RS-16-006, Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)

Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)

ML16006A050
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	01/04/2016
From:	Jim Barstow Exelon Generation Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
EA-12-049, RS-16-006, TAC MF1147, TAC MF1152
Download: ML16006A050 (185)

Text

~Exelton Generation Order No. EA-12-049 RS-1 6-006 January 4, 2016 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-1 8 NRC Docket No. 50-244

Subject:

Report of Full Compliance with March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049)

References:

1. NRC Order Number EA-12-049, "Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements For Mitigation Strategies For Beyond-Design-Basis External Events,"

dated March 12, 2012

2. NRC Interim Staff Guidance JLD-ISG-2012-01, "Compliance with Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events," Revision 0, dated August 29, 2012

3. NEI 12-06, "Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide,"

Revision 0, dated August 2012

4. Letter from M. G. Korsnick (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC), Initial Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), dated October 26, 2012

5. Letter from M. G. Korsnick (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC), Overall integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), dated February 28, 2013

6. Letter from M. G. Korsnick (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC), Supplement to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), dated March 8, 2013

7. Letter from E. D. Dean (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC), R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant - Six-Month Status Report in Response to March 12, 2012 Commission Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events (Order Number EA-12-049), dated August 27, 2013

U.S. Nucle~ar Regulator~y Coriimission Re~port.of F;.ull. Cmpliancbe with Order EA-12-04g

~4anuary 4, 2016 Page 2.

8. Letter from M. G. Korsnick (GENG) *to.Docurnent Contr'ol Dpsk.(NRC) - February 201.4 Six-MVonth S~tatus R~eport in Re.spon~seto iMarch 12, 2012 Cpmtii~sion O'rde*r :Modifying L"icenses.with :Regard to Re~quir~emendtS-for" Miti-gation lStrategies for"Beyond-'Design-

,Basis :External Events-(Order N um~er. EA-t 2-04,9),;,dated Februa'ry 27, 2014" (FL*L-1 4-004) 9.. L~tterfromM.a.G. Korsnick (CENG) to D~o.cu.Jment Con t~rol Desk (NRC) - Augyst,201l4 Six-"Month Status iRept lnO'in Respons.e to Marchli. 2, 2Ol2 Co.mnis'sion orde'r M0#ifying Lic~enses with Regard to Requirerh'ients folr MiiitigationrStsteigie*,foriB~eyond-Design-BasisiE~xternal :Events. (.Orde~r Number EA-1i~ 2-049), dated Au~gust 2:6., 20.14 (FLL-1I 4-029) 10 O..*ettgr ro{-m M, G.;,drsnick i( CEtNG)i to DocLjm~ent Control :Desk (N RC),I -. February 20:15 SSi,x&Month"StatusRepnort in Reslponse to Mar.ch. 12,. 201 o-20mmiss~ion Order Modifying

-Licen~ses swith.Regard to Requiremments for: Mitigation Str;ategies f~or Beyonid-Design-Basis Exter-nal Ev*ents (Orde'r Numiber E.A-12-0 4g), :date'd !February 20, 2015 (RS 01)t

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Beon-DSign-Bais) External Events (Ode Nube E

-2 049)~f r,{ri Jatd:ugst 28, 201 (NRS-t15-rnik2CN)18.): inaa(*er Pwr

12.

in Letterfrom J.s..tBowEn'aif (NRC) ltoM g G.o0vrsnick I(CENG),tR.EanGinnaNeaprs PowOrer*

PlAn-Inte:im SMtilaff~ Evaluatioelatings (To Noverall 5n),gdated Flabrar in9Resonse t Orde EA 13.-.N 9, (Mi't ig,-eqetifr1nion Strateies) (TA ibruntoMF Tit2),daftheCd Ferur 19,er2014 13"R etr Reque;ids-0st fr(Iforegation Pu*rsuaendat title

.10,o.th Code93 of FedNr-eral Reuatidn 50re.vi4( f).gI~dnight frommtenahina 2.1,2.,andch 9.3den, ofathe Near-Term2 Task2 Foc Review of Inig fro th Fudhm Dai-ih "c.dent date Mac 12, 212.Ee0 eeainCipnEClte~t SRRelos oIac 2

02

14. Exel tiir1noflton Genraton om anyLClttertoTtl USNRf~heCodo R

esp a

egionsetMac 12 5012, (

Reg'arding Re'com'imedai*tion's of th6 'Ne'aK:--erm Task For~ce Review of Insighqts frmr th'e Fukushirnma'Dai-ichi..Accd~dnt,-Enc~losure 5,"Reco0mmendation 9.3, :Emergency..

'lPrep0arediness - staffin~g,B Reque sted Indformiation Iteri~s 1', 2, anid"6 -' PJhase 2 Staffing Assessrentb,-dated Ju~ne 8*, 201'5 R*S-1:5-1'23):'.

15..Letter from :J. P.*Bos~ka (*NRC.) to J. :E. :P~apgher (EGC), R. E. Ginna Nuclear Powe~r Plant -

R6po6rt for.the OnSite. Audit :Regarding lmpleetientatioji of Mitigating st~rategi~es. and'

,R.eliable..Spent FEu-.e, Pooli Ii[s.trurnentatipn: R.#.ated to: Orders* EA-.12-.049.and EA-i12,051 (TAC Nos. MF11.i52 and MF1147)., dated June.18, 201 5 On March 12, 20! 2., the Nucle~ar:Regulatory Commission ("N£RC" or "Commissioen") issued Order EA-12-049, "Order" ModSi~fying Lice.is'es with Regard toc Require~ments For Mitigationl Stcrategies For.Be*0nd-eSign-,BaSis iExterna Events," (ReferenCe !) to Exelon Ge~neratioanComfpany,; LLc (EGC),,previously Constellation* Energy Nuclear Groucp, LLC :(Exelon, the licensee).:

Referenlce 1.was, imm~diatiely effective and.di rec'ted EGO to d~evelop, implemenit, and maintain guidance and str'ategies to maintain or. restiore

~o~re coo~ling, containime-nt, and spent fuel pool.'

cooling c*aPabilities,in the event of a: beyond-design-basis external event,. specific requirements are outlined in'Attachment 2 of iReference 1.

Ref erence 1.required submission of an' initial status report 60 days followinig issuance of the final interirm staff guidanCe (Reference 2),and an, Overall.Integrated:Plan (oi.P) pursuant to Section iV* Condition C. ReferenCe 2 endorsed' industr~y g]uidance document N.EI 12-06,

U..S.. Nuciear Regulator'y.Commissioni Repolrt of Full compliance with Or'der EA-12-049 January 4, 2016 Page 3 Revision 0 (Re'fer'ence 3) with clarifications and ex~ceptions identified in..Reference'2..Reference 4 provided the EGO initial status.report regarding'mitigation Strategies. Re~ferences 5 and 6

.provided the R. E*. Ginna Nuclear Power" Plant OIP.

Reference 1 required submission of a Status report at Six-month intervals following Submittal of the OIP. References 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 provided the fir-st, second, third,'four~th, and fifth six-month Status reports-, respectk*ely, pJursuant to'Sect'ion. IV, COondition 0.2, of Ref'ere'nce 1 for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.

The,purpose of this letter is to provide the ireport of full complian~ce with the March 12,. 2012 Comriission order M~difying Licenses with.Regard to Requirements For. Mitigation Strategies FEor Beyond-Design.Basis External Evenits (Order Number E-A-12-049) (Reference 1) pursuant to Section iV,"Conditidn'C.3 of the Order for R. :E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.

R. E. Ginna Nuclear PoWer Plant has deyeloped, implemented, aihd will maintain) the guidance and strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool Clooling capabilities in the eventof a~beyond-design-baSiS external event in response to Order EA 049. The informatiogn provided: hierein.documents full compliance for R. E. Gin na Nulear. Power Plant with Reference 1.

OIP open items *have been addressed and closed as documented in References 7, 8,9,1!0,11, and below, alnd are considered complete pending' NRC closure. EGC'S response to the NRC Interim Staff Evaluation (ISE) open and confirmatory items identified in Reference 12 have been addressed anid closed as documented in References 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and below, and are considered closed as~docum'ented,in Referen'ce '1 5. EGC's response to thqe NRC"IS*E confirmatory items identified as: open in Reference 15 are addressed below,.and are considered comhplete pending NRC closure.. EGC's res'ponse tO the NRc audit qu~esti~ons, and additional audit open items have been' addressed *and closed.as documnented in References' 11*, '15, ahd below, and 'are considlerecompl etepe'nding NRC closure. The"fol1owing table~s pro~vide complet~ion references for each CIP open item and NRC ISE open or confirmatory item, and NRC Audit Repo0rt open item.

Overall Integrated Plan Open Items 1." Implement a design change to install'per~manent Refer~ence 7 and updated pr~otectedl FLEX equipment connection points. (also see with this submittal as 012-3) pr.0vided below '.,

2. Provide for..onsite storage of Phase 2 FLEX components Refer'ence 8 and updated that is protected against external events by design or' With.this submittal as location.

provided below Implement a design change to provide a. protected" storage location for.transportation (equipment and fuel) and debris removal eqtiipment.

Evaluate deployment strategies and deployment routes for hazards impact.-

Evaluate requirements and optio~nsand develop

.U.S. Nuclear Regul~atory Commissi~on Report of Full Complianice with Order EA-12-049 January 4,; 2016 Page 4 straitegies rel!ated.to the Storage onsite of the FLEX porta~ble equipmrent[.

Establish deployment routes from FLEX equipment, Storage locations to connrection points."

Develop a strategy and purchase equipment to respond tb eVents that. maV require debris remoVal such aS.

foillowing a flood, tornado, earthquake, or snow storm.

Dev~elop a strategy t.o move FLEX equipment, !including providing reasonable protection fromi a BDBEE.

3. EFxceptions for :the',site security plan or 'other (iicense/site Reference 8 s-pecific

- 10 CF*R 50.54x) reqluirements of fa nature requiring NRC approval will be communicated in a future 6-month' update.following identificatioK.

4. Develop :and implement~procedures to commence feeding Ref erende 10 and updated the steam genera~tors (S/Gs) from Standby.Auxiliary with this subm-ittal as Feedwater (SA.FWA.)

pdwered by.the new SAF Dl*iwDesel pro~vided below Generator (DIG) and taking suction from the new Condensate Sto'rage Tank (CST) prior to reaching 5. ft in ttie' existing CS.Ts..

5. Develop and implemient a FLEX method /iprocadure to Reference 11 refill the.new.SAFW. csT prior *to losing suction.-

• 6.

Develop anid implemeoni a progira~m and/or p~rocedure to Reference 11t and updated keep F LEX equipment deployment PathwayS clear or with withtihis submittal as identified actions to clea~rthe 'pathways..

provided below.

7. D etermine schedule for when N'SR~s will be fully

.Reference 7 operational...

8. Definecriteria for the localI NSRc staging, area by June Reference 8 2013.

9. *EStablish a suitable local staging: area for portable FLEX Reference 9 equipment to be deliver'ed, from the NSRC 'to the'site.

10. Develop. site specific playbook for delivery of portable Reference 1-1 FLEX equipment from the NSRC to the site.

1i1. perff6rm an: analysis to determine th~e diesel dri.ven Ref erence 9 and Updated portable high pressure pump upper and lower head with this Submittal as requirements to provide for ti minimum of.21'5 gpmto a provided below S/G without causin'g Reactor Coolant system (RCS)

.pressure _to decrease to the poin~t where nitrogen will be injected from the-SI 'Accumnulators, assuming suction is directly from the Ultimhate HFeat Sink (UHS).".

12. Develop and implemen~t procedures to~close Safety Reference 11 Injection (SI) Acc'umulator injectioh valves or vent the SI Accumulators prior tO nitrogen injection,into the _RCS.

13. Perform an analysis to.determine the time to restore.feed Reference 8 tO a S/G if only One S/G Wasable to be supplied with

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report of.Full Compliance with Order EA-12-049 January 4, 2016.

Page 5

'feedwater after a trip and then~feed is lost to that one S/G.

This is to account for the reduction in Water available for heat rer~novaL

14. Implement the design charnge to install the 1' MW SAFW Referelnce 7,and updated DIG, 160,000 gallon Condensate Storage Tank (OST),

With this submittal as and enclOsure rmeeting'the reasonable protection pr~ovided below requirements of NEI.12-06.

15. Develop and implement Procedures to feed S/Gs using a Reference 10 SA.FW Pump. powered by the new SAFW DIG and taking

.suction on the new 1 60,000 OST. Revise procedures to direct Operators to manUally establish makeup to the S/Gs via this flow path if the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDAFW) Pump'fails to deliver water to the S/Gs.

16. Implement a design ch3ange to protect a 'S/G Atmosp5heric Reference 10 and Updated Relief Valve.(ARV) from'Tornado Missiles to address, with this submittal as reactor core 'cooling and heat removal, using a high provided below capacity-portable diesel driven pump.

17. Perfform an analysis to demo'nstratce adequate manpower, Reference 11 communications capability, and habitability~for local op~eration Of the SIG ARVS. If this cannot be demonstrated, implemhent a design change to provide for ARV control from the Control Room 'for seismic and tornado missile events.

18. Develop.and imPlement proCedUres/administrative Reference 10 controls to ensure that the new CST main~tain~s a minimum usable volume at-all times.

19.. Perform anl analy'sis or implement a design dhange to Reference 11 qualify SIG Pressure instrumentation for a Tornado Missile event.

20:IldentifY instrumentation and develop' procedures to take Reference 10 field'readings of necessary parameters, including (Pressure Indicator) PI-430 and (Level Incdicator) LI-427.

21. Implement a-strategy to connect a portable air Ref erence 10 compressor at a' Iocatio'n/. cornfiguration, to support ARV operation.

22. Develop, and implement procedures to refill the.new CST References 8'and 11 from an alternate water source prior depleting the usable volume (approximrately 15. hours after the event).

23.-implement a 'design change as par~t of the installation Of Reference 10 the new OST to install a mechanical connection thatwill allow the tank~to be refilled from a portable diesel driven pump.

24. Perform an analysis t'o establish plant conditions in Phase Reference 8 and updated 2 that will allow diesel driven high capacitY portable pump with this submittal as to be utilized as soon as plant resources are available to provided below provide defense in depth 'for maintaining an adequate heat sink shouldSAFW fail.

U.S. Nuclear. Regulatory Commission Report of Full Compliance with 'Order EA-12-049 January 4,12016 Page 6 25.!Implemen~t a design chlange to install a neW* i~olation Reference 11

.Valve upstream.of the FLEX connection to S/G B in case a tornado :missile impacts a sect ion 'of unprotedted piping

-betve~en the-SAFW Biuilding and the. connection poinht.

26. im*plemlent a stlrategy to provide a sus~tainable sQu~rce. of

References 8 and 11 nitrogen and/_or air to the Power Operated Relief ValVes

,(PORk~s) :to protect RCS Integrity during a BDBEE while

,in Mode. 40or Mode 5, loo0ps filled.

27. Develop and implement procedures.to provide guidance 'Reference 11

• for water solid S/G cooldown using FLEX( equipment.

28.: Ensure 'NSRC Can supply D/Gs capable of powering'vital Refer'ence 8 bus loads.

29. Implement a -strategy to provide connections to 48,0 Volt Reference,10 and updated

.vital _busses.to be able to connect to NSRC Supplied

,with this submittal as-DQiGs.

provided below

30. Ensur-e NSRC ca~n supply a waiter processing unit.

• Reference 9" 31., Implement a[ design cha~nge to install low leak~age Reactor Reference 8 Coolalnt Pump "(ROP) seals. The new seals n~eed to be able to with~stand Thot for an extended period Qf. time..

32. Perform,an analysis to validate that a FLEX Bor'ic Acid Reference 8 Storag'e"Tank (FBAST).with a bioron, concentr.i-tion of at least 2750 parts per million (ppm) and no more than 3050 ppm, and con~taining a minimum usable volume of 7000 gallons, is sufficient to maintain the, rea~ctor subcritical at Beginning of-Life.(BO L) or, End of Life (EEL) conditions withi Tav'e at~or.near no-loa~d Tave, and at EOL Conditions withl a.cooldowni to.3500 F. (Analysis must be bouniding for cuJrrent and future. cycles.)

33. Implem~ent adesign change :to connect a new pre-staged References 9 and 11 high pressure ch-arging purrip anid FLEX diesel driven.

portable, charging pump.to the RWST.

34. lmplem'ent a strategy to batch mix b~eron in the EBAST.

Reference 9

35. Implement a design change tO install a 'pump caPable of References 10 and 11

.pumping 75 gallons pe-r minute i(gpm) of borated water from the RWST into thqe RCS at 1500..pounds per square inc*h (psi), with discharge pipi'ng connected to the Safety Injection System.

36. Deveiol5 and implement proceduires to in~itiate. ROS Reference 11 bOration prior to~conmmencing RCS cooldown to provide

• margin to prevent re-criticality.

37. Implement a design change to connect a portable diesel

References 10 and 11" engine.driven high pressure pump Ito the RWST and the Safety Injection.System, which is capable of pumping 75' gpm of borated water from the RWST to the RCS at,150.0

'psi.

38. Ensure the NSRC can supply a mobile boration unit.

References 9. and i11

39. Perform_ an analysis to deter'mine minimum RCS makeup Ref erenic~e.8 and updated flow Sufficient for simultaneous~core heat removal and with this submittal as

U.S.. Nuclear Re'gulatory. Commission Report of Full Compliance with Order EA-12-049 January 4, 2016" Page 7 boron flu~shing for Mode 5, loops not filled and PreSsur'izer

'provided below ma~hway not removed.

40. Performn an analysis to determine the 'tranSition point fro*m Reference 11 gravity f ill o~f the ref ujeling c avityto When forCed makeu~p is

• required..

'41. Fbr *Mode'5, L0oops. Not Filled, arnd Prles'surizer-M anwa*i Referende 8 and updated Not Rem0oved,-Rcs Heat 'Removal will be, by'RCS Bleed with.this submittal as and Feed. Items Under con sid~eration are:

provided below

• Establish RCS feed path Using low preslsure Pump capable of [To Be Determined].gpm at > 50 psig and a maximum diScharge prie'ssure of 410 psig to 'the RCS.

Establish s ufficient Rcs bleed path (PORVs, Reactor Hea vents)

I mplement a strategy to 'provide a connection point for Instrument Air to Containment (01 47)

• Establish feed toaalbeS/GS Partial strategy for consideration

- 'Fill available SIGs to provide :limited heat' sink function and additional time before' boiling of the coolant Occurs.. Existin~g procedur~al guidance~for Water, Solid SIG Cooldown Cirovides.g~idahce that dan be modified for use with a high flow portable diesel driven pump to maintain the'lim'ited'heat sink function.

if Water solid S/G CoOldown iseffective to maintain core-cooling and heat remova~l, secure RCS Bleed and Feed and maintain Pressurizer Level.

42. Perfor-m an ianalysis to dete~rmine-RCS venit path Reference 8 and.updated requir'ements for Mode 5 with PORV vent path.

with this Submittal as

.provided bel~w"

43. Develop and implement priocedures'to inakeup t0 the References 9 and 11 refueling icav)ity from the new CST, UHS, or RWST to niaihtain refueling cavity level and boron, co~ncentration.

44. Perform a bo0ron mixing analysis for the effects on ROS Ref erence 8 bolrbn. oncentration by providing. unb~orated water to the refuelingl cavity via the transfer Canal from the Auxiliary

• Building to Containment.

45. Ev'aluate the Viability ofr'eed 'and bleed for a~vailable SIGs Reference 8 and Updated to provide a limited heat sink function and additionalI time with this submittal as before b0iling of the coolan~t occurs as a parallel pr~vided below rnitigating str~ategy during Modes 5 '&6. This analysis

.must address reflux condensati~n and its potential *effects oni reactor Shutdow~n margin.

46. Implement a design change to establish provJisions for Refer'ence 9 refilling the FBAST-with borated water.

47. Implement a strategy to p5rovide a* connection 'point for Reference 8 and up'dated Instrument Air to Containment, with this submittal as provided below

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Repor-tof Full Compliance With Order EA-12-049 Jan~uary 4, 2016 Page 8

48. Perform an evailuation to determine a method for Reference 8 and iupd~ated recirculation cooling of the RcS if the Auxiliary.Building with this submittal as Sub-basement is flooded by To~rnado MiSSileS* damaging

,provided below non,-protected ta~nks on the Auxiliary Building Operating FIo66.,"'"

49. Perform ah analysis to determine the containment Reference 8 and updated pressure pro~file during an FLAP.!/Ldss df ultimate Heat with tchjs submittal' as Sink (LUHS) event and determine'th'emitigating

-provided below strategie§ necessary to ensure thein~st rumentation and controls in.conta~inment.which are reli6d Upon.by the Operators are suifficientto perform their intended function.

50. Perform an analysis of.the Con'tainment function to Reference 9 and updated determine the mitigating strategy acceptance criteria for with this subm~ittai as an ELAP./LUHS event,.

provided below

51. Irfiplemerit a Strat'egy.to deterniine contai~nment pressure ReferencesT7 and 10 after a Tornado Missile event.,

52.Devielop* the Phase 3.str-ategy, after the containment Reference 10 and updated pressure analysis. is completed as described in Maintain with this~submittal as containrment,. PWR Portable Equipment.Phase. 2.

.pirovided below

53. EnSure the NSRC will proVide a~dditi~onal portable pumps Reference 9 an~d equipment to spray water-into containment or Supply water to the Conftainmenert Recircula~tion Fans / Coolers.

54. Implement a strat*.gy t9 provide for a protected makeup References 8 and 11 connection to the spent Fuel Pool (SFP) cooling piping to provide makeup tO the SFP that exceeds SFP boil-off and provide a means to suipply SFP makeup without accessing' the SFP,walkWay..

55. Prov)ide,the. necessarly connecting hoses' and/or Refer'ence 11 eq~i*pment to wokWt xsing pumps and water sources.

for filling the SFP.-

56. Implement new.FS G-1 1, Alternate.SF.P MakeUp and References 9 and 11 Cooling, tO provide multiple 'strategies for establishing a diverse means of SFP makeup and Cooling for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

57. Perform an analyVsis to determine if a vent pathway from Reference 10 the SFP is needed for steam and conde-nsate to minimize the potential 'for steam to dause access and equipment problems in the Auxiliary.Building.,(also See 01 62)

58. SFP Water Levelinstr'ument numbers will be 'provided Reference 8 upon detailed design.completion.

59. Ensure the NSRc will provide additional portable pumPs Reference 9 and equipment-to:

provide water from the UHS to the standby SFP Heat Exchanger-to remove-hleat from theSFR-cooling...

system with the Standby SFP Recirculation Pump; or provide water to SFP Heat Exchanger A to removJe heat from the SFP *Cooling.System with the Standby SFP Recirculation-'Pump or SFP Pump A.

U.S,. Nuclear-RegUlatorY Com'mission Report of Full Compliancewith Order EA-12-04-9 Janua'ry 4 2016 Page 9

60. I mplem'ent a strategy :to supplby,the.battery chargers from References 9 a~nd 11 the 1.MW D/G u~sing existing plant equipment connection 61 points.

6 Implement a strategy to supply the battery chargers from References 9 anid 1 1 a 100 kW DiG using existing plant equipment connection.

62. Perform. GOTHIC ca~lculations consistent with NUMARC.

.Reference" 11 87-.00,; Guidelines and.Technica'l.Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addlressin~g Sta tioni Bla cko ut a t Ligh~t water Reactors, t6 de~terminie the effects of a loss.of-HVAC during an ELAP for thie following areats:

Interimediate Building,.TDAFW Pump and ARV/

(Safety Valve (Sv) areas Auxilary B.Uilding, Refueling Water Storage Tank

,(RWST) area

• .Battery Rooms, RelaY Room, and Conitrol Room Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Building

63. Perform an analysis.to evaluate the.Battery Room low

.Reference 11 temperatu~re~for~anELAP' event, assuming -.16°F air'

• temperature to determine if,, and when,-Battei'y Roomt heating is required.

64.-implement~ a strategy for accessing the UHS for all References 8 and 11 BDBEEs anid to meet requiredd~epl0Yrnent times. This must also address how debris in the UHS or other raw water sources will be filtered / Strained and ihow the resulting' debris will effect core cOOling...

65. Implement a strategy to provide for transferring diesel fuel Reference 8 anid updated from th.d D/G A andJ D/G B Fde~l Oil Storage Tanks With this submittal as

..(FOSTs).to ;a fuel tran~sfer" vehicle....

pr~vided~below".

66: Perform an/ analysis to provide a basis that the Qffsite Reference :9 and Updated D/G FOSTs are-reasOnably protected from BOBEEs.

with this submittal as

,prOvided below.

67. Devel~p the strategy to transfer-fuel fromn protected fuel Reference 9 and Updated Storage,lOcations to FLEX-equipm~ent.:

with this submittal as provided below

68. Develop strategies to provide for emergency lightinrg to Refer ence 8 and updated s~upport Operator actions.after a BDBEE.

with this submittal as provided below

69. Develop a strategy to pr;otect' onsite consumables for use Reference 10" after a BDBEE.

70. Develop3 and implement p~rocedures to eStablish battery Reference 11 room ventilation within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of the event to Pre'~ent exceeding the unacceptable hydrogen, concentration limit of 2%, once the GOTHIC analysis has been compieted as discussed in~ Phase 2.

71. Table 3 lists Phase 3 Response Equipment /

Reference 8 Commodities that are being considered for pre-staging at an Offsite location. These include:

u.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report of Full Compliance with Order EA-12-049 January 4, 2016 Page 10 Radiation Protection Equipment Commodities - Food, Potable Water Diesel Fuel

• .Heavy.Equipm~ent - Transportation, Debris Removal Boric Acid Portable. Lighting Portable.Toilets.

72. Install wid-e..range SFP level instrum-entation in Reference 10 accordance with NRC Order. EA-1 2-0.51.-'

73. lInplement, a strategy to provide co.oling water to the RHR Reference 7 and updated Heat Exchangers using a portable diesel driven PUMP.

with this submittal as

__________________________________________provided below

74. Any additional non-safety equ~ipment will be identified a~nd Reference 8 and updated evaluated for suitabi~lity in the mitigation strategies.

.with this submittal as provided below Interim Staff Evaluation Open Items I

~None I

Interim Staff Evaluation Confirmatory Items Item No. 3.1.1.A

,Reference i11 Item No. 3.1.1.1.A Reference !11 Item No-. 3.1.1.3.A

.Referehlce 11 Item No. 3.1.4.2.A Reference 11 Item No. 3.2.1.A Reference.11 Item No. 3,2.i1.B Reference 10 and updated with this Submittal as provided below Item No,3.2.1.i.A Reference 11 Item No. 3.2.1.2.A Refer'ence :11 Item No. 3.2.1.2.B Reference 9 and~updated with this submittal as provided below Item No. 3.-2.1.8.A Reference 11 Item No. 3.2.1.9.A Referenc*e 9 and updated with this submittal as provided below Item No. 3.2.3.A Referen~ce i11 Item No. 3.2.4.2.A Reference i11 Item No. 3.2.4.4.A Reference-11 Item No. 3.2.4.4.B Reference 11 Item No,. 3.2.4.5.A Reference !1 ltem N0. 3.2.4..8.A Reference~ 1i and UPdated with this Submittal as provided below Item No. 3.3.1.A Reference 9 and Updated withthis submittal as provided below

U.S. Nuc le]ear: Re*gulatoryCobmmission.

Janua.ry 4,; 20*16:

Page* 1.1 NRC Audit !Report Ope'n Items SE...

Ref ~rfic6d 1* and updated with this* s'u~bmitaI as provided below,

..SI..,..*,,,

R~f6rence.,l 1....

1'i an d:"'

upd

.... :**°ated: with this, submittali as" "provided" be'low"

SE.i'[*E

"".......,Ref er'endp.' i1 'and" updated with this submittal as'""

.provii'ded......

b elow*

SE# 13i2-E "

Reference'"*:

11.and"

": " 'upd.ated

• """*""*:with,this" "submittal

" :as provided

" *' beiowi SE 1 -

Reference" 11.

• S.E :1 8-E'

,Refe'rence 411""'"

The following,,table ldocumen'ts completion of the 'final ~remaining open,items. As pre'viously sta~ted, EGO provides the responlse for the followifgj t~ms and.,considers them to be corhplete foi;-R.~ E:. *Giinna' Nuclea: :Po'w~r Plant..

Item..

'"Descritin

~

erenice

.Q.

.,T

<.OIP Op~en Item 1-"

FLEX equipment.conniection ~poirts have odm"l "

.been nsltalled to. provwde the ability to add Implement ta de~tsign. chqage,to -w~ter "to!:he S/iQds, t{he 'RO*S, o*r the'SEP:

install p~erm~ane prote:~rtee*id.'"

F:LEXequi.pment connection Within the.SJFWBuilding.Annex, hose co nn ections *have. been iinh tatlled, (TCO5~)" dischari*g~e, an8d return piping.

• I

• -*fr~tr TCDo5;. anda,-along wit (h-.ose

,connections at,valve :9786, to feted-*

FLEX. p~umP drafting off of Lake "Ontario...

1~~~

~

In th-e ba~sement Pf the Auxilia-ry""

U.S.. Nuclear RegulatOry Commission Report of Full Compliance with Order EA-12-049 JanuarY 4, 2016 Page.12 Building, a hose Connection is provided in the SFP Recirculation Pump suctionipiping. This hose connection, at valve 8662 (P&ID.

3301.3-1248)' provides the ability for "the:

diesel driven FLEX pump, drafting off of Lake-onitario, to replenish the SFP Water loss, due to boil off.

• A hose~connection at valve' 9757

• (P&ID.33013-1238), in the SAFW pump. discharge, cross-tie piping allows for the diesel driven FLEX.

pump to feed directly to both SiGs,

• An Alternate RCS Injection System has been designed as a. perman~ently mounted, 'harid-piped system of.FLEX equjipment that is housed in protected

'buildings and spaces. it allows for providing borated water from.the RWST.

. to the RCS, via the Safety Injection headers. A trailer-mounted dieseldriven Aliternate BCS Injedtion FLEX pump is provided as a redundant pump.to the :permanently mounted pump.. Hose connections at valves 9056 anid 9072 (P&I D 33013-1230) provide the ability to connect' the trailer mounted pump to the hard-piped Alternate RCS Injection System.

• In addition to the new Alternate RCS Injection system to inject bor*.ted water~from the RWST through the.SI Headers into the RCS (with portable diese& driven b.ackup),-an alternate means of providing RCS injection through an alte~rnate injection point is available. This alternate means 'of injecting bornted water into the RCS involves repowering a Charging Pump from the SAFW DIG utilizing tempora~ry p~ower-cables and manually lining up to inject from the RWST to the RCS through AOV-392A (Charging Valve Regenerative Heat Exchanger to Loop B.Hot Leg), which opens at a 250 PSig differential pressure to allow flow to the RCS.

U.S. Nuclear.Regulatory Commission Report{ of Full Compliance with Order EA+-12-049 January 4, 2916 Page 13 QIP Open Item :2 Provide for onsite sto rage of Phase 2 FLEX components that is prote'cte~d, against external events by design or.location.

Implement a design Change to provide a protected storage Iodation for transpor-tation (e'quipfrent and fuel) and debris removal equipment.

Evaluate deploymernt strategies and dleployment routes for hazards impact.

Evaluate requirements and options and develop strategies related to the storage onsite of the FLEX portable 'eqUipmfent.

Establish deployment routes from FLEX equipment storage locations to Cdhne'ction poinits.

Develop a strategy and purchase equipment to respond to events'that may requir~e debris r~emoval such as following a flood, tornado, or snow storm.

Develop a strategy to move FLEX equipmenit, including providinjg reasonable protection from a BDBEE.

The follo0wing are the functions for which Ginna has, provided FLEX.equijpment,'

togetherwith a de~scription of th'eir psrotection, against external event~s:.+

1. Provide Auxiliary Feedwater to the steam generadtors.

,The "'N" means employs'permanent~ly' installed sAFW pumps, taking suction from a robust 160,000 gallon Dl Water Stcorage Tank, POWered by+ a permarher/itly installed.1 MW SAFW DIG. The DIG, switchgear, and pumps/.piping a re all located,within robust Structur'es. 'FLEX "N+!"

'equipment. can Pr0vide the water to the S/Gs following SIG depressunization,'eit[her, from th~e 160,000 gallon tank Dl Water Storage Tank, or. dir'ectly from Lake Onitario.

The FLEX pump and hoses are stored in a. commercial ASCE 7-10 building.

2.

Isolate Safety Injection Accumfulat~ors.

The '!N" function is performed bY repbowering a cubicle in MCC "C" and one in1 MCC "D"' from the SAFW D/G,

.then closing the isolation valves.,In the.*event a torn~ado :damages Mcc "C":, an air compresso~r is. conn..cted to an instrument a~ir lin'e, alijw~ng'the adcumulator, tobe vented. 'All*

necessary) cables, co'nnectors, hoses, and.the air compressor are stored in rob'ust locations.. G~omparable equiprient is used for, the "N+1" strategy, Subst+iutL~ng~the1Q )OkW D/G for the SAFW !DIG..This 100 kW. D/G, as-well as. necessary hbses, Cables, and con nections are s tor~ed in :the cOmmercial ASCE 7-10 building.

3. Re power the batteryJ chargers.

This "'N" function is performed by repowding 'acubicle in MCC "C". ad 6ne inMCC "D" from the SAFW DI.

In the even~t a tornado damaged MCC "C", the SAFW D/G would be' conne'cted directly to affected battery charger. All ca bles and connection required for these functions are stored Comprlete

~~in rdbiust ldcationss Th ":.N+I1"..

strateg is 56t~.parblesbstitut~i~g n.r~cessary, c~al

'* s carneet~ions.

are tor~eid :in:h cor'mrciaIASCE 7-

4.

'riri~h'I n.v[enit6ry/iReactivityOon6t rol.'

• .The,,N.,"-f rIdt*&i n :is pei_*&iormed biy,

• insta.ied, an*id po6w.eried :from the 1#

iMW D/G r te ~lOkWpo{abl~e dies6l "

diesel :generator,; hosescab~les,': and por[table d.'ie'sel driv*en Altrnt ROS

'invedhtory/rieacti'ity coptrOi is. by.

erin.

anihta~lled charqging p.*ump ppw~Aler.nat RSanjection.......

mp....as..well.

.as all ei sr oecbig n

conn ecton are s*toreg in ithe

5. SentFuelPoo CoElin gjventory Control.,,

.ei~nloying; a portable [FLEX,dje~sel dischartge, can**]arl andfjiinrl* dirit*'ly, t~o

" ther SFP.th6 is tlrnf can i~prvi~ie fo Storhage Tank'0, asfell)

.as Otheg

SFPr,

.thusin aiev maifod.gthr**aeS OFLX pu-mp

U.S.Nuclari*

j'egulafory C....

ommissi:

,'*:-n

"'Report of.

.Fegoll' 1.ompr.,;i!,nce with Order EA-1 2-049::i:&"

Ja-nuaory4,fo 2016i!!.:i;!ii'

,/s"

-eprovied by aqp:,:tlie*',

e Isr:**g*.dive

',*FLEX :*tt~h te""'"**'

.... *::""*~ [n* f

• 1 m

i*the.

~~~~~conrr

s::flt*iywltne lllngute s -fi8a

.A.op:other.c-ot! !nie tioppit&

F is vi valv&6 62i;

:ss[",!iith[*g

oe san'

'"":p is: a....

str omr~editsaoterm.,

od n h

Scoumeri;al :;'*ASCEo7-10 buii*ng.

th."..u.tin.s 5rfose by pi~iing }tl6d val.*oe 7444.o Ivlv 74is note adeva.ilabe ue o flodds inge:*~

'.-:'ba~eventt.::,he ir opes or*

• !.is, *eda to dpsien h otainrn u

niii: uri!.ige,"valve.,

~~~~Tcompr~esi~soar, fitt*J**in~s r

host, and

-10toos aestored

:i~i:!N a "israoet iis

~f~..

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission" Repoft of Full Complianice wit~h Order EA-12-049 January 4, 2016 Page 1i6 comp'arab~le,, su~bstituting the 1*00 kW D/G.for the SAFW DIG.. The necessary diesel, pump, hoses, cables, and connectors 'are stored in the commercial A*SCE,7-10 bui~lding.

8. Mode'5 Residual] Heat Rem~val.

Following dewiat'ering of.the sub~-

Sbasement, forced flow RCS,.

'r'ecircUlation coocling can be attained.

The "'N" strategy is to provide power

.to the installed RCDT Pump "B" from

• the SAFW DIG,(the. RCDT Pumps can oper~ate after being submerged). All cables, Connectors, and junction boxes ar'e stored in a robust structure.

The "'N+.I* 1.strategly provides for..the "A" RCDT pump to be powered for the 100 kW D/G. :Th~e100"kWD/G as well as all necessary connectors,.

cables, and junctioh boxes are stor'ed in the commercial ASCE 7-10.

building.

9. Heat Sink for Mode 5 RHR.

A means to remove the heat being circulated by the RCDT Pumps is necessairy,. Th6 "N" str'ategy is to aliign a diesel driven FLEX pump from the

.discharge canal to valve *760A, B bonnet-to-*hose adapte~rs. This flow Would Cool the RCDT flow. The water circulating from the. FLEX PUmp wou~ld b~e discharged via hose to outside the Auxiliary Building. The FLEX pump anid all hoses, fittings;, connections, and flanges are lo~cated in :robust Structures: Tile "N+I" strategy is comparable.excePt that the redundant FLEX pumli*, as Well ais the necessary hose, fittings, connectors, and~f~adges

'are stored in the commercial ASCE 7-1t0 building.

10. Communication.

There is a permanently installed*

satellite dish to provide satellite communication betw~een the station and the EOF as well as the state and county Officials. In~the event a BDBEE darmaged the permanent

,satellite dish, a portable dish is

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report of Full Compliance with Orde'rEA-1 2-049 January 4, 2016 Page 17 provided., The portabl1e dishi trailei-,

,uPs system;, cabling, and p~orable di esls generat~or 'are ~tore'd nra 'robust structure: A repeater System is installed to facilitate radio communida~tion onsitedcuring an event, ln the event the permanently installed System would be damaged by a BDBEE, a. redundant repeater Would be deployed.,The rep~eater, an~tenna, tripod, and cable are all irnstalled in a robust structure.

11. RefUeling."

Redundant sources of diesel fuel are available for refueling.the S' AFW DIG, 100 kW D/G, the dieSel driven.FLEX pumps, the diesel driven portable-Alternate RCS Injectionpump, and the~srnaller diesel generators. Two fuel trailers, each with 990 gal'lOns df ultra-low sulfur fuelI, are station~ed at the sitd.-TheY are Stored sO as to be separated by the wid~th 'of the site-

.specific tornado (-1Q40 feet),-

.accounting for the pirevailing tornado directionlfor the region. Each fuel trailer has the neceSsary. fuel transfer equipment, once deployed jthe trailers can be refilled from.the onsite fuel oil storage tanks.

12. Debris Re~moval!/Equiprment TranSportation.

-The site has a Case 621 pay loader, as well as a Ford F-:350,pickuP truck with a snow plow, to remove debris Caused by a BDBEE:' Each yehicle is also equipped With equipment to check for live.wires in downed power lines. Each vehicle is also equip~ped with a pintle hitch, Which can be used to transport mitigation equipment, such as the 100 kW D/G, the.portable Satellite trailer', the FLEX pumps, the fu~el trailers, the "hose.trailers, and :the air compressors to their deployment points.

Primary and alternate deployment, routes for Phase 2 portable FLEX equipment are

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report of Full Compliance With Order EA-12-049 JanUary 4, 2016 Page 18 identified in GN-WP-0O1, BDBEE Debris Removal for qinna Station. Ginna Station*

has designated a-Case 621 F Pay..loader and a Ford F350 4-wheel drive (equipped with a snow plow) as the debris removal! t'ransport equipmenit.. The Case 621 FPay loader is stored out'side to the sout'h (near the W hite Barnf), outside-of the PrOtected Area. The Ford F350 4-wheel drive is stored *inside the L-Buifding, inside of the Protected Area.

These specific locations provide over 1040 ft.

of separati~on to. satisfy the tornado "diverse locations'", storage requirements for FLEX equipment per. NEI 12-06. The.boun ding case is to use the Case 621 F Loader to provide debris removal capabilities in the event of a to'rnado event *th at passes through the Protect Area. Based on NEI 12-06 gUidance regarding aCCeptable separation distance and t'0rnado travel path, it is assumed that the Ford F35.0, located on site is una~vailable because it isrnot stored within a tornado rnissile hardened structure. it is also assumed that if a tornado eVent was to impact the Case_"Loader, it would not dir6ctly impact the F350 stored,in the L-Building. A tornado event is judged bounding for debris removal.efforts for. other beyond design basis evenfts, including snow, high winds, and floods.

In the event of site impacting torrnado event, the Case 621F Loader would be required to travel approximately 1/2 Of a mnile Of publiC roadway and approximately 1/2 of a mile of station access roadways to reach the on-Site storage locations for the FLEX mitigation equipment. From the furthest poirnt of stored location for FLEX equipmernt, it is also

.approximately 3/4 of a mile to the final point of use, dependent on avaialability of the primary and alternate routes.,. Engineering walk.downs of the Case 621 F loader deployment path have identified a number of poten'tial~debris sources. When loader is deployed from the White Barn area, the equipment operator may encounter downed power lines. The operator.shall find any alternate path around the downed lines. If no

U..S. Nuclear Re~gulatory Commission Repbort of Full Corhpliance with Order EA-12-049 January 4, 2Q16 Page 19 alternate path exist(s, the o~pe'rator shall obtaih shift manager. or site Emergency birector Authorization to check lines with an

.availab~le proximity deVice, Verify safe, and '

drive over or cut lines as required.

As the loader proceeds West on Lake road, the operator encounters approximately 1/4 mile section of a moderately woode'd area, with mixed species of hard and soft woods, averaging less than 12" diameter at the trtink.

The Case Loader has a lifting capacity of

• 18,684 lbs., and is equipped with a grapple bucket, proyiding the 'capability to,capture the er~itire tree to the bucket, lifting it, and.

relocating if required.

The Case 621F loader 9i ca.pable of simultaneously pushin~g multiple trees of average Size to the Side of the road. :In the lowest gearing and at.maximum torque operating range, the loader will be operating at approximately 3 mph. With a conservative aSSumption of 15 reversin'g and clearing debris cy'cles of 1 minute each (15 MinUtes),

travel through the 1/4 mile of the moderately wooded area at 3 mph (5 Minutes), it :is calculatedl that the C*ase 621 F loader will clear the maximum, expected de~bris through the moSt challenging section of the off-site deployment path in 30 min~utes, including addressing downed power lines (10 Minutes).

The remainder of the deployment Path to the Protected Area is*lessthan 1 1/2milesand will have minimal debris, based on Surrounding

• landscape, terrain and structures. The loader has~a maximum road speed travel of 24 mph, but for this assessment Only 6 mph travel speed will be considered. Assuming an average of 61mph travel speed the loader is travel the.remaining 1 1/2/ miles to the Protected.Area iri 15 minutes. With additional conservative assiumption of 10 reverse and clear: de'briscycles of 1 minute each (10 Minutes) and addressing additional downed power lines (10 Minutes),'it is expected thatthe Case 621 F loader will require an additional 35 minutes to arrive at

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report of Full Compliance With Order EA-12-049 January 4, 2016 Page 20 the Protected Area.

once th* 'loader :has entered the PA, an addit'ional 3/4, of a mile of travel1 path must be cleared for either the primary or alternate routes from equipmnent storage locations.

The twp protected storage Iodatioris are the har~dened sea vans..west of engineering building an~nex (Pr~ject aUilling).and the SAFW Annex.

BaSed on engineering studies of tornado damnages and deb~ris field at industrial sites, it is not expected that building structures or on-site materials or equipment would provide significant debris, removal challengesfor the Case 621 F loader or:Ford 350. The 150' tall

'high mast lighting towers are assumed to~fail under a beyond design basis event. Given available dePloyment routes, it is possible that high mast lights may be Within.the debris field but :it is reasdnable to expeCt that pOles-will not be blgckinrg the alternate.path. Given the width of travei routes available it is expected that the d~eblris equipment will be able to bypass high mast lights. Therefore, assuming an average of 6 mph tr'avel speed the l0ader can travel the remaining 1 1/22 miles inside the P5rotected Area in 15 minUtes

(.Primary and Alternate route combi'ned).

.With a conservative assufrnption of 10-reverse and clear debris cycles of:t minute each (10 Minutes) andl addressing any additional on-site downed power lines (10 Minutes), it is exp~ected that the Case 621 F loader wi!l require an additional 35 minutes trav~el time.

In conclusion, it has beenh established that all pote~ntial and credible debris along the travel path from the most distant and diversely located debris removal equipment can be cleared in 100o minutes for a worst case' scenario for-debris removal effort. To add fur-ther conservatism to timeline studies, the debris removal time will be rounded up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

ECA-0.0, Loss of Al! AC power, Step 11 RNO states: IF the T*DAFW pump is feeding Complete S/Gs, THEN monitor CST level. WHEN CST

U.s..Nuclear Regulatory Commission-Report of *Full Compliance with order EA-12-049 January 4, 201 6 Page 21 QIP Open Item 4 Develop anid implement, Procedures to commence tfeedin* th~e *steam,ge~n erat'ors, (S/Gs) from~ Standby Au~xiliary EiFeedwater.(SAFW) power~ed by the new SAFW Diesel Generator.(DIG) and taking

sucti.on from the new Condensate Storage Tank:

(CST) -prior. to.reaching 5'ft-in the existing CSTs.,

level iowe'rs to 5 feet,' THEN initiate SAFW feed to the S/Gs,: refer(to ATT-5.5, Attadhment SAFW writh Suction from Dl Water Storage Tank during SBO."

EC*A-0.0 Step 22b-(co~tinuoi~s action step) directs the opera~tors to Monitor CST Level -

GREATER THAN.5 FEET.,The. RNO column states:.Dispatch EO to :initiate SAFW using the SAFW or NFPA DIG, refer to.ATIT-5.5, Attachment SAFW with Suction from DI Wat{er storage Tank du~fing sa0.-

4-4 QIP Open item 6 Develop and. implement a pr~gram and/or procedure to keep FLEX equipment deployment =Pathways. clear or with identified actions to' Clear the pathways.

CC-G I'I 1*8, Ginina Irnplementation 'of 'Diverse andl Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX).and, Spent F~uel Pool Intuettin:~orm speci~fies the deployment path* maintenance

• and availability, requireH lents.

When two or more deployment path options are available, temporarily blocking o'ne path t'o support plant Operations is acceptable.

Compensatory aC~tiorns will be-in place for duratioSns longer than-5 business days. A-52.12, Nonfunctional Equipnment Important to Safety, wil track the 'deploymen't pathos" blocked time. Wihen only one deployment path is available, 'tempOrarily blocking'this path to-s.UlPprt plant operations is aclceptable.' Co~mpens'atorY actions SHALL be in place for any duration beyond a single Shift.

0-6.1, Eq-uipment Operator Rounds, directs checking FLEX deploymient paths are clear each rou'nd.

OPG-IWS-SUPPORTI Operations S upport of the' Integrated Work Schedule, dire'cts SRO review-Of scheduled work to determ~ine 'if it.

Will 'inv0lve blocking FLEX deploym~ent paths.

Complete Calculation 61,7.,1, R. E. Ginr~a FSG QiP Open Item 11 Setlpeints, Setpoin't-H.117 determined that~the

~minimum pressure which prevents.injection

.Complete Perform an analysis to of accumulator nitrogen into the ROS for determine the diesel driven ELAP conditions, plus allowances for nor'mal portable high pressure pump channel accuracy, was 290 psig. ECA-0.0,

_______' ___________Loss of All AC Po wer, AppendiX A directs

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report of Full Compliance with 'Order EA-'12-049 January 4, 2016 Page 22 "

upper' and lower head requirements to provide. for a miinim d~m Of 2i5 'gpm~toa s/G without causing Reactor" Coolant

.Syst~em (RCS).pressurle to de'crease to the point wlhere, nitrogen 'will be injected from the SI A~cumulators, assuming suction is directly from :the Ultimate He at Sink (UHS).

Operators to depressurize selected sIG(s) to.

29.0 psig when establishing 1l,*v pressure S/G feed °and thenrefer to FSG-10, passive RCS Injection isolation, 1to isolate or Vent the SI Accumulatdrsto prevent nitrogen injection into :the RCS.

DA-ME-15-00*5, FLEX :RHR/*CCW/SW Hydraulic Model, predicts FLEEX SAFW pump performance feeding SIGs while d~rafting from the lake. The analysis predicts that the pump is capab~le~of delivering 232 gpm,split to, both generators (116 each),if the S/Gs are at 305 psia: 305 psia was ch'osen as a reasonable SIG.target pressure after'approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. Of 'effective SAFW flow per the Mode 1 RELAP analysis RWAq1 323-003, Ginna SRELAp5 ELAP Analysis for Mode 1.

OQIP Open Item.14 Implement the design change to ins~tall th'e 1 MW SAFW DIG, 160,000 gallon CondenSate Storage Tank (CST),' and enclosure* meeting the reasonable.protection requirements of NEI 12-06.

A 1 MW SAFW DIG and a 160,000 galloni (nominal) DI Water storage Tank have been installed on a 3' thick concrete foundation with daissons to bedrock. The diesel generator is mounted on the foundation and housed within the SAFW Bldg. Annex. The bi Water Storage T~ank is mounted on the founidation with all piping to and from the tank enclosed in a steel plate structure. All structures ont t~he foundation are designed to withstand seismic and tornado* wind loads and tornado missile imnpa~ct. The SAFW Building Annlex is also capable of withstandin~g a floodl as all wall pienetrations are either above the design flood level :or are flood-protected.. Therefore, the 1 MW SAFW D/G and a 160,000 gallon (nomrinal) DIWater Storage Tank meet the reasonable protection requirements of NEI 12,06.

Complete

(

References:

ECP-1 1-000104-015-7-01, Revision 2, Design Change Techniidal Evaluation for DieSel. Driven Standby Aux Feedwater Project - De-lonized water Tank Installation; ECP-1 1-000104-01 5-7B-01,

.Revision 2,.Design Change Technical Evaluation for Diesel Driven Standby Aux Feedwater Project - De-1onized Water Tank Criteria; Ecp-13-00421, DDSAFW Project Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Building Annex; GNP01 1 -C-2, *Standby Auxiliary Feedwater

U.S.,Nuicle ar RdegUlatory Cbmmissiogn R*epo6fofit:bi.F!i*:Qmnpliap6e WithOre~r e*EA-1,'2*049,

• " 2* "

Imp~lem*ent;a des'ign :change to

,Surroun'dipg C~ble*Tu.nnel,Entr.anpe to" protect a SIG ",Atmospheric...

Protect Vital Instr~umentation FEellowing a Relief V:*alve (ARV)"from;*

6~~ri~neiEeent'or';Tornado,rYeinforce~df; remov#ali~r

,dJ*#"h~igh capacity

-.AR~is from T~rnado Me::issiles to all6w fodr a portable diesel'driv~en pump.

isymmnettioc ~oldoWn.:':,

"'i:,

Perfoerm an analysis to establish Hydr':uli. Model, p.:!;:

redi,'-:,-t',.

FLEX SA-..::,.&FWi pump*:

plant conditions th the lak.h e ajnalyis redictstha tgeump,

°capacoity' portable p"ump tO be is: capabl tof de'i* ieing:t'::

2*

• • "'"eri;* spli to ot as* soon,:.:

as,* plant..:-.:

gener"atr (11,.6 each) 'ifthe.S/Os are at 305 u.:tilized,.

.'...,:.. ',* v:,.

psia..305 p~ia.was 'dhosen as a reasonable" resources'are'available-to pp-ro x

,,i:-:m,:

..4'*

.. tely*:*"

proid defense;:-'*:..

in' for.*::.,.. SIG. target pressu~e after app ael 6.

• ,,::.:-,d.,_,pth :.

hours of effective SAFW low per the..Modle1 maintaining an' adequate heat RELAP.;. a.*.r,-al:sis F*W-1.3...3,- 003'*...:-,,.,*..

Ginn SIn]k should SAFW/ fail.lEA~LPAayi o

de1

.QIPpi~ien Itie~m29' A

conn:etinct ponintfr

.f6:th~eNSRC :41g 60V Com..et bu~s<ses tobe a6bl*e to cnnect to Cbodi;ng),.and a"F S.-.1, Gi*;Alternat CNMT.

I. s

.CooAn g

A tly t~chi.iment Cp AignTemp..S'oraryn, oplt supplf' ied*

Emiium;ies I'*citricai~l Power Suplyto*:

CNMl:P*R[itS a~n

• ii6st:..e~i.fi~d*:*hd.#r*:Coouiers),* : wh.Q1ich prvie diretons):

fRHBS~r'tey coneq ting the;6*.

uS~ 4160V

.t e:FLEXt,*

D/G R

toS'

"Repo~rt !of FlleCo(m pliance wi'th Orcder EA-12-04.9

,January 4, 201 6

P~ag24 ma.int~ain IRCS :approximately3"*o. above-the

hoti l g. WithoiJt somie R.HRF.slystem. decay.

.heat r~emova,,makleup rate re~quire~mer'nts after 15 dho.drs :are exect~e*d to:be less'tihan 1i10 GPM.* Th6semak8,1eu*p. rates :ar.e.

thian* -twice6 the boil off r.ate" dLiring t he firtst 15 hours1.736111e-4 days <br />0.00417 hours <br />2.480159e-5 weeks <br />5.7075e-6 months <br /> r*!er iRWA-1323.-0064). ;The 6g reae~r makeup ra~it e w*si *iul t:o. m)Oistur c~-iarryovyer thqro'ugh lthe"arg~e m*hanwy oending,predlicted t.ooccur' ini the R ELAP m6[del obf RWA-1l323-004*. Bbr~opreci*6pitatiion w*s dete~rmined to not be a concrn emin RWA-1323-00C)4;.

OPOpenlIt'emi 41

• For Mode 5, Loops Not Filled, a~nd Pr~essurizer Man~ay Not will be by ROS Ble~ed and Fe~ed.

Items under: consideration are:

-* :Establis sf'RO.S.feed ~path*

usinhg liow pres.sure pump capable:o~f [To,Be DBte~rmined] gpum at>,50 psig :and a maxi~mum'

• discherge pressure of 410

• Estaiblishisuffic}iehit RCS.

bl*ee.dpath. (eORFVs, Reactor I mpl.em~ent a :strategy to

'provide a connectioh.point

.for' Instr.Ument :Aiio -

C~on.tainim~ent (0147-)

• . EstabliSh-fe~ed,to available S/s P9riaI stat gyo cor5 idera"tidn.- Fll avil.:aable

!*s"Qto provi'de lim:,itedl "heat sink* fudn ctio af'nd ad~tditiona~l

• .co6!ait #6cpui-s.

Existing Prbcedual. a[guidance-fi o*

Water Solid'S/G C:ool0down p~rovides guidian*e that can be modified for uise w*ith. a hrigh :flo *wportabl:e,diesel diriven pum~p t maintain.the G nnia RELAP5 ELAP.Analysis for Mode 5, demonsti-ate's use df.a PORV. vent pa~th."

Alternate. RC:S Injection P u ff p ~install'ation

.flowy (75 gpm) anid h4ad -to feed under tihese conditionis..

The strat eg*yto provide a conneCtion point for lnstrurient Air :to"Cohft~inment is a~ddressed InSt~r~umentAir is not needeid for the Mod'e 5 strategy.

A.Diesel driy~en FL:EX :pump. is~capable of

• feedi'n.g".S/G for conditions dlscvssedi under re~sponse-to elP" O pen !te'm *45 be'low.

Apartial-core coo1ing and he~at removal st rdte~gy thiat mi*ay bei' Utliz~{ed is:io fill-avadilable*

• a'nd.a~dditio'nal time bJe~fore boilinig oSf the-cooblanitoccurs." RWA-:1323-004.incl udes a ndib leedl.(seam)~ of8 avadiable~ S/Gsis pr'oVid e a imrfited 'heat in:Sk funciid n and reduce" ;thie a'mounStof, bo~iling ito",containm*ent:. A.P.-

EL*EC4,-.Loss of All AC ':Power.While on, Shutidown Cbooinrg, a*ndFsG-_3-A, Alterniate

c. oolin6g+ forthis event{.:

P'r6cedure ER-FI RE.3,. Alterna~te Shutdown

'for Aux Building Basement/Me1zzanine Fire,

.Secti'on 6.7, Water,Solida SIG C:ooldowni,

..provides _ciudance that can be modified _for Comple~te

'U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report of Full Compliance with Order EA-12-04*9 January 4, 2016 Page 25 limited heat sink function.

use if additional s/G cooling is desired.

If Water Solid SIG Cooldown Water solid cooldoWn requires both SAFW is effective to-maintain core pump~s and S/Os to) be available for...

cooling and heat removal, co~o!down. A high flow portable diesel-driven secure RCS Bleed and Feed pump can also be used in place of. the SAFW ah'dmaintaih Pressurizer PUmps. R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Fir'e Level.

Prbtectionl Program. Section 5.1.6.1, Water-Solid Steam Generator Operation, docfiments that water solid s/G operation can'cool the RCS to less than 200°F in less than 72 hourS.

QI pnIe 2RWA-1323-004, Ginnia RELAp5 ELAP Cmlt OI.pnIe 2Analysis for Mode 5, was performed with Cmlt Perform an analysis to small PORV vent size and also with determine RCS vent path pr~essurizer mearway removed. 'RWA-1 323-requirements for Mode 5 with 004 Shows that the PORv vent path is PORV vent path.

adequate for a mitigation strategy. FSG-14, Shutdown RCS MakeuP, provides actions to establish Rcs makeup flowpat~hs dUring shutdown condtitions.-

QIP Open Item 45

-RWA-1323-004, Ginnat RELAP5 ELAP Analysis for Mode 5, includes cases With Complete Evaluate the viability of feed and S/Gs available that shows feed and bleed bleed f!or available S/Gs to (steam) of available S/Gs provide a ~imited provide a limited heat sink heat sink function and reduces the amount of function and additional'time.

boiling to Containment.. AP-ELEC.4,. Loss of before boiling of the coolant All AC power while on Shutdown Cooling, occurs as a Parallel mitigating and.FSG-3, Alternate Low Pressure strategy duriri'g Modes 5 & 6. "

Feedwater, implement S/G codling for this This-analysis must address

event, ref lux condensation and its potential effects on reactor While some reflux condensation can occur Shutdown mar~gin, during this event, the required RCS makeup rates are signif icantly' more than that required to just remnove decay heat.(the makeulf' rate is more than twice the boil off rate during the first -15 hours per RWA-1323-004) and do not impact shutdown margin. The greater makeup rate was due to moisture ca*rryover througfi the large manway opening predicted to.occur in the RELAP model of RWA-1 323-004..

OIP Open Item 47

-The strategy is to provide a source of air to Cmlt the Instrument Air piping in the Intermediate Cmlt implement a stra~tegy to provide Building basement near valve 5392. The

-a connection point for strategy involves disconnecting a union Instrument Air to Containment, between.valve '5392 and the containment penetration. 'A union/hose fitting adapter" is

u.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Report of Full' Complian'ce with Order EA-12-049 Jan~uary-4, 201 6 Page 26 then ins~talled sothat air can be'fed from a portable air co*mpressor to tLh6 Containment Instrument Air h-eader. :(DA-ME-15-013, FLEX Miscellaneous Calcul~ations)..

QIP Open Item 48 Perform an evaluation to determine a method for recirculati~n cooling of the RCS if the 'Auxilia ry Building Sub-basement is floo~ded by Tornado Missiles damagir'ig non-protected tanks on the Auxiliary Building Operating Floor.

Ginna has 'deVeld*pld ah alternate RH R strategy that is d esc'ib~ed irn DA-ME-15-006, FukuShima Time line Analysis.

Following a seismnic or tornado missile evenlt there i a, possibilityo0f flood ing the Auxiliary Building Subbasemehnt due to failure.of-non-

.qualified tanks and piping. Asump pump will be used to dewater the subbasement if-this OCCURS. Tlhe sum p pump iS capable of

.de~watering the subba~semenht in less than 11 hours1.273148e-4 days <br />0.00306 hours <br />1.818783e-5 weeks <br />4.1855e-6 months <br />.

The Alternate RHR strategy uses the Reactor Coolant Drain Tank Pumps ;(canned motor pump~s), atfter puhmling ou~t the Auxiliary Building Subbasement, to *circulate water from the RCS hot leg, :through bodth RHR heat exchangers, and back tb) the,RCS Cold leg. A FLEX pump iis us'ed to circulate water from

.the l!ake to the CCW side of the RHR Heat Exchanger *through :ho~sing and a bonnet adapter on valve 760A,: The lake water, is discharged nea'r Deer Creek through hoses connected to a bonnet :adapter at valve 760B.

The strategy is'jdStified in DA-ME-i5-OO05, FLEX RHR/CCW/SW Hlydraulic Model*, and DA-ME-15-O11, :FLEX Mode 5 RHR Strategy.

Complete QIP Open Item 49 Perform an,analysis to determine the containment pressure profile during an ELAP I [Loss of Ultimate Heat Sink (LUHS) event~and determine the mitigating Strategies necessary

'to ensure the instrumentation andl controls in containment, Wvhich ar~e relied upon by the Op~erators arde sufficient to perform their intended fUnction.

The Containqmenft pressure prof ile during an ELAP ILUHS event was analyzed in RWA-1403-001, GOTHIC FLEX Containment Anialysis: Instrumentation being cr~edited is qualified for the predicted conditions given that th~e temperature profile (220°F peak) is well below the ontainment Design Basis EQ envelope (286°F peak).

Per E-0,' Reactor Trip dr Safety Injection,

.adverse containment Values are Used for instruments whenever-containment pressure is>* 4 psig or radiation> 1, 0E5 R/hr. The ELAP response procedures use instrument values for adverse containment when necessary. Some instruments, such as containmnent pressure and S/G Pres~sure, are Complete

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Rep~ort of Full Compliance with Order EA-12-049 January 4, 201 6 Page 27 not in containment and do not need Adverse values..

OIP Open Item 50 Per'form an analysis of the containment function to determine the mitigating strategy acceptance Criteria for an ELAP / LUHS event.

The mitigating Strategy~acceptance criteria is to maintain Containment presSure below the design pressure of 6.0psig, and Containment temperature below the containment d.esign temp4eratlire of 286°F (UFSAR Table 3.11-1).

For Mode 1, thle analysis :shows that *with no oper'ator.actions, containment-pressure will slowly inbrease to less than 20 p sig.over 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> and containment ternperature.will slowly increase to 220°F overi the same 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Since 20 psig is below containment design pressure of 60 psig :(UFSAR Table 3.11-1) and. 220°F. is below the c6ntainment designi temperature of 286°F (UFSAR Table 3.11-1 ), no~mitigation acdtions are n6_cessary to 'maintain or restore Containment cooling during Phases 1.or 2.

Mode 5 ELAP containment temperatures are predicted to plateau below 2500°F if the containment is vented based on RWA-1403, 001. Ginna Station's Mode 5 strategy plans include venting the Corhtainment during Phase 2, RHR heat remOval, and also establishment of lake flow to the cRF=Cs so tihatOontainmen't can be isolate'd.

Complete QIP Open Item 52 Develop the Phase 3 strategy after the containment pressuire analysis is completed as described in Maintain Containment, PWR Portable Equipment Phase 2.

ForModes 1 through 4, to minimize challenging instrument operation in Containment, actions can be taken during Phase 3 to maintain 'c~ntairnment pressure less than 20: psig, which is below the containment design pressure of 6Q psig. At approximnately-35 hours from the Start Of the BOBEE, equipment provided from a NSRC can be available to. power bne or-more Contain~ment Recirculation Fans (CRFs) and supply Cooling water from Lake Ontario to

.one or more Containment Recirculation Fan Coolers (ORFCs). RWA-1 403-001! shows.

that one CRF and associated CRFC placed in Service at 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br /> will reduce containment pressure and temperature.

Procedure ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, directs performing FsG-12, Alternate Containment Cooling, tO restore containment cooling usingq the NSRC supplied equipment.

Complete

,U:S. Nuclear Fegulatory, Cornmss~oh-,:

Rjpor:i of;:,

Fullj Copic withOrde E-1 2-0

,supply wate'r to.ont*i nment'RecircuJlation

• .~~~~i s:greater Than 15 p.si k,.

.tab-.fiN'SR,*t~ with ab h-ar;d~

sihi*btq hoe dtodr*f f"r...m coria.ngete~d tp:oth6 es*.onak-rhent Rcrcates on siovdeb~frthe B hand RF":as. T eh onor fdrtrhsferingdiselful fom Attach mept,.G,,Ref ue!ing he F~uel Taink:

Stora~ge i

.k

• &:,:(FO:S~s)"to; a fuel fue

'*U#:t~nk :tr'aile'rs from thlie Qutside :diesel fue~l.

trnse vhcloi toae a~k r rm h E~rager, DIG

fuel, o

'ilstorg hani:*;s.i,'ii!:{[g Perform a.,n anailysis to, provide a "9(errdned tat th ffit6 Fu*l Oil oa.g psrotect~e~d f~rm:,,BEBEs..

,(F ood) Pan, irecajierso:i:**:*nnel to:'PR~ "PROTEC bu*ildn

• irib'y.VERIFY¥ING Ve~hiole:Bari:ii6r",,..

df the bu*ilinig." iFu~e bili c:an be 'accessede by,::

thlmranway" or-if:

iit is as*sesised athat ithe.-

"Pum hos.i.n~ct lcrca o~eto

• U.S. Nucla~r Re~gulatoryCoimm*i~s~sion *.:'

Rei por.t of iFull-!Compliance with* Older IE*A-1.2:-049*.

J~~~y, 2016..

.. L

\\

are insertied i~to6h, nt~hest food p

lugsnt-

....Reasonaby, Protecte," In macordan-ce..with,

.*~~N El -1,2:06 konlfri *lpostu~lated!BDQBE Es..

Q;,.IPA,,,

Open Ite,, 67 Travel :pa~ihs.forth*t:Seiu:lh'iniling :;*li~iiprent,.

Complete:

fari~~e Pflhs ae i:S 1hetra~a thfS fu dr.

thme' loain oFE eupet in Stati~ing Rifu l, iry) g of portabl) e

• n-fLEX, pi~~~dvtiwabe.f0 trilers.*

Reulb ingle.!

tim.18fes

.tnkd

o!P.Oe'n/tm 68 '"

actions ereincorporgAtedinohe*

6t~ihotain* s.

al-datii{onPla, wichalsohini ca't ed th atsu allo

U:.S.. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report of Full Com~pliance wi-th order EA-12-049 January 4, 2o16 '

Page,3.0

• • Hard h4at h'ead lamps with, a; supipy Of batteries,..

QIP Open item 73 Ginna has analyzed alternate RH 1 hea~t Coripet rem~oval capability: using th~e Reactor 9ooblahtCmpee Implement a strategy to provide

Drain Tank (RC1DT) Pumps t6 circdla~te.water coolinfg water to the RHLR Hieat frobi he-h RCSh.Io't ieo, through boh"]t RHR Iheat E*xchan~gers.using a portable exchang~ers,.and bc a*to th~e RCS. cold eg'.

diesel driven pump.

The strate~gy uses aFLEX pum:p to circulate water.from the lake to the.CCW :side of the RH R Heat Exchanger,through hosing and a b onrnet adap~ter.on valve 760A. The. lake water is disch~arged nlear De'er Creek through.

hose~ connected to a bonnet adapt~er at valve 760B (DA-M*E-15-0035, Fukushima

_[__

Ti-ei ne AnalysiS).

k QIP Open.Item 74 A ny additionali non-safety e~quipment will be identified and e*valuated~ forj:su~i~tbility in the mitigation strategies.

With the exception of the SBAFW. '!umps, all.

of the.FLEX equipment is considered non-safety.-,related. All "N".equipm~ent is located in robust struc6tures and s'ecur'edsb as not to be affected by seismic motion. All Support equipment is, either located within a robust structure.or is Separat'ed bY the Site Sp~ecific tornado width,. accounlting for the prevailring tornado direction, so as not to be laffected by the same tOrnado. "N-P1" e~quipment is locatedi ini a commercial.str~ucture meeting A*SCE 7-10 an'd Is* not sep~rated from the buildings where the N equipment is located.

All support and "N+.l" equiPment is secured as needed So as not to be affected by SeiSmoic events.

Complete For non-safety-related installed equipment that :is use~d inr the fitigation st~rategies, Ginna haS installed a' 1IMW SAFW DIG along with a 160,000 Gallon' SAFW-1D1 Water storage-.T-a~nk.. AlthoGUgh installed in a seismic/ITdrn~tdo and Flood plroof str~ucture,

.the SAFW D3/G is classified.as non-;sa~fety.

Th-ie tank is also 'classified as-non-safety (cdnnection p~oints and piping penietrations are protected by design or oiientation), :It is seis mically; mounted. and provides& asuction source to the. two saf ety-r'elate~ci SAFW,..

Pumps.. During an ELAP, the-SAFW D/G will start and manual transfer switches operated to provide power to the two safety-related SAFW PUmps, which 'will then provide feed

U.S. Nuceler:.*gulatory Oomrmis~ion Repor:*f o Full C.Ompliance with Ordeir E*A-,12-049, JPanuay4 20:16..

wat~e'r: fthe SIGs. :Ginna has also iiStalled'a.

-no~n-safety rfelated high ptessur'e :positie, dilernt Tent Alternate ROS *lnjectiorh pump* '

wit p~er bte

!IngB suppli~ted.beathi-:daFWt D/G.

SThr*~

b*DPrepdaker on.itsugsqeaed,loadi{Y Consid~erthe prior'itiz::ation of"

sta'gingj piortable equ~ipm~ent that.

Scooldown imaneuvers are necess ary *.- T~heib licesee*' s.plan

i'Soltionti valves. Th N'evkRC,.staff au66dit hird pclai* to eiislate,or vent6 9.

Followir~ an ELAP'eveiit, there is d procedural r~qi4rement to cooldown!

depressurize the ROS to reduce ROP seal lpak~ge, and to inject borat6d water from the SI Ac9urilulatdrs.

injec~,i~n repIac6s~fluid lost frorrr the ROP s~als and increases shut~ipwn margin. It is also important to ensu~e that ~dfrogen in the SI aocumulators dc5es not br:iter the RCS because that co circulai uld in~ipede natural tion. The plan to avoid inje~ting nitrogeh~ into the RCS is 'to isolate or vent the

~Sl Ac&urnO~ators as follows:

F~SG-10, "Passive ROSinjection Isolation,"

provides actidns to i~olat&drvent'th~ SI accumulators to, prevent nitrogen inj6ction.

F6rELAP eveiits ~er~e ~ectnical p6wer is availabl~ from eithey the SAFW D/G (1 MW) or portable 100 KW D/9~nd both MOO 'C' and '~AOO 'D"~re ~cces~ibl6~ p6wer ~

~es~ored to MOO 'C' and MOO 'D' by~op~ning aIl'input ~~d'~tput break'ers and powe~ing the MOOs x'ia~a batt~rycharg~r breaker.

Once MOO t"and MOO 'D" ar~ ehergrzed, the SI Ac~urriulatbr1solation valve breakers forMQV-841 and MOV-865 are closed~,and MOy-841 a~'id MOV~.865 ~re closed from the Qonirol Room.

If both MOO '0' and MOO 'D' cannot be iepowered dqeto the ELAP event, or if the SI AdcumulatorisolatiQn valves cannot be 616s6d, then] nstniThi&nt Air is establi~hed to Complete

U.S. N!.clear Regulatory Commission.

R*Po~rt, of Full,Cori~plia~nce wNith O'rder,EA-12-0,49 January 4,,2016 Page. 32 Conta~inmen~t to vent the SI Accurfiuiat0rs. In st~ag ed, AOV-5392,.rInstrument. Air"'° Con.tain ment l~ola~tiorf Va~lveZ is :removed, and Onrce,I nsturmehtn Air :is restored to,"

Cohntainme-nt., th~eSi Acc*umuai:tbrs can b:e ven~ted frbm. theCo~ntyol*~

Roomby open*ing SI Aqo-umulator N2 FilM~en~t AO-s 884A andI

.Accumulator Vent}

avie; HCV-94*5.,,

ISE CI 3.2.1.2.B

.Con'fi'imfi"that thie ROP.seal 0-rings will,main~tain.th~eir irntegrity

~t i*h e trem*pe~rat~ure con.ditions experiencead duri~ng the. ELAP l eaka~gerate.usedl in the IE.LAP

• an~alysis :is, adequate and,,

• cceptable.*t Th 6 Stff rie quests that the licensee miake" available for audit :a. list odf where.the B*

,type 0-*rings are liocated" a~nd an

• evaluati0,npf the im~pact of high termperatures on those 0-rings.

Th6 N RC Fl.ex Audit.h*i April1 2015 *ireq deSted that,Ginna mak.e available-for,audit a list of

-7228-B) =are.!0e~tdI arid proyide-anr*

eval!jatioh of thle impac.t of high temperatures on..:those 0-rings.- The donceern is tha~t the" 7228-B hqigh t'emperature.0-ringS are onily qualified to 5500F. *T~hese.0-rings rmay be exp6sbd :to 556,3F RC,F*C water durinlg, EBD F~LAP scu-tenaritoon Westinghus has2q8alified th*2e uret ~genmateiai.seifiion 0-ing (7228-C)mt 580 Fr(the materialan spe-_cificatio isth.sm for-th 7228-andh 7228-C~u~i copounfdma 0-rigs. Hxigh tsiemperaturi~e)i iperfrace-dtb (le.g.,Sexrusonreb~h0!iOs,.nc). Tis xped toR be contains all7228-*C"0-rings.

The fol!lowing list shows 'the locations of the

"'B" compound" 0-ring (7228-*B);-

ROCP A - All 0-r.iings ar-e 7228-c

• . RCP B -'=six 7228-B.compound 0-ringsariecurrentlyinsiitalled in the B

.ROP iseal pac.kage and arte scheduled to-be replaced in April 20,17.

The.APril 201t7 refueli~ng ioutage.will piovide

.the normaldl~ysche'duledipM mainte#na~nce-w indowvfojr the m ajor.insp ectiono th-e B.Rc P Se:aV, pack*age..Th~e [following lpro~ides,,

jus~tificatioin. fqr, u*e.-of the 7228-B,c.dmpound 03-rin'g in the.BRCP,,untfilrepl~acement duri~ng

th'6 AP'ril 201i7. sea~l maintenan*e. Note:.The cur~rent stock of RCP 0-:rings (Seal Service Kit -Item #: G~t 9i1 :*263 and the Seal ~Rebueild.

ComPlete

U.S. Nucl~ear Regulatory Commission Report of Full qompliance with Order EA-12-049 January 4, 2016 Page 33 Kit-Item # G91 11 271) 0-nly contain 7228-C 0.-rings. All future. RC.P seal main~tenance (starting with RFO'I 5) will dnly use 7228-c compound or 7228-D comPo0und 0-rings.

Discussion The-7.228-B comnpo~ud O-rings~in the #1 Seal ring and runhner (westingho6use P/N 4389B72X72) -are located between,the ceramic faceplates and ~the cbrresponding stainless steel Seal supp,0rt housing. These are stationarY 0-rings that Crea-te a seal ion the bottom side of the precision machined cera.m. ic faceplate and associated housing.

Failure of these 0-rings woild res.ult in i~ncreased leakage to the inlet of the number 2'seal.. This leakage would be contained_

(and limited) by the number 2seal and the flow, restricting venturi n the seal return linle.

The clearance between.the ceramic facePlate and the corresponding stainless steel.seal support housirng is applroximately 0.002 inch as-shown :in Table 6-1 of WCAP-1 0541, Revision 2.

The remai~ning four 7228-B comnpound o~rings (Westinighouse P/N 4389B72E75, 620B492E79 and 4395B55E06) ar[e all located in stationary locations in the, #2 seal housing or downstream of the #2 seal. The clear~ance at these locations ranges from 0.0 inches to approximately 0.018,inches (WCAP-1 0541 Revision 2.). There are no 7228-B compou'nd O.rings in the most critical locations Which'are the #1 and #2 channel seals.

WCAp-1 0541. Revision 2 discusses qualification testinlg for the early generation of High Temperature 0-rings Seals (Eastern'-

7228'and 7228.A compound) in Sectiori 6.

The qualification teSting, of the 7228 series compound WaS dompieted using the 1-F and 2-0 locations shown in Table 6-1 and Figure 6-1 of WCAP-1 0541. Testing was completed at 0.018 inch gap and 550°F/1800psid and 0.031 inch gap and 550°F/1200psid for a' minimum of *18 hours.

~n uary4,,201 WC~p-154 hihlight that d

of i the ms T. heq'uaifdal enofth 728-iS[eS'iiicrmspthe'two wascmopleed in the t raeigsanntl asethe 7228*V; -A

' ','*",':"t*.'"x--.:-"*

cogyanpounderwuThe 7228-B S~iipud...

O ains ~e tetdt 0psi.Fo floigconclusions arc;e*

ma fo h 7228-w- <,'* ! 7'cm

"'*n 0-ig 'installed in the*':

1.

he ifficetialpi-esu icrsste tw 7228°:*~B~fri pou~nd 0li-rings in the #1ieal]

rin~~r~n~rwoul be129 psid

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report of Full Compliance Witth Order EA-12-049 January 4,2016 Page 35.

coniditions based on the lowest SG Relief valve setting for Qinna of.1085 psig at" saturation conditions equates to 556.3°F.

The ent~halpy..-at this~c0ndition (2250 psi,.I556.30 F) iS 555 Btu/lbrn. Assuming isenthalpic expansion of the fluid through the #l1:seal, 'the following coniditions will exist, at the outlet of the #1 seal (inlet to

1. 2 seal): P = 951 psia, H = 555 Btu/Ibm, T = 5390°F. This shows that the highest exPeCted temperature at the #2 Seal ring and downstream locations would~be less thanthe 550°F qualification test temperature. Therefore., there is no

-eleva'tedl temperature oncern for these 0'-rinigs.

Maximum PossibleTime at Elevated Tempjeratures The maximi'rm RCS cold leg temperature during ELAP Conditions based on the lowest SO Relief Valve setpoint.(saturated conditions at 1085 psig) is 556.3°F. During anEFLAP event, the RCS average

.temperatures is assumed to be the no load temperatureiof 547.F. This is adhieved by local operator action (ECA-0.0 Step 3 RNO, per Phase 2 staffing study) comp!eting at T+30 minutes. The Tcold at these co'nditions will be' appr6ximatel~i 5300°F. It.is important to note that th~e Model 93 RCP includes a 54.5 gallon volume of '1200F cold water that will last fOr approximately 27 minutes before RCS water at

'556.3 0F reaches the #1 seal. This time. assumes the historical value of 2 gprn seal leak-off from the B RCP.

Based on this sequence, the maximum time the #1.seal 0-r~ings maY. be expOsed to RCS water above 5500 F is estimated to be -10 minutes.(3 minutes from depletion of purge volume until the start bf operator action to establish 547°F plus 7i minutes to establish 547°F). This assumption is conservative since heat capacitanlce.of the thermal barrier, main flange, seal housing, pump shaft and bearing will likely prevent the temperature from exceeding 550°F.

J-anuiry'*i.4,.2016' Pa~ge :36

,Basdor the66 bpunding oondition e*ep:ted '.

d Ju rin*g.ELA:Sp~eve t,,it th r~es

!reaso9n able@*;.

not-occur." Theireforei,Girnna :coosidersit.

• acceptable. to opertate switlhi ;228-B 0-rings, ihnstalledih the'*B ROP.until,the next.

scheduledheainteyan'ewidowte ineApuril of.0-n 201 a,, supIortecmpraby atthe followig facts (A-.'Qlii SJiitep 3 t,-Btb;Blish ROS more:*eti pe*usaesthan 10rinte The temper.ature~dh a**t the# se"--alg 0-ig will' ho t**-J exceedz'.,-',," 550 F*

IrsE, CI3.:2.1 9]A 6nfi*rm :de'sigdni nf ormation an'id ass~imp tin,O*

!aniddocumented aalyiiBsis that{,iR the itigation

• Sltrat*;gyi andc! support eq uipment will perforim as intgnded.

Pumps Will pericirm as iintenlded-as d eocumened in

,h.t~he foljowi6'hg hfdrulic Porta:'ble FLEX: p~ump capBbil ity~to

evalua~ted"in 'ADO-i 4-0005:99-ON-001 S alt'er'nate RHR Ris evali*ated ini DA-ME-is evaluaited-in QAD*,-M E-*i5-0 05:

0001*69-01 5-7B-01i SPum 5i*~ap~bilitvis v-iBe J~at'edn fiiDA-Complete

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report.of Full Compliance With Order EA-12-049 J ahuary 4, 2016 Page 37.

ME-i15-005 I.Flow and pressure requirements are demonstrated for the following:

-A single SAFW pump is capable of feeding both S~s.

-FLEX pump sizing to support feeding both SGs and the sEP..

-Sump pump "can remove Up to 121 gpm from sub-basement.

-SAFW Pump operation with the cross-

-tie modification.

-Alternate ROS injection.

DA-ME-15-005, FLEX RHR/CCW/SW Hydraulic Model, predicts FLEX SAFW pump performanice feeding S/Os while drafting fromn the lake.. The analysis predi~cts that the pump is capable of delivering :232 gpm 'sp~lit to both generators (116 each) if the S/Gs ar-e at 305 psia. 305 psia was chosen as a reasonable S/G target pre ssure after approximately 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> of effective SAFW flow per the Mode 1

.RELAP* analysis RWA-1 323-003, Ginna RELAP5 ELAP Analysis for Mode 1.

A positiVe displacement pump. is being used for RCS injectiorl and-is capable of (dshrepesr nfo)suppor-ting RCS injection strategies ISE OI 3.2.4*8.A Confirm that the final electrical design has the necessary electrical isolations and protec*tions. The NRC staff determined, that t~he auto start feature of the 1 MW FLEX DO in the SAFW Annex, which automatically energiZes the bus, is an alternative to NEI 12-06, as is the use of a permanently installed FLEX DG.. The staff accepted the permanent DG in the ISE review, but was unaware of the auto start feature at that time. Also, the staff needs to evaluate the The reasons why an auto start and load feature could be an acceptable alternative to NEI 12-06 were provided in Refer'ence.11.

A connection point for~the NSRC 41160V FLEX DIG is described in FSG-5, Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging (Attachm.ent I, Establishing Long Term Core Cooling), and FSG-1i2, Alternate C*NMT Cooling (Attac~hmen* c, Align TempOrary Electr'ical power Supply to CNMT Fan Coolers),. which provide directions for connecting the NSRC 4160V FLEX D/G to Bus 16 Station Service Transformer Cubicle, rear panel bus bars, including a figure of the

.bus bar arrangement.

Complete

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report of Full Compliance with Order EA-12-049 January 4, 2016 Page 38 cornnectibn points for the 4160V FLEX DG from the NSRC. The st[af~f requests that the licensee make available for audit the r~easons why an auto start and load feature could be an acceptable a~Jterniative to NEI 12-06, and provide a list of connection points for the'4:160V FLEX DG.

ISE CI 3.3,1.A Confirm sufficient quantities of FLEx equip3ment to meet N+I, and identifytheir storage locations. The staff requests that the licensee make availab~le for audit the location where each piece of FLEX* equipment will/be stored and the associated protection from external events at these storage locations.

All "!N" eqUipment used to mitigate Post Extended Loss of Alternate AC Power (ELAP)are either per'manenitlY installed in a robust structure and properly anchored, capable of resisting Beyond Design Basis External Events (BD BEE), or are portable equipment anchored in place in robust armored SeaVans which can resist :flooding, seismic forces, and tornado winds/missiles.

The "N+I" equipment provides a portable means of providing redundant/diverse means of accomplishing post-ELAp functions. This equipment is stored in a commercial building analyzed in accordance With ASCE 7-10.

There is also certain equiprment used to support post-ELAp functions. This equipmentconsists of.a tow truck, a debris remover, two hose trailers, and two fuel trailers. This sulpport equipment is stored in areas which are separated by the width of a site-specific :t~rnado (104'0 feet), accounting for the prevailing tornado path for the region (southwest to n~rthe~st).

The following are the fu'nctions for which Ginna has provided FLEX equipmenit, together With a descriptio'n df the "N" and "N+I" equipment and their.storage locations:

1. Provide Auxiliary Feedwater to the steam generators.

The "N" means employs permanently installed SAFW pumps, taking suction from a robust 160,000 gallon Dl Water Storage Tank, powered by a permanently installed.1 MW SAFWV Complete

SU.S. Nuclear RegUlatory.Commission Report of Ful.l Compliance with Order EA-1 2-049 J anuary..4,. 2016 Page 39 DIG. The DIG, switChgear, and pumps!/piping are all located within robust structures.: A portable FLEx" Spump,.which can be used to refill the

.DI Water Storage TI-ank., is also located within this r6bu'st Struicture, FLEX "N+I" equipment c~.n provide the water t0 the S/Gs followving S/G depressurization, either.fromi the 160,000.gallon tank DI,Water-Storage Tank, or directly from Lake Ontario.

The FLEX pump a'nd hoses a're Stored

• in a cdmrriercial ASCE 7'-10 buildJing.

2.

Isolate safety Injection Accumulators..

-The "N" function is pe~rformed by repdwering a cubicle in' MOO "C" and One in MCC "D" from the SAFW DIG, then closing.the isolation valves,.. In the.event a tornado damages MCC' "C", an ai compressor is connected to

'an instrumient air line, allowing the accumulator to be vented. All necessary cables, connector's, hoses, and *the air compressor are stored in

'robust locations. Comparable equipment is uised for~the "N+!"

strategy,. substituting the 100 kW DIG for the SAFW DIG. This 100 kW DIG, as well as necessary hoses*, cables, and connectionisare stored in the commercial ASCE 7,-l.(buidin~g.

3.

Repower th'e battery c hargers.

This "N" function is performied by repowering a cubicle in MCC "CO" and-

.one inMCC "D" from ithe SAFW DIG.'

In the event a tornado.damagedl MCC "C",.the SAFW. DIG Would be connected directly to affected battery charger. All.cables and connection required for these fun'ctions are stored in robust locations...The' "N+I" strategy is cornparable, substituting the 100 kW DIG for the SAFWV DIG.

The 100 kW DIG, as well as the necesSary cables and, connections are Stored in the commercial ASCE 7-10 building.

4. Primary'lnventory/Rleactivty Control.

The "N" function is performed by r

U.S. Nuclea~r Regulatory Commission R~eport of Full Compliance with Order EA-12-049.

.January 4, 2016

.Page 40 poweririg the installed Alter-nate RCS Injection purrp, taking Suction fr0r.m thie robust RWST,.and injecting into Sthe SI lines.* A booster pump_ is.

installed, and *powered from the 1 MW DIG., or the-1~00 kW portable die~e!

generator,.t0 aillow full use of the RWST contents. All pumps, piping, diesel g~nerator, hoses, cables,,and connectO rS are stored in a robust structur~e. There are two mean~s of providing, the "N+I-". function. A portable diesel driven -Alternate RCS

-inJection puirnp cani be connected in parallel with the electric Alternate

-*ROS Injection pump.i Also, a diverse means of p~roviding RCS inventory/reactivity c~ntrol is by power'ing an installed chargin gpump from the SA.FW* DIG. The portable Alternate RCS.Injection pumP, as well as all necessary hoses, cabling, and connections are stored in the commercial ASCE 7-10 building.

5. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling!/invent~ry Control.

The "N" function is provided bY employing a por'table FLEX diesel driyen pump taking suction from the discharge canal and filing directly to

.the SFP. This PUmP can provide flow to refill the 160,000 gallon DI Water Storage Tank, as well as the SFP, using a manifold. The FLEX pump and manifold.are stored in a robust st'ructure. The hoses are stored in hose trailers, seParated from each other by the width o0f a Site~specifiC tornado (1040 feet), accounting for the prevailing tornado direction for the region. The "N+I" function is.

provided by another diesel driven FLEX pump. taking suCtion from the discharge canal. T~his pump can] also provide flow directly to the S!Gs following depressunization, concurrently with refilling 'of the SFP.

Another connection point to the SFP is via valve 8662. The pump is a

U.S.. Nuclear.Regulatory Commission Report of Full Compliance with Order EA-12-049 J~anuary 4, 2016 Page 41 redundant couniterpart to the One employed for the."N" strategy and is stored with another ma~nifold in~ the-c0m~mercial ASCE7-i 0 building.

6. Mode 5 Containment Venting.

'The "'N" functionh is performed by opening installed valve 7444, If valve 7444 is not available due to a flooding event, 'the air compresSoi~s used to 0pen the containment pu'rge valve'.,

The compressor, fittings,.hoses, and tools are stor-ed in a*outsrcue The N+I"strategy can. be the same as the "N" strategy, using a redundant N

air. compressor. The aircompressor and necessary.fittings, hoses arid, tools are stored in the commercial ASCE 7-10 building. An alternative strategY is to open the dontainment personnel and equipment airlock Outer doors, and openi the equalizing

,valVes.

7. Dewatering Auxiliary Building Sub-basement (Steam Generators unravai lable) for. Mode 5 RH R..

In the event atornado, missile damages susceptible tanks on the Auxiliary building operating floor, flooding the RHR and Reactor Coolant Drain Tank (RCDT) area, the area must be dewatered prior to reinitiatin g forced RCS flow.. The "N"'

strategy deploys a submersible sump pump; powered.from the SAFW DIG, to remove the water from the' sub-

"basement. This Water is pumped outside the Auxiliary Building. The sump pu mp, DG, hoses, Cables, and connectors are all stored in robust locations. The "N+l" strategy is comparable, substituting the 100 kW D/G for the SAFW DIG. The necessary diesel, pump,.hoses, cables, and connectors are Stor'ed in the commerciai ASCE 7-10 buiilding.

8. Mode 5 Residual Heat Removal.

Fo~llowing dewatering of the sub-basement, 'forced flow RCS recirculation cooling.can be attained.

Y

U.S. Nucl~ear Regulatory Co mmis~sion, Report of Full C ompliande With Order EA-12-049, JanuarY 4, 2016 Page 42 The "N" strategy is to p rovide power to the.installed RCDT Pump "B":'from the SAFW DIG (the ROODT p'uirips can operate after being submerged), All cables, connectors,.and junction boxes a.*e 'stored h a roi:bust' structure.

The "N+1" Strategy provi'des for the "A" RCDT pump.to be powered for the 100 kW D/G.,The.100 kW DIG as well as all necessary coninectors, cableS, and junction boxes are stored in the commercial ASCE 7-10 building.

9. Heat Sink for Mode 5 RHR.

A meahs to remove the heet being circulate'd by' th~e RCDT pumnps is necessary. The "N" strategy is to align a diesel driven FLEX pump from the discharge canal to val~ve 760A, B.

bonnet-to-hose adapters. This flow would cool the ROOT flow. The water circulatinig from the FLEX p'U'mp Would.

be diSCharged via. hoSe to outside the Auxiliary Bui~lding. The FLEX pump and all hoseS, fittings, O0nnections, and flianges are loca~ted in robust structures. The "N+1"[s'trategy'is comparable except th'at the.redundant FLEX pump,.as well as 'the necessary hose, fittings, connectors, aridflanges are stored in the commercial ASCE 7-10 building.'

10o. Communication.

There is a permanently installed satellite dish to provide satellite communication between the station and the EOF as well as the state and county officials. In. the.event. a BDBEE damaged the permanent satellite dish', a portable dish is provided..The portable dish, trailer, UPS system, cabling, and portable diesel generator are stored in a robust structure. A repeater system is installed to fac}ilitate radio communication onsite during an event. In the event the per~manently installed system would be damaged by a BDBEE, a redundant repeater f

r I

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RePort of Full Compliance with Order EA-12*049 January 4, 2016 Page 43 would be deployed. Thqe repeater, antenna, tripod, and cable are all

'installed in a robust structure.

11. Refueling.

-Redundant sources of diesel fuel are available for refueling t'he SAFW DIG,'

100 kW D/G, the diesel driven FLEX pumps, the diesel driven poiltable SAltei'nate RCS Injection-pump, and the smaller di~eselgenerators. Two fuel trailers, each with 990 gallons of ultra-low sulfur fuel, are Stationed at, the site. They arie stored so as to be separated bY.the width of the site-specific tornado L(1040 feet),

accountinig for ithe prevailing tornado direction for the region. Each fuel trailer has the necessary fuel transfer equipment. One deplo*yed', the" trailerS can be, refilled from the. onsite fu el oil sto rage eta nks.

12. Debris Removal/ Equipment Transpor'tation.

The site has a Case 621 pay loader, as' welliaSa F~ord F-350 pickup truck with a snow plow., to remove debris caused by a BDBEE. Each Vehicle is Sequipped with equipment to check for live wires in downed power lineS.

Each vehicle is also equipped with a pintie hitch,>whic~h can be used to tranSport mitigation` equipment, such' as the 100 kW D/G, the portable satellte traile~r, the FLEX pumps, the fuel trailers, the ho'se trailers, 'and the air Compr~essors to their deployment points. There is also an electric Trai'ler caddy, d*apable of movingany of the FLEX mitigation-eq'Uipme'nt, stored in a ro0bust structure.

SE 1-E

~The final validation and ver'ification and Cmlt SE 1-E

~~timeline ch*eckso0f procedures and operator Cmlt The final validation and actions during an ELAP were Performed to verification and'timeline checks the compl~eted procedUres. This includes-the Of procedures and operatbr timeline for in'itiating f~eedwater to the SGs.

actionsduring an ELAP need to be performed when procedures The R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant NEI are completed. The staff is 12-06 FLEX Validatior6 Plan that shows the

"_______________actionis for an ELAP can be Completed as

U.,s. Nuclear R~egulatory Commission Repoert :of Full Compliance with Order: EA-12.-049 Jan.u~ary 4#, 2016

.page.44 "especially c*onderned.with th e

.timeline fo~r initiating feedwa~telr

to th~e sGs. The staff requests that the licensee make available for audit the validation and v*erificaion of the procedures and tmreline that.shows the actions for an ELAP can be completed.as planned.

planned was made available On the ePortal for NRC Staff review.

+

SE 7-E In planning-operator actions for E.LAP, the licensee relies on an

.analysis obf plant responiSe using the modeling code RELAP5/MOD3.3. The NRC staff needs to evaluate the

.results.obtainedlby the~licensee.

No input is needed at this time.

The NRC staff will evaluate the licensee's results.

While Ginna utilizes the WCAP-1 7601-P evaluation roode!! for ELAP cqping, Ginna relies Up~on the plant SpecifiC thermal-hyd.raulic"analyses. that were performed using RELAP5/MOD3.3 Patch 03 (RWA-1 323-001, Ginn~a RELIAPS Base bE~ed.kfo0rEpu Nominal Conditions, and RWA-1 323-003, Ginna RELAP5 ELAP-Analysis for Mode 1,).The

.Ginna specific analysis shows a coping time that is :shorter than predicted in WCAP-17601-P. This in large part is due to the modelinrg of total RC:S* leakage which Ginna c'onservatively assumes to be 61 gpm.. (25 gpm per RCP versus.21 gprm per RCP in the WCAP,and 11 tgpm RCS leakage versus 1 gPm,in the WOAP) Othe~r plant variations to the generic WCAP-1!7601-P analysis result in differ~ences betwveen the, generically predicted copOincitime and the actual cdiinci tine.

Complete I-

-t SE 11-E Discuss all areas where local m.nanual actions are performed

• and evaluate the ability to perform these tasks based on local conditions such as heat, cold., humidity, radiation, lighting, and communications.

The NRC Staff requests that the licensee make aVailable for audit a list of all local manual

.actions and evaluate if the conditions allow-for the task to be.accomplishled in accordance with the event timeline.

Local manual acti0ns a.re employed throughout much: of thie plant. HVAC calculations have been performed for all

• areas requiring accless.- Results a~re described below. Ther'e are flashlights and miner's hats,.alo'ng with la'rge quantities of batteries, stored in rob~ust protected locations. These will.be made available to Plant person~nel as needed to perform local actions. A communications test of the radio system was p~erformed, utilizing.the new protected repeater.-.Cormtunications was

'excellent t~hroughout the areas where com~mun~ication to perform local mitigation actions is required. -Allareas requiring access have multiiple !egr*ess and exit 1points.

1. Standby A FW.Buil ding Annex-the.

local actions taken in 'this room.are the :initiation and control of Standby

• AFW flow, initiation of Alternate ROS Complete

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission RePort of Full Co0mpliance With Order EA-'12-049 January 4, 2016 Page 45 Inje'ction,and mobnitoring of spent Fuel Pool level. HVAC calculations indicate that. there will be-no adverse

• environmental Conditions within this "room to inhibit the perforimance of loeal actions. 'The temperatu~re limits in th~ese areas are 600F to 1 040 1F.

2. Auxiliary Building

-sever'al manipulatoions are expected to occur in this building. When initiating Alternlate ROS Injection', four manual valves must be manipulated. When repdwerin~g MOC C and 0 to provide for, battery c*harging a'nd accumulator isolation.valve* closur'e, cables must

be deployed from theWaste Gas Compressor room to the motor control centers. When dewatering the Auxiliary Building sub-basement and aligning Reactor Coolant Drain Tank pump flow and FLEX pump flow to the 760 A, B bonnet-to-hose adapters, cabling and hoses must be run in varioUs sections of the. Auxili ary Building. Also, running h~ose td the edge of the spelit ftiel pool, er, alternatively-, to valve 8662 for spent fuel-pooi makedp is performed in the Auxiliary Building. HVAC calculations

.hhaVe'been performed whi'ch demonstrate that environmental

• conditions at the oP~erating floor peak at aboutf125°F. The timeduration for actions in this area is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. At lower levels of the Auxiliary BuJilding, W£here actiOns Could have several hours duration, the peak te'mperature remains below 11t0 0F.

3. Intermediate Building - The Atmospheric Relief Valves must be locally controlled but do not require continuous occupancy. The OPerator will spend most of their time outside the Intermediate Building in a low noise-area. With timely Opening of doors, HVAC calculation demonstrates that peak temperatures are limited to 1 17-122°F. Other actions in the Intermediate Buildinq

• U.S. Nuclear.Regu~atory Commission "Report of Full COmplianCe with order EA-12-049 JanuarY 4, 2016-Page 46 include taking of lIdcal readings~for vital instrumentation, and the use of arn.air: compressor lto.vent the safety Injection ac~cumulators. HVAC*

calculatlons i~ndicate~t he *peak.

temnperatures,.in these areas. are "110-

4. ContrOl Room - Many manipulations are performed vWithir~if th~e 'con.trol* room:

HvAC calculations de-reonstrate thqat with the-timely opening.of.doors, peak.

temperatures' ar~lirnited to 1 160F.

5.

Relayi room/annex-the radio repeater systemi.is stored in th6e

• ,annex. The antenna., trilpod, arid cabling woul dbe deplo-yed 'via_ local actions from that-room. _HVAC calculations :indicate the peak*

.temperature i [nthfat roo0m Would be lim~it~edto.103°F. '.

SE 1,2-E Disct~ss strategies involving RCS makeup and borat~on to verifY shutdown margin *is maintained anid methods of venting the ROS to permit, injectien~flow. TIhe NRC staff request$'that the l~icensee make available for audit ah 'eValuation of Shutdown mairgin and tEhe ab iity to injecti borate'd water into the RCS without taking the pressurizer Solid.

RCS venting-is a contingency action if RCP seal lea~kage i~remains unexpectedly low.

With* expected RCS-leakage followinigan E.LAP event, Sl Acculmulatoir in~jection will occur during the coo1down directed by ECA-0.0, ¶'Loss"0f All AC Po0wer,'" and* :is necessary to maintain sufficient RCS inv2entory for-single-P~hase natur~al b*irulationi Ifow (two-phla~s:e f1owis. ac.ceptable if grelater than* the single phase flow rate;)in the RCS. Should RCP seal leak~age rerr-ain u~nexPectedly low, Rcs cooldown will red'uce RCS pressure and preSssurizer level but may.result in. sufficient SI A~ccUrnuatdr.injection.topPrOvide adequate shutd'own margin'. IFSG-1,",Long Ter~m RCS Inventory Control," and' FsG-8, "-Alternate RCS Injection,". provide tables to determnine the vo0lume. of boraetion r~equ~ired,.to maintiain subori ticality, Xenon-Free at 350°F, and direction to inject additional.borated w~ater to tlheRCS."

.If venting the RCS is re~quired thlen two pariallel, rea.ctor, vessel head. yent pathls are avail!able. Eachi path is capable of Venting 9 gpm of makeup dow'n to a RCS pressure of 380 psig. With both reactor vessel Vent paths :open", borated makeup at'9 gpm can be accommodated down.to 190 psig. (DA-M.E-Complete

U.S. NUclear Regulatory Comm ission Report of Full Compliance with order EA-1I2-049 January 4, 2016 Page 47 15-013, FLE.X Miscellaneous Calculations)

Less than 9 gpmn boration would ndrmally be required given thatjthe Shutdown~margin calculation.(CALG-20 1 4-0002, "Cycle 38 Reactor Engineering Calculations," Revision

0) assuimed, the 9 gpmn boration started at 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />. The two availablep reactor head vent paths pr0oide defenSe lin depth for'venting.'

As documented in the Technical Evaluation

• Report on Reactor Coolant System V/ents for Ginna in, the S.afety EyalLqatiorn b,y the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, dated September 28, 1983, the non-condensable gases, steam, and/or liquids vented from the reactor vessel head are piped and.

discharged directly to *the refueling =cavity and the disc*ha~rges from the pressurizer are piped to the pressurizer relief tank. The staff found that the vent system at 'Ginna is acceptable and in cornformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.44 paragraph (c)(3)(iii) and the guidelines of NUREG-0737 Item ll.B.1, and NUREG-0800 section 5.4.12.*

The Alternate RCS Injection System utilizes Positive displacement PumPs capable, of injecting RWST water into the RCS at 75 gpm 'and.1575 psig. FSG-1 checks RCS pressure LESS THAN *1575 psig then directs aligning and establishing ROS lnjection flow.

Operatorsare directed/to control ROS Injection flow to maintain pressurizer level BETWEEN 13% t40%:adverse containment]

AND 75%./ [65%/ adverse containment]. FSG-1 directS the operators to FSG-8.if RCS pressure is NOT LESS THAN 1575 psig, or if the volume of boratio~n is not adequate for.

Plant conditions.

FSG-8 directs Operators to align an available ROS Injection PUmp, establish ROS conditions'surfficient for-injection with RCS Pressure LESS THAN 1.575 psig and Pressurizer Level 'LESS THAN 75.%, and (if Rcs Pressure is.nqt LESS,THAN 1575 psig and PressuriZer Level :is not LESS THAN 75%) then open reactor vessel head vent valves (two valves in ser~ies for both trains) to

~~depressurize RCSoifoboratio~n: IFthead vent

• yalv~esare'not available, :then:Operators are 9

'~~directedi~ to an a*ttachmiient to lowr ;:ROS

'?*~~~~~autionis. Opeirato*S-th~i.ta.*P*ORV sih'ould'only

'-~~~be used if noother mea*isl*or RC;S:

,~~~~~~dlepr[essuriza:tior,.n*,i* availab,;le. f pre,essurnzer[

Ieve isgreater than 95%Y,.-then-Oerators are ailow*

tsqpentaingh preshien rPOR to~~r*!s Tha veni(h'St vafves ar!e!S-op redOp'eiator~sar diQ;Qpnreted torlse he ead, vent vxalve t..

IF.

,fpressurizer. level*

de reat~ elo 13%n 9[40%he Sp~adverse nainmerit] O

¢*tI.@thernae*,~a iOS lnpecti.fcetiriipt fa*is. A**ltenae RCSInjection

nlo isesd,abtlished when I

RO S pressure, to ist.

Cl*.ess han

_575 psigandPre-ssurs:sQizern level Ifneesar y

~nPto support RtaOlS mak:eup.*, and`

• ort,oSn's t6.gmie~~h.sJ~~rt, F9idirect Operaohrse op.ne'otioi rihtien dpatrare i*: rected to iiand SE, Attis tim:et-*h~e PWROu cotinuf:i*::es! to r:aesolve Comp!l!te

__________I hth wo;*uld' be:exp~ected durinrg..an 8:.extended*

U.,S.- Ni*cle~a.r Regulatorly..Ciemi*,sion',

Report-of Fu i![,9

~op~iai "e8 With> Ord er EA-1: 2-04:9

~Pr~yfju~ific1atipn for the ability of the ROP seals to limit the leakage kom~Th~. RQS~*

during FLAP ~condition~tothp leakage v~Jues assumed in the

~planf an~Iyses. The ~taff acknowl~dge~7'that thi~ is applic~apld ~o all pr6~surized-Water reactors With ~standard Westinghod~e ROP sea. The staff h~ pilirsued this with the Pressuri+/-ed-Water Reactor Owners Group wifhout reaching a resolutidn. The NRC staff reque~ts that the licensee make Th available for audit an evaluation of com~pensat6~y margins in the analysis that could compensate in the event that flOP seal

[eakage is ~reater than assumed in thq analysis.

lbgs of ac power (ELAP) for reactors with the standard W~stinghou~'e als~ The binr~a flOP ~e~al leak rat~ ~ofiJe and the an~lysi~ to validate The capability tb maint~.i'r~ rYatUral oir&dl~tion~&o~6 c~oling usNe~l ijla~nt ~I5ebifi&

~aluW~nalV~es, which are m6r~

do~s~r'2at~6 th~an tho~e generic values listed in We~tin~house WGAP-1 7601-P, '5Reactor Co~lant~Sy~t~m F~espon~e fo the, Extended Loss ~f AC Power E&eht for Wes'tinghouse, Coriibustion Engineering and B~bcbck &

Wilcox NSSS Designs.

2 (Apil 215) No.

SeaFlo Git

frna, WesSinghusefReacor Cqela.tiPump oloig Loss0of8Al Ap*i61ow#*er-TaC";r~w 2:

DeerinbSal sFlow Ra-tei:i~s-".*l Tisa df{

ocum e

classifVie~sidmnaased

, "ategor~y 1".plant, ::

catego:)ryesgniiesthe seablr.l.leak-ofatie piping

4 input:,from :th6 westinghou."Se ;documentf;."

_,I,.

'.di!ehii#.

• 1. ha sch#dle 1

.!602"£, P,.ipe',(I"iD of 1.':689 his,,;.*., mrfri" etlan

".., oneQ 4 -""globe '"i a

• ve

"< -(valves:

,-t.

..,2,70, i

A,,B a.nd 293,A;A B); tleref*0rie conservative..

• therefoere conservative; vGina flo6W element f~eet in lenogth~ thre6forelcons* ervative."

The maximumflow,r~esult~s within: PW RQG-1401 5--P,-for 6*atgor# 1-Iden*{tify tht211 gpm is ca#'liujted maimumi for c'ategory1i~s:,17.5,

Ginna assu~me a i25:gpm le~akfa£te p'ier' seal

.with.-the 17..5 gp, mwithin the PWROG re~port)..

Ev#g:er giventhe :i~ncre,'ase i~n RO-P seal leakage b~oud lfinal *:esldiutioh-of-NSAL-1,4-1 imi*pact and thus, N: sAL.-#14-1 hias -no im-pact on Gnnla Staten's strategi~e~s,*.

D~iring :pl ant e6vents,tha.t re~sult i~n lo0ss:of

,reaCto r oodlant pum~p.(RiOP)' seal *COoling;.

incr*ases.

Du_*['r'inthe tiaforementiioned event, walfer/cooiiigtobs'

~gn:the hu ps t Wud be.S a8..

, iblpressu res ofthe" IRCS' :sthat. the, pressurle

• ' 'i"

• L.

% ", ". i......J" ' i'*', *.,;

i

January 4"-2016 v~it~tad RC'66dle~j~pessressu est belowthe nalyed ~imit. Th.sysem hust.

limiting diamtr f. th sytm "n "oto eyt~ eflow.5 The ea-and -of:f pipir e 'g d ntream oftesai 6t

,.s ra dci{nbifiesh biernei

• e toi e,,ns.,i

,ta

-,ein ne th.euie oniin oldbeep iecd uLn los* of..

RO'seal cooling.

,in'Sttio'shih4pour sea lak.f lie wr riiillaa o

a tr Iansen valu of:[ 52..th 0

i aride 245Isg n r the idtifth deumr

,d~dtior~ as6Qad.

'of i

piing intgrty.

i a*ueat B Ginn

's r Sxis5n deig conditw sion ef 8"isg for......

th

Q:.s. Nuclear~i Regulatory Comi~mssidn*

Rep~ort of Fu-l C;ilac v'-t re A1-4 f

L

-, ? !-?;,

r 3 225, and CV~O-25O are respectiv6ly q(~ified to withstand th~rm~l s~tress6sby the following Gilbert Ahalyses: SDTAR-80-05-i ib, SDTAR-80-05-1 18 arid ~SDTAR-80-05-O35.

AWsubse~ uent c~an~6~ ~1Qr~yisior~ to the~e analyses hav6 maintained the same design~temperatL~re ahd pressure. These analyses apply ~quations 11,13, and l4of ASME B31.1 -1 97~3 to analyz&p~ressure, dead~vei~ht, and thermal str6sse~ in~the piping. E~qu~.tior~ 12 of B31.lydeals ~vith pipe stresses. from 6arthquk~s. Th6 stresses gen&rated from Ian ~ver~t descnib~d herein are i~d6p~r~en~t fron~ ~a~th~uak6s ~o that Equation 12 is r~ot required to be c6n~idered.

Equation ii,df B31.i ~evaluate~ the ~iping for prpssure and deadweight stresses. The pr4s~u~e used by4all thr~ analyses for Equation 11 wa~ 2485 psig~ The allowable sfress that The str~e~s o~f~ut values were compared to was

= 16,600 psi (allowable stre~s of A376 TP316 steel @ 6500F). The allowable ~fresse~'th~t 4~re a~pl led to v~6re ba~ed equation 11 n a 6500F design tem~[afure. Bas6d on the pr~s~ure and alloweble~trsspsiised by the analyses, Ahese bound the condition~ of the BDB Event discussed herein. Equation 11 rerrfains

~tisfied.

Equations 13 and 14 of B31.1 con~ider therriial stresse~ fothe piping. The worst c~e trar~sient copditions that we~e ~ppli~d to the piping~for all three a alysesjqr these equatioris were 2485 psig at 552.50F. The piping meets the prescribed ~pre~ure for the BDB Eyen~t (a~pplies to Equation 14 only).

How6ver,~the tern~brature of th& piping i~

expected to ~xce~d thQpr~s6nibed temperakure by 7.50F. This will cause

~tre~ses to the piping anctsupp'ortsto~exceed tIldse which w6r6 ~5raviou~sly q~iajified by the following amoC4it (7pCF c6nsidef~ed as ambi~ht):

[(5600F - 700F) I (552.5 0F - 7O~F),- 1] x 100=

+1.554%

U.S. Nuclear RegulatorY Commis~sion Report Of Full,Compliance wi~th Order EA-12-049 January 4, 2016 Page 53 The allowable stress that was considered by the ana*lyses for Equation 13.was SA =

26,255 psi. This iS leSs than th'e actual allowable (SA =27,525 psi) of A376.. TP31 6 Sst~el at 650°F (bounding) for* u~se b~y Equation

13. Since the allowable stress~that is considered for Equation 14 is SA" + Sh, the alloWable stress that was considered for Equatin 14 is also bounde6d. The allowable st".ress used by.. Equai~toS...13 and 14 in the analyses rmeet the Conditions of the BDB Event.

Pipe supports are evaluated using an absolute summation of forces for al l events and comP~arin~g the stresses, that are generated to the code allowable stresses.

Applied forces to the system poipe SUpports will not inrciease by mor~e than 1V554% as was previously CAlculated.

Since the seal leak-off piping and support stresses are not expected to increase by more than 1.5514% these may reac~h a point tchat is beyond the code~allowable limits.

However, based On tlhis minimal incirease the Stresses Will not reach the Vield point since the code limits maintain stresses well below the yield point.,The piping and supports will not fail and will maintain their function during the event.

In addition, the SDTAR analyses and associated Pipe Support analyses were reviewed for margin. Despite the increase in temperature, code allowable stress limits ~are expected to be met for the Piping and Supports during the BDB Event.

The piping downstream of the breakdown orifices is not qualifi=ed to withstand RCS pressures and temperatures. If the pipe were to rupture beYond the orif ices, then RCS leakage would still be maintained sihce the breakdown orifices would remain intact.

(OPEX Evaluation AR 24728.61-07)

The set pressure for the common Seal leak offlheader piping relief valve (Ginna EIN

U.S,. Nuclear.Regulatory.

,.commission*.

Report of Full Compliance with Order EA-12-04'9

-JanuarY 4, 2016

.Page *54' valve 314) is 152 psig (1 48-.156 psig al/fdwable band). The' relief has ai'J orifice which Corresponds' to 1.287 squ'are in'ches.

For detailed view of the common !heater

'piping see the isoinetrid drawings in' the 0C-381-357 series.

G~inna has reviewed the most recent.

maintenance work orders fdr the RCP seals and has iden-tified that the part nurrbers for the #1.Runner and #1 Ring correspornd to the silicon nitride material. Partnurnbers 4D00542G03 and 4D00541G03 ar~e shown oni We sting house Drawing,4D0.0544 rev 4 under notes B and C as having silicon nitride faceplates.

To address concerns with the ability of the R.CP 0-rings to withstand high temperatures durinig'an ELAP event, oper-ations personnel will take ac~tion per procedure ECA-0.0. Step 3 of ECA-0.0 directs operators' to adjust SIG ARVs to control Tavg at 5470 F (~-530°F Tc01d). The Phase 2.staffirng Study deteirnined that an operator can be dispat~hed *to locally operate ARVS and contr*!

.Tavg to 5470°F Within 30 minutes of event *initi~ation. With th'is oper-ator action performed in the early stages of the ELAP event, the period of time in whi~ch the 0-rings Within the RCP seals would be above 550-°F is minimized.

At approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> from event initiation, a longer-term Cooldown is initiated per ECA-0.0 to reduce RCS temperature to approximately 41 0°F via manual/local operation of the ARVs.. This cooldowb is expected to 'achieve an RCS cold leg temperature of less than 450°F in four hours from event initiation'. A second RCS*

Co oldoWn will be-initiated-to achieve an Rcs temperature and pressure of less than 3500°F and 400 psig within 24'hours Of event initiation.

Margins to the PWROG analYSis that` could compensate in the event that RC.P seal leaka~cie is Qlreater than the PWROG analysis V

V f

y.~.

Nuclear Rgulatdry Commission R6kbit6f Full Compliahce ~vifh O~er EA-12~049 January 4, 'p01 6 Pag~ 55 a~e~ach~iev~d bycompariri~ the~~inn ~ ~5lant specifid v~Iu9~s/~nalyse~ to~ tti6 PWROG R~~P seal ~ak'rates f6r a~Categ6t~y 1 45lant, iricludir~ig the~refiu~ cooling ~anaIysis meid6~66yand~iWcAP 1760Y.P coping times:

1. For conservatism RWA-1 323-003, "Ginr~a RELAP5 E LAP for Mode 1 Ahalysi~

,' u~ing pl~nt-specifi9

• par~meters, ~ass.umed a 61 g~ir~i ROS leak rate (25 gpm per seal AT 2250 psja + ~ 0 gprn worst d~se tech s~ec iWentifiedleaka~e + 1 gpm Worst c~se tebh aped u~iidbntified Ip~kage). For the PWROG-14627-P Category 1 plant, RCP seal leakage at 2250 psia is 16 gprn, at 2000 psia t is 1 ~*? gpm, at 1 8~50 psig it is 17.3 gpm~ atIi 500 psi~1t is 17.5 gpn~i, at 1250 ~si~ it is 15.7 gpm, at 850 psia it i~ 12.0 gpm, at 600 psia !t is 9.3 gprn and at 385 psialt is 6.7 gpm. RWA-1323-003 tr~ts the seals as.an prific~ fo~

ieakag~ reduction as ROS pressure drop~i D~& to the c6nse~v~tive~RCP seal leakag~ ~su~npti6n~, Girina's assumed RCP peal l~akage is conservativd'~r~ater than the PWROQ-1 4027~.P p~6vide~1 data points. At 1500 psi~Ginr~a's RCP seal leakage is c~lculged as 21 gprn, at 1250 ~si~ leakage ~s c~lpulated as 19.5 gpn~, at 600 psia le~ak~e is c~alculated as 1 2.5 gpm, and at 385 psia leakage is calculated as~9gpm.

2. RWA-1323-003 ~1eterrninedthat two-phase looji f 16w will ~b~e less than (3

sin~le~pha~6 Ibop slow at ap~roxir~iately 15.5 ho'~irs from the start bf the ~ent I npl~ceofthe gerierictime to enter reflux cooling of 24.2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> (PWROG-1 4027-P). To~

comply with NRC end6~ement Qf the boro&mixing generic conce~rn, ECA-0.0, "Loss 6f ajI AQ Power," directs charging at 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> into the event per FSG-1, "Lo~g Term RCS Inventory

U.S. Nuclear :Regulatory Co~mmission

.Report of Full Compliance with Order EA-12-049 Jan~uary 4, 2016

.Page 56 Conitrol,"* to ensure..subc~rit~icality is maintained. However) it is, likely that c~hairging will Conmmenceearlier per FSG-.I based on RVLIS and/or.

Pressurizer levels. The NEI 12'-01 Phase 2 sta~ffing Assessment determined that FSG-1 Can be implemented in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> froi iELAP initiation to restore RCS Inventory using the alternate makeup strategy when an ELAP is in.progreSs, PRZR level~is less than 13% [40% adverse CNMT] and time and per~sonnel are available to perform this strategy.

3.

lf-signs of increased RCS leakage are detected such that RVLIS indicates less than 93% and RCS pressure is less than 500 psig, operators :are directed to perform FSG-1.

4. Tbe Technical. Specification.minimum R WST borated wat~er volume of >

300,000 gallons. provides an abundant supply Of onsite borated water for RCS makeup. Tihe new Alternate RCS.Injection System is capable of pumping 75 gpm. from the RWST into the RCS at-1500 psi. A portable diesel engine drivenhhigh*

pressure pump provides alternate

'borated makeup dapability' t0 the RCS. This pUmpis also capable of pumping 75.gpm of b'orated water from the RWST to the RCS at 1500 psi. A Charging Pump provides the capability to Provide.60 gpm to an alternate injection point if the Alternate RCS Injection connection is not axiailable. These' Rcs makeup rates provide margin to the.

conservative RCs leakage rates assumed in RWA-1323-003 and significantly more margin t0'the' expected.leakage rates in.PWROG-14027-P.

In summary, the FLEX strategy for RCS makeup provides the capability to initiate FSG-1, "Long Term RCS Inventory Control,"

in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> from start of the ELAP event,

UJ.s. 'Nuclear RegUlatory CommiSsion' Report of Full.Compliance with Order EA-12-049 Janua'y 4, 2016 Page 57 provides for ROs makeup rates that are Well above expected RCS and RCP seal leakage rates, and in conjunct'ion with RCS cooldown/depressu rization and SI AccUmulator injection prOvides the capability to maintain natural circulation cooling conditions in the RCS even if RCP.seal

_______________________leakage rates are unexpe~tedly khigh.

SE 14-E" Determine if all. components in the RCP seal leakoff line that function to limit seal leakage flp0w are capable of withstanding the pressure predicted during an EL:AP event, or evaldate the new leakage flow that Wouild

.res~ult from a failure -of ithe *seal, ieakoff line. *No input is, needed at this time. The NRC staff will evaluate the licensee's response.

.Leakoff line integrity has 'been eyaluated by.

design en~jineering under OPEX response to IG-15-1 AR 2463300-07. The DeSign temperature and pressure of.th'# seal leak off line Up to the flow limiting venturi flow meters perthe associated isometric drawings C-38!-

357 series is 650° F and 2485 psig. The line segments were originally analyzed for a worst case transient 6f 552.5°F and 2485 psig underanalyses SDTAR-80-05-1.18, 119, and 035. These analyses apply E~quations"

.11, 13, and 14 of ASME B31.1 -1973 tO analyze pressure, deadweight, and thermal stresses in the piping.. Equation 12 of B31.1 deals with pipe stresses from earthquakes.

The stresses g~enerated from an event described herein are independent from earthqua~kes SO that Equation '12 is not required to be considered.

Equation 11 of B31.1 evaluates the piping for pressure and deadweight stresses. The pressure used by all three analyses for Equation 11 was 2485 psig. The allowable stress that the stress output values were Compbared to Wvas Sh =.16,600 psi (allowable stress of A376 TP31 6 steel @ 6500°F). The allowable stresses that Were applied to equation 11 were based on a 6500 F design temperatu~re. Based on the pressure and allowable stresses used by the analyses, these bound the conditions of the BDB Event discussed herein. Equation 1,:1 remains' sa~tisfied.

Equations 13 a~nd 14 of B31.1 consider thermal' stresses to the piping. The worst case transient conditions that were applied to the piping for all three analyses for these equations were 2485 psig at 552.5°F. The pipinqi meets the prescribed pressure for the

'Complete

U.S. Nuclear RegulatorY Commission Report of Full Compliance with Order EA-12-049 January 4, 2016 Page 58" BDB Event (applies to Eqn. *14 only)...

However, the temperature of the piping is expected to exceed the prescribed-tem~perature by 7.50F. This will cause stresses t0 the Pilling anid su~lpprts. to exceed those which were previously qualified by the following amount (70°F considered as.

ambient).

[(560°F,- 700 F) / (552.50F -700 F) -

1] x lo00 =

+1.554%

The allowable stress that was considered by the analyses for EqUation 13 Was~SA.

=

26,255 psi.. This is~less than the'actual allowable (SA = 27,525 psi) of A376 TP31 6 steel at 650-F (bounding) for use bly Equation

13. Since the allowable stress that is conside~red for E~quation 14 is.(SA + Sh), the allowable stre~sst~hat was considered for Equatio.n 14 is also bounded. The allowable Stresses used by Equations 13 and 14 in the analyses meet the conditions of the described BDB Event.

Pipe Supports are evaluated using an absdlute summat[ibt* of-forces for all events and comp5aring the stre~sses tha~t are generated to the code allowable stjresses.

Applied forces to the system pipe supports

-will not increase bY more than 1.544% as was previOusly calculated.

NEI 12:06 is the implementation guide for Flex *Strategies*. Since this scenario is a BeyOnd Design Basis Event, 'NEI.12-06 may be invoked. The guidance in NEI 12-06, Section 7.3.1l indicates that code stress limits may be exceeded as Ilong as the fun~ction of the structure or component is-maintained.

since the seal leak-Off piping and supp~ort stresses are n'ot expected to increase by more than. 1.554%, these may reach a point that is beYonfd the code allowable limits.

However, based on this minimal increase the Stresses Will not reach the Yield.point since the code _Jimits maintain stresses well below the yield.Point,: The p~iping and supports will not fail and" Will maintain their function:during.

y

U.S. Nuclear RegUlatory Commission Report of Full Compliance with Order EA-12-049 Jan uary 4, 2016 Page 59 the event.

In addition, :the SDTAR analyses and associated Pipie Support analyses~were reviewed.for margin.. Despite the indrease in temPerature, code~ allowable stress_ limits are expected to be met for the Piping and Supports during the' described BDB 'Event.

The p~iping downstreamn of the breakdown orifices is 'not qualified to Withstand RCS pressures-and temperatur'es. If the pipe were to rupture beyohd the orifices, then RCS leakage, would still be maintained since the breakdown orifices would remain 'intact.

Since all piping and components upstream of the breakdown flow meters is high presSure/temperature rated, no operator action is credited for isolating anY low pressure piping portions.

No modifications to thea SLO piping are necessary as structural integrity will be maintained.

The components down'strelam of the flow meters past the piping class break as identified on the 'piping isometrics may be susceptibleto over p~ressurization: Since these COmponents are downstream 'of the flow r'estricting *flow meters which provide choked flow, the Seal leak rate W ould not worsen.

SE 17-E ROS injection does not have primary.and alternate injection points as specified "by NEI 12-06, Section 3.2.2 and Table D-1.

The NRC staff reqUeSts that the licensee make available for audit a strategy for RCS injection that Conforms to NEI 12-06, or provides justification for an alternative to NEI 12-06.

An alternate strategy for alternate RCS injection has been developed with an alternate injection 150int as speCified by NEI 12-06,Sect~ion 3.2.2 and'Table D-1.

In addition to thqe new-Alternate RCS Injection system to inject borated water from' the RWST through the SI Headers into the ROS (With portable diesel, d riven backup), an alternate means of, providing'ROS injection through an alternate. injection' point is available. This alternate means of injecting borated water into the RCS involves repowe ring a Charging Pump from the SAFW DIG utilizing temporary power cables and Complete

U..Nula

,euatr Comrniss, p Janar 4, 2016,

>piressure to-allow ;floew.!o:the RS. -

Th piri~haiy metid :ofRC ieetin isif$f*{:

to

use, t

• he insdledAternate RQSilns~ ciont,*:t SI heders :The alternated metho6 o :RCS iijetin rea to useth A ltrae ROS inje~~ctionpit. To* use the 'Alter ate O

Ineton? Diesel' Dive iy

-FLEX P*m p,,,it :is-mov *:iidifom its strge

• dtiont east"of the*

SAF Buldig aid.6nect~ed l.to th'e P.Um*p suction is',.a*plg

• 6.i~e oih RWST, anid irjbi"n'?ithe intalle"dl A'l ternatei RC:S lhj:otkn P'uhi o:r the iAlt~ernat ROi Injeptioh Diesel riven F eXPm ista6 noa g.lbl, C"haring.6 'Pum'

• 'B**i'

6,thei* alt{nat inj6dtion MILESTONE SCH4EDULE,- ITEM*S: COMPLIETE

'.Miies~ton-e-Com 0hplet[ion :Date

,commencie Enigineer*ing iand Design.....

Jul" J01*;Oi.3:

CommenJ:ce Pi:roc~bremn ofit f:Equi* pme~nt'..

-iy.20!13.

Qomm:*en6:.e 1 ntalltaii.A6n o**6f."

Eg'lipmdnt Ji."

id'jy*i2Q13;l[

Submit i6-M6nthi~tat~s Repio r t.::,

.A0 g ust !2°013* '

Develop!Str~feies/.9---.,

tr.ct. withth Nationa

'Jl 2015..,

u.S. Nuclear Regulator'y Cormission RePort of Full.Compliance with Order EA-i2-049 Janua~ry 4, 2016 Page 61 Milestone Completion.Date Develop Training Plan..,July

2015, Submit 6-Month-Status Report.

February 2015,.

Issue FLEX.Support Guidelines Nov-ember 2015 Perform Walk-throughs or Demonstrations November 2015 ProVide onsite.and augmented staffing assessment consider~ing functions related toJue21 Near-Term Task Force (NTTF)Jue21 Recommendation 4.2.

Ilmplemiert Training "October 201 5 Submit 6-Month Status Report August 2Q15

.C~mplete Procurement of Equipment October 2015 Full compliance with EA-:12-Q49 is achieved

!NoVember 3, 2015 Submit Completion Report

.December 2015 ORDER EA-12-049 COMPLIANCE ELEMENTS

SUMMARY

The elements identified below for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant as well as the site OIP response submittal (References 5 ari'd 6), the 6-Month Status Reports (References 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11), and-any additional docketed correspondence, demonstrate compliance with Order EA-12-049.

Strategies - Complete R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant str~ateglies are in compliance with Order EA-12-049. There are no strategy. rela~ted Open,Items, Confirmatory Items, or Audit Questions/AUdit Report Open Items. The R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Final Integrated Plan for mitigating strategies is pr~vided in the ehclosure~tothis letter.

Modifications - Complete The modifications required to support the FLEX strategies for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant have been fully implemented in accordance' with the station design control process.

EquiPment - Procured and Maintenance & Testing - Complete The equipment required tO implement the FLEX strategies for R. E..Ginna Nuclear Power Plant has been procured in acdo0rdance with NEI 1'2-06, Sections 11.1 and 1=1.2, receivedl at R. E.

Ginna Nuclear POwer Plant, initially tested/performance verified as identified in.NEI 12-06, Section 11.5, and is available fOr use.

Maintenance and testing will be conducted through the use of the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Preventative Maintenancelprogramn such that e quipment reliability is achieved.`

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 9am mission Report of,Full Compliance with Order EA-12-049 January 4, 2016 Page 62 Protected Storage - Complete The storage facilities required to implement the FLEX strategies for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant have been completed and provide protection from the applicable Site hazards. The equipment required to implement the FLEX strategies for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant is stored in its protected configuratiorn.

Procedures - Complete FLEX SuPport Guidelines (FSGs) for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant have been developed and integrated with existing procedures.. The FSGs and affected existingproc'edures have been Verified and are available for use in accordance with the site procedure control program.

Training - Complete Training for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant has been completed in accordance with an accepted training process as recommended in NEI 12-06, Section 11.6.

Staffing - Complete The Phase 2 staffing study for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant has been completed in accordahce with 10OCFR50.54(f), "Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident," Recommendation 9.3, dated March 12, 2012 (Reference 13),.as documented in Reference 14.

National SAFER Response Center - Complete EGC ha~s established a contract with Pooled Equipment Inventory Company (PEICo) and has joined the Strategic Alliance for" FLEX Emergency Response (SAFER) Team Equipment Committee for off-site facility coordination. It has been confirmed that PEICo is ready to support R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant with Phase 3 equipment stored in the National SAFER Response Centers in accordance with the site specific SAFER Response Plan.

Validation - Complete R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant has completed performance of validation in accordance with industry developed guidance to assure required tasks, manual actions and decisions'for FLEX strategies are feasible and may be executed within the constraints identified in the Overall

'.Integrated Plan (OIP) for Order EA-12-049.

FLEX Program Document - Established The R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant FLEX Program Document (CC-GI-1 18) has been developed in accordance with the requirements of NEI 12-06.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Report of Full Compliance.with Order EA-12-049 January 4,2016 Page 63 This letter" contains no rew regulatory commitmentcs. If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact David P. Helker at 610-.765-5525.'

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 41h day of January 2016.

Respectfully submitted, Jame~ arstow' bDirector - Licensing & Regulatory Affairs Exelon Generation CompanY, LLC

Enclosure:

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Final Integrated Plan - Mitigating Strategies NRC Order EA-12-049 cc:

Dir'eCtor, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation NRC Regional Administrator - Region I NRC Senior Resident Inspector -. R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant NRC Project Manager, NRR

- R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

'Mr. Johh P. Boska, NRR/JL*D/JOMB, NRC

Enclosure' R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Final Integrated Plan - Mitigating Strategies NRC Order EA-12-049 (121 pages)

ExtonGeneration0 R. E. GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

December 2015

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN

• ,MITIIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC oRDER EA-12-049)

Table of Contents 1 Introduction.....................................................................

........... 6 1.1 Implementatdon Capability Requirements Overview..................

.6 1.2 Implementation Plan.................................................................. 7 2

General Elements......................................................................... 8 2.1 Characterization of External Hazards............................................... 8

2.1.1 SeiSmic

.................................................................. 8 2.1.2 External Flooding..................................................................

9 2.1.3 Severe Stormnswith High Winds:.......................

12 2.1.4 Snow, Ice, and Extreme Cold:................................................. 13 2.1.5 High Temperatur'es:....................

13 2.2 Key Assumptions................................................................... 14 2.3 Extent to which the guidance is being followed................................... 16 2.4 Sequence of Events.......................22 2.5 WCAP-17601-P Recommendations............................................... 22 2.6 RCP Seal Leakoff Line Integrity.................................................... 25 2.7 RCP seal 0-Ring Integrity......................................................... 26 2.8 RCP Seal Leakage.....................

........................................... 29 2.9 Decay Heat Model..................................................................

32 2.10 Use of Non-Safety-Related Installed Equipment for Mitigation Strategies.....

33 2.11 provision of N+I FLEX Equipment................................................. 34 2.12 Generic Concerns................................................................... 42 2.13 Staffing and Commun~ications Response to a BDBEE..........

42 2.14 Deployment Strategies............................................................. 44 2.15 Maintenance and Testing..............................................................

44 2.16 Brief Description of Procedures!/Strategies!/Guidelines......................... 45 2.17 Training...........................46 2.18 Synchronization with 0ff-Site Resources......................................... 46 3

Maintain Core Cooling & Heat Removal (S/Gs Available; Modes 1 - 4 and Mode 5 with Loops Filled)........................................................................... 48 3.1 Objectives.......................................

,.................................... 48 3.2 Acceptance Criteria...................................................

48 Page 2 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN

-.,",M'ITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)'

3.3 Strategies...........

..... 48

.3.4 Phase 1..........................

i..............................................

..... 52' 3.4.1 A~uxiliary Feedwater....

........................................................ 53 3.4.2 Depressurize SIG for Makeup with Portable Injection Source............. 54 3.4.3 SuStai'ned Source of, Water............

...................................... 55 3.4.4 Mode 5, Loops Filled...........................................................

56 3.5 Key Reactor Parameters........................................................... 57 3.6 Phase 2....,.......................................................................... 57 3.7 Phase 3...............................................................................5 4

Maintain ROS Inventory Control/Long Term Subcriticality (Modes 1 - 4 and Mode 5 with Loops Filled).............................................................................. 60 4.1 Objectives...................................

60 4.2 Acceptance Criteria........................................................

60 4.3 Strategies........................60 4.3.1 RCP Seals with Regard to Inventory......................................... 61 4.3.2 RO:S Makeup with Regard. to Subcriticality.............................. *......61 4.3.3 Bor'on Addition/Mixing...................63 4.4 Phase 1..........................65 4.5 Key Reactor Parameters........................................................... 66 4.6 Phase 2................................................................................ 66 4.7 Phase 3.......,.......................................................................

68 5

Maintain Core Cooling & Heat Removal (S/Gs.Not Available; Modes 5 & 6)........ 69 5.1 Objectives.........

69 5.2 Acceptance Criteria...:............................................................ 70 5.3 Strategies....................

....................................................... 70 5.4 Phase 1..:.......................................................................

• ..... 71 5.5 Key Reactor *Parameters........................................................... 72 5.6 Phase 2.............................................................................

73 5.7, Phase 3.............................................................................. 74 6

Maintain Containment..............................,...................................... 75 6.1 Objectives.

...................................................................... 75 6.2 Acceptance Criteria................................................................. 75 6.3 Strategies.......................................... ;.....*............................. 75 Page 3of 121

iTIGA*TI*O:NrSTAT:EQ!.!

(N'RC QJP!R DEkl ::_12-9049??

""'"*:'":*'4:,:"*..

6.4 P lia'se l1::................~.

76~

6.5 Kiey COo ntainf1m~ent Paramhete rs..............

,,.,....-..76 6.6

P ha se 2:..

m...........

. 1:7z 6.7 Phase 3:-.......

,.....-......i...

78 7

-M a~intain i~pen't Fuel. Pool Co*,iirig~i.......

S....

79 7

'.1 O bjec ives...

79 7:2 ACcepta~nce.Criteria......

.....;....-........79 7.3 S trate~gieis.,..-.-,...

79 7.4

.Phas§e* 1:.-....*..".....

80, 7.5 Key SF*P Parameters 8

7.6

.P ase2.....

80 776 P as 3:..............................

83 8

Safety Functions Support....

84 8.1 objec.tive*s..................

'84 8.2 P~hase~l 84 8.2.1 Vital, Batter'ies.

84 8.2.2 Emer~gency Lighting..........................

85 8.2.3, HVAC...

85 8.3 -Phase 2....:...........

• 89

-8.3.1 Vitali*Batteries 89

.8.3.'2 HvAC,...:

... 89 8.3.3 U

lHSi*ccess..

90.

8*.,3*4*

,Dbris Removal I-Transport Equipment.;..........

,92 8.3.5 Diesel Fu~el........

92, "8:3.6 Em ge hc Lighting............

93

• 8.:8.

HeatmuTrading s...........................................................94 8.3.9'8 Keyt Parametersi..............:

,...954 8.43 Pas 3.y.P.r ees...........

..............!.,95

'9 Agg reg ation ofi FLE:X-.strategies

....... 96 1'0 Refe rences......

98 11

• Acron\\yms.-..................;.

,.-.........105 Table 1- -PWR

.Portab~le Equipment Phase 3.*................

.107

Page 4 of,121

1*

~GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED' PLAN

""MITIGATIO sTRATFEGIES (NRC ORDER *EA-12-Q49 - Sequence of Events;Timeline for an ELAP/ LUHS.........108 - Figures....................................................................... 113 Page 5 of 121

~MITIGATION STRATEG°IES (NRC QRDER EA-12-.049) 1 Introduction This integrated p*lan provides ;the..R=E. Gin~naNu clear.Power Plant (Ginna) app5roach for compl~yinfg wi~th3 O(rder: E*A-1 2-049.(Refeirence: 1) d*sing.. the m ethods, described: in NR*C J"LD-IsG-2012"-Oi (Refer~ende 3). -"::-

1.1.

Imrplementation Capability Requir~ements Overview Th9'i6.l!imai:y :*iverseand.flexible: coping "stra~tegiqs (F.LE*X) ob.jetive,is :tp "d.evelopo the

,(ELA*P)' and l!oss.of, nrmdal access t{o -th~e iutirfiate Heat Sink:.(LUH:S) 'event for.ani

.ind~efinite..p~eriod throughi a "combinatio'n"of,inst{alled" planft" e~uilment, ;pprtabldi on-site th'e pr:*s'umption that otherthan th~elos;s of no~rmal.and' altejna~te AC3 power sourOes, andc norm'aliaccess :to t{he :Ultimate"H~eat sinkl* (U HS),i installed eq uipmf~ent th*ati is designed.".,t be rob!u~st with' :respect to :d'e~inisig

' is.exte rnal :venets !is a§su'm6d :to "be fiully"a&ilible.

I'nstalledea!qdipm~ent tha't is"not !obusf" i: a~ssumed to0 :be un~availa:ble.

P:ermanetrfn p:lant equJip~ment, cooling,and mnak~eup water inv*entories,

,~and ::fu~el fl'or FLE*X equipment cont~a~inied*in systems or".struJct{ures withi.designs :thadt are: ro6bust"wi~t~h r~espect to s*ei~smic as* portable.ac po0wer sourc~es, portabl1e back iupl d~irect curi*ent. (DC) poder; suppliies,

..spare.bateri*S;, and equipment.for 10o.CFR 50.54'(hlh)(2i), m'ay bhe,us*ed provdided: it.is reasonably6i~ prot~ected ::froio thle applicab#le exterhnal haard's, hfas pred eiermined h *6ookuP

.strategies A.uth iapp'ropriate pr~o~edure's/guida.nce,: and. the" equipment is stored l*in' a relati'e close.vicinity: o.f tihe: Site'.!

I:.:nsta~lled elect~rical !distfibtition system,,including

.,iVnikdt*S and batt~ry ch6arge'rs, remain available proi-vided thiey a#re.p rote:Cted consistent withd:-urirent S(tion :design The FLEX strategy relies up6n 4h]e'f,61ipio pinci~ple~p*s: '"

'1..

i~itialiy cpe bly relying onin~stalled piani:'t*uipment,(Phase.1)

,2. Transition ;fram installed, plaht *q~ipmernt to o~n-sitie FLEX equ~ipment (Pdhase 2) w*t6r, andcioolant injection.s.ystems :are [e~tor-e~dor cor~issio~n~d..(Phase 3)

4. Response a~ctio~ns aire lprioritiz.td 'basedl oJn" available..equipm ent, resourc(es,,and time c0onst~r.aints.

The : initia~i'co;5inig re*rsponse ations,,can be' per0orme'd :by available siteper~sonhel post-event..'.

.i.'"

5. Trans.ition from in~stalled p"llant equipment.to.on-.site FLEEX !equipment involye on-

.site, off-isite, or riec0alled personnel :as justified,.by evaluation.

6. stratei~ges tha~thave :a tim~e cansir*,int to be 4success~il1 are identified and a ba~sis 5roVided that the timhe cah rea~sonab1ly'be mnet-...

Wh~ile initial.alproaches to FLEX' stra*igieoS talkeno credit for al;ternate ac soures, credit

.is" taken.for an installed diesel :ge:eria'tor.(DIG). that. can biie manuall~y.conne~cte~d to operate equipment uitilized lin FLEX strcate.gies.: This D/G i's not :connected to, and is not onnect5able, t6 the offsite or onsiste eriemrg~ncy ac p6wersyt,,

d~ems, An,.element of,the set of stra.tegies.,to maintain or restore core and SFP. cooling,and contait nm~ent functions.inc~ludes.knowvledge *of the,time*tha.t.Ginna.can W ithlsta~nd chalaieng*-s to-these key saf{ety functions* 'using in'*ta~lled equipiment" during a 'beyond-Pagle 6,of 12.1

*M.ITIG ATION ISTRATEG IES; (NIRCIO*RDOER EA-,!2-0.49),,

design-ba~sis external :event (t~DB'EE). This knowledjge !provides, an inPutto the, choice of stora*e iooatidns* and cdniditidps, bf rediness of the eq~idprm6ntrequirfed for :the fQIlow~f p-*hases.

T*h'is dur~ation: is related to, but,flstiirc*from -th~e sp'ecifid,d'Ufti~ri,,for' the r-equiremeiefisiof 10 -CFR 50'.63,. Lbs*

Of -all alternating current pok*'er, :'(Referen'ce :6)

.,pa~ragr'aphi (a), because' it represents -60ur curreont :c~abiflities rat~her than'i a :required "c6pab}iiij.-

A,.S :su.th G*inna '1)i} acc-o~ints -for the -SFP c. oo~ln'g..fucti*-ton,. *vwhi".Ch i~s. nit ad'dresseid,by 10 CFR. 5.0.63'(a);, anfid. 2) a*sduries tthe non-a.vailability~o [.faltfernhte ace Section 3.8L2.2, Paragrap1h"(-1) o6f.N.EL1~2-06.(Reference :4).

Mainiftenfance of ;theguidanhe and "strategies addressing.estimate ;of coapability,will be kept-cur~rent. to.reflect. plant.

cone~ditidns.fat :llown.ges fac t6a.ility cagessc *b. moiicpatioso

,t eq ulr*ipm:nfo0,ui~:tae. Gihnita]

respbnise p:hase can:: be 'accomnplished, "the required.irdtiation times for the.transitioh phase, a'"nd the required de.ivery and~ :initiating times for :the final :pha'se.

1.2 lmpl'ementation Plan' Capabilities for responding to ELAP and LUHS scenarios caUsed by BDBEEs are desc~ribed,in the following sections.

Page 7 of.121

,~~GINNA ;FiNAL iN*TEGRATED PLI.AN.

2 General Elements 2.1 iCharacterization of External Haizards The applicable extreme external hazards for Ginlna are seismic, external flooding, ice, snow,*; high iwjds' (including tornad*oes),*

low temp~eratu~re and high temperature as

2.1.1 Seismic

Ginn~a.has.two *licenise basis *earlthquak~e sp~eetra.. Thee.spectra are *Regulatory Gu~ide (RG) '1.60"sh*a~p..esw)iwth";the*

O~p rai*.ng. Bais :Earthquake (OBE1 E)ha*ving *a pe*ak ho6riZontal hoiz)iiontal *jroun~d acceleiration of-0;20g:(U0FSAR, Refer'ence 25). Per NEI 12-06 Section*

5.2 (Referen'ce" 4), all sites will considgr 'the seismic htazard.

.The :Ginna UFSAR (Reference.:25,) Section* 2.5.3 was reviewed to perform,a limited eva lUation of th6 liquefac~tion pot'ential outside the po)wer, block, ar*eafor a $,.SE event.

'Two oionsite 'slop.es*, whose fa ilures mlay be.i of s af~ety conicer'n,, were id~en~tified :by Roclheste6r 'Gas. & Elect'ic *(RG&E).

Tlhle first slope. is Io'cated about 200 feet (ft) northwest[ of" the itur~bine. building-while-the sec~ond slope ;is 1ocet."east of the screen hoUse. 'Both slopes :were, exc#avated fromi the :Origirnal ground* elevatio'n.of about :270 ft-down to. ei evatiin-2*55f~t in silty, claysil S6jandwere g*raded.at aplproximat,9ly,7.5 horizonital to.1.vert'i~cal.' In :Ord'er) "to a~ssessthe S't'b~ilitr Ofl those slo(p~es, a*ssumrpt'io-nshlave' been made 'about the subsurface iconditions a*nd"thesoil,paralmeters. Stability anial.ses, both static* &a~ pseJdqsta~tic with earhquake load,.were p:*rformed by tlhe-NRC.staff, using' a

.corf"rierciall a/ilabli&6e compueitr p'og~ram, McAUO't3s :"Slope" program.:.The resUlts.of th*e" slop*e :a.rialyse*si perfo rr*d -.by,th*:e; NRC.sta{ff. dUin*} >th e Syst*imatic ~Eval]u ation ea'rthq*uake, loading* conditionrs are *less. than ::unityi, iindicating th:lat :th.ese slope~s a*re :not stable -and: that failure 'would ak**e pliace >io'rig' an *rh-.of ra~dius abo-ut-1 75.ft..,Sin~e.the slps w**

"ere en.o'8tdetermined ~ito 6 s:table,,t~he: impa*ct of5.the6ir* fa{ilur'es was i*furthe~r

,the.§lope at.elevation 276 ft, adjacenh:t 'to th cr'est and a..:t elevation 257 ft, ad*jace~nt to:t~he toe. Thie liateral spread of th~e.slope failur~ adjacent to th~e t*oe is estimated by the,staff to

be somewhlere'-aroudnd 8.ft,

b*.sed npof.ihst-fail.ure equilib~rium.

Ai;t, the first{.slope, northw~est-of the turbinle build in#, theire i~s no struct~ure nror *equiipm~ent-located.with~in or adja*enrt to 'the' sl~pe exc*ept: a r'oa*dway. 'Therefo1re, t~he fa~ilure. of that slop~e wo~uld not poise, anly safety conce)rn bult-might closge the road.-,"The second :slope6,,.east" of the slc.re~en house, is ;Suffic~iently remov(*d from any requdlired.safety-relate*d :equipment.. Thus, its fa iure )wo.uld not be of safety concern.

Ginna screened in for" assessing seismic *impact.

A Soil li~quefactidn-analysis (References 48,.4.9, 50,. 5.1, and 52) was perfformed,to ensure FLEX *q'uiP~ment*coucld be deployed do~vn the paths to reach the drafting station at the dsch~iar*ge; Canal follo0wing.a seismic ievent.....

The following conclusions f)r9.m ithe ".analysis are noted:

• Liquefaction is not a con)cern for the large majority of the soil sampl~es tested.

Page 8 of 121

The loesi toth we*t ard east-,remain.serviceab~le, fol...owin~g

"" " an

• '"'"earthquake:,wlth" n0p: li~fc~n o~ern;.,

The roada a h t~e of the sl0:peQremains :s6*erv able...

t~sum ha he;s opes re-*the' b<.,u nding*.cse* du ing ga seismico event,.:onsid~ering, the......... toorpi~rfi.

L{ iZJ j IiOf{6drjf u on......

th d"~ymn p..th. xn:i

• Of,the reiewed s~oil samples:, lirnited 'soil :sam~ples w~ere nogted, to be C.apible of

• hr are,.*

no lgre lo[ads '(*,trucOe Ors :or. bridges): located o n... degloy1:*me6nt..

paths

.... ~

soi cinfine'*d !(flaf.area*s :with :no, slopes. to f.ail) lIfliqie t~ip occ

ursdrina seismic even.

io'6*Ji

¢~l~

'#~.t, somne soil strength *will be. regain'ed ovker: tim

• (ff61iwing 0"the evet.

"Large Portable FLEX( eqluipm~ent.ar*e secureda,, as appropr'iate.; to:*protect :thelm :during a seismic :event, and.stored equipment and. structures *w~ere~ evaluated a~nd pri'o6t ecte~d.from c*Oul'"'d" caiuse

" """ damage.:

to"

1O-i"-the& V-equipm:,e-,,-, t.nt.

FOPt.-i 5""

-'000.3P-1S*)030,,0, FLEX LE-"> Eq"uiupmnt"-

en"t""'

Anc bpragemfe-Downs,-(Re ferenc-e 10O) providps the* seismic -stor~age. design requirem:ents C."'6nihforn'ce "to -,N*EI,12-2 06,Section 5.53.3,. Conside~rations8 2 arnd 3,.is,addressed. as of thee Seis mi. Wal*kdobwnsi (RBefeirnce ;!16).

F.a~ilu re. f -non-:seisn*iCa~ly~q ua!lifie~d !t~a~r~ksin

.thei Audlllary.Buildir~g :could-cause,floodirng in the Aux]iliary. Building,subbasement. where

-the"Residual,HeatVRemova~l pu:mps a~re lcoated.- If a.seisr iic event occurs while in low~er mod#es.).then ResidualF-Heat Removalwl dbe, im~ple mentedI in Phase 2:. TInVthis ~steeario, Adeq uate r:-esoure rs:

(personinel rand equdi'p:efnt) and. time 'a~re \\allotted :for *.}h~is' a.tivity.

Thie "lntermnedi~it6. Bu~ilding,,Standby-Au~Xilia~ry. Feediw~ater Suildi~ng,.:StanDdby -Auxiliary Feed~water,;yi~ilding. Anniex, C.:ontainment -and Controli Budiidjng -do :not :.!ha(*e non-:i Confiormanoe.to.NE. 1.2-0.6. Section :5.3.:3, C:on:sidera*tio ni:4.- ;addresse'd as. follows.

Water levees aeareguoatid b Gin*na. is a ":wet"..sit~e which :means.that por~tio~nsof, thep~lan)t are :below the. design* basi~s Page 9 of.12.1

-MITIGATION :STRA&TEGI-ES (NRC O.RDE:R EA-.12-049) :

273.8 '. iS regio~nal pre.ip'itation. result[ing* in. '-a P:*rol*able. Maximum. FlO.Od ;(PM..F) (uFSAR, Re*ference.25)..Per :Table -16: of 'NEI 1.2-06 the. warnfing 'time would b~e days anid. the peri~sitence-of tH*-* evenft :c6uild :be mandy hours to days. TlhuOs, Ginnai* s'creened-in-for

'as siexrera!:lodglmpact...

The p:roba*ble max.imum flo,.:d at Gi*nna :.is: causefd by an :extreme r!:gionlpred:]:ipi~tat on.

eveht.: iKE El12-0.6 !T.able.: 6-1 si:t~aites that flood:s :caus~ed lby ?egio'al* :preciPitation r;-'*'er~tS*

ha~ve d.ays"of w~rin g tim'e asso6dia~ted with theIfm. """

R~ega~rdingdelo:eiim_*nt, of,portable 'equiPm'nt tiduring *floodirng:,

ER-8SC.2,- !-igh :Water exterp~al :floodi~ng:-,L::i.e.!6 1 and: Ley*el 2. The.sym*ptoms or trig'gers't~h"at Jiitiat}e a:i-Level. :1.-

fl¢odin~g' Q6oditioh ja~r*'e as. fOllpws: :(.1) 5,.incl6s. o0f rain _.bver :a: 24-hb'urE pe~riod f1 or~ec..~at~d in t.he,:hext' 3 -days;:.(2) Shift Ma

.*nager'.di.sc*:retiiin. *.., *#mt'm::th at,i nitiate a LezTvel: '2

f1oodjog conddition ar~e as.fo16Ws!:. (1i)F~orecasted" raiihfal,of {10, inchies or-mhqre :withiin. the

.next 24:hours;- (2) Lak~e level.rises to a.level. of, 252.,ft.,.-as note~d,in the 'djscha rge canal and-a. con~ftinue r*7-ide :is o*bSe*ve "or ':exp6cteda; (3)' l~*6oding o f D'beer Cr"eek /re~aches a#Cess. *roa:d. :bridge h1andraiiil'; (4*) Wave ~abtion.cau$'e.s :water-,splashhng over, discharge (anal ~i.waIO.:R: pushes water. oqver: th'e: armorj s tone; :(5):I Floo6ding of t}h~escreen:,Huse-or-Turbi~i.:e",i uididng Ba:sem-ent} "(6) Shift Mana*g'.t'discretioeq.;

Per ERrS~C-2, 'dri*!ng'.a. Lev el 1. f loodi g::condition,. p*ersonnelI are dispatched:to.place F.LE.X dewatering,pumps :in :the followin:g arfeas:.Auxkiliary Building-/R[HR" Subb~asemfent;

,insi~d:e ehgineu.~

f..*_:barriers'.in the. Tur~bine;.Building Basemntnerff.i i.Emer~g*ncy :DIG Rooms ::and insid*e en#fgineered..barriers siin ::th3e Tur:bine -Builin~g,B'asem~ent. near the Opera:tihg.F~lo.r :as.-a: so6urce.of power"b for the dewte"w il ng p:*um*ps.

Add'itionall!!y, in!

accordance. with ER.-SC.2, pe rsonnel' re.-to. move portable FL:EX.equipment (2 :dies.'el gro6und-(SW" ofi Ergin1ieerirg Builiidng,' Highi Integrijty Cc*{ifitaier*

Sgtorage,Fa~iiityio-r-other lo~Io¢.gn. app.roveg; by E.-ngi.n~e~ri[ng).

It 's.hould.be npoted.tha.t, these.are: :c~ntingec.n.c.

• action.iand: are ot e di*

it*e~djt:

ais FlLEX.stra~tegies.'.Critecd.* FLX, ex..quipm~entl :6hS~i'sts:..of "the d&5r#s and seal.s of the Ba~ttery -Rooms, :Air :Ha*ndling.Room, n*;ad th~eDieseliGenerator iRoom.s.i

No *flooding.of tfh*- Auxiliary",Building -is -- nt.icipat.ed d:airinhg,the{l "Pr.obable

As' preyious.Y state6d,, the '-0100 W

.p0,rt.able FI*LEX D/G,is uLSe¢d.as: a soU~rce ;of power fbr th 'F:.g.LE-X.."d*wateing pups et~ails rlelat~ed.to. fuel consu~mption iof.the" 100 KW por-table.FL.EX Di(d,a.re docu~mentpd. in DA:M.E-14;003, Fuk..*Lhima F:u~el.. on*,irption Analys:Iiss.,'(Fefere'ne-dS i24):...Ta~bl~e ;2 o

.,thlis ::nai.ysis c,oncl~du.*,:tides thtit',woulid :tak~e (con'servaiveiy assU ming g.an6 j in*ita.fue o*:*il

ivel"of. 55% 'at;*

tihgi be~in'ii*ing ofte6v~enrt).

Ac~c:rdirng g:to IDA*-ME-I5-:006, !Fukushima. Timeline An~a.ysibi (Re f.ere*ce.30,0j* the' :fl~o~di~ng evenit onl5y h~as a :persistence of 10 hou~rs;.as :a: result,-a. sufficienti a~moun:t.of fuel 6il exiSst with'in t-he -100 K'*: portable. FLE:X DIG' to opqbe rate t hr(oug'hout.the-dura'!ion of *th* fodd.:

"Period*i_./An#n.u~aliL~o~ad B.an.fk~t. 'Ts, AttaKchm*ent :4.(Re~fdyrnee' 31 ), prom"vi~des :g.uidance: for

• refu]eling the 1O o..

W portable :.FL:.EX' D/G utijlizinrg 'two.FLEX :Fuel Tank Trailaers. Each.

fuiel.tank trail.erf.contains 8990gallo6ns. of tdiesel rfUel. For :added cons:ervatism;, theset~anks we:

6*Ai*t':,ediet:d_.fo{r~iUSe Jin iDA:ME-:14-p03.. Per E#-sC..2;',.during a- :Level 1,flooding con~dition, p ersdonnel61 a*re' dispatce~id 'to fill! the D1iesel" Fuel"Truc~k.an~dFuel. Tra~ilers. with

"'Djiesel F:Uel.anid Stage at high ground onsite.. As a r~esult, app~roximately 1,980 ga[lins of Page 1 0 of 1.21

~GINNA FINAL iNTEGRATED*,PLAN MITiGATiON STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) non-utilized diesel fuel would be available for refueling the 100 KW portable FLEX 1DIG if required.-

During a flood,.access to the ultimdte heat sinkwil 'be temporarily, unavailable due,to floodwater on sit'e. NTTF R,?.commeridation *2.-i' flooding ree'~ialuation results (iR.fe~rence

42) show that the p~ersist'ence of the, flood is a~pp roximately.10: hours:, Ginna has installed a 160,000 gallon SAFw Dl Wate~r storage Tanqk which has ajdequate inventorY for' approximately,24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />,of *heat r~emoval.

This tank is prote~cted fromn.all events (sei.ic tonao.n. flood), ahd will b*.Usdd as a' heat s~ink unti tihe ultimate headt sink is 'available.-

With :respect to core cooling,, the SAFW. pumps are credited ;FLEX components, as OUtlinred in DA*-ME-15-*006.

Consequently, ER-SC..2.requires. Operations to evaluate if city water should be aligned to the SAFW. pumps during Levie!l '1and Level 2 flooding conditions. -it shoul'd" be noted th~at the SAFW DI Water Storage. Tank is the credited source of water for the SAFW pumnps.,Similarly, the SAFW pumnps are' credited for core cooling dur-ing a tornoado event. T~he installationl of ECP-14-0007.49, SAFWAB Cf~oss Tie

('Fukushima~) (Referen~ce 45), ensures*the ca~pability to provide flow to both steam Generators from eith~er" SAFW pump. '

'"t.

The reqUired flood barriers used by Ginna are stored immediately adjacent to the openings in-which they are to be* installed. 'The installation of.thes~ebarri~ers is performed on an annual frequ~ency-for testing.' Ginna has a~lso validated that the barriers can.be installed' rapidly during a.rea~s~nabl e simulation

'(Refere.nce 56) performed per Recommendation 2.3 df the March 1.2, 2-012 50.54(f) letter, (Refe~rence 7)..Additional barrilers *were purchases 'for defense-in-depth' protection.of thle DieSel Gener'ator-aRdors and the Battery Rooms. TheSe are not reqUired to mitiga~te a. flood, and are stored in a storage building onmsite.

Connection points for por'table equipment remain, viable for flooe~del conditions as specified in NEI 12-06., Section 6.2.3.2,.Consideration'5. "With respect to core cooling, the SAFW pumps are credited FLEX components (DA-ME-15-006, Reference 30). Prior to flooding' conditions an' operaitor w i be' Staged. in' 'the* SAFW Building to oper~ate the SAFW Pump *as 'needed. 'It -should be noted-that 'the creldited sourc~e of water during a beyon'd design.basis external flooding event is the SAFW,Dl Water, Storage Tank (TCD05). N~either~tlhe SAFw.Di.WaterStorage Tank nor the SAFW Pumps are irnipacted by an *external flood. In the event that both.SAFW Pump5s :and both Fukushima*NFPA Diesel Gener~ators (KDG08 and KDG09) fail, a portable F.LEX pump could, be-installed to provide flow dlirectly to the Steam Generators. This is. cdnfSidered an N+1 scenario' and as a: result is not time critical.

There~fore, an adequate,amount of time would, have elapsed following the event Suich that floodwaters would have receded and debris would be removed-prior to installing a portable FLEX pump.

There is no adverse change to the alternate Residual Heat Removal (RHR) strategy dur~ing an external flooding scenario. All equipment Utilized for alternate RHR is located inthe AuXiliary.Building Subbasement, wh~ich is no~t impacted: 'by an, external flood.

similariy, the conn~ection points and equipment deployment areas to'suliply'Lake..ontario wate'r toan RIHR "Heat Exchlanger. are not 'impacted-by an :external flooding' event.

con~sidering floodwaters recede within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> of the evenit and NSRC equipme~nt does not arrive for 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />' following the event, adequate timhe would-be available to remove debris from eqUipment deployment areas and connection Points prior to equipment arrival and installment.

Page 11 of 121

Per.DA-ME-15-0O6, all,equipmenit respons.ible for' TICS. mak~eup and the :associated c~n'nedti:ihi points*'ae, protected'duri~ing a 'beyohid-designi b'asis exteirnal fi6o*ding *ent.

To ma.intainp Qoitaijri-fent inte~gfiiyV dujrinig ELAP conidjitfios, lonlg term.odd1ing.will, be established using NSRC eq'ui~5ient.}

T'h'is.equdi~pmenrt Will prov~ide flbw..to.the.

Cd"ntainmen't, R'eiryulatioh ;Fan Cooliers: (CRF.Os)*.throug.hi service Wa.v*ter: (sW)_

conn*e'ction6" pdpnt*.'loca'e'd "in,ihe.,i terrredi"ate.Buiding;*

B1.s'epe6nf[.....while thle Intermediate: Bi3lding Baseme~nt, is' subet to

1. !;:{'flooding, Continmt~dent cooiing' :is not nie'eded for a*ttl~east 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br />, which isweli past the".10. hour flood dudraion:-

.Spernt :Fuel Pool (SEP) maikeu*p will :be accormpliShed Usingga po'rtable FLEX, pump with water suppli*ed from" Lake :Ontario. Co~nnection;p~oints.foqr :SFP :makeup exist' at the* pqo'I andiin the basemnent of ithe Auxiliary uild in'g. iSinjce" SFP* na'k-eup is nbt req'uir:ed :until at lea~st 21-.hours after, the.event and dfloodwaters' rec'cede.;.withm '10 'hours' of *the event,.

n~either of th'ese connectiion :poinitS-are i~mpacted by exter~nal *flooding cond'itions. '

,2.1.3 Severe Storms with High WindS:

Per Figur'e.7-1tof NEI 12-06,.Ginna has a 1i in,1 milli6nl ch-ance per year 'of a hurrican6 induced ea:*ek-dgst wind s-peed of <: 12*0 mile's per hou~r "(n'ph). T~hus, the site does not need.to assess the impact olf extreme straight winds..

Pier tFigurie 7-2of NEI 12-06, Ginna has a 1,in-1 mil~~lion,chance of tornado Wind.speeds of 169 :mph. As this :is. gr~e~ater than, the threshold..of 130' mph, tlhe,site: assessed torn'adoes "and tor:nado missiles impact.,

In a~ccordance :with. NEI" 12-06, Section 7.,3.,!- protecti'on'of FLEX.equipment from 'hiigh wNind 'hazardcs can-r be accom~plished by jstoring eqlUiphenit in a structure that hnoots the

plant

's° designr basis for :ilgh iwind hazard.s (el.g.',* 'existing safetji-related' struc¢ture); o0r in s,*orage,locatioins *d~esigned.to' or ievaluated equivalent to[£ Americlan. Soc.iety, of 'Civiil Engineers (,ASC:E) 7-1i0, iMinimum. D6esign1 Lo.ads for:: B~uijdings an6dQthOier. $tructures,

.give61 thfe 'limitifng torna:do.winda :.p,ee*ds fromi (Regulfor fyGuide6: 1.76.(Refere~nce :61i); or inl evaluated storage', Iocatidn~s separated. b.Y,: asutficient, idistance, that,min'imizes the pr015bjblity'fhat: :a single: ev'ent wouldc damage-alli;FLEX rpitiga~tiqn eq:uipm pnt such :that at ieast; N sets of FLEX6 equipment.woul~d reandpoal oloigtehgNind-event.

Cohsidstent with :this guidlanc~e, Ginnia takes-th~e 'followinrg approach to protect installed plant{ equip~ment :and FLEx eq~uipm~ent from :high wind hlazards,. sliecifically tornados *and torn-ad0 missiles:

For conservatismn, Ginn~a',designed the structural 'wlal~sand rioof of the new "robust

.structurfe"-housing thle"N" set[ of FLEX mitigation equipinent to the RegulatOry Guide 1.7:6 1tornado wind *speed and.suite of tornado missiiles.' However', ithe butil~ing's withstan-d *the plant's design ~basis' tornado (iFe.,. 13 a2mljes :per hour wind [Speed)- and St6-na~do missile splectrum. Thiis is con~sist{ent with,NEI i'2-06, section 7.3:i.1.1.a.

• F-urthermorei thle "+1",equipmen~t !and *:uport equipmenet will" gehraliy :be hodused in a" New York 'State (N:YS) BUilding C:'ode c*orie'rcial.str'uhcturfe, inhan".ai*evaluated Storage* locqationl" pe*r NEi !2',-06, Section 7.3..1*.:c. Distanee,separatioln i!s inot applicable in-thi s,situaticon, since. thiemeans uts~ed to minimize th~e prdbability tha~t a sinigl'eevent wouild damage.a~ll" FLEX( mitigation eq*uipment i"s t~he u-se of a robust

• s tructure to house the N sets. Any-stored rriitigation equ~ipment ex*posed to the wind will be ade~qbately ti~ed.dpwn to prevent it'fronibeinlg dam~aged or becoming airborne, Tin.accordan~cewith NEi 1i2-06,-Section 7.'3.1i.1.b...

Page 12.of'*121

.GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN r..

MITIGATION_.STRAT;EGIES (NRC ORDER_ EA-1:2,0.49)

• Other* plant structures and.equipmerl.t (e.g., fuel or water tanks) which are needed, to withstand tornados and tdrnado ini~sgiles will be' designed/evahiuated to oGinna's' Cuirrent l icensing basis.tornado: a 32-milesper hour (mph) wind speed (Updated Finial safety yAnalysis RepOrt (UFSAR)Sections. 2.3.2,2 &"3.3.4.1, Reference *25),"

iand miSsiles do0nsisting of an,e'ght Pound steel rod, 1.-inch diameter anrd 3-feet long,'

traveling at 60% of the.tornado Wind speed and a 1490 pound wooden utility pole, 13.5-inch.,diameter and 35-feet londg,. traveling at 40%.of~ the. tornado wind speed (UFSAR,Section. -3.3.3.1).? As demonstrated in aiStructural u pgrade :Program

• submittal to the NRC (Refer'ence 69) an~d a~pproved.in. thesafety Ev;aluation.Report on* the. Structu'ral,Upgrade

,Program',(Refere.nce-70), wind speeds lower than approximatelY 150 mph cannot proVide the necessa'ry aerodynamic lift requii'ed for a ut iiy..po!e to becorme an airborne missile (UFSAR SeCtion 3.3.5.4.1); therefore impact considerations for the utility pole are at grade level only.

The. above~tornado prote'ctiondesign'criteria are 'consistent With Ginna's current design

.basis, and

.therefore meets 'the.requiremehnts of NEI 12-06, Section 7.3.1'.1.

(commitment in,-Reference 6.5: Clarification to/April 7,,2014 Sup'plemendtali RespOnse to March, 12, 2012 2Commfission Ordler Modifying Licens.eS With,Regard to Requiremients for Mitigation Strategies ~for Beyohd-Design-BaSis: External Events (Order Number EA-12' 049)). Ginna has designed tornadoprotection based on these-ddsign criter'ia.

2.1.4 Snow, ice, and Extreme Cold:

The guidelines~provided in *NEI 12-06 (Section 8.2.1) generally include the need to consider extreme Snowfall at plant -sites Above the 3 5 th parallel.

Ginnha is located at latitude 43*1 6.7'NJ and longitude *77°18:7'W.. Ginna is located above the 3 5 th parallel (Reference 25, Section 2.1.1)'; thus, -the capability,to 'addiress hindrances caused by extrertie snowfall with snow removal equip~menqt is provided.

Per Section 8.2.1 of NEI 12-06, "It will be assumed that th~is same basic trend applies to extremely low temperatures." The lowest recorded temperature for the site region is -16°F (Reference 63).

Ginna is located within the region characterized by the Electric Power Research Institute (EP'RI).as ice severity level 5 (Reference 4, Figure 8-2).I Thus, Ginna screens in for assessing Snow, ice, and extreme cold.

2.1.5 High Temperatures:

Per NEI 12-06 Section 9.2, all sites will address high temperatures for impact on deployment of FLEX equipment. The maximum temperature observed for the site region has~been 100oF (Ref~erence 63). Extreme high' temperatures ar'e not expected to impaict the utilization of off-site resources or the ability of personnel to implement the required FLEX Strategies.

Thus, Ginna screens in for assessing High' Temperatures.

FLEX equipment can operate uhder extreme hot and cold temperatures,. Flex Pu~mps (3),

the' portable Alternate RCS Injection pump, the air cormpreSsors.(2), and the Flex.100 KW Diesel Generator are all equipped with engine block heaters and battery tenders.

Two FLEX Pump units, the portable Alternate RCS Injection. pump, an air cOmpressor, and the 100o KW DIG are stored in a commercial structu~re with the 3rd Flex Pump stored in a robust structure (SAFW Annex) that is protected'from floods, tornados, and Page 13 of 121

""GiNNA FINAL iNTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC oRDER EA-1 2-049) earthquakes. One compressor is stored in a robust s~tructure. The robust, Structures are temperature cont*o11ed as wvell.

For the *100 IKWN DIG the design temperature specifications for the co ntrol un'it indicate a rangeel'o minus 40F Fto.158F Fwith'an Engine Derate indicated for arhnbient temnperatures greater than 1220F. This temperature range bounds those experienced at Ginna.

For the Flex Pump engine there is no max amhbient tern~erature indicated in the specifications. Only if the operating i(coolant) temp~erature in dicates greater than 234°F is it.recommended th~at load be reduced on' theen~gine. For cold w'e~ther" conrcerns a b'lock Iheater is reco'mmended for temperatures down to (0°F, which is "Currently used.

2.2 Key Assumptions Key assumptions associated with implementation of FLEX Strategies for Ginna are described' below:'""

aThe event impedes site access as follows: (NEI 1.2-01,,Reference 5,).

o Post event time: 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> -

No site access. This duration reflects the 'time necessary to clear' roadway obstructions, use different travel routes, mobilize alternate transpdrtation capabilities (e~g., private resource providers or public

-sector support), etc.

o Post event time: 6 to 24 hourS - Limited site access. Individuals may access* the site by walking, personal, vehicle or via-'alternate' transportation capabilities (e.g.,

private resource providers or public sector support).

o Post event time: 24+ hours - Improved site.access. Site ~access is restored to a near-normal status and/or augmen~ed transPortation resources are available to deliver equipment, sui~plies and large numbers of personnel.

• The normal,emergency response capabilities are used as defibied in *th e faci~lity emergency, plan, as. augmented by. NE[ 12-01, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design' Basis Acciden ft Resp~nse $tatffing and Communications Capabilities.

Followin~g plant conditions exist for the baseline ELAP case:

o seismically designed Direct Current (DC) b~attery banks are available.

o se'ismical.ly deSign~ed Alternating,Current (AC) and DC distribution available.

o Entry into EXtended Loss of AC Power (ELAP) will occur by'the one hour point.

o Best estimate decay heat load analysis and decay heat is used to establish operator time,and action.

o All installed eme-rgency and Station Blackout (SBO) AC sourceS are not available.

o No additional failure of Structures, Systems, or" Components (sscs) is assumed.

Portable FLEx components were procured Commercially.

FLE*X equipment was purchased commercially that would be transportable and inherently rugged. Power prime Pumps (Flex Purmps) ar'e currently'in use at FRAC Sites and oil fields.worldwide and subject to ext~reme Conditions., The maximum temperature o0bserved for'the site region.has-been 100°F. From the John Deere Operators manual section,* "Operating in Warm.temperature Climates - John Deere ehgineS are designed to operate,using glycol base 'engine coolants."

'From the Cummins Operators Manual (100 KW D/G) -

if Operation in 'high temperature environments is anticipated, increase the frequency of coolant level checks. Neither

-Page 14'of 121

GiNNA FiNAL iNTEGRATIED PLAN "MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC oR-DER EA-12-049)

'of thlese sections plade.any limits on operation with..high temperatures.

.The air.

compSr~essors are designed to oper~ate.in ambient, temperat~ure, ranges, of. -20°F to 125,F.F D~iring hot weather op~eration, engin~e coolant.should be checked daily or before each shift.

Fro0m the John D~eere Qperat0ors manual -P*dohn' Deere engines are designed -to operate effectively in~cold weather"...From the Cummins Operators Manual.- use.of.

a coolant hea~ter will help pr~vide reliable Sttaitng under adve~rs]:. atherf cohditions.

All Ginna Flex designated dlieg'el engines,have "battery. conditioners", and ";block

.heaters".

The-"'N" designated ",Flex.Portable".Pump", is, station~ed in :an environmentally controlled buildling to allow for immediatie USe." Designatedl N+I equipment are :storned in :* 'structure.that protects the -equipm~ent from weather hazartds.

This.ensures reliable*starting of.equipment under extreme wea~ther" cond if ions.

It.is desirable for dliverse mitigation equipment to be commonly available such that parts and replacements Can be readily obtained. The functionality of the equipment mnay,be odutside'"the r-anufactu~rer's 'specifiCations~: if justifi~ed in a documented engineering 'evaluation.

• This plan defirnes" stra~tegies capable of mitigating a simulta~neous loss of all alterna~ting.current (ac) power and loss of normal access to.the Ultimate heat 'sink resulting fr-om a 'beyond-:design-basis event by providing adequate. capability,. to maintain or restore core cooling,, containment, and SFP*

0cling capabilities. Though SpecifiC.strategi~es are 'develgpe~d, due to the in~bli ity to, an*ticipa~te all possible scenarios," the !strategies are also 'diverse and, flexible to encompass a wide ranige.1of possible Conditions.. These pre-planned strategies deVelOped to.protect The public health and ga-ety,were."incolrpora~ted into. tlhe un~it emnergency operating procedures,!n accordance with~established.EOP change proc*esses, and *their impact to the design basis capabilities '6f the. unit evaluated under" 10 CFR 50.59..The plant Technical Specifications contain 'the limiting co0nditions for: normal unit operations to ensure that des~igri 'safety f6'atures are a*,ailable to irespond to' a design* basis accident andl direct thie r6q'uired actions to be taken when'the li'miting coniditlions ait not rfiet.. The result of the.beyond-d~esign-basis event may 'place the.plant in a cohdition,where` it'caninot comply iwith certain Tpechnical SPecifications :and/or with 'its SecuritY Planl, iand,,as such, may warrant invoCation 6f lb CFR' 50.54(x) and/or 10 CFR 73.55(p)

(Reference 67).

• Normal.

operating ranges for pressure, temperature, and water.level for the appropriate plant conditions were.assumed or conservative values were used, such as With,existing ana~lyses:. All pla~nt.equipment is assumed to be either-normally operatinig-or available from the standby.sta~te~as described in Ginrna's design and

~icen'sing basis.

• The following additional.boundarY conditions are applied for the reactor transient:

o Following the loss of ailac power, th~e reactor automatically tr:ips and all rods are

.inserted (a stuck rod is not assumed for analySeS).

o' Themnina steam system valves (such* as~ main steam isolation valves, turbine stops,, atm'ospheric dumps, etc.); necessary to maintain decaY heat removal

'fu~nctions operate as" designed. '(If functioniS are not robust-to the event, th'ey are assumed to fail.)

Page 15 of 121

r.e~s~eating is also ass um~ed.. (If. functidonsar.not F~ut*e:teee~*te.*e o,No.inRdependent 'failu)re,ei oethbe~rthan.those* ceausing'*,the ELAP!LU HS evept*, are

• Maximhum eni~rdi'nmehetal.room temperatu~res for-habita'bility or *equipmen~t aviailability ar bas~ed*-donhNUMARO i872Ob: (R~e'eneier'~47).

A 2.3,Extent to-which ;the guiJdanice is being ;foll0*ed' Ginna has several devia:tions :to the guidance in JLD-ISdG-2012-01 and NEI -2.-.06:

NI* i?-*06 in~itial-tcbndition'3.2.,1.3(2) states "All insta'lled's*ourbes 'of err'ergenecy on-site ac

power ahld.SBOAterrate :ac power s~gurce~s-are as~s umed 'to be :not *av*ible and not imminenditly -ecov'ei*able' nd in' Sgc*tion 2.1 that initia app: roacdhes to FLEX :str~at~eges wil DIG:, 'whic dhi's no<t conrneA ted to*,.aniid. is.not conan ecta.ble *t6 :the pbffsite or o-ns~itepme 8rgen:*cy

• (SIG),for Reactor Co lanit System :(RCS) cod..ing and he*at riem-oval:. Tt~ese. modifications were A m~aded cue.to t'he6 as.sumed :failure -,of thle" Tu~rbinb D~riven Aux.iliar:Y Eeedwater In Referenet;

!steNC'safcnide ed *th~e: d'ss.ign-f of th1MW FLEX DLG, toe.iall='

it i*;nne foi thrD!n syste*rp

'sid

tru

-ir' e*:ia:

i;:

cm:r'ed

'itingtha 'D/ is a

.in-acppabea,.}*lthnaiveto*the NI

esa found that, als noe~iB

• df tat::

th6Ginsa dhra'if an alter

.*"a '

gu~idapce. Thm re REA-1t0f.

nate Pht(se 2 strategy. foe'~dig thea SInls fd deTyhet Nr'emovaff Thisn strateGy utilizeops dedsttegl dien-portable FLEnstrate alimghnee to takte suctionafsom nsth newtor rsAF Dt Waother Stonrmagetank, wtemsth)caacifye tor maintai th eu"e ee in th SI-wit th S/G at, the tge p r of 26

-sg Page 16 of1t21i

MiTiGATION STRAT-EGiEs,(NR-:ORDE-R.EAi.12.049),

lExel!on pr~opb3sed th.e :f6llowing,allternative approaches"-to NEI 12-0'6 Re~visio:.0 (R~eferenc~e, 4) :ad p*rpvided ',thbe,b~aSs'isfor 'the a~lterri~tive~apprb~aclh in the Au'gust 201:5 Six-:Mo'nth"StatuLsRepo~rt" (RAef erence72):

Ex~elohn proposed an :alternate:a~pproach :to:NEi..12-06: for having an iauto start feature. for

.thb.'e "~w '1 MW FLEx.DiG in tlhe S#AFW :Annhex,,which au*to~maticaiiy ;en~ergizes its Proposed Alterniative::

In thi* alter¢nate* approach, Upon l.Qss of normal ~yard 12.47-Ky-power *to the SAFW Building: loadJs anrd ~i

'/.,,at~liarylo*iad.equipment (i::e.,t block, he~te rs, en*gine :battery,.

chargers, etc.) a'n au~tomatic. transfer,switch. (ATS) will-automatically fndtiate -a commrand to,,start.th,* 1 iMW-FLEX* D.I!G-and, once,stalt~e;, swap Pjthe1 s,0dce pow er frofm. th*e: normal*1 yard :p'6wr: tto th'le sAFW" s.witchger,power.ari :take o:n,"th*eA loads' Con~elcted to n.iiew panel! ACPRDiAFO*)4-.anid, through it iito a-new 120/208V Power Tr'ansfor'mer (iPXAF02),to sd*pply. new power panel Ac~pDA'FO5:,.:

Basis for the alternative a~pproach:,

The exis.ting: normal power to' the. SAFW :pum~p m~otors is 48 OVAC,a 3phase, 60 :Hz :pow eI

-frodm safety,-relatd Bu~s,.1.4,ianid:.Bus.16. With. impl ime:n~tation: of. modific~atioh, ECP 000d459," DDSAFW 'Project Electrical Design :and Instllia~tion (Refer.enc6 7:5),-upJon loss iof nori-nal' bus power, thb o*pe~ratoris are: "abe ito: manually transf~r th.e: pow*er So.ur*ce to the.

S.'AFWpumP motor.s :f~r.dm'their no:*rrti!

pow*er soqurce t tt~ihe 1.;MW*FLE*x..D.'IG v(:=ia lss 1lE mri:anu~al-tra~nsfer switches.43/P.SFO1:A a~nd 43iPSF01B. (F~igur:e -1) '. EG.P-12-:0004.59 suppi~e.s the 1 M I~*FL"EX DIG. Non-:Safety.Related,*Em~ergen*.cyisourge..of p"o.wer :Oto Tese switches. F' or use in em*er'gencies, the Oper"ia~tors will"st~art thelIG:*i

manuai" if.it ha5 r:-ot.

stare:d :prior to: ti s Ltime.due :to:the."lo~ss o!f nora yr, ?47K power.-. With th.e "ge~nerator., bus :voltage, achie*,ng; a, ominal 48QO'V within" 1,0 se.o~nd-s, the operatoir can

• th~en H:aniuaJiy s.tar.t te*SAFW pumpis :and ~::ther.:F:LEX loa*ds. :The nbewly, installed" DIG Tra.n'sf~er Swbitch'es. When normal yar'd pow.elr r*8cover*, the 'a~tomatid itr~ansfer,$witch-is inhibitedd from rans!ferring backtonormali yar!d power-un~tili operator.:action0 n:S{is 6i) take Us.e.o~f the: 1 MW FLE*x, DIG to p~ower th~e SAFW pu~mp~s a~s* "aFLEx. strai'tegy.was pireAiusly accbepted as

• san alternhat!iv~e approa&Ch to :NEI 12-.0.6 (MLt14007A704, ReferenSe 68). W h. ile.the DIG a&uto: start featurie: was: not :iddntified p:¢rior,to th&..isE, review, w,:the.au*to auto_ start,:fea~tu-re iis. used to -repoweri th~e.1M W.FL.E:-X DIG.auxiliary.loa~d.equipr.1 ent ',to

-maindtain g~nerator r:ea.diness fqr a..BDBEE, Providing£ power* to 'r:iitigation e*quip'm~ent fro:m :th6 1,MW F:*[RLEX. DiG muistbe iperforrm-ed ma:n:uallVa*s p*rev#i:ously des6ribed. ;::Exeloi0 r'equests NRc Staff review and appro.val :of thiS a.utO 6-start featurte-a&s an acceptable al te'rnativ vdt6.the-*NEI 12-06 guidance.

Ele~ctribal,isola~tions and. interactions *are addressed,aS.,follow.,.:

The. FLEX Generators the, bus. "Oth~er sources of podwer *t'o that bus will-be verified to be unavail'a~ble anid de-eergie2d.: :This iwill.pr:eclude: the pobss.ibi[ity tha.t 'the oth~eri potent'i~alpower. s~u~rces w il also, attemptI to,repower :thie same equip~ment.

Overcurrent: probtection :and electrical

.isolation is. evaluated,for the fixed FLEX generators..installed per electri~calidesign change pac*kage :ECP-1~l2-000.459.

Page 1.7 of 121

GINNA FINAL.INTEGRBATEDo PLAN..

1o..,

,.*,:....MITIG.ATIO.N STRATEG!ES. (NRC O0R*.DEIR )EA-2.04*Q9),,.

Procedure. ECA-O.o, Loss of All.AC Poweir *(Refierece..22).and Procedure FSG-4 (Reference '76) prOide-s necessary.actions to :prolong-essential.equ'ipment and Control power ln0 enougih to 'deploy alnd uise FLEX equipmient for plarnt"recovery.

See Figure 4: 480oVAC Single LineD...agram BDBEE FlOw" "Path".. "

Exelon pr'oposed lan alternate.approach ito.NEI 12-06 for protection.of FLEX equipmeht as stated "din Section 5.3. 1 r(seismic,) Sectioh 7.?3.1i {'se~f.Ye storms with high: winds),,and Sec"tion 8.3.1 l(impact of snow, iae and extremte cOld, ):.....

v..,...

Pr'oposed Alter-native:

Thisa~lternate ipah will be to. store "N" sets,of.upet i fully robust buildings

,and th'e +1l.set o'f eq uipment itn :a-commercial ;bu.ilding. :For 'all ha:'2ards. scPed. in for thqe site,; 'the FLEX,& equipment! wiii be* stored fR i: a 'cofiguriation such',ia that 5no oneexternal evient can rieasonhablY fail the site.FLEX capabilifYi(N.).,

Basis for the aiternative aPprJoach:

.To; ensure th~at no one.external, event-will re~as.0nably :fail,the site FLEX capability (N),

Ex'*lon il :enisure;that iN equOipm.ent,is. protect6d in* rObst ibuildin'0s. To: accom'plishl this, E.xeloni will devIoP :p~rocedure*s.to ad~dress t-he Unava~iability allo1wance as,stateda finNE

12-06.S~ection.1i- '18.5.. (see. Maintenance,andJ Test!ing section* below.for furthier details).,

Thbi*.,section.allows,for. a. 90-day period of u~navai!.abiiii*';.if a pie*ce.of. FLEX eqU ipme-nt stored in.the.,riobu.st.building vw'ere ',tobecom'e br-'f~nd. to b~e, unavailable, Exelon wVill im16[se* a. shorteOr a,.llowed -outa'*e :tim of fi45 'days.: [Forf poilable' equipme'fin~t* that: iS expected to :be :unavailable for more than.4.5 days, actions will be *initated within 2 hourLS of this determination to. reistore, the ;si~te FLEX: cap~ability (N), in the[ r'obust Stor'age.

Iociatlqn. a~nd implemenrtco~mpensatory neas'ui-es (e~g.,,move the,+1 pie'e of eqluipmenit into, the 'robust buididng') witi~in" 72 houf'rswhere *the* ;total uniav~aiabiit~y time :is n:ot to exceed" 45. days.. 'once th ieFE aaiiy()i etrdinit-he :robst :Stor~age location, iExpion !will e*nter the8 90-day a*llow.ed 6ut :of"servic"e.,ime for. the uh~a~ailiable pieceof equipmenitwith an, entry" dat~e-and ti~e*rh i fromthie, discovery date-and time.

-Maintenanee and T'esting

• The.unavailability of equiPm~nt and api~ip!cab*le connections that directly perforims a FLEX mitigationi strategy, for core,.containmrent, "and SFP should be managed such

-th*,t.risk to mitigating strategy capability is mrinimized od The unaevailability, iof iplant eq~ipme~nt.is cd'ntr'olled by-existing.plant :processes Ssuchl as th*e *Techn]ica Specifica*tions. "when latp}i,. equfipment' which *sup Jports FLEX s*trategies ibecomes *unavai~lable,.theni t~he FL.E:X strategy. affected,by 'this u~nava. abiiity does not-need to bemaintained during"'th'e unavailability.

o Th.fe relui[red FELEX equip~ment may be* unavai'lable for,90 days provided ithat the site FLEX :capab*ility"(N). is m-et. If the,_site.FLE~X(N) capability is met b~ut not

'protcteid. for all of the site'is appica

• ble haz~ards,;,th~rn th£ £liv*ed unavailability is

.reduced to-45 days. =:'.

o The.duration of.FLEX, equipment unav~ailability, discussed.above, does not constitute :a.loss Of reasonable protection from. a div'erse s£tora~ge liocation p5rotectionI strategy per~spective. "

o If. FLEX equipment or *connections become.unavailable such.that the site FLEX capability.(N) :is not maintained, initiate actions wit~hin 24. hours to0rdstore the site

'Page 18 of 121"

,.. :G~INNA"FINAL iN**TEGR*ATED PLAXN.,",

FL-EX capability (N), and impl emenit.*compensa'tory measure* (e*.g.,

,use of, afernat* sis tabl ebquipmeri~t or-sup-plerfiental pe6rsoi~rnel) withinf 72 hou~rs.,

6If FLEX ecjuipment or bonnect!ons to~ permanent,plant equiipment required :for

'"equipm~int or.s~i5piei-fiental personnel)-prior ito exceedance :of th~e 45/90,days..'

.F.orNEI,12-06 Section 5.3.1,, seismnichazard,,Exelon,wil also incoriporate th~ese aetions:

• Lar*g'eporal.be.,FLEx: ecl:ipmrhnt* sUch,as p:umps.and pouwer,sup~plies* Slo*Uldbe

.secured :as approprijate t0ofpr~t~ct them during a. seismjcey:,Vnft (i:.e. Safe Shu'tdown Earthquake,(SSE)leviel).,

Stored e'quipmnht.,and sfrubtures Will. be..evaluated.apd :prote~ted,,frpm seismic interactionis to :ensure that "unsecured,andc/o'r noni-seismic compon'ents do' not For NEi. 1'2-06 section 7.3.1,.Severe storms with high winds,' Exelon Will also incorporate.

For a 2-unit :site, (N+1) of on-silte FLEX eqcltipi'ment -are i'-equired.. The plant scree~ns in per *sectionis 5 through 9 fobr seismic, flooding, wihd",(both tornado arid hurricane),

snowv,-ice a~n~d extlreme cold, a~nd ;high tempfeja*.*tures...

.[

-o"Tomeet Section 7.3.1.1,.a, either of th~e-followinig are acceptable:..

All required sets (Nfi)'in a"striuctur'e(s)"thiat m~eets thie plant*'s design basis for" high wind hazadrds, or (N).sets, in a structure(s) that 'meets the, plant's design basis for high wind

' hazar'ds a~nd (+,1) set store*d in *a location notprotected for a.high win:d Fo E,*,6 et~n83t,!pcthazard.

n e<r'm odEegn.il as Finor EI120 6Sectioiain: 8.1 imac ofsoieadeteeclEeo ilas Sincrprate thi act~eqion:

6thude~ftf~.te:fa~{-htteeupetvjne to :funicti-on :in" a timhely manner. The e1qdipment" should bhe maintained :at a

• exampl{e, by storage in a heated enclosure or-by direct heating (eig.,-jack~et water, battery:, engine block heater, etc.).

Exelon will mneet all, pf the r~equirements in NEI 12,-06.Section 6.2.3.1 for external,flood ha.zard anid section 9.3.1 'for impa-ct of high temperaturps:,-.

.Exelon proposed an alternatiye approach to the N÷ 1 requirement applicable,to h#"oses Sanid c-ableis as stated in Section 3.2.2 of iNE!.1-2-06. NEl.-12-06,-Section :3.2.i2specifically

.states, that a.,site will! *have FL;EX 'eq uipment to meet the needs.of, each unit onha site p5lus one additfional spar~e. T.his is co6mnonly known as N+1 where N :is thle number of units iat a: given sifte., The relevant text: fro.m NEI 12-06* is as follow: "Iln order to~i assure ]re'liab*ility and availability, of :*the" FLEXequifpment requir~ed to. imee~t these Capabilities., the",site sh~ould :have. suffic'ient.eq;ipm~nrfo it:addres*i.all funcdtio'ns a#t 'all units; on-site, plfius oh'e

• add~itional i.spare, i~iei., an N+licap~ability, w*here "N" is the nuiber of [unit{s on-st.'*!&

tTh us,* a

two-unit Site 'iouri'd nominfaili have at ieaist-three' portaible pumps, three sefs'of poritabie

,ac/dc po~er supplies, thre~e sets o0f hos~es & cablses, etc.,"

Page 19 of 121

=....

.*G!INNArFINAL INTEG RATE

.P.LAN M ITI A TI N S R A T G.E.(N C.OD E R....2-49)

NEI. 12-06,. Section 11.3.3 states:- "FLEX mitigation :e.quipment should :be.stored inm a that'o~6neete~rnatievent..

can resnl fai

"~

sit FLX aabliy(N

'Typically6 thrie~i' hos gues utlze oimplmets~ FE Of*

s tr*Ddiategy# A.are ota snle cnt~inO:t~6.*sar hos t.4b are,

mp oseYde of d~itid*! l

o@ rablseon of a srall~t t 10%gt joinedtge t haiierg to 6foerc a sufdent lengh In A

tl cq~

aselat f cablesiirig,S 0 mutiplef :indiiuallente-rehos ae ued o~nii cpp.0.

t6t..scrcyiV suchhasin the casedoi3phaterpower NE 12-06. currentl r.#equiresaN+1 sets of hos!:es andicables.5 As, cab leraivte spareo~,*/

cb.t qu~n rity of h

vose an

.*ds; cheableadqte iitusare, meets either

-of the ftwo methods.described typ/ieof:]n!2:0 hose or:

cable*

nece:.ssary for, th*e "N aaiqityd. Fo A-iimm type/ize0 df. hse are

• .Edamp'je 1-1':* "An :e@intlti-ji requsia

~iring 5,00

• f~t.

,.of_5 in. diameter fire h*e coss1 0 tin of# 100.*.50 ft.:

secti.:ons wouldrequr 5:0:0ft. of 5bin,did

net spregird fiere hse (~ine. ten

-Mietpod 1-2:1 A rdi.pumprequ:cbires asngleo20 6ft sufc~tio hoent ofd 4zin.

diamt er,ele itse dschar':bigeist connected to a fl*rpged hardy pipg**.:eX cohnret~ion. O'-pr 4 in di "ee

• inExdample 1-3:SAn electr(f!.=ical strategy reqires 350al f:ht.cbl98i:::d*e runsof 40abe~q to supp0i:,h6r~t$ 4j 80 vol:t loads. thei hable0 g

t. rU~ns are made0: up, ofi.*ngi 50s ft. elti~on a:

oupled(f, 5 'i tOgr:either.

Eligr~~l:~hithcale rns 2 cblhes uNs pers ph.!seo anc able runs forthe. n*:eutrl) totaiiemngt*:0it~ii#!'

280f ofcbl" setos ar reied A minmu of 280 ft. spare cBas le wolereurdor 6

{hearelt50tft.

sections.:

• h Example 1-4,:

Andeecrical str~!52ategy2* reqiesf100 ft. of7 4/tcbe (4E cabls~,

100pft

' a ( h) to1i suppo15.*-rt one set *iofr 4 kv loa.ds, :s'and 50ft.ef40(

cabloesr, 50ft each)g Mito6 Meertodsa2:,

Provid

[e sar cablin andh ose o suf fici~~e~tenp[ty leng meth an sizia.ngdt replacethe¢ eqin~.dimenter wh~n:ose(00ft.er unait). t hose'toal*lenis thbstf5t in.r diameoterlhoen r:Eequire Page 20 of 12.1

/

~~acknfowled ges, the,NRC staff. has.not reviewed a nd i4s !not: endorsing :the s~ecific

, ~examp*les inciucid-din -the.NE! 'end0'rsnemitf reqUeSt' idated-May 1i, *2015." if "ne~cegssy,

, i"

~r~e'yi ng ~on the :additional;, o~nges!/,ength 'cable/hose a~s-implied by, Exa~mple, 1 *4 in,the

~ ~~;subject letter.

-,'°

.Ho*sesandl ca.bles,arde. passiv~e. devi ces unlikely to fail :provilded they.are appropriately, Senvironmenta[.conditions, '(e.g.,,cablesa st~ored in. a,dry '.condition arid-not subject ;to ch*emical oir petrdl1eum :products):. Th~e hfoses *ai3d caibles 'for rth'6 FLEX istrategie. will be Ssto.r'd' And :mairitaJned ii iac:

W~icf.

ibm

.manufadfur~&*r~s, reco mrien5datiohsiih clJ uding

.. n s*'!helf liife' requ~ireme nts.; In it{ial :inspeotitohns :dnd e'i*Jodie"iJns p~ect-io or *t eting iwill #e.

• incorporateid in the site' smaintenance ~anid,esting prograrW implemented: ni accordance

• with*SectiOn 1l1.5obf NE1 12-06..

~~Therefore, the-pr~obab~ility of a -failure occurri, dgduring.storage is minimali, :resy.lti hgjn the

~~only ik~y!:i~ fa~ilurgc~ur**jng d*ujin'g impl ementation.

Mecha~nical damage :Will ikely.6CCur address.es the lonhgest i'ndividualsectinl'ie~ngth of hos*" or cable...

Provi'ding -eith~er a spare cable o0r hose of a l"en~gth, of 190% of' the to.taI.ength nfecessary

,for th-e "N" 6acabjitVy o~r.a~lter~natively"proviian.g :sp~are da-blin'g, or:,h*ose.:. of ufficilentien~igth is, sufficient.to *ensuire, a,,strategy,can, be i*mp~lemented:. 'Meclhanical, damage, during irrile!mentati~n :can ibe COmpensated for,by having-eno~ugh !spare~s.,to. replace,any d*a*!gedi.setion*,with,mar~ih.i lt is :reasonable to expecot t'hat an entire set d'f hoses or "i:

~cables would not b:e damnaged provided they hav~e :been reasona~bly, prot~ct*ed."'

~~Ex~elon. proposed an.alterioate app~roach. to NEI "12-0o6 for ha~vin~g prim.ary and alternate

• injeCtioh points to :the:.SGs :for"the":p6,rtable FELEX SIG injedtion pump*, :as specified 'by' NE! 12-06, Sectibn, 3.2.2 an-d TableD-.D~:"",""*.

Th~is altiernate i~aproach will be to have. one,conn~ection, -point for th~e p~ort~bie-.FLEX S./G

.injection" pump. :The portable "FLEX S/G injectionhpump "is locatied in the-SAFW:,Budilding

,Aiih*ndx W.~

wil!, b~e staged outsi~de of thlisbuildinig if :usdd.: There is o.ne o:c.neoio-c p~*;.oint

• Buildin~g. :An :alternate, injection ',oirt,.L inot 'planned, idue to, th~e rrmultiple:.and diwerse DiG us~ing :the-previously ad.c~pted alternative approach.(ML1,4007A704,¢ Refer~ence-,68)

Ba:sis for t'he. alt61n6ti \\.alplpioachf.

Ginina hasrimultiple ahd diverse, m~ethods to deliverwv~ater to, the S/Gs from a SAFW pump.

powei~ed by ithe SAF -D/G.

nyoeo the tWo"SAFW p~um~p.S is needed for perform[i~ng t~he /heat, removal fun~ction.,

Either -SAFW pump, is. capable of :be~ing p oweed*

.by~thse.

• SAFW D/BG, andoan be~aligrned,to feed,both,S/Gs,throu1g h) th eir rdisch.arge,.h,#ad~es and one oqf :two no~rmfalyiso lsated: crio~sscon'nec~tions between ttheir didscharege he~aders& :(see Fig*ure,2.attach~ed:, FLEX, SAFILW System Pumps anid Conn'ections').

"Onie cr'oss

Page 21 of 1"21'

connectionh is Iocat~d in the SAFW Buildiing" *nd'the. other. cr6*Ss c~oiine!6tion:,is 'located in Table D~1.,! Exi:elon.=rebe*sts NRC( Staff <review and-, approval of. thSis aterna~tiVe ap~proach 2.4: :Sequenc o*e.f Eynts Ginna* has dev~eloped.-det[ailedl 'timelines~ for :each-extern:al :eydnt during.all. modes of:

peain (Refe~rence 79).:.The detailed::ttm~elines,"d.*S~ib6eithe ope[ratoQr-action tirrie 1oa6Qshow*

)(ing~th:

niumber of re!:;;.sour;des used for e..ach ta*,k., iThese ftimele(nes are-.u~s.d in* cpn&*ju~cro

{~o:ith therma*l *hydraulic'an[al6*ysi:s to6 documen&:t.the,duiratiri:On f e.ach p:i*hase

'for:reac1h itidal fUrnction, anid *the basiS for thqe durtiotion. :

Gin*na is,relyin"g o.n.CLB ianalysis pd*

• q::w*:he~rnec:*e*$ary, p::erfoermin~g ad~dlitio.n~alther~m..l Ginn'ra intehds to uitiliz&*a sOeniario ba6d t~ransition to FL=*E;X ra~ther than a dura~tion.:based transition.

• As. ah 6:eample, 'the transition :.to F.ELE:X :Aux~hary, Feedwater.'will occu r WCGAP-70

P :Reactor Coolan.! System.Response ito thie :xt~ende 'Loss of *AC Power Ev~i fr~etinhoseComustoiEngn~eir~ an Bl~cck Wico NS~S esins (Rfrne9 asrve

.nwi~gi~c tii6 oasstihdvlpi eptfe" e*ho hi pattyewillnb abl toni*i co*p..e* withkan~

ELAP. Analys:*&~iscases-t were*a devloed toLA, :rout resuts~

Sdthat*wouldbusfltZ to.ivtrd other0*0, industryof "iriitiative ande

rguaonthtafec eriergSec pr

diep~ ar~ns inc01d ing N:of 12-0..B*:.6&l:

(Rfrnc*tle 4)ehandO

, Page 22,of *1 2'1

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

The recommendation to develop inventory coping times beyond the reference case by installing low leakage RCP seals was evaluated by Ginna, but will not be implemented due to the 10 CFR Part 21 issue that was identified by Westinghouse for their low leakage seals. As documented in WCAP-17601 Section 5.3.1.6, Ginna has the added benefit of coping time with its Model 93 RCPs (Reference 80) due to the leak donor locations being significantly elevated with respect to the Model 93A RCPs.

Regarding the WCAP-17601 high level list of instrumentation for the RCS, in order to confirm / maintain adequate core cooling, Ginna is crediting instrumentation that has been previously evaluated as acceptable for coping with seismic, flooding, tornados, and loss of AC power events and are part of Ginna's current licensing basis. These instruments are described in the Integrate Plan and meet the NEI 12-06 guidance for PWR instrumentation in Section 3.2.1.10. These instruments support the key actions identified in plant procedures and/or guidance. This approach was accepted in the R.

E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant -

Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049 (Reference 68), Section 3.2.1.5, Monitoring Instrumentation and Controls.

FSG-7, Loss of Vital Instrumentation or Control Power (Reference 81), provides Operators the ability to obtain system parameters should the power to the instruments be lost or wiring damage that precludes the instrument from being read in the Control Room. The Operator will be able to obtain a reading in the Control Room (wiring intact) or at the Containment Penetration (field wiring not intact).

The recommendation for maintaining a subcritical condition in the reactor core is applicable to Ginna.

FLEX specific cycle generated curves will not be used for maintaining subcritical conditions. To supplement the existing cycle specific curves, bounding actions to maintain subcritical conditions are implemented in procedures.

CALC-201 4-0002, Cycle 38 Reactor Engineering Calculations (Reference 20), adds a new Section 8.23 and Attachment 11 for FLEX Boration Strategies. Depending on the scenario evaluated, a 40% or 15% uncertainty was applied to bound the calculation for elevated boron concentrations that may be applicable to future core designs. Since makeup to the RCS is required to maintain adequate inventory for natural circulation cooling, expectations are that the borated makeup strategy will provide adequate shutdown margin (Keff less than 0.99) for the realistic conditions and assumptions cited in WCAP-1 7601.

The recommendation to supply 40 gpm of RCS makeup at 1500 psia is applicable to Ginna. A modification installed Alternate RCS Injection makeup capability of 75 gpm at 1500 psig. Makeup will be initiated prior to the transition from two-phase natural circulation to reflux boiling and with sufficient time to maintain shutdown margin with an hour margin for natural circulation conditions.

As stated under recommendation 2 above, the recommendation to install low leakage seals was evaluated by Ginna but will not be implemented due to the 10 CFR Part 21 issue that was identified for the Westinghouse low leakage seal design.

The recommendation to consider the prioritization of pre-staging a FLEX strategy for alternate feedwater additions, when time and resources permit, is applicable to Ginna. The primary FLEX strategy for alternate feedwater additions relies upon a SAFW pump powered by the SAFW D/G, which is an approved alternative in the R.

E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant -

Interim Staff Evaluation Relating to Overall Integrated Plan in Response to Order EA-12-049 (Reference 68). In addition, the alternate strategy for feedwater addition relies upon one portable diesel driven FLEX pump and associated hoses stored in the new SAFW Annex (robust structure)

Page 23 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) capable of feeding the steam generators.

Deployment involves hooking up the suction and discharge hoses to the new condensate storage tank and AFW lines respectively, which are in close proximity to the portable diesel driven pump, and then perform the valve alignment, start the pump, and begin feeding. To prevent S/G overfill when the TDAFW pump is available, ECA-0.0 (Reference 22) directs the operators to monitor intact SIG levels and when narrow range level is GREATER THAN 7% [25% adverse CNMT] and to control AFW by throttling TDAFW flow control valves, or by throttling TDAFW pump discharge MOV-3996, or by locally throttling TDAFW flow control valves, or by starting and stopping the TDAFW pump.

• The recommendation to have a low pressure portable feedwater system capable of feeding the steam generators is applicable to Ginna.

Ginna's flow and pressure requirements differ from the generic numbers provided in the recommendation, but it is noted that the recommended requirements may vary from one plant to another.

The flow and pressure applicable to Ginna, which is stated in the Overall Integrated Plan, is 215 gpm and 290 psig.

The pressure value is based on the ECA-0.0 Appendix A (Reference 22) direction to cooldown the RCS when establishing low pressure S/G feed by reducing steam generator pressure to 290 psig; and the flow value is based on the design flow for a SAFW pump, which meets decay heat removal requirements. As stated under recommendation 1 above, symmetric ROS cooldown will be performed utilizing both steam generators for RCP seal package temperature considerations.

• The recommendation to evaluate the strategy for accumulator makeup capability and isolation / venting to prevent gas injection is applicable to Ginna. EOA-0.0 Appendix A (Reference 22) directs operators to Depressurize Intact S/Gs to 290 psig when establishing low pressure S/G feed and then Perform FSG-1 0, Passive RCS Injection Isolation (Reference 82), to isolate or vent the SI Accumulators, thereby preventing N2 injection to the ROS.

Boration requirements have been determined and are discussed under recommendation 4 above and are implemented in procedures EOA-0.0 (Reference 22) and FSG-1, Long Term RCS Inventory Control, (Reference 83).

• The recommendation to consider the prioritization of staging portable equipment that may be required to isolate/vent the accumulators when certain cooldown maneuvers are necessitated is applicable to Ginna.

Following an ELAP event, there is a procedural requirement to cooldown/depressurize the ROS to reduce ROP seal leakage and to inject borated water from the SI Accumulators.

SI Accumulator injection replaces fluid lost from the RCP seals and increases shutdown margin. It is also important to ensure that nitrogen in the SI accumulators does not enter the RCS because that could impede natural circulation. The plan to avoid injecting nitrogen into the RCS is to isolate or vent the SI Accumulators as follows:

o FSG-10 (Reference

82) provides actions to isolate or vent the SI accumulators to prevent nitrogen injection. For ELAP events where electrical power is available from either the SAFW D/G or portable 100 KW D/G, and both MOO 'C' and MOO 'D' are accessible, power is restored to MOO '0' and MOO 'D' by opening all input and output breakers and powering the MOO's via a battery charger breaker. Once MOO '0' and MOO 'D" are energized, the SI Accumulator isolation valve breakers for MOV-841 and MOV-865 are closed and MOV-841 and MOV-865 are closed from the Control Room.

o If both MOO '0' and MOO 'D' cannot be repowered due to the ELAP event, or if the SI Accumulator isolation valves cannot be closed, then Instrument Air is established to Containment to vent the SI Accumulators.

In this case a Page 24 of 121

,,,.o,

GIN~NA FINAL INTE:GRATED PRLAN potal:

iee sagd A

......92 'In,.rumdht Air.

9#Co;tniihg'tiient Iolaimon Valvei:,

1. is 6r;eritoi lvd,o

• N*'d h

ir::*4:

hos is connected":'t the 2.6 RCP-S.e.al,,Le~akoff*Line Integrity; L~erakof ied ifoant.*egei~ty.'has been evaluaedn by redesign enginering unearthPEXe~pes se.4~

to 'lG-1i~n AR" 246f3BQQ-7.i

.eadTe hQ De. sipgn-:!i ~p~ratuse and pressure ofig ths~tse~e sle.k 6ff 3813u7seie.6s, is 500 a

ndc!

l 2485*; psoig*e.- the. l8in :e'segmns werte originally they~

fors~

eas wo~rans~..t

case transieto 5'atZ50F an~p[d. 24o8., e"psigunder !f[n

all ythee.SDTAR-80-05~*:¢r18,:

119,e ASexpecte

-197 to analyz.,t e pr~es sure, dtem dwrightr aid t' hermal.auestressesin the pipng eqati'ont1 i (7-cnotrqie t

ecnideredasmbet Equation 11 26 B31,.1

• '"ue th piin fo prsr and dedeih stess "h

pressue.a1w usted byallthreanalyses fonidr~e Equation1 we.any 4,85 ~r,- g.

u the alo.3 wab

.Se st6re81!Js thati-

• sls'hnthe stress output values wer'cAmpared5to was h =

136,6b pi (al6wabtee str8essl t6f '37t TP31 s$6*

steel6

@s#b-s65-00F.

The :lncw~ase stresse

":'6'"t'hat: were** appl:ied to dreiscussed hereinte. Eqato 11 rmaisstisied Page 25.0of 1'2.1

SGINNA FINAL INTEG RATED ;PLAN.',.,

!:~MITGATIO'N STRATEGIES (NRC :ORDER E:A.-12-0.4:9 NEI 12-06: is the: implemeit~ation* guide.for.Flex :strategies.

Since this, scenario is a, B~eyond :Design.Basis.Event, iNE! 12-06 mfay be.invoked. iThe guidance in NiEI 12-06,;"

Secf;io 7.13 :1 :indicates :that: code stre~ss imii*tS"maybe 6exed ed a-s dng'!a~s,th*e ifunctio0n that :is* be6.ode the* code a.iowable"lim~its.::. However bi:

ased on* thei's :rtfiinimai JinceaOse,thd*

-stlresse.s w'l n'ot reach the :yield ppint irsipe the code :limi~ts maintain :*tr~esses well.below thie 'yield.: Point..The pipinOg anda supports wiill not*,fail an:d w*ill mnaint.ain t{heir" function duiring:the event. ':

In additiop, :the SDTAR. analys~esand asso~ciated P-ipe Support ana*lyses were reviewed for m!nargi~n.

Despite the..inc~'ease in temP erature,.code: ailowable stress limits are expected to be met-for the~i Pipi-g and SUppor"ts du'ring thie :described B3DB Event.

The pipi~ng downstream of the.breakdown or~ifices" is-not, qualified,to withstahd RCS pre6ss:ures and.t~emperatures. if the pipe~w~ere 'to ruptuer bey.ond ithe orifices,. then RCS leaka~ge would stllJ :be. maifitained.since.the break~downh orifices,wouldiremain intact.

since.all piping and compon'ents upstr'ea~m of the *breakdo~wn *flow mete~r*,is high preS*ure/temperature rated, no op~erator iaction is creditedl for isolatin~g ainy low pressur'e pipling portions.

No modifications to the.Seal Leakoff (L) piping are,nece~sasiy as structural 'integritY will be(* ma:intaiiidd:

/"

The comp~onents downstream of the.flow meters past the.piping class break as identified on :th~e pip~ing" i*oetricS may;.be sus~ceptible" to Over pressurization.

S~in~ce these coripdi~ents, ar:e downstream o:f "the :flow :restricting,flow meters, wh*ich proVide *choked flow.T*he-seal leak rate would not wor'sen."-..

2.7: RCP SealI0-Ring.integrity Th~e iNRC Flex Audit in April. 201 r'.iequested that Ginnia.make available :for audit a.list of o:f th{ie impact of high 'temiper.atur~eson" thbse 0-rings. :The con~cern ;is that the 7*228-B high.t~emperature 0-.rings are only qualifie~d *to 550°F. These 0-rings may be exposed to 556;30F.RCS wvater during :BOB EL:AP iscenario~s.:

Westinghou~se iha~s qua!ifi:ed,the cdurlrent ;generatio:n 0-'ring :(7228-C) to 582.0F (The?-materii*l specifiication is thIe sam-ne f~or the' :7228-B and 7228-C comp~ound 0-rings. -High

,temperatur~e perfoprmance (e.g.,

extr~usion r~esistance) is expected to be.;the same for both 0.-rings.).

The.'A" RCP conita~is all *7228-C 0o-r'ings:. :The-NRC. i*: requetirihg -an -.evaluatidn of the imp act of.high tempeI~atuirels :on7228-"B &ompoI~nd 0-rings and..the plah to replace the~se 0-rin~gs b~y the&

Flex Compliance daate (Novemb3er, 2015).."""'.

The follow;ing list shows the Io~catio'ns of the "B" comhpound 0-ri~ng (7228-B);

-' ROP A - All 0-rings are 7228-C compound RCP B

- Six 7228-B compound 0-riingjs are currently installed in the B-RCP seal packagearnd are s che*duleod :to"be :replaced in 4/201'7.

Page 26 of 121

"ir5id72for8the hcom inpu ct.bi'oiig ofn -thpe B#1,P seal* ring af ;:rner Th(Westbinghpovidse-jitc.the~nb te f~hde6 'Of "the 722're B co'.n mpouind 0-raing ina~

othe B.Randritalss rlated.humgn.

'dluringo the 42's~ea

m angs enauldereNut, 6:nre Theaae';c

• to

'tbed~e

'of ROP 0-rngs (er-2 asshewn'in, 7228-60-riogs.All luture RPseaslen2 (efrtencne will on' use728-Th~epp rouindn' or.t~pmo und 8BO-.*cr~p*ngd...O ins

,sig¶ u~.- PN.481*.17, The po2'8d compouinds: 0i.!l-ring'st

inithe #1i a'i6se*al ing:te-; 1 and runne (Wetinhouse Pil:eIN 4389B.7* 02X21 arBe lsocate'dibetwen th q':}~c~ttin:.eramic facer lthes ear'thy e~rrtish~ofdHgh st~oaP,,-s'stee sea*bil~fi hots t'ho'at in.4

,athe0 ar 0

sta"rtioni.aryf0t~r-gstafetn*xt, cruteseaonif'ir thre bottom sideiof the

!a~~precsis.rion m-)

'achin*Jed at rm

,)*:tic:s~

facpl:*at

!i~e anda it'ed housing FThilr oqaifi"thes

-iongsf wot'l uld2;B respultlin WraSedo leag eto*

the nl~et ofate nymbn erla 2h sel. 'Theis

• lifeakitagwold bie_:*

6ont*-ained(an imited) b th numberi 2gs~a ridthe filowea re. tricthinglvntur in the seal ;eiurnTline Thre :claasi beteenthe eraiicJ :*ceph;a eesn"d*"e the;respwrdig stil*sstetel se)dal suppor'St husn i5 iuapped ximtlye~ b.o02in'idht assow n 'b~

-1o WC P-1a941e 2isif~

2 f..ne 7)

Th eann fou 728B oi.bn 0-ig (Wsinhus I

439 77,.

MlITIGAT*ION S*TRATErFGIES !(NiiRC,ORDER' EA-12-o49-)'

• excess.of 18 :.:hours ~at "550F) a.nd terriperatu~re :'above the' cltalifiOationi limiti

12.

From -,PWRO:G-! 401 5-P,:, Ta~blei "6,*. C~at6lor :1.plants i(inclueuas~ Gin~na), hayvea cold leg."pf*ess~re of, :250 psia=d~uiing :ELAP, co~n*{ditions.T~he

-axjmum unROS"coldl

'le, g:temperadture durfing E"LiAP :conditiionsbased ont'h 'l*-owO~tISG Re~li*f.vaive

• enlthaipy, at, f:hi& conditioh' :(2580 psia556230F).. is..,i55.Btu/lbm'.:,Assumin;g isenthalpic expan~sion :'of,the* fluid thro~ig hthe #'*ijiseal!;",h t'folio6ing co njaitions w*ill exist at* t{h":'te ou

{,t'l*et.f th #1.s~eai (ihn'et toid #2" seal):. P = 951l p*lsia, H 555-

'S8Btu/lbm, and 'downstr'eam,lobations would be -le~ssithat..*the ':500 F: :qiu-aification test Maiximium, Pos~sible.*ime..at Eleva~ted,T~merfleia, tres.--.,

The mxirnm*

R'dlCS" cod le~g temierai-fdre dulrini~g,ELAP.Conditions based on :the lowest SG:Relie*f valve se~pinOrit (satu~rated con~dit{ion's at, 108'5 p:sig) is :5*6.3° F. During a.n :ELAP eve nt, the.BRCS.dVer.*ge.. temnperature lis as~sum*ed.to be. the no.-!oad te mperatur]:e o0f 547iF.

Th'is isahivd ylca p'r iocion "I(EO-.:GL0 :Ste'b 3 "RNO, p'ler: *'Phe 2 -staffing study) co mplietin~g a*t Td3o. minutes.- :The Tcold ati thes ednc~t;i~ons weill be approximatel6y 5300,F' 'It isi~m'portant.to note t'hatj thiMode! 93§ 'RCP iniclUdes a/ 5*4.5. galAIon ;v~l"ume ef 120,0F cdldwater:i that willls o irxiaIe~

7mntsbfreRSwtr~

5.o reaches.the #1 seal. This time a~ssume's the historical 'value"0of :2 gpm seal leak<-.off f'rom thieB!-ROP.1:.

Based on !thi S sequ~ence, the maxiu runtime th-e #1"seal oriings may, be rexposed* to ROS

• .water above 550° F. is*est imated: to-b~e 1i0m ri~utes- (3 mipnutes from -deplJetion o0fPV *untii the Start. of.-pera~tor action, to eStablish 547w :plus 7 Thiutes.to estabhish, 5472.E) This se~al housing,.pump shaft and-bearing'* w il likl~ey. prvenlt-the temip~erature"'from exceeding ConlclusiOn Base~d.0on the bo:Junding cond-itio0n expected during.ELA*Pevents,.,the~re is.rea~son~able

.assurance th.*at 0-ring e"xtrufsion ;fa~iure.will :nQt 0cc'ur_ Th~refor'e, Ginna :consider*s.it

-acce*ptable to*6 oplerate.with' 7228-.B :0- rings ~inist~Iiled.in the $"B, RCP" u~nt*'.i thenext sCheduled maintenance.,iidow in April of 201!7-.as supprtte~d by the f~ilowinfg facts;.

• • :;Giri'na will tai~ke 'prOmpti actiOn' i(#EA-0.0 St{ep :3) 'tci establish.RCS Tavg :at-54-7'F

• lh

.T

1. 1 ei~:seal 0-Qrings may be exposed-to.the elevate~d temperatutresfOr nio more than 10lo m inutes....

v.

The em~Tp~era~ture" at the #2 seal 0-rings will not exceed 5500F..;

The riiaximu mmpo'ssible temfperature (556.30F) Is only 6.30F ab'ove

-qOaliifcation test co-nditio~ns, Thl-e extru&sion gap a~nd postulated differ'ential pressures a~re le~ssthan or equal to tes't conditions""

• " Testing has shown tha~t the 0-rings will last in excess of 18 ho.Ur'sat 5500 F Page 28 of 121

,.*:.!:::G*!N.NA FINA*L I:!ITE.GRATED PLAN":.,,'

.:.*;L.

M:ITIGATiQN STRATEGI:ES (NR'*Q.R~D*ER EA-i2-049):,:

At: thi s time. the: !PWRQ.G cobntir~ues.;to, resolve.issues ovder :the. amounit o:!f, ROP Seal leakag *.e.that, woul[d be,expectedi duri!ng,.a.n.extende~d lQss:,of acia*O ower, (EI IAP) for reactors.*:!:,,*

<, -*,i::*';

.*o,

p~ er:iELAp.).fr*,.,C~*

• .,

  *. £, [..**ft

• ,:2*

frn -We !stirnghdtse WCA.P-1!:76.01-P, R

• eactor "oelatSjYtemrn Be~sonse to,the. ;:Etended.

the*: P.WiRG ha sudrprPRG eiin2(April..2015) No.); 1,Seal, powie r,Compa~re,to, thfe' ge~neric i;nform'ati6h"iprovided in itNSAL*.14-1. :Ginn~a,:station: iS con.ideteg'dy-a "Catgory"lant.i

.o ar.

wi :t~hin.e WRG-1 401:,:. 5-Pa

• ret~'.The-:e.l categ.froy tinii AB;ttherseal leak-off lie:piping confah:us~tio ethat a nalyze*O:d withih ih:en d

oc5urr~t entv to summriz-ahe

[exp:ected leak rat~ehgor thereor cnfiguratione. CafgoIzamtii*dr'b thedifferen plantsis dimu m nied.esut within *WROG-14008I

(:*1Re!fr*nc&:e gor ZJi~ntify tht'2tgpm.is vebtur'!:in~aiweresproic~d toetin:

SA-in.gds topass*istin classificiAtion-iof the seal leakioff line ino at~or 1

Gna asic reiee th, aeoiainan ntle ln

,...... MITIGATION rSRATEGIES- (RC..ORDER-i EA-.i2-0O49)

.D.uri~n.g.Plant events.that result i~n loss-:of r*.ea.ctdvcplr"oitp i:i..ump mE(flOP.:) :se*l cobbing; su~ch a:s-st..at~ion~ b!ckoujt;, :xend ed l[oss. ofAC,*6o~vr, or. firgs"'that aiffect.pW6 P**i:suipplies,".the Ieak~ge :th~rough t4.he~i R.CF: No. 1:: s..eal i'.crdess...S:

Dur*b.ini~.t~he :afor:*emention*:ed 6

even t w..ater/oolxin~g't0 the -pum~ps!, it woul[d be. possS.ible 'fori "OS :water to e'n~t~r :t~he RCP.No.,. 1 boundary, o~fthe pipir~g is notd c'omprdom1ised.

For b*eyon'd-deign ba#sis events, where6 RaP,,seal.water is lo0st,,the. system is designed to wiWthst:and- :RC* col:d.leg p~re~ssiuirean d tempeiPerature w"h~i* :aintiai:5n.i.

l*CS' -!eak.:e b~elow, the *:-haiyzed l!imits:.

The isyte'm m*u~st wit~hstand :the~se :.t~i'pe~ratuir*s i"a.*

.break<down *orifi~es (FE-i 75.anid,FE-1!76)"have the mest limrfiting *Jia~mete~r for th* system and cobn trol sys~tem flow. The seal. leak-off, pipin~g dow:n.str~eam of ;the Seals,.to thie.last b~reaki :down* ot~fices, hl~as been review~d :to 'ensure that: -itS desig 't.meets the requ ired Ginnau's'high pr~essur~eseal leak-off lines.w.ere originally analyz~ed t*o a transient :V~alue of.

seal :leakoff :(S1O) lines "iden*tify,the' design conhditidns as 65O0.F.and 2 485-pSig).

PWRoGz~14015-

• P.anfaly'zes thle: leak rat~s fodr :a.tempe*rature :abov*e.5,52.50F but: belo0w 2485 psig. : PWRoG-14015 8l-P Ta*ble 18: provides :.the r.teco0*mmended pressure and£ tbre,.5eeratu'reto ver-ify s*eal leak.off. line-.piping intiegrity:. Due o9 :Ginn'as :existinig desigh~

cori*ditibn of 2485 psig, for: the SLO piping, IGinina shows significaht margin.:to th~e exp8ecteid :2045 psia.vitlhin Table1t8.. :Gi:nna-sftructur'alengine'ering' has: review!ed the stress an~alysis for.the. seal! leak off: pip~ing: and:. supporis, th*is' :review ha.s ~oncluded :th'e

-pipling-and. suppo~rts tare adequ~ate for-the. estimnated.maximuim.temp.ieratUr*es.and

p'ies'res for the Ginna SLO :piping..'

T~h'e sea~l leak-off piipi~n.g for :the "A", RCP,.fr0om ithe"RlOP sea*l to *v alve 385A :(downstream bf.FiT-175) was *qiualifiei "as p*art of Gilbert :line segm~fents-CyC-225 and 9GVO.-25O."Th~e seal. lea~k-off 'piping,for.the "B'B -RCP., ffrom.th~e RC:P seal to.valve 385B--(downs~tream.o~f FI.T-176) wa*. q'u*!.ified as pa!.t of :Gilbe#r~t l~ine..sgme~nt CVC-200,; fluid li~n. CV-2. O; vc-200p, OVC-225,; and CiVC,-250arie respectively !quali!fi~ed t£ withstfand, th-ermal stres.ses by th tifolloewing Gilbert i:Ana#lysesi:..SD:TASR-8,0 1 9, *DTAR-,80-.05--,1*8 arid. SDQTAR 0o5-035. All s*ubsequJent. ch~anges a~nd revisijons tO these" ana.Iyses.have mnain'tained :the

samhe design temperature a~nd pr~es'sure..

Th.e.set,pressure. for the common seal leak 'off header.piping.relief *valve (Ginna E IN valve :314). is '152 Psig ( 148-:1156 ipsig' allowablIe.banifd). The rjelijef h~as -t~ J b)ri~f~icewhich

,correspond~s. -to 1i.287 s4quar e,inch~es.i iFoer detai led 'i'i'w :of th~e co0mmon heater pip5ing see the-isometric drawlin*gs in the 0-;381-:357 series:.

i*:

Ginna, has reviewed the most ;recenrtim~aintenance wor~k orders,for.the flop seals and ha~;*,ident~ified "thatth:i:e *part n*umbrsfoi:i r the #1* :Runn6e'r and i.

R:i~i~ng correi,6spod dito *the silicorn nitr:ide-rmaterial. Part nhumbers 4D00542G03. and. 4D0054.1G03 are' sho"wn on Wpstih~ghoulse. Drawinlg-4D005.44 rev, 4 unrder 'notes-B an~d Cb as haveing siliobn 'nitr-ide fadeplaites.

Page 30o 0121

,: ". MITIGATION STRATE*GIES (NRCOi!RDE~R IA-1 2-049.)..

To,addres*s concernswith,the ability bgf, h~e *ROP 0-rings.to with~stand hih.l

,tempera~tu~res,

• dur~ing* an ELAP ievent, -oper~ations pl~er:sonniel-will.take action "per procedure "ECA-0.0,

=

• ARVs.to. c*8ntrblTavg a 5!.-S4-7 0F (-5300

,Tcold)." Th:e Ph*a*se-2 Stafinjg siud5*y determin*edi tha~t"h"n-ope~r~tor:ca.n::be. dspadt~ched tQ loc:iyopiY!)6rate" ARV-s ~and contrtol Tavg fo 5470 E" w*ithin: 30" r*iiute o:'fl event" Initiation. i W.ith1 this o:pe'rator.action performed :in:r,the". erly

-stages

<of.th~e ELAP e.vent"th~e period of time8 in which" the %ri n'gs within the"ROP5 seals wo~uld be'ablove 8550F is riimi~med..

At agproximateiy. 2 ho~urs Arorn.evet inlitilation, a.longer-te~rm*,co01dwnt is.initiated p1er ECA-0,0"to.redudQi RO.S cold l]eg :terper-atuie to aiipproximately 4380F1 via mhanuOal/local op~erlation o1f,the JAR~s..

Th~is c~ooldownr is exp~ected-to ach:ieve' an" R-S; cold leg temperature ' of less*§ t{han,4500 i 6*;*:{ur hii rs; 'ifro m e:.vent ;inif'atio~. A second: ;RO-s coldlown :will be. initiated to "achieve an -ROstemperatur-e and p~ressure of lessthan 35-00F and 4600psig within r2:4 hours of eventinitiation.

-Marginis :to the P*W RO* arialysis tihat :o~uld comnpenis.a~te :in the. event thatRC

, fP,"seal leakage is greater th~ah" the PWROG* ani:alysis ar~e ahiev~ed.by COmparing :the:G'inn~fa plqt specific* valuJes/anialyses tio th*.PWROG-B*

RCPseal :1eak rates: for a-Categoriy 1 lplant, inclu0ding the refflux cooling analysis method6logy and WOAP 1i7601-P cdping times:"

1l. For. conservatism. RWA-1 323-003, using pl!ant-specific :para~meters:, as sumed a Sp~ec idenitified lea.kage*

+* 1,i gprnm worst ca*se. tech* spec"unidlentified leakag'e). :For

• the"FPWROG-f14027-P Ca#tegor~y 1.plan~t, RCPs*e~al leak*age a~t 22'50 'psia is 1t6.

Sgpm, 'at 2000o psia..it is" 17.2:gpim-, !at. 1=850(ipsig i."tis. 17:.3 gpm a~t 150Q0 p*ia it is 1-7,.5 *p:m,:.at: 1250:.psia.itiiis 15;.7' gpm, at:,850.p;s~ia" i~t*:s :i'2.0".gpn,; *at.:00 ps:ia :it is

• 9.3 :gpm, and :at.35 Ps~ia, it.is.6.7,,g*pm.,lRW.A-1i323-o03 trea&ts the iseals as an*

orifice -for ie&kage' r:edudtdibn as' RC*S :pre*ssure drops., Due *.to' the c-8bns8rvatig'e ROp sdeal l.:eakage :assugmptiodsi, iGinnla's a,&ssum"ed,RCqP s'eal ileakage: is

..conservatively. *}reater. than the. PWO-w~G140*7,:-P provi~de)d d:ata points.: A~t 1500

. is 9a*lculat*e as-" 1.9.5 gp'm, at ;600 :psial!eakag6.is calculiated as *,1'2.!5 gpm, and at 385. psi:aleakage is calc'ulated as.-;**'#i 9 gp

.m'.:

2. 'RWA-.1323-003,deterrmiined, that *two-ph~se. loop flow :will be less.than,single-

• pha.s~e loop" flow at approximately.'15.5 hbour'S from th~ee start the event in pla~c:e o!f thegen:6rici t~ime t'o entie:*r reflux cooljing 6f t24.*2 hours :('PWROG -1 40)27-Pi5). To-

comply~ w*ith.NRC endrfsdement 'of the boron m*ixing g}eneric-con~eirn,; ECA-0.0 directs charging at :8.hpurs_ into the* event pert FSG-1,- Long, Termn.RCiS Inventory S Control. (Referende" 83),-to :ensur* subcnritica'lit iiS 7maintiain*ed..

However, it *is likeily..that chairging willicommr~denHce earlier pe¢rFSG-1, bas~edognRVLis, and/or Pres'surizer: lev{els.,Th~e NlkEI '12-01 Phase2S't~a~ffing: A~sessment deteirrminhed thati

FSG-: ca~n.,b~e impleen:&ted i

in. 1".hour :fr'or"iEl*AP i~nitiition tot r*stor@ i~ROds linventory,"ising tii6 aJternate: malkeup :.trat6gy wh*ien.an :ELAP is :in progrS-ss,

3. If *ign's of in~crease~dROS lea~kage are detected-such that RVLIS indicate*S :less

.than:,93%,an~d.RcS :iressure is,less than 500(,psig, operators :are: directed to p~erforrfiFSG-1.

4. [The :Technical specificatfion (Referenice 26), minimum.RWST bo0rate-d.Water V1ume -o~f > " 300,000o :provides an*.i abudndant.su'pply* of o0nsite".porated.water ::for Page 31.of :121i

- :MITIGATIQN.S:TRATEGIES (N*RC ORDER ~-*EA;2.*49),.;

RCS maeup.. T~he new Alt~erna*te RO:S Ijetid*,.n Sy!st.em, is.capal.*eof* pumpinrg 75 gip~m :fromn the :RWST irn'to ::the R:FOS at 1500 :psi I;A

portabled~iese

• -ei.hgipel RWSTuma toythe ROLE Stat*dy6 1500 i.mACake gij P umpprvideste ca.b the capabinit a

t o

S

,in 1,-hour* from s.tart,of *the EL*AP.-vet,*t provides for R*CS ma~keup. rates, that are Well above exp~ecte! :ROS and :.R.O.P-,seal ;leakage. rates, *and.- in confun-tion ~with.ROS

,cooldowrdneprssurizaiafon an~d si ACcU'ifmlator; injecbtion* pt0i.yies" the. capa:bility to maintailn natural!ircula~ltion ~coliing-or'ditiins in the fBCS ev*en if ROP :,seal leak~age r-ates Sare uhnexpectedly hi:gh.:

2.9 DecayHea tModel The decay heat mode! for exis~tinrg *thermal. hyd!raulic an alySes that are used-to support requirements i*n effect at the timne of the,analysis. Gene)rally, conservatisnms ar' -ppibied for assumed decay' heat values, but inp~ll c~ases, the.decay heat model assumptions are:

provid'ed.

For ne~w thermal hydraulic¢ analyse prore speciiclyfor qFLEX, the.decay heat moe n FA bap~ter 6 :(R~fenc 25)wil.b.usd:The ANS Standard, 5.1l,ha-S been~ usd forl the,deter'minatienofdcyha *nrg

• ini t;.:he iLoss iof, Cool°ant Accident

.(EPU)*

Program.

Thi si:-tandar a

altdb th6* "Nuclea-r :Powr* ~Plant.standards standard was. is~stjedi in :August 17.FSRTble :6,2-4 lists.. th.*,8e decay-Ihqat curv6 usedin the !Ginn~a EPlU;"*-]

PormMEelaeana~i~si.

Sig'nificant-a~ssumpponrs in the geeaion oftedecay heat cuv fo.s-i h

LO:CAM&E relieasle :analysis tinclude the following:

T'he decay heat sdurce.s-considered ar~e fission product decay and heavy element The. decay :hea*t po#wer from fissioning iSotopes other than U-235 'is assumed to be

,ider~tic'ali to that of U-23'5 The *'fis~ision rate

i*is. bo!stant over th1e oPera'ting history of ma,*imum po~wer level

.ANSI/ANs-5.1* 1i979.

T~he fu*! has. b~een assumi~d to b~t.atful! power~for i0 8 *seconds

• Tbe to tal recovera'ble enryassoc~iated with one fsinhsb~een a~ssumed to b~e Two s~igma uncert*fainty (twp times the stanfidard deviation) has been :apl6ied to th~e fis.sion ipro0duct decay i:

Page 32.of 1.21

Based. upon: N RC*staff ?r~e.view,,Safety E valuationi Repelrt of the.,Mar*ch 19.79 6va!uatidQn

.m 6d.!,, useg ofdi th**! ANS S*ta'ndard" 5*.1 dec ay *heat mo.:

deli wa9/ ap proved:.for th e 5a'lculatioh

.:~of m*ass ;*nd 6-erOy releases dtl~th.conitainm*ent :following :a LOCA&.

.:!~n,the.NRC:safety EivalJuatio"n (SE) !Relatd to. Exteddn *":Powr,Upr'ateiat: R.:E,,. GinnSa."

• ~~Nuc!:'ar :ow@r P:l~n~t- (M*Lo0Ql38o24.9):,,the, NRC:: no#ted.),=that :Gjn.*na h~a.s also us~ed

.2.6.63 of this ;SE-th~e lic:nse~e L£5'5 theANS"-5.1i dbcay Yiheat m6d9e1.with &.aP2.'ncb~taiht~y.

banrd incluided. Thisis conservativeand acceptable.

~Becau.Se t he* existinfg SG..dr.yout, :RCS T*heim0oHyd.raulio anid-SG: hakeup

• .a~naiy'ses-did

.~not..adequJately a~dd ress t{he. unfique conditionis of a Beyohid-;Designi-Basis Ex~teral* "Eve-rt,

. r h~ew a~nalyses. w~ere p~erforme¢d, usin g R EL*AP5 :,MOD3.,3 PEatchi 03. with t!e AN S :Stan~d~ard

-5.1.decay-heat model ;with an iincluded 2 Sigmau~nc-ertainty barid from UFSAR Chapter R.BwA-1I 3'23-!003, Ginna RELAPS EL*Afb.Analysis for Mode '.1, (Refer~ence 57)'

RWA-1!32:3.-0024.Ginn~aRELA**LA PI ",tnady-lits'~to

for :M ode 5,

(

ef.e'r~ene 923)

RWA-1 4.03-001, GOTHIC FLEX 9ontainment Analysis,.(Refer~ence 94)::

Existing. analyses,that were USed :to dveo!p~the. orig~inal :.OIP" strategies.and are super:seded,by, or-may bae usedto6 sup'pleme'nt, the ne~w anra~lyses incluide:,:

1I 09682-:M-026,': Steam "Generator :Dry-out Tim-e' Assuming: No Fe'edlwate? Addition

.Under.E.PUCon~ditins.(R-efier~en~ce.95):!...

NSL-OQ0.00o005, :Thiermal Hydraulic :Ahd:alysis,ofthe LossS OfRHR b.ooI~ng,While the 1 09:682-M~b-021-Spent,.Fu"el Coo/ing" System EPU_ Evalua~tion, Up~dated.by D.A-ME-98.-1 1 t5, Time: to,Boil FollowinPl Losds "of-RHiR *Dur'ing.Shutdown,(18 Mon'th For :tle 'key.SG: dryolut tim e,; RWA.-:1323-003,",Case 3 dete~rrmin.ed* that the S.s~s. dryout consid:ered t::hetim:e ::at: whic*h.

• SG: dr-out,occ~rs assumi(ng nob. f*eedw~t~er additiot.°-

Inform*a~tion from, RW:A-13:2,3003,'is us~ed to "pi'ovideq ithe RCS 'Theirmo/Hyijdraulic iIorainncs ar tdetermine :the ELPstrategies for Mode 1 nluigS makeup, !and RWA-1l323,-004 is U~dsetoi dete-rmiine,the Mo6cde 5 and 6 strategies..."

2.10 U seo*f".NO n-safedty-Rel!ated,1ns:ta-iledEqui p ment,for MiMt~igat~io n W~ith the dxepion.,of rthe :SBAFW and chbarging p'umps,-all of.the. FLEX-equi:imen't :is con.sidered non-safety-reiated.d:

All "iN" equipment is loi6cated. in irobust 'structui-es antd secure'd so, as nrbt. to.be affected by* Seisriiic m.otion. All.support equipment !is e.ithler

'located: within :a ro}bus~t. Siuc8turei ori iS" separated by ~the "sitese.'c~ific* i6rnado. widthl~,

,accountin~g for.the prevailing tornado direction so as not.to be.a~ffected bytihesamfe

~Page 33 of 1'21

• • i i iGINNAFIFNAL 'INTEGRATED!PL*AN: :.i:'..

I*:":,*,

" ::MiTIGATiON iSTRA-TEGIES (N*RC ORDER EA-12-049)*

• "N+1, equip*ment is s*e~cured so i*as n,0t t8 be affecteid by ):ei~smic evenets.!::

~,rtn Forinon'-safety-reiated iinst~I ed equti Prent:th~t is used in' the n* itig'ation strategies-, Ginna"

-Tapk. -Althodugh. installed in:a*.Seismic::I Tornado :and. Flood1: *-0of,stru.cture,. the ¢*SAFW.

D3*; IGi ca~sgifie*d asnn.*hO-sa.fety",the,tanik is al so:casifif d * *noS-safety '(cpr*heiction

.poi.nts and 0-ipipg..plengt~ra..tons are pr~tected :by idesign nor* 9bt n~t~aon).,< ItS is e !sricallVy moun~ted dan~d provides :a.suctibon source..tQ the two :safe~ty relateid SAFW P~umps :'.Dutin an.ELAP, i!theSI:,.s" D/G.: wil :Strtad.

manual: tr-ansfer switchles opera~ted.:to provid~e' powierto: t*h'jwo. safei!y-related !S.AFWPumps,,which w.ill t.h~fn proVide lfeed "wgt~r to the S/Gs. :Ginna"-.has also ~instal lg:d a non-safety rel*ated* hig'h pressure p:s~itve idi~placeen6ht Alternate: RC ln:,~jec{0flo p~urrpi with' power beinig suppl~ied by' the,SAFWDI thO-ri*cgh-a

' br*eakr opn its a.*so:iated loa~d center.. The, Alt6rnate RCS In~je*ction P~inp.is. i~nstalled in:

..the ex#is'ting :sAFW B*uildinfg, whichq is safety :related.

Th'~ie.*s'uction source'"is from* tlhe RWST.

Ailternate RHR::use~s the,Rea*ctor:. Co*o&,t Drain Ta~nk :(ROOT) ::Pumps:to :circula~te Water*

,fromthe, RCS hd6t l egi,,thredugh. both RHR heat exchangers, anid back to the RCS cold-leg.

TheROO3T"P~umps :are augm~ented quality.

2.11 PrOvtisin nof: N+1i FLEX Equ~i pment,

.Provision,of *t lea~st N+1 se'ts of.portlable :on-site diquipment. Sto0re~d in diver~se locations :or in.St.titu~tres,des~igne6d to ;reasonably protect from. applicable BDBEEs pro0vid-eS

reoasb, ialeissur~an~cei= thatN, s'etS "of.FE~uplrtwill-remj.epl-0yable to -asS ure proSce dures, and system: op~rating proce-dures," ar-6"coordinate0l withiin th'e :site p'r6c~du.ral..

All. "N" equipment used t,o mitigate postExtended,-L6ss of Alt~ernate AC Power (ELAP)are eihrpesmstenglywo sdaDe d in, Bas rousEtrcterarEe ant.(DBEproprl anch ortbed caupaben 6f aeitn~

Be~od D*ii es*ig basis Exarnoe EveaVnts (BDBEE), orn aresi~ioig p

esiortaleeqi sn

.anhord t0m

• in p

msslac enrbst armre Se Van whc ca reis f*oig sesicfrcs The "N+1" 'equipmne'nt prbvides a portablie means of-pro0vidi~ng redundanlt/diverse *means_

of,.accom*plishing ipost-:ELAP; f~unctions.: This. equipmen~t is...stor~ed. in a comm'ercial b~uildiniganalyzed :in accor~dance with A'SCE :7-10.

There.is also ceilain. equipm~ent used t*o suppo:rt..post-_EL*AP fulnctions. This.equgipme~nt

,consists of a *to~w trucik, Ta debris,remover.,.two :h.o~se-trail~eis, anifd.two fuel,trailers. :This-sutpport e~quipmen"t *is 'st~ordiec;n areas *which are separatd~i by, th*e-widtho*f: a,site-speciflc tondoD:d :(1!040 feet), a~ccounting iforthe7 prevailing torn ado path, for,the region (soUthwest The following are the furn'tions for wh~ich Ginna has provided FLEX equipment, together~

'with a d-escription of the"N'i" and '"N+1;" equipm-ent and t~hei rstorage, ocatidns:""

1.PrOVide' AUXiliaryF~eelwater to the steam generators Page-34 of 121

MIIATO.SRTGIS.(R ODR'E-209 Th N nen epospeowere njaldSAWpmstknguto iroms*tallebu

.:3 16,0:alnD W

tr Soa.e.ak powefed a

~erti~hi'~Iri~tl~ed 1 W SAFW.....TheD

.G......hg*a; and p~s S pr:ovid the wtrtthSIsoloigIG pressuulzatin ihrfq h

16Q,0 galo'tnkDI~air-toafuTp, r...........

o..

Lak O.tri..

The N" fnctin isperfme

.y epowe.ring.a c:ubi~le, in MQ.C '"C" and on~e in

a. to*,rndoa: d:a'mageS" MO

-C", a::n 'ajy. i~oqmpre:*:pr.; is, ccnne~ted ito -an

.instrueh.t air: line., alldwn the..aqcc.*umaltor.::O,bp.-vented.- A.!ll, nece~ss:ry c *sl, -connectors,. hIie and.th~e air; cop:*pressor arfe istore*d "in.*robiist locatios Comp*8ariableeqip*...ment" '"s used.,for. tbe"...

.... -"".N+t" "

"strategy,"* ".. substituting'"':'"":"

th* 100r 'kW, DIG"for *thel SAF D:IG. ".Thi'*s-1:00"

" kW D/G,

'.as"

...well" 'as !necei*ssary*"...

hfoseS, cabl'es,: and: coneci*s are strdin the.commerca SE71 3..Repower:ilth~e'batter charg~ers.&,

o."

- This- "N'"function is per*fo~rmied. by repowering a cubicle in.MOO".C,"C and

,one in

' cables an'. connect:6r6ioi.reqUired': for" these" fUntiion~s arestoredi~ -in :::robu~st

.- the !SiAFWD/.G-'.-The 1100"kW DIG, aswel,as.,J the

ien6ec~s~ary cables and c~nn~ectfions are st6r.e~d :in. the commercSial ASCE 7-10.bidl~ding.*i

4. Prima*ry Inve:ntory/Reapiit~~S*ti

-8ity Control The:i.:*~'.'N function. i::

performedi e

"by. powe.rin'g.'the.

inOstall6d:.AlIei ate :Rcs In/je~c.tion

utp, imiita&king suc~tion from t-:he :rqbust RiWST, :and. injecti~ng :into the :SI

. are.'storednii:

".:'.d in

-,.*..a; "robust,":"*

f"'

sructure.

• ": :.. /Ther&

• %'*: are two means

"'of p""ro" vid;;i ng,:.:.~h

".N-.i-i" f'u!licion.*:

A: :p'o'rtiabl ie"asel" driven ::Alter::in~ie ":ROS* :Inj'ect:io~n9 p"umpic:an' TheN:

,uno on pry idd-.by tmplyirecivit onroab e i-FE dpewedrin aen stoed inathedomm:ercacld oli ASyCte 7-0:uidthngf

.s.ese fctrnd.100fet-5._aSpe nt Fue Po*:ol[ Colig epeai~nven

.tory Catdo..l~etg !f:h*.e~n

Te*N+,

pum taki0ing-s¢d.*b;esiitio n

fr iom th fe dsh ecn al andit

,.ef~iling dirfctiyeotheSEP..

"hti Th-**is um cn*,i6nt.t proide sflo t

r~ill th~a:v e 1:660,00 galloffnip i, Wate Strageud*h-PRa'ge :35 of: 12,11

,:G IN NA FEIN:AL INTEGRBATED DPLAN

/:':.'....J-,

,.,MITGATO STA; GE (NRC ORE

.A1209 The. ":N,"}:fur'*di6h :is perdrety66nn isal 8v~alve 7444. 'If':valve 7.444

7.

he danteingAuxnt*

Builgen vai.S Thbbemcin6sr fitt*irfgsi' hoursesaiidlol a)fre st~&y sh a ri'%n

.~mrs~

h i

cmrso

and, nees itins'hoe..anda tous are.!J69ei:a sto red. in reh~

comria ASCEj 7-10a B

,ulifgo.

A~eN al.sternaierateeg**,Q i.*,Brs td oen, the.

p~ntimnrjoe'd rmi~l 7.Dtenp ux Jitir Builbdingy Bubd.nbas'*emei suerp G.pump,~r uGavosaables;fo bclihgoperat*'ing!#

floo, flooing, the.RHR.and Reac{:-

torsd~

Oooied::anft e-Dr;.ainTk a.d onnectoirs are-alldn sorted in robust, orcaedn.

h "N+1" C

Sti' ategy'isnca c

..mparable

~uStitu.tein is th 00keDGfr

{:

the-ihFW DI.li8 R, DTh necmp S

Vpufri, hosie;, 6:'#

ble2s, and6he onetors-ar6e stored ihthre 6ohirci al'*S~

beatanedq~:~.. The "N",stra~tegy is :tp proviad ee p

w.dr tovteinstaledE RCDTumpfrmte "B"cfrori the SAFWl DIoG,(the R6And--oTnetipo-hnoseradate atrs hbeingl su.bmer,:g ed).h Ai ll cahbles d} no...,Oand iuinbti'tn b*xes a:[;iB iare s:.-tor:ed in a roust stru¢ cures

.The

":N÷+1".strategy pvds*

or# thbe

• exROOTpum toa bte powredudn fbrX them1,O asDI.

Thell'100 kWt/iswel snllnuessaryo*it~is con nectors,,-andfa'e d,l:

ae::s~o aed j*nc*ithec o xmes r trcaIAS ed*=10the ca iner. a ASC -.

ibilig

9.

HeatSink forM..e,."R, n'Zh:eessary':. The"Nsrma~tegy i s*id. sii, dh to alg.isldie LXpumpde fromthellt would cool

.th, Ce:

Di t fsel T:*

h e wate6 r

6irrc.u.lttingd*

i ro'!

r:6:t:*iithe FLE puiA wob~t

• .and all.' hoses, fidB.

ouets*:ide t'he Aux6iary Bu.led.in.

T:h

• fe~t FLEX pumpi*:

{*ip~a

• i~

ttingsr,

• n conne*iectaionist~nd'4ang aare lofQcated;:

in robust" stucurs The

• N1 statgy is comparable ec ep tha th'rdndn

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGiES (NRC ORDER EA-.12,049)

11. 'Ref ueling

-Redundant sources of diesel fuel are available for refueling the SAFW DIG,

,100 kW.DIG, th~e d'iesell driven _FLEX, pumps, *the diesel' driven portable Alternate Rcs Injectiohnpump, and the smaller diesel generators. Two fuel Strailers, each with 990 gallons of Ultra-low sulfur fuel, are stationed at the site.

'They are stored So as to be

'Separated, by. the width: of the. site-*Specifi tornado (1040 feet), accounting for the prevailing.tornado direction for the region.

Each Juel trtailer has the necessary fuel.,tran~fer equipment.

Onc~e deployed, the trailers C~n be refilled from the onsite fuel* oil storage ta'nks;

12. Debris Removal!/Eq uipment1Transportation

-The site has a Case 621 pay loader, as well as a Ford F-350 pickup truck with.a snow plow, to rermove d~bris caused by a BD~BEE..Each. vehicle is also equipped with equipment tocheck'for live wires 'in downed power lines.

.Each vehicle is aliso.equipped With a pintle hitch,. which. can be-used to trarnsport mitigation equipment, such as the't00 kW DIG, the portable Satellite trailer, the FLEX pumps,.the fuel trailers,, the hose trailers, and the air compressors to their deployment points.

There is' also an electric Trailer caddy, 'capable of moving any of the FLEX.mitigation equipmenit, stored 'in 'a robust structu re.

The following~table Shows the primary and alternate strategies and connection points required by NEI 12-06:

SaftyMeho CnnctonExternal Procedure(s)

Sfuntyiono oneto Hazard Dra~wings Fun~tin

' Protection Core SAFW Pump One SAFW Pump

seismic, ATT-5.5, Attachment Cooling Powered from (tWO available) can

Tornado, SAFWWith 'Suction

.(P)

SAFW DIG Supply its respective Flooding

.From DI Water S/G or both SIGs via Storage During SBO Located in SAFW a cross connect

'(Ref.

97)

Building/SAFW' valve. Suction is, Annex

'from the SAFW Dl D~wg. 33013-12'38, Storage Water Tank.

'Standby Aux Feedwa ter P& ID (Ref. 98)

Page 37 of 121

• ..GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION,STRATEGIES_ (NRC ORDER EA-12-049),

External Safety Methiod Connection

.Ha~rd Procedure(s)-

Function P

zrotcioDrawings, Core Diesel Driven FLEX Used to refill SAFW

seismic, FSG-6, Alternate Cooling pump_ located in DI Water Storage Tlornadd

'SAFW Dl Water (P)

SAFW Annex Tank. FLEX-Pump (Protected Storage,Tank and Hose Trailer are from,.but not Makeup (Ref.. 99)

Hoses stored in moved to west of available or Portable Trailers ScreenhQusewith needed during Dwg. 33013-1238 suction for pump -

Flood) -

+1 pump stored in from Lake onta~rio.

"L" Building Discharge hoses are run up east side roadwaY *to distribution manifold,.

then from manifold to V-9782 (located in SAFW Annex). In addition, manifold allows brarnch lines to

• be laid intO Auxiliary Building (AB) to fill

..SFP.

Core

-Diesel Driven.FLEX Located in.SAFW

seismic, FSG-3, Alternate Cooling Pump located in Annex and connect Tornado Low Pressure (A)

SAFW Annex along to SAFW cross (ProteCted Fee dwater (Ref.

with suction and c onnect line in SAFW from, but not 100) discharge hoses.

Building. Suction is

.available or fromt SAFW Dl needed during Dwg. 33013-123.8 Storage water Trank Flood) or Lake Ontario.

Pump is moved into po'sit~ion~ outside

'SAFW Annex.

Suction hose is connected to fitting at V-9772 at base of tank. Discharge hose is run into SAFW Annex, through door 63 to V-9757 (to be installed) on discharge cross-tie

.line for" SAFW Putmps.

Page 38 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN.

MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

~~~~External P~eues Safety Method Connection Hazard Prcdues Function...

Protection Drawings RCS Alternatte Rcs Supplied from RWST

Seismic, F..SG-, 1 Long Term MakeUp Injection from

'with d iScharg'e to Torna~do, FiGS inventory (P) motor drivyen pum~p

.either or" both SI' Fldod Control (Ref. 83) powered by SAFW lines.-

DIG FSG-8, Alternate Piping transitions FiRCS Injection

.Located in SAFW from AB Basement/

'(Ref. 101.)

Building.Middle Level to

-SAFW Annex to ECP-1 4-0001 69-ON-SAFW. Purnp. Room.

090, Alternate Valves / piping /

Charging Systemh Power Suipply located (Ref. '102) inside protected Structures.:

Dwg. 33013-1230, Alternate RQS Injection System (BOB P&lD(Ref. 96)

ROS Alternate ROS Connectable to thle

Seismic, FSG-t Makeup Injection diesel al~ter~nate ROS Tornado (A) driven pump injection suction and (protected FSG-8 relocated from the discharge lirves from, but not*

"L' Building `to east penetrating wall near available or ECP-1 4-000169-ON-_

of the SAFW door #99 to take neleded during 090 Building near door suction from the Flood)

1. 99.

RWST and discharge Dwg. 3301 3-1 230 to either o~r both SI lines..

RCS RepoWer Charging

,Manuatlly lineup to

Seismic, FSG-1 Makeup Pump 'B' from the.

inject ftom =the :RWST Torr~ado, (A)

SAFW DIG using to the ROS through' Flood FSG-8 temporary power AOV-392A (Charging cables.

Valve6 to Regenerative Heat Exchanger-to Loop. B Hot Leg) which opens at a250 psig.

differential pressure to allow flow to the ROS._

Page 39 of 121

...GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN.

MITIGATION STRATEGIES.(NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

S..etyExternal Procedure(s)

SaeyMethod Connection Hazard Function Protection

. Drawings SFP 1

Diesel Driven FLEX FLEX Pump and Seismic...

FSG-1 1,"Alternate Makeup

'PUmp located' in Hose Trailer ar'e

,(W~hile the AB SFP Makeup and (P)

SAFW. Annex moved to west of Operating Cooling (Ref. 103)

Scree'nhouse with Floor is not Ho*ses stored in suction for pump, protected, from Dwg. 33013-1248, Portable Trailers from Lakeontario.

a _Tornado, Auxiliary Cooling Discharge hose is access to the

.Sp3ent Fuel Pool

+1 pump stored1 in run u¢ east side SFP is stilj Cooling P&ID "L" Building roadway to expected to be (Ref. 104) distribution manifold.

availab !e.)

From distribution.

(Protected mianifold hbse can be from., but not run to th~eedge Of available or SFP and tied down.

dleeded during

_______Flo'od)

SFP Diesel Driven FLEX

'FLEX Puimp and Seismic FSG-1 1 Makeup pump located in Hose Trailer are (While the AB (A)

SAFW Annex moved to west of Operating Dwg. 3301 3-1 248 Screenhouse with Floor is not Hoses stored in sudtion fo r pump protected from Portable Trailers from Lake Ontario.

a.Tornado, Discharge hose is access to the

+1 pump stored in run up east side SFP is still

""Building roadway to expected to be distribution maniifold.

available.)

From distribution (Protected manifold hose can be from, but not run to the Blitz fire available or nozzles loca.ted needed ddiring withlinr[75 ft. of SFP.

Flood),_________

SFP Diesel Driven FLEX FLEX Pump and

Seisrric, FSG-11 Makeup pump.

Hose Trailer are

'Tornado (A)

Located in SAFW moved to west of (Pr*otected Dwg. 3301 3-1 248 AnneX Screenhouse with fr,6m; but not suction for pump, available or Hoses stored in from Lake Ontario.

n~eeded during Portable Tr'ailers Discharge hose is Flood) run up east side

+1 pump stored in roadway to "L" Building distribution manifold.

F'om distrib'ution manifold hose can be

.run to the flanged connection point-at V-83662 in the SFP Cooling system located, in the AB Basement.

Page 40 of 121

"GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MI!TIGATION STRATEGIES (NRCORDER EA-12-049).

SafetyMethodExternal Procedure(s)

Fcionet eto COnnection,

Hazar~d Draing Function Protection Daig Battery SAFW DIG is used Fed frdrih SAFW D/G Seismic, Flood FSG-4, ELAP DC Chargers to power Battery through B us Loa'd (P) "

C~hargers 'A & B AcPDPAF07..Cable Shedl/Management through "protected r'un 'from 'Juncti~n (R~ef. 76) c.ornnedtion points" "Box

'A" to Junction in theSAlFW Annex B*6x"B,"all located in Dwg. 33013-3131,1, and AB usinig SAFW Annex.

480 VA C Single Line installed junction Transition to ".9 Box"

.Diagramh SAFW &

boxes with cables in AB Middle 'level via NFPA805 I000KW that are Stor~ed in conduit (hard wired)

Stand*y Diesel the Waste Gas.

to Was~te Gas "Generator Sets compressor Room compressor Room.

(R~ef. 1Q5)

(AB Middle Level)

Cable run from "9 Box" to MCC C and Dwg. 33013-2539, MCC D to feeder AC System Plant bre~ker forBateryLoad Distribution brharersA fo Bater bne Line Wiring Diagram (Ref. 106)

Battery SAFW D/G is used Fed from SAFW DIG Tornado FSG-4 Chargers to.lpower Battery t hrough (P)

Charger.B through ACPDPAF07. Cable Dwg. 33013-3131 "protected run from Junction coninection,points" Box' "A"',to Junction Dwg. '3301 3-2539 in the SAFW Annex Box "B'* all loca~ted in and AB us'ing

• SAMW Annex.

installed junction Transition to "9 Box" b5oxes with Cables in AB Middle le*/ei'via that are stored in conduit (hard wired) the SAFW Annex to Waste Gas a~nd AB; arfd to.

co'mprss6r Room.

Pow~er Battery Cable tUh'from "9 Charger A through Box" to Mcc D to "protected feeder breakers for con'nectio0n points

B' Battery Chargers.

in Battery Room "A" In lieu of powering using cables that MCC C, cable is run are 'Stored in the from the SAF.W Waste Gas' Annex through Door Compressor Room 63 and 9"9outside to (AB Middle Level)

TSC..Hallway Door a~nd d1o~wrn to' Battery Roomf "A" With'"

connection made directly to battery charger._______________

Page 41 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED* PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

Safty External Poeues Saey I

Met~hod Connection Hazard Poeues Function ProtectiOn Drawings Battery 100KW DIG

• Fed from 100 KW Seismic FSG-4 Chargers relocated from "L"V DIG by cable run

'(Protcected (A)

Building to outside from' 100 KW DIG to from, b'ut not Dwg. 3301 3-31 31 the SAFW Annex Junctio~n Box "SB" available or overhead door is located in SAFW needed during

.Dwg. 3301 3-2539 Used to power Annex. Transition to Flood)

Battery Chargers A "9 Box" in AB Middle

& B through level via conduit*

"prd~tected (hard wired) to Waste conlnection p-oints" Gas Comp'r[essor in the SAFW Annex Room. Cable run and AB, Using from "'9 Box" to MOO in'stalled junction C and MOO D to boxes With cables feeder breakers for tha~t are stored in Battery Chargers A &

the Northeast Sea B.

Land.

Battery 100 KW DIG

• Fed from 100 KW Tornado FSG-4 Chargers relocated from "L" D/G bypcables run (Protected (A)

Building to the east from 100 KW D/G to from, but not Dwg. 33013-3131 outside entrance to poirtable FLEX available or theTSC is used to Junction box-and needed during Dwg. 3301 3-2539 power Battery then !ay out cables Flood)

Chargers A & B from the Junction through "protected Box to the selected connection points" battery dharger(s) in in the Battery

-the associated Rooms, using Battery Room.

cables that are stored in the Northeast Sea.

Land.*

2.12 Generic Concerns Ginna intends to comply with the NRC endorsement of 'the following applicable generic concerns:

BatterY Life (ML1t3241Al188)

Shutdown!/ Refueling Modes (ML13267A382)

Maintenance and Testing (ML13276A224)

Boron Mixing (ML13276A183) 2.13 Staffing and Communications Response to a BDBEE Responding to BDBEEs presents new challenges and new requirements for personnel*

actionsto mitigate the BDBEE.

In the Letter from J.A. Spina (Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, LLC (CENG)) to Document Control Desk'(NRC), dated May 11, 2012, Sixty-Day Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information (Reference 8), CENG committed to provide an Page 42 of 121

assessmenet of. the oQnsite aid, augmrn~ted.staff needed byG nn to r'espond..to.a large..

i2,e natura R6vent meef*inJ thfe c*nidfi~ dRe~eesdrle*:!i-d in nlsr

~the:

NRC'see~ March 12,ihi 201 R6*ues t

l' C for*i6 brfoi~~iof t (R

ofetrjd ) in RDefere!nceG) 8daned t-Jhe:6' Letr 2ro2m Supplement al Information for the SixtY,-Day Respon..se :to: 10 CFR. ;50,54(f),Request for.

staffi*ng],a~sessment for Ginna cobhsidering ifupntiotns :related :to :NTTF, Recdmpe~ndation 4.2 ::Referenc6 1!2) to thle NRC :4 :mQnth~s,rior to~the begirning of :the second,r~efuehing outage: s*dhedule(l for: O:ctobbr8i[ 201i5.

This staffin~g' a~ds*:eshi: is 8ompljete arfd :w*s submJitted':td t~hpeU.S. Nuclear-Re'gula-tory Commiss'ioni Doou'dm'ent-Contr6lDesk in. letter dat:ed tJune*8, 2015 (Re~ference 107).

'?:

Ginna addreiss'ed c0dmmunications neebds in its r~es'ponse :to th~e :Reques*t for Informa~tion Pursua~nt ::to :it!e 1 0 :of: the: Code lof.':Federal :Re~julatio~ns 5sp.::4(f): Regarding*

Rec"m'me ndatinsh 2.1,, 2.3,.and 9.;3,:of th e '*Nea8-erri'4 Task.*Force'd Review of :i4'sigh~is from 'th~e Fukushima: D~i-ichi, Accidenft (Ml*120*73A348p):.. 'Ginna'as ;plans regar~dinig

'co~mmunicati6.o~ns a be fo'und in the liett-ei. fdrom M.G.: 'Korsnlick-(CENG:) to the Document Control D esk",(NRC),i I:Resp)opf:e to :NRC L:6tte~r on 'Tech*nical Is~sues for' Re~solut~ioni Reg~ardinfg Comhmunic~ations submittals Asgociated w*ith Near: Term Task Force RecdSmmendationf 9.3,:.dated February :22, 2013 g (ML13066A7,,10). 'AS d 6cUmentedinf th~e

,t3109gA26:4), t}he staff has*i determinedth'at :t'he a.Ssessm~enft for dom"munications is rea*onab1e, iand: :the ;anal~yzeds existing systems, :propos'ed: :enhacemen:t*, and interim measu'res w ivilihelp t{oensur~e that comnmuniciationsi ar'e maintained.,

A communibati0ns. *modification-was develope~d unde~r *ECP-14-000756, Installation of FLEX,Sa~tellite Communications,systemi7to provide F:LEX :.and*NABs p~ione service to Contr.ol Room an~dTSC (Refer~ence 10 8).: :Thiis phrdject ]incuded:i'nsgtallati~n of a 'satelite network' t hat t:proidesa second~ary *pathq for t h.e E*M iet and NTTFi!* RFecormrendation 9.3:

Co~ntro~l ::Roor*i i(MC"R)'f andin t:he T}.chnical ;8u".pport Cen*6ter* i(T.SC:)

cdui~ng" :an e:xtenr#dd loss* o*f acpo0w.*r: due-:to" a *,D.BE E. :An: emer-g en*y: pow*er, S,0u rce ifor' it he* s eco~nd ar.y satellt ne5t*6o-k,'wil,be ma~de: available at a:: minimum of :8 hours following a los of: ac

power..

Satel!ite':network: conn~ectivityoprovides three. (3) 'Void6-Over t!ntern1et *Protocol (y~lP,) phoj-nes forl FLdE~X cniomuqnicatipn n Tf"*he :MR. Sa~telilte :cdnihetiviti :for Six (6) vO0iP phPr*es: for FELEX communication-are p~rovided :for ;th:e FSC. Th~e :installed~satellite:

'dish an*tehna m*ay n:ot :Survive,an eveVnt; therefore, theel;,is a po0rtable satellite :dish !in protected st*Jra~ie.

A Sepa~ratily *;avaiIabl'i Ra.Pid Case With *its 'own p~or~tabSle satelilite diSh* (in. c~ase the.

init:*Iled s#atellite dishdo8e§: not sgurive* :thle event) and n etwor ois ' av'ailable and pow~ered' by i~ts ownf fporta~ble( g en6erator.* Thi' s ystemh'can ope rate stridaldone :or can iinte~rface with the :fixed system 'described above.

FSG-5, Iniztial-Asses. nmjent and :FLEX, Equipment.staging. (Refference 109), :c~ont'ainS

.informaition on em*ergency 'communications equ(iplmenft. Onsite :cOm munications::will use:

station radios in talk-aroiund hiode :and :will deploy a ;po~rtable radio repeater for beilt~r radio :reception.; Iirdiu~m Satellite phones are :already in: the MCR. ChargerS fisr radio batteries canpebi pbwered from smallf3.3 KW digselI genierators.

~Page413 of 121

' "MITI!GATION STRATEGIJES.(NRC',ORDER.,EA"12-049) 2.4 De~poym ent iStr ate~gins Primary a'nd alternate 'deploymenit irpute~s.for,, P*hase. 2, portable. FL"EX equipment.are Spent. Fuel Pool..lns~trment ation* Progra

('Refelrence 111)~,' spe:cifieS -thie"de'plohyment patli im'ainfetnance and availabiiity requirements**"..

.i.:

When two ormore..deployment 'path loptions are availa~bl~e,':te.mporalrily :blocking onre path to su*pport l!lant o0perations is ac&e~ptable,. Comphfnatory,action~s 'will be.in pl6ace' fo?-

deploiyment path iS avaableil&

• tem'porar~ily,bio~kib'gtihis path to s~u#pbrt plantoe#6ratihns.is accept~b((e. Coo~pdnsator;y ac{tios SHJALL be in pla*e6 for an*:.durat~ion beyondi a sringle (Reference 1:14), directs IsRO :review. of sche~duled work* to determine if it will involve bl'ocking',FL~EX c1eploymet patibahs'."

-O-,6.1,,Equipm~nt Operator Roundts (Reference :36), directs chedbking.FLEX depl1oyment paths clear each shift.""

On-Shift OPerations p~er~sonnel,carry~isdculrit~y dpor acc~ess keys th'at, in.the situatio0n thait the car*d r.ea d.er.syste'm bechfrngs disabl~ed,.will h~ave, Unirestricdtbd:acc'ess' to,plant ar~eas requi'red for mfitigatin g actionS..of a.BDBEE. (S Y-AA-1I 01-1i 20- F-0O1, Reference 1i 15)

An assessmenit to. ensure considera~tioh of 'NEl-12-06, Section 5.3.2, consideration 4,

• h'as.behn. performed.for all current s~trat~egies.

Thiere is no :planned movementi or dep~oym~ent., of.equipm.ent.that specifically *require~s..electti~ial p~ower,, suchn. that C~osi~derlatio~o for a p,*o~wer rsupply. straiggy,,is.. r.equired.*

'Ardy such movement of gat~es, door~s, fences;,etc. can be p'erformed b~y manual action..

Girnn~a.has:' two.dewa~ter-ing,pum~ps for-remioving,water froam ;the Auxiliayy Bu~ilding Sub-Auxii~ary Buyildin~g.. Ginna :ha#, 550 -fe,*t of 212" i(,'hose" avai~lable f.or the deAh*aiteri-ng pumps.

Ther'e is' no othgh r ar~ea* requiring d.*waterinlg s~iniCeall ot.5her area~s with FLbEX rehspons~e equipm~rent ar~e protected both ~fromi'ntehrnal and external flooding..."

In-plant storag'e iareas" are, uniquely idenitified to ensur'e equipment is_ available at all.

times -to support, the.assoc~ated.FLEX. strategy.

Id~entification of FLEX equipment,

• conn*:etlions, "and.stoJra~ge :loc.ations" is withla~b'els,.if.black. letteringr o'n a green

back~grou'nd to h4igh~light the uniquJe use.s for-thiiS e'quipmeht andl facilities.

2.15Maintenance a.nd Testing=:

Ginna,has estab~li'shed a systemn designation-for emergency porta.ble equipment and will man&flag e thIis isyst~e.m :inf a mannfer donb:is~tent with ;pr'cedua#re W'C-AA-1"04," IntegratedlRisk Manjiagemeh (Referenlce. 40).- 'Allelements,of the :progra~m de~scrbed iin* Sectio'n" 11 iof NI* 1i':2-06,.-including recobmmendcled "shol*Ud" itemns wil beincluded intih~e station pro~gram.

A system enfgineer :is.assigned *the responsibility-for coinfiguraitidnc.bntroel,,maintenance an~d 'letsting hO

"e LE.X equhipmen~t ihave 'un6ique id~ntifi:&tion t#dr*ber~s.

Intlsc*le'd strictuires, 'sys~tems and. comp*onientspursuant-to -10 CFRi 50.63(a).(Reference' 6)..will co ntin*ue tQ meedt* the audgmented !quality, guidelines of R~egul-atory.Guide 1.i,1551, St~ationa Bla~ckout.(Reference 1-"3)..P~revenltive Mlaintenance prlcdi0eur~hS (PMs).we~re estblilshed and,'testingj ;prpcedur~eS developeded-with frequencies esta.blishied based on ttype,of Page 44, of 121.

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) equipment, original equipment manufacturer (OEM) recommendations and considerations made within EPRI Technical Report 3002000623, Nuclear Maintenance Applications Center: Preventative Maintenance Basis for FLEX Equipment (Reference 116).

2.16 Brief Description of Procedures!/Strategies!/Guidelines Ginna utilized industry developed guidance from the PWROG, EPRI and NEI Task team to develop site specific procedures or guidelines to address the criteria in NEI 12-06.

These procedures and/or guidelines support (not replace) the existing symptom based command and control strategies in the current EOPs. Clear criteria for entry into FLEX Support Guidelines (FSGs) ensures that FLEX strategies are used only as directed for BDBEE conditions, and are not used inappropriately in lieu of existing procedures. The existing command and control procedure structure are used to transition to SAMGs if FLEX mitigation strategies are not successful.

FLEX strategies in the FSGs were evaluated for integration with the appropriate existing procedures. As such, FLEX strategies are implemented in such a way as to not violate the basis of existing procedures. Where FLEX strategies rely on permanently installed equipment, such as the new SAFW DG, changes were made to the AOPs and EOPs, as appropriate. FSGs are controlled under the site procedure control program.

FSGs were reviewed and validated by the involved groups to the extent necessary to ensure the strategy is feasible. Validation may have been accomplished via walk-throughs or drills of the guidelines.

Human factors are built into the processes for design and procedure development.

These are primarily based on INPO Good Practice 06-002.

These processes are followed throughout the project stages. Electrical cables are color coded as necessary in order to ensure proper connection.

Validation and verification was performed for the FLEX Support Guidelines and followed the NEI APC 14-17 Guidance Document, FLEX (Beyond Design Basis) Validation Process.

When plant systems are restored, exiting the FSGs and returning to the normal plant operating procedures are addressed by the plant's emergency response organization and operating staff, dependent on the actual plant conditions at the time.

The existing hierarchy for operating plant procedures remains relatively unchanged:

ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power (Reference 22), provides actions to respond to a loss of all AC power.

New procedure AP-ELEC.4, Loss of All AC Power while on Shutdown Cooling (Reference 117), provides actions to respond to a complete loss of all AC power while on shutdown (RHR) cooling.

ECA-0.0 and AP-ELEC.4 are the entry points for ELAP/LUHS events.

FSGs are entered from ECA-0.0, AP-ELEC.4 and if appropriate, other procedures.

Phase 3 FLEX Procedures - FSG-5, Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging Reference 109) discusses evaluation of long-term strategies using NSRC equipment.

This includes support of RHR pump operation (Attachment I, section B); makeup to the RWST using the boration skid (Attachment J); use of the DI Water Processing unit (FSG-6 (Reference 99), Attachment D); and Containment Cooling (FSG-12 (Reference Page 45 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) 118), Attachment C).

When the equipment from the NSRC is a duplicate of site equipment (e.g., 480 volt generator) no explicit steps are provided in the FSGs.

2.17 Training SAFW DIG Modification Training was given during Training Cycle 14-06 to all Operations personnel.

All Operations personnel received FLEX Training during cycles 15-1 through 15-6 in 2015. Chemistry and RP personnel received FLEX Training prior to the 2015 Refueling Outage (RFO).

All Site Employees received "Generic Basic FLEX Initial" during 2015. Select Employees received "Generic Advanced FLEX" during 2015.

TSC personnel received FLEX training prior to the 2015 RFO. The Advanced FLEX training has been added to the qualifications required for select ERO personnel and Operations personnel.

New training of general station staff and Emergency Planning personnel was completed prior to the compliance date.

Training programs and controls are implemented in accordance with the Systematic Approach to Training (Reference 71).

2.18 Synchronization with Off-Site Resources Exelon has signed contracts and issued purchase orders to Pooled Inventory Management (PIM) for participation in the establishment and support of two (2) National SAFER Response Centers (NSRCs) through the Strategic Alliance for FLEX Emergency Response (SAFER).

Each NSRC holds five (5) sets of equipment, four (4) of which are able to be fully deployed when requested.

The fifth set of equipment will be in a maintenance cycle. The contract with PIM addressed the items in NEI 12-06, Section 12.2. Off-site equipment is procured through the SAFER organization. The NSRC plans to align with the EPRI templates for maintenance, testing and calibration of the equipment.

The two NSRCs are located in Phoenix Arizona and Memphis Tennessee. There are no designated alternate equipment sites; however, each site has agreed to enter portable FLEX equipment inventory into the Rapid Parts Mart, which is an internet based search capability currently used for other spare part needs. This capability provides a diverse network of potential alternate equipment sites for portable FLEX equipment.

The Ginna playbook for delivery of portable FLEX equipment from the NSRC to the site has been developed and approved (CC-G1-118-1001 Reference 119 and CC-G1-118-1002 (Reference 112)). The Ginna SAFER Response Plan contains information on the specifics of generic and site specific equipment obtained from the NSRC (summarized in FIP Table 1). It also contains the logistics for transportation of the equipment, staging area set up, and other needs for ensuring the equipment and commodities sustain the site's coping strategies.

Routes were evaluated for post-event conditions, and provisions for alternative transportation, such as airlifting, was considered in the plans.

The NSRC will provide requested portable FLEX equipment to a local staging area where the equipment will be serviced (e.g., fuel and lubricating oil) and made ready for transport to the site. The criterion for the local staging area is identified in the Ginna SAFER Response Plan, Sections 5 and 8.

Suitable local staging areas have been established for portable FLEX equipment to be delivered from the NSRC to the site.

Staging Area 'A' is located onsite and consists of multiple areas for portable equipment Page 46 of 121

L:

GINNA FINAiL IiNTEGRA*TED PLAN:

.MITIGATION,STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER E-A-2-0.49) staging (Figure 6)'. Staging Area 'B' is located in th~e cUr'rently named contra~ctor parking 14 ai.s wellias ithe area, to :thewest" (Figur6" 7). ;*.taging ;Area !c' is Iocatedo 0.R.ocheste-r Iiltern0ational :Airp'ort~proiperty,(Figurie' 8)i The"NSRC wiiI*ll puQrt initial por~tabie FLZEx.

eq"ui~rhent deliv~ery to'the site within.24: hours of a request for deployment.

Page 47 of,121

, :, *GINNA FINAL,-,INTEG:. ATED PLAN,

i:

MITIGATIO*N STRATEGIE*]S..(N*RC ORD*ER* EA-:12'-:049).'

3.Maint~ain Core Cooiing& Heat Remova (SIGs

.3.1.Obje~ctives,-

restored SIG.:e':

l

{6ve jo~ipovide core :cooling. "Ba~seline, CaablibJties..i*iiude.the u.dse..of in~stalled 'e*qLipnenti and FEX L"..equiipmen-'tiforiP'h*S6 1 ;rand Ph*ase 2 coping 'strategids.

Perfoirmance attributes i nclude~ dep~ressur zi ig t:he S/Os,:for" makeup :,with ;portable injection sodrces Utilizing pritnary and -alterna*.6i njedtion pobints-tfo inject through '-sparate divisi.ons! :tmifns, :i.e., sh6oul not#

6ih ave b.oth: conr*ie,.tbio0n.s..inivone *diVisi0.n/ tra'in.- Analysis.

should: -demonistrate tha@t*

thle g*uidanrce an"od.eq~uipmenrt fbr: combined. S/'G de~ressurizatiorn :and :mak'e~up capabili~ty supports.con'tinued core cooling.

Sui~sta~ine(d

.s OuiceS: of wa~ter. *are availablie :an~d" sufficieni.:t0t s~upply water, in definitely :ihclIa~ding cobi~jderiatiibn.6f :c~on urrent make~up orspr-ay 6f sFP,.(Ri~ferien-cOe4) 3.2.Acceptance Criteria' No *ore.damage wilJ :occur. Co~ping.tim~es will b#e calcula~ted such th-at they/ Preclude, core dama ge. Thoesue will ensure. no core. dam-agl6 obccurs including maintainirng

.saturation. conditions )in the core region, ~keep~in~g peak cliad tem*perat~ure below copre. melt.

"limits,i :pr~e~tirini clad.r.pture and matintaininig twvo-phase *water levJel above th~e top of the active fuel.

3.3:,St~rategies Unhder..a los~s of allI AC. power, o~pe*rators *Will inhitiate a don'lrolled Iplant,cooldow~n an-d depre'ssuriziation, as ~per proe~durfe :ECOA-0,O, ;LoI.ss of All, AC. Pp~er,. (Ref~erencet 22.) anda Paper (Refi"ehce' 4.,1).

iNatural circu~lation will[ transfe~r. hea.t from ithe-,Reactor iCoolant Sy..sytem' (RCS) to; lhe SIGs. *S/G,,pre~ssucre. and.stie~a-m ireleases Will.b-1e "controlle.d.bY

.m.e*ts" O.f the :Atm'ospheniic Relief valives,ARV.(s);..By maintain~inl.apprqnia.te S'G. wate-r-inve.n~tbry, Si(jcces~ful implementation o~f the 'FLEX st~rategy during Ph~ases 1,i 2 and"3 Wi~

.prevent cor~e d~arnage.'

.Under iPhase, :1 (usilng,instal~led equ~ipm~ent) the* op:erator~s may -.have,the TDAW :pump taking..suction from _thei: OSTs: av~ailable* to, *m-aintain SIG w~ater..inventory..

Since t he9 SAFW Pumps ipow~erd fro.m thbe newv.SAFW DIG, 'tak.in~:sucit~ion ;from.the. n~ew pr:6tectedl

-SAFW DI Water stdrage Tank. This stra~tegy porovides th'e unit-withi a 24 hiour,coping tim e.*

The !1 MW SA.FW' :DIG and. 160,0.00 gallon,(nomjnal)..1l W.Vater :Stor-ag-e-_Tank, havye* been, installe:dl on. a 3' th~ick. concr-ete,-fo~undation. with: caisson ~is to b:iedrock.:

The :diesel, Ul.Wat er Storage -Tank is mountfed on. the foundation With. all. piping to. and from -the tank encloSed in *a s*teel pl!ate istructur~e. All st~ruct~ures o~n.the-:fouind.ation. ar~e designed".to withstand flodaing*, sei'smi"c an*td to{brna'do,wind loadls.andtorn*ado m'iss~ile.impact. -Th~e SAFW..Building Anne~x is".also capable' of witWhs~tandiri~g a' flood,-:a~s all wall penetrati,0ns.

Page,48 of 121

GINNA FINAL iNTEGRATED PLAN.

,,MITIGATIoN STRAT-EGIES (NROORDER EA-i 2-049) are either" above the design.flood leyel '6r are fl0Qd-pro0tected.

Therefore,' the 1 MW SAFW D!G and a 160,000 gallond (nominal) Dl Water St[6rage.Tank meet the.reasonable protection requirements of NEt *12-06.. (References *120, 121, 122, and 123)

=Electrical isolation is maintained such that:

lass 1E equipmnent-is protected from faults ir" portable/FLEX erquiplment-as

'follows:

o The new :sAFW DIG will power the SAFW pumP, motors. The no0rmal Bus feed to the SAFW pumps will be isolated by manrual disconnect switches which are mechanically linked-to the connection.-switch feed from the SAFW :DIG, pr~event~ing an~y possibl e b~ckfeed ito.the SR 'BUs.

The disconnect is rated for fault current and the feed from the new SAFW D/G is protec~ted-from fault Current,by ove'rcuri~ent and over'voltage relay devices in the new switchgear. There is no robust alternate power supply to the SAFW D/G to feed the SAFW pumps. The alternate is a diesel drivJen pump.-

o The new ~sAFW D/G will ipower-the. 125.,VOBttr/ges h

normal Bus feed to 'the 125 VDC Bater Bhattery Chargers is thedba manual disconnect, switch rated for fault current.' Cables will,be run and codnnected. toquick connects' inStalle.d at the new 'switchgear and at the Battery Charges. This will be protected from fault current by over'current and overvoltage relay devices in the new Switchgear..

o The alternate feed to the 125 VDC Battery. Chargers is the 100KW portable diesel.generator. This will. be manually isolated.and connected to the battery charges in a similar manner as the 1 MW DIG. Overcurrent and overvoltage protection will be provided bY overcurrent and overvoltage relay devices.

o Power to the SI Accumulator Isolation Valves(MV81adOW6)i thesariesouceU~e~tpowerte* 125 VDC Battery chargers aS described above, and fault protection is also the same.

o The new SAFW DIG will power the B. charging pump. The normal feed to B charging pump will be isolated by openiing the Bus 16 Supply breakers.

Cables will be. run.and con~nected frfomrithe load bank dockinig station (DISC/SAFW).to BUS 16 bus bar.: This will be. pr-otected from fault current by ov/ercurrent devices in th~enew switchgear.

oFor CRFC power d~uring Phase 3, manual.disconnect and connect is re'quired. Fault Protedtion~ to be Via relaying PrOvided with the D./G from the6 NSRC, o'r will be 'added by Ginna as required."

• Multiple sources do not attempt to power electrical buses is described as follow~s:

o The sAFw pump motors are.protected from being connected to multiple Sources as noted above bY the m e6harically linked SR-disconnect Switch and the new SAFW D/G feed connect switch.

o The 125 VDC Battery Chargers.are protected from being connected\\ to multiple sources by the pr'ocedures which will manually disconnect the normal power supply and connect the FLEX power.

Page 49 of 121

".GINNA FINAL_ INTEGRATED -PLAN M ITIGATION STRATEGIES_(NRC ORDER EA-12-049)**

o The SI Accumulator. Isolation 'Valves (Mov-841 and Mov-865).are protected from.being conniected to mUlt~iple sources by the. prpcedure which ensures the associated Motor contr-ol center sUpply breakers are openr and all :as~sciated Motor Cohtr'ol Cehter breakers are opened prior to copnecting.FLEx power, o

Charging Pump B is protected fromi being c~nnected to multiple Sources by the procedures which will manu ally. Open the suppl y/crosstie. breakers on Bus. 16 and op~en all load br~eakers onBus 16prior to connecting FLEX power.

o The CRFC cable and motors ar'e protected from bei~ng connected to multiple Sources by proced'ures which will manually disconnect the normal powe.r sUpply and Conrlect-the FLEX pow~er.

A summary of. the sizing.calculation for.the FLEX generators and details of loads connected to show that.they can supply the loads-assumed in Phases 2 and 3 is as follows:

e Load on the 1MW SAFw DG (48OVAC, 1250KVA) is 747KW per EDOC-MISC-2013-0044, Electrical I&C Impact Analysis Form for ECP-12-O000459, ECP 000424,.ECP-13-O00995, ECP-14-O000169 (Reference 124).

Section 5.5.9 presents the load in, KVA.

-A review of the subsections~feeding into the KVA rati.ng were reviewed and quantified to~be 747KW.

Loads.on the 100KW DIG (480VAC, 125KVA 120.42.Amps) are-2 Battery Chargers and.a BoOster pump, with single phase 1;5 HP motor. 'The full load current.of each battery charger is 56 Amps.

T~he' sin)gle phase 1.5 tHP Booster Pump draws less than 2 Amps. The 100 KW DIG will be able tO supply required full load current of 11i4 Amps.

oThe Phase 3.loading.is evaluated as 1127 amps (480 volts), per EDOC-MISC-201 5-0042, Fukushima FLEX Phase 3 Electrical Support Evaluation '(Reference 1!25), and is derived from.the operation of an SI. pump (410 amps),. Containment Recir:culation fan (351.amps), an RHR pump (232 amps), and a Charging pump (134 amps). The total of 1127 amps, with a 0.8 power factor, results in a load of 750 'kW.

Powering an existing SAFW Pump from the new SAFW DIG can be started within 43 minutes of event initiation and c~ntinue t9 operate througl* Phase 2. The feedwater flow path is' manually realigned to take suction from the new 160,000' gal SAFW Dl Water Storage Tank and u'se existing SR piping to feed the SIGs. SiG level will be maintained bY t hrottling SAFW Pump manual valves as directed by the "control room. ARVs.

_will. be manually/locally operated to remove heat from the system as directed by the control room.

Na~tural circulation will be maintained via" heat removal performed by the SIGs using a SAFW pUmp or a portable FLEX pump. Operators Will ensure that the new pro0tected SAFW Dl Water Storage Tank is being replenished from several water supplies; :Lake Ontario providing.the ultimate and indefinite Water source, with the SAFW pump providing the SIG ma~ke-up capability.

The. primary.Phase 2 coping strategy is to resupply the new SAFW Dl Water.Storage Tank from Lake Ontario, the UHS, using a: portable diesel driven pump and hoses. Core Page 50 of 121

cooling. and: heat. *rempyval. wiJl.be, sustair!'d: in definiteliy,, or.tint.i long. t~erm-recov."ery.:

prois*ionsS :fbi.refilinig :the enew: S:AFW 'Dl Water *Stora~ge Tanki.,and dthe.*.sAFW"G :fu*el

Th, a!tei"rnate PiS.haise-2. strategy is 'to: utiizie a idjesel driven high capacity p.ort~able-:5ump. to ELake O'ntario,- should th~e SAF A.

.p~dm'pbeco.m.".unavail~b'e:.,.The n"ew.SAFW Dl W~ater

'*torage.Tank could *be.,resuppied f.lpm..L*ake Ont~ario us*Jing a~n additi*n~al -portable&"diese1.

drivenl,:.pumpi.(if available),and hos~es., :Thi.s :stra~tegy. has *the capa~city to maintai.n.the.

re~quired 'level in f,{ie S:Gs wi~th".th'e"SGs-at the.target pres~urel of,.2§i0 plsig, whvvbich-Sooo-inb"g anid :heat" remov~al c;an b*e, ss;itained i'r*d.finiteiy, obr" until,lon.g t~erm recovery'!

• actions.are :d~t'erii.ned,: uding th~e. l6ortable:

i'disel 6driven p~emp, ~with* plrpvisi.on for.-refilii.~g' thenew SAFW DlWater :Storage Tank.a*d portable dieselI driven pump fuel !tank-.:.

T~he Ginn~a i'.roc~edure.for res~pondi.g.to a station. -blackout i:s "ECA-OO,: L-.oss,of All A'C Rc~wer t(Relference *22).;.,ECA-0.0. 'ste~ps.are ode'.red "to, piovide. th'e* best se~quence !of oper~ator` ac`tions to rie~spondi to 'station *.blackout events. !:ECA-O.O; direc*ts th'e opera~tors to Verify the TDAFW pumfp starts a nd if it has-not, to aitemlnptto."starttheTD.AFW pumnp",* As the,:preferr*ed.and procedurally :direc*ted soi.irce ofwater; to the isi.Gs, if th? :equip~ment iS

,avail.abl.e, i*t vwill be :used. -This pr~o~edurialied-sequence of events is c~onsis~tent wiwt.h.

.(inn'ras"curreii'nt licen'Sing~ basis 'and,-sinctie a beyond-desie!gn-basis external evendt may.not

-be re.adily :.'afpent :,to6 th"e o:!p.eratbrs,; ::Usind I/crbdit~ing: avajilble pla~nt..ejui~pment :for r espondingj to e'venit is preferr~ed"'and provide~s operating mdargin.fo*r abeyond-design-bas*is~ex*ternhalevent.

'I fthe :T.DAF plump.0or :CSTs arenot, available., procedural d*irect.i.n is *to use :the new SAFW *DI.G to power :a 'SAFW. pump* anid 'fe:.ed'thei SIGs.is. v.ia. a "re*:spo6.nse ndt 0obtained"'

,st~ep in ECA-o.0..

To elabo~rate o~n use"of thbe new SAFWDI'G,-the :resufltng str.tegy-is considered to ibe a mfethod.of extending iPhas6 1.,.The, stratlegy.includes a comrbina~tion of :theueo.:J:* :f exi'sting :equiPrhen~t and newlyiy!nstall'ed and isolate.:d eqdi~dmerit.(Attchnia:et:2. F.:iguret 3).

Thie two:6 exist~ing g~SAFW Sd~pumps wit*ia nedwly :ins:taied. (and! electrically isol:ated) :SAFW DIG ahd.a newly'ini s'talleid 1:60;,:000 :gallon (usabl/e capacity), rodbust{ly des ni*edS:AFW :Dl

-Water :storage Tank.,' capable of supplsiyi n~g 24:hoUirs -of -i.n"vengto ryi w*ill[ sup'ply,y by.m.ant ual o.pe rato r,action 'withinl 43 m*inutes,-:e on.d en*a.te 'from the. tan~k :to :: SAFW pium m*'to. bothR S/Gs.

T".[he FLEX Portiqn of the.str~ategy.i* to use.,a ddicated FLEX 'pump 'to 'r~efilli the

SAF D.I Water S orage..Tanik, from !La: k~e"ntari6, and conini!j*ue.to.;suppl~i :th~e: S-/G.Svia the :*sA.FW pu'mps.' Also, a fd

!tr~a.iler w~ilil.:be use'ed.t~o ries*upPlY :the SAFW* DIiG.. :Whilethe' new. DIG fuel ta.fnk :anid SAFW Dl W:.ater :Storag~e.Ta,-k-.(with.the :.plann..e~d coolddoi) c.apabilities :may :be.,le ss than 24 hOurs, timelines$ :SHOW th'aitadeqluatei response 't-ime.i~s

.available to r;ef~ill the tanks dluring--an ELAP event."

Thie.P.h a se, 3. Str*ate gy f Qri"co0re:6p*d*)oin g-,inciudib g wh*at. equ0i pmrin t. w illI b e" n'eeded an d 'how, when and where iit.will'-be 'deployed-is.basically :thle Phase 2 strategy Supplemenirte~d by*

c1jLip)m ent available',from' the ;:NS RC.-:Natu ral cir.*ulation will.cont~inoue to1;:be: main*tainied

• v.ia' heat removal! p1endrfored by the. S/Gs using a SAFWpumfp taki~ng.Qct~ion bn the nrew SAFW, Dl Wa~ter Storage.Tank; br a portable diesel 'driven 'pulmp.con~necte~d-to the.sAFW

-Page. 51 of 1,21

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-1 2-049) system will be used to provide make-up water to the S/Gs from the new SAFW Dl Water Storage Tank or Lake Ontario.

To refill the SAFW Dl Water Storage Tank, any existing source of demineralized water on site will be preferentially used until the NSRC water treatment system arrives. The bounding FLEX scenario to refill the SAFW Dl Water Storage Tank will be to deploy a FLEX diesel driven portable pump with a hard suction hose to take suction from Lake Ontario and, via a discharge hose connected to the SAFW DI Water Storage Tank, refill the SAFW DI Water Storage Tank. When the NSRC water treatment system arrives, water will be pumped from the discharge canal through the water treatment system to the SAFW Dl Water Storage Tank.

Alternatively, water can be pumped from the discharge canal through the water treatment system directly to the S/Gs via a SAFW system connection point. NSRC delivered portable diesel driven pumps provide backup capability to the on-site FLEX pumps.

Connections are available to supply the 480 Volt vital buses from an NSRC supplied DIG and for connecting NSRC supplied portable pumps and the NSRC supplied water processing unit.

A graphic representation of the Phase 1 to Phase 3 FLEX strategies for maintaining Core Cooling and Heat Removal safety functions, with Steam Generators (SIGs),

available is shown below.

Maintain Core Cooling & Heat Removal (SIGs Available)

___ Phase 1 (TDAFW - time 0 up to 2 hrs)

_______________________Phase 1 (SAFW DIG - 43 minutes to 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />; must refill storage tank)

Phase 2

_____________________________________Phase 3 0

6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60 66 72 +hrs 3.4 Phase 1 At the initiation of the ELAP/LUHS event in Modes 1, 2 and 3, Operators will enter the existing emergency operating procedure ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, (Reference 22) either directly or from E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, (Reference 23) on the indication that both Bus 14 and Bus 16 are de-energized.

In Modes 4, 5, and 6 Operators enter AP-ELEC.4, Loss of All AC Power while on Shutdown Cooling (Reference 117).

Per ECA-0.0, steps are taken to verify reactor trip, maintain S/G inventory, minimize RCS leakage, and reduce DC loads on the unit's batteries. Heat removal from the RCS is accomplished by supplying feed water from the CST to the S/Gs using the TDAFW Pump or a SAFW Pump, powered by the new SAFW DIG, taking suction on the new 160,000 gallon SAFW DI Water Storage Tank (References 43, 75, and 122). ECA-0.0 has the Operators verify adequate TDAFW flow to the S/Gs. If adequate TDAFW flow to the S/Gs is not verified and cannot be established, the Operators are directed to initiate SAFW using the SAFW D/G by referring to ATT-5.5, Attachment SAFW with Suction from DI Water Storage Tank during 580 (Reference 97). S/G dryout conditions will be reached within 43 minutes with no feedwater supplied (RWA-1323-003, Reference 57).

The feed rate can be controlled by use of either manual operation of Auxiliary Feedwater Page 52 of 121

SA*FWp~ump., St:a i*s,r'eeasedl -fromThe-S/O s:to thie atmosphere thrQ~ugh th6"R*)

Naturalculation rarsf'ers the h'eat. from the ROSto, fthe 'SIGs. This rmethod i u*=sed.to

~3.4.1 Auxiliary": Feed":water:,

Fo other than-"t.ie T'a' i~,SisiadFodn ELAP'LUH

ent, th

~~The' TD.AFWpumnpinitially t.ake~s,,suction'.from.a,csT-r.

CST l*Tevel.can,be :repleni*shed neW5:,'

SAF tcmn W D/

n tknsuth for':' th ew SAFWm DI: Water

Storage Tank.drngSO

_ ~using 'the SAF o.r NFP:A-D/G, refer to,ATT-5.5, A ttachment.SAFW with. Suction.from DI

,Water istorage Tandkduring,SBO.,,

The, normal water. sour~ce for :the TDAFW pump is. the Cond*ensate storage, Syst~em.

,Howevr th on'dens~ate Storage *S' stem n

h TDAFW pum ar otcnidered "rbs"a eie nNI1-6ffprotcinrmsi,mi, fodr tornad Ther.. or, Gnha in'stalled aneVwrobust :S!AFWIi Dl Wat

!:i.

• torgTank and :"SAFWI9 to power' :5the SfW pump,{11[*':wto h

roi *je*}

coo~

m*lingwtrt h

/si td:

I*T evsen

t0 that thiev.

TDF

• pm ahd" C';*el:!RST are lst.b' Thenbori-ing

is:.aetrytel asts"u...ed that) nedswiatchoaer ocusbt aheoha nh Au'lay ee watcml~ed flo is.. s~tomeedmasnr":'*

""...result of. h. evnt Page 53 of 121

SGINNA FINAL INTEGRATED pLAN

- :MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049).....

• -Modes',1 through 4, and Mode 5 Loops.Filled timeline shows restart of flow to the Steam Generators within 43Thinutes. Steam Generator dryout is eXpeCted tdo ccur at 43 minutes (RWA-1 323-003, R'efer~ence 57) and

• existing procedures and analysis support refill of dry Steam Gener~ators.

The switchover-functi~n is Carried out ma~iiially at the neW SAFW Building Annex, having communications with the Control-Room.

o Make'up ra.teto S/Osis sufficient to preventf~uel dam~age:

• :These s-AFw pu0mps are the sam9 pumpss;,with thie same' capacity, as are currerntly used in the Ginna accident anha!ysi9 to ens~re that sufficient flow will be provided to.the steam Generators to prevent fuel damage.

ste~am~ generatoJr level and *ireSsure infdrmation will :be provided to personnel in the Annex to make adjustments to the injecti~n flow 'rate, if needed.

oThe new SAFW BUilding Ann~ex is designed to be a robust structure per NEI 1.2-.06 and will be ac*cessib:le' fo110wing BDBEE phenomena.

o The switchover function is fail-sate:

The mechanical alignmen~t for switchover ;is manual valves, the electrical alignment to the new DIG is a ma~nUal disconn'ect, ahd The function logic, software, hardwar~e, related piping, valves, systems, structures and' components (SSCs),

and system wate~r level instruhehtation to SUpporit 'the switch6ver function, either manually :or automatica!lY, are qualified :for all potential ELAP events inclUding seismic, tornado!lhigh winds, flooding and missiles.

The eXisting *SAFW pump~s, motor a~nd ~iiping are SR. The new DIG, Electrical, pipe and SAFW Dl water Stor-age Tank are not SR but are being designed to.meet :all 'the requiremnents of NEI 12-06. They will be able to be operated' foillwing an' SSE, Probable Maximfum Flood (PMF),

or a Design.Basis Tornado Missile.

ECP-1 4-000749, Standby AFW Cross-Tie- ('Fukushina,) (Refer~ence 45), implemented, a sAFW cross connect mod'ification in the Auxiliary Building to ensure that SAFW flow can be provided downstream of potentially damaged (from a tornado) SAFW piping.

Installation inCluded a valve to, ensure that :back flow to the Upstream damaged piping cannot occur.

EcP-1 3-000483, DDSAFW Project SAF.W Piping. Tie-In.Design and InStallation (Reference 126), installed a single. FLEX connection to the SAFW c&ross-tie

'line.in the SAFWV Pump Room (V-9757).

These two ECPs toget*her allow for the discharge of the FLEX pump to provide flow~to both SGs.

3.4.2 Depressurize SIG for Makeup withi Portable Injection Source With the.implementation of ECP-14-.000727, Harden Masonry Walls SUrrounding Cable Tunnel Entrance to Protect vital Instrumentation FollovLing a Seismic Event or Tornado (Referenice 127), s/G ARVs* are available to control SiG pressure / T ave,following gBDBEis.

ECP-14-000727 reinforced,! protected the lB w*alls-from a Tornado! Missile event thereby protecting both S/G ARVs from Tornado Missiles, to alowfor a symmetric.

RCS cooldown.

Protected SiG ARVs allow rieducing S/G pressure for RCS Natural Ci'rculatiOn _Cooldown and donnecting and feedirng the S/GsWith a portable FLEX pump in.Phase 2, if necessary.

In order to ensure XRCP seal component temperature limitations are maintained, WestinghoUse Technical Bulletin TB-i15-1, Reactor' Coolant System Temperature and Page 54 of 121

.Pressu.re. "im~its for.thq,No' 2 RCP, Seal,(Refieren.e 1;.:28);, recomimends-tha~t..a ROS coolc8:own be perfforme*dl.following" allii,)ss".,f I i*i~seal :c~blin~g :events.:

The 'ceQldo*6 n

sh

.l [6nlitited _within,2.hours iafter: a loss oef ~&l~igocr.T-he Qo~l~down",rate tiern:ereture anid p'res~sure of les*s than 3,50°F and J40'0 psig shol'-ud' lbe achieved::.

The"S/Gs will.be :dep*essurized by ::opening-tle AR~s'a~s,:directed :in ;ECA-,O.0to maintain, a RO*S :cbqldown ra~te of < 1 00,F/hJ. until:SIG :pressure reaches V360 psig (RO.S Cold :Leg Tremperaturfe -:4380 F).- This willi-educe"R'CS cold leg'temip'eratu~res.for mainta~ining ih~e integrity,.of the RCP, seals and.to in~ject the SI-Accurmnlators. for ROS invento ry control and-ilong term subcriticality:.

" "L In order, to :comply with,the :rec~mmlendati0,n.to perform, an* exten~de d, cdoldown to' sup p~ort.the~ integrity of the second stage: RCOP sea*l;i w~ithin :24 *hours*:Ginna w*ill 'perfor'm th~ eXendled cooidown:, with :direction in ECA-0.0 Step. 31, with a Note t{ha~tdirects th~e needfor.cooldo~wn and depressuriza.tidnto"le~ssthan.3.50()F and less: th*an :400 psig withqin 24 hfOursi of ev:en~tin~iia*tion.'

One *train of SIG pressure instrumentatOn~ is reasonably protected from :a tornad1o missile event.l: Att~achme~nts' :A: & B of'.F G-.7, L:os 'of V:*ital'. lnstrbm'etationh brt Contrbl: P~ower (Reference8i!:):,attempb.t0t restoe t.MOB readinigs 'pf S/-s (isA: & :B" pressure.,' If the S/G.

'pres:ur'e inst:rumenta~tion w&as damagedi, use of FsG-7 Attachiment P :would direct".an ope~rator to take l10cai rea~dii igs, o:!f "that.Para'eter :flrom a!p~rotected locbation.in ithe interm!ediate iBuildinig.;

Aso:, FsG-7 :Attac~h'ments I,,J, M anid N pro.vide a" m~eans of obtainjing-RO:s.Thot and Tcold temperatiures, if needed, to allow a symmietr;ic cooldown'

.PA-PSC.-0:965, PWROG Core Coolin~gPositon* Paper-,. (Refe~re'nce,41i) :States:

"I'f local control o:f S/,G...fe~ed and/6r-"steam ri,*if., is riequired, thilis a.pproachbi Shoul~d,demoahstradte adequate ';manpower a~nd.tommunic~iri.*d-;*

T-his n.e66ds*'

to."ind'ude. h13ab~itbility requir~emenrts. : O3therwi~se, ca-p~ability-to madintain control :of.S/G -fee~d,and St/eamn :relief from*,.the co*n'trol r.oomr wiwll: be,",reqUired.": Lbeal cidntrol of. S/G' AR*V~s -is credited to maintain core :ceoiOing and h'eat remo~yal.: The, Phase.2" Staffing :study. (Refer~en'e* 107)i concluded that Ginna has adequate :resources! staffing :to: loc ally 0perate ARV'S :in :the I nter-mediate. Buildi )g Cold9-Sde *(iB): inthe evien*t of anELAR. :EA-O0O0 provid~es actions..

,tO: openh doorfS !in :the B."that iprovide' a "c'himney.effect" :in ore to sabiizen thaen lower surrounrding a.rea 'tem~peratur~es.-in :the vicinity'* ofthe :ARv'S..:ECP-1:i4-000727 (Rieferen~e :127)reinforce~d!.protected. the lB, walls from a Tornado!/,Missie :event thereby m aihtairop g.th.e l in3 i.a. :conditionr that *th'e AV'V*s* will r:emain '!accessibl~e,following raff even*t.

Comnmuniciatio'ns iniclude a po0iable: radio rep1eater, sa

• tellite p~hones iand a 'rapid' case.

Operator's wii lexit"the lB to *omi5ru~nicate with (he Contrl e~iRoom and r:ieentenftheilB to{

opeirate the *ARVs as nfeeded.-

3.4.:3. Sustaihed -Source.of Water The existing CSTs and/or the.new :i 60',000 gallon SAFW DI Water Storage Tank kare the initial water 'source(s). for f~eiding.,the.S/ps, pro.viding :24 hbeurs" of core :cooling and *heat for the "new SAFW, Dl Water storage :Tank toc ensure: 24 h'iours: of"water supply is

.page 55 of 121

SA*

DIWae

,Stp,

r

• ~e:age:

Tank (reCdO5 tagasystem Alignmentatgnd.C Opeat::ion, Referencel The nSewlSAFW I Water Storg Tan is a

.,"ot, st~s ste denie watdr t*n and m&i~iiE~'etsthe d~eRfinition fh6 ioutan~crkdafis*tdy~, Ta~hkd*hthe S

Oe' o

folo6s gudrdainNE 1-0 a Hi~hetank in d.!!acceordanc e with AP......

Th aki eeoe qulfe to..the..SSE..a..

t ~fran lodn*

Weiflld

.h taki uyn. Tn icagei otdt fTod rotecte)*id:areas Therei areh nolooduiiadtend i-fitluremecan~k.ism.q Thfed tanoi r*bE t i the re gards*!

tohexter~na floovdS:~ih]selte.a*datn :eat*lctdin g

High Win:

.In "acdodaripe twith calcd1latior 175,1 8000.0-SP-oL-000O0 (Referih-:hsbe~nc 13)tetn hasJ**d6:

b60ri eautdfretralwn odo 3i snbwpera hofr (m0ph.s.

e-tan~ki*s robust wit rears to high o

winds.

'a.

• Te~rniad isiple:

ifatin',~

a fcprdane with cacGaipnr 12574-1*a Pther t*ank! is qualifiedto withstAnd t/;LHe curent,dngMdesg b

asis Modie

,5it; Nqoops ardeprvdedl esloqan.ized proe ctidh. fro.imai to.ernadoh missilyes ro barrire.*rs.an"im~td surudng buldeingQ'ey¢es. The~i.tan ei robust w~ithreg ards'to fornado msie.

Page :56 of.,121i

INNA.. FINAL.*:'

',;,*INTEGRATED';

PLAN.*

Gjnadesnt ln

}oprovide* a"o~tr ou of,.nitroge ad/or'a:ir tq the PO:RV's' N aco~i~tr'~'rsur pr D~N~-9,funcJ 4,'

unt "vrpesuizaio P;itro,8*

6ttio Sytemr :fi"*is;tropiisn Accumulato Tak

.TC3 -

.T3 Low Presur.

Limit (Rf~ec

>2.

ee~

h Ntrgn~quultr r

anane

Ri~t:S.q cycles ing 10 errtute','Tis.typic1 anandI<this-Is conitn wBeith 86r-e123re4820, Lo Tmprauei*.

) "Pi4over res......

Anls:

Srh~r eo (Refere

-xit:Ti34) r This

.up.

ultsEin.about 90 rnirite ofPOV!Epi im fra iBl SAF is esxp~cfer.d to beali~ne ir6 adroimaeLyhal42a ho.

"spunty

• "eq~

nitr deri' s av ia"l e t6

i *allovV...

cont~oinued sPOm,.:RV LS fuo -on utl-well a fte SAFW4heat oi SGPresurii}cnfe: t-P1-68 P1S469 P18R P1-s478t,P1-4ce 9,

andt[mntn P1-483 les~e~~b

• *SO.

LeelNaro

-ag (NR L

... an.I47;WdeRne'(

LI and Li-ll50o O

o e epraue-T-1O-aniPdte TIb409A-n,

• !iih:p R'C t7 2S ColdiLg Wrpeatre TIw-s41 OB,1 an I-40a9B

.{*ai~ri:

• 05Prs~reWie ane WR-P In(

.Condens~er :Hptwe~l.(if av~ai!able) or the.Outside.Corfdtens_,te S~torage.Tank,(iffavfailable) an dshrigtrog il:"nc ioh at the itank.

Tis will allow SAF1 Pumpse to~~

• (:

Ta~ri*.fr~m. ifhe: Discha*rge,Can~I.usin-g a iportable diesel idri,*6pnpump *a~n-.

hoses. *:,(S~ee firomh the U.HS.)Ci,Se"cooling and heat i'ehfiovlo'qi"I b:e sstJtned" i~ndefinifeY*,ly~r.u~itil iqhg

..DIG ith-dl~; plro0vIiO*idn.for reiinu*g the fni*ew S*AF.'lW DWatr. Storage eTanhk and,SAFW.DIQ.

• fuieltank.: (See th~e *Safetj Functiofi* :Sppport section for: a* discussion on tihe protected me~anso0f refilling.the SAFW DIG f*i0. ank.)

The piortabl e *diesel.driven 'pump w i :be deployed on the West-side, Of the Screenhouse.

From there h9ses will be run fromt~he suction of the pump either inot

,the discharge canal di'rec*tly :or, through h.a :re~movable,.atini*

an.d :indto.the w:,a'tir:. Thie" curent :,lap.is" to su~bme'rge t{he-hose b!elow the surfface.of the.water-.: i:A :*pin-on Suction": S~trainer. is po iddfo~r, ~he 6inc[D'h suct~ion I*ose.:, Procedure{" Guidanc'e forl.,fil~lng.the-DJ 'Water

-Stora:ge Tian is p~er FsG-6 (Reference 99).

-Alternatie Strategv.

y The *ajt~eirn~te'P*ias 2 stra&tegy is ito u~tilize a diesel drivenhigh.ca~p~acity por table pump to suppiy th~e S/Gs. with water f'rom the* neW-SAFW D~i Water"Stborag~e T-anik,..or-Lake :ontario,-

pump,is..sized to :SU~ly

!iadequate feedwater flow (215gpm*) to restore and mairntain S/G l]ev~elia,* the ta.r~ge iS/G p~resu~i"ire top*6event rit.**rog* *injec tion n:;fror+ the Si" Accumula'tors*.

The d#ie sel driven h~igh cdapa~ity, porthbe ;p~ump iis..cnnected to. the. SAFW systemn ;.at a prot6ited 6ohne#ction" p*i~n~tin the SAFW Buidin~iig." th lo~ication of :this cbnnec~tion is provded iin adiaga~m.in' Attachm~ent 2, FEigule 1.i.

A Alw-Prles~sure portabl:p~ump: is,required to :supply i2,15*gpm :to the.S/Gs.to* provide S/G~sis evaluated *in DA:M E-1!5-005,. FLEX"-RHR/!CC W/SW Hydlra u/ic Model.(Reference 13:6)i. C alcula i6:n'671

? E. *Gin~na FS'G :*setpints.(eeec 137), "Setpoin, H.1i7

into"'the" RS, for :ELAP. con.ditions,' plus allowadnces *for r*or'rnal channe.i ;Accuracy, was 290 p~sig. :ECA-0,o Lo,. s of*e

Al/A Powbb*er,r-Appen~dix A (ReferenCe 22)..dir0c~ts o;perators a~nd tihen,.refer

to F#SG-l 0, PassiveR"CS In] qctionIisolation,.(Refereince *82)," to is~olate or v~ent thei SI "Ac~cumfulators "to preven*tnfi trogen'injection: intothe* R¢S:. ""'

DA-M*E-l.5005.p~redicts"FLE*X, sAFW pump p erformancee feedin~g '_S/Gs. whii dra~fting.

fro m t.he.,lake:. ThIe analysis: pred'ict~s.that~the.iump*is-capablte 6f deliver-ing 232.gpm split

-to: b6th generators-.(116

• gpn. each)i:if".th'e S/Gs a~re at 305 psb'ia.: 305-psi: *as: ;chosen *as t{he-Mode 1:.(

RELAP' analy'is ;RWA-"1 323-.003, Ginn*a RELA:P5 EL;AP Analysis."for Mode.1 C-ooldown' to. Mode 5" If ~cdoodown.toMode5, or remainingin MOde.5, Loops Filled,.isdesired, procedure ER-FiRE.i3, "Alternate 'ShLI:tdown for A'ux Building Basemrh#nt/Mezzanne. F'ire, Section 6.7, Page, 58 of 121

' GiNNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

Water Solid SIG Cooldowni (Reference.35), provides guidance that can be modified for.

use. water solid cooldown requires both SAFW puimps and S/Gs to be available for

-co01down. A high fl0W p0.rtable diesel driven pump Can also be Used in place of the SAFW pumps.,R.E. Ginna' Nuclear Power Pl.ant Fire pi~etectio'n Progra*m'(Rfeference 39) section 5.1.6.1,. Water-Solid steam G3enerator Operationi,.docujments that water solid S/G operation Can cool the RCS to less than 2)00°F in less than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

3.7 Phase 3 The Phase 3 strategy for core cooling, including what equipment will be needed and how, when, anqd where it will.be d~eployed is basically the.Phase 2 strategy.supplemented by equipment ava~ilable from the NSRC.

under Phase 3 _natur'al circulation will continue to be maintained via heat removal.

performed by the S/Os using a SAFW pump taking suction on the new.SAFW DI, Water Storage Tank; or a portable diesel driven pump connected to the SAFW system will be used to provide make-up water to the S/Gs from the new SAFW Dl.Water.StOrage Tank or the Discharge Canal.

To 'refill the SAFW Dl Water Storage Tank, any existing source of demineralized water on site will be preferentially used until the NSRC water treatment system arrives. The bounding FLEX scenario to refill the SAFW [D1 Water Storage Tank will be.to deploy a FLEX diesel :driven.portable pump.with a hard suction hose.to t~ake suction from the Disbharge Canal and, via a discharge hose, connected to t"he SAFW DI Water Storage Tank, refill the SAFW Dl Water Storage Tank. When the NSRC water treatment system arrives, water will be pump~ed from the discharge canal' through the water treatment system to the sAFW~DI Wate'r Storage Tank. Alternatively, water can be pumped from the discharge canal through the water treatment system 'directly.to the SIGs via the SAFW system connection point. NSRC delivered portable diesel driven pumps provide backup capability to.the on-site FLEX pumps, Connections are available to supply the 480.Volt. vital buses from an NSRC SUpplied DIG and f'or connecting' NSRC supplied portable pumps and the NSRC supplied water processing un~it.

Page 59 of 121

.-

G:IN'NA FINAL.iNTEGRATEP P*LAN,

+" :

MiITIGATiON sTrRATEGIES (NRCO ORP-EI]R.EA,-i2:049) 4 *:MaintainRCS IlnVentOry Control/Long Term Subcriticaiity (Modes 1 -4> and dModeh5with Loop 4.1 -:ObjectiVeS Exten.ded,,coping without.ROS ma~keu~p is not possible withot 0*t-min.m:!~l ROCS.leakage.

pr#essure.R-OS makelup: ;An alysis is requiured tio det~rmine, Rs,- :malke~up3 requir#fements.

• Lfft~dw~n may be rec~uire.d. to suppb~rt ":req uire#d ",makeup and,enSu-re.,sub~cr.ticali~ty.

4.2 Acc~eptance Crit~eria Th~ere ;wil I-be no,,,eturn, to" critiiCa!ityioqc~e :thelo~ss ofi all;AC,power ha~s occurlred.. To ensriSe th~at-the r eactor;rem~ains subcritica.l,, a liritfo-f..Keff less t~han 0.,99 (S~ub:r!iticai) is set.. 'The..l~evel :of,0.99 for subcritica~lity Was. chosen becauSe.it Will provide some margin

'to a*ccount >for the-best :estimate..reacto'r physics p~aram'eters ass'umed in-the a~nalysis. '

4.3 : str~a"-tegie~s.

The :general ROS makeuP strategy is to deliver the niepessary amount of borated Water to' miaintain natura-'l circulation* flo'w in the RC:S and mi-n.*tainl adequate 'Shutdowni Margin.

For l!ow to.no :RCS leakage conditidons, the.need.to,.borate: to 'rhaintain subcriticalify boynds tihe.nee~d ifor.RCS" inv;en~tor)Y cgptroi "early.:in ;thi *ELAp LUHS S"event.i': Fort,'he h ighe.st applica~ble. RCS le~akage riateo of.61! gpm (iSBO-PROGPLAN,. Reference 32),,tie need to p5rovide RCS makeup is the boundinag condlition..

Undeir Pha*se :1 (using.insta~lled.equipment) :the. ope.iators,.ini.tiallyi rely; on.]n¢reasing nega:t~ive core re*-c',ivity';duie :to :the "lu.ldup o:f, Xeno:n 6:t6: mainta~inh"t.e. rieiactor *subcriiti:ca.a Th~e op~era~tors..w*ill initiate.&-con~trolled p.,lant-.cooldo6wn and. depressuriizationi. aS. per p~roc.ddure)

,C*A-0.0, "Loss; of, Al.. A.C Pow*er"(R~efere.nce *22),,. anrd, con*sistent-with

.recomemnda~itions ":in P*A-PhS.C-og65,.PW.ROG"Core C-ool~ing :Position Pape'r (Referenc~e 41). :This will result in injecting bo£rat{ed water.from the SI Accumula~torS.

Under. Phdas~e 2 "(using" on-s~ite,FLEX equipment) trhe iOpertotqrs' wil!l be. able to,inje~ct_

bor5ated water from the,RWST Via, ahnewly installedA~lterniate,.RCS lnje'ction P~ump,;

powered* from 'the-sAFW DI.G, t0.maintain RC Rsinve ntory@ a~bove t h.at r.eq ui~red to..maintain.

na:tura!. cirqulatio0h co0oling, anid.to :en~su're the r~eactor rema~ins Subcritic6al dUGring~the:

.con6tr6lled'co66ladown directe'd by ECA-0.0*."

-Under phase 3.(using.off-site, NSRC suppl.ie'd e quip~ment)., portable eq-uipmnent-and consu~mables :will. be used.to..reinforce -an~jd.secure fo)r an 'indefinite copinrg,ti-rn thie

-mea~surtesimplbem~enedldurin'gPhase 2, mfainly additional bdri-iacid an'd"th~e-ability to re-:

• 'pow)-er equiipmen~t..

Agr~aphical:.e;,

reprsenta~tion of. thie Phase 1 tot: Phase 3 :str-ategies for-ma~intaining RCS Inven~toryCon'trol anid :Long Term 'Subcritic;ality (Mlodes 1 - 4 and Mode 5 with Loopbs

,Filled) is shown ;below.

• Page :60 of 1*21'

G.N FINA INTGRTE

PLAN, ait n h v.entorVyC.ohtri /t

• Long eT'rri Su~critialiity (Mp0des 1 - 4 a~nd,Mod 5 withhos FLbd)

Phase ' (Xenon and'SI A~ccumulatorS'-time 0 pto -:8 r

s.

,ps" Filled) o 1'

[*2 i8:,.. 24

,.30 " :36 4'

22 '"48

.. 5'4;

' 60' 66 72.-hr*.'

4,3.1.RCP S~eals ~withi Regard tO Ilnvento~ry.

.As a: res~ult of the 10O.FR Part 2,1.report-regardinfg the Westinghouse low !eakage ROp seals.," (inn.* do"es not in~ten'd to utiliize low :leaklage.ROP. s*eals fo:.its b~eyo~nd-design*-

basi"s externa~l *even~t mitigati~n,,strat~gie:.i.The WCAP-*17601. (Refe'enc8"19i) :Settion 5;.7.1 discus.si6n of Westinglhouse Gneic Casd" e Results with safe, shuidtdown/low lJeakag-e g*eal~s* is not ai&pplicable. :This sdtrategy iaddre~sses t{henreed..for.ad~ditional boratedl makeup*

• for RCS-invio-en oiiry onrl for the assumed flOP Modei'93 sealileakage.

To.,a~cou nt~for the bora.tion reqdirem ents for :the high~est' applicable l*akage rate for :the flop ;sea'ls an~d.unidentifiled,ROs l"eakge, a newly: installe*d "Alterna~te.ROs I:njecdtion pump powered from the niew sAFw :DIGta~king suc~tion frfomthe RW-ST and dispih:arging to' th~e ROS, will be used *to provide bo0rated. make6up :to thed RC-S.. :TJi.Al~ternatel ROS' Injection pumrp -islocated in. the-SAFW,.Bu.ilding. Th*is: a~rrang-e.me nlt inc~ludea disa:*!ch~arge iin~e r*out*d thiou h :a: protectedl portion of thS' Auixiliary Builddin*g' tb newly installed SI !linhe conniections on bosh tr~ais. T*he new Alternate. RCS.,Inj]ection pump:will be6.manualliy Alterniate RCs.Inj'ectionl pump tiaking'suction from th1e :RWST, qo~fnnected.,!t I~he :SAFW B uidicing "via a h~ighl pressure hq~se, to a. saa&d' cor~necti0o

tob the newlyij':installe(d :si infe conn4ection~s, or r¢epower Chdarg~ing Pu~mp :'B',f~rom thqe 'SAFW D/G *using: tem'porary psower To' provide sufficient capacity of bo.rate'd water makeaup to the.ROs, the new Alternate

RCS lnjbct~ion :pumfip. is ';ap'fabe o".f pumping 75 gpm-frbmthed RWST,,into the RCS :at" 1500 psij., Thi portfa~ble diesli :engin~e d'riVen Altrnte

• • dRCS Injection pu:mpi*s also capable' o(f pumpi ng 75 gp*m of bor-atedt water f romh the RW~ST foi the RCS at 1500 p~sig---.'.

TIhe t!iming. for ROSi* makeu.P is variable. A{t~he maximum Umexp~ected IRcs and RC}P seal, leak f!ates,,it 'is expected th~at.natural circulatio~n will trarsitbn from.sinrigle;-phase-loop f 19w to t'wo -plhase: loop :flow,at 2.8 hburs (RWA-1t323-003, *Refe~rence 57) from thie start of. the event and, that -two'-phase-loop ;flow will" be ;le-ss than :sinigle-pha~e loop*! flow at app~roximately 15.5 hoSu~rs fromrhtlesta~rt of~th:

everqt :(Re'ference 57t).

To. comply with injectidnis'i cu-rrentliy dir~e~ted to co:mmence 'at 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> :into the ev-ent.

4.3.2 ",RCS.Makeup with Regard to Sub~criticality' R-egardle~s.s of: whether th~eROS iS',.cooled doQwn or noE*lt,, bo ration.bapability* is n~e.cessa~ry to ri*iain tdi"he r~eacor sutbcritical once.Xenon* has decayed-a~way.: :The modificiation to

-install protected.FLEX Alter-nate RCS :Injection capabiliity, prov£ides, the. albility.to* =restor'e

-'and man.itain RCS inventory andJ keep the r:eactor.subdritical,.

Ac~cording:. to -WCAP-,176o1-P section 5.8, -:Re-Criticality:. _with

• Lowered RCS Temperatures, (Reference 1 9) Gin~a"will.heedd,to borate to"mainitainiK~eff less" than 0b.99

Page 61 of 121

'... GINNA FINAL2"INTEGRATEDP.LAN

," throughou't th~e entireCycle :36....The limitogiingime*:o start *boratipiob1s.endo-I~lfe,wh~en boraf*ion muLSlt sta~rt within 14-hdurs.,*f Reactobr-Trip. :BecaiuSe :it.is iheces~ariy.to place.

RCGS templeratures:. be i mited~io no iless thlan hot s1hitd own,;: i.e., 35*0,"F~d',i.

PA'-P#SC-0965., P~wRO.G Core Coo/ing iPosition Ppe#r (Refereince 41i), si.tates:. I!f.eoon Sgr~eae.r than e:q uili brim is req uired. to% aintain-reactor 's'i~b. ti6~]ailt 360a° F,: then 'irnitia~te bor*4*65".ti.on

.rot'6peak*

.xen6nh of 8 )hours' post t[rip*. "Otherise, in"~ritiate-boration #rior to xenon, deca~yto.level that may cause. re-oritica!ity at. 35o°F."

Th~e !ra~te of.boriie,.acid injeclion 'must be.sufficient_ to.offset ithe maximum addition of positive 'reativity :frpm decay of ijeak X-ehln,asso-ciated, wi~h*-100%i po*wer hisitory.

" Sufficient boric.acid ifromi :the. R6.fuelin~l Water, Storage.Tank..(RWST).canl also '*be injec~ted to co*mpensate for xenon d'ecay beyond the. equilibrium level, *"with" one charging iptum.p opera't~i'ng at its minimum speed, and thereb~y *e*iverln'g :in expess of the requir6d*

minlimu1m,flepw of appjroximateiy 9: gpm into.th'e reactor-co'o1ant systermi.", This required.

• Reactbr Eng~ineering fJalcul~ations (Ref~erenee :20), S'ectieo

• !8.18,. Minimum C..hargigng Flow RBequired f rom RWST, d0cumernts tlhat one charging.pump, delivering-a minrhum un of.9 gpm ;into'{

,.the :RCs, ca~n :keep up with* x'enondecay;. Nine igpm :is ba&sed on. a chargng pump# deliverV r-Jate of :.17 glpma, mriinus ' maximum.sei ieal leaoff-ofL.8gp~m. The basis 'for th~is *flow.rate. (from tlhe.Technical Requii-emefits Manual.for the R.R E. Ginna. Nuclear Power* Pi~ht. (Re~fffe~rece 28)""and0 :ACB 2009-01005,,"!Reference 29))" assumes thiat boration from the R~WST does not.:st..art# untill post-trip X~e.non equals :pre-trip Xenon (20 houri from 10i0% Pre-TripRTp -fro1m BOL p&r.CALC-2014-0.002).

CALC.-20i 4-002..Shows,:that letdown.is required to. support:. borating :to -the.RCS 'to main~tain.sub~criticality,with no RCS-,lea*kage...If at son~

rfeioint lietdown is desired, the R e~atoir::Head Venfts a~re the p refetlred method..

RCSi venting iis a 4conlti~nge~ncy 'actionif fRCP.seal leakage 'remains Unexp~ectedly lo/w..

W~ith' exipect'ed ROS leakage' following. an ELAP. e~vert, SI. A.ccumulator..injection wiill occur during.the cooldown. directe-d byi ECA-0O,O, Loss of.All Aq PoWer (Ref'erence 22),

and, is* ne-cessa.ry to maintain sufdfiiient: ROS ir*ventony for sirngle-phase natural: circulation flow (two-ph~ase flow is ac~cepta~bl'e if great{er than the single phase flow ratte) in, tbe,RCS.

Shbuld. RCP. seal leaka~ge ~remain un~expectedly lo~w,.ROS cooldown" will reduice RCS priessUre a~ndi.pressurizer level' but mayrea:Fsult :in.sufficient" SI :Accum~ulator inject~ion to pr~ovyide adequate. shutdown.margin;.

FSG-1I, Lo~ng Term.. RCS lnventor~' Control

'(:Reference.83), anld FSG-.8, Altern-ate RCS Inhjection, (Refe~rence !10:1),.provide :tables to,

.determFine.t~hel volume. of boria~tion r:equi~red, to.mainitain s*ubcritic~a.ity,' Xenon-Free at 350 IF, a~nd directioni to inject additionalibortated water to :the ROS.

If~venting the. RCS, is riequired, then twio-par'allel :reactor".ve~ssel h~ead vent :paths :are avail!able.i.each ipath is. capab.lOe o~f ve:tin~g 9_gpm of) trnakebp d*-wn to. a, RCOS, priessure of

,380 *p.sig...With bloth,.reactor yess~el vent p~athi dopen,. bonated. makeup at 9.gp'm can. be

,accomhnmodated.dowNn to-190:p~sig (DA-*,ME- :"5-013,: FLEX -Mis~cellaneous Calculations:,

R8*efernce 1[i.38). :Less tian* 9. gp'm.boration,wouldJ norin*al~y be 'requir~ed given* that the s*hUt.downi ma-rgin caloulat{ion,(CAkLC*-20!14-*0002,. Ref~inence 20) a..ssumned: th e,9.gpm boration :start~ed at 20 hour2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />s:. Th'e tw6" availabl]e reactor, head ve~nt p[aths~p~rovide° defenhse Page 62 of 121

,.1

.. 'GINNA FINAL,INTEGRATED.PLAN.,..

!:As doc~umented.inthe TechniCal Evalua~tion Repor-t o.n :Rac~toi"*,ojn~t.-System.Vepts* for*

G na' n.te SfeyEvaluation':by, the.Office 4of. Nuclear R,,eactor *Regulation, dated '

.Septemnber.28, :1 983,the n'on-conden~sab:I e gases:,,steam, an*dcir.iquids vented frbm the reactor vessel head,are*

pied and dis~charged directl yto :,th~e'irefueling;pawty :and,the discharges _from th*"pressulrIZer are pi0ed to-the I:ressu-rizer: reief tank. :The Staff found.':

that the,vent sYS~terr at Ginna iS a~ceptabl~ei.Jnd !*conformianhce v:wth. the requi*en~t~s of**

.NUFEG-.6)860" s tion 5.4.12.."i

-v

.The Alternate ROS Injection Sys'teiti uti.li~es po.sitive dislJ~acem!enit Plumpsi cSp'able,0of-

injectipg RWiST

:wateriniito thpe.R'OS -at 7t5 gpm a~nd 1575-,ps;ig)., FSG-1, ch:&cis :ROS

'p res*:urei LES:S iTH2AN-15-75. p"sig,t~hen dir:.8iec*t* align~ing,.and-est~ablishinig R.S In:jfection" f low:. Oeprator-s :are :di rect-ed toi conitrol RO~S ln*jedtion flow; to :mainitain°, pressurizer level BETWEEN' :13*%.[40% advlerse :*c~ntain*n'ent]' AND.75% [65%, *a~dveyrse :contiainme~ntj.

FsG'1t dir*e'cts.the: opera~tbrs to0- F.SG-8 "if RC*S. presSure i's NOT LEESs T'HAN 1575 p~sig.

If necessai-y :to support RCS rhake~up 'an~d boratlon strategies., FS,Q-1_.dir.ets 9operators reactor head vent vlv

• cannot be openedl,"th~enrOpe'rators ar~e direcy&ed toanhattachment

• th~u~ld-only b;ie used iJf no other *m~eans f0r RCS.depressuriza2tioni i~s avdailable." If pressurizer level iS..greater. than..95%,,.then Operators are6 to contact the Technical

,Suppod

)'i::Center ~tol evalu'ate -.op~ning a"pr-ess~iz&'r P~oRV4to allow w~ater relea~se as n~eeded ito :provide a b~r*tion letdown pathli,."-

• FsG-'.8' directs,Operatiors ito align an.available,.RCS Injection'*.Pu imp,.esta~blish.RGS coniditio)ns.sufficieht, for ']injec*tioip with. RCS.Pre ssu~re.LESS THAN !1575.ps*ig. an'd.

P~es-*urizer.Level LiE~S:STHAN 75%,i and :(ifROS Pressure !is not L:E;SS THAN 15.*75 ps-ig

• and" Pr.e~ss'urizer L.e~vel is ndt LE~SS.THAN 750/) ',then :ol~ned.,:actor vessel head ve-nt' onliy 'be, used" if noot.h~er means-for :ROS dep'ressurizatin :is,available.

If" t-he:r~eactor

've'ssel. head vent iv~Ies,are opdened, otperat6ks are "d*irect~d' to close' th~e :head.:vent valesI*8-F..PressUrizer.l;.ive, d~er~ease*; bi*elow :13%. [40%/ ad*i8ver~sie cntainm6nt] :OR:

,'Alterna&te "RCs Inj'ection um

,:lUfail s'.. Altdrnate..RCS I.ijecltjon flow is estblishe~d 'when*

"ROS* pte's~ure i* le'ss th~an i :..S75pis~ig 'and Plressurize'r levelis les~s* than.95%' R"RLVI.*S"

,upper :range 'is less*"thdn 97%. !

• CALC-2014-00,02 provides shutdobwn.margin input4~r t~he.tables~in.FSG-1, and FSG-8 to

.maintain subc'riticlc*ity, Xenqon!F-ree'conditions at 30 0 F. in the :Ros.."

A.water-solid-ROS is not. permifted..with.boration termination criteria in FSG-1I and"FSG-8.

4.3.;33 Bor'on Ad dition/Mixinig Section 4.3.2.of WCAP-.17601 states: "T~here,shall bie no return to criticahity once :the.loss 6f all* AC :power has. occu~rred. To ensUre-that thl4e plants i~rn~in subcritical, a limit obf lKff

.less: tha'n 0.99.(sU~bdritical).iS s'et. JThe "exact' needed level'"o s~ub'ritic:ality..is "somewhat Page 63 of 121:

"-*M'ITIGATIO'N:STRATEGIES. (NRC* OiRER EA-:12-*049):.

s~ubjectiveQ but0..099,,was 'chpsen because i:t provides some..margin,to,account for.the. :

best estiniate-or, genjeric reactor physics parameters assumed 'in this.analysis." J N*RC clatic.tii~n*`,:as!disc f~sediund~er*bullet :#8bb~eow:.Gi~nna t:ake~s: credit for boro~n*

response.Supplemental Re~os* :to-ReqLA'et~s for Addi~tional tInfrm tion 'R~gardipg.

Topi-cs :DesCribed by. Letters Da.

AuU 2, 2005 and *October /28,.2005,.,ROS mass flo ateie ase'urngtw apae flow 6 (igure

) Ad'_dp it¢iona dtail 5n thi gi~e two-phase RO:s' meas* fldw ':increase are...

"docuetd i

rpitr esigos Calcula'tioni CN-LS:-0.5-163, $SBL*OcA Cob/dow C'lultonRsut"frR..Gi

.(RG'E,) =Etefied P*owerUprat6and 422-V+ Fuel Ue~bg*radeiP'rojramn (Refereace 139).

W*ith *a riat h~e li;arge, c*hange-in (mixtu re deni~e*ty tihreougho6it: th*e cobre/h5ot,leg/SG: :uphill tube side* reiatives "to, th4e do*Jwnhill~ s~ide :(from SGi hea

.... remo:val), the flo velocity" inceass.This Qotntin:u'es witt~increasingve oid racion unil ima~keup* to the* ROs, and the de*lciin~e o~f dlcaY" hea alows ihe ROS"retUr*n to asu b..o.e s dtate.- RO. bora..tion

.to "suppobrt.cooldown ':will c:8redit t.h~e":l build U'of.x*n'o n and :the.: nece*s:*ary bora*tion W:ill

.be complete'd with,at lejast a* 6di~i b.6ur. m'*rgin t6i th~e :mi]nimum *shutd0wn margi'n (IKeff less th an 0.99) ito p*recliLde.crilical!ity an~d accounting for rthe added time ne~icess~ary! fr

-the addedbdrated water t6 mix weith th6 wate~' ihn th;e ROS."...

2. A planrt, sp*c'ifiicboron* anal~ysis w~s. p.e.iorred as :p~art of *CALC:20o1i4-O0002, Oy~cle 38 Rteactor :.Engineering Calculations.:(R,;efe~renc

.20),. to:

6.dete~min~e :boration r*quir*emen~ts to:t :ensure that h

B'.core rema*ins,subcr'Siticadl :throughout.the ELAP ev*en:t for-th'e lim*itin~g.condition with r.es'pect to shu~tdown mairgin. Fifteen p*rcent o6r gre~ater urdcert-a~inties.were :applied, to b*ound the bron~ :conce'ntra*tionh calcblatibns* f0or f:Uture dor'e d*cesig:ns., i-Mhigatidn *strat{egie~s en/SUre tha~t tthS:.e,"cr 'rS'ia~ins sub6-jritidal :('K~ff iess thian 0.99) throygho@ut t~he ELAP 'event :for *the"lim~iting,conditifon w*ith )respec~t to

,shu1tdown margin, ic6pi"d0 cering",bot h6' noRCP.s~eal".leakadge andi I:he. ma&xii*u RC*:*P seal leak~age )postulated v~alue.:.If no :RCPleakage occurs :during the. ELAP ;eyent,

bp'ening a reacStor.head 'vent 9aive :or'a Power

peraled Releiif Valvei..

3. :Ginna follo.ws -the gene*ric approach identified in'the P:WBOG positionp~a~per on boron m*ixir4.- that wbas. submitted: to :'h~e NRC on Augut 15, 20131, s:ubject: to the dlarificati~ons, i]n the," :NRC letter-to.the P:WROG,. dated: Janudary-8,.20.1;4

a. Stat~egy tieli~ne w"ill complete -boration with at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> margin.to pr~eclude" Critficality (i~eff, less than 0.99g) in the most lim'iting bonrd'itions.

b. Inject'ionwi'll be to ~the RiOSC~bS cldgsi

c.,Boraetion will *b~ecndluJded wellwi~thin 100 :hour~s after 'shutdown..

d1. Bor~ation ta~rgets or,: sib'critical~iy :(Keff less thla~n 0:.99)"wilJl bebased on the most e.. All.,steam (.en*:erators ::will :be feod: until the-requi~red.m~inimum *boron :injection.to

f. 'The :-reqyir¢ed timih:* for *5roviding :borated. makeup ~to ihe ;pir~ar~y system.. will con*ider: conditiions with :no r~eactor-cool]ant.system l'eakag~e"and with :th~e :highest applic-ablei leakage rate !for :the: %eac'cor" coolant pump s*eals" ah "uni:dentified re~actor cool ant:system leakage:..

, i....,.-"

g. F-or tihe."conlditiorn !associated.with :the highest a~p3lsicable r:eactor.coola'nt system l~eakage rate, adequ5ate bora~ted" makeup will :be provided ~su'ch thatthe lioop :flow Pa~ge 64 of 1,21

rate.* in two-~ph ase" n*a~tra c

-(

i rculation. do'6es no*it. dec'reas 6 bel'Ow th e. l oop. flowvi rate..' ":

correspodng tosinge-pase natdral oirculatiph.:."

Gin bds ytegnrcapoc ecie n the PWROG August~ 15, 201i3 pos*itiobn.p~aper T*la:t~d t6 i:6oeliniglith*' tfinp '-hd urilfo~rmity of bo1ri[c abiidrixik.ng within '

÷ the-'RQs. u**dr

.a~tu-ral~ieqiIc!tio. dn-go.djtions *potentia~llY i~nv,*vi~ng "two-phase flow;. The

,Calculations (Reference 20):,,whi~ch.analyzes f6r the mp6t limiitin cngfdrition~s..(kehoin~fr~ee De-s"i-gn, (Ref*,renc9. 1*.40), esue s

h.*]eSat ad.equate shutdown :margin* checks arPe performed for futcur'6,operain'g cycles. For th'e boration.str'ategy:

• A newly !nsta'lleb d"(.nUd eidctrically :isolated)"Alternate,RQ'S :lrnj~ti~o~n,Pu:mppoVwer:*d

,from,:the.new S.AFW 'DiG,,.taking s*uction,from,the "RWST _(30Q,00.0. gallons),*nd Sd ischarging to tfh'e..RCs, :is" ued to. pro~vide bortdi, ma~keyp to. the :RCS.

.ThiS.

AlterJn~ate "ROS :Injection pumnp is-lo*ated: in-the" SAFW Buiclding..(s,*,WB).. This ar[ra~ngement :indludes a. discharge line rmuted-,through :a [prot~c~t~ed.porti~on of the.

Au~xiliary tBuiidinrb *to,newly i#installed:i Sftfy,:!ldjectifin '(Si) ]:in* pbnncio**:in~s o.tn bdJth' trains: -The ~tnew.Alterna~te-ROS. lnj~tion p~umP w~ilbe man6uall[yalignied.. as-required.

The.. a*]ternate. FLEX :strteigy.,is to :u~se: a :diesel dr*iv6n poeittable iAl~terna.te. RO8 Ijec~tionf P~umfp. itakirqig S~u~ction from.the, RWsT,. Cqnnrected at.t he :SAFW Building W*all a~djac-nt to:Door. 99: via *ahighitpressure-hose.,?,td a& stiad donnec~tion.to,the 'r~ewly, installed SI: line. conn)ect~ionis, or r"epower. Charging Pump 'B' from :the sAFW DIG usin~g ternp~irary power cable6s..,

To,providJe s'uffic~ient.capacityof borated water. makeup-to,the" RCS, :,the

.n~ew Ailternate.RC:s.."!Inec"tion pumpl ista,pabie o*f' pumping,t7-:gpl from th~e RWST in~to tihe RC

,a150O, psi.',A po"rt.a~ble diesel. engine.driven hjglh.pressure Alternate RCS Ir~jecdtion" pump,1 provides :alternat:5!e' borate d-ma~keup* da pab:}iity/ to t(he!: RCS. Th~is p'.ump is als'o. capable.of Pumping.75 gpm of borated,water-from the..RWST to.th;e RCS at The (ti~ming for RC.S ma~keu#p is vari able.. At-thqe :maximum. i expected. RCS and RCoP s~eal. leak ra'te~s, it.is exp ected th'at natura c~..i rculation w'*(itran"dition fro m s~ihdgle-p hase loop flow.to :tWo-phase oo

flow* at2*.:8,hodLr~s':(RWA-1i3,23-003., Ginnha RBEL*p. rELAP Anablysis for :Mode 1,~ Reference 57):frorh the. start of the :ev~eht abnd,that{ two-phase loop dj.f!,o* will b:e l!ess.than s~ing~le-p1ha~se loop.-flow# at a.pproxim~ately 15.5i hours f rom' th sta6,rt. of the. evenit- (RWA.-.13'23-003).* !To compl*y w*ith.NRC.endors~em~rnt.of t'he boroni miixing generic concern~f, ECA-q0O, Loss oSf all AC Powver, (Referernce 22) dir~ect*Scharging at" 8 :hours *into the event (Set'pbint ID J.23; WOG Fl~otnot[e ID V.08d)"

'per. :75G-1,-i *.Long.Term RCS tInventory.-Control '.j:*e~fere ncei "8,3),. to e~nsure subcritica*l~iy is m'aint~ained. However,: it is ikel~ythe~t charging w~illI c6mmiience [eafirei-r

.per' FSG.-1l !bas~ed on RVLIs a nd/or Pressu~j2zer.leve#ls.

Therefor['e,. thie bora*tion time

..req.uirement ;is bOdnded b6y the requiirern~1rnt".to m~ainta*in RCS inv*,e.ntory.:;-":

Prior :todepleting :the.RWST-inventory;:,& a.mobil.e iboration urBiit *upplied. fro9m the NsRC /can :,be:u~tilized to :provide an ind~einirti source obf water for"Phlase: 3"boron

4.4 Phase

1,.

As discussed. iin"Mainta~in.Core. Cooling..i& Heat Removal,(stea~mG.enerators. Av~aila~ble) cooldlown is inritiated 'to-lOwer-RCS 'cold leg temper'atures fbr mraintaining the integritiy of "Pa-ge 65 of!2:1

~GINNA FINAL: INTEGRATED PLAN

~MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) the RcP seals and to inject the.SI Accumulators for RCS inVentor'y control and long term subcritical ity.

'4.5 :Key Reactor Parameters SG Pressure-PI-468, Pl-469, P1-482, P1-478, P1h479, and P1-483

• • SG Level Narrow Range (NR) -

LI-461 and LI-472;1 Wide Range (WR) - LI-505 and LI-507.

• .PCS H-ot Leg Temperature - T!-410OA-1 and T-4

-09A-i ROS Cold Leg Temperature

- T!-410OB-1 and TI-409B-1 ROS Pressure Wide Range (WR) -PI-420-2 Core Exit Thermiocouple (CET) -CETA and CETB Pressurizer Level - LI-426 and LI-428 Reactor Vess'el Level IndiCation Sysfem (RVLIS) - LI-490B and LI-490A Sou~rce R~ange Detectors N-31I and N-32 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level - LI-920 and LI-921 DC BuS Voltage-El/PG and El/PA Procedure FSG-7, '"Loss of vital Instrumentation or" Control Power," (Reference 81) identifies instrumentation to take field (local) readings (i.e. containment splice boxes) of necessar'y parameters, along with guidan'ce to repower instrumnents of necessary parameters at the instrument racks if field wiring is intact.

4.6 Phase 2 Borated waterSource To main~tain ROS Invgentory Control and Long Term Subcriticality,.the borated water source for RCS makeup and boration is the RWST.

Heating' of the RWST is not required. At the maximum boron concentration of 3050 ppm, the RWST solubility limit is below 320 F.

The RWST meets the definition of robust in accordance with NEI 12-06 as :follows:

The RWST =is a flat bottom, stainless* steel tank located in the AuxiliaryBuilding, a Safety-Related, Seismic :Category (SC) I structure.

Seismic: The tank is evaluated within DA-CE-95-125 (Reference 141) and is shown to withStand des'ign basis ssE load~ings,'...

External Flooding:

The Auxiliary Building is flood protected to withstand external flood events. The tank is not~susCeptible to external flooding events.

High Winds: The A'uxiliary Building structure isev*luated to Withst~nd thqe effects of external wind loads developed by designl basis tornado wind. The structur-e utilizes backdraftdampers. (Tornad~o damper~s) in,order to eliminate the effects of differen~tial pressure associated With design-basis torna~do (UFSAR Section 3.3.5.7,,Reference 25): The RWST.was Subsequently eval~uated for wind p'ressure-effects 'due to a tornado (UFSAR Sectionh3.3.3.3.1),.'

Tornado Missile:

In accor'd~anc&calculation 428-4824-03'4-1C (Reference 142), the tank, is-qualified to withstan~d 'the current design basis missile, suite. There are no exposed nozzles that could cause the tang todani tuck by a tornado missile.

Extreme.Cold: The tank is located within the Auxiliary Building, which has minimum allowable tempe rature of 500F per UFSAR Table 3.11-1 (Reference 25). Ginna. has Page 66 of 121

c,.

,¢ompleted a GOTH:-I~Calruiation for extr~reme riinirnum-tempprature* of th~e lAUXiliary'

Snow*:. The tan~k is loc~ted'withjh :th'e Auxiliary *B.ildin0.which ha~s been eya~uted :for 40

.psf ddsigni basis:g-0roud sno6W 1oadings, :The tank< is 'not stusceptiblie to :snOw io~ds.

.InjectiOn *Syst~em(330.13-1il230, A/ter~n.,te ::Chari,7#.g-*System, P.,&ID *Refe'rence.96),.was

installed prio*r :t the fa'll 2015i 5ref u"Iing;6utage,- with:f~n~al system *tie-ins m*ade during th~e "outage.i T;h"e" o verall desi~ignstra&te*g~y-is to :draw on5 tlhe.RWsT-.ahd :ipurnp :t.he borate*t(d inote 9 odlgd theRS i

h IIn The. Alternate RFO'S Injection..

LEEx pum~p suction,piping is tied into the R WST

.relcir~c~uiation! p~umfp *u~cti6h'ni~ii*.that: tak~es sutiop off !the bSottom of 'the tank,(e1. 237',";:i).,

,T~he 3". Alternate ROS. '-njection FL#EX p: rhnp SLu-ction. piping.. is *run :t~hrough f"the Aux<iliary Build~ring to

{:::bu ried_ lines.b::etwe~n th5 Aux.*-iliiar'Y: Bidingard,'d !.'.the.SAFW Anne.:x, 'to ithei:

Altern-,*te6 ROS Injection p~ump !in the 'SAFWBd~ilding. ?.The.Altern.rate 'RC~lInjection F, L EX(

,pump iis moun0n.ted 'on a~n 8*" concriete.pa*d.-: The"pos~itive displaceme~nt.p._ump :is.powered*

by th~e 1i MW-di'es$el gen~er~ator !housed in the. SAF."W Ann~iexl. It cani~ *(0vide" a floW~ of.75 gp a:it 1:500 opsig, :through* ia 2", pump..di~6harg6 lineS thi.at p~aralls th-}e suection lline.in~to thei*

Aux*iliary B~uildin~g'basement, w*est- 0"f the RBWST-and 'into the. Sa~fety Injedion "iA"' and "B" headerS. "The :entire fsyst~em *is manualtiy" oper.ated. anid contrd led, :making :it impervious t~o Au~iiiar'y Bdi!ldingfires orfod..

Sin~e.thep Altern.ate Rs'..Injeection. system *interfaces with. the, safety, Injedtion..pump disch~argle :hiad*er*, Sa~fety::related isolatii0n.v~alves. were-.installed to.prov*ide-a bounida'ry.

"Eacbh-Alterate ROS*{

.I*s.nj6ction

branch IJine

;fee.dipognii*to the SI. "A" :and "B".head~e~rs is" equiippec* with a :sa~fety: r.elated, normally,:cl~sedrball va~lv.y

The commobn lInqe :feeding *the

,.two, brianc: inhes aflso "has.a :safqtyire:lated 'noym al!y. closed ball v alve.:i toprvide d aouble.

isolaition :for*; each ;headaer:.' These :valv;es ar'e cl(assified:a~s Co0ntainment-ISolation"ValveS (Ci~s). Additionally,: a.check valve in te.ommon lin~e has b6een adcded" toe"nsure th*at conRtamrinated.wa~ter does no m*6i grate"thrpug~h the.Auxiliar~y Build*ing,to tihe :SAFW BUilding or. SAFW Ann.ex,-whicih are not Radioloicg~ally Cont'rolled A*rea~s (RCA).

sin:ce the.Alternate,ROS idnjedti0n,F*LEX :pumriis alpositivie displacement p£ump, a :flow pf" 75,gpm nfrom ':the pump :is con6stant.; A: r:;leliating valv-e ond :the pu~mp s*kid ensures

'd.owns:tr'eam: pres.sur~e doesrnot exceed the valve settring.-:Downs~tr¢eam pressure abo*.ve.

the.settinhg will ca~usea. portioh of t:he flow:'to be :bypa~s~s~d bac:kto' the :pump suction. i"Thie set ':at :17.758, to j1,875 plsig:tO., ensure that: :the :,pressure: remain's we-ll below t{he pressurfe/temper~ature rating of the dlowhstr~am p~iping:. *-

SECA-0'.0,,Loss oSf AIIlAG.Power (Reference 2J2), h*as the op~erators, mon]iforthe.Reactor fo~ri 'ubcriticaliity as 'a-*ontinuous: actioni steP 'that,!s :perform*e'd "imme

• iiat~lyafte!r SIG" d8epressufization (ROS coo1down) is 'commeneed.: if unable-tO :ver*ify sub~criticality Using nruclear *instrumentatiorn andan EL..AP is in. priogr~ess, -th~en F.SG-1 :L, Lhg Term RoS l nve-h~rtbContr'l ('Refe6rence 83), can bl~e performe~d.

Page 67.of 121'

MITiG:ATiON !sTRATEGIE*S (NRC *OIR*DERI EA-:12-0491).*

A:.trailer# ou ted-dies'&el ;driVen Alternate ROS lnjection.'FLEX p'unp: is"being provided as a re~dundant.p ump-to.the,pe~rmaneiitly no~unted 'pump.

Hose. connections,.:at valves trailer m~une:!" pum'pib'#i{*

tot e hr-ipied Alt:*Erna"teiROS In6ectionSy'.'

tem'*.2:.*d**j:*{i i:h

.additioni t the{i~:,nie" Ajteh~nat"dBC' RQ nj~ectioh systjem t(o in]j~ect 'bdr'teda :water fro'rn the alter~nate e--<ans of-"provdiin~g :.ROS :Jinjcti(."n. thr-ou#gh',an [:alte:rnate " inject*in poi0p[t is

avail*b e.

Thi~iS' alter*nate m~ans oif.]injdcting b6orated w ater into ith6 RO.qS, inivolves rep-ower~in Ch.a~rg~in~g Pump 'B'.from th'e :SAFW DIG-uii]zing.ternpor*y pwer c`ables :and rnant*i~ly lining up. to, inject.from the..RWST !to the-ROS :throUgh AOV-392A :(Cha~rging Valve, Regen*r&.tive H'eat,Exchanger to. Loop B Hot :Leg), whicih ope-ns at a,250 :psig

-differ~ential pressure to allow flo;W to theROs,.

FSG-1,Provio~des actions to :restore RCS. inventory. T.o ue thle Alternate.ROS,Inje~ction Diesel.Drivten FL.EX Pump, it is rniO,ed :f~rom its :st6rage Iocation to.east *of *the-SA.

BU-ilding.and conn~heted.to -the AlternateRcs.injectionSystemn via hiiigh pressu~re suction and d~isc harge hcises. Pi'ump suction is :aligned to ithe RWSTr anld di~charge to the SI hea.ders.,

4.,7.-Phase 3.

-The Phase 3 strategy for ROS makeup., including ~postulated flow paths, is basically the Pha-*s~e *2-*tr'ategy supplemented byeqiuipmenit aia~ilable :from the NSRC:.*

Prio~r toe de~pleting,the IRWST inventory, amr'obile.boration unit supplied.from the NsRc can be dtili2zed.to provide &n indefinite :sdurce obf wate'r for :Phase 3 :boro0 -contro1/ROS' inj64{ion.' :TI.pe.rfe[rredlSO.urce-'of w~ter::to sLdpply-the mrobile bora*tion*". Thitwil/:be tbe n~w.. SAFW Dl W&.ter::,stora*ge"Ta"nk-.-.To. re~fill-the* SAFW DglWater; Storage, Tank,-any

.exis~ti'ng* sou~rce 'of-,demine'{alizeid water on[i site.wi~ll 'be prefer¢entiially _usied untl <the NhS RC w ateri.treatmenitsystem arrives.

T ihe.boun*ding.FLEX "scenario to re.f~ill th~e SFW' -DI water storage.T~ank will "be to,deploy. a FLEX diesel driven por'ta*ble pumpiihwith a' hard suctio ho lse

to take SuCtion frdm '.the !Discharge.Canal. and, via a discha~rge 'hose w~h~en-th6 'NSRC. wa.'ter-.tr-etment' sy*.tem arrives, W:iater will "be' pumped: frim the disch~arge* canal *th rough t{he ~water-treatment-system to" the SAFW D~iiW~ater. Storage STank.-Boroni :su:P,.lied from thd N.SRC Wi[th the: mo6bile bor'a~tion unit w~il b6e Vvaiiabie to mix :with -t~h'e prefdiern~tial' wate.r..source-.for.ROS,b6r'at~io'n/makedp.

N~SR, delivyere~d pdr~tabie' diesel driven -pumps provide backup ca~pability to-thb on-site.FLE-X pu~mps.?

ConnectiQns are avail!able to supply the 480 Volt vital buses from an :NSRC Supplied,DIG

.and :-'for connecting* *NSR"C supplied.portiable pumps and thle NSRC-supplied mobile boratin o-andwater-prodessing units.

page 68,of 1,2.1

,~~ '.,:

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN*:;:

5*:!5lMaintain Core Cooling & :Heat Removal (:SIGs Not:__.

.*o~pre.*iot~t*6ion, and 6ontahinm'erit !integ'rity.;* :Th6.FLE* st rat8gie~s :h~av~er#*6i-' ce~i g'edfb~r th~ey can be impl~emen~ted iJn :many' difer*efit confditions as. it: is nodt *possible :to pl*redctithie:

exat.ite nibconditi.ns folldwipg a BDE. As such th taege'a be impe"e tedi

• Althogh g0NEI 12-o06 s*tates that the FLEX strategies are not ex~ilic~itly de*signed f~r odtaige

~

~conditionis,.due ~to tlhe srmall fra~cjiori -*of thie :op*'rbting cy'cile thati. is spent in-.anf outage Provision oQf prifi.ary and*alte'rnat6e connection *oints,provides ighei rla~lt:an

,heilp~saddres*s eqti~ipmnt bd*ih~g.:!oUib 6fsei~ce.,.

ge reia iit and

• .Spec~ific !m~akieup.rate"s N:and.'c6ni*ection~s.: wIll be siedis

• ato support outage coniditions, i',e", connec*tio-n l~oints :for ROs makeupwiill e size'd to support core :cooling.~*

~~~~(Referen~e 1*4-3) g:ives !:guil.idane rto follO'w the ;:NRC, enhd rs*,em ent.-(ML1 ]326:7A382): of the NE*I po*Sition pbaper on

,di:;hutdobn mod'es :(ML"'13273A:514):.

Ginna w*ill folo[Iw this Cooliing *(Ref erndn.:.t1't..),, a~nd FESG-1: 4.*, Shutdown.RCS :Makeupo :(Rdference. 14'*4),"

pro0vide.guidance. :Ginna :al.so :foll!ow:S" P-WROG143-Pi ;".P.:Su~ppleentalI:n forma*tion for Operator!Res~po-nse.to "Extended Lo*Ssof A.C.:Po~'er. in Modes 4 5 and 6 (F. efelrSce 1 45).

... G.inna a ddr*s~s'es,outage conditio1ns in thisstrategy.

~Bor~ated. ROS mqakeup,,Using-diverse.. makeup: Connections: to..s~ustain: residual :heat.

~removal t~o vented.RO.S m~ust :beprovide6d.

.Diverse.injection points.o~r rniethods "are.

re-quired~ to establish c*Japability :to finject throu~dgh :separate :divisions! t*rainS;,i.e.,; 'should not have both cSnnectipOnS in onhe division!, train.. iA~n n~ction, to* RCS for makeup :ishoul~d be capable: offl*ow,rat~es sis.,ffiqce nt. for -simultan~e~ou, cor~e -heat :r moval andbo~o~n.flushing analysisr.,On-s'n ite :p~ump~i (POrtablle or installedl) is availaible !for :ROS makeup.-,In :orde~r' to Saddress :the riequire'men~t. for diversity, if r:e-power~ing ;of installed ch~arg~ing.pumps i*.us~d

~~~for th~is :functionl, the"n. e6ither: (a) multiple p'0ower'* connection p~ints s~hould ibe p'r.vide6d io

.th char~ging:

pumpa*d:

or()poieasingle...orne~~b*

pio wet{r, a

u ply rta!

6hma ectionp *po.int fS'r the chabrgingpumpandat singlerconnection, SUoint:.,-

fo m

prabemkeup pumpis.an Aeanon s

buerafi e.of:,c,

be' provid~ed

byoff-site-tesources. (Refer'ence 4)

Page 69 of 1i21

,o.

• 5.2 Acceptance Critenia :,-r No core dam'age wilroccur., 'Coping times w~ill be calcuiliated s'uCh that they preclude Core,

-dala*gei 'The cic"i'es 'u~'ed",willntir' ho cor*"i:Oe'

• am'age=-ocdurs': (ihdhuidin' ming:itai-ning' Th~ere -will be no re~tUrn,to :critiC~iity.'once -the" Ios of all :AC power, has o6cdurred.

To eh~uie th~at he reactor1-remainissubcrit'ical,l a l]imiit pf *Keff ies*-,thani,0.99,(subo¢ritidal) is

'set.. The,. leve J of O.99 for subcriticahity -was chosen because i.t will, prov'ide s'omen margin to accoun~t, for the best estim~ate rea~ctor~ physics pararheters assu~med in the analy'si...

5.3 St*rategies

when o0perating in.Modes 5 and 6,.RCS cdpolin~g iS accomp~lished using,the, Residual Hea.t Removal (:R'HR) Sys~t~m. Th~e SIG's may no:ht be a*vailable :for na~tural c~ircula~tion 6oo6ldown if ~the RC* during th'ese" mode~s.: Once the RCS :is 9pened, forced feed anrd refi*uelting 7:..avty i$ 'floo~ded,, a sighific.anti amount-of t"ime' e!xists befosre. bo0iir~g :of the cb6oiant wou~ldoccurf:ollowing :a.lo*s of :the ope*rating RHR* pbump. -There iS :ample time: to

'Teh.hnical Sp'ecificationi Basis for. the,R.E. GinnQa :Nuiclear Power.Plant (Reference 27)

• B*3.4.8;,RCS L~o~ops"- MODE 5, Loops Not ;Filled* statesB that the S/Gsa~re not available as a h;leat stinkwdhen.the loopis are not filled.

O~nly !borated :water.should be. ad~ded -to t'he'.RCS to mailntain.dequate shutdown :margin (SDM)I]. CN-*TA-8-:1 48;, R.E.-Ginna '(RG"E.) iCyce 28 Relo-adSafety Ev~aluation r-Mode, 6 Bor~n? Dilution, (Reference,;21) dc~ument~s th*;t,the critical` boro`n boncntriationi is :1330, l:ppm w*ith ali the: -(Rod 'Clustfer: Conti.ol. Assemblies :(RCCAS)",ian the :cbre* during refueliing

.(UFSA*R *Sectioni 1t5.4.4.4.1'0.1,. Rgfer~e~nce 25)...

I' Podtential borat6d wa~ter soures :and ~pat~hs.are:

Gravity. drain frorm the"RW'ST.o thfe :RCS via the RHR System.

R iWST,using.thie paths described in.strate'gy :Ma~inta~in ROS InventorY Control!/Long D.*sig~n_,IAnalysis DA-NS-2006-01:I9, Loss.of.RHR Cooling during Mid-LOop. for, EPU, (Rferi*nce 33) documen~S¢*

tsm tf 8;hat]s:

t6'chaJrg:e n#ih& 6*

hing pumpspss~pplying

7.

p cpspl boi of for.a

.shutd~wn time0of 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> s or-St 0ge.at'e~ afn8()thatone c"harging put:Mxmp sdplm n 6*

a0i gPum canspplty boilofffor a shtdw tim of 80 hours9.259259e-4 days <br />0.0222 hours <br />1.322751e-4 weeks <br />3.044e-5 months <br /> or greate

'(aiu

'agi

.NUR EG/IA-Ol, 8*/1,.`Assessmen~t of.RELAP5/MOD.

for.Re flx CbndensationExperiment, pilanSts, t he$ ref lux -onden~sation he*It transfer in:thqe riser pa~rt of:the: U-tubbe is an :eff'ective he5at: frhmoVral "mech~anism Withou~t :thea',lo~ss of cooliant inventd6ry... -The :heat transfer "coeffici-ents nea~r th'e' tu~be inlet increase as the: inlet steam ?f 6w rate "nd' the syjstem Page 70of" 121

GINNA FiNAL iNTEG RATED, PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) pressure increase. In the presence of non'condensible gas, the heat transfer capability is' dramatically decreased."

5.4 Phase 1 AP-ELEC.4, Loss of All AC Power While. on Shutdown Cooling, (Reference 117),

provides the actions necessary for maintaining core cooling, containment integrity, and.

spent fuel cooling in the event of a cam plete *loss of all AC power While on RHR cooling.

Should an.ELAP occur in the window between exiting Mode 5, Loops Filled, to cavity flooded, the immediate response will be to gravity feed the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST). This will provide some amount Of flow,to the doie and delay or prevent.

core uncovery. In parallel with initiating gravity feed, a.dtionS will also be taken to initiate feed,and bleed cooling by establishing pumped i~njection* into the ROS using FLEX equipment per FSG-14, Shutdowrn RCS Makeup (Refererhce 144).

If available, the S/Gs are the prefer~red rnechanismfor core cooling. If conditions can be established for-S/G heat transfer using natu'ral circulaltion, inclUding.achie*,ing ROS integrity, ith~en ROS core cooling utilizing feed and bleed, is not necessary.

If ROS integrity cannot be restored and/or'conditions cannot be established for S/G h-eat transfer using natural circulation, then availab'le S/Gs a~re Utilized to Supplement core Cooling.

Analysis RWA-1323-004,' Ginna. RELAP5 ELAP Analysis for Mode 5 (Reference 93),.~shows that available S/Gs. will provide effective heat removal if S/G tubes have not been drained, and at least some 'heat removal due to refiux cooling if S/G tubes have been drained.

Any amount of secondary side heat remnoval that can be established reduces the RCS feed and bleed requirements and increases coping time until long ter-m recirculation core cooling has to be established.

ModeS5, Loops Not Filled and Pressurizer Manway NOT Removed See Phase 2 for mitigation strategies.

Mode 5,Loops Ndt Filled and Pressurizer Manway Removed The Pressurizer rMahway veit path *provides a vent area of 1.396 ft2.(CALC-NOTE-69, Reference 1!46). This vent path alone will prevent RcS pressurization (i.e., less than 2 psig) if RHR cooling is lost later than 90 hours0.00104 days <br />0.025 hours <br />1.488095e-4 weeks <br />3.4245e-5 months <br /> after shutdown (for 1400F initial Water tempe'rature) or 85 hours9.837963e-4 days <br />0.0236 hours <br />1.405423e-4 weeks <br />3.23425e-5 months <br />'after shutdown (for 1000F initialI water temperature. (NSL-0000-005, Thermal Hydraulic AnalySis Of the Loss of RHR Cooling While the RCS is Partially Filled, Reference 34).

DA-NS-2006-019 (Reference 33) documents that gravity feed from the' RWST has the capability to provide a large volume' of water quiCkly to restore level in the RCS during mid-loop (Mid-loop is defined as water level belo~w the top of 'the', hot leg (25 inches) operation and that gravity feed is effective if the RC.S Pressure is less than 27 psig.

Figure 3, Peak Cold Leg Pressure, shows that at 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> after shutdown*, peak RCS Cold leg 'pressure is less than 8 psig and gravity feed from.the RWST is available.

The Phase 1 strategy to maintain core cooling and heat removal is to locally open.MOV-856, RHR Pump Suction from RWST. Specific flow requirements have been determined in RWA-1323-004, Ginna RELAP5 FLAP Analysis for Mode 5 (Reference 93).

The analysis evaluated cases with a PORV vent and with the pressurizer m anway removed.

Page 71 Of 121

... GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

Mode 5. Low L~op Level The.strategy to maintain core cooling-and,heat removal With Low Loop LeVel is similar with the-.Pressuriz~r Manway,'reroded' except.tha 'a~n Qpierato'r in icommunicatio'ns with th~e Control Room'"is stationedc in the. Auxiliary Building by' MOV-856 dtUring the drain downi process Or anytime trie loop 'level is less than 64 inches, to refill the ROS.'

Mode 6 with.Ref uelinq" Water Level-<.23.:Ft with the.Reactor Vessel Head Removed Theintntof thi.,trategy,to inject-available borated.water 'sources into the i-efuielirng cavity to obtain r~efL4einPg water level Ž> 23 ft'. or Unhti 1boi offi 0fthe refueling water StArts..

At this tim,; unboirated w~ater.can be used to mhairntain refueling water leVel.

Inject borated water into the ROS to establish refuelinlg water level>Ž 23 ft., Depending on r'efueling cavity level, op:ening MOV-856. and :gra~vitly d raininig from the RW sT may :be effective.. OtherwiSe ';utilize 'the new Alternatie RCSlInjection PUmp taking suction from t~he RWST to :inject available borated wa~ter into `the ROs I refueling cavity (See "'Phase' 2).

DA-ME-15-006, FLEX Time/The Analysis (Reference.30),

address~es gravity fill effectiveness.

Mode.6 With Ref uelinqi water Level > 23 Ft Technical specification Basis for the R.E.. Ginna Nuclear Power.Plant B3.9.4, Residual Heat Removal' (RHR) and Coolant( circulation-Water. Level >.23 ft.,.(Reference 27) state~s that with ho forced circul1ation coolihig, idecay' :heat..removal from.the core occurs by natural cOrve'ction to 'the h eat Sink provided by the."water.above the cor~e. A minimum refueling' water-level of 23 f~t. above'th~e.reactor vessel flange provides an adequate available heat'Sink. Due to the water volume available in,the,RCS with' a water level >

23 ft.. above,the top of the reactor Vessel flange, a sigjnificant amount of time exists before boiling of. the cbolant wouild occur fo1lo~w.:g 'a *loss-of 'the reqjuired RHR pumli.

Des~ign analysis DA-ME-98-1 15, Time to 'Boil.Following L~ss of RHR During Shutdown (18 Month GyCle~) (Reference 73), documents' that at 100 hdurs.after shutdown the.time to boil is 5.15ihours,' and the time to core uncovery is 73.52 ho'urs.

See Phase 2 for mitigation strategies.

5.5 Key.Reactor Parameters SG.Pressure - P1'-468, P1-4,69, PI-482, PI-478, P!-4.79,,and P!-483 SG :Level Narrow Range.(NR) =- LI-461 and LI-472; Wide Range (WR) - LI-505 and LI-507 RCS Hot Leg Temnperature - TI-410OA-1 and TI-409A-'1 RCS Cold Leg Temperature - TI-410OB-1 and TI-409B-1 RCs Pressure Wide Range (WR) - P1-.420-2 Core Exit Thermocouple (CET)-. CETA

• and CETB

• PressUrizer Level "LI-426 and LI-428 Reactor Vessel.Level Indication System (RVL!S) - LI-490B

• and LI-490A *

.Source,Ranlge Detectors. N-31 and N-32

• ' Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Level - LI-920 and LI-921

• DC Bus'Voltage -. El/PG and El/PA

• If not disconnected for refueling Page 72 of 121

-GINNA FINAL* INTEGRATED PLAN.

• .MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

PrOcedure. FSG-7, Loss of Vital Instrumentation or Control Power. (Reference 81),

identifies instrumentation to take field (local) readings (i.e; dontainment splice boxes) of necessary. parameters, along with guidance to repower instruments of necessary pararmeters at the instrument racks if field wiring is irntact.

5.6 Phase 2 Mode 5.5 LOops Not Filled and Pressurizer Manway.NOT Removed RCS Heat Removal will be by RCS-Bleed and Feed.. RWA-1323-004, Ginna RELAP.5 ELAP Analy/sis for Mode 5 (Reference 93), wa's performed with the PORV vent path that" shows the vent path-is adequate for a mitigation,strategy.

FSG-1 4, Shutdown RCS Makeup.(Reference,.144), provides actions to. eStablish ROS makeup flowpaths during shutdowni conditions (Modes 5 and 6).

A p~artial core cooling and heat removal strategy that may be, utilized is to fill available S/Gs-to provide a limited heat sink function and additional time before boiling of the coolant occurs. RWA-1323-004 includeS cases with S/Gs~available that shows feed and bleed-.(steam) of available SIGs provide a limited heat. sink functiob* and reduces the

• amount of boiling to containment. AP-ELEC.4, Loss of All AC Power while on Shutdown Cooling (Reference 117), and'FSG-3, Alternate Low Pressure Feedwater (Reference 100), implement SIG cooling for this event.

Mode 5, Loops Not Filled and Pressurizer Manway Removed The Phase2strategyto maintain core cooling and heat removal with the Pressurizer Manway removed is similar with the Manway not removed.

Mode 5, Low Loop Level The Phase 2 strategy to maintain core cooling and heat~removal with Low Loop Level is similar with the Pressurizer Ma.nway. removed.'

Mode 6 with Refuelinq Water Level < 23 Ft with the.Reactor Vessel Head Removed.

The.intent of 'oh.iS-Strategy to inject available borated watei: sources into the refueiing cavity to obtain refueling water level > 23 ft. or until boil off of the refueling water starts.

At this time, unborated water can be usedto ~maintain refueling water level.

Inject borated water into, the RCS to establish refueling water level > 23.ft. utilizing the new Alternate RCS Injection pump taking suction fr'om the RWST to inject available borated water into the ROS I refueling cavity.

At this point, the primary strategy is the same as Mode 6 with Refueling Wate~r Level _>

23 ft.

Mode 6 with Refueling Water Level > 23 Ft If necessary to add borated water to the refueling cavity, the new permanently,installed high pressure Alternate RCS Injection pump taking suction from the RWST anfd discharging to the Safety Injection System will be the primary connection point for RCS boration. A portable diesel engine powered high pressure injection pump connectable frdm the RWST to the Safety Injection System will be the alternate method. FSG-14, Shutdown RCS Makeup (Reference 144), provides guidance for maintaining Refueling Cavity. level using the RWST, SAFW Dl Water Storage Tank, or Lake Ontario.

Page 73,of 121

-GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN:

MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-i2-O49)

Alternate RHR Following a seismic 'or tornado missile eyent there is a possibility of flooding the Auxiliary Building Subbasem~ent due to failure of non-qualified tanks and piping.. A Sump pump will be used to dewater the subbasement if this occurs. The sump pump is capable of dewatering the subbasement in less than 11 h'ours.

The Alternate RHR strategy will be implemented,per FSG-5, Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging (Refer'ence 109), Attachment I prior to depleting the RWST.

The Alternate RHR Str'ategy uses the Readtor *Coolant Drain.Tank Pumps (canned motor purlps), after pumnping out the Auxiliary' Building Sub:basement, to circulate water from the-RCS hiot leg, through both RHR heat exchangers, and back to the ROS cold leg. A FLEX. puimp is used to circulate water from the lake to the COW side of the RHR Heat Exchanger through hosing and a bonnet adaptelr.on valve 760A.

The lake water is discharged near deer creek through hoses conniected to a bonnet adapter at valve 760B.

The. strategy is justified in DA-ME-1 5-005, FLEX RHR/CCW/SW Hydraulic Model, (Reference 136) and DA-ME-1 5-01 1, FLEX Mode 5 RHR Strategy (Reference 147).

5.7 Phase 3 The Phase 3 strategy for core cooling and heat removal, including POstulated flow paths, is basically the Phase 2 strategy supplemented by equipment available from the NSRC.

Prior to depleting the RWST inventory, a mobile boration unit supplied from the NSRC can be utilized to provide an indefinite source 6f water for Phase 3 boron control/RCS injection. The preferred source of Water to supply the mobile boration Unit will be the new SAFW Dl Water Storage Tank. To refill the SAFW Di Water Storage Tank, any existing source of demineralized water on site will be. p~referentially used until the NSRC water treatment system arrives.

The bounding FLEX scenarioto refill the SAFW Dl Water.Storage Tank will be to deploy a FLEX diesel driven portable pump with a hard suction hose.to take suction from the Discharge Canal and,.via a discharge hose Conriected to the SAFW DI Water storage Tank, refill the SAFW Dl Water Storage Tank.

When" the NSRC water treatment, SYStem arrives, water Will be pumped from the discharge canal thirough the water treatment system to the SAFW DI.Water.Storage Tank.. Boron supplied from ttie NSRC with the mobil eboration unit will be availableoto mix with the preferential water so'urce for RCS b5oration/makeup.

NSRC delivered portable diesel driven pumps provide backup capability to the on-site FLEX pumps..

Connections are available to supply the 480 Volt vital buses from an NSRC supplied DIG and for connecting NSRC supplied portable pumps and the NSRC supplied mobile bOration and water processing units.

Page 74 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEG.RATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-1.2-049)

=6 Maintain COntainment.'

6.1,Objectives In.the long-term, containment pressure may rise due to leakage fromRCS adding heat to. containment.,

Provide a connection to containment spray header or alternate capability or Analysis. Due to the long-term nature of this function, the connection does not need'to be a permanent modification, However, if a,temporary connection, e.g., via va.lve bonnet, then this Should be iire-identified. (Reference 4) 6.2 Acceptance Criteria Co ntainment pressure will be maintained below the design. pressure of 60 psig and Containment temperature WiJI be maintained below the containment design temperature of 286°F (UFSAR Table 3.1"1-1, Reference 25).-

6.3 Strategies With an ELAP, containment cooling is lost and over an extended period of time containmen~t temperature and pressure can be expected to slowly indrease. An analysis.

has been performed to determine the containment-pressure profile during an ELAP /

LUHS event, and to justify that the instrumentation and controls in containment wh~ich are rielied Upon by the Operators are sufficient to perform their intended functions.

An'alysis RWA-1 403-001, GOTHIC FLEX Containment Analysis.(Reference 94), shows that during an ELAP / LUHS, mitigation strategies are necessary at Sorne point in time to manage the containment pressure profile and maintain containment integrity.. This analysis uses GOTHIC 8.0, has cases for Modes 1 and 5, and. was benchmarked against previous LOCA analyses.

Ginna is not crediting containment spray pumps to lower containment pressure/temnperatL~re in response to the ELAP conditions..

Water Hammer water hamtmer is not a concern upon re-estab.!ishing flow to the CRFC's (DA-ME-15-013, FLEX Miscellaneous Calculations, Refereonce !138). Ginna took a conservative approach and analyzed for column closure water hammer under DA-ME-2002-061, Resolution of Generic Letter 96-06 Water Hammer Issues Using 'EPRI Technical Basis Reports (EPRI 1003098 &.'11006456) (Reference 148), in.response to GL 96-06 even though the occurrence did not appear. credible for the GL 96-06 conditions..During an, ELAP is it" recognized that the CRFC's may generat[e more steam than considered in DA-ME-2002-,

061 and it is feasible that all the piping upstream and downstream'of the CRFC's could be vo0ided when flow is established.. Upstream piping may be voided due to drainage necessaryl for the strategy.to replace 4628/4641 with adaptor inserts to allow hose connections. Downstream piping may be voided given' that it may be many hours after initiation of the event to establish CRFC cooling'flow. The CRFC's may be voided due to high containment temperature and steaming in the CRFC's.

The two water hammer phenomena, of potential concern are referred to as column closure water hammer (water hammer that.can-occur when flow is established with a void present) and condensation induced water hammer (water hammer than can occur P-age 75 of 121

by.trapping 'steai,m b ubbles in, bold-"water/piping *with reSuLting accelerate~d/d. ecelera~ted wate:rwolum'r*es).

W

"*ate rhammer* o6*,6ccrre nce. following" an i*E LAP*woul-*

r~easonably* ibe

`D*A-ME*:`5.i(5-005, FL-EXHR/.CW/SW H*ydr~uic Modiel'(Re`ference *136), *pr~ed`idts

• flow..rates

'.within ::10 o/*of,those,used,in :the QDA-ME-2002-061' columhn *closure

• TO re-estalblish ifl~wf o the ORFC's :following an ELAP,.the steam~will be, vented *

• i*.finij,*tly Th*dude'ti&te-6dlih n c1osr W-e-ater.. hammNsch~e::al thiat th l

'*DA-ME-O.*ME;2002-061 det~ermine*d tihat condierisatirn :indu~ced water h~ammer wtas not S rates such that similar..refil codbditionis would dbe exp*iectd':.,-*.

i*

WhienIe the ClGBFO's "are* rief iicllid followting an :EL'AP, eve".nt: it,is :reasonable. to given "the lo~nger: dur.a~tion. 'of,.the ELAP...,:This :.two,(p.hase, mixtul-e..tends,:to a~it;e,uatle Wat~i hammers such. t'ha~t the " A-ME-:2,00;2-061I a nalysis re,.mains 6.4 Phase 1:

Contai'nment Isls0ation.Fol'l'owingFLA

'Contairnmien: *isoation b'ourlSidies"Yi areprovided with acti]t~ion and 'cortr~ol.equipiment.

appropri[ate :to t~he -vaIye t:ype. "Fdr examffple,.air-Ol~er.ted and.diaphr:agm (sauniders p~ate-t) v"alves",are,generally equ~ip~pedwith a*ir.diaphra-gm :Operator~s, with fail-s.afe op6:ration g6nsure~d"by r~ednaihdnt donfrb8. :devices in the *ih.Stum~ent ai

• isu~pply~i to te VaIve.

Solenoid: valves, are-al*sodes!i'gne`d for fail! safe operation`.`:`!*Moto:r-operated va~lVes ar-e capbl;e' o.f beinig.supl~ied 'from :reliablbe, onsi~teemergency power, as,wellas their no~rmral use"d,in linfies fhi mugt, r:t.iem~ain "in: servwice;, :at Iea:*t. for;-: atime, 'folloinig *an,accidelnt..

Ths r

lsdmanually;,if and when hei ine*s ar~e itaken out-of,service. (Reference 25, C ontainment Temperatur'e and.Pressure-,Response.

Monditor. cont-ainfrient status.- 'Conta~in~ment ~te#mperature a'nd pressUre arde. expected to

• rema*in below d.a6s:ign" liits:for ati least".72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />s:.

For :Mode 1,,.the analysis-sh ows that with nO.:operator actions, contarinment pressure wil slwl.ldi.incre*aseto" 2200F ov6ter-the"-S.m~e :72 :houis.,* ::Sinc C20 :psig iiis b-ew o

bhStai nmtnnt design p~r~s~ui'e of 60 )psig (UFBSAR 'Tabl~e 3.11:-!t1, Refer~ence 25)::an[d !22o0° is below the conta'inmenht design :t~eriperaure.of "2860F '(UJFSAR "Table 3.1-i :1),: no..mitigat;ion* a*ction-s a:re :*nec6ss~ary to maint*ain or r[.e~storecon~tainmr*en~t:cooling :durindg P.,h~*s 1 or':2.

6.5' Key Conta~inment Parameters.

P1-945, Containmen~t Pressure (0-60 psig) aP1-'947, :Containment Pressure"(0-60.psig)

,/page 76: of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

Procedure FSG-7, Loss of Vital Instrumentation or Control Power (Reference 81),

implements a strategy to take a field (local) reading of containment pressure at a containment pressure transmitter using a pressure test gauge, along with guidance to repower a containment pressure instrument if field wiring is intact. PT-945, CNMT Press XMTR, is located on the middle level of the Auxiliary Building and is therefore protected from tornado or missile damage.

The sensing line for PT-945 would be available to attach a pressure gage and take local readings in accordance with FSG-7.

Containment Temperature:

Measuring temperature of the containment atmosphere is not required for purposes such as validating the qualification range of measurement instruments located in the containment or establishing the survivability of penetration seals or other equipment. As described in UFSAR Section 6.2.1.5.4, (Reference 25), containment temperature instrumentation is "not required nor designed to function during or after a safe shutdown earthquake." Containment temperature is not identified as required instrumentation for safe shutdown from tornado missile events (UFSAR Section 3.3.3, Reference 25), and is not designated as Station Blackout Coping Equipment (SBO-PROGPLAN, Reference 32).

Analysis RWA-1403-001 (Reference 94) and the strategies to limit containment pressure show that containment temperatures do not challenge the qualification range of measurement instruments located in containment or the survivability of penetration seals or other equipment.

For Mode 1, containment temperature does not exceed 220°F in the first 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, and for Mode 5, containment venting will limit containment temperature to less than 250°F, which are below the containment design temperature of 286°F (UFSAR Table 3.11-1, Reference 25).

For determining the impact of adverse containment conditions on instrument indication in containment, the applicable Emergency Operating Procedures use containment pressure, not temperature. For example ECA-0.0, Loss of All/AC Power (Reference 22),

states: "NOTE:

Adverse CNMT values should be used whenever CNMT pressure is greater than 4 psig or CNMT radiation is greater than 10+05 R/hr."

6.6 Phase 2:

No mitigation actions are necessary, or planned, to maintain or restore containment cooling during Phase 2 for Modes 1 through 4. Containment status will be monitored.

Containment temperature and pressure are expected to remain below design limits for at least 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

For Mode 5 (bounding for Mode 6), RWA-1403-001 shows that operator actions are required to vent containment within 12.8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> from the start of the FLAP / LUHS event to prevent exceeding 60 psig in containment. To minimize the impact on RCS makeup strategies of pressurizing containment in Modes 5 and 6, and the resulting temperature increase, actions will be taken during Phase 2 to maintain containment pressure less than 7 psig and containment temperature less than 250°F by venting containment through Containment Leak Test MOV 7444 and Personnel and Equipment Hatch Inner Equalizing Valves; or by opening the Containment Purge Exhaust Valve.

Page 77 of 121

"GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN.:

" -MI.TIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) 6.7. P-hase 3:

For-Modes: 1 through.4, to minimize :challenging instrument op~eration in conta~inment, actions can be taken during Ph~ase 3to maintain :c*nt'ainmentp.1ressure.iess than 20 psig, which: iS bel6w the containmerit'design-pressure of.60 psig. :At approximately 35 hours4.050926e-4 days <br />0.00972 hours <br />5.787037e-5 weeks <br />1.33175e-5 months <br /> from the Start of the beyond-design-basiS external eyent (BDBEE), equiprrient~provided from a NSRc' can be available t0 piower o0ne.or. m-ore c~ntainment Recircdulationh Fans (CRFs) and supply cooling water from Lake On'tario t0~ one ior more Conitainment Recirculation :Fan.Coolers (CRFCs)..

RWA-1403-O01

'shows t1hat one CRF -and associated CRFC. placed in service.at 35. hours willireduce containment-pressu-re anfd

.temperature.

Pr-ocedure ECA-O.O,.Loss of All,AC Power (Reference 22), directs performing FESG-12, Alternate Containme ht Cooling (Reference 1 18),,to restore containment cooling using NSRC supplied equipment.

The NSRC equipment Will be used' to repower Containment Recirculation, Fans and. supply.water.to Containment Recirculation Fan. Coolers if Containment temperature is gr~ater than 200°F or Containrment p'ressure is gr'eater than 15 psig.-~.

For Modes 5 a~nd 6, the restoration of core cooling, as described under, the strategy~to Maintain Core Cooling & Heat.Removal (Modes 5 & 6), will alleviate the need to 'vent containmnent during Phase 3.

-The bounding Strategy for SUplbpying 'an.iindefinite 'source of water of Phase 3 contalinmen~t cooling will 'be to deploy a ieedriven porta~ble pump.provided by the NSRC, With a ha'rd suction hose to draft from Lake. Ontario, and.with the discharge bose connected-'to the Containment Recircu~latiorl Fan Cooler.(CRFC) supply side (outside of Cotanmnt va frehoe yp cnncto. r Hose adaptor inserts (were designed a~nd fabricated.to be placed in the lo0cation Qf butterfly valves 4628 and 4641 on the su~pply side of the B and C CRFC's. *This arrangement provides lake flow rates consistent With Design Basis heat removal, flow requir~ements-per DA-ME-1I5-005, :FLEX RHIR//CCW/SW Hydr'aulic 'Modiel(Reference 136.). 'Existing

.safety-related. discharge pip-ing returns CRFO, discharge water back to the Lake. A D/G proyided,.from-the ;NSRC can power one or more CRFs. '

Page 78 of 121

• GINNA FINAL.INTEGRATEDPLAN.,,

7 ;Maintain iSpent F~uel, Pool poolinjgl;

'

"*'{"

Makeup.to'thie 'SEP from,. portable-injection sources m~.ustbe' oxirevded Thje.various basel]ie., dapabitjties must include: :(Ref erenc9,4)-",.,.

Pvd mku o h.SP i h:,

nte uingfloo~r that ielxc9e~ds, SEP.

f b

,.oil-o~f~ftosi{'pSU rt lon-t*;Eirm c6ooling o'f spen~t fiu*l with *:!suffici'ent ma~keup.iii*'"

th t°* 6,xce e'ds ::SFP *:.bOiidff iand, iovdae* :a* m:ans !td".* spply* :SF m@*.aku ie*(W]t h~ ut.

,,a e* :sing th-e r~fue,*iing floor.

" :.;i -,;::1

.f". ;'.

Ensure ;a yent :pathway. for "steam &,conden*sate from. SE:P. Steam from boiling

,.pool,;can condense 'and cause access a~nd,equipment problems in thier parts :ef.

Provi de' spray* :ca~ablitbi tvia :pdrtfabl& erTor~Iito'r :nozzles froim the :rdefeling deck i *s'i*6na po'rtabl epump~for coolig :of s*pdfnt fuel fleak~age fomthe t~iSEP,xeex~*Ss

makbup cpab*1

• liity. A minimumof i2'0 the~J0

!'&SFP, or! *50 gp~m if* oveirs]pray occedrs, consistent with 10. CFR: 50.54(1hh (2) :must be plrovided.':

7.2 -Acce*ptabnc-e Criteria No ifuel darfage will 0,cc;ur,CoPing,times will ber c~alculate~1 *Such th~at they-prec;luode fuel dami~ge,.inclu~ding main6taining two-phas'e.w~ter levdl above t:he top of the active fuel.

There will.be. no. return :td'crit~icaliity :once t~he l10ss of. all AC, power has poqcurred.. To eis~i~e..tha8t rithe4 reac&'tor tier ai:rs. 'su-bcritical, a 'liimit o0f kef~f Igass t~han 0.99-(Su!bcritica.l) *is se*t.

Thqi~ level of" 0.99 for ;s'uisriticaiity *as cho*sen bl6a~u~e it will provyide "some,'margin to account fo'.r ;the be!st es timrate. react~r physics: 1parameers, *S*Umed in h ie an~alysis.: :-

,resuit in SEP,boiling,an~d loss of adeq uate "SFIP water' level-fOr :prote~ctioni of the sp~en~t fuel,,

.as well as'fo!ir n*liinte'nanceof sufficienht radiat'ion shielding "if ndo operator action. is take6n.

v:*h~icht*tim~e, he*at removail fromi ithe SEP" will b~e du'e;:o bqilin'rg of t'he waerw~it*i,:ih t*he st~eam' remoi-v-ing' the h*eat :from theb SEP.. In these cirgu*mstances, a" minim~um water l)evel of 5*'-9'"

.f~eet above th;e",top of h* "fuel hias bee*n' 'determined:

to pro0vi~de,,adeqluat'e.short t erhh'

.The in*itial SE F.coriciditio~ns are:-,

• :"A~ll boundaries of t'he sEP are ihtact

'.Although sloshing m~ay occiur~duilng-a se~ismic event, thre initial: loss: of SEP,inVenitory d

.e*s'no.t prelu6 c cg_*&*ss fo'th6r~e ~fi einfigdeck around the "o-.o*"

'SE*P coolngsystem isinta6't, ih~ciudirig *ttached pipi3ng"""

SEP' h'erat Ioad :a~su*me*s"te.i~ie axirAm 'design ba 5sis hea loai0d.

the '.basic. ElEX strategylfor imainta~inirlg :SFP c-.o,1ing: is 'to, mhonitor.SEP.wa~ter" level and '

provide, i-akeup Water t0 the SEP*: su~fficen ei.to maintai n :the norr~hal isEP 71vafer level.

Pag-e 79.of 121;'

GINNA FINAL iNTEGRATED PLAN MI

• .TIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-1 2-Q49)..

.With the maximum expected SEP heat load immediately following full cqore offload, withi.-

SFP water~level required.tO be approximately 277', theSFP will reach a bulk boiling temPerature of 212°Fln approximnatelyS h'6urs, and boil o0ff to a level 5-91" (Level 2 value of 257-0" )above the top of fuel in approximately another.40 hoUrs (for a total of 45 hlou~rs).unless additrional Water is supplied to the'SFP. A flow of 5.3 gpmwili replen~ish, the water being boiled. For a partial core. off load d~ring a typical refueling :outage, and With the minimUm allowed 'SEP wNater level at 261',.th.eQSFP will reach a bulk boiling temp-erature of 2i2°E, in appr~ximately 5 'hours, arid boil off to a* level 5'-9" abo*ve the top of fuel in *another approximately 16.hours (for a total of 21 ho~urs) Unless,additional water is' s~ppl'ied to the SEP. A flow of 27 gpm will replenish the water being boiled.

The FLEX strategy during Phase 1 of an ELAP / LUHS event for SEP cooling is to. utilize the SFP.level instru~nentation installed in respoflse to Order EA-1i2-051 (Reference 2) to monitor the SEP water levzel and stage a portable diesel driven pump for the addition of makeup, water to the 'SFP "as it is needed.to' restore and maintain the normal level in Phase 2. Under Phase 3 (using off-site NSRC sup~l5lied equipment), portable equipment and consumables will be. used to reinforce and secur'e for an indefinite~coping time the m~easures implemented during Phase 2.

A' graphic representation of the Pha~se 1 to Phase 3 strategies for maintaining SEP Cooling is shown below."

Maintain SpentFuel Pool coo!ing

_________________Phase 1 (21 hrs. to 45 + h rs.)

Phase 2

________________________Phase 3 0

6 12 18 24 30 36 42 48 54 60

'66 72 +hrs.

7.4 Phase 1:

The PhaSe 1 strategy will. be to monitor SEP level to ensUre COveorage. The modification to.install a new level._indication with integral backuP power supply will allow for remolte moniitoring. Water' addition is not required before the end of Phase 1. There are no Phase 1 actions required that need to be addreSsed 7.5 Key SFP Parameters LI-310, SEP Wide Range Level Indicator (NE)

LI-31 1, SEP Wide Range Level Indicator (SE)

LI-31 0 and LI-31 1 are powered from.indePendent,. non-.safety-related, 120VAC power feeds with indication available in the SAFWV Bldg.

C-cell Lithium batteries provide backup power" for a minimum of 'one-hundred-thirty-0ne (131) hours when normal 120 VAC power is not available. LI-31 1 may be powered from t(he SAFW DG.

7.6 Phase 2:

SEP level is normally maintained between 276'-1.5" and *277' (O-6.1, Auxiliary Operator Rounds* and Log Sheets, Reference 36). For 6ff normal conditions where SEP.level is tempor'arily lowered (such as maintenance, transfer Slot filling evolutions or emergency Page 80 of 121

......,,GINNAR FIA IEGRATED PLAN

..conditions), operation 'using the

...e sucbiorn.has. been..evalu~ated, T-his configura~tio.p

• • ~has b'een' :sh!own ito be ac

!cei~abI-e as :*lOng.as :the"SFP,i* 'm:iainta~inedl at a*n elvaierton i..:!

,/:

, ~Tec~hnical ReqLire.menSts' Mqnual (TRM) :Seqtiol T,, 3-7.-7.(Refer'fien*e28). re~lquires th,a~t 3.. '~ie ta urn h

0enoal,of:*ll irrad~ditd fu~l assemblies fr'0m-theirea-ctdrto sys,0'*

-*:z.!e~temssthal b

PEABE d(dgteach6omesrt ihteS etlaadwt h

'~~aft~i" s hutdo~wn shall be me6t.

The Precations an*td 'Limitations -in procedure..S-9,.SFP -Cooling System. obe rati on Ohnly the lo~we~r,SE-P cool&*ing :ucio-nCi ai :that: i~f:

the us.ei Oof onlythe..i6.wer suctioh!is.

O'l*'*opratio*nal' restriction '*pec-lu~des. 'd~rinirig' thelI:sP' :to ellevaion* 2*61"ft, duering iful! c6re

' 6offloa.ds as theare wOUld b5eoniy ;one :SElP io~olin'g ;system ionsideiredJ~operable:.

E~ullo m C ~e Offload.,

~~Witafull cfdi:6re' of~fload a~nd.initial.SEP t.emperatur:e.of 180o F, the.-time, to. 2120E in the SappJr-aximateily*-255s,00 gallons: of water w;":ith a d epth. of "ap~iroxim*ately 40* 'f eet:.anid th e adapproxim:telY: 6,32 *gallons' p'er :foot of ;SEP w*ater':lei~el "(Referernce 17.4), it will tak~e, pru ringa f iil cor ieoffoad v,iithin:

itiar S FP, emperature *,at 150°E a'r~d,sFP water l-ev~el :in the normal.range, it,:will tak'e :approxim~ately,45 :hours blefore 'maleup is required :using

~~~Instrumen-tati.On(Refereric~e 2):,

Partial.Core,Offload,*"..

~Anal!ysis 1 0g6*2-*M-021t,"Speht.Fuel Coolin~g Sys~tem ;EP~U Eval*uation*, Tab~le 7, Tota~l'

~~~~Heat L~oad* a~s avfurdicti6::on! ofTime R*eference 441), documeits,.that t*he heat Ibad,for; a full c' ore offload h

';teat la.id Fr

i.*-a. par.tial co¢re offloadt with. initial Fi f,*e,-pti ra*ture!a~t

-15Q0l :a nd S*EP level a

'evt.:

ioi n *261 f:t,-it wil ak(e.ap~proxii`iatel*y 21 hou~drs tore.ach 'th1e,

SFP:,:LveVi.2 val*.ue (257.-0":)., *(5 hou:rs to* 21j20E,plus 1:6 hou*6rs :to bol-o[*ff 4* 'fe6-ff,

SFEP

': :lMainitaffining the,SEP: :full ;at 'ail t:i~mes :durini~g the :EL*AP, ieyent,is,"no~t required; ":the,

~requi-rement is :to miaint{ain adequdate, level ;to prot~ct :the' storied sp~ent.fuel anrd :limit'

- exposqre: to peirsp:idnne on:asite an.:d o0ffsite.': Procedur'e; SG 1, Altern~ate SEP.. Mla'keup and C:ooling, (iReference 1"03),provides" multiple :strategies :for-establishing. a -diverse

Page 81 of 1:21

. ~Primary 'Str~ategv,

/,

"pump w:',ili be' moved frohmY its stora*ge lo: i or6a i n*:ft6.

"a liio-c~tin ffn'ear U*hef nortwest corh~ ir df

.,dischargeise: h route;,?~ i.to. the, iedgle o:f,the. SFF? ;ard *tied dow.Sufi["Sfiicient. flo!wi wi be-

. i~e'sjablsii:ed t*o red-over andmaintaiian SFi P le;el.: (Atta:*hme*:t 2, LFigur&*5)';":,

~ ~Ailternate. Strategy l 1 r

I,

'k

',t Z.

'~~~A a-ft~ern.ateSFP-P m@a.ke~up stratetgy: is, acomp~lished using:.a ;medium. pressure por~t~ble th~e "Scre¢en HouP,*e." Non-.collpible i s~uctior*[ h.sle.will bes dijroted :ilnto L;ba ke 'ontaro,ahd B litz'fire nodzzJls" located withini 75 :feet df th e *SEP Sufii*-

.SJ:en t: flow 6will ble establ*iShed :to:

'Alternate[ Strategy 2, Ar*othey a*fternatel s*trat~egy ini FsG-1 1 p'rovides, dire~tion *to fill "the ISEP at a flanged

• ~~dn';ctio6 5oint f -8~'v6.62.

T-Fii.*vly

• YIislo'catp

• in ithe: A uxiiiaryBii~i*l'dirig Baserient~and.

Sairw~ell 'anda *cross the AuxiliaryBuidingr~"*Basernent:"

v

..~Ven ff:P.athwa~yi for iSteam "& Cond*ens'ate *froem SEPR

.~includes *th6e SEP, area) in r~esponsie to(' :a lo9ss oft focd averfitiation' :during ;an iELAP..' The.

pur~pos.e o:f.this ;*anlysi~s,.. isto-establishl f thp [neces~sariymitiigating. actions and6..requ ied

.Com~5ens6atory."ac.tioens, arei r#eqired tomint*a~ni~n t.h~e; Auxiliary.B.Uidin*ig: withiin ac4eptable

~~temper iatu~es." :These a*c~tion's; incliude openin-g,dors and bclbdkdr'a~ft ~fuers (Torn*ado.

~~ECP-.15-000585:-ON-QOlj,.u.se of C:iPB. RollUp.Doors..*in L,,!ieu :of. Tornad.o,Diam*pers (Ref*erence 1 !50),. comBar:e.d t~e flo6w rate through the-b&.ckdra~ft d~amp.ers i:with' flow "rat*s CPB !do, rs imay..be used. in lie~u.-of torna~do,damper!s :for ventifng,. iECP-1 :5-00Q' 85-CN-

.001 donclu~de, ftha.t te CP¢:B rpii q;'p~idoqrs provyide ".:e;tter* AuJ~iiia*y Building,ventilati,6n th!le A*B/CPB" doo*is :ar foeeid

• "*.in lieu.of the6' AU~dliiaryBu~ilidn~g' torhaadoda*mp*e~ Stha*t the' results of 6::CALC-201i,4:0O6

,for6 'extreme ihot qcnfditions: r~emain bounding: an~d.useof t-he AB/CPSroll-up-doors i~s 'an;aoeptal ialt.e.rrinthje'.:...

.The tee.iperatur6: limits.for,*tie Auxiliar y: -Bu ildfing Op*ratin&'g l !eveli and a'bovea~re.d.riv~en :by

.the lim[its..for the spent,,fu~el' leel idic.ator..and-aSociated equipmient. ::There a#re, no

'significant. operator Onth action*...to be: ta.ke'h ~*th'per;atingi fpoer' of t~he-Auxiliary ::Uild.ing

"(only trave#rs~ing the.area *nd ~lopening: door*s/dampers').

For thii* rieason", :there a&re. no Sexpliipit accep~tanqe. criteri-a for, t~m per~atU'res a.dtithis.level., All l.wer leve v:tem peratuyre*.

• where.work."is being performed"'shouldi be *below'i[ 110.deg'rees"Fahrenheit -Which,is.an t ~Page 82.0f 121,

"<GINNA FINAL INTEGRATE-D PLAN :.,, '.

M:' ITATIO'N ST*RATEI"_.ES (NRC OREREA-:12-049) :...

S.acceptalt*'e teme*'#rature pey r'NUMAR.:87-00. -.NEI :712-0J6 allowsoSiir reason:,bl ejudgmenpts,.

" for. beyontd 'design'basis scenarios; therefore,*:short :duratins that :cause the temea&{.

'"i...

FgSG*5:,. InitiaI Assessment,.and,- FgLEX Equ.iorneht. Staging '(R'efererice.* 109.),, initiateg.

,in-:i4i*.-

[ia.

Buldl6i".g: a~nd Cai~rist'er. Prepiaration Bu!iOlding, as.Well a8s thie..A1~iiiary" 7.7-* Phasie.3:,"-

The Sarme. strategies empilioyed in Phafise.2 cani be..employed in Phase 3 Using. NSRC equipmnent...

,Page 830of 121i

8,,-Safe~ty Functions Suppor~t.:.,

8.1:

O bjectives -,,.. '

The strategies for ithis. secti6n 'involve suppor6t eq*uipie;it thti :facilita~t:s, :but dpes jnolt

• ' Battery Rooml Hydrogen CSontrol1,

• .,pebri~s rem*oval,..6quiprent transport, and fuel :transpo~rt..equipment, D. ies'el Fuel, and

• Co~mmunicbations, 8.2 'Ph*sel 1 8.;2.1.Vitali Batt~eries DBesign aalaysis _DA-EE-97-0'69), Sizing of Vital Batt~eries A" and B,- (Reference.53) show0,is that.th¢ Ginhi s :t'atid o :b't~te~rie'*.are -adequa~te i6o iustal'in poe~r to t h e-:, current iad. profiles.

Sfor. :thedlurati*:on ofafdiur houri "station,blackout:, uising '*ite*p'eratuiwe o0f i550F..In addition, :

ECA-.OA(,,

"Loss. of A flA G F*ower,.(Referen*ei. 22)' plroviades load *shddin'g :guidance* :to ithe" DA-!EE-20O01-028, Vital' Battiery 8 "Ho~ur Capacity,: (Refer~nce.55.,)

wa:* subs equ~ently

.perfo0"ed ;and c*:eocment*'

• an 8 hor ca.p.acity *given*:th.*1e 'loa6d,sh`edcding *direct`ed !by irzis'trum*entatio°n availab~le aft~er an ELAP eve-nt.

F.""=

D-DEE~-2O-1-0:I28,.Attachment& 3,ists t:he loads r~emoved frqm B-ttery A.

DA-EE-.2.0.0-628. provi'des.th'e di-rect c'i-rent.'(dc) load plb_6!i~ (in::tabl~eorat wf0*ii.ith*

the requiLired loadis fp-,the rilitigation st{rategies,to1 maint'ain cor~e I

eirihg, cont~inme..t,.anld. spent.fU~el pool.

.. e~ut#,.,:.ion:t tbBat'teryA, andc o:nlV durintig :the pe:1ri*dIfr6m 12: minlo}.24s.5.5 hun,.: =:5O.%o:fith' ef~fect~s ofl~oad she'dding for :B~ttery. B:::latt'e~ry Bis shown to :be. ad'qua*-t~eiy siz)ed..fo.r an 8-hou..*r S*BQ itho':ut proc0..edural"load "sheddair~g (SBO-P#ROGPL"AN" Para~graph 7.,2.2 (Ref~erence 32)).-""

'=

.The" miniimur* dc 'bus vdliag'e required, to" ensure:,5plrer.opertation :of.a~ll. required.

electrical equipIment is :198.6 V. *This -ensures that 'dev ces supl~iOed b~y th~e batteries havee. adeqUate voltage.lev~els after, accounting for line. losses betw.een *the,battery.

ter(mina!s? 'an~d"th~e. d.evices :.(Technic.al:

CSpedifioat'iohf : :Basis.- B.3.8.6, ; Ba~tte Cell!I Parameters; :Refer~er}fe 2:7).

Desigjn Analysis DA-EE-'.99-047, 125.VDC Ssybtem Loads Page84of 121

GINNA FINAL iNTEGRATED PLAN

,MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049).

-a~nd iVoltages: (Refe~rence :14),.provides.a.detailed" analysis *supporting this' minimum.

voltage number..,.-

8.2.2,Emergency Lighing As descr~ibed in UFSAR,-Rev 24, section 9.5.3, Lighting.Systems (Reference 25): Fixed emer:geny lighting idnits are* p*rov.ded: in Saety-r~elated aras-*

an.d.other.-:ares which

'cna fire ha:zards to-facilitate memrgency operationS,. maniual 'fire-f ightin~l, and access

' ~ndegress.froimneach-des~ignated. fire.are6,

.:e

h~ligh~ting u~hitS a8r.( "8-heur rated [b:ut

.are.not. seismi~cally qu~alified]. :In additionf to. the fixed l~ighting Systems,.portable battery-p:owered hand lights-ar~e.provided." Ginina safe shutdown. panels *are.loc'ated in sever~al areas of the plant. The lighting :at.the.safe Sh-utdoWrf a'reas has.been !determined to bee suff#ic-ient to" perfform.all ;requir'ed safe. shutdlown -ta~ksl: This determination was' mbde b; a.lig~hting,survey conduudted -in conjlunctionjwith :10. CFR.50.App~endix.R COmplianCe efforts.:. The Control R~oom 125-Vdc em~ergenicy lgh'ting syst[em comes o'n for" os~s"of ac power [doeS not load shed by *FLEX].

Th~e COntrol-Room emergency i ghting fixtd~res ar~e fed'.from ei*ther~th6 Ao~r :B station ba:tteries. In the event of lossof :ei'ther battery ithere is a transfer.switch in.the. Control Room by. which the operators :can. man.uallV¢,'switc~h thqe emergenc~y.ighI~ting feed from oen train to the* other. Sho:uld loSS of either b~atter~y occur in the emergency lighting mode,,,.an 8e-hour-rated emerge~ncy l!ight fixture Ioca~ted near the transfer switch shal re m& n functional to pro~vide Sufficienlt lgh~ting to"perform the transfer.

Thqe: 125-V. dc power supply.up to the point of termination :at the. emergency l!ighting fixtur'e'. is Class. 1E and Seismic, category I. The.emergency lightinig fixtures are standard. A prototype fiXtUre, has been S~eismically te~ted ini accor~dance with IEEE 344-1975 :to.enSure -contin~ued oper~ation of,the fixtures in the* event of an' earthquake.

In addition, a n analyVsis. of.the seismically rein~forcedl s~uspe~pded ceilirig has.been performed to ensure that the ceiling,* includi~ng t~he.normal andl emergency lighting fixtu~res,.does rnot create a' hazard to Control Room per'sonnel or safety-related equipment during a seism~ic event..

Lighting in.the SAFW Apnnex Building.is automatically *powered from theSAFW DIG

• when fin operation.

Initial lighting.in the SAFW"Building Room will :be" fro0m8-hour Appelndix R.battery pow~ered lighting, with portable flood, lights =being available to be deployed. '.The door to the SAFW Annex can be oPened, to hielp with lighting in.the SAFW feed room.

8.2.3 HVAC Aha'lyses of. multiple plant.areas have been completed to evaluate the.effects of.loss of heating ventilating and a.ir conditioning (HV/AC) during an ELAP event.

GOTHIC calcUlations were perfr'm'ed aS foilows and residlts incorporated into mitigati0n strategies:

RWA-1 316-901, FLEX Intermediate Buiilding GOTHIC Heat Up A4nalysis (Reference 151).

.This includes: TDA.FW pump and-SRV/SV areas, which are Io~ated in the Intermediate Building.

RWA-1 403-001 -GOTHIC FLEX Containment Analysis (Refer~ence.94-)

RWA-1433-001, Ginna Standby Auxiliary Feedwater *Room Heat-Up Analygsi (Referen~e. 15.2)

CALC-2014-0006, Auxiliary Building Environmental Conditions during ELAP (Reference 153).

Page 85 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12.-049)

For" ELAP GOTHIC calculations, the. maximum, and ~minimum outside ambient

.temperature assum'ed is 1000F nd-6F~respectively (Refer-ence Ginna UFSAR section 2.3.2.2).. The c'alculations assume reasonable ambient temperatulre in the associated rooms prior to the1loss of all 'AC power. 'The GOTHIC models simulate actions such as opening of doors or installation of fans,.as necessarY,.to obtain airflow.l Equipment and HVAC strategies a~re based..on the resdltS" of.these calculations, to ensure that temperatur'es *remain within personnel and equipment limits.

ELAP Specific GOTHIC.analyses.were not. performed for the.Battery Room/Relay Room/Control Room.

DA-ME-15-0.12, FLEX HVAC for Control Room and Battery Rooms (Reference 154) used Mathcad 14.0 topredict heating' and cooling needs for the Control Room and Battery Rooms' during ELAP conditions (with,extreme hot and cold weather).

Control Room, Relay Room, and Battery Rooms. Habitability Plant specific analyses were performed in August"I1990 (Referen~ce 59).and December 15, 1993.(Reference, '60)> to determine the maximum expected stat ion blackout temperatures 4or the Battery Rooms, Relay Room, and the Control Room with the fdllowing.results:

Area T[emperature

'Reqiuired Operator Action.

Control Room 1 15.9°F

a. Open doors to turbine deck

b. Open cabinet doors Note: Flow through ceilirhg tiles.have. replaced selected solid tiles to eliminate the need for Operators to remove tiles during a blackout.

Battery Room 1A 108.2°F None Battery Room lB 106.20F None Relay Roorm 1 03°F None Ginna's-design basis vital station battery sizing calculation DA-EE-97-069, "Sizihg of Vital Batteries A and B, (Reference-53) utilizes a minimum Battery Room ambient temperatu~re of 55°1F. This temperature-was Utilized for both th~e station blackout a~nalysis (4-hour coping period) as well as the SI Sequence ana~lysiS. Ginna ha~s' alSoperformed a special case analysis to verify the capacity" of the sta~tion batteries for 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> under DA-EE-2001 -028, Vital Battbry 8-Hour Capacity (Reference 55). A more realistic rrinimuim Batte'riy Room ambient temperature of 65°F is used.for this arialysis.

Elevated temperatures are not considered in these analyses as they' actually-improve battery performanice bylowering the internal'resistance of the battery as well.as speeding up the internal chemical reactions.

As discussed. in section 7.5.3.1 of DA-EE-97-069, the 55°F ambient temperature is conservative and would not b~e seen in the Battery Rooms. DA-ME-99-033, Vital Battery Temperatures during Station Blackout Event, (Reference 1,55) has demonstrated thlat the Battery Room temperatures Will not drop below 6~5°F during an 8-hour period.

Page 86 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

Therefore, a 65°F minimum ambient temperature was used in the extended SBO analysis. The DA-ME-99-033 calculation uses a set of very conservative assumptions (e.g., inverter heat loads not credited, which would add several degrees to the rooms).

Using the 55°F (650°F for the extended SBO analysis) ambient temperature in the battery sizing calculations provides conservative margin in the analysis. Therefore, the station battery is shown, through the existing design analyses, to be able to perform its function for the duration of an ELAP event.

Intermediate Buildingq (IB) Habitability A GOTHIC calculation has been performed for both the TDAFW Pump and the ARV areas of the lB for the Ginna SBO Program (Reference 32).

The results of these calculations indicate that with doors $37F, S44F, and SD/55 opened within 30 minutes, the ambient temperature of TDAFW Pump' area is between 11 0°F and 11 5°F (Reference 58).

With this result, equipment operability is not considered to be of concern.

Calculations utilizing the NUMARC 87-00 methodology performed for the ARV area have yielded a resultant ambient temperature of between 117°F and 122°F (Reference 58) with doors S37F, S44F, and SD/55 opened within 30 minutes. Operator safety concern~s with habitability in the ARV area of the Intermediate building caused a cautionstatement at the beginning of ECA-0.0 (Reference 22) to be written. The caution states that, "Due To Potentially Extreme Environmental Conditions, Caution Should Be *Used when Entering The Intermediate Bldg For Local Actions."

Protective clothing (ice vests) may be required by the Operators at the Operators discretion when Occupying these areas to perform manual actions, such as TDAFW flow Control Valve throttling, ECA-0.0. The ice vests are not considered to be required station blackout coping equipment and are not proceduralized, but are regularly inspected being treated as ordinary safety equipment.

(Reference 32, Section 7.2.4). The calculations for the TDAFW Pump and ARV areas of the lB show stable temperatures at the 4 hour4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> SBO coping time.

Calculation RWA-1 316-001, FLEX Intermediate Building GOTHIC Heat Up Analysis (Reference 151), documents the develoPment and results of a GOTHIC model of the Ginna lB under an ELAP / FLEX scenario.

The model evaluates the building temperatures consistent with the plant's current coping and mitigations strategies and assesses the effect of potential operator actions. RWA-1 31 6-001 concludes that the lB GOTHIC model above predicts conservatively high temperatures for the TDAFW Pump and ARV areas, and that once temperatures are reduced by opening of doors S37F,

$44F, and SD/FF, steady state temperatures of approximately 117°F at the ARVs and 11 0°F at the TDAFW Pump are maintained.

Service Buildinq Habitability This is a relatively large open area with no significant heat source located in the proximity of the coping equipment (CSTs and associated level transmitters). Therefore, no significant ambient temperature rise is anticipated.

Auxiliary Building (RWST area) Habitability Minimal heat loads would be present in this area during a station blackout. This area was analyzed assuming a LOCA and a simultaneous loss of ventilation.

The results demonstrate that the ambient temperature rise in this area is nominal and will not preclude operator habitability or equipment operability.

However, with an ELAP event, the loss of SFP cooling will result in SFP boiling and the release of steam into the Auxiliary Building. This impact is addressed under the SFP Cooling safety function.

Page 87 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

SAFW Building Annex RWA-1 433-001, Ginna standby Auxiliary Feedwater Room Heat-Up Analysis (Reference 152), documents the SAFW Building and SAFW Annex temperature response for HELBs, Appendix R cases, and Fukushima/FLEX cases. The calculation includes assessment of temperatures of key Components within the SAFW building.

SAFW ventilation is established under ATT-5.5, Attachment SAFW with Suction from DI Water Storage Tank during SBO (Reference 97).

SAFW pumps depend on ambient cooling such that ventilation is adequate to ensure temperatures are acceptable. The new permanent RCS Injection pump in the SAFW Building will depend on ambient cooling. The selected pump motor has Type H insulation such.that it is qualified for well beyond predicted room temperatures for thousands of hours.

ECP-13-000975-015-7B-01, Design Change Technical. Evaluation, (Reference 156) documented acceptable SAFW Annex DIG air system flow resistance.to satisfY radiator flow requirements.

RWA-1433-001 modeled ventilation for the Annex DIG. Case 6 simulated FLEX conditions.

The analysis outputs were provided as maximum temperatures for different room elevations.

Annex DIG temperature constraints are satisfied by comparison of ECP-1 3-000975-01 5-7B-01 requirements against RWA-1 433-001 predictions. One temperature of potential ihterest is the engine air intake. ECP 000975-015-7B-01 documents the engine will derate if the air intake temperature exceeds 122°F. The GOTHIC analysis identifies a max air temperature of 123°F below 10 ft. elevation (air intakes are at approximately 7 foot elevation). The engine air intake temperature is expected to be significantly less than the max prediction of 123°F given the location of the engine air intakes in the room air flow. The engine air intakes are upstream of the engine and face the incoming outside air such that the engine intake air is not expected to be heated significantly.

RWA-1433-001 (Reference 152), a Gothic model analysis of the SAFW Annex interior temperatures, including limiting cold conditions, determined that additional heating must be provided to maintain temperatures above 40F to prevent water from freezing. As a result, a 15KW electric heater was installed in the Annex DIG Room (ECP-13-000975, Reference 157). The analysis shows that no additional heat is required in the Annex, aside from that being provided in the DIG Room. The Annex heater is thermostatically controlled to maintain room temperatures above that required and can be powered from the SAFW DIG if needed.

To support SAFVV equipment functionality during potential freezing conditions ECP 000995, "DDSAFW Annex Building -

Mechanical Scope," (Reference 157) installed vendor-designed heat tracing on the SAFW DI Water Storage Tank sample lines, tank suction piping, tank' return piping, and recirculation piping.

During an ELAP, the heat trace installed in these areas can be powered from the SAFW DIG. Furthermore, the DI Water Tank Recirculation Pump and the DI Water Tank Heater, which can maintain tank water temperature above 40°F, can be powered by the SAFW DIG during an ELAP. As a result, freezing of these areas during a station blackout is not a concern.

The Alternate RCS Injection Pump, powered from the SAFW DIG, utilizes the RWST as a source of water for RCS makeup.

Initially, the Alternate RCS Injection Pump suction and discharge piping is filled with unborated DI water. As a result, Boron precipitation is of no' concern during this time. However, upon initiation of the system, borated water from the RWST is injected into the reactor via Safety Injection piping. Per the UFSAR (Reference 25),

the maximum boric acid concentration within the RWST is Page 88 of 121

..a.'p-pi*roximately' 1 7:5* Wt% ibprid *acid..

"At*.,20iF, th olue~ibii~ty limit.o~f !boric acdid, is 2:.2%; :.

thrf*,tecncnrto fbri cdi h WS swl eo h~t:be solub iity l

in ta Breqilitaiong"w is of no coier-ri.

ni:bv-#e~rgI (i.e. "410F), durir'cb* ":d don;iditions,' *B~ion':

.8.:3.1 V.ital Batteries" T~he prim!ary *tr_*te.gyw~ill :b~e to po.wer opq o.:r mor0"e Of thle prot~edtie~dba~ttery..chia-rgers :for" thed.1i25)0

D"batiterli's.,'fr'm.the.. 1. MW: 'SAFW DIG.to ~e'nsu~re vita.l 'instrumenta.tion remains'!pow:ered. :Tem p.orary-ca~bles.vill b6e run fro t0m: 1, :Mw :SAFW D/G connrections inp the.,S\\FW.Ann*ex :to a porta:ble distribution.-panel an.d/or to, a dilstribution-pa~nel inith.e.

Waste..Gas".Corrrn s

(W:spi.:GC.),Room,. From :thd :portable. di~~ribu.*tion "pane1.c.a~ble cdan

-be routed to one battery,;charg~r on :each train. From the distribution panel in the'WGC Roo m c;able !can be. routed "td b:!reaker~s on.MC.C C' and.M.C.C D. to :po.wer *o~ne :batte y charigei" for-, each :train.,.Ther~e ar*e"two batt~ery charglers aVailable to each: of: the, station.

battres!e, bo~th.with a capacity of.200 amps at 1,3.2 Volts DC and requirig' up to 58 amps Th'e aldtera s*:fj'trategy wiillb.e implem~ented in the eve~nt,that th~e 1] 1W-,SAFW D/G ca nn.pt of' d~eli*Vi ng iso 5o:amp:s at 480q.Volts'- 3-plha~e..wi :b.e-.conni!ected :to.on64, or¢* mre:o~f t}he

'pr6e.id.,:t#.d_ b~atte-ry'chagers. :fo:r the,1.25.VDCg bst~teries 'to erSsuI(e ivital instrumen~tati~n rema*ins :pow*e~re.d..

T.his '*[lt*,nate* s¢tratiegy will u*se :two meth:*ds *sirin'iia'r: :to. the ':1 M:IW SAF*\\ :D/G. To!*

p~qwer the :distri~b.ti0on panel..in thle:,W:GC Roo.m:,.the 10.0. KW F, L.EX,D/G SWil rbe tran~sported to *outside-the SAFW. Anniex overhead-doo~r..Temp~orary cbl~es will.

.d~is~tr[b:ut~ion* i*anel in ::the* WGC CR..m anrd,from ethe: dis[tribuLtion:: ipanel in :th:e :W:GC"Room :to0

.. battery char~gerb*(ak~ers: for,each train; on-,MCCb: C *and 'MOO D..'To power-th~e-portablie

, Temporay able w*!.:ill

-be ro!Ute~d from th1e 1:0.0 :KW FLEX D/G to t-,he: portab]e distribu~tion p~anel* *and from the ~poita.ble cflstributiobn paneli.to ione.battery charger on each htrain....

'Control:

Room1 and iBatt:, e rv. Roo ms: Habit ab ility..

"ELAP -sp*ific GO;TH~IC, 1analyseswe~r~e no6t perf~orm~d for :the Control Roomn-and Batteryi

• .154) :determined ithat -:for extr-emelly *cld conditions, two"1500 Watt heia~te*.s pl~aced"in "serice: :b~y 8 ho0ur S.po'st. event woul k:Q8 e~ep t:he Contolb.R0oom: above :4_-F.for. 7:2: hours.

• ,.Fb'r ext'remely:: hodt c..on*d~itiohi*,

on:e_ 350 c3iof~m.

blo.weri placed c*ain :,service9by :81:houirs p.ost,

• vernt 'is predicte**d to keep 'the-Con,-trol Room' 6e1ow *120F F-for.72h~our and a::iS predicted.

_.to reduce th~e Control Room to, below 105F Fby 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

For "ihe. :Battery Roodms :.duri~ng extreme!Y col1d c~onditiioris,.if normal-ductwo'rk.is intact,

• theni theii :DC pdoW~ered *:fanh is.ad.equate.to circulatewa'rr.i.a.re back.to the.Battery Ro'om*s

• and.mfa~initain Battery :Room. tempberatu~res,! above 60 0F. lIf ~inorml ductwor~k is nhot intasct

• Pa-ge 89 of 1i21.

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) then it may be necessary to throttle the DC fan or use a smaller/variable speed fan to limit air flow to approximately 400 cfm to achieve a room temperature of at least 50°F.

For extremely hot conditions, "A" Battery Room temperature is predicted to be acceptable if fresh is taken into the Air Handling Room (AHR) and blow to the "A" Battery Room using the DC powered fan and the air is not recirculated back to the ARH, but is discharged to ambient. "B" Battery Room is cooled by using an approximately 3500 cfm fan to reduce battery room temperature to less than 105°F or a 700 cfm fan to maintain less than 120°F.

For all conditions it is recommended that ventilation be established prior to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Ventilation for the Battery Rooms is established under FSG-4, ELAP DC Bus Load Shed/Management (Reference 76).

FSG-5, Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging, (Reference 109) contains guidance!/recommendations to mitigate actions associated with extreme heat and cold.

Battery Room Hydrogen Control DA-EE-99-068, Vital Battery Room Hydrogen Analysis (Reference 62), documents that under worse case conditions, without ventilation, the 0.8%

normal hydrogen concentration limit would not be exceeded until 28.9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> and that the unacceptable hydrogen concentration limit of 2% would not be exceeded until 73.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, with all batteries being equalized. Ventilation to both Battery Rooms is available from a single DC fan that must be manually started. FSG-4, FLAP DC Bus Load Shed/Management, (Reference 76) starts normal Battery Room ventilation (DC powered vent fans) after establishing temporary power to the station battery chargers. FSG-4 also directs using temporary Battery Room ventilation if required.

FSG-5, Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging, (Reference 109) directs using portable fans for Battery Room ventilation.

Guidance for Battery Room ventilation is also provided in Alarm Response AR-C-i13, Battery Rooms Loss of Ventilation (Reference 158).

8.3.3 UHS Access The DDSAFW Dl Water Storage Tank provides --24 hours of feed water for the S/Gs (DA-ME-1 4-020, Deionized Water Tank Inventory Requirements, Reference 159). This tank is protected from all events (seismic, tornado and flood), and is used as a heat sink until the ultimate heat sink is available.

Emergency Operating Procedure ATT-5.5, Attachment SAFW with Suction from DI Water Storage Tank during SBO, (Reference

97) starts the SAFW pumps and is accomplished within 43 minutes of event initiation.

FSG-3, Alternate Low Pressure Feedwater, (Reference 100) FSG-6, Alternate SAFW DI Water Storage Tank Makeup," (Reference 99) and FSG-12, Alternate CNMT Cooling, (Reference 118) all have steps directing use of Lake Ontario (UHS). FSG-1 1, Alternate SFP Makeup and Cooling, (Reference 103) directs using Lake Ontario for Spent Fuel Pool makeup or spray and is directed by ECA-0.0, Loss of AllIAC Power (Reference 22).

In the area of the discharge canal there are multiple options to place a hose into the discharge canal to provide makeup to the DDSAFW DI Water Storage Tank or S/Gs if the preferred area (by the grating) is blocked.

FLEX suction hoses have a strainer installed on the end of the hose. Each strainer has

-3.7 X the surface area of the non-collapsible suction hose.

Strainer perforation diameter is 3/8". There are 19 holes per row and 50 rows around the diameter of the strainer, giving a surface area of -105 in2.

Non-collapsible suction hoses are 6" diameter giving a surface area of ~ 28 in2. There are two suction strainers available. In the unlikely event that one becomes clogged there would be a brief interruption to shut Page 90Oof 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) down the pump, swap strainers, and restart the pump.

Monitoring of pump flow and pressure would indicate a possible clogged suction strainer. FSG-5, Initial Assessment and FLEX Equipment Staging,. (Reference 109) directs staging of debris removal equipment. FLEX pumps with flexible suction hoses can be maneuvered to access Lake Ontario water at various places on the discharge canal.'

The water chemistry of Lake Ontario has minimal effect On long term heat transfer in the Steam Generators (NWT 167, Use of Lake Ontario Water in Steam Generators During Hot Shutdown attached to June 23, 1981 letter to NRC). Lake Ontario water is used to feed S/Gs when condensate.grade water is not available per ER-AFW.1, Alternate Water Supply to the AEW Pumps (Reference 160).

By letter dated June 17, 1999 (Reference 161), the staff concluded that the licensee's approach (i.e., use of Condensate Storage Tanks and then Lake Ontario) demonstrates that it can achieve and maintain hot shutdown for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> following a seismic event.

By letter dated September 29, 1981 (Reference 162), the staff issued a letter to Ginna regarding Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) Topics in which the staff concluded that the licensee should provide, procedures that should caution operators.on the long-term use of service water to feed the S/Gs. The condenser Hotwell has -30,000 gallons of DI water available and can be gravity filled from the Condensate Storage Tanks.

The NSRC can provide a portable filtering/demineralizer system to provide filtered or condensate grade water from. Lake Ontario or other onsite sources such as the yard fire loop.

Duiring a flood, access to the ultimate heat sink will be temporarily unavailable due to floodwateron site. Results of the NTTF Recommendation 2.1, Flooding Reevaluation (Reference 42), show that the persistence of the flood is approximately 10 h-ours. The onsite water sources are sufficient to supply water for this timeframe.'

Frazil ice at Ginna has historically occurred at the Intake Structure. The intake structure is not credited for FLEX.

Frazil ice at the suction of hoses dropped into the discharge canal for FLEX or SAFER pumps is reasonably expected to not be a concern requiring special equipment for the following reasons:

Frazil ice blockage has been managed effectively at Ginna by accelerating and decelerating the water going through the intake structure by changing level in the Screenhouse. This agitation has historically been effective at disrupting the frazil ice and re-establishing normal flow rates. For FLEX pumps,, the length of hose dropped into the discharge canal is short enough tO allow operators to physically agitate the hose to disrupt frazil ice if it were to occur. Alternatively the drafting pumps have variable speed engines and.. discharge valves' that could be used to accelerate/decelerate flow similar to the intake structure strategy.

• Frazil ice has occurred at Ginna during late night hours.

Operators would be cognizant of the potential for frazil ice during extreme cold conditions and cognizant of the potential vulnerability during late night hours. Margin is available in the FLEX response times and integrated flows/heat removal associated with FLEX/SAFER pumps to accommodate brief periods of flow degradation from FLEX/SAFER pumps for frazil ice management.

Potential icing over of the discharge canal could be effectively managed by on-site personnel using available equipment.

If the ice is thin then it. could be broken using readily available lengths of piping or boards. Options for accessing the discharge canal Page 91 of 121

- ".'.. :"",-i.".- :'iGIN*NA FI:NALlI.NT.EGRATEDPLAN:.

if th~i~i6 *is thi~hck ;inclu~deibut 'aire no#t.limited. to is6 o:f the d.e'bris r~em6Veri* to.br~eak up lthe.

,.*ice;,.accessing t(he.water f.in. t*h:'.Scree~nhousebay, o#*.*.jr

.apcessing. :the. water in t':he F _SG-,

I.nitiali Assesdm-en*t ::nd FLEX Eqi.qtpment !St~aging, "(Rifer!e.[nce. 1*09) pirovide#.sa iprec*utit oithat-if potential ftr~e~zirnggconditions exist, *tia~tegie~s. for, us-e and lprotection *of vuln~Ib eFLEX :equipmnent sho'uld-be evalUated.- Attachmeht.C,?Additiona[ ;Strategies

,for.,;xtrpre eW.eather.Co~nditions,.,#rovid~es'str'ateiie~s fdr

,f rei-xt'me w~eather. coh'ditio~p.

.Strategies for protection inmc ude creatin g a 'con~tin.usu~flow~ path.s.ch-that, freezing *f

.vylnerabl6e !FLE~X" eiujpraen*t *(i-:e.," hos~e,':iinipset&)wilriholt 6cduri*ar'O actio~ns..to itake as~s~oci*ted:,iosi-n~g:.can be idraine6d whlen,not in bu.se*'- tdpre~vent freezing.

!8.3."4" Debris Removal I.Transport *Equipment Ginna Statiio.n has..designat'ed.a Case 621F.Pa.y, loa.der an~d.a.;Ford, F350 4-*wheel. drj.ve

• "(e~quOippeda with a*_ sn6w plo~w)-.as.the d*:bris! r:emoval/~itransport equJipfrent..;Th e C:ase*

.621F.Pa l***<:6atder is' stor~edou.ts]idej* to te: sou*th" (near. Thie Wh6ite,Barn*),, :outsi'de# o:f the Protected Area. The For[id F350 4-wheeI drive.is stor~ed in*side.the L-Building, inside"of

• the P ro~tected :.Area,. The, se se ifi ocat~ions prvd ver~i 100f:o eaaint

• sati~fy th~ie..torna~do "divers:e. iocatins"..st*r*ge 'req u:irdm"ens fo~r 'FLEX ;equip*et n.per NE.,Ii 2L~ -0'6..

thei boudi~ing -case :is to: ;use :th!e CaO6"e 62.1F Loader to :provide "debri'is "Area. ;;"Based odn NE i1 12::06gbulidan*e,,reigardin~g aeptbe~i*i "separation fdistanc:ad.*rd tornaSlo travel path,. it is :aSsumd n8that. th$' Ford FP350 1catedb'on site.-iS. unlav*ailable

.because "iti~is r'io :stored withini,a" to*rnado missile hardenhed stiructU~re. ]It iis. also.*su*6d

{thai if a tornado. even qtwas to :'imp !actthle' Case" Lo6ader, it{ wouldl :not..directy

• impac.t_ the F3.0t.stordid-,n the L-B~uilding::. A "tornado0 ebi.s

judg~d bo0un~ding.fo'r d"elbri~j i'emrhval efforts fort oth~er :beyonid design basis ;evenrts,'includin g sn~owl,ihigh winfds, and flioodis.'"

' 8.3.5 D)ies~el F~uel'"

• 8.3.5.1 Sto'rage I

SOff site* DiG Fuel,Oil Storage,"Tank i,(F*ST) A "and OffSite DIG,FOST B.have '18,o000 gallons worki~ng: capacity in :each tandk;,The 'minimu.mr isto6rage 'vo1lume :maint'ained between th..( "two tanks.-is. 19,93.6(116 gallons Thi*,volume of* o-ffsite.diesel 'fuel o6ii~ln wd6i~ith t h e vol-um'e of diaesel fueloil-in,the DIG :A :& :B FQ'sTs siu~pports 7 days of ope ratO.ion' :of one*

the.-Offsite.FoSsT~ ar'e.:rea*o'nab*Y pro~tected,: e:xce~p'tfor :th.* exfern&l flood.: "ERISC.2, High ;Water"(Floo~d.) ean, t('Reflerence 11.lidir:ects pers~onnel to* ",PROTECT. th e offsi't~e fuel stdrage.tanks a.nd fueli transfer ?buildingi.b~y :VE RIF-Y iNG V*.hicel6.ta'rieri~ Sy:s tem:b~plocks

.rie, inplaceon'the: we-st si]de o*f the ':buiid,.ng."i: :F.uel Oil.c~an :b"e a&,ccess~ed.by the'h*.imanway.

o.r if :it~.assess*ed thait th6e '"P.mpihouse" iS*'s

.intact, electricial",confnection.. 6ints anfd -a transfer switclh exist that,can 'be.u*sedl to£power: the :in stalled1 pu~mp.a-nd,refi~ll.the~f'uei

-trail'ers. For* the' eXterdnal flo.od,' plUgs' ar'e inserted. in~t6the )vent lines to pr'event -flood I eater" fromi enterinirg"the :tanks. :Th-e* strdte~gy, is :.described;,in ER-*sc.L2.

With t{he implem-entation of the afbove protective.strategy in "E:R-SC.2*, te aki:ais"a~re "R*Ieasona~bly Pirotect.ed";i n a'ddor*dance With NEI 1i2-06 frmal o

s*.

tulaPS~lted BDBEE's.

Page 92of 121!

' /

o ' : ;*,.I.*MITiGATION iSTRA'TEGiES (NRC ORDER E-A-12-;049)...,"

DieSel fuel is-av~ailable o0nsitefrriteptetdDGAanD/

FSsNrfalia.

i;:!i* :*ln!Um*Qf *;0loong!0s',will: be a*vailable aft!er a IELAPILUHS *event,,unless !:one 'of*

.."the ',die*e] :FOSTS is,iS*removed, from 'srvic"-for,require'd mrfianienlahce-. ".For-that. isi1ort,

-~~DA-ME-1*-.0.03, <Fukushi~ma Fuel C*orsumrptio *.An~alysis, '(Re~ference ';24) provides. fuel.

a~co'di tselfuel

diii'ra re h;0

,aiours of

cfese,

,:fu*

6 erals. "

T he

.tinmpmamuit*n* of

.vo~lume of protected diesel fuel onsite1s 32,0O0 gallonis.

~~~On-Site fuel: oil1 storage t:anks (il9ated in the, Owner Cont~roliled 'Area).is s~afety r' elat~e~d f~uel' that i*:,6o5z.tr6iled '!ein ¢.odrnea.:.

wiwththe"Si~te's* Fuel: O*il pr6rg¢ram,,-Receipt' of fy.l oil.

fo Drthe[ two c*qmm-rcialiy Iprocur#'d port'abl e.fiyel oil -trai er wil be fr'om the "same venfdor'

~~~as received for-the s~afety related tanfks.-

8.3.5.2.Transport and Transfer

,~~Travel! paths: for 'the. fuel h.bandli ng* eq uipm.e~nt "are-the.same e.as :the. !travel. paths f:or, the

Ginii::,Station.(R~eference" 11)

,lO)"!;Refuelinfg 'of :porlablei FL'EX:.e:quipmehnt,.incluiding the.

SAFWDI*G;, will I.be adcompl*ished b6y using~two""(2) -,990 !Gallon towabl e:fue~ -trfaile$rs.

B~~ef ueling.times :and action~s wgre incorpor~ated.into th~e t.me~iines :for the6 phase 2,Staffing

,!~Stu~dy.

,'iTh'e !staififing Stu~dy indic*aited that 'all :t-asl werte.able*i 'to b6 ac,,complishied 'With,

• f..dfor th~e S*AFW DIGis*660 *gallons.

With.a comd*plt`ete re*fioft~h*'SA*

'D/G,; '3.30 :galloni~s

.6~~f fuel iwould: r~emin ~ito :fil an qpfeIat ing :FLEX 'PumQp (171" 'ga1.0ns.,working capap[ity):and 100oo

-i/G~(i144 gaj!0ns 'working.a~palcity):. 'Fuel will be.dra~n from.th6e FOST's 'using.

s

malle9ngine driven :p;impff and disc~harging. to the'.re*fLi~ling tra.ilers...

EsOG's :do notb.iden*rti~fy..fueloir' :co.rsurnption -rates.for. :sp.ecific 6qu0ipment,". 0per~a~tor#

Puqmps, :FLEX.!100 K.t/G and.th'e SAFW :D/G allIi: havre fuel !*gage"Js, f*inle~d to aid'i[n--

mnitoi~ring..:.P.re-alarm asio exist 6n tfhe SA FW D/G.for-.Low Fuel :Oil',Le'~eli as* advaniced FS.G-5, !Initi"al "Assdessmen adt FT*lex: "Equipment. Staging, ;r(Regfer.ence 10b9.) di':rects

.establIshing-diesel! fuel.sourice andri.efuelinfg me.ans.. Atta~c*men-t G.," Re~fuelingf ih~e FuelOI

'Tan~k'!Trailers,; p#rovides thle g"uidance !foriflilin6gi'the* fue*l. tank :tra&i6ers. from *~th~e outi~&de.

diesel: fuiel oil storage tantks or from the Emergency,D/GfUeoi~lbi storage ta'nks:".

.(Referenee.16"4) p'rovides opderating gUidanCe, for the~fuel tank'trailer"..""

18.3.6 Emergency Ligh~ting..--

,'Lighting~ in' th-e.Standby..,A.uxilia-ry. Feed Ann~exBudilding :wi~ll.be,automatically :powered frmm"the S*tandby Auixiliary Feed Di.esel.G'eni~rator whenin p6pr~tionf-i.

Page 93 of 121

batter'y pobeed.ightfin.g, w*itlh praleJr*6*fi6-d lighits bpinig ya~ilable-t6 be !ideployeld.':-,

, FSG-5,..Initial Ass*ssreht and FLEX Equipment Staging (Reference_ 1i09)*,-Attachment F.:

t.

i*ncluding.t~hefolloowing tem..:stpr.d,!i :robu~st.focations;

.. ' supor Opeato,

,..n,'

• . La~rge, portable "Smith.Li:ght".LEpbattery.operated work-lighits

,* Additional,flashlights, with 'a supp~ly of-batteries.,.

.Ons'ite comm.unicati*6ri iWill,b.e,,performed -using §taiitin ira~diobs i~n t!he: t~alk around.mo#de.

,A-*por:tablte. :rsdio. 'ep~eatdr stored in a p.rotect~e.d ioca~tion* will be5 deplo.6yed for. better

' Offsite,c~ommuni,*ations twi~ll.utilize: satellite pshones staged in the,,Contriol :Room and Vaei:2'n..If t,lie insts~ll,*d,sat~ellitetdish do'es not s'drviv;e, a *portable)satiellite dish" a.v.ailable inrobiust storag ill be"

~~ideployedi'*.

Battelry,phargers,for portabl1e communications.equipment Will.be, powered.from,on-sife Durfing th*e.NEI 1 2-01' 'Phase 2 -St~affin*g "Assessmen~t,. a.'tab~letop.a~sessirier~t.of iwas's*.pprfo*rmed:. in.dis'cuisionr of.their btion~s*,-itw.as: statfed thatt ;*'high noise a:r~ea.was expeqted-arid itha~t-they w6uld. -re1odateitb*. an rea bUtside of the Ineniemediate' Building to area :'arid-thien* perfdrmed.16c~'liy at the valve*;..-.

8.3.8, He~at Tr~acin~g H eati[n g.,sou)rces (hleaters [.,triaing). for eqie,pm enfU*Sed: in :ELA P: mitig ation, systems, and

.sfra~te~i.es.die. s*ef.-#on ta!ined"(i. e., proviaded.by Phase 1 anid Phase..2 p*ower,gen eration equip~ment).

Low ;arhbient temperatu~re c6nrditions* were,copsidered in 6 detqirmin*ingi the Staging," (Ref eren*e.,109).states that if pot'ential f~eezing.con~ditions :exist, strategies" for

,use.and. protedtion *f-vUlnerahble FLEX.equipm~ent.shoi~d bd"ekialuated..sti-ategies. for Sequij5ment :(ie.*,h8 se,. pumps,] etci::.) will 'niot occuir. -Ini:& addiion;, *pumps and ias'sociated

Diesel.Driven,.:FLEX Pumips (.i3),* "the, portab[e:.Ait.erna~te RCS.*

In16ectio.n :pump,,i-the.air comp:res~s.rs ari th*te. FLE*X" 100 KW "Die"sel! Generator :are_ alli:.e.q.ui.P~ed, with* Enginhe Blo.0ck He~ate'rs and !Battey.tenders. :,Two" Pump units alnd.,the !0:0 KW D./Q*, arde ;stored in

.a..commrnecial :struc~ture with' the 3r-dFlex Pump stor'ed in a Robu'st str-.actur:ethat is Flood I Tiornado / Ea~rthquake pr~oof, :andis t'e~mperatiure "controlelid as well:.?.

• Page 94 oif.121*

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER* EA-12-049) i..

For the 100 KW DiG the design temperature specs for the contro! unit indicate a range of minus 40°0F tO 1 58°F with an engine derate indicated for ambient temperatures greater than 122°F. This temperature range is withih~ tho0seexperienced atGinna Station.

For the FLEX PumP diesel engine, there is no max aimbient tempe'rature 'indicated in the

• specs.

only i!f the Operating (coolant) temperature indi~ates greater than:23.4°F. is it recommended that load b'e rieduced on the engine.-For~cold Weather concerns a block hea.ter is recom~rmended for tem oerture's down tO 00F, wh~ich is currently Used.

8.3.9 Key Parameters FLEX equipment have installed local instr'umen~tation needed to operatethe equipment.-

Use of the~se, instr~ument~s is described in the. associated` procedures for use of the equipment. These procedures are based on inputs <-from the equipment suppliers, operation experience, and expected equipment functions in an ELAP.

8.4 Phase 3 Electrical Power D/Gs from the NSRC can.power can be used. to repower buses and/or equipment. A cohnection point for the NSRC 4160V.FLEX D/G. is deScribe'd in FSG-5, Initial Assessment and, FLEX Equipment Staging (Attachment I, Establishing L~ong Term Core Cooling), and FSG-12, Alternate CNMT Cooling. (Attachment C, Align Temporary Electrical Power. Supply to' C.NMT Fan CoOlers), which provide directions for connecting the NSRC 4160V FLEX D/G to Bus 16 station Service Transformer Cubicle real panel bus bars, including a figure of the bus bar arrangement.

UHS Access The NSRC can.proVide a portable filtering system to provide filtered water from Lake

• Ontario, or other onsite sources such as the yard fire loop.

Page 95 of 121

':MiTIGATiON :STRIATEGiES:(NRC ORID.ER :E:A-2-O49):.

L': *;:

9: Ai.ggregationh of FILEX: St~rategies An

'*lj,*g°re':*a.tion of.

Q":.FLEX "trati~e~gie

~s perfor-iief*).:!d -.in :DA:-M.E.-1*5-0o6', Fukushirna.i Timroe~ine Ahalysis(Re'f erene 30). Thi*

ilt i

nvol*ed o

n'*f~sdere*

ration

'6fi-'* :*the agreatesi*e*

ti*.t, of onst an'**";hd a***'ofasitereoucecnsalide' fJrationsiort aeppl)iaiech*'2arb.: le: I:z;"ds. That': is':

,: all:';

of the:,

FPL.:EX' :e~uip~ment

.onnection s *are" pro~te~cted, again~st ::xterhal hazards'. ' Ginna :has.

located all.JL-E~X :connhectiorns.in' seismicall ~~

iy~

tr*ucst<-tiretCe..'-1*l or evaluate-d"

..otherie lse.)..:'t;**""

In..

., :-,.i]~~

d~d.itiO.n,. an~y t,.:-.:- :..,,areas..*, ":"*"u:*:;t*that.

~l'anrt op~er~at rs

.:::,*:**:..,-,..."*requi~re :'c~es.to. deploy,. 6r" conrol(.the capabil)it,;,are' !locat-ed.in, "or 'arie 'on: t.he 'e.xterior o6f, :seismicall y.:robust Saf'ety R'eiated, seis.micCat'ego}y~ifStructu~res per..UFSAR :T*.be 3.2.-1 (Reference 25)'::

Ai'xCihtary Building.*",.

Cnte I.a

.:uiidinig St.an.db6y A'U~iItary :Feed Water.Buildingi" Diesel Gener~ator Buildin'g,

.The.foilpwing.structue*S,.which.ar~e utilized duri'ng FLEX implemenrtation, are n~on-safety related;,howev:er. 'th*ey arie cons(idered.seismically robust sfor thie. following r~easohs :

Tubin&Builfe*~d~ing

-.:per ;footnote "ij"; o~fi0 UFSAR iTable,3.2.-.:.1,i tl~.Turbine B~uild*ing

.was

• isahly'zeddu*inig the SEP and it was :ddetermied.th~at tlhe lbu(Iding* could mee~t.

Seis:imic Ca.te'gory 1* req uiremenis':without failiN!6, T~i~ 6ri"'*'O:ti b~ii' r**ir~i::{::m~iitin.i*o~~i:-:tr*6*u~lInhtegrity are n'row conside~red Seismi6.

standb"Auxiliary. Feedwate~r Annlex and Associated concrete Pad -..the concr*et

e. a~rthq*Uake6 as a d~sign :input. T-he sfut'urt~ie is :iesig'ne-dto with~stand SSE:: loads.'-

The even*t which.causes floo~ding" at Ginna is, ca~used by, extreme reg)ion~al precipi tati'oh

.w.hich -has 'days. of :warnig,time :associated with i!t (N El 12-06 Table. 6-1).. The Girana Battery "Charger: connec(6tibs, O

J~*:conhections,' and Aux*ilia.ry FSeedWate* :Conniection~s are protected froim.the desig'n basis flood.

Fi'nal.Validat{ion, Verifiication :and *Timelinie COhec'ks of.Procdreii6s an~d' Operator.Actions:

Th' ih*l:;*aldtis,

• ,dfia~~dar~J ti6J~e:*ie-k-s of.pr6c~edur*es-and.oper-ator a*ctions timelne fo*r-.initiating ifeedwater :to the S:Gs.,The Rl. :E. tGinnia.Nuclear Pow er Plant NIEI 1:2-06 FL#JEX Validat'ion. PlJan'(Refere'nce 79) ho:w*" that the act'ios foir,a~n EL.AP canh be

..Local.Maniual Actions" Lo[*cal \\maflua.lactions arie employed throui~ghoUt.much"of-thle,pla~nt.

H.PVAC* calcuilatio~ns h.a~ve::been performed for" all.areas.r~equiring access. -Results' are.des~cribed :below.

ITh!ere,arie'-,fl~ashli~lhs and :hard: hat lights," alon~g With l~arge qu*antitiesi of ba*tteriesi stored

.in rob6ust :protected locations.. These will.be made a*vailable.to,-plant.personnel-as Page 96 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) needed to perform local actions.

A communications test of the radio system was performed, utilizing the new protected repeater.

Communications was excellent throughout the areas where communication to perform local mitigation actions is required. All areas requiring access have multiple egress and exit points.

1. Standby AFW Building Annex - the local actions taken in this room are the initiation and control of Standby AFW flow, initiation of Alternate RCS Injection, and monitoring of Spent Fuel Pool level. HVAC calculations indicate there will be no adverse environmental conditions within this room to inhibit the performance of local actions. The temperature limits in these areas are 60°F to 1 04°F.

2. Auxiliary Building - several manipulations are expected to occur in this building.

When initiating Alternate RCS Injection, four manual valves must be manipulated.

When repowering MOO C and D to provide for battery charging and accumulator isolation valve closure, cables must be deployed from the Waste Gas Compressor room to the motor control centers. When dewatering the Auxiliary Building sub-basement and aligning Reactor Coolant Drain Tank pump flow and FLEX pump flow to the 760 A and B bonnet-to-hose adapters, cabling and hoses must be run in various sections of the Auxiliary Building. Also, running hose to the edge of the spent fuel pool, or, alternatively, to valve 8662 for spent fuel pool makeup is performed in the Auxiliary Building.

HVAC calculations have been performed which demonstrate that environmental conditions at the operating floor peak at about 125°F. The time duration for actions in this area is less than 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. At lower levels of the Auxiliary Building, where actions could have several hours duration, the peak temperature remains below 11 0°F.

3. Intermediate Building - The Atmospheric Relief Valves must be locally controlled.

With timely opening of doors, HVAC calculation demonstrates that peak temperatures are limited to 1 17-122°F.

Other actions in the Intermediate Building include taking of local readings for vital instrumentation, and the use of an air compressor to vent the Safety Injection accumulators. HVAC calculations indicate the peak temperatures in these areas are 110-11 5°F.

4. Control Room -

Many manipulations are performed within the control room.

HVAC calculations demonstrate that with the timely opening of doors, peak temperatures are limited to 11 6°F.

5. Relay room/annex - the radio repeater system is stored in the annex.

The antenna, tripod, and cabling would be deployed via local actions form that room.

HVAC calculations indicate the peak temperature in that room would be limited to 103° F.

Page 97 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) 10 References References used in this integrated plan and listed here are available for audit.

1)

NRC Order EA-1 2-049, Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, March 12, 2012

2)

NRC Order EA-1 2-051, Issuance of Order to Modify Licenses with Regard to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation, March 12, 2012

3)

NRC Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) JLD-ISG-2012-01, Compliance with Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events, August 29, 2012

4)

NEI 12-06, Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide, Revision 0

5)

NEI 12-01, Guideline for Assessing Beyond Design Basis Accident Response Staffing and Communications Capabilities, Revision 0

6) 10 CFR Section 50.63, Loss of all alternating current power,

7)

Letter from E. J. Leeds (NRC) and M. R. Johnson, (NRC) to All Power Reactor Licensees and Holders of Construction Permits in Active or Deferred Status, dated March 12, 2012, Request for Information Pursuant to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendations 2.1, 2.3, and 9.3, of the Near-Term Task Force Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,

8)

Letter from J.A. Spina (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC), dated May 11, 2012, Sixty-Day Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information (ML12136A231 )

9)

Letter from M.G. Korsnick (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC), dated June 6, 2012, Supplemental Information for the Sixty-Day Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information (Withheld from Public Disclosure Under 10 CFR 2.390)

10)

ECP-15-000380, FL EX Equipment Anchorage/Tie-Downs, Revision 0001

11)

ER-SC.2, High Water (Flood) Plan, Revision 01200

12)

SECY-1 1-0093, Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the Events in Japan, July 12, 2011

13)

Regulatory Guide 1.155, Station Blackout, August 1988

14)

DA-EE-99-047, 125 VDC System Loads and Voltages

15)

SEP Topic IX-3 (NUREG 082 1, Integrated Plant Safety Assessment SEP Final Report, December 1982)

16)

Letter from M. G. Korsnick (CENG) to Document Control Desk (NRC), R. E.

Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Response to 10 CFR 50.54(f) Request for Information, Recommendation 2.3, Seismic, dated November 27, 2012 (ML12347A104); Attachment 1: Seismic Walkdown Report, Section 7 IPEEE Vulnerabilities Resolution Report

17)

A-601.10, Time Critical Action Management Program, Revision 00100

18)

Circular 1311, Lake-Level Variability and Water Availability in the Great Lakes, U.S. Geological Survey, Wilcox, Douglas A., Thompson, Todd A., Booth, Robert K., and Nicholas, J.R., 2007.

19)

WCAP-1 7601 -P, Reactor Coolant System Response to the Extended Loss of AC Power Event for Westinghouse, Combustion Engineering and Babcock &

Wilcox NSSS Designs, Revision 0 Page 98 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

20)

CALC-201 4-0002, Cycle 38 Reactor Engineering Calculations, Revision 0

21)

CN-TA-98-1 48, R.E. Ginna (RGE) Cycle 28 Reload Safety Evaluation - Mode 6 Boron Dilution,, Revision 1

22)

ECA-0.0, Loss of AlI/AC Power, Revision 03800

23)

E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, Revision 04500

24)

DA-ME-1 4-003, Fukushima Fuel Consumption Analysis, Revision 1

25)

UFSAR, Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, Revision 25

26)

TECHSPEC, Technical Specifications Amendment for R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 112

27)

TSB, Technical Specification Bases for R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 64

28)

TRM, Technical Requirements Manual for the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Revision 50

29)

Acceptance Criteria Basis Form ACB 2009-0005, Minimum Charging Flow >_

17 gpm, February 2, 2009

30)

DA-ME-1 5-006, Fukushima Timeline Analysis, Revision 2

31)

STP-O-40.2, Diesel Driven FLEX Generator Periodic/Annual Load Bank Test, Revision 00000

32)

SBO-PROGPLAN, Station Blackout Program PROGPLAN Ginna Station, Revision 8

33)

DA-NS-2006-019, Loss of RHR Cooling During Mid-Loop for EPU, Revision 0

34)

NSL-0000-005, Thermal Hydra ulic Analysis of the Loss of RHR Cooling While the RCS is Partially Filled, Revision 3

35)

ER-FIRE.3, Alternate Shutdown for Aux Building Basement/Mezzanine Fire, Revision 03301

36) 0-6.1, Auxiliary Operator Rounds and Log Sheets, Revision 04700

37)

S-9, SFP Cooling System Operation, Revision 00404

38)

NUREG/IA-01 81, Assessment of RELAP5/MOD3.2 for Re flux Condensation Experiment, April 2000

39)

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection Program, Revision 8.0

40)

WC-AA-1 04, Integrated Risk Management, Revision 022

41)

PA-PSC-0965, PWROG Core Cooling Position Paper, Revision 0, November 2012

42)

FHR-REPORT, Fukushima Flood Hazard Reevaluation Report, Revision 1

43)

ECP-1 1-000104, Diesel Driven AFW Pump Modification Scope, Revision 1

44)

Analysis 1 09682-M-021, Spent Fuel Cooling System EPU Evaluation, Revision 0

45)

ECP-14-000749, SAFW AB Cross Tie (Fukushima), Revision 1

46)

ATT-8.0, Attachment DC Loads, Revision 7

47)

NUMARC 87-00, Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors

48) 130421 2-CAL-001, Liquefaction Evaluation Near Slope Northwest of Turbine Building, Revision 0

49) 130421 2-CAL-002, Stability of Slope Northwest of Turbine Building, Revision 0

50) 130421 2-CAL-003, Liquefaction Evaluation Near Slope East of Screenhouse, Revision 0

51) 130421 2-CAL-004, Stability of Slope East of Screenhouse, Revision 0

52) 130421 2-RPT-001, Ginna Nuclear Power Plant - Liquefaction Evaluation and Slope Stability Final Report, Revision 0

53)

DA-EE-97-069, Sizing of Vital Batteries A and B, Revision 005 Page 99 of 121

• ¢/:*. G!NNA FINAL= INTEGRATEOD PLAN!'-<..,:.:;

54 CAO0,Bckrud lnform'ationf Loss of Alli,,

Pdwe","Revision 019

'55

-6ti

-j Evore-102, V eRvision~t 001

~5)

RW-1323*a6;

)-03inaRA5ELPnisifobde 1; R9dsvissies 000 59)" ii*v'ru&"ticultn, 4E GinnaS' contrq Bsuildsn' Thr' Env!/a2-*ironment, Augus 1'1 an M933Q,;'

i**a:~pf e "",[2OB Con.rol Bu.lding,',Deceri'-ber.15,..199

63)

Lester f~rom0.M Crthied, NROto J. E.'Maier, RG!::'&r, Subjeci!ti SEP.Topic>

G~ll-2A, eeeWate Phenmena Noer i'

b<o-0 aer*"

3,1.J981

>;":"'~!*'984:> :."

7-1)

FRTH1 Resoseto4ssq S*8ondni H.!adtSink Rev *istaion~v~in0 65:*) Lett~er' from M.

B.

'Korsnick (EGO)rnto

'ft

1. • • • (O,:##

i-M:7tiga:io,4,n LA*

Besy:ond-Shesign'asis Ex;i!ensiah Evns(rdrNme EA-. 2-04.....

dated:

M" 16

',2014: :'".i'

-. :..":." /*

Page. 100\\ of 121,,,

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-1 2-049)

77)

Letter from Jack R. Davis (NRC) to Joseph E. Pollock (NEI), Endorsement of NE! Alternate Approach for Spare Hoses and Cables, dated May 18, 2015 (ML15125A442)

78)

Letter from Nicholas Pappas (NEI) to Jack R. Davis (NRC), Alternative Approach to NEI 12-06 Guidance for Hoses and Cables, dated May 1, 2015 (ML15126A135)

79)

R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant NE! 12-06 FLEX Validation Plan, Revision 0

80)

ME-343, Equipment Specification for New Westinghouse Model 93 Reactor Coolant Pump Internals, Revision 001 81 )

FSG-7, Loss of Vital Instrumentation or Control Power, Revision 0

82)

FSG-1 0, Passive RCS Injection Isolation, Revision 0

83)

FSG-1, Long Term RCS Inventory Control, Revision 0

84)

SDTAR-80-05-1 18, Westinghouse Analysis for Line Segment CVC-225, Revision 0

85)

SDTAR-80-05-1 19, Westinghouse Analysis for Line Segment CVC-200, Revision 0

86)

SDTAR-80-05-035, Westinghouse Analysis for Line Segment CVC-250, Revision 0

87)

WOAP-1 0541, Westinghouse Owners Group Report, Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Performance Following a Loss of AllIAC Power, Revision 2, November 1986

88)

PWROG-1401 5-P, No. 1 Seal Flow Rate for Westinghouse Reactor Coolant Pumps Following Loss of All AC Power, Task 2: Determine Seal Flow Rates, Revision 2

89)

NSAL-14-1, Impact of Reactor Coolant Pump No. 1 Seal Leakoff Piping on Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leakage During a Loss of All Seal Cooling, dated February 10, 2014

90)

PWROG-1 4008-P, No. 1 Seal Flow Rate for Westinghouse Reactor Coolant Pumps Following Loss of All AC Power, Task 1: Documentation of Plant Configurations, Revision 1

91)

PWROG-14027-P, No. 1 Seal Flow Rate for Westinghouse RCPs following Loss of All AC Power, Task 3: Evaluation of Revised Seal Flow Rate on Time to Enter Re flux Cooling and Time at which the Core Uncovers, Revision 3

92)

RWA-1 323-002, Ginna RELAP5 Steady-Initialization for Mode 5, Revision 0

93)

RWA-1 323-004, Ginna RELAP5 ELAP Analysis for Mode 5, Revision 1

94)

RWA-1 403-001, GOTHIC FLEX Containment Analysis, Revision 0

95) 1 09682-M-026, Steam Generator Dry-out Time Assuming No Feedwater Addition Under EPU Conditions, Revision 0

96)

Drawing 33013-1230, Alternate RCS Injection System (BDB) P&ID, Revision 0

97)

ATT-5.5, Attachment SAFW With Suction From DI Water Storage During SBO, Revision 00300

98)

Drawing 33013-1238 Standby Aux FeedwaterP&lD, Revision 37

99)

FSG-6, Alternate SAFW Dl Water Storage Tank Makeup, Revision 0 100) FSG-3, Alternate Low Pressure Feedwater, Revision 0 101)

FSG-8, Alternate RCS Injection, Revision 0 102) ECP-14-000169-CN-090, Alternate Charging System, Revision 1 103) FSG-1 1, Alternate SFP Makeup and Cooling, Revision 0 104) Drawing 33013-1248, Auxiliary Cooling Spent Fuel Pool Cooling P&ID, Revision 43 105) Drawing 33013-3131,1, 480 VAC Single Line Diagram SAFW & NFPA805 IO00KW Standby Diesel Generator Sets, Revision 3 Page 101 of 121

GINNA' FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN'/

.. '. MiTIGA*TION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) :

106) prawinig 33013-25319, AC.System. Plant Load Distrib~ution,One.Line.Wiring SDiagram, Revisibn'28

",...i 107) Letter froml J. Barstow (EGO) to Docu~ment Control.Desk (NRC), Resp~onse to March,12, 2012, Request for 'In formation Pursuant to-7Title 10O-of the Co~de of "Federal Regulations 50.54(f) Regarding Recominendations qf the Nedar-Term Task Force Review of In~sights' from, the Fukushima :Dai-ichi. Ac~cident, Enclosur'e ;5,,Recommendation 9.3,* Emergency: PreP-aredness -*:Staffing,

Reqbestedd Information 'Items r 1, 2, and 6 - Phase '2. Staffinfg Assessment, dated June:8 2'015.

'108) ECP-,14-000756, Installation_ of FLEX satellite* Commrunications system to S.provide :FLEX and NARs pohon~e se~ic~e to.Control Roomi and TSC; Rev~ision 1 109.)/FsG-5, lnitia-lA~sse*Srent and FLEXE-quiPment. Stag~ing,.Revision '001.00-110) GN-WP-01, BDBEE Debris Removal :for Ginn~a Station,.Rev~ision 1 111 )

CC-Gi-I 1 8, Ginna Impleme/ntation -of Diverse and Flex.ible Coping Strategies

(FL EX) and SPenht Fuel PoolI!nstruimentation Pro grain, Revisioh 0 112) CC-GI-1 18-1002, Special Corigested Area Plan for R. E. Ginna Nuclear Generating.Station, Revision 0" 113)

A-52.1,!2 NonfunctiodnalEquipment Important to safety, Revision 07900 114) OPG-IwS-SUPPORT, Operations support of the Initegrated Work Schedule, Revision 10800" 1 15)

SY-AA-1!01-120-F-0l, Key I'ssuancle Log, Revision 0 11i6)

EPRI Technical Report 300200.0623, Nuclear Maintenance Applications

Center: Preventative.Maintenance Basis for FLEX. Equipment, September

.2013.

117) AP*ELEc.4, LOss of AII AC Power while on Shutdown Cooling, Revision 0 118) FSG-12, Alternate CNMT Cooling, Revision 00100 1.19)

Gc-GI-118-.100i, SAFER Response Plan for R. E-. Ginna Nuclear Generating S Station, Revision 0 :

1.20)

ECP-1 1-000104-015-7-01,.Design Change Technical Evaluation for Diesel Driven :Standby 'Aux 'Feddwater :Project De-Ionized :water Tank Installation, ReviSion 2...

121)

ECP-1i1-0001i04-0:15.-7B-01, Design Change Technical Ev/aluation for Diesel Driven Standby Aux Feedwater Project -

De-!ohiz~ed Water-Tank Criteria, Revision 0,

122)

EcP-1 3-*00421, DDSAFW Pirolect Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Building Annex, Revision 1 123) GNP01.1 2,1 Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Arnex. Design, Revision 1 124)

EDQC:MISC-2013-0044, Electrical I&C Impact Analysis Form for LCP 000459, ECP-13-000424, ECP-13-000995, ECP-14-000169, Revision 1 125)

EDOC-MISC-2015-0042, Fukushima FLEX P.hase 3 Electrical Support Evaluation, Revision 0

• 126)

ECp-1 3-000483, DDSAFW Project SAFW Piping Tie-In Design.and Installation, Revision 1 1.27)

ECP-1 4-000727, Hafden,Masonry Walls :Surroun~ding.Cable.Tunnel Entrance

• tO Prote~ct-Vital Instrumentation Following a.Seismic Event or Tornado, Revision,.1 128)

TB-i15-1, Reactor Coolant System 'Tempera~ture and Pres'sure Limits for the No 2 RCP. Seal, dated March 3, 2015 129)

AR-AA-.3, STDBY Aux FW Dl Stor Tank Hi Hi/Lo LO, Revision 00900 130) T-44.7, SAFW DIl Water" Stoit~age. Tank (TCD05). System Alignment and Operation, Revision 0050Q Page 102 Of 121

,::i:-".i

• !,.i., ;!.::.GI.N-NA: FINAL IN*TEGRATED PLA'N,!.*"./

i~) 758000-P-CL-O0001,.Design.Calculations.for. (t) 36' Diameter-x 34 '-9".

• ,1.32),.:DA-N.S--9.201 4,:.ROS.O*.-verpr~essurizatidi!: Pro~tec'titn :*S.ystem.-,Nitrogen:

134) :123:*820Low Tern p ideratreOverprfeS~ure 'A~nalye Pe--S'umma' /Report,.

1

• 3.5)

E C.-1 3i:0004~_.24, DDSAFW Pro'ject iP-.iping l*'sign ano: in:stalflation,..Revisiq~on 0 136*:) "PA-ME-i 95-0`05*: FLEXs RmHR/n.*1

/siW HydRef**``:aulic Mo~del Revsink, 0

v~~q 137)

Ca:c-lao 617.1,: Rh'.dE.'*

Gainnya FSG.g.tpmiht, Revii~ro" r.n, 1.y SiOi S 1,38)

DA-M-*12 5-08*13; LE "T

isca*ll"nMoussGalcula.tin, Rev(isi.# on 1

139'.,)

ONLIS-S-i 63, Sh, BL~Own Cooldown Gqulatioin~o R,u.ts fb R-.E". Gin (RGE 1:40)

RE*O*-i

'i03, Conrol o R:loadpCore".

Dest:(ign-o~~',

Revisio fQ0.304iato pse.t 141)

GDALCE-9.-1 25 S!9ismicSpt Analysis.of efu.e *Ol*g Water Sorage Tank, Revision 0

.142) 428-48?4-.i5034-1 C,.TornadMod Misil RF npact, Revyis-6*ioin" 0

.143)

OU-AA-1M 03, Shutdown Saf es*(ty Managem!#

entc Progt~r*`6'6.amaRevision er 15s*e 14).S..,.htdw

RRCSihl.

i Mak.up Reisio 0 145-) 'EPWROG51 40735.-PC-.0, S

Uppeenl InformaBtio-up.ds.n fo prai espons "Tomo" 146i~)" CB ALCNOTE1-69-0,1;' Fl:X.-np teParmedatertoGTC Mi.ufdi'~

T.-Loop Moel,-UpReais~isn 1.7.5) DA-ME-*LiS-.:ol 1;,.zFL EX Mon.deY 5

uX RHRStatey Revisio 0~,RmHa-pAa~i, 148)

DA-MRe~is2h02-0.""

,. Reouin of: Geei Letter.

Water Hammer Iss.e 1495')

C*ALC."20!4-O006, Auxiliary :Buil ding E£nvir.onmental Codni~tions-durinhg ELA.P,.

Rt*4'*Levision 01iFE.XVAfr o,.hrlRomn, "Bate o

s *vion0 150). DA-ECf-0585.-CN-,0Vea Usate".

f CP

'T erollt U doorsng inad

.lekut ofvTonado

.. 57 mpe.`;3s,

?5ReAvisxion.O..*.*j~a*Sp`:e~i*~n 152)

RWA-M-1433-.0201, Ginre Standbyd

.Auxiliary IFevdenterReoomreat-Ups; Analysiso R.0):evB.Aision 0ientlde.s-/~.tteA*prp,.Ryso 07:,...

1S63)

ALeter201m.G 4-0006,S*

AxiryBldng Env),i6Lr.

on meenaCoditR&),":ions durngcELAP 154 DA.ME 5-012,u~~iea FLEX'ln HV tAC f*or ContrlRoo andBatte*j.eely Rooms, Rev§9:isio 0

1.52)

DALette 99-033

),

Vita atrthferd TeNpr).tuo.

during. Station-(*&) BlniackoutEvent 15i63)

EP-Mi3-00097-O015, ",7B~o-a1, Dleig iotChange Technlucati*

Evaluatsion R-Fevisionag 5 15)D.E1400 eoie ae Tankklnvevntoono-.Requirements,.

Re.isio.n 0

,\\-

" ', 'i ;,

Pa'ge"10. o 1'2

• ,.GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED.PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049:)

164) FSG-1 05, FLEX Support Equipment.- FLEX Fuel Tank Trailer (TBDO1A/

TBDOiB), Revision,0 page 104 of 121

" GINNA FINAL INTEGRAT"ED PLAN

..MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC.OIRDER EA-12-O49)',:

11 AcronYms

,AB

,AC

' ARV,

' BDBEIE BOL

,CENG OST.

DCo DIG

.Dl.

ECP,,

ELAP EOL EPSRI EPU FLEX FOST FSG ft.,

gprn hr.

lB.

KVV" ILOCA LUHS MBtu MFP MOV mph

• .'M W NEI NRC NSRC NSsS NUMARC OBE;"

OEM porn

.PM':

P;MF PORV ppmn PWROG RCCA RCP SAuxiliary Builiding,..

Alter~na~ting Carrent"

,AUxiliaryF~eedwater' Atmosplh~eric Relief Valve Beyond-Design-:Basis Exterinal Event

Beginnirig df, Life*

Consteilaltion Energy Nuclear Grup, LW*

Conde'nsate Storage Tahk""

Direct Current

Diesel Genreiator Demineralized, Engineering Change package Extended Loss 6f AC Poweir Ehd'~f:Life Electric: Power" Research Institute Extended PRower.uprate.

Diverse and Flexible'Coping Strategies Fuel Oil' Sto0range Tank

FLEX* Support; Guideline feet gallons pelr minute

hlour, I.ntermediate Building,

Kilowatt, Loss of.Coolant Accident.

Lo~ss of. lt imate*. HeAt'sin k Million Britislhthermal 'units Main Feedwater.Pump Motor oper-ated Valvye

.miles P~erhour Megawatt

.Nuclear Enlergyilnstitute Nuclear Regul~ato~ryCommission National SAFER Response Center.

Nuclear, Steartn SUpply System NUcl ea'r Maniagement,and Resources Council Operating Basis Ear~thquake O'rigin~al Equipment Manufacturer

!percent mail:

'pooled Inventory Management Planned Maintenanice' Probable Maximum Flood Power-Operated Reli'ef Valve

parts per million PressuriZed Water Reactor Owner's Group Rod' Cluster Control Assembly Reactor Coolant Pump' Page 105 of 121

, i',,,.i:' *

",MITIGATIQN iSTRAT*EGIE*-S (NRC *ORDER E:A-12-Q)49)..

-RFO Refuelinhg -Outag~e"..:*.

RG-E RohsteinGner GsandElotr, Cor"

ati, RSR.

R SaetsidualiHeat Remoal.

RsTE Reafuei*~o~ng Water Stoage Tan TBDE",R" StrateiegirmAllianea,? f FLEX E'nr~iyRsos TDA*Fw stnb Aux~iiai'ry eneAdw tr TBO

$tation Bla'*ickiout TSDM.

Shu tdow c

MniaigiSuptSnte FSEP Syst*.ematicEv~alu*atio.nPrgamissi~pr SEP*I Spenii~at FuHi;eik Pool

. - *.*-r-.i*:* *' ' :' ',

-Page 106,0of,121"

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED.PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

Table-1. -- PWR-Portable EqUipment Phase,3 List portable equipment Performance Criteria Notes Medium Voltage Generators :(2) 4160 VA'C,1 MW 2 MW~byoperating generators in, parallel.

with Cable I Electrical Low Voltage Generator with Cable /

40A,10 WThe unit~is derated from* 1100.KW Electrical 40VC 00K High Pressure Injection Pump 160 gpm"..at 2000 psi..

With'Suction & Discharge Hose / Mech. Connections S/G/RPV Makeup Pump 500 gpm at 500 psi With Suction & Discharge Hose! Mech. Connections Low Pressure / Medium Flow'Pump

-2500 gpm at 300 psi With:Suction &-Discharge Hose IMech. Connections Low Pressure!/ High Flow. Pump "5000.gpm at 150.psi With Suction-& Discha~rge Hose I!Mech. Connections Mobile Lighting.Towers (3) 440,000 lumens 440,000 Lumens / 30 ft. height Diesel Fuel Transfer '

264-gallon

With:30 gpm AC' PumtpŽ,& 25,gpm DC Pump Fuel Air:Lift Container 500 gallon 2" Cam Lock Portable: Fuel Transfer Pump 60 gpm With, 0.5 Micr'on Filter/Suction-a~nd'Discharge Hose 4160 VAC Distribution-System 4160 -VAC, 1200.Amp

-500 gpm mechanical: filtration with a,250 gpm brackish.

water reverse osmosis system. Output water quality meets the following:

.g Specific Conductivity < 0.08 pS/cm Includes *interconniecting hoses..and:480 VAC.

MoieWtrTeamn ytm Dissolved Oxygen < 1'00ppb Generator with~anelectricaloutput of 150KW at 0:8 SChuloride <.1 ppb power factor and leads-and ground cables.-

• Sodium < 0.5 ppb

• Silica -< 10 ppb TOC <iO00ppb Moble oraionSysem 1:000-gallon tank capable of-heating a boric acid solution Unit-.includesaagitator,.hea~ters and controls, hoses

__Mobie__Borat

__on__ystem__of up to 7750 ppm~.to1I30*F in less than 4-hours; and!power supplies.

,Pa~ge 107 of 121.

• GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) - Sequence of EvnsTmliefra ELAP/ LUHS

~~~Time "..

Action

.Elapsed Action Constraint Remarks/IApplicability"

.item" Time Y,,.I N-,

0 Event starts NA Plant @100% power" 1

1 mai Operators initiate a manual N "

Ensures ayreactor trip is initiated within 1 minute reactor trip...

of blackout initiation."..

'2 5 mmi Dispatch Equipment Operator N

See remdiks'for"ThrottleS/G A & B ARVs' beloW.

.to Throttle SIG A & B ARVs.

3 6 main Dispatch Equipment operator N

See remarks for 'Establish* SAFW to S/Gs using 1 to establish SAFW to S/Gs MW SAF=W DIG prior to S/G dryout to maint'ain :

using 1 MW SAFW D/G.

heat sink' below."

4 20Qmin Dispatch Equipment Operator N

See remarks for 'DC LoadShedding' beldw.'

.to commence DC Load

______Shedding.

5 30 min Throttle S/G A & B ARVs Y

Throttle S/G A and B ARVs per ECA-0.O (Ref. 23)

Step 3 RNO in order to establish a~nd maintain

_________Rcs Temperature at 5470F.

6 30 mai Open control.Room & All Y

Time critical action is'to open Control Room and

.Reactor Protection and Control all Reactor Protection and Control System Rack System Rack Doors in the D.oors:,in the Control Room, arnd,to Open, select, Control, ROOm. Open 'selected vital area' doors t'o limit max temperatur~es.

vital area doors.

7 43 min E-sta~blish'SAFW to S/Gs using Y

RW.A-1 323-003 (Ref. 57) determin'ed that the time 1 MW SAFW D/G priofto S/G to S/G dryout frorfn nominal conditions, with dryouit to maintain heat sink.

conservative decay heat levels, occurs at 43 minutes.

8 1 hr.

DC LoadShedding "Y

.Following loss of all Ac power, the.statiion batteries are the only sou'rce of 'electrical power.

The station batterieS supply the DC buses and the AC vital inistrument buses. Since AC emergency power is not available `tocharg6 the station battteries, battery power supply must be

.conserved to permit monitoring and con~trol of the plant until AC power can be restored. The intent Of load shedding is to remove all large nOn-essential loads as soon as practical, consistent with preventing damage to plant equipment.

9 1 hr.

Declare ELAP N

Declarationof ELAP s~hall be nlade whe~n it is recognized or determined that restoration of power to mitiga~te the effects of a SBO cannot not be performed.. ECA-0.0 (Ref..22).direct{s t~he Operator td try and restore' power to any train' of AC emergency buses.very quickly after a loss of all' AC power.. One hour is sufficient time for the Opherators to recognize or determine that off-site power or on-site emergency power restoration is

_______unlikely and that an ELAP should be declared.

10 1 hr.

Establish Long Term RCS N

FSG-1 (Ref. 83) can be entered to restore RCS

__________Inventory Control.

inventory using an alternate makeup strategy.

Page 108 of 121

MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-i2--049)-

Actem, Timaped ACtion Constraint Rem~arks/IApplicability 11 1hr.

Dispa~tch"Eq~uipment Oera~tor

.N

'e e iemaks for 'Repower Battery Chargers' and:

• to com'mencerepowering

'Provide BatterY Room-ventilatidn for hyidrogen

~~~Battery Chatigersand eStablish dco-nrol' below.i Battei~y Room ventiladtion.

12 -

'2 hr's.

C'ommence Rcs C66lddwn -

N

' 'TB-15-1 (Refi.'128/recdmm6'nds'that'cooldown:

hiaintain maximurf cooldown-should be initiated within 2 ho~iis :after: a loss of all rate in the RG:S cold legs not

ROP Sea~l' Cool'ing occurs.' C ooldo;wn ra~te.*hould

'to exceedJ 1 00°F/hr-.

,,be b50-F/hr. t0"l000F*/thi.

• ,.~:.

13 4 hr's.

ROS cold leg temperature'less Y

TB-i15-1"(Ref. 1i28) recon nmen~ddthat an RCS cold than 450°F leg temp~erature of leSt :than 4500F' be. achieve~d" withriin 4, hbUrs to.maintai~n RCP sealI inte'grity. See further discussion i'egarding Action Item 12 below:.

• 14 4 hrs.

Degas Main Generator.

N Ge'nerator degasSi~ng Should be started.c to en~ixre that DC sdalil olbackup purhp Car be stoppe'd in

.four hdurs tO decreaseUD loading on the Tsc

..Battery (non-vital)....,

15 6 hrs.

Dispatch per~sonn~el to set up N

see reemarks for'!Commernce refueling' 1fMW

~for refueling 1 MW. SAFW D/G SAFWD/G a~nd other equipm~rent as necessary' and other equipment as below.

~~~nec~esSary.

16 8 hrs.

RePower:Battery' Chargers.

Y DA-EE5-2001 -028 (Ref. 55) 'documents tha~t the vital batteries'have~an adequate-capacity for an 8-hour event a.ssuming the lIoad redUction's liSted in p~rocedur~e ECA-0.0'(ATT-8.0, Ref. 46)) are

_______________imp!emehted,,

17 8 hrs.

Com~mence Aiternate RCS Y

-See -the.Phase 1 discu'ssion foPr'rbitiga~tion str;.te'gy Ilnjection.

-Maintain Ros.Inventory control / Log 'Ter~m

,SUbcriticalitY for a discussioniof this time

,~~cdnstraint.

18 9,hrs.

'DiSpatch Persqnnel to s'et,[

N

Seereinarksfori cdmmenoe'SFP.M~keup/

fdr SEP Makeup! Cooliing and

.Coo1ing' apd 'Refill SAFW DI Water Storage Tank t&Ref ill sAFw DI Water bel'ow.

Storage TEank.,...

19 12 hrs.

Commrn~ne refue!ling!. MW Y

.PAI-MEI-i 4-00.3 (Ref. 2.4) documents that tthe 1 SAFW D/G and other MW SAFW D/G must be refueled in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

_____equipment as necessary.....

• 20

' 21 hrs.

C oinmence SFFPMkeup/

Y For the lrimiting case of starting SFP level and Cooling',

h eat load, it-takes 21 htours,'to reach Le~vel 2.

21

'24 hrs.

-RCS temperature and Y

TB-15:I (Ref. 128) recommends thatafter24 "pressure is less thani 35.0°F hours, -an RCS 4erperatdre and pressu~reof less.

and 400 :psig.

t han 3500 F and 400 psig shlould be achieved to m~aintain RCP~seal inltegrity.' See further" discussion regarding Action Item 12 below.

22 24 hrs.

'Refill SAFW DI water Storage Y

IFSG-6 *(Ref. 99).pr0"vides a method.of. refilling th~e Ta'nk.

-S'AFW DI Water Storage Tank.

23 48,hrs.

Pro*iideO Battery R~om-N DA-EE-99-0-68 (lRef.,62) documents'tha~t Under

,vertil'ation for hydrogen worse case conditio~ns, without ventilation; the dontrol.

0.8% normal hydrogen conicentration limit would not be exceeded Until 28..9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> and that the

-unacceptable'hydrdgen condentration, limit of 2%

would not be exceeded until 73.3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />, with all batteries being equalized Page 109 of 1.21

.MiTiGATION STRATEIECiJS:([NRC-OR:DER EA.-i2-*049)-.

Discussion,of time, cOn'straints identified in.Attachmenit:. '1.

• .:,1,mfri~utei (mim),, 8Ope'rator*s7.iniitiate-.a' maniual rea'cto~r. trip..Thisis not ia F{LE*X"time' staint aBi~

d N'.~elIhi~

12 061iti"l',bnd.ti..tions.BassumJt...die,,no0aihir6 bey0[63.d.thef J,6ent..

irndud:dhftiurs and*s((

ts6e'ios fallr C

o wai~

eiir.Ase~dn~ioia'reI~ted, to staion backoiitri..{e tral Wed on

'Jecthis rp~orsbl senarioracd lari proeu ralyij* dina'iri6ete

ytohmanallyt.r~ipth~e r*bo

-R:.*whenic nthese to~ndi~ti h xit.

Pant s

and e*ing.%hineeringk personei m.ie~~if on~

Novembenuytrip2, 199 to ditcsm aparatue enat~ vlerability ent~i i fi'esnd' eduering imulba'*tor'd gexerie eatedto.,Tsso metng the:s~*m.r,*

.Sta e..ti lcot Rlnbaek6.,ut Baesd.e~d o

noi~r.na

..Pi.An

.s'Ubliec tic ".ri'snge.enty AsssS f olaento safut guadsbss-h 14~~d~~al eand 16 l-i~does nte both :vri* lieato si":ir c~

m lan hi pums afer ar~ativ::i.elyti shtd ;erio' oii~~ftimenly. The{r:

plan wudn ie e'JJ{e:'sain bla6koutaferLi t"tmpraure related

'quiie nt failuSSres hnic ener intos. a statio gReferaere This. scenari iR*O s'"*imilarto,mhsatin ba hk-buSTecosieatred i ou

.4PRANE

(.~~p~rifd-robabilsticvisk~ISe Asessment)#:., but was o~t seiicn';allye valj.uaitied; since,8B0*,;

the sdutiig' bElackou scenarios inclu¢edese a lssof

.the 115kV offite; sys 8i* te-m.Qaitaiviiel,*

howver th':'perisk fromrthis sen ar0'iro"o

&is imae

ato bP'6ecsignifiantl gCnrea Sytermhn h

'evaluated*

tto r~ blaecknrf(out duea to('tefmr eereee-19 con).idsaequencest~. aSbie-

,SROGPLrtIAN P*-Oqrlgeri~aph 2.4.3(Rfe-erence, 32); A-601l.1;.0

(Refer.en~cel 7t);.E

• 30 mmn,Thtle S/G-A). Ba~ltih*,iif*,

AR

.a Throttle SIDA* and~m Br A-Rfen,18

• n~ca.

22) S~~.tt.eab~n..e ptepe. wl3,T.et eme

• ,1 er:atur at 1547 0

(fNEI.afo Phase 2

StB.ffin'

b*ia*sseasmet, (Ref:"

er'ence,*4E 1bnd STh5ae.

q

.*neern Wishat.3he722-Bigh~s tepeatcre O-.i." s in selec.

ftt-RhPe *tbs~!eallocations' vare 'ohly v

qale.ifienideto 5500F.e Thxm es erOing may~t be betpdwedn to ii7.3F Rnd S':2 Tcol wait*..eors d$37Fn BD EL4*

aPd 1SD/5psig.*ee withisnecssr ihto s

takeprop

.actionr touie.stato blsh RutCS Tavg ater5"7F spu~ing EarL~AP sceariJostoredJ6uciedTcold toe approximately 53 0

F;.n:6 tohin-imrizeotime Page,10 of 1'21

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) assumed for an ELAP / LUHS event. A-601.10 (Reference 17); SBO-PROGPLAN Paragraph 7.2.4 (Reference 32) (Analysis supports 4 hr. coping period).

43 mai, Establish SAFW to SIGs prior to S/G dryout to maintain heat sink. RWA-1323-003, Ginna RELAP5 ELAP Analysis for Mode 1, (Reference 57) determined that the time to S/G dryout from nominal conditions, with conservative decay heat levels, occurs at 43 minutes. Table-tops/walkthroughs were performed to validate that the time critical action could be accomplished as required. Restoration of feed to the S/Gs was completed by 43 minutes.

1 hr., DC Load Shedding.

Following loss of all AC power,:the station batteries are the only source of electrical power. The station batteries supply the DC buses and the AC vital instrument buses. Since AC emergency power is not available to charge the station batteries, battery power supply must be conserved to permit monitoring and control of the plant until AC power can be restored. The intent of load shedding is to remove all large non-essential loads as soon as practical, consistent with preventing damage to plant equipment. ATT-8.0 (Reference 46); NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment-Report (Reference 107); ECA-0.0 Background Information*

(Reference 54).

1 hr., Declare ELAP. Declaration of ELAP shall be made by the Shift Manager when it is recognized or determined that restoration of power to mitigate the effects of a SBO cannot be performed. ECA-0.0 directs the Operator to try to restore power to any train of AC emergency buses after a loss of all AC power. One hour is sufficient time for the-Operators to recognize or determine that off-site power or on-site emergency power restoration is unlikely and that an ELAP should be declared. The NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment (Reference 107) determined that the Shift Manager will declare an ELAP as early as T = 16:54.

1 hr., Establish Long Term RCS Inventory Control. The NEI 12-01 Phase 2 Staffing Assessment (Reference 107) determined that FSG-1, Long Term RCS Inventory Control, (Reference 83) can be entered to restore RCS Inventory using an alternate makeup strategy when an ELAP is in progress, PRZR level is less than 13% [40%

adverse CNMT], and time and personnel are available to perform this strategy.

2 hrs., Commence RCS Cooldown - maintain maximum cooldown rate in the RCS cold legs not to exceed 1000F/hr.

In order to ensure RCP No. 2 seal component temperature limitations are maintained, Westinghouse Technical Bulletin TB-15-1, Reactor Coolant System Temperature and Pressure Limits for the No 2 RCP5 Seal (Reference 128), recommends that a RCS cooldown be performed following all loss of all seal cooling events. The cooldown should be initiated within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after a loss of seal cooling occurs.

The cooldown rate should be the typical emergency response guidel~ine (ERG) rate of 50 to 100°F/hr. to a cold leg temperature of less than 450°F in 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and after 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, an RCS temperature and pressure of less than 3500°F and 400 psig should be achieved.

4 hrs., Degas Main Generator. Generator degassing should be started to ensure that DC seal oil backup pump Can be stopped in four hours to decrease DC loading on the Technical Support Center Battery.

ECA-0.0 (Reference 22); ECA-0.0 Background Information (Reference 54).

8 hrs., Repower Battery Chargers.

Vital Battery Capacity given load shedding in ECA-0.0.

DA-EE-2001-028 (Reference 55) documents that the vital batteries have an adequate capacity for an 8-hour event assuming the load shedding listed in procedure ECA-0.0 (ATT-8.0, Reference 46)) is implemented.

This analysis is conservative because it applies 50% of the calculated load reduction to Battery A, and only during the period from 12 min to 245.5 min. 50% of the calculated load Page 111 of 121

(! :;!.....

, *she*dding is *onse~itiva~ly smiall in tha.t, the load she~dding is a~ssumed-to tak~e place,

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. GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN.

.:i.MITIGATION STRATrEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

Attachment :2

-FigUres, FIGURE 1: -FILEX SAFW SYSTEM PuMPs AND C0NNECTIoNs.....:........................,114 FIGURE 2: FLEX, A.LTERNATE. RCS INJECTION PUMPS AND CONNEcTIoNs*........

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FIGURE 3: SAFW/IALTERNATE RCS INJECTION/IANNEX BUILDING...........116)):

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................11_9 FIGURE 7': STAGiNG AREA 'B'

"......120 FIGURE 8: STAGING AREA 'C' 121 Page 113 Of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-1 2-049)

FIGURE 1: FLEX SAFW SYSTEM PUMPS AND CONNECTIONS Page 114 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-1 2-049)

PROPOSED INST/kLLED EQUIPMENT FLEX EQUIPMENT INSTALLED EQUIPMENT TOBAPW TO R'WST

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GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-1 2-049)

PLAN OF SURROUNDING AREA FIGURE 3: SAFW I ALTERNATE RCS INJECTION / ANNEX BUILDING Page 116 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049) 1 I

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GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

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GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

FIGURE 6: STAGING AREA 'A' Page 119 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

FIGURE 7: STAGING AREA 'B' Page 120 of 121

GINNA FINAL INTEGRATED PLAN MITIGATION STRATEGIES (NRC ORDER EA-12-049)

FIGURE 8: STAGING AREA 'C' Page 121 of 121