ML15261A247
| ML15261A247 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1999 |
| From: | Casto C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Mccollum W DUKE POWER CO. |
| References | |
| AL-98-07, AL-98-7, NUDOCS 9904130209 | |
| Download: ML15261A247 (83) | |
Text
April 1, 1999 Duke Energy Corporation ATTN: Mr. W. R. McCollum Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station P. 0. Box 1439 Seneca, SC 29679
SUBJECT:
PLANT PERFORMANCE REVIEW - OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION On February 9, 1999, the NRC staff completed a Plant Performance Review (PPR) of Oconee Nuclear Station. The staff conducts these reviews for all operating nuclear power plants to develop an integrated understanding of safety performance. The results are used by NRC management to facilitate planning and allocation of inspection resources. Plant Performance Reviews provide NRC management with a current summary of licensee performance and serve as inputs to the NRC's senior management meeting (SMM) reviews. The PPR for Oconee involved the participation of the Management Oversight Group (MOG), as well as all technical divisions, in evaluating inspection results and safety performance information for the period April 1998 through January 1999. The NRC's summary of your performance was discussed in a public meeting with you on May 15, 1998, and subsequently provided in letters dated May 29, 1998, and June 4, 1998. An updated assessment of your performance was discussed during a public meeting on March 24, 1999; a meeting summary will be provided to document the items discussed.
As discussed in the NRC's Administrative Letter 98-07 of October 2, 1998, the PPR provides an assessment of licensee performance during an interim period that the NRC has suspended its Systematic Assessment of Licensee Performance (SALP) program. The NRC suspended its SALP program to complete a review of its processes for assessing performance at nuclear power plants. At the end of the review period, the NRC will decide whether to resume the SALP program or terminate it in favor of an improved process.
During the last six months, Unit 1 operated at 100 percent power except for a brief outage.
Likewise, Unit 2 operated at essentially 100 percent power except for a reactor trip resulting from an inadvertent cable grounding during a fire penetration seal repair. Unit 3 started the period at 100 percent power and commenced a power coast down to a refueling outage.
Following the startup after the outage, the unit experienced a reactor trip due to testing coincident with a broken wire in the control rod drive mechanism testing circuit and then returned to 100 percent power operation for the remainder of the period.
Overall performance at Oconee was acceptable. Operations performance, while acceptable was marked by several human performance errors. Plant material condition improved; however, plant performance continued to be impacted by material condition problems. Your increased focus has resulted in improvements in the Engineering area. Nevertheless, engineering design shortcomings and missed opportunities to discover problems continued to be identified. Plant Support activities were generally effective except for issues that were identified in the fire protection area.
9904130209 990401.
PDR ADOCK 05000269 S
DEC 2
Operations performance has declined. 'This decline was the result of several operator-related human performance shortcomings (which resulted in a reactor trip) and mixed performance in programs and processes (the more significant being inadequacy of procedures supporting emergency operating procedures). The operator training program was improved, but Operations personnel did exhibit some weaknesses in knowledge and skills for operating the plant during testing and surveillance activities. Operations work environment has improved with increased emphasis on management expectations regarding control room professionalism and material condition. Problem identification and resolution activities within Operations were generally positive. The performance this period does not warrant any inspection beyond the core program.
The resident inspectors will focus on human performance during implementation of the core inspection. Additionally, the need for additional inspection in this area will be evaluated during the next PPR.
Performance in the Maintenance area has improved. In general, material condition appears to have improved as part of the Oconee Recovery Plan, though individual problems continue to be identified. One reactor trip and four power reductions and/or shut downs occurred because of equipment condition problems. While most maintenance programs were improving, deficiencies were identified in individual maintenance, surveillance, and work control procedures. One reactor trip did occur because of inappropriate work performance activities. In general, training, pre-job briefings and worker skill levels were appropriate for the circumstances. Engineering support of maintenance and surveillance activities was generally good. Identification of material and program problems was adequate, but some problems still exist that warrant your attention.
Problem investigations and root cause analyses were generally good. Resolution of problems and issues has improved. In addition to core inspection, regional initiative inspections are planned to follow up on previous steam generator issues during the upcoming Unit 1 and Unit 2 outages.
While performance in the Engineering area has shown some improvement, performance in the area of design control continued to be poor, as depicted by the number of variances from requirements. Even though there was increased management attention and focus on design issues, engineering design problems, such as the example related to a failure to provide separation between redundant trains of safety-related cables inside terminal boxes and the main control room panels, continued to be identified. Improvement was noted with the control room ventilation system design after corrective actions were implemented in response to an NRC violation. Engineering support of the facility on an on-going basis was good and improved over the period. Engineering programs and processes were adequate with several deficiencies observed during this current assessment period. In general, engineering performance in the areas of problem analysis and resolution improved. However, performance in the area of problem identification declined. For example, you did not identify some potentially significant emergency feedwater (EFW) design vulnerabilities, inadequacies of procedures supporting emergency operating procedures (EOPs), and some inaccurate Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) statements applicable to the EFW system. An inadequate UFSAR Review Project and problems with thoroughness in the EFW safety system engineering audit (SSEA) resulted in the failure to identify certain EFW design and EOP concerns. In addition to core inspection, regional initiative inspections are planned in the following areas: review of emergency operating procedures; followup of your standby shutdown facility (SSF) SSEA; review of emergency feedwater open items; and assessment of your UFSAR review. These inspections will include inspection effort that had been planned under the Management Oversight Group (MOG), which has been terminated. In addition, a regional initiative inspection will be conducted to resolve NRC questions regarding the Keowee air circuit breaker design basis (IFI 50-269/99 01-03).
DEC 3
For the most part, performance in Plant Support program areas was consistent with the previous NRC assessment. You maintained effective As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and Chemistry programs. Radiological effluents and meteorological parameters were properly monitored, and the environmental program was properly conducted. Radiation protection program self-assessments appropriately identified issues, which were corrected. Worker implementation of radiation protection work practices continued to be a concern. The security organization continued to perform in a highly professional manner. Performance in some areas of the fire protection area showed a declining trend. Although appropriate emphasis was placed on the maintenance and operability of fire protection equipment and components, the penetration seals in each units' fire barrier walls that separate the SSF shutdown components and normal plant safe shutdown components were not installed correctly and consistent with a full three-hour fire rating. A reactor trip occurred because of a personnel error during maintenance on a fire protection feature. Violations of site fire protection procedures governing combustible materials and fire watches also were identified this period. The performance by the fire brigade was good.
Engineering design performance for fire protection was mixed, with a violation being identified for failure to provide separation between redundant trains of safety-related cables inside two terminal boxes and a main control room panel. Your identification and resolution of fire protection issues were adequate. Emergency Preparedness performance initially declined, but this decline was recognized by you and corrected, such that by the end of the period, the overall performance was consistent with previous periods. Performance for the biennial emergency preparedness exercise in August 1998 was marginally satisfactory with two exercise weaknesses identified.
Subsequent training and practice drills were successful in bringing the organization back to a proficient level of performance. In addition to core inspection, a regional initiative inspection to review the status of your fire barrier penetration seals, associated open items, and related license renewal issues will be performed. contains a historical listing of plant issues, referred to as the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM), that were considered during this PPR process to arrive at an integrated view of your performance trends. The PIM includes items summarized from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Duke Energy Corporation. The NRC does not attempt to document all aspects of your programs and performance that may be functioning appropriately. Rather, the NRC only documents issues that the NRC believes warrant management attention or represent noteworthy aspects of performance.
This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the Oconee PPR review. It is provided to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to ensure that conflicts in scheduling and personnel availability can be resolved in advance of the inspection. Enclosure 2 details our inspection plan for the next six months. The rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program is provided so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. In addition, the plan also includes inspections planned as part of the license renewal effort. Resident inspections are not listed because of their ongoing and continuous nature.
DEC 4
We will inform you of any changes to the inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact Charles Ogle at (404) 562-4510.
Sincerely, (Original signed by)
Charles A. Casto Deputy Director Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-269, 50-270, 50-287, 72-04 License Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, DPR-55, SNM-2503
Enclosures:
- 1. Plant Issues Matrix
.2. Inspection Plan cc w/encls:
J. E. Burchfield Compliance Duke Energy Corporation P. 0. Box 1439 Seneca, SC 29679 Lisa Vaughn Legal Department (PB05E)
Duke Energy Corporation 422 South Church Street Charlotte, NC 28242 Rick N. Edwards Framatome Technologies 1700 Rockville Pike, Suite 525 Rockville, MD 20852 Anne Cottington Winston and Strawn 1400 L Street, NW Washington, D. C. 20005 Mel Fry, Director Division of Radiation Protection N. C. Department of Environmental Health & Natural Resources 3825 Barrett Drive Raleigh, NC 27609-7721 cc w/encls cont'd: (See page 5)
DEC 5
cc w/encls cont'd:
Virgil R. Autry, Director Div. of Radioactive Waste Mgmt.
S. C. Department of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, SC 29201 County Supervisor of Oconee County Walhalla, SC 29621 Manager, LIS NUS Corporation 2650 McCormick Drive Clearwater, FL 34619-1035 L. A. Keller, Manager Nuclear Regulatory Licensing Duke Energy Corporation 526 S. Church Street Charlotte, NC 28201-0006 Peggy Force Assistant Attorney General N. C. Department of Justice P. 0. Box 629 Raleigh, NC 27602 Steven P. Shaver Senior Sales Engineer Westinghouse Electric Company 5929 Carnegie Boulevard, Suite 500 Charlotte, NC 28209 Distribution w/encls: (See page 6)
DEC 6
Distribution w/encls:
S. Collins, NRR J. Zwolinski, NRR W. Dean, NRR J. Lieberman, OE G. Tracy, OEDO T. Boyce, DISP H. Berkow, NRR D. LaBarge, NRR NRC Resident Inspector PUBLIC
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE PAGE FOR SIGNATURES.
OFFICE RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRS RII:DRP RII:DRS SIGNATURE NAME AbelisLe KLandis Hchristensen Kbarr CogLe Bmallett DATE 3/
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YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO YES NO OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME:
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DEC 6
Distribution w/encls:
S. Collins, NRR J. Zwolinski, NRR W. Dean, NRR J. Lieberman, OE G. Tracy, OEDO T. Boyce, DISP H. Berkow, NRR D. LaBarge, NRR NRC Resident Inspector PUBLIC OFFICE RI DRS RII:DR IRII:DRS RII:DRS Rll:DRP /
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04/01/1999 Page: 1 of 28 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:1:/1 Region I
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 01/16/1999 1998005-01 Pr: ENG NRC VIO IV Prd: 4B Sec:
Sec: 5C Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pd: 2A Dismantling of a vent louver on the essential siphon vacuum building for the power path, required to be Sc:
Sc: 3A closed during cold weather, was not detected by Installers or building users as a configuration control problem on support systems Important to safety. This was considered a weakness. (Section E2. 1: (WEAK: 2A, Ter: 4B 3A, 3B - Poor))
01/16/1999 1998011 Pr: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 4A The licensee's Implementation of the Configuration Management initiative was not consistent with the Sec:
Sec: 4IC scope, schedule, and goals described In the Recovery Plan. All of the near term corrective actions defined in Revision 2 of the Configuration Management Improvement Team charter were not completed by the Ter: SC November 1, 1998, date specified in the charter. Also, some of the interim measures previously implemented to prevent Engineering configuration management Issues had been discontinued. (Section E2.6; (NEG:
4AAC.5C - Poor))
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 4B The Problem Investigation Process (PIP) report backlog categorized as Management Exceptions was not Included In the licensee's scope, schedule, and goals for Implementation of Recovery Plan Item SAl:
See:
Sec: SC Corrective Action PIP Activity Backlog. The Inspectors concluded that implementation of the Management Ter:
Exception backlog was not adequate because the criteria for Management Exception Items did not consider priority based on the significance of the problem or technical justification as demonstrated by the untimely resolution of the PIPs reviewed during this Inspection (Recovery Plan Item SAI). (Section E2.4; (NEG:
4B,5C - Poor))
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: ENG NRC NEG PH: SC The licensee's Implementation of the Problem Investigation Process Quality Improvements (RootfCause Sc:
Se:
Quality) Initiative was not consistent with the scope, schedule, and goals described In the Plan. No feedback or mechanism for feedback was provided from the 16 point root cause quality check to the root Ter:
cause evaluators as described In the Root Cause Improvement Plan. Performance goals described in the Plan were not met. (Section E7.1; (NEG: SC - Poor))
01/16/1999 1998011 Prl: ENG NRC POS Pil: 2B The Keowee Emergency Power and Engineered Safeguards test was performed well with the test meeting Sec:
Sec: 3A acceptance criteria. (Section E2.2; (POS: 2B, 3A. 4B - Good))
Ter: 4B 01/16/1999 1998011 PrI: ENG NRC POS Pri: 3A The survey and analysis of the historical outside temperature data and using the information to develop freeze protection requirements for the essential siphon vacuum system was good. (Section E2.1; (POS: 3A.
Sec:
Sec: AIA IA. 4B -Good))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Pr: ENG NRC POS Pri: 3A The some type of analysis was applied to verify the adequacy of existing freeze protection equipment used
.c S
4B at Oconee. (Section E2.1; (POS: 3A 4B -Adequate))
Sec:
Sec: 4B Ter:
ENCLOSURE 1 Item Type (Compliance, FollowupOher), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page: 2 of 28 Date: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 48 The licensee's Implementation of the high pressure injection (HPI)/Iow pressure injection Self-Initioted Sec:
Sec: 5C Technical Audit System Review, which was the second phase of the HPI System Review initiative, was consistent with the scope and goals described In the Recovery Plan. Although all of the original corrective Ter:
actions were not completed by the December 31. 1998. target date, the remaining items had action plans and were scheduled for completion (Recovery Plan Item DB2 - closed). (Section E2.5; (POS: 4B.5C -Good))
01/16/1999 1998011 Prl: ENG NRC POS PrI: 48 The licensee's actions to resolve the self-identified equipment performance deficiency related to K-Line Sec:
Sec: SC Breaker Issues (Inspector Followup Item 50-269,270.287/97-18-06) were good. (Section E8.3; (POS: 4B. 5C Good))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 5A The licensee's implementation of the Managet Observation/Group Assessment Effectiveness and Sec:
Sec:
Benchmarking was, In general, consistent with the scope, schedule, and goals described in the Oconee Recovery Plan. Although the number and percentage of manager observations and group self-assessments Ter:
met the Recovery Plan goals, efforts to Improve the quality were on-going. Revisions to Nuclear System Directive NSD-607 to address some of the weaknesses identified by the licensee are scheduled to be Implemented in early 1999. (Section E7.2; (POS: 5A - Adequate) 01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 5A The licensee's Implementation of the In-plant Review/Safety Review Group (SRG) Job Observation Program Sca Initiative as implemented through the Independent Nuclear Oversight Team, was consistent with the scope Sec.
Sec.
and goals described In the Oconee Recovery Plan. Although all items were not completed as specified In.
Ter:
the Plan schedule, the SRG was achieving the Plan's Intended functions of Independent in-plant reviews and reporting station health to management. (Section E7.3; (POS: 5A - Adequate))
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: ENG Licensee POS PrI: SA A non-cited violation was Identified for Incorrectly placing an Individual on the Qualified Reviewers List without. the Individual having completed the required training. (Section E8.6; (NCV: 4C -Poor; POS: 5A. 5C See' sec: 5C Good))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 58 The licensee was resolving through the Problem Investigation Process and the Failure Investigation Process Sec (FP) all the potential problems brought to light by conducting a special test on Keowee in November 1998.
Sc:
The most significant problem was the chattering with one phase failing to close on one of the nine Ter:
contractor that were monitored during the test. The FIP team had found the most probable cause to be a weak contractor colk However, this finding was preliminary and more work was needed to confirm the cause. (Section E2.7; (POS: 5B - Good))
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 5B As corrective action for a potential essential siphon vacuum failure scenario. the licensee took prompt Sec:
Sec: SC corrective action to realign the system and change applicable procedures. (Section E2.3; (POS: 513.
5C Adequate))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Pril: ENG NRC WK Pri: 3A Poor engineering judgement was shown In that a temporary power installation from the essential siphon system building received an engineering review without a specified routing path. The temporary power was Sec:
Sec: 4B tied Into a motor control center that also supplies power to systems important to safety. (Section E2.1; Ter:
(WEAK: 3A. 48 - Poor))
Item Type (ComplianceFollowupOther), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page:
3 of 28 Date: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: ENG NRC WK Prl: 3A A wiring error and Inadequate testing during the Installation of non-safety-related temperature indication for S.c:
Sc: Q the Unit 3 essential siphon vacuum system float valves gave the operators d false temperature Indication and caused Unit 2 and 3 to be placed In an unnecessary limiting condition for operation. Similarly, two Ter:
thermostats on two condenser circulating water pumps' support equipment Instrumentation were not properly Installed, calibrated, or tested. (Section E2. 1: (WEAK: 3A. 4B - Poor))
01/16/1999 1998011 Prl: MAINT NRC POS Pri: IC The general cold weather preparations for electrical trace and electrical space heating systems were Sc:
Sc: 2B comprehensive. Identified the electrical heating equipment required by the program. and gave instructions on adjusting the heating control equipment. The controlling procedure for cold weather electrical heating Ter:
protection and the work activities were good. (Section M1.2; (POS: IC. 2B -Good))
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: MAINT NRC POS PdI: 2A The licensee has made large strides In improving general plant conditions by implementing and carrying out Sc.
Sc: 28 a material condition upgrade and repair effort. Further repairs and upgrades have been discussed, but the licensee has yet to produce a scope definition or schedule of future repairs (Recovery Plan Item SE1).
Ter:
(Section MlA; (POS: 2A. 2B - Good))
01/16/1999 1998011 Prl: MAINT NRC POS PH: 2B Mechanical and Instrumentation trouble shooting procedures met the Intent of the Recovery Plan. With one Sc:
Sc:
exception, the procedures were Implemented properly. Recovery Plan Item TD5 remains open. (Section M1.3; (POS: 2B -Adequate))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pr: 2B The proper valves had been selected for the Inservice testing program and justifications for test deferrals Sec:
-Sec:
were acceptable. (Section M3.2; (POS: 2B - Adequate))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: MAINT Licensee POS Pri: 5A A non-cited violation was Identified for an earlier failure to have quality control verification of safety-related Keowee work Involving transformer top position alterations. (Section M8.1; (NCV:.3A - Poor: POS: 5A. 5C))
See:
Sec: 5C.
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: MAINT NRC WK Prl: IC Weaknesses were identified-In the cold weather preparation program. The area heaters.in the plant steam heating system were.not tested prior to the onset of cold weather. Turbine building louvers were not verified Sec:
Sec: 2B as closed prior to cold weather. (Section Ml.2: (WEAK: I C. 2B. 3C - Poor))
Ter: 3C 01/16/1999 1998011 Prl: MAINT NRC WK Prl: 2A The material condition of the plant heating system was considered poor after testing Identified 8 out of 29 heaters as Inoperable with the majority In one area of the Unit 3 turbine building basement. (Section MI.2; Sec:
Sec: 2B (WEAK: 2A. 2B - Poor))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 PrI: OPS NRC NEG Pri: IC The inspectors concluded that the licensee's implementation of the mispositioning root cause assessment Initiative (N9740) was not adequate to close Recovery Plan Item OFl. (Section 07.1: (NEG: IC. 3C. 5C Sec:
Sec: 3C Poor))
Ter: 5C Item Type (Compliance, FollowupOther). From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Date: 04/01/1999 Page:
4 of 28 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Pri: 3A General Inspection period findings found human performance error Sec:
Sec: 3B process problems that will require longer term resolutions. There were several surveillance performance Issues In this period. (Section 04.2; (NEG: 3A, 38 3C - Poor))
Ter: 3C 01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Pri: 58 The simultaneous testing of an engineered safeguards channel and emergency power system components Sac:
Sc: 5C resulted In the recurrence of a previous problem when an engineered safeguards component unexpectedly Sec:
Sc: 5C actuated during testing of an engineered safeguards channel and a Keowee hydra electric unit. This was Ter:
another example of a previously cited violation. (Section 08. 1; (NEG: 58..5C - Poor))
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri OPS NRC POS Pi: IA Operations personnel properly Initiated a procedure change and properly adhered to It when Isolating Sec:
Sec: 3A feedwater startup control valve 3FDW-35. (Section 01.4; (P05: IlA. 3A - Good))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 PrH:
OPs NRC PQS Pri: ]A With the operators exhibiting good command and control. Unit 1 was reduced from 100 to 20 percent power Sac:Sac 3A to add oil to reactor coolant pumps 1 A2 and 1 BI motors. Minor problems during the return to power were Sec:Sec 3Ahandled well. (Section 0 1.6: (POS: IlA, 3A - Good))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri:.0p5 NRC POS Pri: IA The overall Unit 3 startup following the end-of-cycle 17 refueling outage wasperformed by operations Sac:
Sc: 3A personnel with proper command and control, control room communications, shift turnover activities, and use Tr3B of appropriate procedures. (Section 0 1.2; (POS: IA. 3A. 38 - Adequate))
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: IA The licensee was reporting findings as required to the NRC. (Section 04.2; P05:1A, 5-Adequate))
SDc:
Sec:
4B Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 P I: OPS NRC POS Pri: B Following a Unit 3 reactor trip, operators properly followed their procedures and exhibited good command Sac:
Sc: 3A and control. (Section 0 1.3; (POS:1IB, 3A, 3B - Good))
Ter: 38 01/16/1999 1998011 Prl: OPS NRC Ps Pr: 28 The daily risk assessment process met the goals of the recovery plan. Specific actions of the process had Sec:
Sec:
eitheri been Implemented or scheduled. (Section 02.5; (POS: 28-Adequate))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 P: OPS NRC PE Prl: 5B The root cause evaluation and corrective actions taken following loss of onsite emergency electrical power Ter:5 during testing were proper for the situation. (Section 08.2; (PN: 58, 5C - Adequate))
Sec:
Sec: 5C Ter:
Prem Type (Compliance,FolvowupeOther) From 10/0f1o/1997 To 0 1
/30/1999
5 of 28 Date: 04/01/1999 Page:
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: OPS NRC WK Pri: IA The Inspectors concluded that operations' failure to identify that the Unit 3 loop vent performance test had Sac:
Sc: 28 not been completed was a weakness in the review of startup prerequisites and in operations procedures.
The work control personnel's removal of the performance test from the schedule without the test being Ter: 3C completed was also a weakness. (Section 04.1; (WEAK: IA. 3A. 3C - Poor))
01/16/1999 1998011 Pit: PLTSUP NRC POS Pd: IC The licensee's security plan changes were thorough, well documented, and consistent with the Physical Sec:
Sac: 3C Security Plan commitments and 10 CFR Part 50. (Section S3.1: (POS: IC. 3C -Good))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Pr: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC The licensee's actions to Implement NRC Information Notice 98-35, "Threat Assessments and Consideration of Sc:
Sc: 3C Heightened Physical Protection Measures," dated September 4, 1998. were considered adequate. (Section Sec:Sec:3C 4.2; (POS: I C, 3C - Good))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 PrI: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC Corporate. site and security management were very effective in providing support to the Physical Security Program. This was a major strength In the Duke nuclear security program. (Section S6.2; (STREN: IC. 3C Sec:
See: 3C Excellent))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC The licensee's management controls of the security program were aggressive, effective, and Sec:
Sec: 3C comprehensive. (Section S7.4; (POS: IC. 3C -Good))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 PrI: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC On December 15. 1998. the licensee conducted what It designated as "1998 Emergency Response Exercise It" as an Integrated quarterly drill with participation by the Control Room Simulator. Operational Support Sec:
Sec: 5C Center. Technical Support Center, and Emergency Operations Facility. An Integral aspect of the scenaio Ter:
objectives was to demonstrate corrective action with respect to the two exercise weaknesses identified during the August 18, 1998. full-participation exercise. The inspectors noted significant improvements In the performance of the emergency response organization and suitable corrective action for the two exercise 0 weaknesses. (Section P4.1; (POS:1C. 5C - Good))
01/16/1999 1998011 PrI: PLTSUP Licensee POS Pri: 5A One non-cited violation was Identified for failure to maintain a required three-hour penetration seal fire Sec:
Sec: SC barrier rating. (Section F8.4; (NCV: IC. 2A - Poor: POS: 5A. 5C - Good))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Pr: PLTSUP Self POS Prl: 5A A non-cited violation was identified for a safeguards Information document being unsecured and unattended. (Section S8.3: (NCV: 3A. 3B - Poor; POS: 5A, 5C - Adequate))
Sec:
See: 5C Ter:
Item Type (Compliance FollowupOther), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page: 6 of 28 eDate:
04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 01/16/1999 1998011 PdI: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 5C The licensee demonstrated effective corrective action with respect to previously Identified weaknesses by Sec:
Sec:
conducting a drill which demonstrated timely followup of damage assessment reports and prompt STec:
.classification of the General Emergency. (Section P8.1; (POS: 5C - Good))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Prl: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 5C The licensee's corrective actions for security related problems were technically sound, effective, and Sec:
Sec:
performed In a timely manner. (Section S7.3; (POS: 5C - Adequate))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011.
PrI: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 5C The licensee took appropriate corrective actions when Informed that a contract employee failed to report Sec:
Sec:
criminal offenses on pre-employment screening records. (Section S8.4; (POS: 5C - Good))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Prl: PLTSUP
-NRC POS PrI: 5C Corrective actions were found to be good for two violations which involved: a fallure to provide fire fighting Sac:
Sec:
procedures for all safety-related plant areas; and a failure to follow procedures for control of combustible material. (Sections F8.2 and F8.3; (POS: 5C - Good))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Pri: SB The licensee reviewed and analyzed documented problems. reached logical conclusions, and prioritized Sc the problems for appropriate corrective action. This problem analysis program was a major strength to the Sec:
Sec.
security program. (Section S7.2; (STREN: 5B - Excellent))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011-04 Pr: OPS Licensee NCV Pri: ]A Personnel Error at Keowee Results In Overheating the Closing Coils for the Unit 1 Field Breakers Failure to Sc:
Sc: 3A follow procedure when stopping a Keowee hydro electric unit following testing caused damage to two Keowee circuit breakers and resulted In a non-cited violation. (Section 08.2; (NCV: IA. 3A - Poor))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011-06 Pr: MAINT NRC NCV Pri: 3A Failure to Follow Procedure (Section M8.1)
A non-cited violation was Identified for an earlier failure to hav quality control verification of safety-related Keowee work involving transformer top position alterations.
Sec:
-Sec:
(Section M8.1; (NCV: 3A - Poor; POS: SA. SC))
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011-07 Prl: ENG NRC EEl Pri: 4B Three Examples of Failure to Meet the Requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B. Criterion XVI (Sections E2.4 and Sec:
Sec: 5C E8.2)
Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011-08 Pri: ENG NRC NCV PrI: 4C An Individual was Incorrectly Placed on the Qualified Reviewer's List Without Completing all Required Training (Section E8.6)
Sec:
Sec.
Ter:
Item Type (Compliance, FollowupOther), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Date: 04/01/1999 Page: 7 of 28 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region 11 PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 01/16/1999 1998011-09 Pri: PLTSUP Licensee NCV Prl: 3A Failure to Control Safeguards Information (Section S8.3)
Sec:
Sec: 3B Ter:
01/16/1999 1998011-10 PrI: PLISUP NRC VI IV PrH: IC Failure to Properly Implement Procedural Requirements for a Continuous Fire Watch (Section Fl) - A violation of procedural requirements was identified for not properly implementing continuous fire watch Sec:
Sec: 3A requirements. A designated continuous fire watch left the affected turbine building continuous fire area Ter:
unattended f or longer than 15 minutes. (Section F 1.1; (VIO: I C. 3A - Poor))
01/16/1999 1998011-11 Pri: PLTSUP Licensee NCV PrI: IC Failure to Maintain Required Penetration Seal Fire Barrier Rating (Section F8.3)
Sec:
Sec: 2A Ter:
01/15/1999 1999010 PH:
NRC PS Pri:
LIcensee actions to resolve a concern with poor operator access to the handwheet of Unit 3 EFW flow 011/9P:
NC Pcontrol valve FDW-316 were adequate. (Section E8.1; (POS: 5C - Adequate))
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
01/15/1999 1999010 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Pri: IB A weakness In emergency operating procedures (EOPs) was identified In that EOP action steps were not Sc:
Sc:
written clearly or in a consistent format. (Section E8.1; (NEG: IB - Poor))
Ter:
01/15/1999 1999010 Pri: OPS NRC*
NEG Pri: 18 A weakness In documenting the EOP basis was Identified in that the Emergency Procedures Guideline (EPG) 0/51r: O:
Nwas not updated to Include a 1995 EOP change and the EPG Reference Document was significantly out of Sec:
Sec:
date. (Section E8.1; (NEG: IB - Poor))
Ter:
12/12/1998 1998015 PH: ENG NRC WK Pri: AA The licensee's 1998 UFSAR Review Project locked the necessary thoroughness to identify the above UFSAR 129 9 5
- NG NC Wupdate issues. (Section E8.1; (Weakness: 4A, AC - Poor))
Sec:
Sec: AC Ter:
12/12/1998 1998015-01 ri: ENG NRC V1IIV Pri: 4A A violation (VIO 50-269.270.287/98-15-01, Failure to Update the UFSAR) was identified. This violation Involved failures to update the UFSAR sections describing the emergency feedwater system. (Section E8.1; (VIO: AA.
Sac:
Sec: AC AC - Poor))
Ter:
12/12/1998 1998015-02 Pri: OPS NRC EEI Pr: IC An apparent violation (EEl 50-269,270,287/98-15-02, Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations) was Sac:
Sac: B identified for three examples of the failure to perform or Inadequate safety evaluations for changes to emergency operating procedures related to providing alternate emergency power to a high pressure Ter: dC injection pump. (Section E8.1; (EEI: IC, 4B. 4C - Poor))
Item Type (ComplianceFoowu p.Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page: 8 of 28 Date: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Dale Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 12/12/1998 1998015-03 Pri: OPS NRC EEl Pri: IC An apparent violation (EEI 50-269,270.287/98-15-03, Emergency Procedure Not Adequate to Mitigate Sec:
Sec:
Secondary Pipe Break Events) was Identified for an Inadequate procedure for connecting alternate cec.
emergency power to a high pressure Injection pump. (Section E8.1; (EEI: IC - Poor))
Ter:
12/04/1998 1998301 Prl: OPS NRC POS Pri: 3B The NRC concluded that the licensee's examination submittal met NRC expectations and was of significantly Sec:
Sec:
higher quality than the previous year's submittal. This is indicative of improved performance In the licensee's licensed operator training and evaluation program (Section 05.2).
Ter:
12/04/1998 1998301 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 38 The examiners concluded that SRO candidate performance on the written examination was satisfactory Sec:
Sec:
(Section 05.3).
Ter:
12/04/1998 1998301 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pr: 38 Overall performance on the operating test was satisfactory with some weaknesses noted in the areas of Sec:
Sec:
diagnosis of events and understanding Integrated plant system response (Section 05.3).
Ter:
12/04/1998 1998301 Pri: OPS NRC WK
. Pit: 38 The examiners concluded that RO candidate performance on the written examination was weak (Section Sec:
Sec:
05.3).
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 PI: ENG NRC NEG Prt: 2A During the Keowee test, motor operated valve 3LP-17 did not operate as expected. The licensee repaired Sec:
Sec: 4B the valve after the recent problem Identification and Is Investigating. (Section E2.4; (NEG: 2A. 4B - Poor))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Prl: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 2B Test procedures were poorly written for a post-modification test of the 7 kilovolt and the emergency power Sec:
Sec:
switching logic systems. (Section E2.3; (NEG: 2B -Poor))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 3A During post-modification testing of the minor temporary modification for the Keowee emergency test, a wrong switch was manipulated which resulted In both Keowee units being inoperable. The inspectors will Sec:
Sec: 3B evluate potential enforcement with the licensee event report. (Section E2.4; (NEG: 3A. 3B - Poor))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pit: 3A Implementation of the Unit 3 emergency condenser circulating water, (ECCW) Initiative was consistent with the scope and schedule described in the Oconee Recovery Plan. Test procedures were generally well Sec:
Sec: 48 written and required only a few changes. The pre-job briefing was thorough. Test deficiencies and Ter:
discrepancies were documented for evaluation and resolution. The test acceptance criteria were met or retesting was performed to resolve deficiencies where the test acceptance criteria were not met Initially.
Item Type (Compliance, Followup, Other), From.10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page: 9 of 28 Co msinDate:
04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pr: 4A The Inspectors concluded that the safety-related 4Akilovolt switchgear located in the turbine building was not Sec:
Sec:
required to be qualified In accordance with the environmental qualification rule based on the licensee's mitigation strategies for high energy line break events that had been previously reviewed and accepted by Ter:
NRC. (Section E8.5; (POS: 4A -Good))
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 4A The modifications and replacements for the Keowee breakers are in progress or have been scheduled. The Sec:
Sec: 4B design, support. procedures, and processes used were good. (Section E2.2; (POS: 4A. 40. 4C - Good))
Ter: 4C 11/28/1998 1998010 PrI: ENG NRC POS Pri: 4A Implementation of the first phase of the high pressure injection system review initiative was consistent with Sc:
Sc: 4B the scope and schedule described In the Oconee Recovery Plan. The corrective actions developed to address the three recommendations from the high pressure injection system reliability study were adequate.
Ter: 5C This Item Is closed. (Section E2.5; (POS: 4A, 48. 5C - Adequate))
11/28/1998 1998010.
PrI: ENG NRC POS Pr: 48 The operability analysis and inspections of the Unit 3 reactor coolant pumps were adequate. (Section E2.1; (POS: 4B - Adequate))
Sec:
See:
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Prl: ENG NRC POS Pri: 48 Identification and evaluation of the deformation/excessive movement of the main steam supply piping to the Unit 28 feedwater pump was a good example of proactive Involvement of engineering support of Sec:
Sec: 5A facilities and equipment. (Section E2.8; (POS: 4B, 5A, 5B -Good))
Ter: 5B 11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 5A The resolution for overstress on the pressurizer surge line drain line nozzle was good. (Section E8.2; (POS: 58.
Sec:
Sec: 50 5C - Good))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: ENG NRC POS PI: 5B The root cause analyses and corrective actions for undersized welds or welds which were not Inspected by Sec:
Sec: 5B quality assurance were thorough and comprehensive. (Section E8.1; (POS: 5B. 5C -Good))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 5C The corrective actions were considered adequate for an earlier failure to conduct post-modificatIon testing Sec:
Sec:
on Keowee over voltage relay. (Section E8.3; (POS: 5C - Adequate))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: ENG NRC STR Pr: 2A A weakness in the design of the temporary modification for the Keowee Unit 2 emergency power test resulted In a test failure. An unrelated equipment failure on Keowee Unit I made both Keowee units Sec:
Sec: 4A technically Inoperable. (Section E2.4: (WEAK: 2A. 4A, 4C - Poor))
Ter: 4C Item Type (Compliance, FollawupOther). From in/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page:
10 of 28 Date: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 11/28/1998 1998010 Pd: ENG NRC STR Prl: 2B Personnel dosimetry devices were appropriately worn. (Section R 1.1; (STREN: 3A. 3B - Excellent))
Sec:
Sec: 3B Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: ENG NRC STR Pri: 3A The performance of a test following modification of the 7 kilovolt power system was excellent in that Sc:
Sec:
personnel used effective communications, stopped the test for unexpected conditions, identified procedure problems, and were continuallyaware of equipment status at all times. (Section E2.3; (POS: 3A Ter:
Excellent))
11/28/1998 1998010 Pr: ENG NRC STR Prd: 3A The Keowee emergency start test procedure was well written, technically correct, and the overall activities Sec:
Sec: 3C Involved with the test performance were excellent. (Section E2.4; (POS: 3A, 3C -Excellent))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: ENG NRC STR Prl: 4B The modification for the reactor coolant pump swtchgear was excellent, In that it was technically sound, easily understandable, and was Installed In an excellent manner. (Section E2.2; (POS: 4B, AC -Excellent))
See:
Sec: 4C Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: ENG NRC WK Pri: 4B The decision to delay performance of an operability evaluation of a potentially Inadequate cable tray support based on the existence of redundant equipment was Identified as a weakness in the justification for delaying the evaluation of the associated Problem Identification Process report. (Section E2.7; (WEAK: 4B, 5B Ter:
- Poor))
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC NEG Pri: 2A The synchronization checking relays were In poor condition and contributed to a standby bus breaker Sec:
Sec:
failure. (Section MI.3: (NEG: 2A - Poor))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 2A The performance of the emergency power switching logic tests was good and the Keowee units did not mechanically overspeed trip when electrically tripped from 68 megawatts each. (Section M.1; (POS: 2A, 3A Sec:
Sec: 3A
- Good)).
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC POS PrI: 2B Corrective measures implemented as a part of the Oconee Recovery Plan Work Management Backlog issue Sec:
Sec:
were effectively Implemented. (Section M8.1; (POS: 2B - Good))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 2B Corrective measures Implemented as a part of the Oconee Recovery Plan Outage Readiness issue were Sec:
Sec:
effectively Implemented. (Section M8.2; (POS: 2B - Good))
Ter:
Item Type (Compliance,Followup, Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page:
11 of 28 United States Nuclear Regulatory CommissiDton te: 04/01/1999 CommisionTime: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Dale Funcilonal Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC POS PrI: 2B The results of the scheduled and augmented Inservice Inspection activities reviewed provided clear status of Sc:
Sc: 3A the components acceptability for continued service. This completes the NRC review of the Oconee Tec: 3A Inservice Inspection Defense Plan. (Section Ml.4; (POS: 2B. 3A - Adequate))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 PI: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 2B The licensee's eddy current examination activities were conducted In a conservative manner, with several Sec:
Sec: 3A levels of review during data analysis. (Section M 1.5; (POS: 2B. 3A - Good))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 3A Overall, maintenance on the Unit 3 core flood check valves was good as evidenced by procedure Sc:
Sc: 3B availability at the work site and the proper control of replacement parts. The use of vendor personnel to perform maintenance increased the experience level of the work force. (Section MI.2; (POS: 3A. 38 -Good))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 4B The followup action plan and the initiation of a minor modification to address the failed synchronization Sc:
-Sc:
4C relay, which caused a failure of a breaker In the standby thus, were appropriate to address this degraded material condition. (Section M1.3: (POS: 4B. AC - Good))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Prl: MAINT NRC STR Pri: 3A The repair activitIes, estabilshed contingencies, the use of thermography, and supervisory oversight for a rectifier cooling water leak repar on the Unit 2 generator was excellent. (Section MI.1: (POS: 3A. 3C Sec:
Sec: 3C Excellent))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 PrI: MAINT NRC WK Pri: 2B The procedure for assembly and disassembly of the Unit 3 core flood check valves contained some weaknesses In the instructions for removing and installing the bonnet and for Installing the disc. (Section Sec:
Sec:
MI.2; (WEAK: 2B - Poor))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Pri I A Through a review of records, the licensee discovered that Unit I exceeded a 72-hour limiting condition for 18 operation for low pressure service water flow instrumentation to the low pressure injection decay heat Sec:
Sec:3B coolers. Additional Inspector followup will be performed during review of the associated licensee event Ter: 4A report. (Section 02.6: (NEG: IA, 3B. 4A -Poor))
11/28/1998 1998010 PrH:
OPS NRC NEG Pr: 2A Licensee inspection of the Unit 3 low pressure injection pumps revealed several rotating element problems.
Those were properly repaired and documented. The licensee plans to examine the other units' pumps as Sec:
Sec:
soon as practical. (Section 02.4; ( NEG: 2A - Poor))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC.
POS Pr: ]A Following a Unit 2 reactor trip, the overall startup activities by the operators were good. Operators exhibited clear communications, used appropriate procedures. and were attentive to changing plant conditions. The Sec:
Sec:
command and control by shift supervision were good. (Section (51.1; (POS: IA - Good))
Ter:
Item Type (Compliancan FollowupOther), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page:
12 of 28 Date: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region It PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Dale Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: IA Unit 3 reduced Inventory operations were completed properly with appropriate operator action, supervisory Sec:
Sec: 3A oversight, and procedure adherence. (Section 01.2; (POS: IA, 3A, 3C - Adequate))
Ter: 3C 11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: IA Fuel movement activities on Unit 3 were conducted In a professional manner with adequate procedures and good adherence to procedures. (Section 04.1: (POS: IA. 3A, 3C - Good))
Sec:
Sec: 3A Ter: 3C 11/28/1998 1998010 Pd: OPS NRC POS Pri: 2A The plant equipment responded as expected to the November 3. 1998. Unit 2 reactor trip. (Section 01.3; Sec:
Sec:
(POS: 2A - Adequate))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 2A The Top Equipment Problem Resolution process has been fully Implemented at Oconee and meets the Sc:
.Sc:
2B Recovery Plan goals by functioning to bring about Improvements in equipment reliability and operator work-orounds. (Section 02.5, (POS: 2A, 2B. 5C - Good))
Ter: 5C 11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 3A Preparations and training for significant Keowee hydro-electric plant testing were good. (Section 01.1; (POS:
Sec:
Sec: 3B 3A, 3B -Good))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 3B The good questioning attitude by a non-licensed operator regarding fuse labeling was seen as a positive.
The corrective actions taken to label the fuses was also seen as a positive. (Section 03.1; (POS: 38. 5C Sec:
Sec: 5C Good))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 3C The licensee's Implementation of temporary defenses from the Oconee Recovery Plan for management observations during non-outage times was detailed, met the objectives outlined in the Recovery Plan, and Sec:
Sec: 5C were appropriately entered into the corrective action program. (Section 04.2; (POS: 3C. SC - Good))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 5A An inadequate procedure resulted In the Isolation of both trains of the Unit 2 Essential Siphon Vacuum System Sec:
Sec:
and was considered a non-cited violation. (Section 08.1; (NCV: 3C -Poor; POS: SA Adequate))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pr:OPS NRC POS Pri: SA Licensee Inspection of the Unit 3 low pressure injection pumps revealed several rotating element problems.
Those were properly repaired and documented. The licensee plans to examine the other units' pumps as Sec:
Sec: SB soon as practical. (Section 02.4; (POS: 5A. 5B - Adequate))
Ter:
Item Type (Compliance FollowupOther). From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Date: 04/01/1999 Page:
13 of 28 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template
- Date Source Area ID Type Codes item Description 11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 5B The past operability evaluation performed on the reactor coolant makeup pump regarding the use of Sec:
Sc: 5C calculated reactor coolant pump seal return flow instead of actual flow showed proper analysis and Sec:
Sec: SC resolution of the problem. (Section 08.2; (POS: 5B. 5C - Adequate))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pi: OPS NRC POS Pri: 5B Regarding a thermal insulation violation closeout, the licensee's corrective actions and closure materials
/2 9 9 0 P: 5B were complete and adequate. (Section 08.3; (POS: SB, 5C - Adequate))
Sec:
Sec: 5C Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pr: OPS NRC STR Pri: IA After a Unit 1 standby bus breaker relay failure. the operators and shift operations manager exercised sound Sec:
Sec:
judgement; were very cognizant of plant conditions; were aware of applicable Technical Specifications and procedures; and controlled and coordinated the followup activities In an excellent manner. (Section 01.1; Ter:
(POS: I A -Excellent))
S11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC STR Pri: 1 B The operator responses to the November 3, 1998, Unit 2 main turbine and main feedwater pump trips followed by a reactor trip event were excellent. The operators were business like and methodical In their Sec:
Sec: 3A command and control during the recovery. (Section 01.3; (POS: lB. 3A, 3B - Excellent))
Ter: 3B 11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC STR Pri: 3A The corrective action activities In troubleshooting,. replacing the damaged cable associated with the Sac:
Sc: 5B November 3. 1998, Unit 2 reactor trip; and the post-repair testing were excellent. (Section 01.3; (POS: 3A. 5B.
Sec:
Sec: 5B 5C -Excellent))
Ter: 5C 11/28/1998 1998010 Prd. PLISUP NRC NEG Pri: IC Poor radiation worker practices at radiological control area control points were observed. (Section R1.1; S1c:
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: PLISUP NRC NEG Pri: 38 The Unit 3 containment prejob briefing was not effective in communIcating Information to some workers.
1/98 9:
P(Section R1; (NEG: 38 -Poor))
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Fri: 5C Corrective actions for previous Issues had not been fully effective. (Section R1.1; (NEG: 5C - Poor))
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 PrI: PLISUP NRC STR Pi: IC Material was labeled appropriately, and areas were properly posted. (Section R 1.1; (STREN: 1C -Excellent))
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Item Type (ComplianceFoowupOther). From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page:
14 of 28 Date: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Pri: IC Radiation work activities were planned. radiation worker doses were being maintained well below regulatory limits and the licensee was continuing to maintain exposures as low as reasonably achievable. (Section R. 1; Sec:
Sec:
(STREN: IC - Excellent))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010 Pr: PLTSUP NRC STR Pri: 38 The Interactive video computer program for job planning was observed to be a strength towards obtaining Sec:
Sec:
exposures as low as reasonably achievable. (Section R 1.1; (STREN: 38 - Excellent))
Ter:
11/28/1998 1998010-01 Pri: OPS NRC NCV Pi: IA Failure to Follow Procedure Results in Reactor Coolant System Inventory Loss (Section 01.2)
Sec:
See: 28 Ter: 3A 11/28/1998 1998010-03 Pri: OPS NRC NCV Pri: IA Inadequate Fuse Labeling Results In Standby Bus Inoperability - The failure to adequately label fuse blocks in the standby bus breakers and a lack of a questioning attitude on the part of the work control senior reactor Sec:
Sec: 3A operator resulted In inoperability of the standby busses and was Identified as a non-cited violation. (Section Ter:
03.1; (NCV: 1A. 3A - Poor))
11/28/1998 1998010-04 Pri: OPS NRC NCV Pri: 3C inadequate Procedure Results in Valve Mispositioning - An inadequate procedure resulted In the isolation of both trains of the Unit 2 Essential Siphon Vacuum System and was considered a non-cited violation. (Section Sec:
Sec:
08.1; (NCV: 3C - Poor; POS: 5A - Adequate))
Ter:
11/28/1998
.1998010-05 Pi: MAINT NRC VIO IV Pri: 4B Inadequate Corrective Action Concerning Removal of Lagging Adhesive from Stainless Steel Piping and S.c:
Sec: 58 Components (Section M8.3)
Ter: 5C 11/28/1998 1998010-06 Pri: ENG NRC VIO IV Pri: 4A Failure to Provide Separation of Redundant Safety-Related Cables Inside Enclosures - A violation was Identified for failure to provide separation between redundant trains of safety-related cables inside two Sec:
Sec: dB3 terminal boxes and a main control room panel during Installation of Unit 3 Modification ON 32885/0.
Ter: 4C (Section El.1; (NEG: 4A. 4B, 4C - Poor))
11/28/1998 1998010-08 Pri: ENG NRC EEl Pri: 2B Failure to Inspect and Document Inspections of Reactor Building Service Level I Safety Related Coatings Sec:
An apparent violation was identified for failure of the licensee's quality control Inspectors to perform and Sec:
document Inspections of the coatings In accordance with quality control inspection procedures. This Ter:
apparent violation will remain open for a reasonable time to allow the licensee to develop corrective actions (Recovery Plan Item NRC5). (Section E2.6; (EEI: 2B - Poor))
11/28/1998 1998010 Pri: OPS NRC NEG Pri: IB On November 3, 1998, an Incorrect repair of a electrical penetration fire sealant resulted in a direct current Se: MAINT Se: 28 ground that caused Inadvertent main feedwater pump and main turbine trips. with an ensuing Unit 2 reactor trip. Inspector followup of this Issue will be performed in the closeout of the associated licensee event report.
Ter: 3B (Section 0l.3; (NEG: IB. 2B. 3B-Poor))
Item Type (ComplianceFolowup.Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Date: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 46 It was not evident that the post-modification/malntenance testing process program Improvements have yet Sec:
Sec:
assured that all post-modification/maIntenance testing are correctly designated, scheduled, and executed which was the stated goal for this recovery plan item. (Section E2.6: (NEG: 41 - Poor))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 5A The licensee's Safety System Engineering Audit of emergency feedwater was weak in that it did not Identify Sec:
Sec:
three potentially significant design vulnerabilities, one violation, and some Inaccurate Updated Final Safety Analysis Report statements that were Identified by the NRC. (Section E7.2: (NEG: 5A - Poor))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009.
Pri: ENG NRC POS PrI: IC An operating experience feedback process is In effect, being used by applicable personnel, and Is Sec:
Sec: 4C considered good. (Section E7.1; (POS: 1C, 4C -Good)).
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pr: ENG NRC POS Pri: 2B Implementation of the secondary system/component reliability Initiative was consistent with the scope, schedule, and goals of the Oconee Recovery Plan. The actions taken by the licensee had resulted in Sec:
Sec: 46 Increased engineering involvement and plant management attention to secondary system component Ter:
problems. Recommendations from an engineering analysis of selected systems and components were being Incorporated Into the licensee's work control process. (Section E2.4; (POS: 2C. 41 -Good 10/17/1998 1998009 PI: ENG NRC POS Pri: 26 A temporary measure of Increased pre-outage support by the licensee's Implementation team identified a c
S number of outage related post modification/maintenance testing problems which prevented the Sec:
Sec: 5A occurrence of post modification/maIntenance testing deficiencies during those outages. (Section E2.6; Ter:
(POS: 2B. 5A - Good))
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 4A The licensee's actions for Generic Letter 96-06 were consistent with the scope, goals, and schedule Sec:
Sec:
described In the Oconee Recovery Plan. Outstanding actions are appropriately tracked via a licensee event report and supplemental responses to Generic Letter 96-06. (Section E8.5: (POS: 4A - Adequate Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 4A The licensee's walkdown inspections of coatings were adequate to plan and prioritize coating repair activities to be performed during the current refueling outage. The licensee's actions to address repairs to Sec:
Sec: 56 the coatings in the Unit 3 reactor building were performed In accordance with good engineering practices Ter:
and NRC requirements. (Section E2.1. (POS: 4A, 5B - Good))
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 4B Implementation of the system team development Initiative was consistent with the scope, and schedule described in the Oconee Recovery Plan. The goals were not fully met In that the licensee identified team Sec:
Sec:
member attendance and meeting scope as an area for improvement. However, appropriate Ter:
self-assessment action was provided to monitor continuing performance related to this Initiative which demonstrated the licensee was adequately addressing these deficiencies. (Section E2.2; (POS: 48 Adequate))
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 4B The tracer gas tests of the control room ventilation system represented a substantial improvement in the Sec:
Sec: 2A licensee's ability to assure operability (Recovery Plan Item NRC3). (Section E8.3; (POS: 4B, 26 -Good))
Ter:
Item Type (Compiance, FollowupOther)t From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page:
16 of 28 Dole: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional
-Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 4B Implementation of the temporary modification (TM) Initiative was consistent with the scope. schedule, and Sec:
Sec: 4C goals described in the Oconee Recovery Plan. The actions taken by the licensee to reduce the number of old TMs and control the Installation of new TMs were effective and contributed to the number of TMs being Ter:
reduced from greater than 70 In January 1998 to 38 In September 1998. (Section E.2.3: (POS: 4B.AC -Good))
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC POS Prl: 5B The analysis and resolution of a problem with the emergency feedwater recirculation valve was thorough Sec:
5C and satisfactory. (Section E8.6; (POS: SB, 5C - Adequate))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 58 The analysis and resolution for a violation concerning an inadequate engineering evaluation for lifts over Sec:
Sec: 5C safety-related components was complete and timely. (Section E8.7; (POS: 5B,.5C - Good))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 5B The licensee's analysis and resolution for failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report regarding Sec:
Sec: SC fuel enrichment was thorough and timely. (Section E8.9; (POS: SB. 5C-Good))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009
- Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 5B The licensee's analysis and resolution concerning a failure to assure that the design basis for valves in the Unit Sec:
Sec: SC 1, 2, and 3 letdown storage tank instrument lines were correctly translated into station procedures was timely and complete. (Section E8.10; (POS: 5B, 5C - Good))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: SB The licensee Initiated a design study report to resolve ground Issues. The study was thorough and made Sec:
Sec: SC several recommendations which were adopted. (Section E8. 11; (POS: SB. 5C -Good))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: ENG NRC STR Pri: 4B The root cause analyses for two relay failures were excellent In that they were very thorough, Sec:
Sec: SB comprehensive, technically sound, and identified the most probable cause of the failures. (Section E8.1; (STREN: 4B, 5, 5C - Excellent))
Ter: SC 10/17/1998 1998009 Prl: ENG NRC STR Pri: 48 The licensee's engineering, analysis, and resolution of an error In the energy deposition factor for determining Sec:
Sec: SB operational Imbalance limits was thorough and well done. (Section E8.12; (STREN: 4B, 5B. 5C -Excellent))
Ter: SC 10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 2B The ilcenseb carefully followed procedure and used good parts control during the seal injection of the Unit 2 Sec:
Sec:
steam generator feedwater risers. (Section M1.2; (POS: 2B -Good Ter:
Item Type (CompllanceFollowup.Other). From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page:
17 of 28 Date: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 10/17/1998 1998009 Pil: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 28 The database specified in the fluid leak management program directive was not yet fully developed.
Sec:
Sec:
However, the fluid leak management program directive, catch containers, and database tools met the objective of the Oconee Recovery Plan. (Section M2.1; (POS: 28 - Adequate))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 5A The licensee Identified failure to include adequate guidance for eddy current analysts and the failure to Sec:
Sec: 5B correctly analyze eddy current data resulted in a non-cited violation for returning steam generators to service with defective tubes. (Section M8.1; (POS: 5A, 5B, 5C - Adequate; NCV: 2A, 2B - Poor))
Ter: 5C 10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 5B The analysis and resolution of several examples concerning inadequate control of modifications was timely Sec:
Sec: 5C and thorough. (Section M8.2; (POS: 5B. 5C -Good))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pri: 5B Actions taken by the licensee regarding full thread engagement on packing retaining nuts were timely and Sec:
Sec: 5C complete. (Section M8.3; (POS: 58. 5C -Good))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: MAINT NRC POS Pit: 5B The corrective actions taken by the licensee regarding a violation for the failure to establish and Implement Sec:
Sec: 5C procedures were timely and thorough. (Section M8.6; (POS: 58. 5C -Good))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: OPS Licensee NEG Pri: 2A A direct current ground on the safety-related power supply for all three units resulted from a failed cable.
Sec:
Sec: 3A Induced from repair work on a-valve. (Section 02.7; (NEG: 2A. 3A - Poor))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pi: OPS NRC NEG Pri: 4A The lack of a calculation for operation of the reactor building spray system with suction from the borated Sec:
Sec:
water storage tank resulted in an operable, but degraded, system. (Section 02.4; (NEG: 4A - Poor))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Prl: OPS NRC POS Prl: ]A The management and reduction of workable Control Room Instrument Problems met the Recovery Plan Sac:
Sec: 28 goals. The philosophy change to ensure control room Instruments received Increased awareness and timely repair was good. (Section 02.5: (POS: IA, 2B, 3C - Good))
Ter: 3C 10/17/1998 1998009 Pi: OPS NRC POS Pri: IA Unit 3 reduced inventory operations were completed properly with-appropriate operator action, good Sec:
Sec: 3A supervisory oversight, and good procedure adherence. (Section 01.2; (POS: IA, 3A, 3C -Good)).
Ter: 3C Item Type (CompllanceFollowupOther), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page:
18o128 U t S t.l.
Date: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID
-Type Codes Item Description 10/17/1998 1998009 PI: OPS NRC POS Prl: 2B A direct current ground on the safety-related power supply for all three units was resolved prior to a critical Sec:
Sc: 5A evolution (I.e., the Unit 3 refueling drain to mid reactor coolant loop level). Licensee management placed the drain down on hold until the ground was found. (Section 02.7; (POS: 2B. 5A. 5C - Good))
Ter: 5C 10/17/1998 1998009 PrI: OPS NRC POS Pri: 48 The licensee has adequately reviewed recent control rod mobility problems. Historically, this review process Sec:
Sec: 5B has been ongoing. The licensee plans to replace the mechanisms over the three series of refueling outages (Section 02.6: (POS: 4B, 58 - Adequate))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 5B The corrective actions for the Implementation of Lee Station procedures and Keowee lockout instructions Sec:
Sec: 5C were appropriate and the overall actions taken by the licensee were good. (Section 08.2; (POS: 5B. 5C Good))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pr: OPS NRC POS Prl: 5B The Investigative report regarding the failure to perform an operability test of a 4160 volt breaker was thorough and the corrective actions to prevent recurrence presented in the response letter were adequate.
Sect Sec: SC The Immediate actions were timely and the long-term actions have been completed. (Section 08.3: (POS:
Ter:
58 - Good. 5C - Adequate))
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Prl: IC The licensee's security facilities and equipment were determined to be reliable and effectively maintained.
Good maintenance support was the major factor to continued operability of the personnel search Sec:
Sec: 2A equipment and vehicle barrier system. (Section S2; (POS: IC. 2A. 3A - Good))
Ter: 3A 10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC The security force personnel possessed appropriate knowledge to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities. Including response procedures, use of deadly force, and armed response tactics. (Section Sec:
Sect 3B S; (POS: IC. 3B - Good))
Ter:.
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pi: IC Site and security management provided good support to the Physical Security Program. (Section S&: (POS:
Sec:
Sec: 3C IC, 3C -Good))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 5A The last safeguards audit was thorough, complete, and effective in uncovering weaknesses in the security Sect Sect 5C system, procedures, and practices. (Section S7; (POS: SA, SC - Good))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009-01 Prl: MAINT Licensee NCV Pri: 2A The licensee Identified failure to Include adequate guidance for eddy current analysts and the failure to Sect Sect 28 correctly analyze eddy current data resulted in a non-cited violation for returning steam generators to T:ec: 2 service with defective tubes. (Section M8.1; (POS: SA. 58. 5C - Adequate; NCV: 2A, 2B - Poor))
Ter:
Unem Type IComnlianceFolinwunOther), From 10/01/1 997 To 01/30/1 999
Page:
19 of 28 Date: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 10/17/1998 1998009-02 Pri: ENG NRC VIO IV Prl: 4A A violation was Identified for Inadequate design control in that there were no quality records of tests or Sec:
Sec: 5A analyses to assure the ability of the emergency feedwater pumps to operate at runout as relied upon to mitigate a design basis accident since 1986. Also, the ilcensee had missed two recent opportunities to Ter:
Identify this violation. (Section E8.2; (VIO: 4A. 5A - Poor))
10/17/1998 1998009 PrH:
MAINT NRC POS Pri: 5B The licensee's analysis of the failure to add an In-service test for the Keowee guide bearing oil system valves resulted In a self-initiated, broader review of problems with the surveillance scheduling process. Resolution Sec: ENG Sec: 5C of the specific Issue was timely and appropriate. (Section M8.5; (POS: 5B. 5C - Good))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pr: OPS NRC POS Pri: 40 The operability evaluation and compensatory measures for degraded operation of the reactor building Sec: ENG Sec: 5C spray system with suction from the borated water storage tank addressed relevant safety concerns. (Section 02.4; (POS: 4B. SC - Adequate))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 5B The licensee's actions to resolve a potential for not meeting a reactor coolant system Technical Specification Sec: ENG Sec: 5C temperature limit were complete and thorough. (Section 08.4: (POS: 5B. 5C -Good))
Ter:
10/17/1998 1998009 Prl: OPS NRC POS Pri: 5C Licensee actions in resolution of a March 1997 control rod drive short circuit Induced reactor trip were Sec: MAINT Sec:
adequate. (Section 08.1: (POS: 5C - Adequate))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG Licensee NEG Pri: 2A The repair practice on the non-safety-related 101 reactor coolant pump lower oil reservoir that had perpetuated a repetitive minor oil leak was poor. The leak from the reservoir was the reason for the Unit 1 shutdown this period. (Section E1.2, (2A. 3A. SB - Poor))
Ter: 5B 10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Prl: 4C Some equipment was notably missing from the partially completed Oconee Safety-Related Designation Sec:
Clarification Program database, such as electrical power supplies (Recovery Plan Item DB3). (Section El.1, Sec:
(4C - Poor))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 5C The Problem Investigation Process corrective action backlog, as stated in the Oconee Recovery Plan, provided an Inaccurate and unclear assessment of the overall Problem Investigation Pr6cess corrective action backlog. Specifically, the recovery plan stated that there were 232 open Problem Investigation Ter:
Process corrective actions greater than six months old, while other performance Indicators showed the actual number was approximately 660 (which Included 428 management exception Items) open Problem Investigation Process corrective actions (Recovery Plan Item SAl). (Section E2.1, (5C - Poor))
10/05/1998 1998008 Prl: ENG NRC POS Pri: 2B The licensee's procedures, oversight, and performance of a surveillance test of the Unit 28 penetration room Sec:
Sec: 48 ventilation system air flow, using a pitot tube, were good (Recovery Plan Item NRC3). (Section E8.3. (2B, 4B.
SC - Good))
Ter: 5C Item Type (Compliance FollowupOther), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page: 20 of 28 UDate:
04/01/199 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 10/05/1998.
1998008 Pr: ENG NRC POS Pr: 4A The licensee's review of the history and causal factors associated with an Issue Involving fuses In the reactor Sec:
Sec: 5B trip confirm circuit was thorough and timely. (Section E8.4, (4A, 59. 5C - Good))
Ter: 5C 10/05/1998 1998008 PrI: ENG NRC POS Pri: 4A The Oconee Safety-Related Designation Clarification Program was two years behind its original completion Sec:
Sec: 5C schedule of January. 1997. The licensee had essentally kept the program on its revised schedule during the last 11 months of Increased oversight, and overall progress on the program during the last year was Ter:
adequate (Recovery Plan Item DB3). (Section E1.1. (AA. 5C.- Adequate))
10/05/1998 1998008 Prl: ENG NRC POS PrI: 4B Engineering analysis of the current self-disclosing 191 reactor coolant pump reservoir leak was good.
Sec:
Sec: 5B (Section E1.2. (4B. 58 - Good))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pd: ENG NRC POS Pri: QB The onsite engineering group was addressing the NRC open Items and commitments Involving the Sec:
Sec: 59 emergency power system In a sound technical manner, with approprIate resources, using approved methods, and with management and supervisory oversight (Recovery Plan Item DB7 -Closed). (Section E1.3, Ter: SC (4B. 5B. 5C - Good))
10/05/1998 1998008 Prl: ENG NRC POS Pri: 4B Based on the sample reviewed, the licensee exhibited good progress In the evaluation and resolution of the Sec:
Sec: SB outliers for the Seismic Qualification Utility Group program. Most outliers resolved to date have been through analyses or documentation review. More complex outliers remain to be resolved by repairs., modifications, or Ter: SC refined analyses (Recovery Plan Item DB6 -Closed). (Section E8.6, (4B. 5B. SC -Good))
10/05/1998 1998008 Prl: ENG NRC POS PI: 4B The recent leak sealing in the Unit 3 control room ventilation system outside the control room was very Sec:
S thorough and professional. This leak sealing resulted in a substantial Improvement In the attainable pressure Sec: SC in the Unit 3 control room (Recovery Plan Item NRC3). (Section E8.2. (41, 5C - Good))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG NRC POS Prd: 4C Some of the level of detail In the partially completed Oconee Safety-Related Designation Clarification Sec:
Sec:
Program database of components relied upon to mitigate accidents was good, in that related Indication and associated components were Included (Recovery Plan item DB3). (Section E1. 1, (4C - Good))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: SA The Problem Investigation Process quality reviews performed by the Safety Review Group were effective in Sec:
Sec:
Identifying areas for Improvement In the Problem Investigation Process (Recovery Plan Item SA2). (Section E7.1, (SA -Good))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pr: ENG Licensee POS PrI: 5B Screening of Problem investlgation Process reports was generally good In that the significance level was Sec:
Sec:
appropriately Identified. Downgrading of Problem Investigation Process reports was adequately controlled (Recovery Plan item SA2). (Section E2.1, (5B - Good))
Ter:
Item Type (Compliance,Followup.Other), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page:
21 of 28 Date: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Descriptlon 10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 5B Engineering analysis of the self-disclosing I A2 reactor coolant pump seal problem was good. (Section El.2, Sec:
Sec:
(5B - Good))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG NRC POS Prl: 5B Although the licensee failed to adequately Identify the licensing basis related to reactor building spray Sec:
Sec:
pump net positive suction head assumptions; they performed appropriate, timely analysis to assure operability of the pumps. (Section El.A. (5B - Adequate))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Prl: ENG NRC POS Pri: 5B Operability evaluations of Problem Investigation Process report Identified problems were adequate See:
See:
(Recovery Plan Item SA2). (Section E2.1, (5B -Adequate))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pr: ENG NRC POS Pri: 58 Problem Investigation Process report cause determinations and assigned corrective actions were adequate (Recovery Plan Item SA2). (Section E2.1. (SB, SC - Adequate))
See:
Sec: SC Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Prt: ENG NRC POS PrI: 5C The licensee promptly responded to the maintenance rule violation, including cycling the caustic injection valves to assure that they were capable of fulfilling their Intended function and revising a procedure to Sec:
Include cycling the valves annually. (Section E8.1. (5C -Good))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG NRC STR Pri: 48 The use of the failure Investigation process reports, at management direction when necessary, by Sec:
Sec:
engineering to address significant issues Involving the emergency power system and the quality of the failure reports was excellent (Recovery Plan Item DB7). (Section E1.3, (4B - Excellent))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG NRC WK Pd: 2A Inspector Identified deficiencies found In the seismic mounting of the nitrogen supply lines for all three units degraded the emergency feedwater systems and indicated a weakness in maintaining the nitrogen supply See:
Sec: 5A line supports (Recovery Plan Item D86). (Section E8.7. (2A. 5A - Poor))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: MAINI NRC POS Pr: 28 The licensee's plans for inservice Inspection and steam generator examinations during the Fall 1998. Unit 3 e refueling outage were comprehensive (Recovery Plan Item SE8). (Section M3.1. (28 -Good))
Engine Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC NEG PrI:- IA Poor communications between operations and material condition personnel resulted In tape remaining on the stem of an operable safety-related low pressure injection valve for three days. This was considered a Sec:
See: 3A weakness in communications between site organizations. (Section 04.1. (1 A, 3A - Poor))
Ter:
Item Type (Compliance, FollowupOther), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page:
22 of 28
- e*Date:
04i1v1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 10/05/1998 1998008 PrI: OPS NRC NEG Pri: 2B The Inoperability of both trains of the essential siphon vacuum system on Unit 2 was due to a procedure Sec:
Sec:
weakness that resulted In a mispositloned valve (Recovery Plan Item DB4). (Section 01.5. (2B - Poor))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: IA The Unit I shutdown was performed In a controlled fashion with good command and control. (Section 01.3, Sec:
Sec: 3B (lA. 3B -Good))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: IA Pre-job briefs to support return to service of the Unit 3 auxiliary fan coolers were good in that they contained Sec:
Sec: 38 appropriate detail and stressed procedure adherence (Recovery Plan Item DB8). (Section 01.4,.(1A,.38 Good))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC' POS Pri: IA The Unit I startup from a forced outage was performed effectively. The operators' responses to annunciators, monitoring of parameters, supervisor control, the use of procedures, communications, and Sec:
Sec: 38 management oversight were good. (Section 01.6, (lA, 38 -Good))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS Prl: IA The recognition and response by the operators to a failure of main feedwater while shutdown, and the Sec:
See 5A resolution were considered timely and thorough. (Section 08.5. (lA. 5A. SC - Good))
Ter: 5C 10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: IB During the Unit I return to power operations, the licensee adequately responded to a condensate air Sec:
Sec:
ejector radiation monitor alarm. This showed a marked improvement over a past occurrence, which resulted in a non-cited violation. (Section 01.6. (1B - Adequate))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pr: 48 The compensatory actions established in response to the licensee's identification of another water hammer scenario identified during a Generic Letter 96-06 review were adequate (Recovery Plan Item DB8). (SectionW Sec:Se:5 01.5. (4B. 5A - Adequate))
Ter:
10/05/1998
-1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS PrI: 4B The evaluation and followup actions established by the licensee in response to lack of oil in a reactor Sac:
Sec: 5B building spray pump were adequate. (Section 01.5. (4B. 58, SC - Adequate))
Ter: SC 10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS Prl: AB The engineeringevaluation to support the return to service of the Unit 3 auxiliary fan coolers was adequate (Recovery Plan Item DB8). (Section 01.4. (48, 5C - Adequate))
Sec:
Sec: SC Ter:
Item Type (Compliance, FollowupOther). From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page:
23 of 28 Date: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS Prl: AC The Ilcensee's activities involving the Technical Specification change and administrative controls in place to Sec:
Sec:
require three high pressure Injection pumps to be operable above 350 degrees F were adequate. (Section Te: 08.1. (AC - Adequate))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pr: OPS NRC POS Pri: 5A Once the potential Inoperability of the essential siphon vacuum system was recognized, the licensee took rapid action to return the system to readiness and made appropriate notifications to the NRC (Recovery Sec:
Sec: SB Plan Item DBA). (Section 01.5. (5A. 58. 5C - Adequate))
Ter: SC 10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS PrI: 5B The analysis performed to ascertain reactor building sump operability, causes of discovery, and resolution Sec:
Sec: 5C were timely and complete. (Section 08.2. (SB. 5C - Adequate))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: OPS NRC POS Pri: 5B The discovery and subsequent corrective actions for a failure to perform a low pressure injection flow Sec:
Sec: 5C Instrument surveillance were timely and thorough. (Section 08.3, (58. SC -Adequate))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pd: OPS NRC POS Pri: SB Following the Inspection and recognition of the significance of the failure to Install cotter pins on main steam Sec:
Sec: SC safety valves, the licensee took prompt and thorough corrective measures. (Section 08.4. (51, 5C - Good))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Prl: OPS NRC POS Pri: 5B The resolution and corrective action In response to an inadequate procedure for voltage regulator Sec:
Sec: SC adjustment were timely and thorough. (Section 08.6. (SB, 5C - Adequate))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pr: OPS NRC POS Pri: 5B The licensee's analysis and resolution of the issues related to the May 3. 1997, Unit 3 high pressure injection Sec:
Sec: SC event were timely and thorough. (Section 08.7, (SB. SC - Good))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 PrI: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC The licensee was effectively maintaining controls for radioactive material storage and radioactive waste Sec:processing.
Work practices observed during radioactive waste processing were good. (Section R1.1, (IC.
Sec:
Sc: 3A 3A - Good))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC The licensee's water chemistry control program for monitoring primary and secondary water quality had been effectively Implemented in accordance with the Technical Specification requirements and the Station Sec:
Sec: 3A Chemistry Manual for water chemistry. The collection of the samples was performed In accordance with the Ter:
licensee's chemistry sampling procedure. (Section R.I.2. (IC. 3A -Good)).
Item Type (Compliance, FoiowupOther), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page:
24 of 28 Date: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 10/05/1998 1998008 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 2A The Inspectors concluded radiation and process effluent and environmental monitors were being Seg Sec:
maintained In an operational condition to comply with Technical Specification requirements and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report commitments. (Section R2.1. (2A -Adequaie))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008 PrI: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: 2A The meteorological Instrumentation had been adequately maintained and the meteorological monitoring Sec:
Sec: IC program had been adequately implemented. (Section R2.2. (2A. IC - Adequate))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008-02 Pd: ENG NRC ViO IV Pr: AA A violation was identified for an Inadequate 50.59 safety evaluation, for a 1996 Final Safety Analysis Report Sec:
Sec: 4B revision, which failed to Identify an unrevIewed safety question related to the net positive suction head for the reactor building spray pumps. (Section E1.4. (4A, 48-Poor))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008-03 PrI: ENG NRC NCV Pri: 3A A non-cited violation of the maintenance rule was Identified by the inspectors for a failure to monitor the Sec:
Sec: 2B performance of manual caustic injection valves. (Section E8.1. (3A. 2B -Poor))
Ter:
10/05/1998 1998008-04 Pri: ENG NRC NCV Pri: 4A A non-cited violation was Identified for improper design basis assumptions regarding the high pressure Sec:
Sec:
Injection system Injection and crossover valves. (Section E8.5, (4A - Poor))
Ter:
10/01/1998 1998-009-02, PrI: ENG Licensee LER Pri: 4B Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System Technically Inoperable Due to Design Oversight Sec:
See:
Ter:
09/30/1998 1998-006-00 Pri: ENG Licensee LER Pri: 5C TWO TRAINS OF ESSENTIAL SIPHON VACUUM SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO INEFFECTIVE CORRECTIVE ACTION Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
09/22/1998 1998014 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC The background Investigation process adequately developed and verified the background elements before Sec:
Sec:
granting unescorted access (Section SI).
Ter:
09/22/1998 1998014 PrI: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC The psychological evaluations of applicants were properly administered and supervised (Section Sl).
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
Item Type (Compliance FollowupOther), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page: 25of 28 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission i4/1:01 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date.
Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 09/22/1998 1998014 PrI: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri:1 C The behavioral observation program was Implemented according to licensee commitments and regulatory Sec:
Sec:
requirements (Section S1).
Ter:
09/22/1998 1998014 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS PrI: IC The grandfatherlng, reinstatement, updating, transfer, and temporary unescorted access authorization elements were efficiently maintained and proficiently managed (Section Si).
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
09/22/1998 1998014.
Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC The protection of personal Information by the Access Services Group was adequate (Section S).
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
09/22/1998 1998014 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IC The licensee had Implemented and staffed an organization that was capable of managing and Sec:
Sec: 3C implementing the Access Authorization Program requirements (Section S1).
Ter:
09/22/1998 1998014 Pri: PLTSUP NRC SIR Pri: IC The documentation and management of the denial, revocation, and appeals process was a strength In the Access Authorization Program (Section S1).
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
09/05/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG Licensee NEG Pri: 3A A non-cited violation of the maintenance rule was Identified by the-inspectors for a failure to monitor the Sec:
Sec: 3B performance of manual caustic Injection valves. (Section E8.1. (3A, 2B - Poor))
Ter:
09/05/ 1998 1998008 Pri: ENG NRC NEG Pri: 4A The Inspectors identified a poor design condition for both timely access to equipment and personnel safety in that operator access to the handwheel of Unit 3 emergency feedwater flow control valve FDW-316 Sec:
Sec: 5A involved walking on a horizontal pipe about 15 feet above the floor. This condition had existed for many Ter:
years without licensee Identification and corrective action (Recovery Plan Item DB9). (Section E8.1. (4A. 5A Poor))
09/05/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: 5A The in-plant reviews of the Oconee Recovery Plan were being performed in accordance with established S0c:
Sc:
schedules. However, programs and directives under which the independent Nuclear Oversight Team will function were still In the process of being revised to reflect the Safety Review Group organization (including Ter:
the Independent Nuclear Oversight Team roles and responsibilities) (Recovery Plan item SA4). (Section E7.1.
(5A - Adequate))
09/05/1998 1998008 Pri: ENG NRC POS Pri: SA The Identification, analysis, and resolution of the design basis concerns related to the failure of Valve 1IHP-27 Sec:
Sec:5 to close were adequate. (Section E8.5. (5A, 5B. 5C - Adequate))
Ter: 5C Item Type (Compliance, FoilowupOther), From 10/0111997 To 01/30/1999
Page:
26 of 28 Date: 04/01/1999 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Time: 13:10:14 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 09/05/1998 1998008 Pi: ENG NRC POS Prl: SC The use of the problem Investigation process to track to closure corrective actions for NRC open items and Sec:
Sec:
commitments involving the emergency power system and the quality of this process were good (Recovery Plan Item D7). (Section El.3. (SC - Good))
Ter:
08/28/1998 1998014 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pr: IC Personal access authorization records were maintained according to the Access Authorization Program Sec:
Sec:
commitments and regulatory requirements (Section S1).
Ter:
08/28/1998 1998014 PrI: PLTSUP NRC.
POS PrI: SA Audits of the Access Authorization Program were thorough, concise, and timely (Section S1).
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
08/21/1998 1998013 Prt: PLTSUP NRC NEG Pr: IB (Section P4.2.b.1) The EC and his staff failed to advise the EOF Director that a General Emergency declaration was warranted as of 11:00 a.m. when the unit blackout occurred (1B. 3A -Poor) (Section Sec:
Sec: 3A P4.2.b.1)
Ter:
08/21/1998 1998013 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Prl: IB The EC and his staff were not proactive In directing a timely assessment of the damage to the Unit 1 West Sec:
Sec: 3A Penetration Room (18. 3A -Poor). (Section P4.2.b.1)
Ter:
08/21/1998 1998013
.Pr: PLTSUP NRC NEG Pri: IC An insufficient supply of electronic dosimeters hampered mission team response (IC -Poor) (Section P4.2.b.2)
Sec:
Sec:
Ter:
08/21/1998 1998013 Pri: PLTSUP NRC NEG Pri: 2A Equipment problems affecting offsite communications resulted In delayed activation of the EOF (2A, IC Sec:
Sec: IC
-Poor) (Section P4.2.b.3)
Ter:
08/21/1998 1998013 Pri: PLISUP NRC POS PrI: IB Technical Support Center - (Section P4.2.b.1) Command and control of TSC operations was adequate (IB.
Sec:
Sec: 3A 3A -Adequate).
Ter:
08/21/1998 1998013 PH: PLTSUP NRC POS Pri: IB Emergency Operations Facility - Command and control of EOF operations was adequate (18.
Sec:
Sac: 3A 3A-Adequate). (Section P4.2.b.3)
Ter:
Item Type (Compliance, FollowupOther), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Page 27 f
28Dale:
04/01/1 999 Page: 27 of 28 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission time: 13:1:/1 Region II PLANT ISSUE MATRIX OCONEE By Date Functional Template Date Source Area ID Type Codes Item Description 08/21/1998 1998013 Pri: PLTSUP NRC POS Pr: IC Scenario -The scenario developed for this exercise was effective for testing the integrated emergency Sec:
Sec:
response capability bf the onsite and offsite emergency organizations (Section P4.1; (iC -Good))
Ter:
08/21/1998 1998013 Prl: PLTSUP NRC STR PrI: IB The OSC Manager exercised effective command and control (18, 3A -Good). (Section P4.2.b.2)
Sec:
Sec: 3A Ter:
08/21/1998 1998013 Pri: PLTSUP NRC STR Pri: 5A The licensee's controller/evaluator organization was proactive in identifying the significant performance deficiencies, consistent with NRC observations. Licensee management committed to another exercise In Sec:
Sec: 5C the near future In order to demonstrate the.higher level of emergency response proficiency expected by Ter:
management (5A. 5C -Good).
08/21/1998 1998013 Pri: PLTSUP NRC WK Pr: IC The decision to not follow up on the damage report from Security delayed critical damage assessment of Sec:
Sec:
the West Penetration Room (IC -Poor) (Section P4.2.b.2)
Ter:
08/21/1998 1998013 Pd: PLISUP NRC WK Pd: 3A The EOF Director and his staff did not provide a timely classification of the General Emergency (3A 1B -Poor)
Sec:
Sec: lB (Section P4.2.b.3)
Ter:
01/26/1998 1997016-03 Pri: OPS NRC VIO IV Pd: 5B Sec:
Sec:5C Ter:
01/08/1998 Pri: ENG Licensee LER Pri: 58 Sec:
Sec: 5C Ter:
Item Type (Compliance,FollowupOther), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
Date: 04/ili/1999 Page:
28 of 28 United States Nuclear Regulatory commissionme:
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX By Date Legend Type Codes:
Template Codes:
Functional Areas:
BU Bulletin
]A Normal Operations OPS Operations CDR Construction IB Operations During Transients MAINT Maintenance DEV Deviation IC Programs and Processes ENG Engineering EEI Escalated Enforcement Item 2A Equipment Condition PLTSUP Plant Support IFI inspector follow-up item 2B Programs and Processes OTHER Other LER Licensee Event Report 3A Work Performance LIC Licensing Issue 3B KSA MISC Miscellaneous 3C Work Environment MV Minor Violation 4A Design NCV NonCited Violation 4B Engineering Support NEG Negative AC Programs and Processes NOED Notice of Enforcement Discretion 5A.
Identification NON Notice of Non-Conformance 5B Analysis P21 Part 21 5C Resolution POS Positive ID Codes:
SGI Safeguard Event Report NRC NRC STR Strength Self Self-Revealed URI Unresolved item Licensee Licensee VIO Violation W K W e a k n e ss ISt at e m e ntof__
_ _ _ya n d EEis are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy). NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the Issues identified by the EEls and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.
URis are unresolved Items about which more Information Is required to determine whether the issue In question is an acceptable Item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a vUoiaton. A URI may also be a potential violation that Is not likely to be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
Item Type (Compliance.FollowupOther), From 10/01/1997 To 01/30/1999
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission PLANT ISSUES MATRIX by SALP Functional Area OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 8124/98 Negative IR 98-07 LICENSEE Inappropriate actions by operations staff and inexperience on the part of the tagout 1 2 3 4 5 administrator were contributing factors to the Unit 2 reactor trip on June 3, 1998.
(Section 08.5, 3A, 36 - Poor))
A 0 000 B00 0 00 C 0 000 8/24/98 Weakness IR 98-07, LER 270/98-03 SELF Weaknesses in the licensee clearance and work control process were the root cause 1 2 3 4 5 of a Unit 2 reactor trip on June 3, 1998. (Section 08.5, [26 - Poor))
AOOOOD B 00100 CO 000 8/24/98 Negative IR 98-07 NRC The inspectors concluded that the licensee exhibited a weakness in understanding 1 2 3 4 5 surveillance requirements for the Unit 3 reactor building hatch testing. (Section 08.4, [1A, 38 - Poor])
A 0
0 0
CO 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The licensee's corrective actions for a water hammer event on September 24, 1996, 1 2 3 4 5 were adequate. (Section 08.3, [5C - Adequate])
AOOOOO A 00000 B 1100000. 1 CO 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The corrective actions for a procedure administrative hold violation were adequate.
1 2 3 4 5 (Section 08.3, [SC - Adequate])
A 00000 c 0 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The inspectors found the corrective actions for a failure to follow procedure violation 1 2 3 4 5 to be reasonable and complete. (Section 08.1,[5C -Adequate])
A 100000 cO 0000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 1 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE I
TYPE(s)
ISEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd IISSUE(s)
SMVM CODES 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC Management has explained Its expectations regarding plant material condition to the 1 2 3 4 5 staff and the staff has begun to Implement these expectations (Recovery Plan).
(Section 02.3. (3C - Good])
A OOO B 00000 CO 050 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The licensee has Improved plant material condition and housekeeping as part of the 1 2 3 4 5 recovery plan (Recovery Plan). (Section 02.3, [2A - Good))
A 00000 c
01 000E 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The licensee's identification and evaluation of a single fallure vulnerability in the low 1 2 3 4 5 temperature overpressure protection system were seen as positives. (Section 01.2 (SA, 5B, 48 - Adequate]
A O
0 00 B 00000 CO 000 8/24/98 Negative IR 98-07, LER 269/98-09 LICENSEE The licensee identified that the low temperature overpressure protection system was 1 2 3 4 5 not single failure proof for all three units. (Section 01.2, [4A - Poor])
A 00000 B 01E0 0 C 0 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 LICENSEE The licensee was timely In recognizing the fire protection Issue and made an 1 2 3 4 5 appropriate notification to the NRC. (Section F2.1, [5C - Good])
A 00000 B 00000 cO0 00 0
7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 LICENSEE When it was determined that potential degraded fire protection existed, the licensee 1 2 3 4 5 properly and promptly established compensatory action,,i.e., fire watches were initiated in accordance with commitments. (Section F2.1, [2A - Good])
A 0 0 0 0 0 cO 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 LICENSEE The identification of discrepancies in the frequencies for refueling outage 1 2 3 4 5 surveillance requirements was acceptable. (Section 08.1, [5A, 5C - Adequate])
A 00000 c0 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 2 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 7/13/98 NCV IR 98-06 LICENSEE The failure to properly Implement surveillance requirements at the times specified in 1 2 3 4 5 the Technical Specifications resulted in a non-cited violation. (Section 08.1, [2B Poor])
A 0000 9 00000.
CO 000 7/0/98 VIO IR 98-06 SELF Lack of attention to detail resulted In a violation of procedure requirements and the 1 2 3 4 5 Inadvertent starting of an engineered safeguards component. (Section 04.2, [lA.
3A, 3B - Poor])
A 0lO00 0 0 B 00000 CO 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC As a corrective action resolution, the licensee positively Implemented temporary 1 2 3 4 5 defenses for continuous management oversight during Unit 2 startup and for periodic monitoring of Unit 2 reactor coolant system inventory (Temporary Defense A 0 0 0 0 0 under the Recovery Plan - closed). (Section 04.1, [lA, 5C - Good])
CO 000 7/13/98 URI IR 98-06 LICENSEE The licensee Identified a mispositioned valve that may affect the penetration room 1 2 3 4 5 ventilation system. This Item was left unresolved pending completion of the licensee's Investigation and lurther NRC review. (Section 02.4, [1A, 3A - Poor])
A 0 0 0 0 0 B000000 CO 000 7/13/98 URI IR 98-06 SELF During the period, there was a mispositioning of Valve 2HP-116 that requires further 1 2 3 4 5 licensee analysis. The residents identified an unresolved item to track those issues.
(Section 02.3, [3B, 48, SA - Poor])
AOOOO 0 CO 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC Licensee response to a degraded grid was prompt and complete. Operators 1 2 3 4 5 responded well and technical followup on the encountered problems was also prompt and continuing after the end of the inspection period. (Section 02.2, 119 -
A O
0 0 Good])
B 0 10000 God) 0 0 01 0 CO 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC -
Items found during Unit 2 reactor building tours at hot shutdown were properly 1 2 3 4 5 dispositioned in the licensee's work management system, however, there was room for Improvement In the procedure documentation of the resolution (Human A O 0 OOO Performance under the Recovery Plan). (Section 02.1, [28 - Adequate])
B. O 0 0 0 CO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 3 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 7/13198 Positive IR 98-06 NRC Reactor building tours conducted at hot shutdown prior to Unit 2 startup were 1 2 3 4 5 thorough and detailed. This indicates corrective actions dealing with material conditions In the reactor building have been effective in upgrading housekeeping A
0 0 0 0
(Material Condition under the Recovery Plan). (Section 02.1, [2A, 2B, 3A - Good))
CO 0000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC Plant systems responded appropriately following a Unit 2 reactor trip with only minor 1 2 3 4 5 problems noted. (Section 01.6, JIB, 5A -Adequate]),
A 00000 B 00000 CO 000 7/13/98 URI IR 98-06 LICENSEE The surveillance procedure used to determine operability of the Unit 2 and 3 reactor 1 2 3 4 5 coolant makeup pumps was found to be using the wrong reactor coolant pump seal return flow Instrument for determining total reactor coolant system leakage. This A 0 0 0 0 0 Item was left unresolved pending NRC review of the licensee's past operability O 0 0 0 0 determination. (Section 01.5 [28 - Poor])
B cO 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC Operations response to the engineer's phone call regarding the reactor coolant 1 2 3 4 5 pump shalt rubbing problem was prompt, showing good communications and plant understanding. (Section 01.4, [1B - Good])
A 0000 B 00000 CO 000 7/13/98 VIO IR 98-06 NRC The lack of a procedure to adjust reactor coolant pump restraints was a violation of 1 2 3 4 5 the licensee's Technical Specifications (Section 01.4,12B - Poor])
A 00000 c 0000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC During the outage and through the Unit 2 startup, the licensee tracked and 1 2 3 4 5 discussed outage problems. This process culminated In a post-outage meeting to critique outage problems and provide positive direction to the outage process A 0 0 0 0 0 (Human Performance under the Recovery Plan). (Section 01.3, [3B - Good])
0 OO cO 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC During the Unit 2 outage, the inspectors observed some delays and some minor 1 2 3 4 5 examples of poor communications. Those were fewer than those seen during the preceding lengthy Unit 1 outage (Human Performance under the Recovery Plan).
A 00 0 0 O (Section 01.3, (3A - Adequate])
CO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 4 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
01-Apr-99 OCONEE DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The control of personnel access to the main control panel areas was good. Access 1 2 3 4 5 to the control room was restricted. The Inspectors observed that discussions involving equipment status were generally conducted outside the main control panel A 0 0 0 0 0 areas. This resulted in minimal interference with the operating unit and the startup activities (Human Performance under the Recovery Plan). (Section 01.3, (1A -
B 0 11 0 0 El Good])
CO 0 0 0 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The overall Unit 2 startup was performed by control room personnel with good 1 2 3 4. 5 command and control, control room communications, shift turnover activities, and use of appropriate procedures. (Section 01.3, 11A, 3A -Good])
A 001000 CO 000 7'13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The Unit 2 reduced inventory operation was completed properly with deliberate 1 2 3 4 5 operator action, good supervisory oversight, and good procedure adherence.
(Section 01.2, 1lA, 3A, 3C -Good))
A 00000 CO -000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC" The licensee used conservative judgement in declaring Keowee Unit 2 inoperable in 1 2 3 4 5 response to the April 20, 1998, failure to synchronize due to the speed adjustment motor. During this normal start for commercial power generation, an unknown A 0 0 0 00 condition was properly addressed with the operability determination. (Section E2.1, JiA -Adequate])
B E
0 cO 000 6/1/98 MISC IR 98-05 NRC Retraction of the four-hour notification for the Keowee Unit 1 unanticipated start of 1 2 3 4 5 April 9, 1998, was appropriate. (Section E2.1, [1B -Adequate])
A 000l 00El E
B 00000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The addition of operations procedural guidance to verify that fuel assemblies were 1 2 3 4 5 properly positioned, the fuel bridge mast was properly secured, arid spent fuel pool water level was maintained at least eight feet above the fuel storage racks was A 0 0 0 0 0 considered adequate to resolve the issue of previous occurrences of Inadequate 0 0 0 procedure control over spent fuel movement. (Section 08.3, [5C - Adequate])
B 0
CO 000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The corrective actions Implemented for the failure to make a timely notification in 1 2 3 4 5 accordance with Title 10; Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.72 following a 0
reactor trip on March 16, 1996, were adequate. (Section 08.2, [5C - Adequate])
A D O 0 0 0 B 00000 C 0 000 FROM. 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 page 5 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
01-Apr-99 OCONEE DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The corrective actions implemented for the failure to have a procedure for reactor 1 2 3 4 5 building closeout were adequate. (Section 08.1, [SC -Adequate])
B000 C 0 0
6/1/98 VlO IR 98-05 NRC The inspectors Identified a corrective action violation regarding lack of quality 1 2 3 4 5 assurance review of engineering Instructions for minor and temporary modifications.
The licensee had Identified this low level problem approximately two years earlier but A 0 0 0 0 0 Instances of lack of review have continued. (Section 07.1, [5C - Poor])
B O
CO 000@
6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC Refueling activities on Unit 2 were completed in a professional and conservative 1 2 3 4 5 manner. Locating the defueling/refueling administrative and fuel tracking activities in a separate area adjacent to the control room was seen as a positive. (Section 04.1, A 0 0 0 0 0 (1A - Good])
0 CO O00 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The licensee properly completed the operations and maintenance spent fuel pool 1 2 3 4 5
procedural enhancements listed In the Oconee probability and public risk analysis of December 4, 1996. (Section 03.1. 11C, 2B - Adequate])
A 0 00 0 0 B 0100001 C 0 000 5/4/98 VIO ENG IR 98-03; VIO 98-03-01 NRC A violation (VIO 50-269,270,287/98-03-01) was Identified for untimely reporting of 1 2 3 4 5
design Issues. (Section 01.1)
A 000 0
CO 0000 3/21/98 NOV IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-02 LICENSEE Failure to complete an adequate review of all items necessary for Unit 1 startup 1 2 3-4 5
resulted in a non-cited violation. (Section 04.2)
A 0 0 0 0 A 00000 3/21/98 NOV IR 98-02; NCV 98-02-01 SELF A non-cited violation was identified with three examples for failure to follow 1 2 3 4 5 procedure. (Section 04.1)
A 00000 B 00El]00 cO 000 FRO: 1/3097 O:./3099a 6t of4 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99, DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'dj ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 3/21198 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The shutdown of Unit 2 and reduced Inventory operations were completed properly 1 2 3 4 5 with deliberate operator action, good supervisory oversight, and good procedure adherence. (Section 01.4)
A O 0 0
OO B 00000 cO 000 3/21/98 LER PLT SUP IR 98-02, LER 269/98-07 LICENSEE The licensee reported a potential non-conservatism In the procedure for response to 1 2 3 4 5 Appendix R fires in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72. The compensatory actions established appeared to be adequate. (Section 01.3)
A 0 O 0 O 0 BO00 c O 000 217/98 URI ENG IR 97-18; URI 97-18-03 LICENSEE An apparent lack of agreement between the Safe Shutdown Facility diesel technical 1 2 3 4 5
manual and operations procedures will be tracked through an unresolved item.
(Section 03.1)
ADO 0
B 00000 CO 000 2/7/98 Positive IR 97-18, LER 269/98-02 NRC Operations satisfactorily manipulated Unit 1 to cold shutdown for repairs and 1 2 3 4 5 Investigation of a 2 gallon per minute leak from a crack on a one-inch drain line off the pressurizer surge line. Operations made appropriate notifications and reports.
A 0 0 0 O 0 (Section 01.7)
B 0 0 0 0 0 cO 000 2/7/98 Positive ENG IR 97-18 LICENSEE The licensee carefully tested and satisfactorily replaced a Unit i control rod, which 1 2 3 4 5 had latching problems. Operations and engineering provided good overall controls during the rod freedom of motion test. (Section 01.6)
A 0 0 0 0 0 B 00000 CO 000*
2/7/98 URI IR 97-18; URI 97-18-02 NRC The licensee exited a 24-hour limiting condition for operation on the Unit 3 reactor 1 2 3 4 5 building emergency hatch without fully understanding that a Technical Specification interpretation did not relieve them of the surveillance requirements for further A OOOO testing. This Issue was left unresolved pending review of past practices. (Section 01.5)
B 2/7/98 Positive IR 97-18 LICENSEE Operations personnel displayed a good questioning attitude that allowed them to 1 2 3 4 5 detect an unexpected power Increase during letdown flow instrument calibrations.
This problem is alsodiscussed In Section M3.1. (Section 01.4)
A 0 O 0 0 0
.00000 cO 000 ouinniT-ininPage 7 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(S)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
~SMM CODES 2/7/98 NCV IR 97-18, LER 269/97-11; NRC Operations personnel satisfactorily shut down Unit 1 following a steam generator 1 2 3 4 5 NCV 97-18-01 tube leak. The licensee identified a related procedure problem that resulted in a Non Cited Violation. Operations satisfactorily performed the shutdown and overall once A 0 0 0 0 0 through steam generator configuration control work. The licensee drained the reactor coolant system In a controlled fashion to reduced Inventory levels five times during B 0 0 0 the work. This problem is also discussed in Section M1.4 (Section 01.3)
C 0
[ 0 0 2/5/98 URI SAQV IR 98-01; URI 98-01-01 NRC The licensee's administrative procedures for the Nuclear Safety Review Board 1 2 3 4 5 contradicted Technical Specifications regarding review of Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations 50.59 safety evaluations. This was left unresolved pending further NRC A 0 0 El 0 0 review of licensee changes to the review process. (Section 07.4)
C 0 El0 00 2/5/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-01 NRC Plant Operations Review Committee activities were generally in compliance with 1 2 3 4 5 selected licensee commitments and licensee administrative procedures. Related licensee-identified discrepancies had been properly addressed in the corrective A D 0 0 O 0 action program. (Section 07.3) c 0 000 2/5/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-01 NRC The reviewed licensee audits and assessments were performed In accordance with 1 2 3 4 5 NRC regulations and the licensee's quality assurance program commitments and procedures. The audits and assessments were effective in identifying continued A 0 O
O 0 weaknesses and areas for improvement In problem investigation process report B O D
quality. The audit findings generally reflected those identified by the Inspection team B
and the licensee was actively addressing the audit-related deficiencies during the C 0 0 0 El inspection period. (Section 07.2) 2/5/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-01 NRC Generally, problem Investigation process reports reviewed by the Inspection team 1 2 3 4 5 reflected appropriate screening, operability and reportability determinations, with adequate documentation of the problem and corrective actions. The inspection AO 0 0 0
team Identified instances of non-compliance with Nuclear System Directive 208 which paralleled the licensee's audit findings stemming from the Oconee Recovery B E 0 1 110 Plan focus on problem investigation process report quality improvements. The C
0 0 licensee was actively pursuing corrective actions for the previously identified problems with problem investigation process implementation. (Section 07.1) 12/27/97 Positive ENG IR 97-16 NRC The inspectors concluded that the emergency power switching logic functional test 1 2 3 4 5 was performed in accordance with the procedure and with supervisory and engineering oversight. The Inspectors concluded that the problem identification A 0 0 0 0 0 process report appropriately addressed a deficiency involving a potential conflict between the test and the shutdown risk matrix. (Section M1.5).
B cO 000 FROM 10/0/97TO:
/30/9.
ae 8 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DA TE TYPE(s) I SEC. SFA ISOURCE(s)
IDb'd ISSUE(s)
SMVM CODES 12/27/97 Positive ENG IR 97-16 NRC The Units 1 and 2 post-modification low pressure service water full flow test 1 2 3 4 5 adequately tested the system performance and was technically well managed by the system engineer. The operators Involved with the test were well-briefed and A 0 0 0 OO conservatively responded during the testing. (Section M1.2)
B 0 0
C 0 000 12/27/97 VIO
!R 97-16; VIO 97-16-03 SELF The inspectors Identified a violation for inadequate procedures. Three examples 1 2 3 4 5 were Identified that resulted in unexpected responses of operating systems.
(Section 03.2)
A 0 0 0 0 0 CO 0000*
12/27/97 NCV IR 97-16, LER 287/97-04; LICENSEE A non-cited violation was Identified for an Inadequate procedure, which failed to 1 2 3 4 5 NCV 97-16-02 prevent missing a required Technical Specification surveillance requirement.
(Section 03.1).
A O 0 00 600000 C
. 000 12/27/97 Weakness MAINT IR 97-16 LICENSEE During post-maintenance testing, the licensee discovered that a primary core flood 1 2 3 4 5 check valve leaked In excess of Technical Specification limits. The licensee had not performed Intermediate checks of the repaired valve prior to performing the post-A 0 0 0 0 0 maintenance testing. The lack of an Interim check of work performance quality before valve re-assembly was considered a procedural weakness. The licensee had B 0 E 1 0 0 no previous problems with these valves. Operational recovery efforts, reduced C 0 0 0 Inventory control, and root cause analysis were good. Retesting indicated that the rework had been satisfactory. (Section 02.3) 12/27/97 Positive ENG IR 97-16 SELF During the return to service of Unit I reactor coolant pumps, a seal Injection valve 1 2 3 4 5 experienced a socket weld failure. The operators responded In a controlled manner to the failure, utilizing their off-normal procedures. The licensee demonstrated good A 0 0 0 0 0 Investigative techniques during the recovery period. (Section 02.2)
BOD 0
0 CO 000*
12/27/97 VIO ENG IR 97-16; VIO 97-16-01 SELF A violation was Identified involving the simultaneous testing of safety-related 1 2 3 4 5 electrical systems In two units that created a significant voltage transient. (Section 02.1)
A 0 000 6 00000 12/27/97 Positive ENG IR 97-16 NRC Results of physics testing of the new Unit I core, were satisfactory. Operations and 1 2 3 4 5 engineering controlled the evolution satisfactorily. (Section 01.5)
CO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 9 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 12/27/97 Positive MAINT IR 97-16 NRC During a three-hour closeout tour of the Unit 1 reactor building, the inspectors found 1 2 3 4 5
the building In near-ready condition for power operations. Corrective actions from other previous closeout problems had been effective In Improving the licensee's A 0 0 0 OO containment closeout process. (Section 01.4)
BO O O cO 000 12/27/97 Weakness IR 97-16 SELF During a high pressure Injection flow test, the licensee discovered a leaking drain 1 2 3 4 5 valve. The Initial level of documentation of this problem was poor. Immediately following discovery, the licensee did not bound the problem or attempt to completely A 0 0 0 0 0 assess the scope of the problem prior to the onshift crew departing. These were 0
considered weak Investigative practices. Subsequent investigations were adequate B
0 and proposed activities were properly scoped. (Section 01.2)
C 0 0 0 0 11/15/97 Positive MAINT IR 97-15 NRC The Inspectors concluded that the licensee's program and preparations for cold 1 2 3 4 5 weather were good. (Section 02.2)
A 0000 B 00000 cO 000 11/15/97 Positive MAINT IR 97-15 NRC The licensees power reduction and replacement of a degrading Unit 2 main seal oil 1 2 3 4 5 pump was proactive and performed without Incident. (Section 02.1)
A 00000 B 00000 CO 000 11/15/97 Strength IR 97-15 NRC Refueling activities were completed In a professional and conservative manner. The 1 2 3 4 5.
use of the reactor engineer on the refueling bridge in the reactor building, the use of an extra licensed operator In the spent fuel pool area during refueling, and the new A 0 0 0 0 O level of licensee safety conscious overview were strengths. (Section 01.2)
BOOO 0 0 cO 000@
11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety conscious.
1 2 3 4 5 (Section 01.1)
B 00000 CO 000 V-i 22AN 1rRW 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The Investigation and followup testing to confirm the effect of a mispositioned valve 1 2 3 4 5 on the penetration room ventilation system was good. (Section M8.4, S, C, 48 Good])
AOOOOO B 1 0O00 CO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 10 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr.99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(S) jSMM CODES 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The licensee adequately resolved questions Identified in an unresolved item 1 2 3 4 5 regarding the use of Teflon tape. (Section M8.3, [4B, 5C - Adequate])
A 00000 CO 000 8/24/98 Weakness IR 98-07 NRC The failure to adequately document activities In the problem investigation process for 1 2 3 4 5 installation of the wrong parts in a low pressure service water valve was another example of a previously Identified weakness. (Section M8.2. 156 - Poor])
A OO 0 0 6 00000 CO 000 8/24/98 NCV IR 98-07 SELF The failure to detect an Incorrect part prior to Installation in a valve was identified as 1 2 3 4 5 a non-cited violation. (Section M8.2, [28, 5A - Poor])
A 00000 BOO CO 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The formation of the fallure Investigation process and associated Investigation and 1 2 3 4 5
corrective actions for low pressure service water pump bearings problems were good. (Section M8.1, (4, 5B, 5C - Good])
A 00 OO 600000 cO 000 8/24/98 NCV IR 98-07 SELF A non-cited violation was Identified for Inadequacies In the alignment procedures, the 1 2 3 4 5 failure to verify magnetic center, and the Installation of the wrong bearings In the low pressure service water pumps. (Section M8.1, [2A, 28 - Poor])
A 0 0 0 0 0 B 00000 CO 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC Engineering follow-up to the loss of oil In the reactor building spray pump on June 1 2 3 4 5 30, 1998, was good. (Section M2.1, (4B, 5B - Good))
A 00000 9 00000 8/24/98 Weakness IR 98-07 NRC A weakness existed In the followup and resolution of previous problems with the 1 2 3 4 5 reactor building spray pumps' oil system. (Section M2.1, [5A - Poor])
A 00000 CO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 11 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
01-Apr-99 OCONEE DATE I TYPE(s)
SEC. SPA SOURCE(S).
I' ISSES SIMM CODES 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 LICENSEE The analysis and resolution activities associated with an earlier Keowee 1 2 3 4 5 hydroelectric unit's problem occurred before any breaker loss of function occurred.
(Section M1.2, (56, 50 - Good])
A 011 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 LICENSEE The licensee's Identification of an unknown degradation of the Keowee hydroelectric 1 2 3 4 5 units' field flash breaker moving contacts was adequate.. (Section M1.2, [SA Adequate])
A 0
0 C 0 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC Corrective actions were found to be good for two violations which involved: (1)a 1 2 3 4 5 failure to perform procedure prerequisites when draining the elevated water storage tank; and (2) a failure to provide adequate corrective actions for both an eroded high A 0 0 0 0 0 pressure mini-flow Injection orifice and an Inadequate weld on an orifice assembly B 0 0 0 0 0 (Recovery Plan). (Sections M8.1 and M8.2, [SB, SC - Good))
a E
CO 00 7/13/98 VIO IR 98-06 SELF The Inspectors Identified a violation for failure to issue a maintenance procedure to 1 2 3 4 5 clean the system strainers following installation of the Unit 2 siphon seal water system. This failure resulted from a weakness In the process for Implementing A 0 0 0 0 0 procedure changes following plant modifications. (Section M3.1.[2B - Poor])
9 0 0 0 0 0 CO 000 7/13/98 URI IR 98-06 SELF The Inspectors Identified an unresolved Item with the failure of and maintenance on 1 2 3 4 5
the Unit 1 and 2 low pressure service water pumps. (Section M2.1, [2A, 2B - Poor])
CO 000*
7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The use of operating experience feedback In the inspection of the CRDM motor tube 1 2 3 4 5
welds was seen as a positive (Self-Assessment under the Recovery Plan). (Section M1.2, [56 -Good])
A 000 cO 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC Engineering support of the control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) changeout and 1 2 3 4 5 evaluation of the control rod drive mechanisms was seen as a positive (Recovery 0
Plan). (Section M1.2.4B - Good)
A 0C000 1 00000 CO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 12 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The revision of the control rod drive thermal barrier procedure by maintenance to 1 2 3 4 5 complete additional Inspections was seen as a positive. Subsequent testing of the repaired control rod drive mechanisms did not indicate any problems (Recovery A
O O
0 0 0 Plan). (Section M1.2, [2B, 3C -Good])
CO 00 7/13/98 LER IR 98-06, LER 98-03 SELF Unit 2 tripped due to loss of vacuum. The licensee was still investigating the 1 2 3 4 5 maintenance and configuration control problems that caused the trip with a Licensee Event Report to follow. (Section 01.6, [t A, I C, 3A - Poor])
A 0 00 0 0 BO0O 0 0 C 0 000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The inspectors concluded that the Unit 2 emergency power switching logic test was 1 2 3 4 5 successfully performed. This was indicative of adequately maintained equipment.
(Section M1.4. [2A. 2B - Adequate])
A 0000 BBOOO CO 000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC Inspection and testing of the Unit 2 once through steam generators were being 1 2 3 4 5 conducted In a thorough and conservative manner. Unexpected findings were thoroughly evaluated for significance and potential impact on the operating units.
A O OO 0 0 (Section MI.3, 126 -Good])
B 00000 cO 000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The licensee's augmented inservice Inspection programs for the high pressure 1 2 3 4 5 Injection connections to the reactor coolant systeni cold legs have been improved since the piping failure in the Spring of 1997. (Section M1.2, 12B - Adequate])
A 0 0 0 0 0 S00000 CO 000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The licensee property completed a commitment to adjust the automatic voltage 1 2 3 4 5 regulator for the main generators. These corrective actions were considered adequate resolution of the problem that previously resulted in a Unit 2 reactor trip.
A DO 0 O 0 (Section M1., [5C -Adequate])
6 00000 CO 000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC Pump, engine, and valve on-line maintenance was generally completed In a 1 2 3 4 5 thorough and professional manner. Personnel were knowledgeable of the assigned tasks and demonstrated attention to detail. Procedures were detailed and actively A D 0 OO used on the job. Data were recorded as the steps were performed and compared to the acceptance criteria. Pre-job briefings were thorough and communication B
0 0 OO between test personnel was good. Work performance during these activities demonstrated that maintenance processes were positively in place. (Section MI, C
(2B, 3A, 3B - Good])
FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 13 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DAT IYEs ISUEs SII COE DATE TPE~s)
SEC. SFA jSOURCE(s)
ID'd ISEs M
OE 5/4/98 NCV ENG IR 98-03; NCV 98-03-03 NRC A non-cited violation was Identified for failure to follow the Measuring and Test 1 2 3 4 5 Equipment (M&TE) control procedure In that an incomplete evaluation was performed for an out of calibration M&TE. (Section M4.1)
A OO 0 0 0 1 00000 cO 000 5/4/98 Positive IR 98-03 NRC Acceptance criteria in maintenance and surveillance procedures were adequately 1 2 3 4 5 verified in completed maintenance and surveillance activities. (Section M4.1)
A 00000 BOO000 cO 000 5/4/98 VIO ENG IR 98-03: VIO 98-03-02 NRC A violation was identified for failure to perform surveillance testing of the penetration 1 2 3 4 5 room ventilation system air flow using the flow measurement method required by Technical Specifications. (Section M3.1)
AOD 0
0 B 00000 CO 000 5/4/98 Positive ENG IR 98-03 NRC The majority of design and licensing Information was appropriately incorporated into 1 2 3 4 5 maintenance and surveillance documents. Exceptions included the control room dose calculation assumptions and a TS penetration room ventilation system test A 0 O D 0 0 required to verify system design air flow. (Section M3.1) 0 E 0 0 0 CO 000 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC Segments of the licensee's third ten-year inservice Inspection interval program that 1 2 3 4 5 were reviewed complied with Code requirements. Inservice Inspection examinations observed were performed in a satisfactory manner. Fabrication and examination A DO 0 0
records of high pressure Injection nozzle component welds were consistent with Code requirements and licensee commitments. Technicians were well trained and BO 0 0 0 0 had good knowledge of plant equipment and procedural requirements. The licensee's evaluation of inspection results were documented with accuracy and clarity. (Section M1.6) 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The licensee's response to the apparent snubber lockup problem on the 1B2 reactor 1 2 3 4 5 coolant pump motor was well planned and carried out in a timely manner. Soliciting assistance from the vendor resulted In the correct diagnosis of the problem and A OO 0 0 produced positive results. (Section M1.5)
B 00000 CO 000 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The Unit 2 low pressure injection cooler test was performed in a well planned 1 2 3 4 5 manner, the applicable procedure was followed, personnel were well qualified to perform their assigned tasks, and the results showed that low pressure injection A OO O 0 0 coolers 2A and 2B are capable of performing their design function. (Section Ml.4)
CO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 14 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 SMMOCODE DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 3/21/98 Positive ENG IR 98-02 NRC The licensee's response to the Unit I pressurizer surge line drain line vibration 1 2 3 4 5 phenomenon was appropriate. Maintenance and engineering provided good coverage of the Issue. Evaluation of the problem and corrective actions taken and A 0 O 0 0 0 planned were consistent with plant safety and code requirements. (Section M1.3) 1OOO 0 0 CO 000 3/21/98 NCV IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-08 SELF A non-cited violation was Identified for failure to follow procedure when calibrating a 1 2 3 4 5 component cooling flow transmitter. (Section M4.1) cO 0001 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC Corrective actions as a result of an Inadvertent start of the Unit 3 standby 1 2 3 4 5 component cooling pump heightened the sensitivity of Instrument technicians to procedural compliance and proper communications. The inspectors considered this A 0 0 0 0 0 a positive result of the licensee's recovery plan. (Section M4.1)
B 0 00 0 0 CO 000 3/2 1/98 V1 IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-07 NRC The licensee's failure to Implement procedural requirements for material condition 1 2 3 4 5 and housekeeping practices on safety-related components and in the areas housing these components and structures was identified as a violation. (Section M2.3)
A 0 0 0 0 0 CO 000 3/21/98-URI
.IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-06 NRC An unresolved item was identified for past operability concerns for Improperly 1 2 3 4 5 installed packing gland followers for valve 1HP-149. (Section M2.2)
A 0 0 00 C0 000*
3/21/98 VIO IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-05 NRC Material condition In the Unit 1 west penetration room was deficient. A violation was 1 2 3 4 5 Identified for failure to follow a minor modification Instruction for adequate packing gland adjustment on valve 1HP-286. (Section M2.2)
A 00 0 0 0 B 0 00003 CO 000 3/21/98 VIO IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-04 NRC A violation of procedural requirements was Identified for foreign material control 1 2 3 4 5 practices during maintenance in the Unit 1 and 2 spent fuel pool. (Section M2.1)
A 00000 B 1000 cO
.0 0
FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 15 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE01-Apr-99 DAETYPE(s) ISEC.
SFA jSOURCE(s) iD-'d ISSUE(S)
SMM CODES 3/21/98 VIO IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-03 NRC A violation was identified for failure to follow the nuclear site directive for 1 2 3 4 5 modifications when repairing the Unit 2 turbine driven emergency feedwater pump hotwell suction line. (Section M1.2)
A B
CO 000 2/23/98 Weakness ENG TAC MA0607, 2/23/98 NRC Based on our review of the submittal, the staff is concerned about the timeliness of 1 2 3 4 5 your application. Your staff failed to recognize the effect that extending the operating cycle would have on the inability to perform certain Unit 2 refueling outage A
surveillances within the interval allowed by the TS.- As a result, the amendment application was submitted too close to the start of the refueling outage, which B
0 0 0 caused agency resources to be diverted and the application to be processed in a nonroutine manner. In addition, confusion and a processing delay arose when the need to add additional surveillances was discovered and verbally transmitted to the staff, causing plans to be made to withdraw the application and, subsequently, changed. These problems Indicate that changes are needed to the process used at the site to control surveillance schedules when a change to the operating cycle is made.
V17/98 URI IR 97-18. LER 269/98-03 NRC On January 30, 1998, the licensee was granted verbal enforcement discretion on 1 2 3 4 5 statements in their TS regarding TS surveillance performance intervals. The licensee submitted a TS change to allow eighteen-month periodicity of surveillance A 0 0 0 0 0 instead of a refueling outage periodicity. The Inspectors had reviewed the change for completeness. Additional followup on the enforcement discretion will be tracked under an unresolved item. (Section X2)
C oo 20/98 Weakness IR 97-18 LICENSEE During Inspection and testing of Safe Shutdown Facility 600 volt breakers, several 1 2 3 4 5 problems were Identified by the licensee. The licensee satisfactorily addressed the Immediate equipment problems. Several issues regarding grease hardening and A 0 0 0 0 0 trip device past operability were Identified. (Section M3.2)
B 0
2/7/98 VIO IR 97-18; VIO 97-18-05 SELF A violation was Identified for failure to revise a high pressure Injection system 1 2 3 4 5 letdown flow Instrument calibration procedure following modification of the Unit 3 integrated control system. (Section M3.1)
A 000 0
B 110 [000 2/7/98 Weakness ENG IR 97-18, LER 269/97-11 NRC The December 28, 1997, Unit 1 shutdown for primary-to-secondary leakage that was 1 2 3 4 5 the result of past repairs where there had been an apparent over-reliance on the results of visual inspections, and less than adequate appreciation for primary water A 0 0 0 0 0 stress corrosion cracking. (Section M1.4)00000 C 0 0
F 00 00 FROM:~~~~~~~~~~~
~C 103/7T:13/9Pg00 f4 O
ULCRLAS atUdtd
/49
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s) ]SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s) 5MM CODES 2/7/98 Positive PLT SUP IR 97-18 NRC During the pressurizer surge line drain line work, pipe removal and reinstallation 1 2 3 4 5 practices and controls were generally acceptable. Health physics personnel appropriately supported the maintenance activities. (Section M1.3) One rework A 0 0 0 0 0 item was observed that Is discussed as a violation in Inspection Report 50 269,270,287/98-01.
B 00 00 C 0 000 2/7/98 Positive IR 97-18 NRC The licensee and its primary vendor removed and disassembled a malfunctioning 1 2 3 4 5 Unit 1 control rod mechanism, finding no definitive problem. The overall inspection work was performed in a satisfactory manner, with care to detect as-found A El 0 El 0
conditions. (Section M1.2)
BOQOQO CO 000 2/7198 URI IR 97-18: URI 97-18-04 NRC Maintenance activities were generally completed thoroughly and professionally. One 1 2 3 4 5 unresolved item was opened on the use of Teflon tape on the low pressure injection system. (Section MI.1)
AD 0 0 0
CO 000 2/5/98 Negative IR 98-01 NRC Continuing problems in the area of Technical Specification surveillance tracking and 1 2 3 4 5 scheduling have not been resolved through the corrective action program. The inspection team identified a number of clerical errors and the licensee has A OO 0 0 O
documented problems with the tracking or completion of surveillance activities in a number of problem investigation process reports. Accordingly, more licensee B 0 0 0 0 0 management attention is warranted in this area. (Section M7.1) c O 13 0 0 2/5/98 Weakness IR 98-01 NRC The Inspection team concluded that not requiring Less Significant Event Category 3 1 2 3 4 5 problem investigation process reports to be reviewed for generic applicability was a weakness in Nuclear Site Directive NSD 208 and the problem investigation process.
A 0 O 0 O 0 (Section M3.1)
C 0 000 2/5/98 VIO IR 98-01; VIO 98-01-02 SELF A violation of Technical Specification 6.4.1.e was identified regarding an Inadequacy 1 2 3 4 5 in maintenance procedure MP/0/A/1810/014. Specifically, the procedure did not provide sufficient instructions for limiting the amount of purge paper to be used as A 0 O 0 0 OO weld damming material. As a result, the drain line connected to the Unit 1 pressurizer surge line became blocked following welding. The licensee had previous B
0 0 0 0 opportunities to correct this procedural inadequacy from earlier related experiences C E r o 0 documented in problem Investigation process reports. (Section M3.1)
FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 17 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s) jSEC. SFA SOURCE(S)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 2/5/98 Negative ENG iR 98-01 NRC The licensee's newly implemented program to trend and analyze cause and event 1 2 3 4 5 code data from problem investigation process reports had yet to produce auditable results. In conjunction with the licensee's Engineering Support Program, the Failure A OO 0
00 Analysis and Trending program and its associated semi-annual Equipment History Trend Report were considered adequate tools for assisting engineering in identifying B 0 0 00 and assessing plant equipment performance trends. An in-depth review of two risk o o significant systems and associated components discerned that a considerable length of time passed before arriving at viable solutions for resolving repetitive problems. (Section M2.2) 2/5/98 Positive IR 98-01 NRC Problem deficiency tags observed during plant tours, were generally only around six 1 2 3 4 5 months old. Some of the oldest deficiency tags observed (October 1994 and August 1996), identified auxiliary service water (tornado) pump supply valve seat leakage A Ol 0 Ol Ol 0 V and noticeable operator oil leakage. The licensee indicated that these problems, along with an auxiliary service water pump seal leak that was beginning to cause B 0 0-0 El 0 pump base corrosion, were scheduled for resolution during the upcoming Unit 2 C 0 0 E 0 refueling outage. (Section M2.1) 2/5/98 Positive IR 98-01 NRC System and equipment reliability Is a major focus area of the Oconee Recovery 1 2 3 4 5 Plan. Newly implemented under this Plan, the Top Equipment Problem Resolution process has begun to focus attention on the resolution of a considerable number of A 0 El 0 O E equipment/material condition Issues; some of which are long-standing. (Section M2.1)
B El0 00 CD 000 12/27/97 VIO ENG IR 97-16; VIO 97-16-06 NRC The Inspectors identified three examples of a violation for failure to property control 1 2 3 4 5 modifications. (Section M3.1)
A 00000 B 00000
- C 0 000
[
12/27/97 NCV IR 97-16; NCV 97-16-05 LICENSEE.A non-cited violation was Identified for a failure to follow procedure when assembling 1 2 3 4 5 a control rod drive mechanism after maintenance. (Section M1.4)
A 00000 B 0000 C 0 010 12127/97 NCV ENG IR 97-16; NCV 97-16-04 LICENSEE A non-cited violation was Identified for failure to provide written Instructions for 1 2 3 4 5 changing the washers In the turbine driven emergency feedwater pump overspeed trip plunger. (Section M1.3)
A 00000 C
0 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 18 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s) ISEC.
SPA j SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SIMM CODES 12/27/97 Positive IR 97-16 NRC The inspectors concluded that general maintenance activities were completed 1 2 3 4 5 thoroughly and professionally. (Section MA.1)
A 00000 CO 000 12/27/97 LER ENG IR 97-16; LER 269/97-10 LICENSEE Through a licensee Initiated audit, additional potential problems were uncovered in 1 2 3 4 5 the reactor building emergency sump flow paths. The licensee performed corrective actions to remove strainers, flanges, and insulation from all three buildings as A 0 0 0 0 0 applicable to assure present operability. Further follow up of this issue will be accomplished through review of associated Licensee Event Report 50-269/97-10, B 0 which will address past operability. (Section 01.3)
C E 0 0 11/15/97 Positive ENG IR"97-15 LICENSEE The licensee Implemented repairs in once-through-steam-generator 16 tubes in a 1 2 3 4 5 conservative manner, following administrative controls and applicable controlling procedures. Technical support provided good guidance and oversight while the A
0 0 0O activity was in progress. (Section M2.3)
B 110 005 CO 000 11/15/97 Negative ENG IR 97-15 NRC The failures of mechanical feedwater piping connections to the Unit 1B steam 1 2 3 4 5 generator were not being Identified and trended as repeat failures. (Section M2.2).
A 00500 BOSOOOD C
0 000 11/15/97 Positive ENG IR 97-15 LICENSEE The condition of the Oconee once-through-steam-generators has seen additional 1 2 3.4 5
licensee attention through Babcock & Wilcox Owners Group sponsored tube pulls in each unit, and the contract with Dominion Engineering Incorporated to do an A
O O
0 0 independent review of the Oconee steam generator program. (Section M2.2)
B 0 0 0 O CO 000*
11/15/97 URI IR 97-15; URI 97-15-02 NRC Assembly of low pressure service water valves with the wrong parts resulted in an 1 2 3 4 5 Unresolved Item concerning parts identification. (Section M2.1)
A 00000 00000 CO 000 11/15/97 Weakness OPS IR 97-15 NRC The practice of obtaining an oil sample from the Unit 2 turbine driven emergency 1 2 3 4 5 feedwater pump without it running was a weakness in the oil sampling methodology. A request by operations for a procedure to govern the-realignment of A D 0 0 0 0 the pump's steam supply was seen as a conservative. measure to protect the steam O 0 0 0 0 header piping and structural supports from possible water and steam hammers.B000 0
(Section M1.7)
CO 0 0 0 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 19of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE01
-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s) jSEC. SPA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 11/15/9 Positve ENGIR 97-15 LICENSEE The licensee's process far the evaluation at steam genraoedycrntaaws 1 2 3 4-5 being conducted In accordance with current industry guidelines and expectations.
(Section Mi.6)
A 00 00 S00000 CO 000 11/15/97 VIO IR 97-15; VIO 97-15-01 NRC The failure by maintenance personnel to complete a Technical Specification required 1 2 3 4 5 surveillance on low pressureinfection flow instruments resulted in a violation.
(Section M1.5)
A 0
0 0
B 00000 CO 000 11/15/97 Positive ENG IR 97-15 NRC The Failure Investigation Process team was aggressively pursuing the root cause for 1 2 3 4 5 the failure of the MARBO plugging tool. All maintenance and inspection activities observed for Installation of the 24-inch MARBO plug were performed in a A DO 0 0 conscientious manner by qualified personnel in accordance with detailed procedures. Welding and non-destructive examination activities observed and B
reviewed were performed in accordance with the applicable code and procedure C 0 0 0 0 requirements. (Section M1.4) 11/15/97 Positive ENG IR 97-15 NRC Strong management oversight, good communications, and sound coordination by 1 2 3 4. 5 engineering and maintenance resulted In an error free recovery of a broken MARBO stopple plug from the low pressure service water system. (Section M1.3)
A 0 0 0 0 0 B 00000 CO 000 11/15/97 MISC E NG IR 97-15 LICENSEE During the period, the licensee searched for and found a missing piece from the 1A1 1 2 3 4 5 Reactor Coolant Pump impeller. During the search, the licensee found other reactor vessel related pieces that had been missing since 1981. The licensee was A
O 00O generating an evaluation on the vessel related piece that would remain in place.
Video inspection of the Unit 1 reactor coolant pumps had been performed and the B- 00 0 0 licensee was evaluating continued operations of the three pumps with observed C
0 Impeller degradation for an additional fuel cycle. (Section M1.2) 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC The inspectors concluded that general maintenance activities were completed 1 2 3 4 5 thoroughly and professionally. (Section M.1)
A00000 CO 000 nOGINR IING FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 20 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01 -Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s) I SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
I D'd ISSUE(s)
SMVM CODES 9/14/98 Weakness TS Amendments 228, LICENSEE The referenced amendments Involve three different Technical Specifications to 1 2 3 4 5 229, 230 allow specific surveillances to be extended on a one time basis from a maximum allowed frequency of 22 months 15 days. Two of these amendents are for Unit 3 AOOOO 0 and one Is for Unit 2. (TS Amendments 228, 229, 230, [Poor - 4C. 5A. 5C]) All of these amendments required a quick turnaround due to your late identification of the B 0 0 0 0 0 surveillances. Your late submittals Indicates that the ability to quickly and accurately C 0 1000 Identify all Impacts of an operating cycle extension has not yet been adequately addressed.
8/24/98 Strength IR 98-07 NRC The licensee's Maintenance Rule periodic assessment was considered a strength.
1 2 3 4 5 (Section E8.8, [2B -Excellent))
B 00000 CO 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The licensee had thoroughly addressed the causes of two violations involving 1 2 3 4 5 shortcomings In the Inservice Inspection program for high pressure injection nozzles and monitoring thermal stresses in the Injection nozzles. (Section E8.7, 15C -
A DO 0 0 0 Good])
1 C
0000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The licensee's corrective actions developed In the high pressure injection reliability 1 2 3 4 5 study, In response to a violation Involving the Inoperability of three high pressure Injection pumps, were adequate. (Section E8.6, 128, 48, 5C -Adequate])
A 0 0 0 0 D B 00000 CO 000 8/24/98 Weakness IR 98-07 NRC Delaying Inclusion of out-of-service equipment configurations considered prohibited 1 2 3 4 5 by the Expert Panel Into the on-line maintenance administrative procedure was a weakness. (Section E8.5, 12B, SC - Poor])
A 00 AOOOO B 00000 CO 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The licensee's use of the 1996 PRA model revision results in the Expert Panel's 1 2 3 4 5 determination of risk ranking and performance criteria were good. (Section E8.5,
[2B, SB, SC - Good])
ADOOOD BOOQ CO 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC Corrective actions for open Items Identified during the Maintenance Rule baseline 1 2 3 4 5 Inspection were effectively implemented. (Section E8.2, E8.3, E8.4, [28, 5C Good))
A 0
0 OOO B 000E00 CO 000 FROM: 10/30/7 TO: 1/30/99 Page 21 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(S)
SIMM CODES 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The corrective actions for a violation regarding inadequate post-modification testing 1 2 3 4 5 and Inspection requirements were adequate. (Section E8.1, [5C - Adequate])
AOOOOD B 01QOQ1 1 cO 000 8/24/98 URI IR 98-07 NRC An Unresolved item was Identified pending further NRC review of the licensees' 1 2 3 4 5 interface between the inservice testing program and design output documents..
(Section E7.1)
A 00000 BOOD CO 000 8/24/98 Weakness IR 98-07 NRC There was a weakness in the timeliness of the resolution for Problem Investigation 1 2 3 4 5 Process Report 0-098-0165, In that, the design stroke time requirement for low pressure injection system valves LP-21 and LP-22 was not determined prior to the A 0 0 0 0 0 performance of subsequent quarterly inservice test valve stroke time tests. (Section E7.1, 5C - Poor])
cO 000 8/24/98 Weakness IR 98-07 NRC The operability discussion provided In the problem description for Problem 1 2 3 4 5 Investigation Process Report 0-098-0165 for low pressure injection valve stroke time issues was weak, In that there was not an adequate basis to support the conclusion A 0 0 O 0 that there was not an operability concern. (Section E7.1, [5B - Poor])
B 000001 CO 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation for the main steam line break modification was 1 2 3 4 5 comprehensive and thorough. (Section E4.1, (4B -Good])
A 00000 cO 00000 8/24/98 Weakness IR 98-07 NRC An engineering weakness was Identified In that the modification process did not 1 2 3 4 5 assure routine review and documentation of the general design criteria as design inputs. (Section E4.1, [4C - Poor]).
A 0
cO 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC Reactor building temperature conditions were appropriately monitored and 1 2 3 4 5 maintained within the limits established by the associated Generic Letter 96-06 operability evaluations. (Section E2.2, [4B - Good])
A 0-0 0 0 0 B 00000 cO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 page 22 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98 s
OCONEE01-Apr-99 OCONEE DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 8/24/98 Strength IR 98-07 NRC The licensee's Initiative to have the Keowee study and report done, commit 1 2 3 4 5 resources for its performance, schedule modifications and procedure changes, and the tracking of actions to resolve the issues was excellent (Recovery Plan). (Section AOOD 0 O E2.1, (4A, SC - Excellent])
B 0055 CO O
8/24/98 Strength IR 98-07 NRC The Keowee vendor report consisted of a review of material conditions, equipment 1 2 3 4 5 performance, identification of problems, and was communicated to the licensee very well (exit and written report) (Recovery Plan). (Section E2.1, (5A - Excellent])
A 0 O O 0
B 5055500 CO 00 0
8/24/98 Strength IR 98-07 NRC As a result of the licensee's initiative and guidance, the Keowee vendor report was 1 2 3 4 5 very comprehensive, the goal and objectives were precise, and the scope was Inclusive. The methodology for collecting field data, the Input sources utilized, and A DO 0 0 0 the development of the data base for the study was excellent (Recovery Plan).
(Section E2.1, [4C -Excellent])
B 550 5
cO 00 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The use of a failure Investigation process team to investigate failed relays in the 1 2 3 4 5 emergency condenser circulating water system showed good sensitivity to the safety function of the relays. (Section E1.2, [2A, 4B -Good]
A 0 0 0 0 0 B 05000 cO OOO 7/13/98 ED IR 98-06 LICENSEE The request for notice of enforcement discretion on the steam generator tube 1 2 3 4 5 Indication problem and the submitted Technical Specification change request were technically complete. (Section X2, [4B - Adequate])
A D 0 OD 0 B 1505 CO 0.00 7/13/98 ED IR 98-06 LICENSEE A notice of enforcement discretion was Issued to allow continued operation of Units 1 2 3 4 5 1 and 3 until an appropriate Technical Specification amendment is approved. An unresolved Item was identified to followup collateral issues around the discretion.
A DO OO O (Section X2, (5C - Poor])
B 55551130 CO 0
7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 LICENSEE The immediate evaluation of the steam generator tube end anomaly problem 1 2 3 4 5 revealed there was no safety Impact. Subsequent more thorough review of actual tube Inspection data on Units 1 and 3 based on updated Inspection criteria, revealed A OO O OO10 that Surveillance Requirement 4.17.2 had not been completed. (Section X2, [5B -
B 0 0 0 0 0 Adequate])
CS 000 FRO: 1/3097TO:1/3/99Pe 2 of 45 as FOR PUBIC a RASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE01-Apr-99 OCONEE
=DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SPA SOURCE(S) jID'd ISSUE(s)
SMCODES 7/13198 Weakness 1R 98-06 LICENSEE The evaluation of the operational data on Unit 2 steam generator tube inspections 1 2 3 4 5 revealed a weakness in the licensee Inspection program. (Section X2, [13, 40 -
A 1E Poor])
A 0
0 8 00000 CO 000 7/1 3198 Positive IR 98-06 LICENSEE The lIcensee discovered Information about steam generator tube Inspection activities 1 2 3 4 5
from an outside source. The licensee factored this emergent operational data into their on-going Unit 2 generator Inspection (Self-Assessment under the Recovery A 0 0 0 0 0 Plan). (Section X2, [SA, 58 - Good) 8 00000 CO 000@
7/113198 Strength IR 98-06 NRC Overall, the Inspectors concluded the program used for post modification testing of 1 2 3 4 5 the new integrated control system on Unit 2 was thorough and complete. The Implementation of that program was well controlled with good evaluation of results.
A 0 0 0 0 0 (Section E8.1, 128 - Excellent])
B 0 0 0 0 CO 000 7/13198 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The licensee's actions to resolve a previously identified weakness regarding the 1 2 3 4 5 review of less significant event problem investigation process reports for generic applicability was noted as a positive observation (Recovery Plan under Corrective A 0 0 0 0 0 Action). (Section E7.2, 15C - Good])
B 0 0 0 0 0 CO 000 7/13/98 Weakness IR 98-06 NRC The licensee's documented evaluations were weak for some of the problem 1 2 3 4 5 investigation process reports associated with findings from the self initiated technical audit of-the high pressure Injection and low pressure systems. Some of the reports A 0 0 0 010 were characterized by problem evaluations with Indeterminate causes, poor 80 0 0 0 0 supporting documentation of conclusions, and screening of the issues as low significance based on engineering judgement, which prevented operability C0 0 0 0 determinations from being performed (Recovery Plan under Corrective Action).
(Section E7.2, [5B - Poor))
7/1 3198 Strength IR 98-06 NRC The self Initiated technical audit of the high pressure injection and low pressure 1 2 3 4 5 Injection systems and Interconnecting systems was a thorough and detailed effort that was effective in Identifying equipment and programmatic issues (Recovery Plan A 0 O 0 0 0 under Corrective Action). (Section E7.2, [5A - Excellent])
0 0 0 CO 0
NRC Prior to the Unit 2 restart, the licensee completed all necessary problem report 1 2 3 4 5
7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 corrective actions. The 35 reviewed problem reports were technically sound and used good engineering judgement. (Recovery Plan under Corrective Action).
ADOO (Section E7.1, 48 -Good))
BOOO 0
CO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 24 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
01-Apr-99 DATE I TYPE(s)
ISEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
!D'd ISSUE(s)
SMM COD ES 7/13/98 VIO IR 98-06 NRC The Inspectors Identified a violation for failure to follow the procedure far safety 1 2 3 4 5 evaluations performed under Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 50.59 when changing the core operating limits report. (Section E3.1, [4B - Poor))
A 0 0 0 0 0 B50000 CO 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The licensee effectively planned and managed work on the Unit 2 reactor coolant 1 2 3 4 5 pumps and activities surrounding the pumps and associated activities. (Section E2.2, [5C - Good])
A 0 000 8 00000 cO 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC During the Unit 2 outage the licensee adequately completed reactor coolant pump 1 2 3 4 5 Impeller work and Inspections as necessary to reliably operate for the next fuel cycle (Operational Concerns under the Recovery Plan). (Section E2.2, [38, IC -
A 0 0 0 0 0 Adequate])
c -0 OO O 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The inspectors concluded that the failure Investigation for the Incore power tilt 1 2 3 4 5 produced adequate conclusions and findings and that the recommendations were technically sound. (Section E2.1, [58 - Adequate])
A 0 0 0 0 0 B 00000 cO 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 SELF Engineering resolution of a minor problem with the essential siphon vacuum system 1 2 3 4 5 was good. Testing met acceptance criteria. (Section E1.1, [4A. 3B, 58 - Good])
A 0000 CO0000 C 0 0oEo*
7/13/98 V1O IR 98-06 SELF The failure to have a procedure to adjust the reactor coolant pump restraints 1 2 3 4 5 Indicated a lack of evaluation and understanding of plant,operation. This was Identified as a violation of the licensee Technical Specifications. (Section 01.4. 11, A 0 0 0 0 0 5B - Poor])
cO 000
-7/13/98 Strength IR 98-06 SELF The early identification of a reactor coolant pump problem made by a touring 1 2 3 4 5 engineer was positive in preventing the condition from worsening. (Section 01.4,
[3A, 3B, 5A - Excellent])
A O 0 0 0
8 00000 cO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 25 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 6/3/98 Positive IR 98-12 NRC Appropriate root cause analysis and short-term corrective actions were taken by the 1 2 3 4 5 licensee upon Identification of the borated water storage tank level instrumentation height discrepancy and the potential emergency operating procedure sump AOOOOO swapover Initiation conflict brought on by reactor building emergency sump level Instrument uncertainties. (Section E.8.1; [5-Good])
B CO 000 6/3/98 Positive IR 98-12 NRC Considered noteworthy, was the questioning attitude on the part of Self-initiated 1 2 3 4 5 Technical Audit team which initially identified the borated water storage tank level instrumentation height discrepancy and the potential emergency operating A
O OO 0 0 procedure sump swapover Initiation conflict brought on by reactor building emergency sump level Instrument uncertainties. (Section E.8.1; (5A-Good])
B E 1 1 0 0 CO 000 6/3/98 EEl IR 98-12 LICENSEE An apparent violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III was identified in all 1 2 3 4 5 three Oconee units for failures to appropriately account for the as-built height configuration of the borated water storage tank level instrument taps (in system' A D 0 O 0 0 design drawings and calibration procedures) and the reactor building emergency sump level instrument uncertainties (In emergency operating procedures). This not B
E0 only had the potential to render emergency core cooling system pumps inoperable C
0 0 and interrupt long-term core cooling, but could have precluded meeting the required 46 feet (350,000 gallons) of borated water available in the borated water storage tank for emergency core cooling: (Section E.8.1; 14A-Poor])
6/3/98 EEl IR 98-12 LICENSEE An apparent violation of Technical Specifications and 10 CFR 50.46 was Identified in 1 2 3 4 5 all three Oconee units for Inoperable borated water storage tanklevel instruments due to uncompensation for instrument tap height differences. This not only had the A 0 0 0 0 potential to render emergency core cooling system pumps Inoperable and Interrupt long-term core cooling, but could have precluded meeting the required 46 feet B 0 0 0
(350,000 gallons) of borated water available in the borated water storage tank for C 0 0 0 0 emergency core cooling. (Section E.8.1; [4A-Poor])
6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The technical resolution of the failure of the Keowee Unit 2 speed adjustment motor 1 2 3 4 5 on April 20, 1998, was adequate. (Section E2.1, (SC -Adequate])
B 0000 c 00000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC Good control of the testing evolutions was demonstrated by the test coordinators.
1 2 3 4 5 (Section E8.3, 11iA - Good))
BOOOOO C 0 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 130/99 Page 26 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE01
-Apr-99 OCONEE DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s) 5MM CODES 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The Inspector attended the pre-job briefing for several of the seal water, emergency 1 2 3 4 5 condenser circulating water, and essential siphon vacuum system tests and noted that the briefings were thorough. (Section E8.3, [3A, 38 -Good])
A 0 O 0 0
B 00000 CO 000 6/1/98 Stre ngth IR 98-05 NRC The Inspector noted that the siphon seal water, emergency condenser circulating 1 2 3 4 5 water, and essential siphon vacuum system test procedures were well written and required no changes. Only a few enhancements were identified duing the conduct A 0 0 0 0 0 of the procedures. (Section E8.3, 2B - Excellent])
CO 000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 LICENSEE Corrective actions identified by the licensee In response to a missed snubber 1 2 3 4 5
surveillance test were adequate to provide reasonable assurance of not missing TS required inspection when new snubbers are Installed. (Section E8.2, [5C -
A 0 0 0 0 Adequate])
0 0 0 0 0 CO OO008 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 LICENSEE The licensee's identification of a missed surveillance following a snubber Installation 1 2 3 4 5 was adequate. (Section E8.2, (5A - Adequate))
A 00000 CO 000 6/1/98 NOV IR 98-05 LICENSEE The accountable engineer (individual performing modification) failed to list a snubber 1 2 3 4 5 In the Technical Specification surveillance procedure which caused a required Inspection to be missed and resulted In a non-cited violation. (Section E8.2, [3A -
A 0 0
0 Poor])
CO 0000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 LICENSEE Changes to low pressure service water system design basis to allow for use of 1 2 3 4 5
Industry and Nuclear Regulatory Commission guidance concerning vulnerable target area and probability of Impact of a turbine missiles was considered appropriate. The A 0 O 0 0 0 licensee's effort to understand their design was adequate. (Section E8.1, (4A -
6OOOOO Adequate])
CO 000 6/1/98 Strength IR 98-05 NRC The performance of the licensee's failure Investigative process team concerning the 1 2 3 4 5
Keowee Unit 1 overcurrent and undervoltage disturbance of April 26, 1998, was excellent. (Section E2.1, [SB, SC - Excellent])
A 0.0 00 0
600000 cO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 27 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98.
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SPA SOURCE(s) j ID'd ISSUE(S) jSMM CODES 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC Good engineering support was provided and good troubleshooting methods were 1 2 3 4 5 used on the speed adjustment motor in response to the April 20, 1998, failure of Keowee Hydro Unit 2 to synchronize. (Section E2.1, 48 - Good))
A 0 0 0 0 B 0000 cO 000 6/1/98 Negative IR 98-05 NRC The Inspectors concluded that the failure of the speed adjustment motor on April 20, 1 2 3 4 5 1998, did not affect the safety function of Keowee Unit 2 but did reflect poorly on the material condition of the speed adjustment motor. (Section E2.1, [2A, Poor])
A 0 0 0 0 0 B 00000 CO 000 6/1/98 Weakness IR 98-05 NRC A more thorough pre-test review of the quality and completeness rf the procedure 1 2 3 4 5 for the Unit 2 emergency power switching logic test could have precluded some of the minor discrepancies observed during the test and was considered a weakness.
A OO O
0 0O (Section M1.4, (3C - Poor])
00 0 0 0 cO 000 5/4/98 URI IR 98-03; URI 98-03-09 NRC An unresolved Item was opened for further NRC review of licensing basis issues with 1 2 3 4 5 single failure vulnerabilities and quality assurance for non-safety equipment that is required to mitigate a design basis accident. (Section E1.3)
A O
O 0 0 B 00000 cO 000 5/4/98 URI IR 98-03; URI 98-03-08 NRC An unresolved item was opened for further NRC review of licensing basis issues with 1 2 3 4 5 control room habitability. (Section E1.3)
A 110 0000 B 00000 C 0 000DI.
5/4/98 Positive MAINT IR 98-03 NRC After the licensee recognized the potential operability concern with control room 1 2 3 4 5
habitability, they addressed It in a timely manner and demonstrated an effective working relationship among Engineering, Operations, and Maintenance. (Section A O O 0 0 0 E1.2) cO 0000 C 0 0 10 5/4/98 V1O IR 98-03; VIO 98-03-07 NRC A violation was Identified for Incorrect and nonconservative assumptions In control 1 2 3 4 5 room operator dose calculations. (Section E1.2)
B 00000 c
0 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 28 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE, I TYPE(s)
'SEC.
SFALISOURCE(s)
ID'd jISSUE(s)
SIMM CODES 5/4/98 Positive OPS IR 98-03 NRC After recognition of the reportability of the single failure vulnerability of the cable 1 2 3 4 5 room ventilation, the licensee's actions were timely and comprehensive and demonstrated an effective working relationship between Engineering and AO 0 0 0O Operations. (Section E1.1)
CO 000 5/4/98 EEl IR 98-03; IR 98-06 NRC An apparent violation was identified for a 1997 untimely UFSAR change for the 1984 1 2 3 4 5 modification to the control room'ventilation system. (Section EI.1) Previously identified apparent violation EEl 50-269,270/98-03-05 (Untimely Final Safety A D O 0 0 0 Analysis Report Change for 1984 Control Room Ventilation System Modification) was dispositioned by letter dated June 5, 1998, as a non-cited violation. (Section B 0 0 X3, [4A - Poor]; [5A -Adequate])
CO 0 0 0 5/4/98 EEl IR 98-03; IR 98-06 NRC An apparent violation was identified for a 1984 modification to the control room 1 2 3 4 5 ventilation system that introduced an unreviewed safety question involving a single failure vulnerability of the cable room ventilation. (Section E1.1) Previously A
O O
0 0 0 Identified apparent violation EEl 50-269,270/98-03-04 (Unresolved Safety Question Involving Single Failure Vulnerability Introduced by a 1984 Control Room Ventilation B 0 System Modification) was dispositioned by letter dated June 5. 1998, as a severity C
0 D 0 level IV violation. (Section X3. [4B - Poor])
3/21/98 Positive OPS IR 98-02 NRC The actual Unit 1 integrated control system testing completed during power 1 2 3 4 5 operations was conducted in a well controlled manner with good evaluation of results. (Section E8.1)
A 1 0 0 0 0 O
0000O 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The licensee used an acceptable approach to determine the operability of the high 1 2 3 4 5
pressure injection system injection and crossover valves after the failure of valve 1HP-27 toclose. (Section E1.1)
AD 0 000 a 00000 CO 000@
3/21/98.
VIO IR 98-02; VIO 98-02-12 LICENSEE The licensee discovered that design errors had been introduced into reactor physics 1 2 3 4 5 analysis for power-Imbalance on all three Oconee units. This problem was documented as a design control violation. (Section E3.3)
A O O 0 0 0 B 00000 CO 000 3/21/98 NCV IR 98-02; NCV 98-02-11 LICENSEE The licensee failed to make a required 1995 10 CFR 50.46 report. This was 1 2 3 4 5 identified as a non-cited violation. (Section E3.2)
A 00000 B0000 c
000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 29 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01 -Apr-99 DATE TYES SC F
OR'()ID'd ISU()SMM CODESI 3/21/98 URI MAINT IR 98-02; URI 98-02-10 LICENSEE An unresolved item was identified on engineering review of as-built conditions for the 1 2 3 4 5 reactor building emergency sump ahd the borated water storage tank level instrumentation. (Section E3.1).
A OO 0 6 00000 CO 000 3/21/98 URI MAINT iR 98-02; VIO 98-02-09 NRC The past operability and control of preventive maintenance for valve IHP-27 was left 1 2 3 4 5 unresolved pending further review. (Section E1.1)
A 00000 600000 CO 000 2/7/98 Positive IR 97-18 NRC The licensee was making good progress in the Installation of the service water 1 2 3 4 5 modifications. Modifications on Unit 2 should be completed during the March 1998 outage. (Section E8.2)
A 00000 600000 CO 000 2r7198 NCV IR 97-18, LER 269/97-10; LICENSEE A Non-Cited Violation was identified for failure to follow procedures controlling 1 2 3 4 5 NCV 97-18-10 modifications as discussed In Licensee Event Report 50-269/97-10. regarding reactor building sump issues. (Section E8.1)
A 0 0 0 0 O 600000 CO 0O0 2/7/98 VIO IR 97-18; VIO 97-18-08 LICENSEE Two additional examples of the violation resulting from procedural Inadequacies 1 2 3 4 5
.were identified on the Keowee Hydroelectric units. One example involved the motor operated automatic voltage adjusters on both Keowee units not being adjusted In A 0 0 O 0 D accordance with their applicable drawings due to lack of procedural detail. The other example involved missed in-service tests on both Keowee Hydroelectric units due to B 0 0 0 0 0 engineering not converting a temporary test into a periodic test of lube oil valves.
C 0 0 0 (Section E2.2) 2/7/98 ViO IR 97-18; VIO 97-18-05 SELF Three examples of a violation resulting from procedural inadequacies were 1 2 3 4 5 identified. An engineering supported troubleshooting procedure did not minimize risk to equipment and was not completely validated prior to performing work. Use of the A 0 0 0 0 0 procedure on Unit 2 integrated control system wiring resulted in unexpected system 0 0 responses. The other two examples are discussed in Section E2.2. (Section E2.1)
B CO 000 FRO: 0/0/9 T:
/3099Pa 0...A of 45 FOR PULIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 217/98 Weakness IR 97-18 NRC Replacement of the cracked one-inch drain line on the pressurizer surge line was 1 2 3 4 5 consistent with applicable code requirements. A lack of attention to detail in the planning phase of welding the replacement line caused a significant job delay and A 11El0 OO the need to cut and re-weld a new weld on the line. Engineering provided adequate support and took an active role In determining the root cause of the crack. Welding.
B El 0 0 nondestructive examination, and process control activities were satisfactory. Stress CO 0 O analysis calculations determined that thermal stratification and hanger loads on the drain line exceeded code allowable usage factor requirements on the drain line nozzle.
.(Section EI.1) 215/98 Positive IR 98-01 NRC The inspection team concluded that operating experience information reviewed by 1 2 3 4 5 the team was being processed in accordance with the licensee's procedures.
However, as Indicated by the violation identified in Section M3.1 of this inspection A OO OOlE 0 report, not all of the corrective actions identified through the operating experience program reviews were being Implemented by the Oconee site. Findings from B
assessments of the operating experience program were documented and tracked In C 0. 0 O
the licensee's corrective action program. (Section E7.3) 2/5/98 Positive ENG IR 98-01 NRC The Self-Initiated Technical Audit of the High Pressure Injection and Low Pressure 1 2 3 4 5 Injection systems and the High Pressure Injection System Reliability Study were thorough and detailed efforts that effectively identified equipment and programmatic A DOOO Issues, as well as provided pertinent recommendations. These recommendations were appropriately captured In the licensee's corrective action program. (Section B
E7.2)
COl 0 00 2/5/98 Positive SAQV IR 98-01 NRC The Inspection team concluded that the licensee conducted good reviews during 1 2 3 4 5 Phase 1 of the voluntary Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Review Project. The licensee appropriately captured the majority of identified UFSAR discrepancies Into A 0 O
El El E 0 Its corrective action program and added those that were identified by the inspection team. One inspector followup item was Identified for further evaluation of startup B 0l00E0 0 0 thermal transient number 23, associated with the reactor coolant system, and C
O 0 0 0 Incorporation of the related calculations into fatigue analyses. (Section E7. 1) 2/5/98 Negative IR 98-01 NRC The Failure Analysis and Trending Program and Equipment History Trend Reports 1 2 3 4 5 for the evaluation of equipment performance were adequate. However, the Inspection team Identified examples of Incorrect documentation of engineering AOOOOD responses regarding failure analysis of certain equipment. Accordingly, more attention to detail is warranted in compiling engineering review comments in this B
area. (Section E2.1) 0 00 0
12/27/97 VIO MAINT IR 97-16; VIO 97-16-08 NRC The Inspectors identified a violation for failure to conduct the required review of out-1 2 3 4 5 of-tolerance as-found conditions when test results did not meet acceptance criteria.
(Section E8.1)
A O 0 00 0 B 00000 CO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 31 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 12/27/97 VIO IR 97-16; VIO 97-16-07 NRC Current engineering guidance relative to Unit I reactor coolant pump operation at 1 2 3 4 5 less than required net positive suction head was not clearly communicated to licensed operators. This was a training weakness In that site engineers did not A 0 OE 0 OO change existing plant curves and that operations did not train their personnel appropriately in this area. A violation was issued regarding a past engineering B
0 11 0 0 failure to translate the reactor coolant pump design details into plant operational C o E E 0 curves which contributed to impeller pieces being eroded, Impacting plant operations. (Section E1.1) 12/27/97 Strength OPS IR 97-16 NRC The Unit 1 integrated control system testing was conducted in a well controlled and 1 2 3 4 5 professional manner with thorough pre-job briefings and good evaluation of results.
(Section 01.6)
A 0E0 0 0 B 00000 CO 000 11/15/97 VIO IR 97-15; VIO 97-15-09 NRC The failure to revise the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report to reflect different fuel 1 2 3 4 5 enrichments since 1994 was Identified as a violation. The discrepancy had been previously identified, but went uncorrected. (Section E8.3)
A O O O 0 0 13 00 00 0
COl 000 11/15/97 Strength IR 97-15 NRC The engineering self-assessments performed in 1997 were effective in identifying 1 2 3 4 5 and assuring correction of deficiencies in engineering performance. (Section E7.1)
A 00000 B 00000 COl 000 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC Design control for a Unit 1 low pressure service water modifications was good. The
- 1. 2 3 4 5 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations were detailed and thorough. (Section E3.1)
A 00l 000 B E00000 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC Based on a review of engineering activities, engineering support to operations and 1 2 3 4 5 maintenance was adequate. (Section E2.1)
A 0E0000 B El l l0 l0 CO O00 f
ANTas FO PRTU I E
ALt d
- 94 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 32 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Lest Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
ISEC. SFA ISOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMVM CODES 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The actions to address the closure of the configuration control violation involving a 1 2 3 4 5 radiation monitor sampling tubing were timely and adequate. (Section R8.2, [SC Adequate))
AOO 0
0 B 00000 cO 000 8/24/98 Strength IR 98-07 NRC The resolution and the resources committed to the operations -chemistry Interface 1 2 3 4 5 Initiative short term Items, the tracking and completion of the items, the procedure changes, and the involvement of the supervisors and the managers were excellent A D 0 OOD (Recovery Plan). (Section R8.1, [IC, 5C - Excellent])
0 0 00 CO 000 8/24/98 Negative IR 98-07 NRC The licensee did not identify the group or individuals responsible for tracking and 1 2 3 4 5 completing three of the operations - chemistry Interface Initiatives considered as long-term Items or needing further evaluation. Following inspector questioning, the A OO 0 0 0 licensee resolved ownership of the three items (Recovery Plan). (Section R8.1, (5C - Poor])
B 00000 cO 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC Initiatives to Improve the operations - chemistry Interface were comprehensive and 1 2 3 4 5 identified specific problem areas. The areas were Identified by group and the responsibility for these areas were assigned by name to various Individuals A 0 0 0 0 0 (Recovery Plan). (Section R8.1, [IA. 5C - Good))
B 00000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC Communications between the chemistry and operations groups during shift 1 2 3 4 5 turnovers and during shift operations were improved and are considered good (Recovery Plan). (Section R8.1, [IA - Good])
A 00000 B 00000 cO 0000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The licensee was performing reviews in the area of radiation protection as required 1 2 3 4 5 by 10 CFR Part 20.1101. Licensee self-assessment in the area of radiation protection was good. (Section R7.1, (SA, 51, 5C - Good))
A O 0 0 O 0 B 00000 CO 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC Radiation protection personnel Interviewed were knowledgeable and competent in 1 2 3 4 5 the task of performing unit ventilation sampling for radioactivity. (Section R4.1, [3A, 3B - Adequate])
0 A
0 1
B 00000 CO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 33 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 0 1-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA I SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The licensee was maintaining good controls for personnel monitoring, control of 1 2 3 4 5 radioactive material, radiological postings, and radiation area controls at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation area as required by 10 CFR Part 20.
AOOOOO (Section R1.3, [1C - Good])
c 0 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The licensee's programs for controlling exposures As Low As Reasonably 1 2 3 4 5 Achievable was effective. All personnel exposures to date in 1998 were below regulatory limits. (Section R1.2, [1C - Good))
AOD 0
0 8000000 C 0 000 8/24/98 Positive IR 98-07 NRC The licensee was maintaining good controls for personnel monitoring, control of 1 2 3 4 5 radioactive material, radiological postings, radiation area controls, and high radiation area controls as required by 10 CFR Part 20. (Section R1.1, [1C - Good])
A 00000 6 00000 cB 000 7/13/98 Strength IR 98-06 NRC The 1998 Triennial Fire Protection Audit of the facility's fire protection program was 1 2 3 4 5
comprehensive and effective in identifying fire protection program performance to plant management (Corrective Action under the Recovery Plan). (Section F7.1, AOOOD 0
[5A - Excellent])
CO 000 7/13/98 URI IR 98-06 NRC An unresolved item was identified regarding the licensee's installation, maintenance, 1 2 3 4 5 repair, and inspection of penetration seals. (Section F7.1, [2A - Poor])
A 11000003 1 B 00000 CO 0D00 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The fire brigade organization and drill program met the requirements of the site 1 2 3 4 5 procedures. The performance by the fire brigade as documented by the licensee's drill evaluations was good. (Section F5.1, [4C - Adequate])
A O O 0 6 00000 cO 000 E 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The scope and content of the maintenance Inspection and surveillance test program 1 2 3 4 5 procedures for the fire protection hose stations and standpipes were sufficient to assure that the fire protection design and surveillance requirements specified In the AOOOOD updated final safety analysis report were met. (Section F3.1, [iC - Adequate])
600000 c
000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 34 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE I
TYPE(s)
ISEC. SFA I SOURCE(s) j ID'd ISSUE(s).
SMM CODES 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The low number of inoperable or degraded fire protection components indicated that 1 2 3 4 5
appropriate emphasis had been placed on the maintenance and operability of the fire protection equipment and components. Impaired fire protection components had A O 0 0 0 O been restored to service In a timely manner. (Section F2.4, [3A - Good])
B gOOOOO CO 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC Sufficient procedural guidance was provided to verify that the reactor coolant pump 1 2 3 4 5 oil collection tanks were normally maintained empty and that the plant operators could identify an oil leak from the lubrication system of any one of the reactor A 0 0 0 0 0 coolant pump motors and take appropriate action. The reactor coolant pump oil collection system met the performance criteria of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Section B 1 0 0 0 E 111.0. (Section F2.3, (2A - Good])
CO 000 0 7/13198 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The physical separation of the redundant high pressure service water fire pumps 1 2 3 4 5 was well maintained and met the criteria described in the updated final safety analysis. (Section F2.2, [4A - Adequate])
A 0.0 0
B 00000 cO 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The general material condition of the fire pumps and the fire protection water supply 1 2 3 4 5 was good (Material Condition under the Recovery Plan). (Section F2.2, 12A Good))
A 0 0 1 0
0 B 00000 CO 000 7/13/98 Negative IR 98-06 NRC The observed level of plant housekeeping did not reflect good organization and 1 2 3 4 5 cleanliness practices on the part of plant workers. (Section F1.2, 13A -Poor])
A 00000 13 0 0 0 00 cO 000 7/13198 VIO IR 98-06 NRC A violation of procedural requirements was identified for not using and correctly 1 2 3 4 5 storing transient combustibles in safety-related areas. The observed material condition In the plant indicated that the various plant departments were not A 0 0 0 0 0 consistently Implementing their responsibilities for combustible material control.
(Section F1.2, (2A - Poor])
B 00 00 CO 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC During 1998 there were two incidents of fire due to electrical equipment failures 1 2 3 4 5 within safe-shutdown significant areas. In both cases. licensee personnel identified and extinguished the fire condition in a timely manner, contained the fire to the A 0 O O 0 0 original source, and prevented the fire from spreading to other equipment or cables.
(Section F1.1, (3B - Good])
BO 0 000 CO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 35 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OC NE01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The licensee's safeguards event logglng/reportability program properly analyzed, 1 2 3 4 5 tracked3 resolved and documented security Incidences. (Section S3,/3 - Good])
A 005051 1 1
- B 11 OQ1 1 C
000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The licensee's security procedures were thorough and well documented concerning 1 2 3 4 5 the physical security plan. (Section S3,3-3G
- Good])
A 00000 CO 000 7/1 3198 Positive iR 98-06 NRC The protected area detection aids were functional and efective, antd more than met 1 2 3 4 5 the requirements of the physical security plan. (Section S2,3(2A - Good])
B 0E00 C 0
,E 0
7/13/98 Strength IR 98-06 NRC The protected area assessment aids had good picture quality and excellent zone 1 2 3 4 5 overlap. (Section S2, 12A - Exceent)A 0 0 0 0 B 0000 CO 000 7/1 398 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The licensee used good compensatory measures that ensured the reliability of 1 2 3 4 5 A 00000 B
0000 7/1 3198 Strength IR 98-06 NRC The excellent testing program and maintenance support provided to the security 1 2 3 4 5 program was a major factor to the continued operability of the detection and assessment equipment. (Section S2, [IC -Excellent])
A 0 1 0 13 0 B 00000 c 0 000 7/13/98 Strength IR 98-06 NRC The protected area access controls for packages, personnel and vehicles were 1 2 3 4 5 Implemented in an excellent manner and according to the physical security plan.
(Section S1, (IC - Excellent])
A 0 0 0 0 0 B 00000 c0 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99.
Page 36 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The security communication equipment was operating properly and the required 1 2 3 4 5 communication tests were being conducted. (Section S1, [IC, 2A - Good))
A 0000 B
000 c 0 000 7/13/98 Strength IR 98-06 NRC The alarm stations were appropriately equipped and operating in an excellent 1 2 3 4 5
manner. (Section S1. (2A - Excellent])
A 00000 B 00000 C 0 000 7/13/98 VIO IR 98-06 NRC The Inspectors identified a violation for a worker exiting a contaminated area without 1 2 3 4 5
properly removing protective clothing. This violation appeared to be caused by inadequate knowledge of protective clothing requirements on the part of the worker.
A 0 0 0 0 0 (Section R4.1, (3B - Poor])
O 0 OO CO 000 7/13/98 Positive IR 98-06 NRC The Inspectors concluded that sample requirements for the out-of-service LPSW 1 2 3 4 5
system radiation monitor were performed adequately. (Section R1.1 [IC, 3A. 3B Adequate])
AOO 00 OO 600000 c 01 0001 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The licensee's identification and resolution of a procedure problem Involving 1 2 3 4 5 excessive reactor coolant pump seal leakage following a fire was adequate.
(Section F8.2,[5A. 5C - Adequate])
AOOOO 0 CO 000*
6/1/98 NCV IR 98-05 LICENSEE Due to improper assumptions regarding pressure downstream of the reactor coolant 1 2 3 4 5
pump seals, reactor coolant system leakage during a scenario Identified for Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50, Appendix R, could have exceeded design A 0 0 0 0 limits for the reactor coolant makeup system and resulted in a non-cited violation.
(Section F8.2, [IC, 4A - Poor])
B 0 0 0 0 0 c
[ 000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The licensee's identification and resolution of deficiencies In operational guidelines 1 2 3 4 5 following a fire were adequate (Section F8.1, [SA, 5C - Adequate )
A 00000 3
1 0 0 0 CO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 37 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 6/1/98 NCV IR 98-05 LICENSEE The failure to Include instructions for an electrical damage check of breakers in the 1 2 3 4 5 procedure for operational guidelines following a fire resulted in a non-cited violation.
The failure could prevent alignment of the low pressure injection system following a A 0O 0 0 O fire. (Section F8.1, (1 - Poor])
c 000 6/1/98 VIO IR 98-05 NRC The Inspectors identified a configuration control and design violation for improper 1 2 3 4 5 bend radius in two locations on the Unit 2 vent radiation monitors. (Section R8.2, 12A - Poor])
A 0 0G0 CO 000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The proposed change to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Reports for additional 1 2 3 4 5 requirements for performing radioactive work in the reactor coolant pump and ice blast buildings was considered appropriate. (Section RB.1, [1C - Adequate])
ADOOOD B 00000 c 0 000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC Based on the training activities reviewed and interviews, the inspectors determined 1 2 3 4 5 the radiation protection technicians had been provided an adequate level of training to perform routine survey activities involving radiation and control of radioactive A
D 0 0 0
material. (Section R5.1, [3B - Adequate])
CO 0O0 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC Chemistry personnel were knowledgeable and competent during collection of a 1 2.3 4 5 reactor coolant system sample. (Section R4.1, (3A - Adequate])
A 11001J0 B 0000 CO 0000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC Personal frisking practices in the Interim Radwaste Facility were acceptable.
1 2 3 4 5 (Section R4.1, [3B - Adequate])
A 00000 B 00000 CO 000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The Inspectors concluded that the check sources Identified by the inspectors were 1 2 3 4 5
exempt sources and were controlled appropriately. (Section R4.1, [1C -Adequate])
A 00000 6 00000 c 0 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 38 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 6/11/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC The respiratory protection program was being implemented as required by 10 CFR 1 2 3 4 5 Part 20 Subpart H. (Section R2.1, [1C Adequate])
B 00000 c 0 000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC Review of breathing air testing records verified that the licensee was calibrating 1 2 3 4 5 breathing air compressor equipment and sampling In-use breathing air systems for certification in accordance with procedural requirements. For the tests reviewed, A
0 0 0 00 breathing air met Grade D or better quality requirements. Survey instrumentation 0 0 0 0 0 had been adequately maintained. (Section R2.1, [2A - Adequate])
CO 000 6/1/98 Positive IR 98-05 NRC Based on licensee planning efforts to reduce source term and the licensee's efforts 1 2 3 4 5 to achieve established exposure goals which were challenging, the inspectors determined the licensee's programs for controlling exposures ALARA were A 0 0 0 0 0 effective. All personnel exposures to date In 1998 were below regulatory limits.
(Section R1.2, 110 -Adequate])
B 00 00 c 0 000 6/1/98 Strength IR 98-05 NRC The Inspectors determined the licensee was effectively maintaining controls.for 1 2 3 4 5 personnel monitoring, control of radioactive material, radiological postings, radiation area controls, and high radiation area controls as required by 10 CFR Part 20.
A 0 0 0 Efforts to reduce personnel contaminations was positive. (Section R1.1, 11C -
B 0 0 0 0O Good])
c 0 000 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The licensee was effectively maintaining controls for radioactive material and waste 1 2 3 4 5 processing. (Section R1.1)
A 0 0000: 1 B 0000 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The meteorological Instrumentation had been adequately maintained and the 1 2 3 4 5 meteorological monitoring program had been effectively implemented. (Section R2.2)
A 00 0 10 B 00000 c 0 000 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC Effluent and environmental monitors were being maintained in an operational 1 2 -3 4 5 condition to comply with Technical Specification requirements and Updated Final Safety Analysis Report commitments. (Section R2.1)
A 0 0 0 O B 00000 cF 000 FROM 1030/7 TO 1/0/9 Pae 39o of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Lest Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC Personnel involved with performing environmental and effluent surveys were 1 2 3 4 5 maintaining current training qualifications. (Section R5)
A 00000 c 0 000 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The licensee's water chemistry control program for monitoring primary and 1 2 3 4 5 secondary water quality had been effectively implemented, for those parameters reviewed, In accordance with the Technical Specification requirements and the A OO 0 O O Station Chemistry Manual for water chemistry. (Section R1.2) g 0 0 0 0 c 0 000 3/21/98 Positive IR 98-02 NRC The licensee had continued to effectively Implement a program for shipping 1 2 3 4 5 radioactive materials. (Section R1.3)
A 00000 B 00000 C 0 000 3/21/98 URI IR 98-02; URI 98-02-13 NRC An unresolved item was Identified to determine if a Unit 2 sample tube was 1 2 3 4 5 constructed as shown on a design drawing. (Section R2.1)
A 00000 c 0 000 3/5/98-Positive IR 98-04 NRC The Inspector verified that the total number of trained security officers and armed 1 2 3 4 5 personnel immediately available to fulfill response requirements met the number specified In the Security and Contingency Plan. One full-time member of the A 0 O O O 0 security organization who had the authority to direct security activities did not have duties that conflicted with the assignment to direct all activities during an incident B
(Section 6.3);
C ooo*
3/5/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC The Inspector's review found that the security force training records met the Training 1 2 3 4 5 and Qualification Plan and regulatory requirements (Section 5.2).
A 00000 c 0 0001 3/5/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC The Inspector concluded through observation and Interviews of security force 1 2 3 4 5 personnel, that the security force was being trained effectively and according to the Training and Qualification Plan and regulatory requirements (Section 5.1).
A O 0 0 0 c3 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 40 of 45 FOR PUBIC REILEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 3/5/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC The inspector's review of random samples of the Security Procedures verified that 1 2 3 4 5 the procedures adequately met the Security and Contingency Plan commitments and practices (Section S3.2).
AO 0 00 B 0 0 0 00 c
000
/3/5/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC The inspector's review of plan changes verified that the changes did not decrease 1 2 3 4 5 the effectiveness of the Security and Contingency Plan and the Training and Qualification Plan (Section S3.1).
AOO 0 O B 00000 c
0 000 3/5/98 VI0 IR 98-04; VIO 98-04-01 LICENSEE A repeat violation was identified for failure to secure unattended safeguards 1 2 3 4 5 information. The unattended safeguards Information was not disclosed or compromised (Section SI.4).
A 0
0 OO c 0 0000 315/98 Positive IR 98-04 NRC The inspector's evaluation of the Fitness For Duty Program determined that there 1 2 3 4 5
were no changes to the licensee's Fitness For Duty Program and that the program was adequate and met the licensees' commitments and NRC requirements (Section A 0 0
00 S1.3).
00 0 c 0 000 2/7/98 NCV IR 97-18; NCV 97-18-11 LICENSEE A Non-Cited Violation was identified for failure to perform a continuous fire watch as 1 2 3 4 5 required by the selected license commitments. The licensee had performed hourly fire watches Instead of continuous fire watches when they removed the Unit 2 and 3 A 0 0 0 0 0 startup transformers fire protection deluge system from service. (Section F1.1)
B 0
OO 800000 C 0 0 0 1 12/27/97 VIO IR 97-16; VIO 97-16-09 NRC The inspectors identified a violation for an Individual's failure to follow procedure for 1 2 3 4 5 contamination control. (Section RI.1)
A 00000 B 00000 c
0 11000 12/3/97 Weakness IR 97-17 NRC Review of the appropriate records and reports revealed weaknesses in the General 1 2 3 4 5 Employee Training program and the Physical Security Plan (Section S3.4)
A 00000 C.0 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 41 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Lest Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE I
TYPE(s)
JSEC. SPA ISOURCE(s)
ID'd IISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 12/3/97 Positive IR 97-17 NRC The control room barriers which Included the controlled access door met the 1 2 3 4 5 Physical Security Plan commitments and regulatory requirements (Section S2.7).
A 00000 B 000 C 0 000 12/3/97 NCV IR 97-17; NCV 97-17-01 LICENSEE The inspection of the October 30, 1997 event identified one non-cited violation 1 2 3 4 5 concerning vital area access control (Section S2.6).
A 000 B 00000 CO E 000 12/3/97 Positive IR 97-17 NRC The licensee's compensatory measures Implemented for the degraded security 1 2 3 4 5 conditions at the Control Room door were within the commitments of the Physical Security Plan (Section S1.3).
A 50OO B 555000 C 0 000 11/15/97 Positive SAQV IR 97-15 NRC The 1995 audit and assessment of the facility's fire protection program were 1 2 3 4 5 comprehensive and appropriate corrective action was promptly taken to resolve identified issues. (Section F7.1)
A 0 50 BOO OO C 0 000 11/15/97 Weakness IR 97-15 NRC Fire brigade performance during a drill conducted during this inspection period was 1 2 3 4 5 mixed. Subsequent brigade performance after resolution of drill identified deficiencies was satisfactory. (Section F5.1)
AOO 0 O BOOOOO CE 000 11/15/97 Strength IR 97-15 NRC The fire brigade organization and training met the requirements of the site 1 2 3 4 5 procedures. The use of the fire brigade safety officer position during fire emergencies was identified as a program strength. (Section F5.1)
A O 0
0O B OOOOO C 0 000 11/15/97 VIO ENG IR 97-15 NRC A violation was identified involving the failure to provide fire fighting strategies for all 1 2 3 4 5 plant areas which contained safety-related equipment or presented an exposure hazard to safety-related components. (Section F3.1)
A O O 0 O 0 B
E0000 CO 000 FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 42 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Lest Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM CODES 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC In general, fire protection program implementing procedures were well written and 1 2 3 4 5 met the licensee's commitments to the NRC requirements. Procedure Implementation for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles was A
0 0 0 0 0 good. Overall, general housekeeping was satisfactory. (Section F3.1) 1 0 0 0 0 C E 000 11/15/97 MISC IR 97-15 LICENSEE The fire barrier penetration seals were functional. However, the licensee had 1 2 3 4 5 Implemented a project to provide documentation to identify the design specification and bounding test criteria applicable to each fire barrier penetration. (Section F2.3)
A OO O 0 0 B 00000 C 0 0
0 0
W 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC Adequate surveillance and test procedures were provided for the fire protection 1 2 3 4 5 systems and features, and implementation of the procedures was effective. (Section F2.2).
A 1 0
0 0
01 B 00000 C 0 000 11/15/97 Positive MAINT IR 97-15 NRC The low number of Inoperable or degraded fire protection components, in 1 2 3 4 5 conjunction with the good material condition of the fire protection components and fire brigade equipment. Indicated appropriate emphasis had been placed on the A 0 0 0 0 0 maintenance and operability of the fire protection equipment and components.
(Section F2.1) cO 000 11/15/97 NCV IR 97-15; NCVs 97 LICENSEE Three non-cited violations were Identified for the licensee's failure to meet the fire 1 2 3 4 5
04, -05, -06 protection operability requirements for three required fire protection features.
(Section F1.1)
A 1 00000-1 B 00000 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC The licensee's fire protection staff demonstrated an aggressive attitude in the 1 2 3 4 5 identification and correction of fire protection deficiencies. (Section F1.1)
A cO 0000 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC The inspectors determined that the licensee was performing Quality Assurance 1 2 3 4 5 audits and effectively assessing the radiation protection program as required by 10 CFR Part 20.1101. The Inspectors also determined that the licensee was A 0 O O O 0 completing corrective actions In a timely manner. (Section R7.1)
B 0
O O D1 C 0 000 FROM: 10/0/97 TO:1/30/99 a 43 of4 FOR PUBLIC REILEASE Lest Updated: 9/14/98
01-Apr-99 OCONEE I
I SMM CODES DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
C 11/15/97 Positive MAINT IR 97-15 NRC It was concluded that the meteorological instrumentation had been adequately 1 2 3 4 5 maintained and that the meteorolo gicall monitoring program had been effectively Implemented. (Section R2.1)
A 000 B00000 c 0 000 11/15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC The inspectors determined that the licensee had effectively implemented a program 1 2 3 4 5 for shipping radioactive materials required by NRC and Department of Transportation regulations. (Section R1.3)
A 00000 B 00000 C 0 0000 11/ 15/97 Positive IR 97-15 NRC It was concluded that the licensee's water chemistry control program for monitoring 1 2 3 4 5 primary and secondary water quality had been effectively implemented, for those parameters reviewed, in accordance with the Technical Specification requirements A 0 0 0 0 0 and the Station Chemistry Manual for Pressurized Water Reactor water chemistry.
B 0 0 0 0 0 (Section R1.2) c G 000 11115/97 Strength IR 97-15 NRC Based on observations and procedural reviews, the inspectors determined the 1 2 3 4 5 licensee was effectively maintaining controls for radioactive waste and waste processing. One unresolved Item was Identified to determine monitoring A 0 0 0 0 0 requirements for radiological work in two onsite buildings. The licensee's Initiative to 8 0 0 0 0 0 Improve resin sluice processing systems to maintain exposures As Low As Reasonably Achievable and to Improve environmental controls for resin sluicing was C 0. 0 0 0 viewed as a strength. (Section R1.1)
FROM. 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 44 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE 01-Apr-99 ESMM CODES DATE TYPE(s)
SEC. SFA SOURCE(s)
ID'd ISSUE(s)
SMM Template Codes:
SALP Functional Areas:
ID Code:
1A OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Normal Operations 1B OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Operations During Transients ENG ENGINEERING NRC NRC iC OPERATION PERFORMANCE - Programs and Processes MAINT MAINTENANCE SELF SELF-REVEALED 2A MATERIAL CONDITION - Equipment Condition OPS OPERATIONS 2B MATERIAL CONDITION - Programs and Processes PLT SU PLANT SUPPORT 3A HUMAN PERFORMANCE - Work Performance SAOV SAFETY ASSESSMENT & V 36 HUMAN PERFORMANCE -KSA 3C HUMAN PERFORMANCE-Work Environment 4A ENGINEERING/DESIGN - Design 46 ENGINEERING/DESIGN - Engineering Support 4C ENGINEERING/DESIGN -
Programs and Processes 5A PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION - Identification 56 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTION - Analysis 5C PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION & SOLUTIONO-Resolution EEls are apparent violations of NRC requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action* (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached Its final enforcement decision on the issues Identified by the EEls end the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made. Before the NRIC makes Its enforcement decision, the licensee will be provided with an opportunity to either (1) respond to the apparent violation or (2) request a predecislonal enforcement conference.
URIs are unresolved Items about which more Information Is required to determine whether the Issue In question Is an acceptable Item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation.
However, the NRIC has not reached Its final conclusions on the issues, and the PiM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.
FROM: 10/30/97 TO: 1/30/99 Page 45 of 45 FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Last Updated: 9/14/98
OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION INSPECTION PLAN INSPECTION PLANNED PROCEDURE/
TITLE NUMBER OF INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION TEMPORARY TLINSPECTORS DATES COMMENTS INSTRUCTION IP 71001 LICENSED OPERATOR 1
TBD Requal Examinations REQUALIFICATION PROGRAM EVALUATION IP 73753 INSERVICE INSPECTION 1
6/99 (Ul)
Core - during Units 1 and 2 RFOs, 11/99 (U2) respectively (to include FAC)
6/99 (Ul)
Regional Initiative - steam generator 11/99 (U2) inspections during Units I and 2 RFOs, respectively LICENSE RENEWAL INSPECTIONS 4
4/99 Regional Initiative-Inspection of 7/99 licensee's license renewal efforts IP 37550 ENGINEERING 1
10/99 Regional Initiative - Inspection of ACB Design; MOV Testing March31, 1999 (1.14PM) GA299WD Page 1 of 3
INSPECTION PLAN NED PROCEDURE/
TITLE NUMBER OF INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION TEMPORARY IIIEINSPECTORS DATES COMMENTS INSTRUCTION IP 37550 ENGINEERING Regional Initiative - (Post-MOG Items):
IP 92903 FOLLOWUP - ENGINEERING IP 37001 10CFR 50.59 SAFETY EVALUATIONS 2
8/99 (prep)
- Emergency Operating procedures (6 6
9/99 (2 wks) people for two weeks) 3 TBD
- Followup of standby shutdown facility SSEA TBD TBD
- Review of emergency feedwater water open items TBD TBD
- Inspect licensee's UFSAR review project TBD TBD
- Open item closure (during inspections above) 1 6/99
- Followup inspection of containment coating EEl during Unit 1 outage IP 40500 PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION/
1 - 3 12/99 Core - Will include a review of PIP RESOLUTION Activity Backlog, PIP Quality Improvements, and Manager Observations and Group Self Assessments (Post-MOG Items)
IP 83750 OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE 1
10/99 Core - focus on HP program and outage activities March 31. 1999 (1:14PM) G.0299.WPD Page 2 of 3
INSPECTION PLANNED PROCEDURE/
TITLE NUMBER OF INSPECTION TYPE OF INSPECTION TEMPORARY TLINSPECTORS DATES COMMENTS INSTRUCTION IP 84750 RADIOACTIVE WASTE SYSTEMS, 1
12/99 Core WATER CHEMISTRY, CONFIRMATORY MEASUREMENTS AND RADIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING IP 86750 SOLID RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENTAND TRANSPORTATION OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IP 81700 PHYSICAL SECURITY PROGRAM 1
9/99 Core FOR POWER REACTORS 81001 ISFSI - SECURITY IP 64704 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM 1
8/99 Regional Initiative - focus on status of 9/99 fire barrier penetration seal effort, IP 92904 FOLLOWUP - PLANT SUPPORT associated open items, and related license renewal issues IP 82701 OPERATIONAL STATUS OF THE 1
TBD Core EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM March 31. 1999 (1:14PM) G0299.VPD Page 3 of 3