ML14266A369

LTR-14-0486-1 FW: Nuclear Power Plant Security Concerns - EDATS: Region I-2014-0262 (LTR-14-0486-1)

ML14266A369
Person / Time
Site:	Pilgrim
Issue date:	09/23/2014
From:	Oakes K - No Known Affiliation
To:	James Trapp Division of Reactor Safety I
Trapp J
References
EDATS: Region I-2014-0262, LTR-14-0486-1
Download: ML14266A369 (2)

Text

From: Heater, Keith Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 1:48 PM To: Heater, Keith

Subject:

FW: Nuclear Power Plant Security Concerns - EDATS 2014-0262 (LTR-14-0486-1)

Our response to the concerned individual and his subsequent reply back. No response back is required.

(LTR-14-0486-1 / EDATS: RegionI-2014-0262)

- Keith Heater, Admin.

From: Karl Oakes Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 8:13 AM To: Trapp, James Cc: Screnci, Diane

Subject:

Re: Nuclear Power Plant Security Concerns

Sir, For the record, I don't take this response seriously. If individuals wearing bright "Close Pilgrim" stickers were able to loiter on the premises for 20 minutes, it suggests that corporate security personnel are not nearly as vigilant as the idealized scenario you're selling. My assessment is that anyone could easily drive up or come by in a boat and put a rocket propelled grenade in the spent fuel building, or could easily fly a small plane into it. You don't have to personally penetrate the "secure perimeter" in order to trigger a meltdown. Look at a satellite photo and tell me I'm wrong. Look at the results of prior security exercises at Pilgrim, where simulated attackers were able to get in position to disable power to the reactor, and tell me I'm wrong. You're just blindly hoping the FBI will will detect potential attackers before they get to the execution stage, in the same way that you're blindly hoping society will stay functional and stable for 160 years when you issue your waste confidence rules.

Security personnel are human beings. They get bored, they get complacent, they goof off. Look what just happened at the White House. And the people who employ Pilgrim's security personnel also effectively employ you. Certainly, if you annoy them, they can make sure there's no cushy private sector job waiting for you after you leave the NRC. So when you tell me I can trust my life to these people, does it make any sense to you that I'm not in the least bit reassured?

I understand that it's your job to email this kind of nonsense to the public. I understand that no matter what I say to you, all you can do is copy a stock response and send it to me. So let's not waste any more of each other's time. I'll just say in closing that I hope the wrong people don't ever focus their attention on this situation, or myself, my family, and many thousands of other people will suffer enormously while your office spews out carefully crafted CYA statements

("there will be a vigorous and thorough investigation to make sure an event like this can not

possible ever happen again") to make sure you don't have to take any responsibility for it.

Because in your world, I think that's what everything is ultimately about.

Sincerely,

-- Karl Oakes On Sep 23, 2014, at 7:25 AM, Trapp, James wrote:

Dear Mr. Oakes,

I am responding to the email you sent to Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman Allison Macfarlane on September 2, 2014, on security at the Pilgrim nuclear power plant. The Chairman was also copied on a letter you sent to the Secretary of Homeland Security on September 2, which raised the same security concerns.

We are aware that individuals and a television camera crew recently drove into the parking lot at Pilgrim and that there have been other instances of members of the public entering this area. I assure you this does not pose a security threat to Pilgrim. In fact, Pilgrim and the nations other nuclear power plants are among the best-protected sector of our national infrastructure.

NRC requires nuclear power plant owners to take a graded approach to physical protection focusing on the areas most important to safety. For example, the area encompassing a nuclear power plant and its safety equipment is the Protected Area. NRC regulations require stringent access control measures before personnel and vehicles can enter a Protected Area.

Within the Protected Area are the Vital Areas, which have additional access barriers and alarms to protect important equipment. All plants are required to have security checkpoints into the Protected Area. The outermost area, or the Owner-Controlled Area, does not have the same access control requirements and can be accessible by the public.

In the recent incidents at Pilgrim, members of the public were able to drive onto the owner-controlled area, but were not able to enter the protected area. Driving onto the owner-controlled area and entering an administrative building did not pose a security threat or a danger to the site or to the public.

Since the September 11th terrorist attacks, the NRC has required numerous security enhancements at the nations nuclear plants. While the plants are secure and contain robust structures designed and built to withstand a variety of natural and man-made events, the agency ordered additional measures to be taken. For example, we strengthened requirements related to physical barriers, access controls, and intrusion detection and surveillance systems, as well as the existing well-trained and armed security officers. NRC regulations require that plants be able to defend against an assault by multiple, determined and capable adversaries attacking by land or water, truck bombs, boat bombs, insider threats and cyber attacks.

Finally, the NRC has an extensive security oversight program. The NRC reviews and approves a plants security plan and our inspectors conduct onsite inspections of personnel and equipment on an on-going basis to ensure our requirements are met. Additionally, Force-on-Force security inspections are another part of this program. During these inspections, a specially trained mock adversary force attacks the facility in a coordinated fashion. Should NRC inspectors find deficiencies, they are corrected or compensated for before the inspectors leave the site.

In summary, NRC regulations and oversight ensure security at Pilgrim and the other operating nuclear power plants is appropriate to protect the public health and safety.

Should you have any further questions, please contact Region I Senior Public Affairs Officer Diane Screnci at diane.screnci@nrc.gov or 610-337-5330.

Sincerely, James M. Trapp, Acting Director Division of Reactor Safety