ML15259A400

301 Final Administrative Documents

ML15259A400
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	09/16/2015
From:	Division of Reactor Safety II
To:	Tennessee Valley Authority
References
Download: ML15259A400 (70)

Text

ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 7/17/27hcas of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have nof been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowleçlge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 7/Zi!c)7/Z7/IFrom the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or proIide etformance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

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ES-201, Page 27 of 28

ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201 -3

1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 1/t/1 7/i1/,as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been uthorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knoilqdge, I çJçi not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) oflfZDIlc 7)2716 From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide prformance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

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ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 7/2O1i 712 7/15 as of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback), Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 7120115 & 7/27/15 From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

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ES-201 Examination Security Agreement Form ES-201-3

1. Pre-Examination I acknowledge that I have acquired specialized knowledge about the NRC licensing examinations scheduled for the week(s) of 7/ac/i c7/z7/Ias of the date of my signature. I agree that I will not knowingly divulge any information about these examinations to any persons who have not been authorized by the NRC chief examiner. I understand that I am not to instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants scheduled to be administered these licensing examinations from this date until completion of examination administration, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC (e.g., acting as a simulator booth operator or communicator is acceptable if the individual does not select the training content or provide direct or indirect feedback). Furthermore, I am aware of the physical security measures and requirements (as documented in the facility licensees procedures) and understand that violation of the conditions of this agreement may result in cancellation of the examinations and/or an enforcement action against me or the facility licensee. I will immediately report to facility management or the NRC chief examiner any indications or suggestions that examination security may have been compromised.

2. Post-Examination To the best of my knowledge, I did not divulge to any unauthorized persons any information concerning the NRC licensing examinations administered during the week(s) of 7/ac/,c7/s7/zs-From the date that I entered into this security agreement until the completion of examination administration, I did not instruct, evaluate, or provide performance feedback to those applicants who were administered these licensing examinations, except as specifically noted below and authorized by the NRC.

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ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Examination: 7/20/2015 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*

Determine License Status Active / Inactive 2.1.4 Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as Conduct of Operations M,R medical requirements, no-solo operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc.

3.3/3.8 CFR 41.10 / 43.2 Perform RCS Deboration Calculation.

Conduct of Operations M,R 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

3.9 / 4.2 CFR 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12 Perform QPTR Calculation and Evaluate Results for Tech Spec compliance.

Equipment Control M,R 2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

3.7/4.1 CFR 41.10/45.13 Calculate the maximum permissible stay time within emergency dose limits.

Radiation Control M,R 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

3.2/3.7 CFR 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10 Emergency Procedures /

N/A N/A Plan NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)

ES 301, Page 22 of 27

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Examination: 7/20/2015 Examination Level: RO SRO Operating Test Number: 301 Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed (See Note) Code*

Determine License Status Active / Inactive 2.1.4 Knowledge of individual licensed operator responsibilities related to shift staffing, such as Conduct of Operations M,R medical requirements, no-solo operation, maintenance of active license status, 10CFR55, etc.

3.3/3.8 CFR 41.10 / 43.2 Perform RCS Deboration Calculation.

Conduct of Operations M,R 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

3.9 / 4.2 CFR 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12 Evaluate conditions and determine Tech Spec Entry requirements.

Equipment Control N,R 2.2.37 Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment 3.6/4.6 CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 45.13 Calculate the maximum permissible stay time within emergency dose limits.

Radiation Control M,R 2.3.4 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

3.2/3.7 CFR 41.12 / 43.4 / 45.10 Classify event as Site Area Emergency.

Emergency Procedures / 2.4.41 Knowledge of the emergency action level D,R Plan thresholds and classifications.

2.9/4.6 CFR 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.

• Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (< 3 for ROs; < 4 for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)

ES 301, Page 22 of 27

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: ___Watts Bar__________________________ Date of Examination: __7/20/2015___

Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: _____301_______

Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. . Retrieve a Dropped Rod. A, M 1 001 A2.03, 3.5/4.2 CFR 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8

b. Perform 1-SOI-63.01, Safety Injection System, Section 8.3.1, Add Water to CLA 1. D, L 2 006 A4.07, 4.4/4.4 CFR 41.7/45.5 to 45.8

c. Isolate Cold Leg Accumulators per 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. A,EN,D 3 011 EA1.09, 4.3/4.3,

d. Start #2 RCP per 1-SOI-68.02, Reactor Coolant Pumps. A,M,L 4P 003 A1.02, 2.9/2.9 CFR 41.5/45.5, CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6

e. Shutdown 1B MFP using 1-SOI-2&3.01, Condensate and Feedwater Systems. N 4S 059 A4.03 2.9/2.9 CFR 41.7/45.5 to 45.8

f. Align RHR Spray per 1-FR-Z.1, High Containment Pressure. A, D 5 E14 EA1.1, 3.7 / 3.7 CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6

g. Synchronize 1A-A DG from the Main Control Room per SOI-82.01, Diesel Generator (DG) A,EN,D 6 1A-A.

064 A1.03, 3.9/3.9 CFR 41.7/45.5 to 45.8

h. Start up Instrument Room Purge per SOI-30.02, Containment Purge System. D 8 029 A2.03, 2.7/3.1 CFR 41.5/43.5/45.3/45.13 CFR In-Plant Systems* (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U) i Perform 1-SOI-62.01, 1-SOI-62.01, CVCS - Charging and Letdown, Section 8.9, Seal D,R 4P Injection Filter Swap.

003 A4.01 3.3/3.2 CFR 41.7/45.5 to 45.8

j. Perform 2-ES-1.1, SI Termination, Appendix E actions to support SI Termination. E, EN,N 3 E02 EA1.1, 4.0/3.9 CFR 41.7/45.5/45.6

k. Perform 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS), Attachment 1, Alignment of E,M,R 8 ERCW to CCP 1A-A Lube Oil Coolers.

008 1.02, 3.3/3.4 CFR 41.2 to 41.9/45.7 to 45.9

• All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature 1 / 1 / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/1/1 (S)imulator

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: ___Watts Bar__________________________ Date of Examination: __7/20/2015___

Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: _____301_______

Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. . Retrieve a Dropped Rod. A, M 1 001 A2.03, 3.5/4.2 CFR 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8

b. Perform 1-SOI-63.01, Safety Injection System, Section 8.3.1, Add Water to CLA 1. D, L 2 006 A4.07, 4.4/4.4 CFR 41.7/45.5 to 45.8

c. Isolate Cold Leg Accumulators per 1-E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. A,EN,D 3 011 EA1.09, 4.3/4.3,

d. Start #2 RCP per 1-SOI-68.02, Reactor Coolant Pumps. A,M,L 4P 003 A1.02, 2.9/2.9 CFR 41.5/45.5, CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6

e. Shutdown 1B MFP using 1-SOI-2&3.01, Condensate and Feedwater Systems. N 4S 059 A4.03 2.9/2.9 CFR 41.7/45.5 to 45.8

f. Align RHR Spray per 1-FR-Z.1, High Containment Pressure. A, D 5 E14 EA1.1, 3.7 / 3.7 CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6

g. Synchronize 1A-A DG from the Main Control Room per SOI-82.01, Diesel Generator (DG) A,EN,D 6 1A-A.

064 A1.03, 3.9/3.9 CFR 41.7/45.5 to 45.8

h. Not Applicable N/A N/A In-Plant Systems* (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U) i Perform 1-SOI-62.01, 1-SOI-62.01, CVCS - Charging and Letdown, Section 8.9, Seal D,R 4P Injection Filter Swap.

003 A4.01 3.3/3.2 CFR 41.7/45.5 to 45.8

j. Perform 2-ES-1.1, SI Termination, Appendix E actions to support SI Termination. E, EN,N 3 E02 EA1.1, 4.0/3.9 CFR 41.7/45.5/45.6

k. Perform 1-AOI-15, Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCS), Attachment 1, Alignment of E,M,R 8 ERCW to CCP 1A-A Lube Oil Coolers.

008 1.02, 3.3/3.4 CFR 41.2 to 41.9/45.7 to 45.9

• All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all five SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

• Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U A)lternate path 4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank 9/8/4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant 1/1/1 (EN)gineered safety feature 1 / 1 / 1 (control room system)

(L)ow-Power / Shutdown 1/1/1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) 2/2/1 (P)revious 2 exams 3 / 3 / 2 (randomly selected)

(R)CA 1/1/1 (S)imulator

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Exam: July 20, 2015 Operating Test No.: 301 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 3 4 T M L N O I CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T POSITION T C I A

A T S A B S A B S A B S A B M L U N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 1 1 1 1 0 NOR 2 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 3,4,5,6, 5 4 4 2 7

SRO-U 8 MAJ 1 2 2 1 TS 3,4,5,7 4 0 2 2 RX 1 1 1 1 0 RO NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4,5,7 3 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 8 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 2 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 3,6 2 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 8 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Exam: July 20, 2015 Operating Test No.: 301 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 3 4 T M L N O I CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T POSITION T C I A

A T S A B S A B S A B S A B M L U N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 5 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,3,4,6 4 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 1 1 2 1 TS 2,4 2 0 2 2 RO RX 5 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,3 2 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4,6 2 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 7 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Exam: July 20, 2015 Operating Test No.: 301 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 3 4 T M L N O I CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T POSITION T C I A

A T S A B S A B S A B S A B M L U N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 5 1 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,3,4,5 4 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6 1 2 2 1 TS 2,3,4,5 4 0 2 2 RO RX 5 1 1 1 0 NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 2,4 2 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 3,5 2 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Exam: July 20, 2015 Operating Test No.: 301 A E Scenarios P V P E 1 2 3 4 T M L N O I CREW CREW POSITION CREW POSITION CREW POSITION N I T POSITION T C I A

A T S A B S A B S A B S A B M L U N Y R T O R T O R T O R T O T P O C P O C P O C P O C P M(*)

E R I U RO RX 4 1 1 1 0 NOR 4 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 1,2,3,5 4 4 4 2 SRO-U 6 MAJ 1 2 2 1 TS 1,2,3 3 0 2 2 RX 4 1 1 1 0 RO NOR 0 1 1 1 SRO-I 1,3,5 I/C 2 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 6 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 0 1 1 0 NOR 4 1 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 1,2 2 4 4 2 SRO-U 6 MAJ 1 2 2 1 TS 0 0 2 2 RO RX 1 1 0 NOR 1 1 1 SRO-I I/C 4 4 2 SRO-U MAJ 2 2 1 TS 0 2 2 Instructions:

1. Check the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must serve in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions. Instant SROs (SRO-I) must serve in both the SRO and the ATC positions, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position. If an SRO-I additionally serves in the BOP position, one I/C malfunction can be credited toward the two I/C malfunctions required for the ATC position.

2. Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a one-for-one basis.

3. Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4. For licensees that use the ATC operator primarily for monitoring plant parameters, the chief examiner may place SRO-I applicants in either the ATC or BOP position to best evaluate the SRO-I in manipulating plant controls.

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-301-6 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Examination: 07/20/2015 Operating Test No.: 301 APPLICANTS RO RO RO RO SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-I SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U SRO-U Competencies SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO SCENARIO 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 3,4,5,6 2,3,4,6 2,3,4,5 1,2,3,4 3,4,5,6 2,3,4,6 2,3,4,5 1,2,3,4 Interpret/Diagnose 5,7 5,7 Events and Conditions ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL Comply With and Use Procedures (1) 2,3,4,5, 1,2.3.4. 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,5, 2,3,4,5, 1,2.3.4. 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,5, Operate Control 6,7 5.6. 5 6 6,7 5.6. 5 6 Boards (2)

ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL Communicate and Interact 1,2,3,8 2,3.4.5. 2,3,4,5, 1,2,3,4 Demonstrate 6,7 ,6 5,7 Supervisory Ability (3) 3,4,5,7 2,4 2,3,4,5 1,2,3,4 Comply With and Use Tech. Specs. (3)

Notes:

(1) Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

(2) Optional for an SRO-U.

(3) Only applicable to SROs.

Instructions:

Check the applicants license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant. (This includes all rating factors for each competency.) (Competency Rating factors as described on forms ES-303-1 and ES-303-3.)

ES-401, Rev. 9 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2 Facility: Watts Bar Date of Exam: July 2015 RO K/A Category Points SRO-Only Points Tier Group K K K K K K A A A A G A2 G* Total 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4

• Total

1. 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 18 3 3 66 Emergency &

2 2 1 1 2 1 2 9 9 2 2 44 Abnormal Plant N/A N/A Evolutions Tier Totals 5 4 4 5 4 5 27 27 5 5 10 10 1 3 3 1 2 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 28 3 2 55 2.

2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 2 1 33 Plant Systems Tier Totals 4 4 2 2 4 3 4 4 3 4 4 38 3 88

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities 1 2 3 4 10 1 2 3 4 7 Categories 2 2 3 3 1 2 2 2

1. Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable K/A category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (i.e., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the ATier Totals@

in each K/A category shall not be less than two).

2. The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table.

The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by 1 from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions.

The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

3. Systems/evolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to section D.1.b of ES-401 for guidance regarding the elimination of inappropriate K/A statements.

4. Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

5. Absent a plant-specific priority, only those K/As having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected.

Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

6. Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and K/A categories.

7. *The generic (G) K/As in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the K/A Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system. Refer to section D.1.b of ES-401 for the applicable KAs.

8. On the following pages, enter the K/A numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics=importance ratings (IRs) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above; if fuel handling equipment is sampled in other than Category A2 or G* on the SRO-only exam, enter it on the left side of Column A2 for Tier 2, Group 2 (Note # 1 does not apply). Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

9. For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the K/A catalog, and enter the K/A numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to K/As that are linked to 10 CFR 55.43..

ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 007EA1.01 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery 3.7 3.4 T/G controls

/1 008AK2.02 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident / 3 2.7 2.7 Sensors and detectors 009EK2.03 Small Break LOCA / 3 3 3.3 S/Gs 011EK1.01 Large Break LOCA / 3 4.1 4.4 Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux boiling.

022AA1.02 Loss of Rx Coolant Makeup / 2 3 2.9 CVCS charging low flow alarm, sensor and indicator 025AA2.06 Loss of RHR System / 4 3.2 3.4 Existence of proper RHR overpressure protection 027AG2.4.18 Pressurizer Pressure Control System 3.3 4.0 Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs.

Malfunction / 3 029EG2.4.31 ATWS / 1 4.2 4.1 Knowledge of annunciators alarms, indications or response procedures 038EA1.43 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 3.6 3.5 Manual isolation of steam dump valves 040AK3.01 Steam Line Rupture - Excessive Heat 4.2 4.5 Operation of steam line isolation valves Transfer / 4 054AA2.08 Loss of Main Feedwater / 4 2.9 3.3 Steam flow-feed trend recorder Page 1 of 2 8/21/2014 4:39 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 055EK1.02 Station Blackout / 6 4.1 4.4 Natural circulation cooling 056AG2.2.41 Loss of Off-site Power / 6 3.5 3.9 Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical and mechanical drawings.

057AK3.01 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus / 6 4.1 4.4 Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac electrical instrument bus 058AA2.03 Loss of DC Power / 6 3.5 3.9 DC loads lost; impact on ability to operate and monitor plant systems WE04EK2.2 LOCA Outside Containment / 3 3.8 4.0 Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

WE05EK1.3 Inadequate Heat Transfer - Loss of 3.9 4.1 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and Secondary Heat Sink / 4 remedial actions associated with the (Loss of Secondary Heat Sink).

WE11EK3.4 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 3.6 3.8 RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

Page 2 of 2 8/21/2014 4:39 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 005AA1.05 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 3.4 3.4 RPI 028AK3.03 Pressurizer Level Malfunction / 2 3.5 4.1 False indication of PZR level when PORV or spray valve is open and RCS saturated 032AG2.4.11 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 4.0 4.2 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

033AK1.01 Loss of Intermediate Range NI / 7 2.7 3 Effects of voltage changes on performance 060AG2.4.4 Accidental Gaseous Radwaste Rel. / 9 4.5 4.7 Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures 061AK2.01 ARM System Alarms / 7 2.5 2.6 Detectors at each ARM system location 067AA2.10 Plant Fire On-site / 8 2.9 3.6 Time limit of long-term-breathing air system for control room WE08EK1.3 RCS Overcooling - PTS / 4 3.5 4.0 Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions associated with the (Natural Circulation Operations).

WE10EA1.3 Natural Circ. With Seam Void/ 4 3.4 3.7 Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

Page 1 of 1 8/21/2014 4:42 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 003K5.02 Reactor Coolant Pump 2.8 3.2 Effects of RCP coastdown on RCS parameters 003K5.04 Reactor Coolant Pump 3.2 3.5 Effects of RCP shutdown on secondary parameters, such as steam pressure, steam flow and feed flow 004K5.31 Chemical and Volume Control 3.0 3.4 Purpose of flow path around boric acid storage tank 005A1.02 Residual Heat Removal 3.3 3.4 RHR flow rate 005K2.03 Residual Heat Removal 2.7 2.8 RCS pressure boundary motor-operated valves 006A3.08 Emergency Core Cooling 4.2 4.3 Automatic transfer of ECCS flowpaths 007K4.01 Pressurizer Relief/Quench Tank 2.6 2.9 Quench tank cooling 008A2.05 Component Cooling Water 3.3 3.5 Effect of loss of instrument and control air on the position of the CCW valves that are air operated 008G2.4.11 Component Cooling Water 3.8 4.2 Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures 010K2.01 Pressurizer Pressure Control 3.0 3.4 PZR heaters 012A1.01 Reactor Protection 2.9 3.4 Trip setpoint adjustment Page 1 of 3 8/21/2014 4:42 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 012K2.01 Reactor Protection 3.3 3.7 RPS channels, components and interconnections 013K6.01 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 2.7 3.1 Sensors and detectors 022A1.02 Containment Cooling 3.6 3.8 Containment pressure 026A4.01 Containment Spray 4.5 4.3 CSS controls 039A3.02 Main and Reheat Steam 3.1 3.5 Isolation of the MRSS 059G2.2.42 Main Feedwater 3.9 4.6 Ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for Technical Specifications 061K6.01 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 2.5 2.8 Controllers and positioners 062G2.4.46 AC Electrical Distribution 4.2 4.2 Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions.

062K1.02 AC Electrical Distribution 4.1 4.4 ED/G 063K1.03 DC Electrical Distribution 2.9 3.5 Battery charger and battery 064A4.06 Emergency Diesel Generator 3.9 3.9 Manual start, loading and stopping of the ED/G Page 2 of 3 8/21/2014 4:42 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 064A4.09 Emergency Diesel Generator 3.2 3.3 Establishing power from the ring bus (to relieve ED/G) 073A2.01 Process Radiation Monitoring 2.5 2.9 Erratic or failed power supply 076K3.01 Service Water 3.4 3.6 Closed cooling water 078K1.05 Instrument Air 3.4 3.5 MSIV air 078K4.02 Instrument Air 3.2 3.5 Cross-over to other air systems 103A2.04 Containment 3.5 3.6 Containment evacuation (including recognition of the alarm)

Page 3 of 3 8/21/2014 4:42 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 002K5.05 Reactor Coolant 2.9 3.3 Reason for drain tank pressure rise during water inventory operations 011K2.02 Pressurizer Level Control 3.1 3.2 PZR heaters 011K2.01 Charging Pumps 014K1.02 Rod Position Indication 3.0 3.3 NIS 017K6.01 In-core Temperature Monitor 2.7 3.0 Sensors and detectors 029A3.01 Containment Purge 3.8 4.0 CPS isolation 033A1.01 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 2.7 3.3 Spent fuel pool water level 034A2.03 Fuel Handling Equipment 3.3 4.0 Mispositioned fuel element 034A2.01 3.6 4.4 Droppped fuel element 035A4.06 Steam Generator 4.5 4.6 S/G isolation on steam leak or tube rupture/leak 055K3.01 Condenser Air Removal 2.5 2.7 Main condenser 079G2.4.35 Station Air 3.8 4.0 Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects.

Page 1 of 1 8/21/2014 4:43 PM

ES-401, REV 9 T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO G2.1.18 Conduct of operations 3.6 3.8 Ability to make accurate, clear and concise logs, records, status boards and reports.

G2.1.25 Conduct of operations 3.9 4.2 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

G2.2.12 Equipment Control 3.7 4.1 Knowledge of survellance procedures G2.2.35 Equipment Control 3.6 4.5 Ability to determine Technical Specification Mode of Operation G2.3.14 Radiation Control 3.4 3.8 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities G2.3.15 Radiation Control 2.9 3.1 Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems G2.3.4 Radiation Control 3.2 3.7 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal and emergency conditions G2.4.1 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.6 4.8 Knowledge of EOP entry coditions and immediate action steps G2.4.27 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.4 3.9 Knowledge of "fire in the plant" procedures.

G2.4.50 Emergency Procedures/Plans 4.2 4.0 Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual.

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ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 015AG2.2.44 RCP Malfunctions / 4 4.2 4.4 Ability to interpret control room indications to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions 029EA2.01 ATWS / 1 4.4 4.7 Reactor nuclear instrumentation 038EG2.4.31 Steam Gen. Tube Rupture / 3 4.2 4.1 Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures 058AG2.4.47 Loss of DC Power / 6 4.2 4.2 Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material 077AA2.07 Generator Voltage and Electric Grid 3.6 4.0 Operational status of engineered safety features Disturbances / 6 WE11EA2.2 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc. / 4 3.4 4.2 Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

Page 1 of 1 8/21/2014 4:44 PM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T1G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 005AG2.4.8 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod / 1 3.8 4.5 Knowledge of how abnormal operating procedures are used in conjunction with EOPs.

024AA2.04 Emergency Boration / 1 3.4 4.2 Availability of BWST 032AA2.06 Loss of Source Range NI / 7 3.9 4.1 Confirmation of reactor trip we13EG2.4.20 Steam Generator Over-pressure / 4 3.8 4.3 Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes.

Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation we13EG2.4.3 3.7 3.9 Page 1 of 1 8/21/2014 4:44 PM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T2G1 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 012G2.2.36 Reactor Protection 3.1 4.2 Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance activities, such as degraded power sources, on the status of limiting conditions of operations 013A2.04 Engineered Safety Features Actuation 3.6 4.2 Loss of instrument bus 061G2.2.22 Auxiliary/Emergency Feedwater 4.0 4.7 Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

076A2.01 Service Water 3.5 3.7 Loss of SWS 026A2.03 Containment Spray 4.1 4.4 Failure of ESF Page 1 of 1 8/21/2014 4:45 PM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T2G2 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO 017A2.02 In-core Temperature Monitor 3.6 4.1 Core damage 029A2.01 Containment Purge 2.9 3.6 Maintenance or other activity taking place inside containment 075G2.1.20 Circulating Water 4.6 4.6 Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

Page 1 of 1 8/21/2014 4:45 PM

ES-401, REV 9 SRO T3 PWR EXAMINATION OUTLINE FORM ES-401-2 KA NAME / SAFETY FUNCTION: IR K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 A1 A2 A3 A4 G TOPIC:

RO SRO G2.1.34 Conduct of operations 2.7 3.5 Knowledge of primary and secondary chemistry limits G2.2.21 Equipment Control 2.9 4.1 Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements.

G2.2.6 Equipment Control 3.0 3.6 Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures G2.3.12 Radiation Control 3.2 3.7 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties G2.3.14 Radiation Control 3.4 3.8 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities G2.4.23 Emergency Procedures/Plans 3.4 4.4 Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure implementation during emergency operations.

G2.4.44 Emergency Procedures/Plans 2.4 4.4 Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations.

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ES-401 Record of Rejected K/As Form ES-401-4 Tier / Randomly Reason for Rejection Group Selected K/A 2/2 011K2.02 Q57 K/A overlapped with Q37, K/A 010K2.01, which also directly asked for power supplies to pressurizer heaters.

K/A 011K2.01 randomly selected by Chief Examiner.

2/2 034A2.03 Q62 Could not write an operationally-valid RO question for mispositioned fuel element because ROs have no related actions.

K/A 034A2.01 randomly selected by Chief Examiner.

1/2 WE13G2.4.20 Q85 Unable to write a question that met the K/A at the SRO level from Cautions and Notes in emergency procedures.

K/A WE13G2.4.3 randomly selected by Chief Examiner.

2/2 014K1.02 Q58 Could not generate a discriminating, operationally-valid question. K/A 014K1.01 randomly selected by Chief Examiner.

1/1 058G2.4.47 Q79 Tried two different questions for this K/A, couldnt make either work at the SRO level.

K/A 058G2.4.11 randomly selected by Chief Examiner.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam ES-401 Written Examination Review Worksheet Form ES-401-9 Instructions (Refer to Section D of ES-401 and Appendix B for additional information regarding each of the following concepts:

1. Enter the level of knowledge (LOK) of each question as either (F)undamental or (H)igher cognitive level.

2. Enter the level of difficulty (LOD) of each question a 1(easy) to 5 ( difficult); (questions with a difficulty between 2 and 4 are acceptable)

3. Check the appropriate box if a psychometric flaw is identified:

• Stem Focus: The stem lacks sufficient focus to elicit the correct answer (e.g., unclear intent, more information is needed, or too much needless information).

• Cues: The stem or distractors contain cues (i.e., clues, specific determiners, phrasing, length, etc.).

• T/F: The answer choices are a collection of unrelated true/false statements.

• Cred. Dist: The distractors are not credible; single implausible distractors should be repaired, more than one is unacceptable.

• Partial: One or more distractors is (are) partially correct (e.g., if the applicant can make unstated assumptions that are not contradicted by stem).

4. Check the appropriate box if a job content error is identified:

• Job Link: The question is not linked to the job requirements (i.e., the question has a valid K/A but, as written, is not operational in content).

• Minutia: The question requires the recall of knowledge that is too specific for the closed reference test mode (i.e., it is not required to be known from memory).

• # / Units: The question contains data with an unrealistic level of accuracy or inconsistent units (e.g., panel meter in percent with question in gallons).

• Backward: The question requires reverse logic or application compared to the job requirements.

5. Check questions that are sampled for conformance with the approved K/A and those K/As that are designated SRO-only (K/A and license level mismatches are unacceptable)

6. Enter questions source: (B)ank, (M)odified, or (N)ew. Verify that (M)odified questions meet the criteria of ES-401 Section D.2.f.

7. Based on the reviewer's judgment, is the question as written (U)nsatisfactory (requiring repair or replacement), in need of (E)ditorial enhancement, or (S)atisfactory?

8. At a minimum, explain any "U" Status ratings (e.g., how the Appendix B psychometric attributes are not being met).

1. 2. 3. Psychometric Flaws 4. Job Content Flaws 5. Other 6. 7. 8.

Q LOK LOD Source Status (F/H) (1-5) Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO B/M/N U/E/S Dist. Explanation Focus Link units ward K/A Only Generic/global comments:

1) The color highlighting on words (Q1 is an example): this is different than we've ever seen and we think not necessary. Unless you can show us similar usage in station procedures we'll disallow this practice.

6/3/15 - KRS - The facility removed the use of GREEN, RED, ORANGE and YELLOW and replaced with normal text. Please note that highlights such as a description that the question is continued on the next page or the use of the word NOT may retain their highlighting. 6/5/15: Okay.

2) Up and down arrows next to words like "increasing" and "decreasing". Same as above. 6/3/15 - KRS - These were removed.

3) Clock times: mimicking the control room digital clock is unique, but probably not necessary. We'd prefer times to be in the same font/size/color as their related text, but leave that decision to you. However, taking times out to seconds is, in most cases not necessary (Q9 is an example), and we think possibly distracting to applicants, so we'd like seconds to be left of when possible. (In rare cases seconds are needed though; see Q20.)

6/3/15 KRS - As discussed on a phone call, the facility wishes to present times as they would appear on the clock in the MCR (on panel 1-M-4). Therefore, the color, font and format (HH:MM:SS) was chosen to match this and the facility wishes to maintain this exact format throughout the test for reasons presented on the phone call. 6/5/15: Okay.

4) Distractor analyses: in general the analysis for the correct answer is very sparse because the basis for it has been covered in the analysis for one or more of the distractors.

(Q15 is a good example of this.) Ideally the correct answer analysis would have the supporting discussion for why the correct answer is correct, and the analyses for incorrect answers would focus on why they're plausible. (Reference NUREG 1021 ES-401 2.g. It also says the distractor analysis is an optional practice, so you dont have to change anything. But if any new questions followed this convention it would help the review process.)

And for 2-part questions if you wanted to do a discussion of each part without labeling them Choice A, B, etc, that would be acceptable. Just explain why the correct 1st-part choice is correct and why its distractor is plausible, then do the same for the 2nd part. Two paragraphs could cover it, one for each part of the answer.

D/A in the following comments = Distractor Analysis P after a question number denotes a pre-submittal question.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 007EA1.01 Reactor Trip - Stabilization - Recovery: T/G controls 1 F 3 N S

1) Dont see how the last sentence of D/A D supports the wrong answers.

6/3/15 -KRS - Reworded the last sentence to reflect that the 2nd part of D is correct (the first part is incorrect).

008AK2.02 Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident Sensors and detectors 2 H 2 S B 1) Choice B: on a RCS cold-leg, or an RCS? I prefer the latter, but just be consistent.

6/3/15 - KRS - The facility verified that a RCS is used throughout the test (to maintain the word a paired WB with a word starting with a consonant). 6/5/15: Okay.

2010

2) All words in Choice D dont need to be capitalized. Specifically not Condensing Pot Rupture, and probably not Detector or Level. 6/3/15 KRS - Removed the title capitalization from this distractor.

3) D/A C, last sentence: true statement, but the Q doesnt mention temperature, so this doesnt support plausibility. 6/3/15 KRS - I believe the original author of this Q wrote that sentence to explain the response of PZR level (in the sentence previous). The sentence was deleted as it is unnecessary as the PZR level response is described in the sentence previous.

5) Technical References dont match; seem to have carried over from Q1.

6/3/15 - KRS - Corrected the reference to the Westinghouse Owners Group Executive Volume (cited the reference used by the bank Q).

009EK2.03 Small Break LOCA: S/Gs 3 H 3 N S

1) Stem: Containment pressure peaked at 1.5 psig. Suggest adding, and is slowly lowering, or is stable. 6/3/15 - KRS - Added and is slowly LOWERING.

2) Part 2 question reads funny. Maybe something like, To raise injection flow rate, the crew could __.

6/3/15 KRS - Agree with the proposed verbiage. The use of could in this case remains completely defensible (in terms of the wrong answer remains absolutely wrong).

3) With no information on PZR level, the plausibility of starting an SI pump is reduced. Lets put level at some value and lowering, so starting SI looks more enticing. It would still be incorrect.

6/3/15 KRS - Included PZR level is 20% and slowly LOWERING. This would mimic an approach to SI reinitiation IAW ES-0.1. The only thing potentially problematic with doing this is that with pressure stable, would PZR level be lowering? I would tend to believe that level would be rising. At worst though, I think this would just present a goofy situation. I dont think that it would flaw the question.

6/5: Agree. Situation could be that level is lowering slowly enough that heaters are keeping pressure stable.

011EK1.01 LBLOCA - Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux boiling.

4 F 2 X B E

1) The fill-in-the-blank line is redundant to the stem of the Q. Recommend delete, with no other changes San S necessary. 6/3/15 KRS - Deleted fill-in-the-blank.

Onofre

2) Admittedly this is a difficult KA to hit, because in a LBLOCA you dont get natural circ, but as-is, only the distractors match the KA, and even the KA Match statement says this. See if you can rewrite the KA match to focus on the and cooling part of the KA. 6/3/15 - KRS - Rewrote KA match statement. It now addresses the cooling part of the KA. 6/5/15: Looks good, thanks.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 022AA1.02 Loss of Rx Coolant M/U: charging low flow alarm, sensor and indicator 5 F 4 N S

1) 1st-part Q: add a comma after CHARGING FLOW. 6/3/15 KRS - Added a comma.

2) 2nd-part Q: remove comma after Annunciator 108-A. 6/3/15 - KRS - Removed comma.

3) Distractor Analysis: has A as correct answer. Change A to D and D to A and itll be right.

6/5/15: noted that change was made.

4) Instead of SAME or DIFFERENT use HIGHER or LOWER, will that work? If they can just choose DIFFERENT then they just need to know theres something funny about it. But if they have to choose HIGHER or LOWER, thats a better gauge of their understanding.

6/3 KRS - I like same/different because the annunciator has three possible causes: 1 high flow alarm (which is independent of letdown flow) and 2 low flow alarms (dependent on letdown flow). I can see in appeal space an applicant stating that higher is always correct because of course the charging flow HI setpoint is always going to be higher. I can certainly state that the annunciator (in whole) will alarm at a different value with varying letdown flows. I havent convinced myself that the higher / lower is truly defensible. 6/5: Discuss in person during prep week. 6/25: Reached resolution onsite.

025AA2.06 Loss of RHR System: Existence of proper RHR overpressure protection 6 H 3 X X N E

1) Minutia: is knowing relief valve setpoints from memory required?

S 6/3/15 KRS - Thought about this for quite a while and it really is minutia to have to know a whole laundry list of setpoints. It would be minutia to know the COMs setpoints (I wouldnt memorize that) and the 600 psig reliefs are most probably minutia. One should know that the suction line is protected by a 450 psig relief.

6/5: Agree with 450# relief.

2) Plausibility of B, 405 psig: RCS pressure is probably rising because RCS temperature is rising due to loss of RHR cooling (as stated in Distractor Analysis A). The 405# number was taken from the AOI-14 App.

D table for 150F, the initial temperature, but its indeterminate what temperature will be at the time any of the various relief valves lift. If T got to ~215F then the variable setpoint would be greater than 450#, which is the correct answer. 6/3/15 KRS - Rewriting Q, so this distractor will not be applicable.

3) KA Match statement: last sentence says, given that section 3.4 of 1-AOI-14 is in effect, but its not given that the AOI is in effect. 6/3 KRS - New Q will clearly place the applicant in 1-AOI-14.

4) We probably cant cite the System Description as the source of the answer because its probably not a controlled engineering document (and almost definitely not part of the licensing basis). Does the question still stand if we take that out of the stem? Its really just a systems question, isnt it?

6/3 KRS - Reference new Q.

6/18: New Q (New, High, 3) is definitely better. As we discussed by phone, you havent changed the backpage material until you get a read on the validity of the question, so I dont have the benefit of the new D/A analysis, but if the answers to these two points are satisfactory I think we can move forward:

1a) Plausibility of A, currently exposed to > design pressure, interested to see how you justify that.

2a) Plausibility of D, 500#? Is that based on the curve given? If we cant make a good argument for plausibility of either of these, could maybe use the 600# from the original Q.

6/29 KRS - Revised all of the D/A. As discussed during prep week 1a is supported by the mis-association of the design temperature of 350 with the design pressure. Also, as discussed, Ive left the 500 because it is more plausible (as it is the lift setpoint of the COPS system for the temperature given). I also added FIRST to B,C and D to eliminate an appeal based upon the assumption that the suction relief valve could not keep up with the pressure rise (not likely but it occurred to me that someone might try to argue this).

Certainly one cannot claim that the COPS lift at 500 psig would occur before the mechanical lift at 450 psig.

7/6: agree with all changes.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 027G2.4.18 PZR Pressure Control System: Knowledge of specific bases for EOPs.

7 F 3 X X X N U

1) Choice B is likely also correct: D/A B notes that the Excess L/D HX is located on el. 737 of the the S Aux Bldgin a location which can affect the dose topersonnel, and that theres a procedure step to notify RP Supervisor. All that said, why else would you notify RP? BUT:

Lesson Plan 3-OT-SYS062A says the HX is located on containment El. 716. [slide 135]

System Description N3-62-4001 says its in the reactor bldg. (El. 716). [p. 69]

Assuming both of those are correct, then at a minimum D/A B needs to be revised. But I suspect the reason you notify RP is dose-related. Maybe the transport time is less so theres more dose, or it flows through areas where dose is normally lower, something. I couldnt find a basis document for 1-AOI-18.

2) Distractor C is weak to implausible. if one believed that a siphon or educator effect were created?

Clever, but stretches credulity. Everyone should know that excess L/D flow will/could LOWER seal leakoff flow, so they could dismiss RISING.

3) Distractor D is implausible. How can a pump be damaged by putting water in its tank faster than the pumps design flow rate? The D/A gets closer to reality by saying that flow could out run the pumping capacity of the RCDT pumps

4) 1st part of KA isnt hit. This is essentially a systems question about design flow rate of Excess L/D, which can be used in many more cases than just AOI-18.

2nd part of the distractor also isnt really hit, vis a vis EOP vs. AOP. With the first part not hit wed really need the 2nd part to squarely hit. What comes to mind is ECA-3.3, but there may be other places in the EOPs that deal with loss of pressure control.

This Q has a lot of issues and a new Q may be easier. 6/3 KRS - Wrote new Q which centers about ECA-3.

6/18: Reviewed new Q (New, Low, 3), seems pretty good.

1a) 3rd bullet: can we put quotes around the step from ECA-3.3? normal pzr spray looked funny to me, so I checked the step and thats exactly what it says, so if we quoted it then we wont have anyone questioning non-standard terminology (pzr instead of PZR, or for that matter, PZR versus Pressurizer). Or paraphrase the step. 6/29 KRS - As discussed onsite, Pzr is fairly standard. Put quotes around the step.

2a) Stem: do we need the IAW the Westinghouse basis document? 6/29 KRS - No, removed this.

3a) This is a standard, pretty easy Q, so to make B a juicier choice could we put it first? Spray comes from Loops 1 & 2, and look, theres the answer. That sort of thing. 6/29 KRS - Swapped B to the A spot.

029EG2.4.31 ATWS: Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures 8 F 4 X B E Job-Link: Has this bank question been used on an NRC exam? It looks like SRO-only knowledge. Is an RO H 3 N S expected to know the criteria for exiting FR-S.1? 6/3 KRS - Used at SQN on their 9/2010 NRC exam before being incorporated into the WBN NRC bank.

If you want to keep it, then:

1) Choice B: change to something like, REMAIN in S.1 until directed to exit at Step 8 for SI. To make it look more like the other answer choices, which are of the forms exit and perform, exit and perform, and perform and transition (exit)

2) Choice C: remove the color from RED.

3) Choice D: says Step 6 of 1-FR-S.1; revision 1 of S.1 that we have has the transition to E-0 at Step 8.

Also in the D/A.

6/4 KRS - While the Q in question is pedigreed from previous usage on the RO NRC tests, I agree with the above. Ive generated a new Q which remains purely at the RO level.

6/5: Reviewed new Q (New, High, 3), looks like it might work. I didnt look up the alarm, but Im guessing RCP Board Undervoltage comes in earlier than any RCP trip or bus UV trip, so you could have that and not the four lights in Option 1?

1a) Could Option #1 BY ITSELF be an option, instead of having to bundle it with Option 2?

6/29 KRS - Yes, changed as requested.

2a) In the stem, would it help if we added in after indication(s)? 6/29 KRS - Added in.

6/29 KRS - As discussed during prep week changed OPTION 1 to show 3 of 4 lights lit.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 038EA1.43 SGTR: Manual isolation of steam dump valves 9P H 2 X* N S 2nd-part answer plausibility weak, but supported enough by the plausibility analysis. A Chief Examiner thought it was unsat. Given how big steam dump valves and piping are, even with rudimentary plant knowledge an applicant should be able to rule out that only one manual isolation valve would isolate all 12.

5/14: We have vacillated as to which is more plausible: a single isolation or an isolation per condenser zone (3 total). I believe that based upon the piping layout, a single isolation is more plausible. I believe that the very construct of a commercial nuclear plant is not-plausible (as to the concept of immensity of size). When I saw RCS loop isolation valves at the Byron station (the same primary plant as WBN), I realized that just about anything was possible.

6/18: RII tends to disagree on plausibility. Will discuss during prep week.

6/29 KRS - As discussed during prep week changed part 2 to An AUO can/can not manually isolate ONLY 1-FCV-1-103. This was in line with our discussion about maybe someone thought that a zone would be isolated. The D/A is modified to consider the zone/individual valve plausibility.

7/6: agree with change.

040AK3.01 Steam Line Rupture - EHT: Operation of steam line isolation valves 10 F 3 N S

1) IAW the Westinghouse background document for E-2 Are we sure we want to ask ROs a basis question? 6/4/15 KRS - Because the step is also a major action category, I believe that it is acceptable to ask a basis question. 6/5: Okay.

2) D/A C, last sentence: nothing about #2 MSIV is given in the Q, so remove this sentence.

6/4 KRS - Deleted sentence.

054AA2.08 Loss of Main Feedwater: Steam flow-feed trend recorder 11 H 3 X N E

1) Choice B (the correct answer): Are the 4 feed lines separate everywhere in the steam vault room?

S 6/4/15 KRS - Yes, the feed lines are separate. S/Gs 1 and 4 feed lines are in the South VVR and 2 and 3 are in the North VVR.

Theres no place in that room where there is 1 or 2 headers only (i.e. common)?

6/4 KRS - There are two headers per Valve Vault Room.

Are the recorder shots from the sim?

6/4 KRS - The recorders are screen shotted from the Thunderview glass top simulator (the same software which drives the physical simulator drives this. It is the GUI for the code which determines the simulators response.)

Theres no robbing of feed flow causing level/flow in the other 3 to go down?

6/4 - For this case a relatively small break was used. The MFPs were able to compensate and the overall result was that the three other generators were unaffected. Therefore, you can notice that S/G 3 dropped 0.2% and #2 (which started just under 60.0% dropped a few tenths). Really, no effect on the other S/Gs was observed.

2) Choice A plausibility is weak, and the D/A doesnt discuss why its plausible, just what happens. Even if I dont know which way a FRV fails I can eliminate this choice because of the mismatch between feed flow and level. (If I thought the FRV failed Open, then with FF up as shown, level should be up but its not, so it cant be that. If I thought it failed Closed, then level is acting like it should, but feed flow is up instead of down.)

6/4 - Added additional support for the plausibility.

6/18: Still weak, but somewhat plausible, so Ill take it.

3) Choice D seems implausible. As its D/A says, MFRV failed open means higher feed flow (which is shown) and higher level (the opposite of whats shown). Theres no discussion of why this choice is plausible.

6/4 KRS - Replaced distractor and modified the D/A to reflect.

6/18: Reviewed change. Its better, not terribly plausible, but okay.

B 055EK1.02 Station Blackout: Natural circulation cooling 12 F 3 S San 1) Proposed references to be provided: add None to be consistent. 6/4 - Added None.

Onofre

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 056G2.2.41 LOOP: Ability to obtain and interpret station electrical & mechanical drawings.

13P H 4 X X N E The second-part answer seems like minutiae. Is it required knowledge for an RO to know which drawing S series contains the depicted drawing? Is it required knowledge for *anyone*, even an SRO?

Doesnt seem operationally valid. If you needed to look it up you could go to an index, or just leaf through the book you probably know this drawing is in. The question probably included this to hit the obtain part of the KA, which is difficult to do in a written exam setting, so were okay with just squarely hitting the interpret part, which the first-part question clearly does.

5/14: It is needed knowledge for several series of prints to know the drawing series. This is due to the print numbering scheme. For example: for a logic print, the numbering would be Unit-47W611-System Number-sheet number. One must know the 47W611 piece though. For a "high voltage" AC print: the numbering would be Unit-45W760-System Number-sheet number. While indices for the single line prints exist, I am not aware of such for the logic, control, low voltage and high voltage prints. One must possess the knowledge of the basic naming convention or one would end up leafing through many many prints. I would not want an operator in my control room who, during a casualty, could not at least obtain the correct hanging bar of prints (by using the convention described above).

6/1: RII disagrees, still believes its minutia. Elevated the question to a branch chief, who agreed and thought it would lose on appeal. As discussed above, its okay not to hit the obtain part of this KA in a written exam setting. This part of the answer choice will have to be removed, and either another added or new Q submitted.

6/4 KRS - Changed 2nd part and maintained compliance with obtain part of the K/A. Focused on the NPG-SPP-31.1 driven verification requirements for the documents obtained from BSL.

6/12: Good change. Massage the D/A and KA Match, and include p. 13 of SPP-31.1 with Step 3.2.10 highlighted and Q will be sat.

6/29 KRS - Updated D/A. Included excerpt from SPP-31.1. Rewrote K/A match.

7/6: changes good.

057AK3.01 Loss of Vital AC Inst. Bus: Actions contained in EOP for loss of vital ac bus 14 F 3 N S Good question, but could be streamlined:

For loss of Vital Instrument Power Board ( I / IV ), the AOI ALWAYS requires the rx to be tripped. This takes the Note with the procedure names out of it, and cleans up the answer choices. Thoughts?

6/4/15 DAH - Modified to read For a loss of 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Board _____(1)_____ the related AOI ALWAYS requires that the Unit 1 reactor be tripped.

Removed NOTE containing AOI titles and AOI reference from distracters.

058AA2.03 Loss of DC: loads lost; impact on ability to operate & monitor systems 15 H 4 N S

1) Stem, would like to see this change: WOOTF describes the response of CCS Pump 2A-A AND the its handswitch indicating lights for CCS Pump 2A-A? Does that make sense? Just cleans it up, less redundant. 6/4 DAH - Changed as indicated.

2) Might be a High cog Q. 6/4 DAH - Changed to Higher Cog

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S WE04EK2.2 LOCA Outside Containment: Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, 16 H 3 X N E emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems and relations between the proper operation of these S systems to the operation of the facility.

1) Labels on the drawing will need to be clearer (Im working from the hard copy that was mailed to us), or not use the drawing and just state which 2 lights are lit.

6/4/15 - Were going to either take a picture of the simulators panel or edit the Thunderview picture to insert an invisible text box (which sharpens the text discretely and still maintains the accuracy of the picture). 6/12: That will work, thanks.

2) Whats the mechanism for the leak? Its not discussed in the D/A, but a red text box on the cover page of ECA-1.2 says its postulated to be downstream of the B HX outlet check and upstream of FCV-74-28, and the provided drawing shows the same. To get a leak there wouldnt we have to have TWO series check valves from any one of the loop cold leg injection lines fail open (or leak by grossly)? Is this plausible?

(FCV-63-94 is normally Open, correct?)

6/4 - The preceding argument has always existed for the LOCA Outside of Containment. You are correct, multiple check valves have to fail in order for the LOCA Outside of Containment even to exist. This is probably why students have a hard time understanding this procedure. With that said, every outage (that I have been a part of) we will have a terrible time getting the RHR discharge check valves to seat. Often times, we will have to use the leak test lines to depressurize the RHR discharges and to try to seat the check valves. If the check valve conspiracy is not allowed then ECA-1.2 would simply be 1. CHECK 74-1 and 2 shut. 2. Return to instruction in effect.

6/21: Good discussion. Plausibility SAT.

3) Pressure instrument distractor: struggling with plausibility. D/A says the aux bldg contains multiple pressure detectors [that] provide inputs to control loops in order that a specific pressure band be maintained. Ventilation-related? Do any give control room alarms? Need to flesh out the D/A with examples.

6/5 - Added additional information regarding the pressure switches and pressure loops germane to the aux building. 6/12: Very nice write-up. 0.24 WC is very sensitive. Plausibility SAT.

WE05EK1.3 LOHS - Knowledge of operational implications of annunciators and condition indicating 17 H 3 N S signals, and remedial actions associated with LOHS.

1) In the stem, NO CCPs are RUNNING, should probably add and cant be started, to avoid questions during the exam. (Step 2 of H.1 would have you try to start one: ENSURE at least one charging pump RUNNING.) 6/4 DAH - Changed to BOTH CCPs tripped and cannot be restarted

2) Question statement: The RCPS were [running or not] isnt precise, because someone could argue that a crew forgot to stop RCPs as required on the Phase B. Nothing in the Q automatically stops them, so to say they were running or not doesnt exactly work. Suggest: IAW EOP E-1, the RCPs ( are / are not )

stopped. Upon entering H.1, the first crew action taken is to ______. 6/14 DAH - Changed as indicated.

3) D/A A: 2nd & 3rd sentences, none of that is in the Q and probably doesnt belong here. 6/4 DAH -

Removed.

4) LO 4 doesnt really fit. RCPs are not tripped during H.1 in this question; were asking if they were tripped before then, in E-1. 6/4 DAH - Removed Obj. 4.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S WE11EK3.4 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc - Knowledge of reasons for RO or SRO function within 18 H 3 X M E control room team, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and limitations in facilitys license and SQN S amendments are not violated.

2013

1) Stem: IAW the Westinghouse Background Document. Okay for ROs?

6/4 KRS - The basis for this can be obtained from the purpose of 1-ECA-1.1 (i.e. to conserve the RWST B

water). Because the basis originates from such a broad item, it is allowable on the RO test. 6/12: Okay.

2) Struggling with plausibility of 400gpm. Yes, its in the Acceptable Region of the curve, but so would be, say, 650gpm. What about this: the LOCA happened 20 minutes after the trip, or 70 minutes ago (vs. 90 minutes for the correct answer). I could see someone applying 70min to the graph instead of 90 (yes, even though the x-axis is labeled Time After Trip) and getting the wrong answer. At 70min I read something between 340 & 350gpm. So what if we gave them 350 as a choice? Too close to 325?

6/14 DAH - Changed from 400 gpm to 350 gpm. 6/12: Thanks.

3) Q is called Modified, but I dont see any changes that meet the requirements of NUREG-1021 ES-401 Section D.2.f to call it a Modified question. There are some different, non-relevant given conditions, but the answer choices are exactly the same, and the answer is the same. 6/4 DAH - Changed to Bank.

005AA1.05 Inoperable/Stuck Control Rod - Ability to operate and/or monitor RPI.

19 F 1 X N U

1) Struggling with plausibility of 2 steps. The D/A talks about +/- 2 steps for Operability of the group S demand counters, but its a stretch to think that someone would take that for the correct answer, assuming they knew of it in the first place (and its a shutdown Technical Requirement, even less likely to be known).

Is there a number like 6 or 8 or 12 we could use? 6 is half of 12, and certainly more plausible than 2. SR 3.1.5.1 is done every shift; is the number there 12 steps, or something more conservative? SR 3.1.5.2 does the quarterly rod freedom test, and the requirement is to move them at least 10 steps; maybe that could be the distractor? 6/5 KRS - Changed 2 to 6.

2) 2nd part, whether you can swap what the two screens display, seems very easy. Combined with the current 1st part distractor plausibility it probably makes the question LOD 1. Can you pull up the rod positions anyplace else than the 2 screens discussed? If so then that hurts the difficulty even more.

6/5 KRS - One can pull the rod positions up on the ICS. The problem with this is that the ICS screens CAN NOT be used to satisfy the SR 3.1.5.1 requirements. The rod position on ICS is not a compliance instrument. I also added some plant O.E. which lends to the plausibility of the second part. This O.E.

reflects that WBN Operations failed to toggle between the control and shutdown rod screens while recording rod position data used to meet surveillance requirements.

6/12: I see the OE you added in the D/A, but 1) I dont understand how you can read *anything* on an inoperable monitor (it mustve been working but TS-inoperable or something?), and 2) it doesnt help plausibility for this Q, which has a screen going blank. But something said above is intriguing: what if the question was whether you could use the ICS screens to satisfy the SR? Could that work?

6/29 KRS - As discussed during prep week, rewrote this to keep the 6/12 component and to ask if it is applied rod-to-rod or rod-to-GPI.

7/6: D/A A last sentence mentions a rod-to-rod deviation alarm, so if we gave them that the alarm was in, that would make 6 steps more plausible (if the alarm comes in at 6 steps). I looked for an alarm like that, but the closest I got was 1-ARI-81-87, NIS & Rod Controls, window 83-D, Plant Computer Generated Alarm. On p. 22 of 52 it says that two computer alarms that will light this window are Rod and Bank Position and Rod Position, both at 12 steps. Is there any alarm at 6 steps?

7/6 KRS - There is no alarm that occurs at 6 steps. The closest CERPI related setpoints which I can find are 3 and 5 steps and are hysteresis settings. The RIL LO alarm is nominally set at 10 steps above the RIL LO-LO alarm. 7/7 KRS - Changed 6 steps to 10 steps, its the setpoint for annunciator 87-A.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 028AK3.03 PZR Level Malfunction - Knowledge of reasons for false indication of PZR level when PORV or 20 H 3 X N E spray valve is open and RCS saturated.

S 1) PZR Level will be __(1)__ than ACTUAL PZR Level 6/5 SPW - Added than.

2) D/A page has Correct Answer B at the top; should be A. 6/5 SPW - Changed correct answer to A.

3) Plausibility of containment T & P rising isnt very strong to begin with, but the D/A actually makes it worse: not only would an applicant have to think a 300# pressure drop would rupture the rupture disc (I dont think we can say if it would or wouldnt), but hed ALSO have to think that happened AND containment conditions got high/hot enough to affect instruments, ALL IN 5 SECONDS. Not going to happen. Better to assume the applicant totally forgets about the PRT and assumes the PORV dumps straight to containment, but even still, you probably wouldnt see enough P/T change in 5 seconds to affect an instrument.

6/5 SPW - The time was added to fence the question. We removed the timeline, changed the sequence to immediately and adjusted the D/A to remove the PRT rupture portion. 6/12: Q is SAT 7/6: Licensee called, noted an issue with defensibility of the correct answer. Proposed changing the order in 2nd part to ACTUAL PZR Level will IMMEDIATELY be (higher/lower) than INDICATED PZR Level Will need to review this change when its provided.

7/7/15 KRS - Im much happier with the new D/A A. I believe that this question will hold in appeal space.

7/8 KRS - The only change in the Q was the swapping INDICATED to ACTUAL (and vice versa). The reason this question gives me a real headache is that one can interject a lot of assumptions into it. I wanted to be very careful as to what I could defend. What we had before was a GFES question which required the applicant to assume that actual level remained constant. While this may be correct in GFES it is absolutely not correct for the actual (empirically demonstrated) conditions. I believe it is defensible to show that the actual inventory drastically expands in volume and that the mass (even if its considered to be lowering due to the action of the PORV) will exert a pressure on the HP side of the D/P cell to cause indicated level to always be lower. In summary, I think that by swapping which level we were asking about (ACTUAL or INDICATED) and then by substantively beefing up the D/A we have a question which is fairly solid. 7/9: Concur with changes.

032AG2.4.11 Loss of Source Range NI: Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures.

21 H 2 X N U

1) How is it plausible that taking the Channel Selector switch to N31, which youre told has failed, would get S audible count rate back anywhere? That makes A & B implausible.

6/5 KRS - Changed the direction of the question. See modified Q.

2) With the Volume knob pointing to MIN as shown I doubt youre hearing anything in the MCR, as stated in the stem. Does the picture add much value?

6/5 KRS - Edited the picture so the volume knob is at a reasonable setting. I think the picture in this question adds value in that it removes the need for an applicant to memorize what the front of the drawer looks like. 6/12: Agree with all changes.

033AK1.01 Loss of Intermediate Range NI: Effects of voltage changes on performance 22 H 3 X N S

1) Dont think the picture of the P-10 status light is needed. Does the light come on somewhere around 10%? Does Mode 1 start at 5%? If both of those are true then of course the light is dark and its teaching in the stem, steering an applicant toward the correct answer.

6/5 KRS - Removed P-10 picture. Now the Q just presents the applicant with the fact that the Unit is in Mode 2. Left D/A alone as the statements regarding P-10 are still true as this would be the threshold at which the IR High Flux trip would be removed. Therefore, the technical accuracy of the D/A remains.

6/17: okay.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 060AG2.4.4 Accidental Gas Release - Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating 23 H 3 N S parameters that are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal procedures

1) 2nd fill-in-the-blank: IAW AOI-31 probably not needed. Isnt this basically a systems Q? If so, the isolation happens based on design, not because an AOI says it will. And put a blank line between the 2 fill-in-the-blank sentences please.

6/15 KRS - Included carriage return between the fill in the blanks. Removed IAW AOI-31. I did put the word automatically before ISOLATE. I agree, the question remains fenced without the IAW AOI-31.

6/17: thanks.

2) 1-RI-90-400, SHIELD BLDG VENT MON - I couldnt find this in procedures. I found a 2-RM-90-400 in ARI-188-194, Window 191-B, could that be it? Probably I just missed it.

6/15 KRS - This is part of the alphabet soup of radiation monitoring instruments at WB. 1-RI-90-400 is the computer keypad and display module located on 1-M-30. It is affiliated with the Unit 1 90-400 radiation monitoring loop. Also part of this loop is 1-RR-90-400. This is the digital recorder which is located on 1-M-30 as well. I changed the NOTE and first part distractor to 1-RR-90-400 as it would most realistically be used to identify a trend. Either the RI or RR would be correct. 6/17: okay.

7/6: Remove 1-AOI-31 from the Note. 7/7 KRS - Removed note.

7/10: Possible clarification needed: 2nd part Q asks if the RM will or will not isolate the failure. The failure is the relief valve failing open, so: whats the release pathway here? When GDT J relief opens, is that hard-piped to the vent header, or does it dump to the room the tank is in, or what? Its irrelevant based on the correct answer, but we want to prevent an applicant from dismissing WILL isolate because you never isolate downstream of a code safety. If we just changed the word failure to release that would fix our concern, or tell me its fine as-is. 7/10: Agree with release.

061AK2.01 ARM System Alarms: Detectors at each ARM system location 24 F 3 X X N U

1) Why radiography in two locations? Doesnt seem necessary for the Q, and isnt very likely.

S 6/16 KRS - The radiography is simply to establish the cause for the ARMs. This bullet could be worded as Radiography is scheduled to occur in the Waste Package Room AND the Decontamination Room. The next bullet could either be left as-is or could be stated as: The Radiographer improperly shields the source and causes a VALID HIGH radiation condition within one of the two rooms.

2) Minutia, Choice 2: knowing from memory whether or not an ARI will tell you the specific room isnt fair.

Youd look up the alarm window and it would tell you.

6/16 KRS - The concept Im after is to be able to identify that the alarm window which is caused results from any of the ARMs. Unlike the process monitors, the ARMs are served by a solitary annunciator (save the 1-RM-90-102 and 103 which cause a pseudo-auxiliary building isolation) which requires the operators to refer to the common recorder to determine which ARM is actuated.

3) Distractor process monitor is mostly implausible. D/A C even says, The locations given in the Q do not contain any resident process monitors Of course, one would have to know that in order to not choose it, but even if we granted plausibility, it also is minutia. Respond to the alarm and youll know which type of monitor caused it.

Very good KA hit though, and its too bad this one screened as a 2.5 and not 2.4. Were open to a KA swap if desired. 6/17: Nothing was changed. Talk about during prep week.

6/25: Discussed in person, more work required.

6/29 KRS - Rewrote this in the manner discussed during prep week. Addressed Phils comment about what is being reset (i.e. the input to the annunciator is being reset). The D/A has been rewritten.

7/6: Reviewed revised Q, looks good. One note: recommend bold SPECIFIC in answer choices C & D to align with ONE COMMON in choices A & B. 7/7 KRS - Bolded SPECIFIC.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 067AA2.10 Plant Fire On-site: Time limit of long-term-breathing air system for control room 25 F 2 X X N U

1) 1st part distractor: choosing between 30 min and 2 hr bottles is probably going to be pretty easy for 3 S anyone, especially if theyve been exposed to SCBAs. (And 5 of your applicants are going up for RO, so ostensibly theyve been NLOs?) The D/A says the air packs can hold a 2 hr bottle, but are there any onsite? If not Im going to say this isnt plausible. And granted, theres some plausibility added by them being used at the fire training facility, but even there its probably stressed or at least noted that the bigger bottles are for the convenience of training, and are not used at the plant. Are there any 1 hr bottles? (Thats what Im used to, 30 min and 1 hr.)

6/15/15 KRS - WBN complied with the BTP-9.5.1 guidelines by purchasing 30 minute SCBA cylinders. This is seen in part VIII of the FPR. One could order a 60min bottle from the maker of the SCBA (MSA).

2) 2nd part distractor: if there was a manifold system, why not just use it in the first place? It would bound to be faster to just don a mask and plug in than to strap on a pack and then put on the mask. And yes, even though Chemistry is supplied with a manifold in 2 places(?), to 1) think that an applicant would know that, and then 2) make the assumption that the MCR has one also, is a stretch.

Calling this Q Unsat based on the weakness of the distractors taken together, even though either by itself may be able to be argued.

3) Job-Link (or Minutia, even): Its probably not operational in content to ask what the minimum operating life is: you use one till it runs out then you get another one. What size bottles are in the control room right now? The supplied references dont answer that. EPIP-12 Appendix K lists 10 SCBAs in the MCR, but doesnt give the bottle sizes. If by chance theyre 1 hr bottles then the correct answer would be incorrect because those would be the ones used by control room personnel. And if you wanted to fix that by saying IAW Part VIII of the WB Fire Protection Report I would call that Minutia. Good job hitting this goofy KA though. Will swap if desired.

6/15 KRS - Wrote new Q which meets K/A from a different perspective. Trying to focus on your comment of minimum operating life: use one till it runs out then get another one. The non-minutia knowledge requirement therefore becomes, how do you know that youre running out of air?

6/17: New Q (New, Low, 3) is good.

WE08EK1.3 RCS Overcooling - PTS: Annunciators and conditions indicating signals, and remedial actions 26 H 3 X N S associated with Pressurized Thermal Shock.

1) 00:10:30 entry: is it realistic that SGs are this low 9m after a SLB?

6/5 DAH - Confirmed using simulator that SG LVLs actually drop lower than that listed. 6/17: okay.

3) Job-link: Is it RO knowledge to know what Step 3 of P.1 is? Maybe better to say something like, Feed flow has just been (adjusted/established) per Step 3. 6/5 DAH - Edited bullet as requested. 6/17: thanks.

4) We basically say that the MSIVs are open, but would it be clearer to add that they cant be closed? Step 3 of P.1 (before you do feed flow) has you REFER TO E-2, Faulted S/G Isolation, which would try to close the MSIVs, or you wouldve tried to close them earlier using Prudent Action if nothing else.

6/5 DAH - added that attempts to close the MSIVs have failed.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S WE10EA1.3 Natural Circulation with Steam Void: Desired operating results during abnormal and 27 H 2 X B U emergency situations.

3 WBN S 1) 2 implausible combinations of distractors. From a simple mass-balance viewpoint, how can Rise/Rise or 2011 Lower/Lower be plausible? If I only know that the RCS is a closed system with no goes-ins or goes-outs, SQN then where is the water inventory coming from or going to?

2013- 2) Q is listed as Bank; was it ever used on an NRC exam? If so were willing to evaluate that precedence.

302 6/16 KRS - Used on 2/2010 SQN NRC exam. Subsequently used on 6/2011 WBN NRC exam.

6/17: Re-reviewed Q in light of this knowledge. Q is essentially identical to questions given on two NRC exams. On WB 2011 all 14 applicants got it right. In validation, 2 of 2 ROs and 5 of 7 SROs got it right.

Decision was made to uphold the Unsat status. A new Q will have to be written.

6/29 KRS - Changed as discussed during prep week to a bank Q used on 12/2013 SQN exam.

7/6: New Q (Bank, High, 3) looks good. Minor comment:

1a) Theres a line break after the 3rd bullet. Probably extraneous, but wanted to make sure the last 5 bullets arent meant to be at a later time or something.

7/7 KRS - This extra break was intentional. I wanted to separate the plant parameters which would judge whether or not natural circulation was occurring. I can certainly remove it if desired. 7/8: okay to leave it.

003K5.02 RCP - Effects of RCP coastdown on RCS parameters 28 H 3 X X N E

1) Q assumes that RCPs trip, but doesnt say that or give any indications to diagnose it.

S If RCPs were running then D would be the correct answer. See D/A A: The case given in the stem would cause an automatic rx trip as one or more RCPs is secured [>P-8]. Thats not given in the stem. Of course they have to be coasting down to hit the KA.

6/16 KRS - Quite correct. Probably in response to a validator comment, on 4/8/15 we swapped the 00:00:01 bullet from #3 RCP is de-energized to The Main Turbine tripped. This swap rendered the question almost nonsensical. Replaced The Main Turbine tripped with The #3 RCP is de-energized.

Also added available to C & D distractors to improve their plausibility (as one of the RCPs cannot be connected to the generator as it is de-energized). 6/17: Good, thanks.

2) Plausibility of rising DNBR isnt supported in D/A. C just says its plausible, but doesnt explain why.

6/16 KRS - Added clarification for this to D/A A and copied to D/A C. 6/17: thanks.

3) 00:00:03, change to: Reactor trips occurs. 6/16 KRS - Changed to The Reactor trips. 6/17: okay

4) L.O. doesnt fit. How about 3-OT-SYS068B-RCPs, 1.r, 6.b, 7.c&d, 11.d, one or more of those.

6/16 KRS - Included the 1.r objective as it seems to cover everything. 6/17: okay.

29 H 3 N S 003K5.04 RCP - Effects of RCP S/D on 2 params, such as steam pressure & flow and feed flow

1) Learning Objectives 1.b and 12 dont fit. From 3-OT-SYS068B-RCPs, 7.f & 11.e nail it.

6/16 KRS - Added these two objectives.

004K5.31 Chemical and Volume Control: Purpose of flow path around boric acid storage tank 30P F 3 X N S It may not be fair to provide just the truncated drawing. (I couldnt find the full dwg, and its hard to tell from the snippet whats going on.) A Chief Examiner thought the drawing was not necessary, that the question could just be asked with words.

5/14: I put the drawing in because I can't think of how else to describe the flow-path. I don't just want to list a valve because I don't believe that anyone would really identify what is being described by the question (i.e. the flow path).

6/1: Not acceptable to label on the drawing Line from the BA Transfer Pumps. This is teaching in the stem. If having a larger part of the drawing would take away that need then that would be acceptable.

In answer choice B, please add 0 in front of SOI-62.05. In choice C, recommend capitalize chemistry because its the name of a department. 5/14: Both changes made.

6/16: Revised Q received, requested changes were made.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 005A1.02 Residual Heat Removal: RHR flow rate 31 F 2 X N S

1) Stem: should we add the noun names and/or designators for the motor operated mini-flow valves? Also theres a semicolon after valves. Either delete it or make it a comma.

6/16 KRS - We had experimented with the modified WOOTF (to reinforce the Q). In this case, there are too many prepositional phrases following the semicolon mentioned. Therefore, I changed the WOOTF back to the stock WOOTF. 6/18: okay

2) Subset issues: I could argue that Choice B is correct because at 250gpm the valves would be open. You probably tried to address that with, will be OPENED, but that may not be enough to withstand an appeal.

You know how to fix it, but something like, will FIRST be demanded open. Then do the second half a similar way so it doesnt stand out.

6/16 KRS - I think Ive created two symmetrical statements. I added demanded to each and spaced the question out to not appear so wordy. 6/18: good

3) D/A A is excellent, and this is kind of a tricky thing to test, so lets make sure the applicants have been exposed to the new number. Do you know when the change was made? Their procedures werent frozen before that point? And most importantly, what were they trained on? I see that 3-OT-SYS074A-RHR has the 750 number, so were probably good on that.

6/16 KRS - The applicants have been trained to recognize that 750-1400 is the correct miniflow band for the RHR pumps. One may reference either the lesson plan, the General Operating Procedures or the SOI (in addition to the setpoint documents). 6/18/15: okay then.

005K2.03 RHR: RCS pressure boundary motor-operated valves 32 F 2 X N E

1) Questioning plausibility of C&A Vent board only because I dont know what one is. From D/A C, S plausibility is based on safety related MOVs which do have their supply breakers located on a C&A vent board. Fair enough if true, but can you give some examples? Where can I find a list of these boards to see whats on them?

6/16 KRS - The easiest reference to use to see what a board supplies is the print because the procedure checklists are broken up by system number (i.e. one cant find a consolidated list of what the C&A vent board powers). Or one may walk down the boards and look at the labels for the MOVs. An example of why this is plausible follows:

[picture deleted to save space]

You can see that the individual RHR pump suctions are powered from the C&A Vent boards. Other valves powered from the C&A vent boards include the RWST to CS PMP A SUCTION and RWST to CS PMP B SUCTION valves, ERCW strainer backwash and flush valves. One can refer to the 1-45W756 series prints to discover these facts. 6/18: examples support plausibility.

A page from 0-PI-OPS-17.1 App. A is attached to support the correct answer, but I noticed that in that whole 5-page Appendix for locked breaker verification, theres only one breaker on a C&A Vent Bd: Battery Room Exhaust Fan C-B. If there are no examples stronger than that (this is RHR-to-RCS pressure boundary were talking about), then Vent Bd isnt going to be plausible.

6/16 KRS - The PI-OPS details the locked valves. But again, one must go to the prints for the individual boards to see the actual loads. 6/18: okay.

2) KA Match statement, 2nd line: on which type of board And last line, Id prefer the locking On/Off requirement; more in line with the KA and what were asking. 6/16 KRS - Changed K/A match.

006A3.08 Emergency Core Cooling - Ability to monitor automatic transfer of ECCS flowpaths 33 H 3 M S

1) Q doesnt meet the Modified criteria of ES-401 D.2.f.4th bullet. The stem changes how the information is SQN presented, but the information is the same. In the original Q SI actuation was stated; here its easily 2009 inferred. RWST level was given as 32%; here we give 2 of 4 indicators >32%. Sump level was given as B 18%; here, 2 of 4 indicators >18%. Answer choices are either identical or only slightly worded differently, and the answer is the same. Its fine as a Bank Q. 6/16 KRS - Changed source to Bank.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 007K4.01 PRT: Quench tank cooling 34 F 2 B S Q was on the last WB NRC exam (2013-302). 2nd part was changed slightly, but probably not enough to WB make it Modified. No response necessary, just capturing here for counting purposes. (You addressed it in 2013 an earlier communication, it just wasnt noted here as a last-exam Q.)

(last exam) 008A2.05 CCW - Ability to predict impacts of, and based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, 35 H 3 X N S control or mitigate: effect of loss of IA on the position of air-operated CCW valves.

1) D/A A says annunciator 249-A, U1 SURGE TANK LEVEL HI/LO, would be expected And again on the markup of ARI 249-A you say it would be expected. Should we just say that in the stem so there are no questions? In MCR youd know if it were in or not.

6/16 KRS - I can certainly add the annunciator or even put a picture of the RONAN panel but I dont see that the plausibility of the A distractor would remain. The A distractor is plausible if an applicant looked at the level depicted and thought it was normal. Putting the annunciator (which doesnt clue one in to whether the surge tank is HIGH OR LOW) would certainly make the Q easier. I dont believe that it would maintain the integrity of the Q. It would just seem goofy to answer that conditions are normal when a HI/LOW annunciator was in. 6/18: agree with your reasoning, leave as-is.

2) KA Match, 2nd-to-last line: do we mean 0-AOI-10 and not ARI-249-A? 6/16 KRS - Youre correct.

7/10: On the pictures of the handswitches, the valve symbols with the Xs under them: does that indicate the valve fails closed? If so, that helps to answer the question and will need to be suppressed. If an AOV fails open is there an O there? If so, then just redact that. If NOT, then if we redacted it but I knew there were only Xs and no Os on the labels then I could deduce that an X was there, so in that case probably white it out. Thoughts? 7/10: Agree to redact the Xs.

008G2.4.11 CCW: Knowledge of abnormal condition procedures 36 F 3 X N E

1) 2nd part distractor: 10 & 12 are pretty close, and 12 comes from a CCP, a different class of pump than an S RCP. Is there a number more different from 10 we could use, and thats related to RCPs? Its standard at some W plants that if CCW and seal injection is lost for 15 minutes then you trip the Rx and trip the pump, but I couldnt find that in your procedures. If you had that I think 15 would be better than 12. Thoughts? Im not saying at this point that the distractor is unsat.

6/16 - We dont have something similar to the 15 minutes. The closest thing I can think of is the 5 minute requirement to shut the seal return valve for a tripped RCP exhibiting high #1 seal leakoff. This is contained in 1-AOI-24. Clearly, this number would be relative to the RCP but irrelative to the CCS (CCW). I have no issue using it though because it does apply to a casualty with the RCP.

6/18: I like 5 minutes better than 12. Its further away from 10, its half of 10, and its a time related to RCPs.

Lets go with 5. 6/25: changed.

010K2.01 Pressurizer Pressure Control - Knowledge of bus power supplies to PZR heaters 37 F 3 N S The 480V distractors are great, suckered me in. Good Q.

012A1.01 RPS - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with trip setpoint 38 F 3 N S adjustment

1) LO doesnt seem to hit. How about 3-OT-MSC146B, DCS Controls, 2.4(?) and/or 12.a?

6/16 KRS - I can see the fit for the 12.a. so Ive included that objective.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 012K2.01 RPS - Knowledge of bus P/S to RPS channels, components, and interconnections 39 F 2 X B S

1) Not sure how plausible distractor A is. The other choices are vital or preferred power supply; a novice SQN operator would choose one of these options using the logic that a vital or preferred power supply is 2010 implied by the nature of the question. Can we use the 48VDC power supply thats discussed in D/A A?

6/16 KRS - I dont think one could put the 48VDC output of the SSPS (the supply talked about in the A D/A) because that does directly supply the UV coil (through the SSPS UV driver boards). The A D/A is indicating the fact that the 120 Vital AC board feeds the SSPS power supplies (2 15VDC and 2 48VDC). The 48VDC power supplies auctioneer and then feed the UV driver boards. 6/18: okay.

6/25: Discussed in person during prep week; please provide percentage of validators who chose A.

6/29 KRS - Validated at 77.8% overall, 9 validators. 1 person selected A, and 1 selected B. The rest selected correct answer D. So 22% got the Q wrong; 11% picked A. 6/29: okay then.

013K6.01 RPS - Knowledge of the effect of loss or malfunction of bistables and test equipment 40 H 3 X M E

1) KA match: Were not hitting the loss or malfunction piece. The source Q hit, but those elements were B S removed from the new Q.

2) While acknowledging that the question is a derivative of a previously used NRC exam question, two simultaneous bistable failures in this version is unrealistic and can be better presented like the original copied question. Even D/A A is using the old information; there is no initial bistable removed from service.

We dont see any issues with using the original question as a bank Q.

6/16 KRS - Agree with lack of plausibility of having two simultaneous failures. Changed the Q accordingly (to a modified bank Q addressing only the RPS). Also changed lesson plan objective to match one directly from the RPS lesson plan. 6/18: New Q (Bank, High, 3) is good.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 022A1.02 Containment Cooling - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with 41 H 3 X X N E operating the CCS controls including: Containment pressure S 1) Distractor A plausibility: 2nd paragraph of the D/A isnt helping. If one believed that the LCC fans drew air from somewhere other than the containment atmosphere, then what would ever make pressure go down? Youd constantly be pumping in mass until the fan(s) dead-headed, and no amount of cooling could overcome that in the long term.

3rd paragraph is better, but suffers when looked at from a localized versus global perspective: yes, a powerful blower will raise pressure at its discharge, but it wouldnt raise P for all of containment, even momentarily (unless the detector is right in the flowstream, which isnt likely).

6/16 KRS - Swapped A distractor with another concept. 6/18: looks good.

2) Distractor D plausibility: Is there really an IA isolation on a leak in containment? Whats the pressure, and is it just pressure, or is flowrate involved? I like the idea of this distractor, but we tell them right in the answer choice that no isolation occurs. So two observations: our applicant has to be smart enough to evaluate the possibility of an air leak, but then dumb enough to miss/forget that we tell him theres no isolation; or if we took the no isolation piece out then the graph is probably representative of what would happen for an air leak.

6/16 KRS - Control or instrument air to containment will isolate when the associated header (A train, B train or the non-essential header) depressurizes to less than 70 psig. This may be found on the logic print 1-47W611-32-2 when used in conjunction with plant Setpoint document (SSD) 1-PIC-32-80 (for example).

Flowrate is not involved in the header isolation. Please see revised distractor D. 6/18: looks good.

3) Job-link/operational validity: pressure peaks in this graph at about 0.007#. Seven-thousandths of a pound. Edgemeters wont see that, will the computer traces? Even if they did, the normal span for a graph like that would probably be much higher and youd never see the bump. Unless this graph is already up, is this operationally valid? Could be considered UNSAT due to 2 non-plausible distractors.

6/16 KRS - While I agree that one would have to set up the ICS plot specifically to see the trend, I dont agree that its not possible to do so. I continue to be amazed by the instrumentation afforded to these plants. Several examples come to mind: 1) As the US, I had to adjust the hand speed changer on one of the MFPs to achieve the proper bias. We set up a very tight ICS trend which was used by my ROs to monitor my minute manipulations of the hand speed changer. We were monitoring parameters over about an hour using a very tight trend. 2) Our monitoring of calorimetric power (and Tavg) is done using a microscope. We trend Tavg on a span of several tenths and calorimetric power with the ability to resolve on 10s of watts. 6/18: Okay, youve convinced me.

026A4.01 Containment Spray - Ability to manually operate and/or monitor: CSS controls 42 H 2 M S

1) Q doesnt meet the modified criteria of ES-401 D.2.f.4th bullet. This Q shows pictures of the switches in B question, and makes minor wording changes in the answer choices, but is fundamentally the same question. 6/17 KRS - Changed coding to Bank.

039A3.02 Main and Reheat Steam - Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MRSS, including isolation 43 H 2 N S of the MRSS

1) The pictures drive the Q to 3 pages, well outside the norm.

6/17 KRS - I was trying to solidly hit monitor but I agree that a three page question may well be too much.

Replaced the pictures with a table. I believe that this should still adequately meet the K/A.

059G2.2.42 MFW - ability to recognize system parameters that are entry-level conditions for TS 44 H 3 X X N E

1) Job-link: 3.3.3 is a 30-day action LCO, is it fair to ask ROs? AND, more importantly, theyd have to know 4 S whats in Table 3.3.3-1 to know if the spec should be entered. Might be SRO only.

6/17 KRS - Generated a new Q to clearly separate the SRO and RO LOK.

6/25: Reviewed new Q (New, High, 4), which is satisfactory, but need to check for overlap with scenarios.

6/25 KRS - As discussed during prep week this Q involves a mechanically bound and partially open MFRV.

This does not overlap with the op test.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 061K6.01 AFW - Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of controllers and positioners.

45 F 2 N S

1) D/A C needs work: 3rd sentence says its plausible that AFW control valve would fail closed, but D/A A &

B both say/imply that it does fail closed. It has to, if answer is right. 6/17 KRS - Rewrote D/A.

062G2.4.46 AC Electrical Distribution: Ability to verify alarms consistent with plant conditions.

46P H* 1.51 X* N E

1) Seems to be a lower-cog question, and very easy. Every Westinghouse plant Ive seen, the top row of H 4 S bistables lights for loss of Bus 1, 2nd row for Bus 2, etc. Or if an applicant just remembers that CERPI Monitor 1 is lost on loss of Bus 1 (along with receiving other incongruous alarms/indications, of course),

then they can get it right.

2) I thought plausibility of the distractors was marginal, but a Chief Examiner thought they were not plausible. 5/13 - New question was written. 6/25: reviewed new Q (New, High, 4).

7/10: Please move the answer columns closer together to enhance readability; the 4 pictures seem kind of off by themselves. A line break or two between the stem and the column numbers would help too, but dont know if you can get that. 7/10: Made requested changes.

062K1.02 AC Electrical Distribution - Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause effect 47 H 3 X N E relationships between it and ED/G S 1) Distractor A plausibility is weak. Blackout and NO diesels are running 14s later? D/A last paragraph, last sentence says, If one believed that >14s was required for an EDG to start and repower the SDBD Why would one believe that? Is the number 10s for WB? Is there any plausibility for 14s, or any other number?

6/17 KRS - The EDGs are required to start and reenergize the SDBDs within 10 seconds. One could assume that x amount of time was required for the loss of voltage detection, y amount of time was required for the diesel start relays to actuate and z amount of time was required for the diesel start and acceleration to rated speed. For example, one could state that SDBD voltage dropped to less than 87% and as a result the 27 relays took 0.75 sec. One could next comprehend that the DG start relays took an additional 0.5 sec to operate and finally for the diesel to physically start and accelerate to rated speed, that 10 sec was required. Therefore, one could arrive at 0.75+0.5+10 = 11.25 seconds. If one used the Degraded voltage times and the load shed times, one could arrive at an even greater number. 6/25: okay.

2) Is the blackout terminology correct? Is this a sustained UV condition that feeds into the SBO circuitry?

If the buss normal supply breaker opened, would that be seen as a blackout by that bus? Just checking.

6/17 KRS - A 6.9kV Shutdown Board BLACKOUT is either a sustained undervoltage condition or a loss of voltage condition. If the normal supply breaker opened (assuming that an automatic fast transfer on transformer fault were not occurring), a blackout would be seen on the loss of voltage. 6/25: ok.

063K1.03 DC Electrical Distribution - Knowledge of physical connections and/or cause effect relationships 48 H 4 X N S between it and battery charger and battery

1) Minutia: is this Q hanging on the oolie that Vital Battery V has 2 more cells than all the others, or is it more operationally valid than that? Its a square hit on the KA.

6/17 KRS - While the basis for the voltage difference is the 2 more cells, I believe that this is more than minutia because this fact is contained throughout the SOIs and SIs. For example, when performing the realignments described by the Q, one must sit out in the board rooms with the electricians as they adjust float voltage (up for the placement of VBB V). 6/25: accepted.

2) Stem, 1st bullet: does this add something to the Q that Im missing, or help with plausibility?

6/17 KRS - Included to avoid the appeal of NO correct answer. The reason for this is that the 6-S charger can supply either VBB I or VBB II. Assuming that one recognized that VB charger V couldnt be used, one could claim that the 6-S could be used and then claim something crazy such as no correct answer existed because the 6-S was not listed as a choice.

6/25 KRS - After discussing the ability to assume that the 6-S charger was able to be used, I took out this bullet. I agree that claiming that the 6-S would be used represents too much of an assumption.

6/25: okay.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 064A4.06 EDG - Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: manual start, loading, and 49 H 3 N S stopping of the EDG

1) Q should technically be written with an apostrophe here: describes the Emergency Diesel Generators response, or here: Generators, because were asking about the response of something (possessive, plural or singular respectively). But writing it one way or the other could steer an applicant to or away from the correct answer. What if we did away with the WOOTF this time and added Depressing the switch pictured above will start 6/17 KRS - Agree with grammar and punctuation. Also agree it will probably confuse everyone, so Ive done away with the WOOTF.

064A4.09 EDG - Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: establishing power from 50 H 2 X M E the ring bus (to relieve EDG) 3 N S 1) Plausibility of Too Fast: since we tell them its rotating CW, its hard to conceive that someone would calculate the speed based on it going CCW. D/A B is dead-on for the math, Im just having trouble with someone calculating it that way when we tell them its clockwise. Anyone youd let into a nuclear plant better know CW from CCW.

2) Reference provided: redacted p. 61 of 0-SOI-82.01: is that the last page of this Qs submittal, or was that the page provided for the Source Q? Maybe the same, but either way: I dont think its fair how its redacted there, leaving out desired.rotation. The only word we should need to redact is clockwise, so it would read: to obtain desired clockwise rotation, but then you could probably infer from the length of the blackout that it had to be CW and not CCW, which is probably why it was done that way to begin with.

Could we black it out as it is now, but off to the side in a text box have desire ___ rotation, would that work? A real short blank so you couldnt tell if CW or CCW fit.

This question is basically a JPM and would be more appropriate for the simulator. Theres likely a better question to match this KA thats appropriate for a written exam.

6/17 KRS - Rewrote to address 1). I agree with 2) and will generate such a redacted reference if this moves forward. I did black out the desired to try to hide the CW vs. CCW. I like the text box idea.

6/25: reviewed new Q (New, High, 3) in person, was Sat but 1st part overlapped with a sim JPM. Revising.

6/29 KRS - The sim JPM involves an emergency stop. So, as discussed during Prep week, Ive shifted the first part of the Q to ask how do you accomplish a normal stop of the DG? The second part is slightly modified to get rid of the picture (based upon Mikes concern of proving that the DG would really be at 0 rpm 1 minute after the stop) and just ask will the DG run for 10 minutes at reduced rpm or not. This is clearly stated in the procedures (and other sources). 7/6: reviewed revised Q, looks good.

073A2.01 Process rad monitors - Ability to predict impacts of erratic or failed power supply on the PRM 51 H 3 X X N U system, and use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences.

S 1) 1st part LOD & plausibility: for someone who generally knows what a rad monitor does, why would they ever pick high activity? It doesnt seem plausible that detecting high activity (which is what its supposed to do) would also cause a malfunction alarm. Youve got a beautiful D/A for A, and it surprised me that loss of power to the ratemeter would cause RAD HI, but thats not the right answer and you dont need to know that. You just need to pick which of two choices gives 181-C, which kills plausibility of high activity.

2) 2nd part is minutia. Heres the question: From memory, is there a step in SOI-77.01 that lets you bypass a failed process radmon and continue the release? Besides that, the plausibility analysis for unable to is flawed because Im pretty sure youre misreading 77.02. The submittal has p. 60 and notes that Step 16 will not compensate for loss of power to RM-118. The step actually says, If RE-118 is inoperable, then do these 3 things, and then you move on. Look at Step 19: N/A IV if 118 is operable. Step 20 same thing, and 21. Step 24, with the release now in progress: IF 118 is operable and malfunctions, THEN stop release. If it didnt want you to proceed with an inop 118 it wouldve stopped you at Step 16 and not had all the conditionals for if it was operable. Correct me if Im wrong. 6/22 KRS - wrote new Q.

6/25: reviewed new (New, High, 3) Q at WBN. Should be Sat with a minor modification.

6/29 KRS - Made changes discussed during prep week. Got rid of pictures in the answers and changed 2nd part of the Q to a text version. Also, the D/A is rewritten. 7/6: Agree with changes.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 076K3.01 SWS (ERCW for WBN) - Knowledge of the effect that a loss of SWS will have on closed cooling 52 H* 2 X X N E water (CCS at WBN).

S 1) D/A A says HX B is alternately cooled by ERCW 1A, thus making Choice A hypothetically correct if an applicant made some assumptions. To fence that in could we say something like, All systems are in normal alignments? Could also say there are no Operating Requirements or LCOs in effect, but Im not sure an RO has the knowledge to know what that means in this case. Thoughts?

6/22 KRS - Agree with first method. The second would wander into SRO territory because of the OR implication (knowledge of items in an OR table). Added, All systems are in their NORMAL alignments.

2) Were questioning the plausibility of distractors 1A & 1B. Will discuss onsite.

3) The blue bar at the top of the recorder screen with the flow values, thatll have to be a little clearer. Or could ask the Q without the picture.

6/22 KRS - Well edit the top bar. Im amenable to taking the picture out as long as we agree that the K3 aspect will be kept (e.g. the knowledge of the effect vs. the knowledge of the physical interconnections).

That was my original idea for putting the picture in. 6/25: agree, leave picture.

6/25: discussed at WBN, all agreed to have the Q refer to 0 Train (common) CCS HX C to help the plausibility of 1A & 1B choices. 6/25 KRS - Changed to the common B train Hx (Unit 0). Updated the distractor analysis. The correct answer becomes D. 7/6: concur with changes.

078K1.05 IA - Knowledge of connections and/or cause-effect relationships between IA and MSIV air.

53 F 3 X N S

1) Marked Partial because Id like to see better justification that the accumulators will hold for at least a minute. I know theyre supposed to, and you show that in a Maintenance Instruction, but there must be something in the FSAR or a lesson plan or procedure. Id feel better if that were better supported.

6/22 KRS - Added a paragraph to DA C regarding the lesson plans description about the purpose of the air accumulator. Also performed a very conservative calculation to show that the MSIVs would remain open following a loss of air.

078K4.02 IA -Knowledge of design features/interlocks which provide for cross-over to other air systems.

54 F 3 X B U

1) Great question, but doesnt hit the KA. Two of the distractors do, but that wont work. I dont need to S know anything about crossover or interconnections to answer this, just when a standby A/C starts. Even the KA Match statement says that.

6/22 KRS - Q was taken from the bank, was on the SQN 09/2010 NRC exam. I believe the writer of this Q thought that the cross-over encompassed the cross-over for the essential air headers to their individual aux air compressors (separated significantly from the station air compressors).

6/22 KRS - Changed B choice to 0-FCV-32-82 SHUTS. Changed the system response to a system response.

6/25 - Changed the correct answer from an air compressor starts to a cross-tie valve shuts. Now the question clearly addresses the cross-over from control to aux air.

6/25: agree that KA is now matched.

7/6: Just noticed: the noun name of 0-PCV-33-4 in Choice D isnt all-caps like the other three distractors.

Would like to see that changed for symmetry.

7/7 KRS - Capitalized the 33-4 UNID. Also adjusted Q for symmetry and psychometrics. Swapped C to D and vice versa (to have the choices ordered shortest to longest). Correct answer is unaffected.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 103A2.04 Containment System - Ability to predict the impacts of containment evacuation (including 55 F 1 X N U recognition of the alarm) on the containment system, and use procedures to correct, control or mitigate.

S 1) 1st part LOD=1. Q: Is there an evacuation horn in containment? A: Well since youre asking The D/A goes to great lengths to support the plausibility of there NOT being one, but a better question would be if it sounds automatically on Hi Flux at S/D alarm, or if an RO has to initiate it (plausibility: like you do for fire alarms, site evacuation, etc.).

6/22 KRS - I like this idea. Agree it is plausible because the other alarms (which you mentioned) are manually controlled. The fire alarm (for example) could most certainly have been automated.

2) 2nd part is minutia. From memory, whats the first step of this Alarm Response Instruction? Thats not even a valid SRO question. If you know it, its LOD 1, if not, its 5. But why would you ever wait to evacuate people from a dangerous situation? That alone makes it LOD 1, but its worse:

The D/A hangs the distinction between evacuate or borate on the meaning of the word ENSURE in an ARI, using TI-12.04, Users Guide for Abnormal and Emergency Operating Instructions. That procedure doesnt even apply to ARIs (see 1.1 Purpose). But even if we use it as guidance, what about 2.2.5B.1:

completion of the task is NOT required before continuing with the next step. Or B.2: It is sufficient to begin a task and have assurance it is progressing satisfactorily before continuing But thats all moot because the Q is still essentially asking which step is first, evacuate or borate, and as pointed out above, thats not a fair question to ask, and no one should ever guess wrong.

6/22 KRS - Significantly reworked the Q. 2nd part now asks if a transition to 1-AOI-34 is made (on account of the ARI). This is RO LOK as the SR Hi Flux at SD alarm an entry alarm for 1-AOI-34.

6/25: reviewed revised Q at WBN. Mostly satisfactory but some further work on 2nd part needed.

6/29 KRS - As discussed during prep week, changed 2nd part to select between 1-AOI-29 and 1-AOI-34.

Both are AOI entries (RO LOK) and both would appear reasonable entries for a refueling high flux at shutdown condition. 7/6: agree with change.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 002K5.05 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the RCS:

56 H 4 X X X N E Reason for drain tank pressure rise during water inventory operations.

S 1) Interesting question, but I dont think it meets the intent of the last part of the KA: during water inventory operations. Id interpret that as diverting letdown to the RCDT, excess letdown, draining the RCS; something to do with RCS inventory. Im open to swaying, but:

a) Is flushing #3 seal leakoff lines something thats ever done? Never heard of it, is there a procedure?

b) What does flushing instrument lines mean to an operator? And whats at panel 1-L-171 thats going to lead me to believe the flush water might go to the RCDT?

c) In either case, can I expect enough water to raise RCDT level 40% (however many gallons that is)?

6/22 KRS - Restructured to remove the myopic concept of water inventory operations. Now the Q states that Excess Letdown is I/S.

3) Why 2.2#? The D/A says the waste gas header is nominally at 2.2#, but it also gives a band of 2.0 to 3.5. Do the compressors stop at the same point they start, 2.0#?

6/22 KRS - The WGCs will run unloaded for a time, before shutting off. They have an unloader feature that basically just recircs the machine.

If so, why wouldnt that be the number? I know what the answer is and what youre trying to do here, but I dont think we can say that pressure will be 2.2# 5 minutes later. Can we put some wiggle room in both:

about 0#, about 2#, would that work?

6/22 KRS - Nervous about using about. Could someone say that (especially for such a relatively small pressure amount) that about 0 the same as about 2. I could see that popping up in appeal space.

And could the waste gas compressor(s) pump down to zero in 5 minutes? Im guessing not, so to help plausibility we should probably make that a longer time period.

6/22 KRS - Ive got to keep the time span to avoid having the automatic RCDT pumps from pumping out more water (50 gpm) than the excess letdown will supply (about 20 gpm).

4) Stem, time 00:00: can we bundle containment pressure with the next 2 at the same time? Does it make a difference somehow? The lesson plan says, the RCDT must be isolated from WDS Vent Header when pumping refueling water, so should we add U1 at 100% or something so no one could argue that the vent is closed?

6/22 KRS - Shifted from an outage type Q to online (at 100%). One could not argue that we have placed the RCDT on an atmospheric vent (which would be the case during certain parts of an outage).

6/25: discussed above comments at WBN and agree. Reviewed revised question.

011K2.01 PZR level control - Knowledge of bus power supplies to charging pumps.

57 F 2 B S 014K1.02 014K1.01 Rod Position Indication System - Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause 58 F 2 X N U effect relationships between RPIS and NIS CRDS.

H 3 S 1) KA Match: dont need to know anything about NIS to answer, only to rule out a distractor. Theres no cause/effect relationship.

6/22 KRS - I think were going to need to swap this KA. I cant think of any other way to write to it.

6/25: Swapped KA to the only other one in the K1 category: K1.01 CRDS 6/29 KRS - Wrote new Q addressing cause/effect between CERPI and the CRDS as well as the physical connection between the two.

7/6: Reviewed new Q (New, High, 3). Looks good.

1a) To help with plausibility of CERPI, in the 2nd picture could we have the needle deflected off of 0?

Would it be possible to see that in the plant with rods in MAN? Something less than 1.5F (if thats where auto rod movement starts).

7/7 KRS - It is certainly possible. I drove a (-2) degree Tavg - Tref mismatch and took a new picture.

7/8 Just to be sure: does 8 steps/minute correlate with 2 degrees?

7/8 KRS - Yes, until one exceeds 3 degrees the Rod Speed is 8 steps per minute. 7/9: thanks.

017K6.01 In-Core Temperature Monitor System - Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of 59 F 4 X N S sensors and detectors.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 029A3.01 Containment Purge Sys. - Ability to monitor automatic operation of, including CPS isolation.

60 H 3 X N E

1) Plausible distractors: 2nd part Q is pretty easy. I got it right using the Since youre asking technique.

S And of course therell be indication in the control room, its just a matter of where. The D/A has some discussion of 1-M-9 (which isnt applicable to the Q as-written); was that from an earlier iteration that asked if it was on M-6 or M-9? We might like that better than the current is/isnt on M-6.

6/22 KRS - Rolled part 2 back to the previous version. My idea with the IS/IS NOT was to streamline the Q as much as possible. 6/25: reviewed changes at WBN.

033A1.01 SFPCS - Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters associated with SFPCS 61 H 3 X N E operating the controls, including SFP water level.

S 1) Distractor Lower isnt terribly plausible if you know much of anything about the SFP, so to help that a little could we add a bullet something like, Preparations are being made to flood up the U1 Reactor cavity.? Then either merged with that, or right after it, the bullet The U1 Reactor cavity is EMPTY. [And is it Reactor cavity, or Refueling cavity? Or either?] Put those two ideas first, then the others.

6/22 KRS - Yes, it is the reactor cavity. Changed the stem such that the first two bullets are Preparations are in progress for Reactor Cavity flood up. The Reactor Cavity is EMPTY.

2) 2nd part LOD=1 as-written. You can always monitor SFP level locally, and even a novice operator would know that. And why would a procedure prevent you from monitoring locally? Could improve plausibility by asking what the preferred location is. 6/22 KRS - Changed as requested.

3) Partial: The gate doesnt leak at all? If even a tiny bit, someone could argue that SFP level WILL go down, albeit very slowly. The more I thought about this the more I think it might be a show-stopper. I had the Q as S* before this, but lowered it to E.

6/22 KRS - Changed this because youre right: evaporation causes the pits level to lower, seepage through the floor causes it to lower Now, the Q gives you the trend and asks what happens to the trend. I also built in a transfer canal level so it becomes incontrovertible that the trend will remain the same.

4) Is the one SFP shared between the two units? If so we might want to address the U2 side, so no one makes unfounded assumptions.

6/22 KRS - Included a generic statement about U2 fuel movement system being positioned normally.

6/25: Reviewed at WBN, agree with all changes.

034A2.01 Fuel Handling System - Ability to predict the impacts of a dropped fuel element on the FHS, and 62 H 3 X* N S use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate consequences.

1) The pictures will have to be bigger/readable. Was going to suggest do without them, but:

6/22 KRS - Put in new bigger pictures taken from the Thunderview software.

2) Secured choice isnt plausible given that no alarms or alerts are in. BUT, playing off D/A B: what if we put one or both monitors in Alert? You could say that in words, but the picture is more realistic. Thoughts?

6/22 KRS - Put the 90-102 RM in Alert and moved its needle up. Plausible because the detectors are in different locations. Setpoint for HIGH is 500 mr/hr so the needle position is plausible for an Alert ONLY.

3) 1st part f-i-t-b: 1 second after noting the readings bugs me. Could we take time out of it and ask something like, BEFORE any operator action, the fan is _____? 6/22 KRS - Changed as requested.

6/25: Reviewed revised Q at WBN, concur with all changes.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 035A4.06 Steam Generators - Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: SG isolation 63 H 4 X X X N U on steam leak or tube rupture/leak.

3 S Part 1 of the Q is good, Part 2 isnt:

1) Minutia/Job-link: is it RO knowledge that a Note in an E-2 Attachment says you can direct the next Attachment if you have people available? Conversely:

2) Partial: what does Minimum Staffing mean for WB? [Is Q written as if U2 isnt manned yet?] Is normal staffing a Shift Manager, SRO, two ROs, and an STA? Is there a 3rd RO usually staffed? Is there a Work Control Center SRO type person? Could HE come to the CR and do ATT. 2? The markup of E-2 Att. 1 says the BOP would still be performing the equipment verification of 1-E-0 and thus be unavailable. Can we say that for sure? Its not until Step 14 of E-0 that you go to E-2, and then youve got communication and transit time for an AO to get to the location(s) and perform Att. 1. Whos to say the BOP couldnt finish up and be directed to do Att. 2, and beat the AO? I dont see how we can bound this appropriately, short of saying that ONLY Att. 1 is implemented. But then (and even as-written), were asking ROs to have knowledge of specific steps in specific Attachments of E-2; doesnt seem right.

6/25: Reviewed new Q (New, High, 3) at WBN, found to be SAT.

055K3.01 Condenser Air Removal System - Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CARS 64 F 1* X X N U will have on the main condenser.

S 1) Partial: as discussed in D/A A, dumping steam to the condenser would probably cause some level of vacuum to be established. The Q doesnt bound how much vacuum, so an applicant could correctly choose CAN be established. A way to fix would be to say something like adequate vacuum to allow turbine startup, or enough vacuum to clear the C-9 permissive.

2) 2nd part LOD=1, GFES question. Also the plausibility of saturation temperature lowering is a stretch. I dont quite understand the last part of D/A B, but we seem to be relying on a weak applicant thinking that vacuum lowers (gets worse), so temperature lowers.

3) 1st part isnt much better. LOD is low, and plausibility hinges on applicants thinking the plant might have air ejectors, which it doesnt. If WB is their only plant, they may not even know about A/Es, so without vacuum pumps of course you cant draw vacuum. 6/25: Reviewed revised Q at WBN.

079G2.4.35 Station Air - Knowledge of local AO tasks during an emergency & resultant operational effects 65 F 3 X N E

1) Whats the postulated failure that sets up the Q? Not a break, because pressure wouldnt come back.

H S Trip of running A/C? Which one(s) is/are normally running? We give that power is available to A, so it probably isnt the one that tripped or we likely wouldnt be restarting it. So B was running and it tripped?

Note in 0-AOI-10 Att. 2 says C will start if there is a demand; is 480V Aux Bldg Common Bd normally energized? If so, why doesnt C start and hold pressure up? We need to bound what got us here and what the success path will be, to make sure this is operationally valid. 6/25: working on 1st part.

2) If you did align U2 Construction Air, does it pipe directly into the top of the Service Air Receiver? And then would have to back-feed through PCV-33-4 to supply U1 Control Air? If all thats true, then we need to reword the 2nd part Q, which says, and control air header pressure is restored. Control Air pressure wouldnt be restored if 33-4 was closed, so that could unfairly lead an applicant to an incorrect answer.

6/29 KRS - Ive tried to write what we talked about during prep week. The basic setup of this Q is staged when the U2 construction air was afforded by a larger receiver supplied by diesel air compressors. The Unit 1 is held in M3 (to not complicate recovery with other items such as loss of feed or the msivs). The change to the Q is the Loss of Offsite power. When a LOOP occurs, all of the station air compressors are lost (common power is lost in addition to the loss of shutdown power). Therefore, C and D SSACs which are powered by AB Common and TB common power are lost. A and B SSACs are available if an AUO locally starts them as the EDGs start and reenergize the SDBDs. U2 construction air is available and Ive added a nominal pressure to make that abundantly clear. I think that this addresses 1) because the Q now places the applicant in a situation which is (1) quite plausible and (2) could be physically mitigated by either of the choices (note that 0-AOI-10 does not align construction air though). This Q could well be higher cog because of the existence of the LOOP. 7/6: Concur with changes. Agree with High Cog.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 063K1.03 DC Electrical Distribution: Battery charger and battery 66P H 2 X N E The question was written to Rev. 33 of OPDP-1, but we have Rev 34, which is 5 pages shorter. The F S section on Crew Updates looks the same though.

5/14: Very true, the reference was replaced. The content is the same.

I like the idea of the question, but not that we put them at 2100#. If as you say thats a standard trigger value used to initiate a manual reactor trip, then I think OPDP-1 3.3.4 (its probably numbered differently in Rev. 33) would take precedence:

Operators shall without hesitation insert a manual scram/manual reactor trip whenever any of the following conditions occurs: E. When a pre-determined trigger value is reached. [emphasis added]

To downgrade an operator for not doing a textbook Crew Update first is unfair I think. More likely theyd get chastised for not taking a timely trip. The last part of the C distractor analysis pretty much says this.

If we want to keep this as PZR pressure well have to move the value above 2100#. Or consider a different parameter thats conducive to showing an appreciable change on meters like youve done here, and yet theres no question that a Rx trip is required at or very near the same time.

5/14: Shifted the 2nd set of Pzr Pressure indicators to 2200 psig. I also removed the "quickly" from the report. I believe that the impetus to take action is still present because if one looked up and actually saw Pzr Pressure dropping, that operator would be very motivated to take an action.

6/25: Question is satisfactory, but there is an overlap issue with every scenario.

6/29 KRS - Wrote a new Q regarding both plant announcements and written log requirements. OPDP-1 (conduct of OPS) is very thin on written log requirements; many of the concepts we have tested in the past have either been edited out or are very weakly defensible (e.g. very appeal likely).

7/6: Reviewed new Q (New, Low, 2) and found it satisfactory, but leaning towards LOD=1 because its an RHR pump. Just using the reasoning that its an important pump Im going to probably pick must announce, and must log start. Is there another pump or maybe fan that gets started fairly often that maybe people forget to announce and/or log?

7/7 KRS - Shifted stem to address start of ABGTS for an SI run. ABGTS would require a log entry and an announcement but would not impact very much (in terms of would an announcement really be needed).

7/8: Reviewed change, looks good. I see its a 31-day SI done in Modes 1-4, so its pretty routine. A couple of minor comments on the 2nd bullet:

0-SI-30-8-A from the 1st bullet became 10-SI-30-8-A here. Consider changing had been previously recorded to was previously recorded, to simplify a bit. 7/9 KRS-Changed 10 to 0 & had been to was.

G2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc.

67 H 2 X X N U

1) Two implausible distractors: I liked the Q, till I went back and looked at the graph in the D/A with the S points plotted. Even with the labels redacted, when you look at those four points its obvious that C or D is the answer, and the red line kind of points to it being D. [And granted, the applicants wont have that picture, but theyll have the graph, and plotting the points is a fundamental skill [with very little opportunity for error in this case.]

2) Job-link: not operational in content, because all four answers are in the same minute, and the station probably doesnt log Tech Specs to the second. And its so fast-moving you wouldnt see it in real-time because you wouldnt be looking at AFDs, youd be trying to figure out what the heck just happened.

Granted, you could go back and get values from the computer, but again, the four answers are only 15s apart. Will need to slow down the runback to get the AFD values into different minutes.

6/25: Reviewed revised Q at WBN. Changes were made as suggested.

G2.2.12 Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

68 F 2 N S

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S G2.2.35 Ability to determine TS Mode of Operation.

69 F 3 N S

1) Good Q to hit this KA. Easy if youve been exposed to it, maybe not so much for someone new. Good discussion of Tcold plausibility, but theres no discussion of 350F plausibility. Its not terribly plausible if you know the names of the Modes, but since you dont give that its acceptable. To me its plausible if you remember that theres a M6 (which doesnt have a temperature limit) and you get confused and assign 200 to that, so that 350 goes with M5.

2) 350 isnt technically the answer to anything, since M4 is < 350, and maybe someone remembers that tidbit and gets it right for the wrong reason, so can we move the less than (or equal to) signs into the answer choices? For example: < 350F or 200F 6/25: Reviewed revisions at WBN.

G2.3.14 Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, abnormal, or 70 H 3 X N S emergency conditions or activities.

1) Job-link: RO knowledge? SRO Q98 is similar (and Q97 is a TI-12.07A question also). Youve listed the L.O. for employee responsibilities concerning the ALARA program, but that could be just doing what youre told in an RWP brief, monitoring/responding to your EAD, using low-dose waiting areas, etc, and NOT whether you need Special Access for certain areas, which seems to be an SRO function.

At 3.2.2.A it says that Personnel needing to enter Containment or Annulus must request that RP initiate an Appendix A, to obtain authorization for entry.

And at 3.2.2.B: Personnel must notify RP Shift Supervisionto coordinate support and establish access requirements.

Maybe its common knowledge, but Id hate to lose this on appeal.

6/25: Discussed with two members of licensees staff our concern that this question is minutia, but their position was that ROs should know this information, so we let it go.

G2.3.15 Knowledge of radiation monitoring systems, such as fixed radiation monitors and alarms, portable 71 F 3 X B U survey instruments, personnel monitoring equipment, etc.

2 WB S 1) Q doesnt match KA, its simply an administrative question that involves personnel monitoring equipment.

2013 New Q to be written.

(last 6/29 KRS - Pulled Q71 from the LAST (10/2013) NRC Exam. Ive put it forward for consideration verbatim exam) from its use on the last test. This would bring the count to two (from the last test).

7/6: Reviewed new Q (Bank, Low, 2), found satisfactory. Acknowledge its use on last WB exam.

G2.3.15 Knowledge of radiation exposure limits under normal or emergency conditions.

72 F 2 N S

1) Q seems to have had an earlier iteration as an administrative dose-limits question, because thats what the D/A is written to. As-written, the correct answer is D, 5 REM, not B as listed. Massage the D/A and it should be a good question. Also the L.O. applies to admin limits, not CFR limits.

6/25: discussed at WBN, further work is required.

7/7 KRS - This Q started out as asking the admin limits for the TVA NPG-SPP. We shifted it to ask the CFR limits. The D/A however, supported the admin limit Q. Ive changed the D/A to match the new Q.

Note that the new D/A still mentions the NPG-SPP because the existence of the admin limits yields the plausibility for the distractors (i.e. because an admin limit exists then one may believe that is the CFR limit).

7/7: 10CFR20.1201 lists annual limits, so we need that idea in the stem. Could be as simple as adding per year after REM. Otherwise the question is good. 7/9 KRS - Added per year.

G2.4.1 Knowledge of EOP entry conditions and immediate action steps.

73 F 3 N S

1) Each answer choice contains the words require that the operator perform, so could we move that to the stem, and change w/out the procedure to from memory, something like this:

The IAs listed in certain EOPs require that the operator perform from memory _______. Then:

ONLY the left column -or- BOTH columns Thoughts?

6/25: Resolution achieved during on-site discussions.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S G2.4.27 Emergency Procedures / Plan - Knowledge of fire in the plant procedures.

74 F 3 N S

1) So you push a button to sound the fire alarm, and then push the same button to make it stop? Unusual.

Im not sure that concept is worthy of a test question though, borderline minutia. Plausibility with the accountability alarm seems good though. 6/25: Issues resolved while onsite.

G2.4.50 Emergency Procedures / Plan - Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls 75 F 4 N S identified in the alarm response manual.

015G2.2.44 RCP Malfunctions - Ability to interpret MCR indications to verify status & operation of a system, 76 H 3 X X X X N E and understand how operator actions & directives affect plant and system conditions.

S 1) Distractor/Partial/Job-link/SRO-only: all of these Xs relate to Distractor C. There is a very minor, nuanced distinction between correct answer B and distractor C, namely whether the CRO should do any actions in AOI-24 before E-0 Immediate Actions are complete. 0-TI-12.04 2.8.3 (discussed in the D/A) says to continue performance of the AOI that directed the rx trip immediately following transition to ES-0.1. So this is implicitly clear: if youve gone to ES-0.1 then you must be done with IAs of E-0. Yet 2.2.4.c.1 says the OAC does the 4 IAs, so the CRO is kind of available; is he not allowed to do anything during IAs? 2.7, Prudent Operator Actions, A.5 says the operator is expected to take action toprevent equipment damage (e.g.stop the RCPs when Phase B is actuated) Is it ALWAYS wrong to stop an RCP while E-0 IAs are being performed? Some plants, for this very scenario, specifically state that the rx is to be tripped, verified tripped by the OAC (not validated yet by the SRO with the procedure), the RCP stopped, then remaining IAs completed, followed by SRO verification. Is it practiced that way at WB? Couldnt find anything in the TI.

6/17 KRS - I believe I understand where youre going with this. The point is well taken and represents a mistake often seen. May I present two examples:

Example 1 - If A train CCS is lost (which cools the RCPs oil), 1-AOI-15 will direct the crew to:

e. TRIP Reactor. f. STOP RCPs.

g. **GO TO 1-E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, WHILE CONTINUING this Instruction.

Example 2 - If an immediate shutdown of an RCP is required in accordance with 1-AOI-24:

3. TRIP the reactor, and GO TO E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, WHILE continuing.

4. STOP and LOCK OUT affected RCP(s).

Please note the distinction. In 1-AOI-15, it would be appropriate (in accordance with procedure use and adherence) to direct the OAC to Trip the Reactor, Verify the Rx Trip and Secure the RCPs. In 1-AOI-24, it would not be appropriate to TRIP the reactor, Verify the Rx Trip and Secure the #1 RCP. However, to tighten this issue up more, Ive changed the word further (which could imply JUST securing the RCPs) with the remaining.

7/1 KRS - Changed Distractor C as requested.

7/7: I had handwritten on 6/25 that Distractor C was to be changed, and you said on 7/1 that it was, but was it Distractor B we meant to change, because thats what changed. I mightve had it wrong.

7/9 KRS - I shouldve typed changed D/A C and B. D/A B now defends the transition to 1-AOI-39 (that was the Distractor we changed during prep week). Because we moved the old B (the correct choice to C, I copied the D/A for the old B to C. I also made the C D/A stand alone as it has shifted position so the use of as aforementioned is too cumbersome. 7/9: thanks.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 029EA2.01 ATWS: Ability to determine or interpret reactor nuclear instrumentation 77 H 2 X X X N U

1) Operationally valid? Stable at 4% power with zero SUR? Even if rods havent dropped yet, thus giving -

F 3 S 1/3 dpm SUR for some period of time, the OAC should be inserting rods, thus causing a negative SUR.

2) Hanging the correct answer on whether the SUR meters are reading exactly zero or not isnt going to work. The line at zero has a certain thickness, and I see the needles as pointing to the bottom edge of them, which technically is something less than 0.000000. Too much room for argument. I guess if you wanted to state that SUR is 0.00 (Im assuming its displayed digitally somewhere, and maybe out to two places), that could work, but still the larger question would be, if Im still at 4% power, do I want to be stopping emergency boration? Yes, technically per S.1 the rx is shut down, but I wouldnt want to be defending that position in a root cause investigation.

3) Whether or not emergency boration is time-critical is not SRO-only knowledge. ROs perform it, so they would know if there was a time limit.

6/18 KRS - Generated a new Q. 6/25: Reviewed new Q (New, Low, 3) at WBN.

038G2.4.31 SGTR: Knowledge of annunciator alarms, indications, or response procedures 78P H 4 N S The stem says that the Orange path is based upon the Tcold in loop #1. Should we explicitly state that the other three Tcolds are not causing the Orange path, or maybe that its solely due to loop 1? Just to avoid questions during the exam. 5/14: changed to add the word SOLELY.

With the picture of the RCS Lo Flow alarms were conveying that the RCPs are off, but could we just say that? Did we include this to help with K/A match? I could see someone arguing that flows are low due to underfrequency or blockage or something crazy, and us having to answer that during the exam.

5/14: I had put the lo-flow annunciators to match a second facet of the K/A. Removed pictures and put The RCPs are secured.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 058G2.4.4711 058G2.4.11 Loss of DC - Ability to diagnose and recognize trends in an accurate and timely 79P H 3 X X N U manner utilizing the appropriate control room reference material. Knowledge of abnormal condition 4 X S procedures.

Good question, but doesnt meet K/A. The first line of the K/A Match statement says, while in a loss of DC power, which were clearly not. The last line says that loss of a vital charger is an initiator to such casualty; true statement, but I dont know that the intent of NUREG 1122 is to consider initiators to casualties as being the same as the casualty.

But even if we can agree on that, I dont think were meeting the G2.4.47 piece, Ability to diagnose and recognize trends Granted, you can do some trending in this question to get to an answer (or three), but it would be the wrong answer. The correct answer hinges on understanding that breaker CB-2 is open, and theres no trending involved with that.

5/14: Question was removed, wrote a new question.

6/25: New Q reviewed at WBN, couldnt make it work. A new KA was requested. Provided 058G2.4.11.

7/1 KRS - Prepared a new Q for the new K/A. I feel fairly confident that this Q keeps to the SRO LOK given that we are really put into an RO KA. As I mentioned during prep week, there is no appendix or what not for a loss of DC during the EOP network. Both halves of the Q are steps in the AOI and interpreting their effect on the T/S (using the basis and section 3) should keep the SRO LOK.

7/13: Reviewed new Q (New, High, 4), looks like it could work.

1) Plausibility of unaffected: Would 3.6.3 be entered at 00:00, when the valve first loses power? As pointed out in DA A, it would be unable to complete any of the required surveillance testing which it undergoes. Granted, its in its required position, but youd still be in the spec, wouldnt you, and verifying the flowpath isolated once per 31 days? Then at 00:40, with it on a temp air supply, its open and a closure signal wont close it so youre no longer meeting the Required Action. I think we need to massage the words to make that idea clear, if thats what were after. (Was that the intent of having unaffected as the other choice? I was expecting to see met there, but maybe you meant that the Required Action was either no longer met, or there was no change in meeting it.)

7/13 KRS - My first thought on this is the application of LCO 3.0.6 and the fact that one does not cascade T/S LCOs. Our Facility rep agrees that one would not enter 3.6.3 upon the loss of power. We would recognize that a support system has been lost which is contained in the T/S (the DC power) and then enter the spec for the DC source. T/S LCO 3.0.6 does not require that we cascade the T/S LCO and render the CIV inoperable at time 00:00. 7/14: Okay.

2) After putting Battery V on the board were given that voltage is 136 VDC. After aligning Charger 8-S were told its still 136. Is that expected, or would it normally be higher? I ask because someone might think that the charger wasnt working properly and therefore not exit 3.8.4.

7/13 KRS - Youre right, 1-SOI-236.05 would adjust the chargers output voltage to between 137 and 140 VDC. Adjusted bullet to say that voltage is 138V. 7/14: thanks for that change.

3) Last page: Technical Reference is EPIP-1; should be AOI-20.02? And were not providing a reference on this one, are we?

7/13 KRS - Youre right, these are not correct. About the reference though, I had thought that none was required. However, do we need to give the SRs for 3.8.4 (to show that an operable Vital Bat V need be above 132 V)? Im wondering if someone missed the Q because they thought that somehow voltage came into the determination process. And then because a below the line T/S piece was not provided to them that the Q was operationally invalid. This seems to be ridiculous though. I dont think its needed.

7/14: I dont think a reference is needed either. The SR 3.8.4 number is 128V, and we tell them voltage is 136 on just the battery, then 138 with the charger, and they should know that those are reasonable normal numbers.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 077 AA2.07 Generator voltage and grid disturbances - ability to determine and interpret the operational 80 H 4 X N E status of engineered safety features.

S 1) Plausibility of placing the DG on the SDBD: this is usually a big no-no, you dont risk the diesel to try to support/buffer the grid. Would a novice operator have been exposed to that concept? An alternative might be that you place the SDBD on the diesel, divorced from the grid. Thats fairly drastic, but seems about as plausible as adjusting voltage on the entire grid, as your D/A A so aptly pointed out.

6/17 KRS - Changed to placing the DG on the SDBD and then divorcing the SDBD from offsite 6/25: Reviewed changes, sat.

E11EA2.2 Loss of Emergency Coolant Recirc - Ability to determine and interpret: adherence to appropriate 81 H 2 X B E procedures and operation within the limitations in the facilitys license.

4 S 1) Plausibility of Choice C (the interplay): why would the reason for an action be in another procedure that WB 2011 is never addressed?

2) 1st question is RO knowledge. 2nd question is leading (would suspect ECA-1.1 to be correct w/o having N the knowledge, otherwise why is it asking it this way?).

7/1 KRS - Wrote a new Q for the same KA. I researched the history on the original Q and it had been used between SQN and WBN no less than 5 times (in really the same form). It did have multiple entries in the bank. I agree with Phils comment about how can I be in the ECA and operate spray pumps IAW another FR. That doesnt make sense.

7/10: New Q (New, High, 4) hits KA, is SRO, and appropriate LOD, but may have some issues:

1) My 1st thought was: Why am I only seeing A RHP Rump amps and pressure, and not B also? But if you showed B of course the delta between the two pumps would be obvious and kill plausibility of A. But you cant have it both ways: throughout, WB has been wanting to present information as the operator would see it, which is fine, but why are keeping a secret now?

2) Plausibility of B, is cavitating - Q tells me indications are stable, so I rule out cavitation. The question is, would a less-than-competent operator be able to do that?

3) Were saying shaft shear and discharge P is 15# (agree), but how do we know the amps are representative? Is there OE? Something in a motor testing procedure, running uncoupled? Related: DA A says amps would be 24-25 if pumping forward; how do we know? If the sim shows that then okay. (And last sentence of DA A: would like to see very sensible replaced or augmented with procedurally driven

{ref. ES-1.3 RNO6.a})

7/14 KRS - Increased the discussion in the A DA to show that one would be procedurally driven to continue in 1-ES-1.3 given the availability of a single RHR train. Moved the discussion contained in DA C to DA A to help this. 7/14: Good, thanks.

4) I think we need to state that cntmt sump level is some value >16.1%, otherwise one could argue a transition to ECA-1.1 at RNO5.b and not get to Step 6 where the answer is.

7/14: Requested changes were made, 2 minor comments:

1) Since were now showing indications for both pumps we should change the 2 nd part of the 00:25 bullet:

The crew notes that the 1A -A RHR pump exhibits the following STABLE indications. (or similar) 7/14 KRS - Completely agree, changed as requested.

005G2.4.8 Inoperable/stuck rod - Knowledge of how AOPs are used in conjunction with EOPs.

82 F 1 X N U

1) LOD=1, and not SRO-only. Everyone knows that 1 control rod is allowed to be stuck out, and giving a 3 S parallel/secondary procedure to the BOP is how its always done. Good distractor analyses, but both parts are just too easy. Excellent K/A hit though

2) The stuff about SI-99-10-A is extraneous. 100%, trip, one rod stuck out.

6/18 KRS - Reworked Q significantly. Please regard new Q.

6/25: Reviewed new Q (New, Low, 3) at WB, sat.

024AA2.04 Emergency Boration - Ability to determine and interpret availability of BWST.

83 H 3 X N S

1) Choice D: can we leave out using LCV-135 & -136? If not, need to add the noun names there or in a Note. If keeping, make Using lower-case. 6/18 - Made requested changes.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 032AA2.06 Loss of SRNI - ability to determine and interpret confirmation of reactor trip.

84 F 3 X N U

1) Does not appear to be SRO only. TS 3.3.1 Required Action L.3 has a Completion Time of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; the 4 S first block of SRO guidance Figure 1 kicks it out. Granted, whether you choose 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> or 1.25 hours2.893519e-4 days <br />0.00694 hours <br />4.133598e-5 weeks <br />9.5125e-6 months <br /> is SRO-only, but an RO just choosing what he knows would get that part right.

6/18 KRS - I can see this. To eliminate any perception of RO LOK, shifted the Q to ask when the next required performance of the SR is required.

2) Also for the piece about entering E-0 or not: ROs are required to know EOP entry conditions, and being in Mode 5 clearly precludes entry into E-0.

6/18 KRS - As a user and not the preparer of the Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions, I offer the following. The applicants knowledge can be evaluated at the level of 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) by ensuring that the additional knowledge of the procedures content is required to correctly answer the written test item, for example: Knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation, and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures. Furthermore, SRO-only knowledge should not be claimed for questions that can be answered solely using fundamental knowledge of: plant parameters that require direct entry to major EOPs; e.g., major Westinghouse EOPs are E0 From these two items, one may deduce that (for WBNPs purposes) section 2.0 Symptoms and Entry Conditions for the EOPs listed are RO LOK. With that taken, the RO LOK would become (for E-0), Entry into 1-E-0 is based on any Reactor Trip or Safety Injection actuation. The any does not imply a mode of applicability.

Therefore, I have been opined to call the administrative requirement to implement the EOP set (save 1-ECA-0.0) in Modes 1-3 an SRO LOK item as the derivative source for this is the administrative procedure TI-12.04. 6/25: Discussed at WBN and came to agreement.

WE13G2.4.3 S/G Over-pressure: Ability to identify post-accident instrumentation.

85P H* 2 N S In 2nd part of Choice A would like to see this change made: the crew will continue REMAIN in FR-H.2.

That would make it exactly match the second part of B, and theyre saying the same thing already.

5/14: changed continue to REMAIN in Choice A.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 012G2.2.36 RPS: Ability to analyze the effect of maintenance, such as degraded power sources, on the 86P H 4.49 X N U status of LCOs.

4 S The answer isnt adequately supported by the references. Were making a very big jump from a statement in a Tech Manual that there are two auctioneered power supplies, to: SSPS is operable because I still have one P/S. Plus its very hard and probably not fair to ask.

Starting with the correct answer analysis: The Westinghouse manual for the SSPS system Does Watts Bar require SROs to know Tech Manuals from memory? (Rhetorical question, of course.) Further on: Because of this design, there is no impact to the operability of SSPS The Tech Manual doesnt speak directly to operability; one can infer, but it just doesnt say those words.

The KA Match statement says an applicant can get to the right answer using both systems knowledge and the contents of the T/S Bases. Id argue against the systems knowledge piece, but its almost irrelevant because its not in the T/S Bases. The 3.3.1 Basis markup provided for Automatic Trip Logic does not speak at all to the POWER SUPPLIES for SSPS.

In the PER 3516 Details field someone wrote, B TR SSPS is still operable due to the auctioneering circuit for the 15VDC power supplies, but what was the basis for saying that? On the next page the question, Potential Operability Issue? is checked NO; again, how did they know at that point? In other cases, failure of one of two power supplies inops something. If I were on shift at 2:00 in the morning faced with this situation and only the references provided, I probably wouldnt make the call that it was operable, yet thats what were asking an SRO applicant to do, and closed-book at that.

I dont think this is a good question, but if we decide to move forward with it, here are some other observations:

In the 5th bullet, does troubleshooting/repair work order equal WO-TM? Because it needs to be a WO-TM to 1) match the correct answer analysis (very last line), and 2) match the procedure, NPG-SPP-09.5.

The B distractor analysis says The proposed connections for the jumper to be installed are test jacks, but thats not given in the question. It comes from the Screening Review Form for WO 01-008855. (But we dont need to give them that because it wont help them answer it.)

Further in the B distractor analysis: the stem of the question details that the jumper will not be attended No, it doesnt. It says it will be in place for 2 weeks. Ive seen times where a Dedicated Operator is manned for days on end, so if thats what we intend to convey then we need to state it. But even if we clear that up, testing recall of one of 24 Exclusions in an NPG Temp Mod procedure really isnt fair (ref. NPG-SPP-09.5 Section 2.2).

5/14: Removed this question and wrote a new one which is quite defensible (the basis exists with the surveillance instructions). 6/24: Reviewed new (New, High, 4) Q at WB.

013A2.04 Ability to (a) predict impacts of the following malfunctions on ESFAS; and (b) based on those 87 H 4 B S predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate consequences: Loss of IB WB 1) Just to clean up the stem a bit, what if we took out Subsequently and merged the 1st 2 bullets: Unit 1 2011 was in Mode 3 when a loss of 6/18 KRS - Cleaned up.

061G2.2.22 AFW - Equipment Control: Knowledge of LCOs and safety limits.

88 F 3 N S Question appears to be Sat, but its a basis question that doesnt use TS bases, but rather a system description, which is not part of the plants licensing basis (and thus subject to appeal). A better place to cite the function of the DC fan would be the FSAR, which discusses it in Chapter 9, pages 9.4-40 & 41, with language almost identical to the system description. (Also some discussion in Table 9.4-43A.)

6/18 KRS - Agree, added verbiage from UFSAR pages 40 and 41. This is now incontrovertible.

076A2.01 SWS - Ability to predict impacts of loss of SWS and, based on those predictions, use procedures 89 H 3 N S to correct, control, or mitigate consequences.

Q appears to be sat. A few editorial comments:

In Choice B, should we give the title of OPDP-8? 6/18 KRS - Yes, this should be the case. Added a NOTE.

In Choices C & D, since were quoting steps from AOI-13, lets put quotes around them. 6/18 KRS - Added.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 026A2.03 Containment Spray - Ability to predict impacts of failure of ESF, and based on those predictions, 90 F 3 B S use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate consequences.

Q appears to be sat (2009 exam, so it should be). A couple things:

WB 2009 Table 3.3.2-1 Function 1.c pertains to Containment Pressure - High, and only requires 3 channels operable.

Technically by TS you wouldnt have to invoke Condition D and trip the Hi channel, but wouldnt you trip it as part of taking that instrument (30-43) out of service? Does that change anything about the question or answer? I dont think it does, but wanted to ask.

6/18 KRS - The containment pressure transmitters feed not only the HI containment pressure Bistable but also the HI-HI Bistable. If you look at function 2.c. for example, all four transmitters are required.

6/24: Ah, thats the answer; leave as-is.

Related, in the stem we say the channel is OOS with the channel bistables positioned as required by Tech Specs. You probably have a procedure for taking this channel OOS (I didnt search), and it might trip the Hi bistable. If thats the case, it might be more accurate to say the channel has been taken OOS IAW that procedure.

6/18 KRS - We do have a procedure and Ill certainly put it in if desired. Im not sure its needed because as an operator, I just care if the bistable is bypassed IAW the T/S. (I dont want the applicant to get all balled up in the what does the IMI say?). 6/24: Okay, leave as-is.

017A2.02 In-Core Temperature Monitoring System - Ability to predict impacts of core damage, and base on 91 H 3 X X N U those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate consequences.

S KA Match: this Q really has nothing to do with ITM. (Unless the picture provided is from WBNs ITM system, but I doubt it is.) The KA Match statement says the applicant must understand the relation of the temperature indicated by the ITM to that of the fuel metal. No, they dont, because no temperature from ITM is given. The D/A supporting the 1st-part answer choice kind of relies on ITM to know what normal 100% power delta-T between clad and coolant is, but an applicant doesnt need that to arrive at an answer.

Plausibility: its really not plausible that the T under discussion would be (exactly) the same as the 100%

power steady-state value. In fact, its highly unlikely that at any other core condition it would be the same as, let alone at the verge of core damage and transition to a beyond-design-basis procedure. By that reasoning one could always eliminate the same as. That leaves less than as the only other option, but thats not much better. 6/18 KRS - Generated new Q. 6/25: Reviewed new Q (New, High, 3) at WB, sat.

029A2.01 Containment Purge - Ability to predict impacts of maintenance in containment, and based on 92 H 3 X N E those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate consequences.

S Plausibility of 1st-part choices: EGTS is not very plausible if you know anything about how that system works. All you have to know is that it sucks from the annulus, and without a hole between Containment and the annulus youre not going to affect Containment pressure. Are 37 & 40 normally open? Are we basing plausibility on the applicants missing that we tell them in the stem that theyre closed?

Related, theres always some Containment leakage; since all of that appears to go into the annulus, could someone argue that starting EGTS could in fact lower Containment pressure by providing a vacuum on the outside? (Depending on the rate of rise, of course.)

Plausibility of 2nd-part choices: weekly periodic doesnt seem very plausible, given that youre doing an as-required purge. (Theres probably some plausibility when crossed with EGTS, but given the problems discussed above with EGTS I dont think its enough.)

Im used to not being able to open the purge valves (the big valves) at-power, but apparently its okay at WBN. But SOI-30.02 P&L V.3 does say not to open both upper and lower simultaneously. Might that prompt a question during the exam, and should we bound the answer choice better?

6/26: New Q was written (New, High, 3), reviewed during prep week, sat.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S 075G2.1.20 Circ Water: Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps.

93P H 3 X N E The second-part answers of choices A & B are subsets of C & D, unless you add ONLY or similar.

S 5/14: Added ONLY to A & B. 6/1: thanks.

DA: Totally confused here. In B, for the correct answer, we say that 0-FCV-27-112 could be used to compensate for cooling tower evaporative losses. But in every single one of the incorrect answer choices we say that FCV-112 can NOT be used. Also, the question itself never mentions FCV-112. Probably one of the two procedure sections which are choices uses this FCV, and if thats the case then we should either go with a flowpath choice in the question (vs. a procedure choice), OR have the DA talk about the procedure sections, and not just the FCV.

D D/A: the 2nd paragraph is justification for NPDES being the correct answer, and would fit better in B.

5/14: Modified D/A. I believe this was the result of reordering the answers (and thus the D/A).

KA match: Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps probably isnt met: the 1st part of the question doesnt require you to know or understand the basis of the provided step in order to implement it. And the 2nd part of the question is really more of a systems question, or a procedure selection question at best, rather than an interpret and execute steps 5/14: I am interested in the final determination of what is the "interpretation of steps." I had to read and re-read Webster's with respect to this. I did this because operators are well taught to follow a procedure as written and not to interpret steps (i.e. seek procedure revision when the meaning is unclear). Thus, I take that given a set of circumstances, one "tells the meaning of" a procedure section implicitly upon his choice of such section. 6/1: RII evaluating your response.

6/26: Discussed in person during prep week and came to agreement on KA match.

G2.1.34 Conduct of Ops - Knowledge of primary and secondary plant chemistry limits.

94 F 4 X2 N E

1) Minutia: If you were asking for the value that got you into 3.4.16 I could see that, but asking the value in S the Required Action that you have to check for every 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is a stretch. We normally expect an applicant to interpret a given TS as a reference (or know something from the bases), not tell me what this word is in a 4hr action statement. If you know enough to get you into a spec then you get to look up the rest.

2) Minutia again in the 2nd part: were basically asking, Does paragraph c of 3.0.4 say this or that? Not operationally valid. A way to fix would be to ask if youre allowed to enter M1. Then youve demonstrated an understanding of 3.0.4 and applied it. The applied piece is important because it makes it a better SRO-only hit on p. 3 of the SRO-only Guidance where youve highlighted Application of generic LCO requirements. As-written youre just recalling, but not applying.

Those considerations aside, the key point of 3.0.4 is whether youre allowed to do a mode change, not which of its three methods lets you.

6/26: Q was modified during prep week to address concerns above.

G2.2.21 Equipment Control - Knowledge of pre- and post-maintenance operability requirements.

95 F 3 B S SQN 1) Add to stem: returned to service under administrative control for Makes it better match the wording 2015 of LCO 3.0.5. 7/1 KRS - Included the verbiage.

G2.2.6 Equipment Control - Knowledge of the process for making changes to procedures 96 F 1.5 X3 B E

1) Listed as a bank question, last used on the 6/2011 NRC exam, but I cant find it. Please provide. Were 2 N S having difficulty with LOD and plausibility and want to check its pedigree.

2) Plausibility for C: Given a certain type of procedure change, youre asked if you have to do either/both/none of two processes, one a higher significance/level of effort than the other. Is it plausible that youd do the higher one (50.59) but not the lower one (IQR)?

3) Plausibility for A: for a minor/editorial change, with no intent change, would anyone think youd need to do a 50.59?

4) Plausibility for D: with all the peer checks, IVs, CVs, QC, etc. in nuclear power, is it plausible that one person is going to make a change on their own?

6/26: A new Q was written (New, Low, 2) this KA, reviewed during prep week.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S G2.3.12 Radiation Control - Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator 97 F 2 X B S duties, such as containment entry requirements, etc.

SQN 1) D/A B: pretty thin to say Caution Tag is plausible because TI-12.07A doesnt specify hold order every 2010 time it says TAGGED. Tagged is pretty common usage for danger tagged. By similar logic I could say CT isnt plausible because TI-41 never says TAGGED, it always says hold order.

2) SRO-only Guidance, red text box: does an SRO hold the clearance along with the RP Shift Supervisor?

Because D/A A says the RP SS holds the clearance order (supported by the Note on p. 13 of 1-TI-41).

Pretty easy Q, maybe just because Ive been exposed to its concept, but I nuked out the answer based on the weak plausibility of both parts. 1st part, yes, I might forget the other storage location, but using the since youre asking technique I ruled out ONLY. 2nd part, if I know much at all about incores and how activated they must be, and knowing that a Danger tag is to protect life and equipment, then Im jumping on that. But based on the adage, They dont all have to be hard, its probably okay.

6/26: Q was modified, reviewed during prep week.

G2.1.34 Radiation Control - Knowledge of radiation or contamination hazards that may arise during normal, 98 H 4 X X N E abnormal, or emergency conditions or activities.

3 S 1) Two correct answers/Minutia: SRO, you have to send someone into containment at power, what are you concerned about? Well, heat stress and dose mostly. D/A B 2nd paragraph says that inevitably purge would be run. Its minutia/unfair to ask which procedure stipulates heat stress as a concern; its always a concern. They probably just didnt think to put it into 12.07A. But its telling that 12.07B specifically briefs on heat stress, which is less of a concern in Modes 5&6 (which that procedure covers) than at power. The folks entering containment are surely going to be briefed, and heat stress will surely be covered. This part of the Q is not acceptable.

6/26: Q was modified, reviewed during prep week, needs some work.

7/9: Wrote a new Q per Phil's comments during prep week. We left prep week with a concept of what it would look like but not actually with the Q.

7/9: Reviewed new Q (New, High, 3), thinking theres a subset issue. Granted, the form for Special Access lists only Shift Manager as the signatory (and the RP manager on a separate line, but irrelevant to the Q.),

but the SMs work for the Ops Superintendent, who is the senior license holder on site, goes to requal, etc, and I bet if he wanted to he could legally sign that spot. Could we rebut that?

7/9 KRS - I believe so because IAW OPDP-1 or the Units T/S the Ops Superintendent need not be a shift manager. Im not sure that the Ops Sup has NOT been a SM or that any management team would take an SRO directly to Ops Sup but can one by default say that the Ops Sup (for every case) is a shift manager?

But at any rate, what about putting the Ops Manager rather than the Ops Sup? The Ops Manager doesnt even need to hold a license on the Unit. Ops manager would be more symmetrical with the RP manager (who must concurrently sign). The plausibility would remain given that he is still in the chain of command with the AUO. 7/10: Like that idea a lot. Lets change to Ops Manager. Thanks. 7/10: Agree.

Watts Bar Nuclear Station July 2015 ILO Exam LOK LOD Stem Cues T/F Cred. Partial Job- Minutia # / Back- Q= SRO Source Status Explanation Q Focus Dist. Link units ward K/A Only B/M/N U/E/S G2.4.23 Emergency Procedures / Plan - Knowledge of the bases for prioritizing emergency procedure 99 H 3 X X X N E implementation during emergency operations.

S 1) KA match is weak to unsat. Breaking it down: during emergency operations; is a fire by itself emergency operations? Probably not. prioritizing emergency procedure implementation; theres no EOP required in the Q, it just asks if the fire AOIs take precedence or not. If we could mod the Q to have an EOP in parallel (even just E-0) that would work, and probably fix the 1st-discussed part also.

2) Partial: Choice A is potentially correct because The decision to trip the unit and declare an Appendix R fire is left to the judgment of the Unit SRO/SM (N3 of AOI-30.1) The conditions given are way too subjective to hang a question on. Whats happened? An SI pump started and a valve in the other train opened. Is that a big deal? (Is WB a high-head or low-head plant?) For a low-head plant its not. Even for high head, stop the pump and/or trip/rack out the breaker and youre done. Is any equipment necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown affected (N3 again)? No. Now if it was RHR that would be different, but youd still probably want to see it affect both trains, i.e. threaten the safety function. D/A A even acknowledges this at the end: wait until more severe impacts are observed. Would any crew in the plant right now trip on just these indications?

3) Is Choice B saying youd directly enter AOI-30.2 without first going into 30.1? If so, wouldnt that be RO knowledge, procedure entry conditions?

4) Choice A reads funny because the stem doesnt say 30.1 was entered, so how could it continue to be in effect? Maybe: AOI-30.1 would be entered and remain in effect 6/26: Discussed during prep week. Spurious equipment operations given would not necessarily force a reactor trip. Agreed to modify to make it clearer, like affecting RHR, a system needed to reach CSD.

7/9 KRS - Modified Q to very clearly indicate to the applicant that a loss of the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown is occurring. Rather than just showing a spurious actuation of an SI pump and 1 BIT valve the Q begins with one RHR pump tagged out and then the remaining RHR pump being affected by the fire. With both trains of RHR impacted the ability to maintain safe shutdown is very much impacted.

It is incontrovertible given this that an App R fire exists, 7/9: KA is hit well now, and squarely addressed our concerns about loss of a function needed for CSD.

1) For psychometrics Id like to see Choice B first, so youre looking at time 00:01, then three time 00:05s.

7/10: change made.

G2.4.44 Emergency Procedures / Plan - Knowledge of PARs.

100 F 3 X X B U

[

Background:

Where I licensed, making PARS at SAE was optional, so I expected that to be the answer.]

SQN S 1) D/A says, IAW REP GenericPARS are only made at the GE level. This may not be a true statement, 2010 because REP-Generic says at 5.2.3, SAE, C, Any appropriate protective actions for the public are Q100 recommended to State agencies... (that page is in the submittal)

N Another data point, but also a mystery: in the EPIP-4 Revision Log, the entry for Rev. 38 (the latest rev),

Affected Page 9, says, added steps to allow SM to transfer responsibility forPAR development But I cant find that change anywhere. That was dated 12/18/14.

All this to say that Choice A is a potentially correct answer. I realize this was used on the 2010 exam almost verbatim, but with that contradictory statement in REP Generic under the SAE heading I dont see how we can administer it as-written. How would we rebut that appeal?

Calling this Q currently Unsat because the potentially-correct optional choice gives 2 bad distractors.

6/26: New Q was written (New, Low, 3), reviewed during prep week.