ML15223A622
| ML15223A622 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 05/12/2014 |
| From: | NRC/OGC |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| RAS 28143, ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01, 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR | |
| Download: ML15223A622 (41) | |
Text
NRC00208C Submitted: August 10, 2015 Surry Unit 2 tion lot. 1)
Comments:
Bottom Mounted Visual examination 100% of BMI column N/A N/A Instrumentation (VT-3) bodies for which difficulty System is detected during flux Bottom-mounted thimble instrumentation (BMI) insertion/withdrawal.
column bodies See Figure 4-35 of MRP-227-A.
Comments:
Notes to Westinghouse Expansion Component Table:
- 1. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the Westinghouse components are in Table 5-3 of MRP-227-A.
- 2. A minimum of 75% coverage of the entire examination area or volume, or a minimum sample size of 75% of the total population of like components of the examination is required (including both the accessible and inaccessible portions).
31
Surry Unit 2 Existing Programs Components N/A - examination scheduled for N/A - examination scheduled for i
- 2R25 - Spring of 2014. 2R25 - Spring of 2014.
mments:
%10I Scheduled during 2R25- Spring 2014.
N/A - examination scheduled for N/A - examination scheduled for
- l 3 su e at s2R25 - Spring of 2014. 2R25 - Spring of 2014.
mments: Scheduled during 21125 - Spring 2014.
Inen l ;...................
mmbly exmntono. ............
h All";;
accessible' urae t ....*!'
pcfe ;;*',;';* N/A 2R25- -Spring examination scheduled for of 2014. N/A - -Spring 2R25 examination scheduled for of 2014.
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Surry Unit 2 N/A - examination scheduled for N/A - examination scheduled for 2R25 - Spring of 2014. 2R25 - Spring of 2014.
2R24 (Nov. 2012). All 50 of 50 No issues noted during the were inspected. No tubes are examinations.
capped. All tubes were inspected i- full length. 14 tubes had been replaced prior to this inspection.
They are presented below.
,r to the Nov 2012 inspection: B5, CI12, D3, D5, D1 2, G9, H6, HI13, L4, L6, t-omments: I ne oiIowing TIUX mfIn M3, N7, N8, & N12.
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Surry Unit 2 A
N/A - examination scheduled for N/A - examination scheduled for 2R25 - Spring of 2014. 2R25 - Spring of 2014.
LNommens:tWcneousieuEuring Notes to Westinghouse Existing Programs Components Table:
- 1. XL = "Extra Long" referring to Westinghouse plants with 14-foot cores.
34
Tables for Reporting MRP-227-A Inspection Results for B&W Plants Plant Name: Oconee Unit 1 Utility: Duke Energy Date of Exams: 11/1/2012 to 11/12/2012 Plant Age: 39.75 (years) / 30.61 EFPY Primary Components Comments: The one-time physical measurement was performed in November 2006 with no evidence of wear occurring during service period (AREVA Engineering Information Record 51-9115429-000) 35
Oconee Unit 1 Comments:
100% including top and No relevant Indications were bottom retaining rings and noted on retaining rings or locking devices. The Jack locking devices. There was a screws which are not crack like indication on one of included in MRP-227-A were the jack screws and signs of also inspected. There are 8 mechanical damage on vent vent valves, valve ZW. The vent valve was replaced with a new one.
Comments: In valve ZW length of engagement of jack screws were not the same (from Internals ID left jack screw shorter than right jack screw), and right jack screw contained a crack. The jack screw locking devices are not currently in MRP-227 but were identified as needing to be screened in A/LAI #2. They received a VT-3 inspection under as a Category B-N-3 component under ASME Section Xl. The Jack screw is also not an item listed in MRP-227-A.
36
Oconee Unit 1 Comments: 116 (100%) upper core barrel bolts were inspected in April 2008 (AREVA Engineering Information Record 51-9078346-00) with no indications found. Four bolts (#1, #31, #60, and #91) were removed in the 1980s for testing and no indications were found.
100% - 108 bolts UT - 5 lower core barrel with crack like indications.
100% - 101 bolts and locking VT - 1 locking device with a devices, missing weld on one side and a 50% - 6 bolts and locking small weld on the other.
devices (#1, 19, 36, 37, 55 and 90).
40% - 1 bolt and locking device( #108).
Comments: 5 bolts with indications the bolt numbers are 37, 40, 57, 58, and 86. The bolt locking device with the missing weld on one side and small weld on the other was #44. The coverage for the VT-3 examination of 7 of the LCB bo Its and there locking devices was 40% to 50% due to the partial obstruction from the CAS stand, although 100% of the accessible surfaces were exam ined.
37
Oconee Unit 1 360out of 864, No relevant Indications were 4baffle-to-former bolts were noted.
un-inspectable due to large welds on locking bars.
Comments: ie 4 un-inspectable bolts (Quadrant - Plate - Column - Elevation) are 1-2-6-7, 3-2-1-7, 3-2-4-6, and 3-2-4-7.
100% No relevant Indications were noted.
.,ommenis; 38
Oconee Unit 1 Comments:
UT -- 100% UT - 1 flow distributor bolt (#49) 95 bolts inspected, 1 was with crack like indication.
removed during the 1981 inspections.
VT - 100% VT - No relevant Indications 94 locking devices inspected, were noted.
2 were removed during the 1981 inspections.
Comments: 2 locking clips (#2 /) and 1 bolt (#2) and were removed in the 1981. The second bolt for which the locking was removed could not be removed due to high torque values. Bolt #2 was sent for laboratory examination in 1981 and no indications were found.
39
Oconee Unit 1 Comments: Previously one guide block was lost and its pair was removed. Neither W7L nor W7R were replaced.
100% No relevant Indications were 52 spider castings each noted.
casting with 8 welds.
Comments: Unidentified loose part pinned under IMI guide tube spider casting F13.
40
Oconee Unit 1 Notes to B&W Primary Component Table
- 1. A verification of the operation of each vent valve shall also be performed through manual actuation of the valve. Verify that the valves are not stuck in the open position and that no abnormal degradation has occurred. Examine the valves for evidence of scratches, pitting, embedded particles, leakage of the seating surfaces, cracking of lock welds and locking cups, jack screws for proper position, and wear. The frequency is defined in each unit's technical specifications or in their pump and valve inservice test programs (see BAW-2248A, page 4-3 and Table 4-1, reference 18 of MRP-227-A).
- 2. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the B&W components are in Table 5-1 of MRP-227-A.
- 3. A minimum of 75% of the total population (examined + unexamined), including coverage consistent with the Expansion criteria in Table 5-1, must be examined for inspection credit.
41
Oconee Unit 1 Expansion Components Item ..... Examination Achi d Findings (Note 1)
Upper Grid Assembly Visual examination Accessible surfaces of Alloy X-750 dowel-to-upper (VT-3) 100% of the dowel grid fuel assembly support locking welds.
pad welds See Figure 4-6 of MRP-227-A (i.e., these are similar to the lower grid fuel assembly support pads).
Comments:
Core Barrel Assembly Bolts: Volumetric 100% of accessible Upper thermal shield (UTS) examination (UT). bolts or studs/nuts and bolts and their locking devices Locking Devices: their locking devices Visual examination (Note 2).
(VT-3)
See Figure 4-7 of MRP-227-A.
Comments:
42
Oconee Unit 1 Core Barrel Assembly Bolt or Stud/Nut: 100% of accessible Surveillance specimen holder Volumetric bolts or studs/nuts and tube (SSHT) studs/nuts (CR- examination (UT). their locking devices
- 3) or bolts (DB) and their Locking Devices: (Note 2).
locking devices Visual examination
(-Vr-3) See Figure 4-7 of MRP-227-A.
Comments:
Lower Grid Assembly Visual examination Accessible surfaces of Lower grid fuel assembly (VT-3) the pads, dowels, and support pad items: pad, pad- cap screws, and to-rib section welds, Alloy X- associated welds in 750 dowel, cap screw, and 100% of the lower grid their locking welds fuel assembly support pads.
See Figure 4-6 of MRP-227-A.
Comments:
43
Oconee Unit 1 equied Examnaton oveageExamination ItmMto EaiainAchieved Findings (Note 1)
Lower Grid Assembly Visual examination Accessible surfaces of Alloy X-750 dowel-to-lower (VT-3) 100% of the support grid fuel assembly support pad dowel locking pad welds welds.
See Figure 4-6 of MRP-227-A.
Comments:
Lower Grid Assembly Bolts: Volumetric 100% of accessible Lower grid shock pad bolts examination (UT). bolts and their locking and their locking devices Locking Devices: devices. (Note 2)
Visual examination (VT-3) See Figure 4-4 of MRP-227-A.
Comments:
44
Oconee Unit 1 Lower Grid Assembly Bolts: Volumetric 100% of accessible Lower thermal shield (LTS) examination (UT). bolts and their locking bolts (ANO-1, DB and TMI-1) Locking Devices: devices. (Note 2) or studs/nuts (ONS, CR-3) Visual examination and their locking devices (VT-3) See Figure 4-8 of MRP-1227-A.
Comments:
Notes to B&W Expansion Components Table:
- 1. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the B&W components are in Table 5-1 of MRP-227-A.
- 2. A minimum of 75% of the total population (examined + unexamined) must be examined for inspection credit.
45
W-Oconee Unit 1 Expansion Components Requiring Evaluation or Replacement In Lieu of Inspection Item Examination Method Disposition Core Barrel Assembly No examination requirements.
Core barrel cylinder (including Justify by evaluation or by replacement.
vertical and circumferential seam welds)
Former plates Comments:
Core Barrel Assembly Internal baffle-to-baffle bolts:
Baffle-to-baffle bolts No examination requirements, Core barrel-to-former bolts Justify by evaluation or by replacement.
External baffle-to-baffle bolts, core barrel-to-former bolts: No examination requirements.
Justify by evaluation or by replacement.
Comments:
Core Barrel Assembly No examination requirements.
Locking devices, including Justify by evaluation or by replacement.
locking welds, for the external baffle-to-baffle bolts and core barrel-to-former bolts Comments:
46
Tables for Reporting MRP-227-A Inspection Results for Westinghouse Plants Plant Name: North Anna Power Station Unit 1 Utility: Dominion Date of Exams: 3/16/2012 to 3/22/2012 Plant Age: 34 (y'ears) / 26.9 EFPY Existing Programs Components Comments:
Three new indications of minor vibrational wear were recorded during this inspection, tube N-12 and tube B-10, located at previously identified wear areas. Wall loss is not severe and no tubes require repositioning at this time.
47
Tables for Reporting MRP-227-A Inspection Results for Westinghouse Plants Plant Name: North Anna Power Station Unit 2 Utility: Dominion Date of Exams: 9/14/2011 to 10/11/2011 Plant Age: 31 (years) / 25.7 EFPY Existing Programs Components Comments:
Tubes G-14, L-14 and N-8 have recorded wall losses indicating active degradation.
Tube G-14 recorded a 6% increase in wear from 40% to 46%, and does not require any further action.
Tube L-14 recorded an increase in wear from 62% to 76%. This tube is an isolated tube and should remain isolated; however, as the wear recorded indicates an area of active wear, the tube should be repositioned 3".
Tube N-8 recorded an increase in wear from 60% to 65%, identifying an area of active wear. This tube should be repositioned 3".
48
Tables for Reporting MRP-227-A Inspection Results for Westinghouse Plants Plant Name: Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Utility: NextEra Energy Date of Exams: March 24 to April 4, 2013 Plant Age: 42 (years) / 33.64 EFPY Primary Components OO U "_1I yUlUw LtIdU WIt" I*lUIUdUIa indications (wear) were identified.
Based on Operation Curve Method -
2 CRGTs yellow in - 7 EFPY, 3 CRGTs yellow in 17 to 20 EFPY, and 28 yellow in 20+ EFPY Based on Operation Curve Method -
1 CRGT red in - 7 EFPY and 32 CRGTs red in 20+ EFPY Lomments:
FME found during guide card exams and removed after guide cards examined. 1 flexureless insert needed to be replaced after exams completed.
49
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Comments:
During planning, 96 welds were determined to be accessible for EVT-1 exams. During actual implementation of EVT-1 exams, 110 welds were able to be examined to EVT-1. 8 welds planned to be examined were inaccessible due to an interference with the reactor vessel flange protection ring which was on the lower internals stand. No was cleaning required.
100% of exterior surface No evidence of cracking observed Comments:
Upper core barrel flange weld - Weld has distinct features typically associated with welds. Weld edges were well defined. No cleaning was required.
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Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Comments:
Upper core barrel cylinder girth weld - Weld has distinct features typically associated with welds. Weld edges were well defined. No cleaning was required.
Lower core barrel cylinder girth weld - Weld does not have any features typically associated with welds. Weld is finished flush with no evidence of weld edges, weld ripple or other distinguishing marks. Scans 15" above and 15" below the design drawing weld location were performed without any obvious weld observed. The intersecting longitudinal welds were also undetectable. Weld appeared to be ground at various locations. No cleaning was required. The design drawings showed 16 obstructions which would have limited coverage to 73%, Actually, 6 jacking bolts were not present, resulting in the 77% coverage, 51
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Comments:
Lower core barrel flange weld - Weld does not have any features typically associated with welds. Weld is finished flush with no evidence of weld edges, weld ripple or other distinguishing marks. The intersecting longitudinal welds were also undetectable. Weld and adjacent base material appeared to be ground all along the circumference. No cleaning was required. Due to exterior obstruction (reactor vessel flange protection ring), about 30 degrees of the weld circumference was inaccessible to EVT-1 exam.
100% of 384 baffle-edge No evidence of failures bolts Comments:
52
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 t.omments:
Baffle former bolt design has internal hex head with locking washer. 58 bolts did not produce relevant exam results. Internal hex hole for these bolts have a flat bottom which was not inluded in the sample bolts used to develop the UT technique.
100% of hi-fluence No abnormal gaps or displacement.
seams and vertical plate alignment Comments:
16 hi-fluence seams 53
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Comments:
PBNP has internals hold down springs made from 403 stainless steel.
100% of 6 thermal shield No evidence of cracking, deformation, flexures or wear.
Comments:
Notes to Westinghouse Primary Components Table:
- 1. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the Westinghouse components are in Table 5-3 of MRP-227-A.
- 2. A minimum of 75% of the total identified sample population must be examined.
- 3. A minimum of 75% of the total population (examined + unexamined), including coverage consistent with the Expansion criteria in Table 5-3 of MRP-227-A, must be examined for inspection credit.
- 4. A minimum of 75% of the total weld length (examined + unexamined), including coverage consistent with the Expansion criteria inTable 5-3 of MRP-227-A, must be examined from either the inner or outer diameter for inspection credit.
- 5. The lower core barrel flange weld may be alternatively designated as the core barrel-to-support plate weld in some Westinghouse plant designs.
54
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Expansion Components Upper Internals Enhanced visual 100% of accessible Assembly examination (EVT-1) surfaces (Note 2). N/A Not examined Upper core plate Comments:
Lower Internals Enhanced visual 100% of accessible Assembly examination (EVT-1) surfaces (Note 2). N/A Not examined Lower support forging or castings See Figure 4-33 of MRP-227-A.
Comments:
V 55
V Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Me Rquire Examination Coverage Examination Coverage Achieved Findings (Note 1)
Core Barrel Volumetric 100% of accessible bolts.
Assembly examination (UT) Accessibility may be N/A Not examined Barrel-former bolts limited by presence of thermal shields or neutron pads (Note 2).
See Figure 4-23 of MRP-227-A.
Comments:
Lower Support Volumetric 100% of accessible bolts Assembly examination (UT) or as supported by plant- N/A Not examined Lower support specific justification (Note column bolts 2).
See Figures 4-32 and 4-33 of MRP-227-A.
Comments:
56
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Core Barrel Enhanced visual 100% of one side of the Assembly examination (EVT-1) accessible surfaces of the N/A Not examined Core barrel outlet selected weld and nozzle welds adjacent base metal (Note 2).
See Figure 4-22 of MRP-227-A.
Comments:
Core Barrel Enhanced visual 100% of one side of the Assembly examination (EVT-1) accessible surfaces of the N/A Not examined Upper and lower core selected weld and barrel cylinder axial adjacent base metal (Note welds 2).
See Figure 4-22 of MRP-227-A.
Comments:
57
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1
,tem-Exainatn Meh Required Examination .. Coverage Examination tovaia M t Achieved Findings (Note 1)
Lower Support Enhanced visual 100% of accessible Assembly examination (EVT-1) surfaces (Note 2). N/A Not examined Lower support column bodies See Figure 4-34 of MRP-(non cast) 227-A.
Comments:
Lower Support Enhanced visual 100% of accessible Assembly examination (EVT-1) support columns (Note 2). N/A Not examined Lower support column bodies See Figure 4-34 of MRP-(cast) 227-A.
Comments:
58
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 CoveageAchivedFindings (Note 1)
Bottom Mounted Visual examination 100% of BMI column Instrumentation (VT-3) bodies for which difficulty N/A Not examined System is detected during flux Bottom-mounted thimble instrumentation (BMI) insertion/withdrawal.
column bodies See Figure 4-35 of MRP-227-A.
Comments:
Notes to Westinghouse Expansion Component Table:
- 1. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the Westinghouse components are in Table 5-3 of MRP-227-A.
- 2. A minimum of 75% coverage of the entire examination area or volume, or a minimum sample size of 75% of the total population of like components of the examination is required (including both the accessible and inaccessible portions).
59
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 Existing Programs Components uomments:
N/A Not examined u.omments:
60
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 61
Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 1 aN/A Not examined rnments:
sNot N/A examined mnments:
Notes to Westinghouse Existing Programs Components Table:
- 1. XL = "Extra Long" referring to Westinghouse plants with 14-foot cores.
62
Tables for Reporting MRP-227-A Inspection Results for Westinghouse Plants Plant Name: Millstone Unit 3 (MPS3) Utility: Dominion Nuclear Connecticut Date of Exams: Spring 2013 Plant Age: 27 (years) / 20.7 (approx.) EFPY MPS3 inspected only its flux thimble tubes and does not expect to perform other Primary or Expansion inspections until approximately 2027 Existing Programs Components OP l 1-I3. IUUl
. I-/0
/ll Oliux opring
[ U ,3- iviaximum wear OT thimble tubes inspected full length 60% observed, little changed from last cycle. No corrective actions required uomments:
None.
Notes to Westinghouse Existing Programs Components Table:
- 1. XL = "Extra Long" referring to Westinghouse plants with 14-foot cores.
63
Tables for Reporting MRP-227-A Inspection Results for Westinghouse Plants Plant Name: H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant Utility: Duke Energy Progress Date of Exams: October 2013 Plant Age: 43 (years) / 31.4 EFPY Primary Components Comments:
20% Inspected in R026 (2010). During the guide card wear inspection at H.B. Robinson Unit 2, nine guide tubes were inspected, and the wear in these guide tubes was found to be in the green zone.
64
H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant L;omments:
Completed in R027 (2012). Of the accessible CRGT lower flange weld surfaces and adjacent base metal on the individual periphery CRGT assemblies, H.B. Robinson obtained coverage of 100%. There were 32 peripheral Control Rod Guide Tube Assemblies (CRGTAs) initially scoped for inspecting. H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant examined 13 of the 32 peripherals. Inability to access all 32 peripheral CRGTAs was due to upper internals configuration or adjacent component proximities. Also, examiners noticed air bubbles near upper welds from the Tri-Nuc filtration system that would continuously return after attempted removal. The 13 CRGTAs inspected were CRGTA-B-6 totaling 50% coverage, CRGTA-F-2 totaling 50% coverage, CRGTA-K-2 totaling 50% coverage, CRGTA-P-10 totaling 50%
coverage, CRGTA-F-14 totaling 31% coverage, CRGTA-P-8 totaling 31% coverage, CRGTA-B-10 totaling 28% coverage, CRGTA-H-2 totaling 25% coverage, CRGTA-M-6 totaling 22% coverage, CRGTA-B-8 totaling 19% coverage, CRGTA-K-14 totaling 19%, CRGTA-H-14 totaling 15% coverage, and CRGTA-D-10 totaling 13% coverage. A given CRGTA totaling 50% coverage, for example, signifies that particular CRGTA contained 8 accessible and acceptable welds of the total 16 weld locations.
65
H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant Circumferential indication identified at weld centerline around 3450, this was determined to be a Non-relevant fabrication anomaly lomments; Completed in R027 (2012). RNP Core Barrel protrudes out of Containment Vessel cavity water approximately 18" while in the stand. A portion of this exam was completed while pulling the Core Barrel out of the Reactor Vessel and the remaining area was completed with the Core Barrel in the stand.
100% No evidence of cracking was observed.
66
H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant
%,Omm1TIIEnS; Completed in R028 (Fall 2013). 100% of the Upper Core Barrel Girth Weld was accessible and the examination obtained 100% coverage with no evidence of cracking observed. There were no obstructions during the examination of the Upper Core Barrel Girth Weld. 80% of the Lower Core Barrel Girth Weld was accessible and the examination obtained 80% coverage with no evidence of cracking observed.
There were multiple obstructions during the examination of the Lower Core Barrel Girth Weld located behind the Core Barrel Thermal Shield.
N/A N/A Comments:
Completed in R028 (Fall 2013). 94% of the Lower Core Barrel Flange Weld was accessible and the examination obtained 100% coverage with no evidence of cracking observed. Proximity of the weld to the reactor cavity wall became an obstruction.
67
H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant Completed in R027 (2012). No missing bolts or locking bars on any of the 322 Baffle-edge bolts. A black and white camera was used during this inspection due to high radiation proximity.
100% Total Baffle-Former Bolts: 1088 Total accessible (inspected): 1076 Total with possible defect: 8 Total with confirmed Head-Shank defect: I 68
H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant L.omments:
Completed in R028 (Fall 2013). 98% of the Baffle-Former Bolts were accessible during the UT examination. The RNP Baffle-Former Bolt has an external hexagonal head and is locked in place with a lock bar tack welded to the baffle plate. There was no distinct flaw signal in the bolt volume of the 8 bolts listed as possibly having a defect. There were no missing or damaged lock bars, misaligned bolt heads, or other anomalies observed. All relevant and nonrelevant indications were determined to be acceptable for return to service, and examination of the expansion components as described in MRP-227-A were not required. RNP experienced several probe failures during the UT exam of the Baffle-Former Bolts. The issue is believed to have been the unexpected width of the unique square lock bars on the RNP bolts.
100% None Comments:
Completed in R027 (2012). No signs of void swelling, induced distortion, vertical displacement, or any other aging mechanisms. A black and white camera was used during this due to high radiation proximity 69
H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant Comments:
Currently planned for replacement during RO-29 (Spring 2015).
100% None S-,,Ulll 11II R~lb Completed in R027 (2012). There were 2 weld locations requiring inspection of each of the 6 Thermal Shield Assembly Thermal shield flexures. The vendor denoted the two weld locations as (1) Thermal Shield Weld and (2) Thermal Shield Flexure Weld. Also a portion of this exam, the 2 weld locations at the 900 azimuth, was completed while pulling the Core Barrel out of the Reactor Vessel and the remaining exam was completed with the Core Barrel in the stand.
Notes to Westinghouse Primary Components Table:
- 1. Examination acceptance criteria and expansion criteria for the Westinghouse components are in Table 5-3 of MRP-227-A.
70
H.B. Robinson Nuclear Plant
- 2. A minimum of 75% of the total identified sample population must be examined.
- 3. A minimum of 75% of the total population (examined + unexamined), including coverage consistent with the Expansion criteria in Table 5-3 of MRP-227-A, must be examined for inspection credit.
- 4. A minimum of 75% of the total weld length (examined + unexamined), including coverage consistent with the Expansion criteria in Table 5-3 of MRP-227-A, must be examined from either the inner or outer diameter for inspection credit.
- 5. The lower core barrel flange weld may be alternatively designated as the core barrel-to-support plate weld in some Westinghouse plant designs.
71