Information Notice 2014-15, Inadequate Controls of Respiratory Protection Accessibility, Training, and Maintenance

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Inadequate Controls of Respiratory Protection Accessibility, Training, and Maintenance
ML14217A041
Person / Time
Site: Hatch, Watts Bar, Ginna, Robinson, Quad Cities  Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/01/2014
From: Camper L, Michael Cheok, Kokajko L
Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery and Waste Programs, Division of Construction Inspection and Operational Programs, Division of Policy and Rulemaking
To:
M Banic, 301-415-2771
References
IN 2014-15 IN-14-015, IR 2003003, IR 2006003, IR 2007002, IR 2009003
Download: ML14217A041 (7)


ML14217A041 UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR SECURITY AND INCIDENT RESPONSE

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

OFFICE OF NEW REACTORS

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

December 1, 2014

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2014-15:

INADEQUATE CONTROLS OF RESPIRATORY

PROTECTION ACCESSIBILITY, TRAINING, AND

MAINTENANCE

ADDRESSEES

All holders of an operating license or construction permit for a nuclear power reactor or a

non-power (research or test) reactor under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations

(10 CFR) Part 50, Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities, including those

that have permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently

removed from the reactor vessel.

All holders of and applicants for a power reactor early site permit, combined license, standard

design certification, standard design approval, or manufacturing license under 10 CFR Part 52, Licenses, Certifications, and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants.

PURPOSE

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to

inform addressees of inspection findings related to weaknesses in licensee respiratory

protection programs supporting emergency preparedness. Inadequate controls of

accessibility, training, and maintenance of self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs) has

led to numerous violations since 2001. Specifically, this IN intends to inform licensees of the

importance of having adequate procedures to properly implement and maintain an effective

respiratory protection program

The NRC expects that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities

and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions

contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific

action or written response is required.

DESCRIPTION OF CIRCUMSTANCES

The findings detailed below (additional findings included as an attachment) represent various

weaknesses in respiratory protection programs that the NRC identified subsequent to

distribution of information notices discussed below.

Missing SCBA Spectacle Kit at Clinton Power Station

On May 12, 2011, during an observation of SCBA maintenance inspection activities in the

control room, the inspectors identified that one of the operating shift crew who wore eyeglasses

did not have a corrective lens kit in the designated storage location. A licensee investigation

determined that the missing spectacle kit was the result of a program weakness. Specifically, the process used for establishing the medical readiness of control room operators did not

ensure operators had received SCBA corrective lens inserts before assuming watch

responsibilities.

Additional information appears in Clinton Power Station, NRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000461/2011-004, dated November 3, 2011, available on the NRCs public Web site in the

Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) under Accession

No. ML11308A056.

Failure to Provide Adequate SCBA Respirator Masks at Columbia Generating Station

During an inspection completed on July 23, 2009, NRC inspectors evaluated the adequacy of

SCBA units staged in the control room for emergency use. The licensee staged six SCBA units

for emergency use. The units contained medium respirator masks. On top of the units were

staged one small mask, one large mask, and one extra-large respirator mask. NRC inspectors

identified that three of the licensed control room operators on the day shift on July 22, 2009, were fit-tested for small respirator masks. In the event of an emergency requiring immediate

respiratory protection, two of the three licensed operators who were fit-tested in small respirator

masks would not have been qualified to use the pre-staged SCBA equipment and may have

been unable to function in the event the control room became uninhabitable.

Additional information appears in Columbia Generating StationNRC Radiation Safety Team

Inspection Report 05000397/2009009, dated September 15, 2009, on the NRCs public Web

site in ADAMS under Accession No. ML092600874.

Expired SCBA Qualifications at Diablo Canyon Power Plant

On August 7 through 9, 2011, an operator filled an on-shift emergency response organization

position for three consecutive shifts with expired SCBA respiratory protection qualifications. The

licensee did not ensure the operator obtained the proper requalification training, an action that

did not provide the emergency worker the full range of available protective actions as specified

in 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). Although the licensee was aware that the operators respiratory

qualification had expired, the operators supervisor determined that the licensee met its

technical specification minimum complement of qualified operators and considered that the

minimum emergency response organization complement did not require respiratory

qualification. The Diablo Canyon technical specification required number of operators is less than the Emergency Plan required number of operators. The licensees determination was in

error because the required minimum of emergency response organization on-shift staff

personnel is required to respond to all emergencies and, therefore, requires that staff members

be fully qualified for their response functions.

Additional information appears in Diablo Canyon Power PlantNRC Integrated Inspection

Report 05000275/2011004 and 05000323/2011004, dated November 18, 2011, on the NRCs

public Web site in ADAMS under Accession No. ML113220067.

Failure to Properly Test and Maintain SCBA Bottles at Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station

During walkdowns of in-service SCBA equipment on February 8, 2007, the inspectors identified

that several SCBA air bottles did not have current hydrostatic tests. The SCBA equipment was

strategically located in various areas of the plant to support emergency response activities

including the main control room. Following the inspectors identification of the problem, the

licensee determined that approximately 12 percent of the SCBA air bottles (26 bottles) in the

stations in-service inventory had not been tested for periods ranging from just over 3 years up

to nearly 7 years. According to the licensees preliminary evaluation, the bottles were acquired

in 2001 and placed into service without the knowledge of the radiation protection staff

responsible for SCBA equipment inspection. Consequently, those particular bottles were not

tracked as part of the licensees bottle inventory. While the licensee performed monthly

inspections of all in-service SCBA equipment, including all air bottles, those inspections failed to

identify the problem because the procedure governing the inspection activity did not require that

bottles be checked to ensure current hydrostatic testing.

Additional information appears in Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2, NRC

Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/2007002 and 05000265/2007002, dated May 3, 2007, on the NRCs public Web site in ADAMS under Accession No. ML071230732.

BACKGROUND

Self-contained breathing apparatuses (SCBAs) are used in the event the control room

operators, who are key responders identified in the emergency plan, must perform licensed

duties while wearing respiratory protection during certain postulated accidents. As such, SCBAs must be properly maintained and accessible to trained individuals in the event of an

emergency that requires respiratory protection.

The NRC issued Information Notice 98-20, Problems with Emergency Preparedness

Respiratory Protection Programs, on June 3, 1998. That notice informed licensees of various

weaknesses in licensee respiratory protection programs, including but not limited to the various

weaknesses that are reemphasized in this IN. Specifically, this IN addresses recurring

problems relating to the availability of corrective lenses, availability of masks in the proper sizes, manufacturer-specified maintenance and testing, as well as appropriate licensed operator

training. In addition, the NRC issued Information Notice 97-66, Failure to Provide Special Lenses for

Operators Using Respirator or Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus during Emergency

Operations, on August 20, 1997, to address the accessibility of SCBA to licensed operators

during emergency response.

DISCUSSION

The NRC requires licensees to comply with 10 CFR 50.54(b)(10), which states, in part, that a

licensee must provide adequate protective measures for emergency workers. Each of the

above descriptions (and those included in the attachment) resulted in a violation of NRC

regulations.

The NRC has consistently dispositioned inadequate controls of accessibility, training, and

maintenance of SCBAs as more than minor safety significance. SCBAs are an integral piece of

emergency response equipment for radiological and oxygen deficient atmospheres. As such, SCBAs are an integral piece of safety equipment for Fire Protection Plans and Emergency

Response Plans. They are used extensively by Onsite Fire Brigades for immediate fire-fighting

response and emergency workers for radiological protection. When they cannot provide

adequate personnel protection, a degradation of emergency response is likely to occur and the

consequences could be life-threatening. The examples used in this IN, that have all been cited

following the release of IN 98-20, detail the varied nature of issues that have been identified

related to respiratory protection programs. The NRC believes that the nature of these findings

may be indicative of an ongoing trend that was not adequately addressed following the

publication of the previous INs.

This IN informs licensees that they may benefit from further evaluating the adequacy of controls

for their respiratory protection program. Regulations in 10 CFR 20.1703, Use of Individual

Respiratory Protection Equipment, require, in part, that each worker that may be required to

wear an SCBA be fit tested and properly trained. It is important that licensees maintain current

and comprehensive oversight. A strong oversight program would ensure not only that each

worker is appropriately fit tested, trained, and qualified, but also that respirator mask sizes are

staged and available to meet any potential demand, and that corrective lens kits are available at

all times to all users who require them. A strong oversight program would also ensure that each

piece of equipment is systematically tested and maintained in accordance with guidelines

agreed to by the manufacturer and licensee.

CONTACT

S

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. Please direct any

questions about this matter to the technical contact listed below or the appropriate NRC

project manager.

/RA/

/RA/

Lawrence E. Kokajko, Director

Larry W. Camper, Director

Division of Policy and Rulemaking

Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

and Waste Programs

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

/RA/

Michael C. Cheok, Director

Division of Construction Inspection

and Operational Programs

Office of New Reactors

Technical Contact:

Jonathan Fiske, NSIR/DPR/DDEP/IRIB

301-287-9228 E-mail: Jonathan.Fiske@nrc.gov

Note: NRC generic communications may be found on the NRC public Web site, http://www.nrc.gov, under Electronic Reading Room/Document Collections.

ML14217A041 *concurred via email

TAC MF4551 OFFICE PM:NSIR*

Tech Editor*

BC:IRIB:NSIR* D:DPR:NSIR

BC:DUWP:NMSS* LA:PGCB:NRR*

NAME JFiske

CHsu

RKahler

RLewis

BWatson

CHawes

DATE

04/21/14

07/09/14

10/22/14

09/12/14

10/22/14

11/12/14 OFFICE PM:PGCB:NRR BC:PGCB:NRR DD:DCIP:NRO DD: DUWP:NMSS DPR:NRR

DPR:NRR

NAME MBanic

SStuchell

MCheok

LCamper

AMohseni

LKokajko

DATE

11/14/14

11/17/14

11/20/14

11/18/14

11/24/14

12/01/14

Attachment

Additional Findings

Operators Did Not Have Corrective Lens Kits Available to Implement Emergency Plan

Requirements at Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

Information available in Ginna Nuclear Power PlantU.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

(NRC) Integrated Inspection Report 05000244/2009003, dated July 27, 2009, on the NRCs

public Web site in Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) under

Accession No. ML092080369.

Failure to Provide Proper Size Respirator Masks for Respiratory Protection at H.B. Robinson

Information available in H.B. Robinson Steam Electric PlantNRC Integrated Inspection Report 05000261/2007002, dated April 20, 2007, on the NRCs public Web site in ADAMS under

Accession No. ML071100293.

Failure to Perform Air Quality Test for Compressors Used to Supply Emergency Preparedness

SCBA Breathing Air Tanks at Watts Bar

Information available in Watts Bar Nuclear PlantNRC Integrated Inspection Reports

05000390/2006003 and 05000391/2006003, dated July 25, 2006, on the NRCs public Web site

in ADAMS under Accession No. ML062060218.

SCBA Training Procedure Did Not Require Users To Demonstrate Changing Bottles at Edwin I.

Hatch

Information available in Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Power PlantNRC Integrated Inspection

Reports 50-321/02-03 and 50-366/02-03, dated July 26, 2002, on the NRCs public Web site in

ADAMS under Accession No. ML022100427.