov.

Sincerely, IRA/

Victor Hall, Senior Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Japan Lessons-Learned Division Hazards Management Branch Docket No. 50-333

Enclosure:

Audit Report cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:

PUBLIC JLD R/F RidsNRRJLD Resource TGovan, NRR LQuinn-Willingham, NRO RidsNroDsea Resource RidsNrrDorllpl1-1 Resource RidsNrrDorl Resource RidsNrrPMFitzPatrick Resource RidsRgn1 MailCenter Resource RidsNrrLASLent RidsOgcMailCenter Resource RidsOpaMail Resource RidsAcrsAcnw_MailCtr Resource CCook, NRO ARivera-Varona, NRO KErwin, NRO ACampbell, NRO MWillingham, NRO LHibler, NRO BHarvey, NRO MShams, NRR ADAMS Accession No.: ML16072A035 *via email

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!DATE I0311512016 103/14/2016 103/22/2016 103/22/2016 I OFFICE NRO/DSEA/RHM2/BC NRR/JLD/JHMB/BC NRR/JLD/JHMB/PM NAME ARivera-Varona MShams VHall DATE 03/22/2016 03/22/2016 04/12/2016 OFFICAL RECORD COPY