ML14211A602

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IR 05000285-14-003; 04/01/2014 - 06/30/2014; Fort Calhoun Station; Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Control
ML14211A602
Person / Time
Site: Fort Calhoun Omaha Public Power District icon.png
Issue date: 07/29/2014
From: Hay M
NRC/RGN-IV/DRP
To: Cortopassi L
Omaha Public Power District
Hay M
References
IR-14-003
Download: ML14211A602 (41)


See also: IR 05000285/2014003

Text

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

1600 E LAMAR BLVD

ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511

July 29, 2014

Louis P. Cortopassi, Site Vice President

Omaha Public Power District

Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4

P.O. Box 550

Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550

SUBJECT: FORT CALHOUN - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT

NUMBER 05000285/2014003

Dear Mr. Cortopassi:

On June 30, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at

your Fort Calhoun Station. On July 16, 2014, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this

inspection with Mr. E. Dean, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. Inspectors

documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.

NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.

This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements.

If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within

30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with

copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident

inspector at the Fort Calhoun Station.

If you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a

response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your

disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the

Fort Calhoun Station.

In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public

Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your

response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public

L. Cortopassi -2-

Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's

Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible

from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic

Reading Room).

Sincerely,

/RA/

Michael C. Hay

Chief, Project Branch F

Division of Reactor Projects

Docket: 50-285

License: DPR-40

Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report 05000285/2014003

w/Attachment: Supplemental

Information

ML14211A602

SUNSI Review ADAMS Publicly Available Non-Sensitive

By: MHay Yes No Non-Publicly Available Sensitive

OFFICE DRP/FCS DRP/FCS RIV/DRS RIV/DRP

NAME JKirkland/dll JWingbach HGepford MHay

SIGNATURE /RA/E-Hay /RA/ /RA/ /RA/

DATE 7/24/14 7/28/14 7/25/14 7/29/14

Letter to Louis P. Cortopassi from from Michael C. Hay dated July 29, 2014

SUBJECT: FORT CALHOUN - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT

NUMBER 05000285/2014003

DISTRIBUTION:

Regional Administrator (Marc.Dapas@nrc.gov)

Deputy Regional Administrator (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)

Acting DRP Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)

Acting DRP Deputy Director (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)

DRS Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)

DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)

Senior Resident Inspector (Max.Schneider@nrc.gov)

Resident Inspector (Jacob.Wingebach@nrc.gov)

Acting Senior Project Engineer, DRP/F (Peter.Jayroe@nrc.gov)

Project Engineer, DRP/F (Chris.Smith@nrc.gov)

FCS Administrative Assistant (Janise.Schwee@nrc.gov)

RIV Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)

RIV Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)

NRR Project Manager (Joseph.Sebrosky@nrc.gov)

RIV Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Geoffrey.Miller@nrc.gov)

RIV RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)

RIV Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)

Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)

OEMail Resource

OEWEB Resource (Sue.Bogle@nrc.gov)

Technical Support Assistant (Loretta.Williams@nrc.gov)

RIV/ETA: OEDO (Anthony.Bowers@nrc.gov)

RIV RSLO (Bill.Maier@nrc.gov)

ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov)

MC 0350 Panel Chairman (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)

MC 0350 Panel Vice Chairman (Louise.Lund@nrc.gov)

MC 0350 Panel Member (Michael.Balazik@nrc.gov)

MC 0350 Panel Member (Michael.Markley@nrc.gov)

ROPreports

Distribution via Listserv for Fort Calhoun Station

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION IV

Docket: 05000285

License: DPR-40

Report: 05000285/2014003

Licensee: Omaha Public Power District

Facility: Fort Calhoun Station

Location: 9610 Power Lane

Blair, NE 68008

Dates: April 1 through June 30, 2014

Inspectors: J. Kirkland, Senior Resident Inspector

S. Schneider, Senior Resident Inspector

J. Wingebach, Resident Inspector

C. Alldredge, Health Physicist

N. Greene, Ph.D., Health Physicist

P. Hernandez, Health Physicist

J. Larsen, Senior Physical Security Inspector

R. Latta, Senior Reactor Inspector

C. Speer, Resident Inspector

L. Willoughby, Senior Reactor Inspector

Approved By: Michael C. Hay, Chief, Project Branch F

Division of Reactor Projects

-1- Enclosure

SUMMARY

IR 05000285/2014003; 04/01/2014 - 06/30/2014; Fort Calhoun Station; Radiological Hazard

Assessment and Exposure Control.

The inspection activities described in this report were performed between April 1 and

June 30, 2014, by the resident inspectors at Fort Calhoun Station and inspectors from the

NRCs Region IV office. One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in

this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The significance of

inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow,

Red), and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination

Process dated June 2, 2011. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection

Manual Chapter 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas dated

December 19, 2013. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with

the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated July 9, 2013. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe

operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor

Oversight Process revision 5.

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

Green. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited violation of Technical

Specification 5.11.1.b, which resulted from an individual entering a high radiation area

without being aware of the radiological conditions. Specifically, on July 19, 2013, an

operator was performing valve lineup work in the reactor building. Although the operator

was on a radiation work permit that allowed access to high radiation areas, access was

only allowed with knowledge of the dose rates in the areas entered. As immediate

corrective actions, the radiation protection supervisors coached the operator on properly

informing Radiation Protection of his planned work areas and coached the radiation

protection technician on having a more intrusive questioning attitude during briefings

so that radworkers are properly informed of all hazards and radiological conditions.

This issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Condition

Report CR 2014-14693.

The entry into a high radiation area without knowledge of the radiological conditions is a

performance deficiency and is a violation of Technical Specification 5.11.1.b. The

performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Occupational

Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of program and process (exposure control) and

adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health

and safety from exposure to radiation. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C,

Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, dated

August 19, 2008, the inspectors determined the violation has very low safety significance

because: (1) it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, (2) there was no

overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability

to assess dose was not compromised. This violation has a cross-cutting aspect in the

human performance area, associated with teamwork, because the operator did not properly

communicate his work locations to the radiation protection technician for briefing and the

technician did not display a questioning attitude to understand the work locations for the

operator to properly brief him and ensure nuclear safety was maintained [H.4].

(Section 2RS1)

-2-

PLANT STATUS

The unit began the inspection period at 100% power. On April 15, 2014, the unit commenced a

plant shutdown in accordance with Technical Specification 2.0.1 due to two inoperable control

room air conditioners. One air conditioner was restored to operable status on April 15, 2014,

with reactor power at approximately 36% power and the shutdown was halted. The unit

returned to 100% power on April 18, 2014. On April 20, 2014, reactor power was decreased to

approximately 85% to perform condenser cleaning. The unit returned to 100% power on

April 26, 2014. On May 14, 2014, reactor power was decreased to 90% power to repair leaking

gaskets on the heater drain pump suction piping. The unit returned to 100% power on

May 16, 2014. On June 20, 2014, due to rising Missouri river levels the station commenced a

downpower to 30%. On June 23, 2014, high Missouri river levels were determined to not be an

operational restraint and reactor power was raised to 100% where it remained for the rest of the

inspection period.

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity

1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)

.1 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions

a. Inspection Scope

On May 12, 2014, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations readiness for

impending adverse weather conditions due to severe thunderstorms in the area. The

inspectors reviewed plant design features, the licensees procedures to respond to

tornadoes and high winds, and the licensees planned implementation of these

procedures. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and

indications for those systems required to control the plant.

On June 16, 2014, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations readiness for

impending adverse weather conditions during a tornado watch. The inspectors reviewed

plant design features, the licensees procedures to respond to tornadoes and high winds,

and the licensees planned implementation of these procedures. The inspectors

evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those

systems required to control the plant.

These activities constituted two samples of readiness for impending adverse weather

conditions, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

-3-

.2 Readiness to Cope with External Flooding

a. Inspection Scope

From June 17 through June 23, 2014, the inspectors completed an inspection of the

stations readiness to cope with external flooding due to expected flooding on the

Missouri River.

The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures for coping with

flooding. The inspectors walked down selected areas to inspect the design features,

including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The inspectors

evaluated whether credited operator actions could be successfully accomplished.

These activities constituted one sample of readiness to cope with external flooding, as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.

1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)

.1 Partial Walkdown

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant

systems:

April 30, 2014, partial alignment of the diesel generator system while DG-1 was

under a surveillance activity,

May 28, 2014, partial system alignment of the spent fuel cooling system while

spent fuel cooling pump AC-5A was out of service for maintenance, and

June 18, 2014, partial system alignment of the intake cell level control system

when the site anticipated river level would require their use.

The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to

determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions

of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.

These activities constituted three partial system walk-down samples as defined in

Inspection Procedure 71111.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

-4-

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)

.1 Quarterly Inspection

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status

and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on four plant areas

important to safety:

May 21, 2014, Room 56E, East Switchgear Area, Fire Area 36A

May 21, 2014, Room 56W, West Switchgear Area, Fire Area 36B

May 28, 2014, Room 59, Pipe Penetration Area, Fire Area 23

June 19, 2014, Intake Structure, Fire Area 31

For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and

defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors

evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and

suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire

protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.

These activities constituted four quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection

Procedure 71111.05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)

a. Inspection Scope

On April 29, 2014, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations ability to

mitigate flooding due to internal causes. After reviewing the licensees flooding analysis,

the inspectors chose two plant areas containing risk-significant structures, systems, and

components that were susceptible to flooding:

Corridor 4, Basement and Personnel Corridor Area

Room 21, Safety Injection and Containment Spray Pump Area I

The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures for coping with

internal flooding. The inspectors walked down the selected areas to inspect the design

features, including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The

inspectors evaluated whether operator actions credited for flood mitigation could be

successfully accomplished.

These activities constitute completion of one flood protection measures sample as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.

-5-

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed licensee programs to verify heat exchanger performance and

operability for the following heat exchangers:

Raw Water/Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger - AC-1B

Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger - AC-4A

Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger - AC-8

The inspectors verified whether testing, inspection, maintenance, and chemistry control

programs were adequate to ensure proper heat transfer. The inspectors verified that the

periodic testing and monitoring methods, as outlined in commitments to NRC Generic

Letter 89-13, utilized appropriate industry heat exchanger guidance. Additionally, the

inspectors verified that the licensees chemistry program ensured that biological fouling

was properly controlled between tests. The inspectors reviewed previous maintenance

records of the heat exchangers to verify that the licensees heat exchanger inspections

adequately addressed structural integrity and cleanliness of their tubes. Specific

documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.

These activities constitute completion of three triennial heat sink inspection samples as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.07-05.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance

(71111.11)

.1 Review of Licensed Operator Requalification

a. Inspection Scope

On April 17, 2014, the inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario performed

by an operating crew. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and

the evaluators critique of their performance.

These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification

program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

-6-

.2 Review of Licensed Operator Performance

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plants

main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of

heightened activity. The inspectors also assessed the operators adherence to plant

procedures, including conduct of operations procedure and other operations department

policies. The inspectors observed the operators performance of the following activities:

April 15, 2014, Technical Specification required shutdown due to inoperable

control room air conditioning units

May 12, 2014, Plant downpower to 90% power due to leaking gaskets in heater

drain pump suction piping

Reactor Plant power maneuvers to support power ascension on

June 22 and 23, 2014

These activities constitute completion of three quarterly licensed operator performance

samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-

related structures, systems, and components (SSCs):

April 15, 2014, failure of control room air conditioning Unit VA-46A

May 2, 2014, charging Pump CH-1A packing failure

The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures

and evaluated the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors

reviewed the licensees work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a

role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensees

characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance

Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance

and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.

These activities constituted completion of two maintenance effectiveness samples, as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

-7-

1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed two risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to

changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in

response to elevated risk:

April 3, 2014, risk management actions associated with the turbine driven

auxiliary feedwater Pump FW-10 being out of service for maintenance

April 29, 2014, risk management actions associated with the performance of

OP-ST-ESF-009, Channel "A" Safety Injection, Containment Spray and

Recirculation Actuation Signal Test

The inspectors verified that these risk assessments were performed timely and in

accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant

procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees

risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk

management actions based on the result of the assessments.

In addition, on April 5, 2014, the inspectors also observed portions of one emergent work

activities that had the potential to affect the functional capability of the Chemical and

Volume Control System. Specifically, the inspectors observed portions of the emergent

rebuild of the A Charging Pump, CH-1A.

The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work

plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to

minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected structures, systems, and

components (SSCs).

These activities constitute completion of three maintenance risk assessments and

emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed four operability determinations that the licensee performed for

degraded or nonconforming structures, systems, or components (SSCs):

April 15, 2014, operability determination of control room air conditioning Unit

VA-46A after installation of a modification to bypass the low lube oil pressure

switch

April 23, 2014, operability determination of charging Pump CH-1B

-8-

May 2, 2014, operability determination of reactor coolant system Loop 1A

charging line stop Valve HCV-238

June 4, 2014, operability determination of the auxiliary building while allowing

access down the main access gate while under a tornado warning

The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees

evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable, the

inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to

provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee

had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the

degraded SSC.

These activities constitute completion of four operability review samples, as defined in

Inspection Procedure 71111.15.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed five post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-

significant structures, systems, or components (SSCs):

May 23, 2014, post-maintenance testing following maintenance on Emergency

Diesel Generator 1 (EDG-1)

June 2, 2014, post-maintenance testing following maintenance on the diesel

driven auxiliary feedwater Pump, FW-54

April 17, 2014, post-maintenance testing following maintenance on control room

Air Conditioner VA-46A

May 1, 2014, post-maintenance testing following maintenance on raw water

piping

June 6, 2014, post-maintenance testing following maintenance on raw water

Strainer AC-12B

The inspectors reviewed licensing and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the

maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the

performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests

in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria,

and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.

These activities constitute completion of five post-maintenance testing inspection

samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.

-9-

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed four risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results

to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the structures, systems, and

components (SSCs) were capable of performing their safety functions:

In-service tests:

May 1, 2014, Safety Injection System Category A and B Valve Exercise Test,

OP-ST-3001

Other surveillance tests:

April 4, 2014, Component Cooling Water Pump Base Line Curve Procedure,

SE-ST-CCW-3002

April 22, 2014, Quarterly Functional Test of Steam Generator Low Water Level

Trip Units, IC-ST-RPS-0014

April 10, 2014, Channel Functional Test of Containment Pressure High Signal

(CPHS) Switches

The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the

licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of

the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the

licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.

These activities constitute completion of four surveillance testing inspection samples, as

defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness

1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)

.1 Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on May 13, 2014, to verify the

adequacy and capability of the licensees assessment of drill performance. The

inspectors reviewed the drill scenario, observed the drill from the technical support

center, operations support center, simulator, emergency operations facility, and attended

the post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency

- 10 -

classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were

appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness

weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and

entered into the corrective action program for resolution.

These activities constitute completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation

sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2. RADIATION SAFETY

Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety

2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed the licensees performance in assessing the radiological

hazards in the workplace associated with licensed activities. The inspectors assessed

the licensees implementation of appropriate radiation monitoring and exposure control

measures for both individual and collective exposures. The inspectors walked down

various portions of the plant and performed independent radiation dose rate

measurements. The inspectors interviewed the Radiation Protection (RP) manager,

RP supervisors, and radiation workers. The inspectors reviewed licensee performance

in the following areas:

The hazard assessment program, including a review of the licensees evaluations

of changes in plant operations and radiological surveys to detect dose rates,

airborne radioactivity, and surface contamination levels

Instructions and notices to workers, including labeling or marking containers of

radioactive material, radiation work permits, actions for electronic dosimeter

alarms, and changes to radiological conditions

Programs and processes for control of sealed sources and release of potentially

contaminated material from the radiologically controlled area, including survey

performance, instrument sensitivity, release criteria, procedural guidance, and

sealed source accountability

Radiological hazards control and work coverage, including the adequacy of

surveys, RP job coverage and contamination controls, the use of electronic

dosimeters in high noise areas, dosimetry placement, airborne radioactivity

monitoring, controls for highly activated or contaminated materials (non-fuel)

stored within spent fuel and other storage pools, and posting and physical

controls for high radiation areas and very high radiation areas

Radiation worker and RP technician performance with respect to RP work

requirements

- 11 -

Audits, self-assessments, and corrective action documents related to radiological

hazard assessment and exposure controls since the last inspection

These activities constitute completion of one sample of radiological hazard assessment

and exposure controls as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.01.

b. Findings

Introduction. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, Green, non-cited violation of

Technical Specification 5.11.1.b, which resulted from the licensees failure to control

entry into a high radiation area (HRA) when an operator entered a posted HRA without

knowledge of the dose rates. As a result, the operator received a high dose rate alarm

upon entry into an area with greater than anticipated dose rates.

Description. On July 19, 2013, an operator entered a posted HRA without adequate

knowledge of the radiological conditions (dose rates) in the area. As a result, the

electronic alarming dosimeter (EAD) worn by the operator alarmed due to a high dose

rate. This unanticipated dose rate alarm was received while performing valve lineups on

the 1013 foot elevation of the reactor building, B steam generator (S/G) bay area. This

work was performed while signed onto Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 11-0020, Task 2,

OPS support (STs, walkdowns etc.), with alarm setpoints of 35 millirem for dose and

375 millirem per hour for dose rate. However, the inspectors determined that the

operator should have been signed onto Task 1, Valve Line-Up and Tag Outs, to perform

the specific duties of valve lineup; the Task 1 alarm setpoints were 30 millirem for dose

and 150 millirem per hour for dose rate. Both tasks of RWP 11-0020 allowed access to

an HRA, but only after being made knowledgeable of the dose rates in the areas to be

entered.

An RP technician briefed the operator on the general area radiological conditions of the

walk path for the job, but failed to provide detailed information on the work areas

surrounding the walk path. Per discussion with the licensee, the operator informed

the RP technician that he was performing valve lineup work in the B S/G bay area,

but he did not specify that he would veer from the walk path for which he was briefed.

The RP technician briefed the operator of the radiological conditions using

Survey M-20130625-5, dated June 25, 2013. The survey showed a maximum general

area dose rate of 20 millirem per hour on the walk path of the B S/G bay area. The

operator veered from this path to access a valve atop the reactor coolant pump volute

area, which was located a few feet away from the walk path below the shroud level of

the pump. Upon entry to this area, he received a high dose rate alarm of 476 millirem

per hour. As required, the operator stopped work and immediately exited the radiation

controlled area (RCA) to inform RP of the alarming dosimeter. A follow-up

survey, M-20130719-2, dated July 19 2013, was completed and showed a maximum

of 1,000 millirem per hour on contact and 450 millirem per hour at 30 cm in this specific

location.

The licensee determined in their investigation of the event that if better communication

had occurred between the operator and RP technician performing the briefing, this issue

could have been avoided. There are procedural requirements, developed and

maintained for the purpose of radiological protection of personnel, which also could have

also prevented this event. Section 7.12.3.A of Procedure RP-204, Radiological Area

Controls, Revision 66, states, in part, that a briefing shall be conducted PRIOR to initial

- 12 -

entry: (1) with the most recent survey data available, BRIEF workers on current

radiological conditions in the work area and travel path; (2) INFORM the workers of

areas to avoid; (3) BRIEF on EAD alarm settings and ENSURE they are adequate for

the work area; and (4) ENSURE workers are aware of entry only to briefed HRAs. In

addition, Section 4.5.3.B.1 of Procedure SO-G-101, Radiation Worker Practices,

Revision 39, states, in part, that entry into HRAs with an alarming dosimeter shall be

made only after the dose rate level(s) in the area have been established and personnel

have been made knowledgeable of the radiological conditions. These steps were not

followed by either the RP technician or the operator. Records show that the radworker

received a total of 9.9 millirem dose during the radiological controlled area (RCA) entry.

As immediate corrective actions, the RP supervisors coached the operator on properly

informing RP of his planned work areas and coached the RP technician on having a

more intrusive questioning attitude during briefings so that radworkers, in general, are

properly informed of all hazards and radiological conditions. In addition to these

immediate corrective actions, per discussion with the NRC inspectors, the licensee also

planned to post more detailed surveys at the entrance to large areas posted as HRAs to

better inform radworkers of the radiological conditions which they may encounter. This

issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Condition

Report CR 2014-14693.

Analysis. The entry into a HRA without knowledge of the radiological conditions is a

performance deficiency and is a violation of Technical Specification 5.11.1.b. The

performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the

Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of program and process (exposure

control) and adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection

of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Additionally, this issue

resembles IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example 6(h). Using Inspection Manual

Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination

Process, dated August 19, 2008, the inspectors determined the violation has very low

safety significance because: (1) it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable

(ALARA) finding, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential

for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This

violation has a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area, associated with

teamwork, because the operator did not properly communicate his work locations to the

RP technician for briefing and the RP technician did not display a questioning attitude to

understand the work locations for the operator to properly brief him and ensure nuclear

safety was maintained [H.4].

Enforcement. Technical Specification (TS) 5.11.1.b states, in part, that any individual or

group of individuals permitted to enter a HRA shall be provided with a radiation

monitoring device which continuously integrates the radiation dose rates in the area and

alarms when a preset integrated dose is received and that entry into such areas with this

monitoring device may be made after the dose rate levels in the area have been

established and personnel have been made knowledgeable of them. Contrary to the

requirement of TS 5.11.1.b, on July 19, 2013, an operator entered a HRA with a

radiation monitoring device (electronic alarming dosimeter), but was not knowledgeable

of the dose rate levels in the area. Specifically, the operator veered from the walk path,

on which he was briefed for a maximum dose rate level of 20 millirem per hour, and

entered a HRA with dose rates of 450 millirem per hour at 30 cm. As a result, the

operator received a high dose rate alarm of 476 millirem per hour on his EAD.

- 13 -

Because this violation is of very low safety significance and was entered into the

licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR 2014-14693, this violation

is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the

Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000285/2014003-01: Failure to Control an Entry to a High

Radiation Area Resulting in a Dose Rate Alarm.

2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls (71124.02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors assessed licensee performance with respect to maintaining occupational

individual and collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable

(ALARA). During the inspection, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and

reviewed licensee performance in the following areas:

Site-specific ALARA procedures and collective exposure history, including the

current 3-year rolling average, site-specific trends in collective exposures, and

source-term measurements

ALARA work activity evaluations/postjob reviews, exposure estimates, and

exposure mitigation requirements

The methodology for estimating work activity exposures, the intended dose

outcome, the accuracy of dose rate and man-hour estimates, and intended

versus actual work activity doses and the reasons for any inconsistencies

Records detailing the historical trends and current status of tracked plant source

terms and contingency plans for expected changes in the source term due to

changes in plant fuel performance issues or changes in plant primary chemistry

Radiation worker and RP technician performance during work activities in

radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas

Audits, self-assessments, and corrective action documents related to ALARA

planning and controls since the last inspection

These activities constitute completion of one sample of occupational ALARA planning

and controls as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.02.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and operability of the licensees personnel

monitoring equipment, verified the accuracy and effectiveness of the licensees methods

- 14 -

for determining total effective dose equivalent, and verified that the licensee was

appropriately monitoring occupational dose. The inspectors interviewed licensee

personnel, walked down various portions of the plant, and reviewed licensee

performance in the following areas:

External dosimetry accreditation, storage, issue, use, and processing of active

and passive dosimeters

The technical competency and adequacy of the licensees internal dosimetry

program

Adequacy of the dosimetry program for special dosimetry situations, such as

declared pregnant workers, multiple dosimetry placement, and neutron dose

assessment

Audits, self-assessments, and corrective action documents related to dose

assessment since the last inspection

These activities constitute completion of one sample of occupational dose assessment

as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.04.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency

Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and

Security

4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)

.1 Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity (BI01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees reactor coolant system chemistry sample

analyses for the period of December 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014 to verify the

accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and

guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory

Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of

the reported data.

These activities constituted verification of the reactor coolant system specific activity

performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

- 15 -

.2 Reactor Coolant System Total Leakage (BI02)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensees records of reactor coolant system total leakage

for the period of December 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014 to verify the accuracy and

completeness of the reported data. The inspectors observed the performance of

OP-ST-RC-3001, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leak Rate Test on February 4, 2014.

The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute

Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7,

to determine the accuracy of the reported data.

These activities constituted verification of the reactor coolant system leakage

performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.3 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (OR01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors verified there were no unplanned exposures or losses of radiological

control over locked high radiation areas and very high radiation areas during the period

of April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014. The inspectors reviewed a sample of radiologically

controlled area exit transactions showing exposures greater than 100 millirem. The

inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute

Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7,

to determine the accuracy of the reported data.

These activities constituted verification of the occupational exposure control

effectiveness performance indicator as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.4 Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETS)/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual

(ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences (PR01)

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed corrective action program records for liquid or gaseous effluent

releases that occurred between April 1, 2013, and March 31, 2014, and were reported to

the NRC to verify the performance indicator data. The inspectors used definitions and

guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory

Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of

the reported data.

- 16 -

These activities constituted verification of the Radiological Effluent Technical

Specifications (RETS)/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) radiological effluent

occurrences performance indicator as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)

.1 Routine Review

a. Inspection Scope

Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items

entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the

licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee

personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these

problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that

the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the

significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees

problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other

inspection activities documented in this report.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

.2 Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors selected one issue for an in-depth follow-up:

On March 13, 2014, the inspectors assessed the licensees operator work-

arounds to determine if the mitigating system function is affected or the

operators ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures

were affected. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized

the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate.

These activities constitute completion of one annual follow-up sample, which included

one operator work-around sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

- 17 -

4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)

.1 (Opened) Licensee Event Report 05000285/2014-003-00: Reactor Trip Due to Stator Water

Cooling Leak During Maintenance

On March 17, 2014, at 12:02 Central Daylight Time (CDT), a turbine trip and subsequent

reactor trip occurred while operating at nominal 100 percent power. Maintenance was in

progress on the main generator stator cooling system when system inventory was lost

resulting in an automatic turbine trip due to low system pressure. Immediate response by

operations personnel included implementing procedure emergency operating procedure

(EOP)-00, Standard Post Trip Actions, and subsequent entry into procedure

EOP-01, Reactor Trip Recovery. Based on plant system response this is considered an

uncomplicated trip.

The station determined that the root cause of the plant trip was that operational risk was not

effectively identified or mitigated by individuals throughout the organization.

The leak was isolated shortly after the trip by fully removing the probe and closing the

isolation valve. Fort Calhoun Station will be implementing the Exelon risk management

procedure, WC-AA-104, Integrated Risk Management. This procedure provides direction

consistent with industry best practices, and requires individual review of each category of

risk identification and mitigation.

.2 Operator Response During Unplanned Events

For the plant event listed below, the inspectors reviewed and observed plant parameters,

reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating systems. The

inspectors communicated the plant event to appropriate regional personnel. The inspectors

verified that Fort Calhoun made appropriate emergency classification assessments and

properly reported the event in accordance with 10 CFR Parts 50.72 and 50.73. The

inspectors reviewed Fort Calhouns follow-up actions related to the event to assure that Fort

Calhoun implemented appropriate corrective actions commensurate with their safety

significance.

Operator conduct of a plant downpower to approximately 30 percent power to

prepare for a potential plant shutdown due to rising Missouri river water level on

June 20, 2014 and Fort Calhoun actions to ready the plant to mitigate the

consequences of a significant flooding event from June 17 through June 22, 2014.

These activities constitute completion of two event follow-up samples, as defined in

Inspection Procedure 71153.

4OA4 IMC 0350 Inspection Activities (92702)

On December 17, 2013, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a Confirmatory Action

Letter to Fort Calhoun Stations (ML13351A395). The Confirmatory Action Letter confirms the

commitments in the December 2, 2013, Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), Integrated

Report to Support Restart of Fort Calhoun Station and Post-Restart Commitments for Sustained

Improvement. In the report, OPPD committed to take actions following restart of the

- 18 -

Fort Calhoun Station to ensure the improvements realized during the extended outage remain in

place and performance continues to improve at the facility. Included in the commitments are

completing actions detailed in the Flooding Recovery Action Plan.

Flood Recovery Action Item Plan 1.2.3.21, Inspect tank and equipment on demineralized

water tank for damage

a. Inspection scope

A water filled barrier was installed prior to the 2011 flood to protect the Deionized (DI)

Water Storage Tank and its associated utility building. Due to excessive stress on

the barrier in the tight installation configuration, the barrier failed and the tank was

exposed to flood water for several months.

A structural assessment of the DI Water Tank was conducted. The inspectors

reviewed the structural assessment, and performed visual inspection of the tank and

concluded that there was no damage to the tank or associated utility building.

The inspectors previously performed a review of the Demineralized and Potable

Water Systems. The scope of these reviews determined that the only equipment

affected were to the Reverse Osmosis Unit Water Storage Tank Inlet and Outlet

Pumps, DW-69 and DW-70. These pump motors were damaged after being

submerged in flood waters. These pump motors were replaced in accordance with

Flood Recovery Action Plan items 2.3.1.13, 2.3.1.14, 2.3.1.15, and 2.3.1.16, and

documented in inspection report 05000285/2012004 (ML12276A456).

This activity constitutes completion of action item 1.2.3.21 as described in the Flood

Recovery Action Plan and the December 17, 2013 Confirmatory Action Letter.

b. Findings

No findings were identified.

4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit

Exit Meeting Summary

On April 24, 2014, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to

Mr. M. Prospero, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee

acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information

reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed. One document, which remained in

the possession of an NRC inspector, was identified as proprietary after we left site. The NRC

inspector informed the licensee that this document was later identified as proprietary and the

licensee informed the NRC inspector to shred the document. Thus, the proprietary document

was shredded in an official security waste bin at the NRC office.

On June 12, 2014, the inspectors presented the final inspection results Mr. E. Dean, Plant

Manager and other members of the licensees staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues

presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the

inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

- 19 -

On July 16, 2014, the inspectors presented the inspection results for the Heat Sink

Performance Inspection to Mr. E. Dean, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee

staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any

proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.

- 20 -

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee Personnel

S. Anderson, Manager, Design Engineering

D. Bakalar, Manager, Security

J. Bousum, Manager, Emergency Planning and Administration

D. Brehm, Engineer, Radiation Protection

C. Cameron, Supervisor Regulatory Compliance

L. Cherko, Health Physicist

L. Cortopassi, Site Vice President

S. Coufal, Health Physicist

E. Dean, Plant Manager

E. Durboraw, Health Physicist, Radiation Protection

M. Ferm, Manager, System Engineering

H. Goodman, Site Engineering Director

P. Gunderson, Supervisor, Radiological Operations

R. Hugenroth, Supervisor Nuclear Oversight

K. Ihnen, Manager, Site Nuclear Oversight

P. Kellogg, Supervisor, ALARA

J. Lindsey, Director, Training

D. Little, Rad Health Specialist

K. Maassen, Program Engineer, GL 89-13

T. Maine, Manager, Radiation Protection

E. Matzke, Senior Licensing Engineer

W. McCall, Health Physicist, Radiation Protection

J. McManis, Manager Engineering Programs

B. Obermeyer, Manager, Corrective Action Program

T. Orth, Director, Site Work Management

M. Prospero, Plant Manager

S. Shea, Supervisor, Operations Training

T. Simpkin, Manager, Site Regulatory Assurance

M. Stewart, Sr. Radiation Protection Technician

S. Swanson, Director, Operations

D. Whisler, Supervisor, ALARA

-1- Attachment

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened

Reactor Trip Due to Stator Water Cooling Leak During

05000285/2014-003-00 LER

Maintenance (Section 4OA3)

Opened and Closed

05000285/2014003-01 NCV Failure to Control an Entry to a High Radiation Area Resulting

in a Dose Rate Alarm

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AOP-1 Acts of Nature 40

NOD-PP-M-4 Severe Weather Procedure 13

OP-AA-108-111-1001 Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines 12

EPIP-TSC-2 Catastrophic Flooding Peparations 17

SY-AA-101-146 Severe Weather Preparation and Response 0

SY-FC-101-146-AD-WEA Severe Weather Preparation and Response (FCS 0

Specific)

TBD-EPIP-OSC-1H Recognition Category H - Hazards and Other 1

Conditions Affecting Plant Safety

PE-RR-AE-1003 Preparation of Station Non-Vital Assets fro External 0

Flooding

PE-RR-AE-1001 Flood Barrier and Sandbag Staging and Installation 20

Condition Reports

2014-07489

Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AOP-1 Acts of Nature 40

OI-DG-2 Diesel Generator No. 2 69

-2-

Procedures

Number Title Revision

OI-SFP-1 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Normal Operation 38

SDBD-AC-SFP-102 Spent Fuel Storage and Fuel Pool Cooling 24

Condition Reports

2011-10302

Drawings

Number Title Revision

11405-M-11 Auxiliary Coolant Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Flow 57

Diagram P&ID

11405-M-257 Composite Flow Diagram Circulating Water P&ID 96

Section 1RO5: Fire Protection

Procedures

Number Title Revision

OP-MW-201-0007 Fire Protection System Impairment Control 7

SO-G-102 Fire Protection Program Plan 18

SO-G-103 Fire Protection Operability Criteria and Surveillance 27

Requirements

SO-G-28 Station Fire Plan 87

SO-G-91 Control and Transportation of Combustible Materials 30

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision

EA-FC-97-001 Fire Hazards Analysis Manual 17

FC05814 UFHA Combustible Loading Calculation 11

USAR 9.11 Updated Safety Analysis Report, Fire Protection Systems 24

Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures

Procedures

Number Title Revision

EA08-010 Internal Flooding 0

-3-

Condition Reports

2007-2715 2007-3670 2008-3492

Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance

Calculations

Number Title Revision

FC 05660 Check of CCW Flow Model Against Measured Data 0

FC 05664 Determination of Raw Water Flows to CCW Heat Exchanger 0

Performance

FC 05693 Component Cooling Water System Design Heat Loads and 1

Flows

FC 05742 Acceptance Criteria for CCW Heat Exchanger Performance 0

FC 05789 CCW System Design Basis Performance Criteria 0

FC 05888 Raw Water Flows to CCW Heat Exchangers 1

Miscellaneous

Number Title Date

RA 2014-1214 Fort Calhoun Pre-NRC Triennial Heat Sink Inspection June 6, 2014

Certificate of Calibration Flow Meter No. MT-22700 May 19, 2011

Certificate of Calibration Flow Meter No. MT-22701 November 30, 2011

Certificate of Calibration Flow Meter No. MT-22706 April 15, 2013

Component Cooling Water System Health Report March 14, 2014

Raw Water System Health Report March 14, 2014

Service Water System Health Report March 14, 2014

Vendor Documents

Title Revision

Instruction Manual for Component Cooling Heat 1

Exchangers

Instruction Manual for Shutdown Heat Exchangers 1

Instruction Manual for Storage Pool Heat 1

Exchangers

-4-

Procedures

Number Title Revision/Date

CH-AD-0035 Microbiologically Induced/Influenced Corrosion 3

Monitoring Program

CH-AD-0048 Environmental Inspection for Biofouling Organisms 3

IC-CP-01-AI-96 Calibration of Component Cooling Water and Raw 1

Water Outlet From Heat Exchanger AC-1A/B/C/D

NOD-OP-N-3 Strategic Water Plan 10

OP-ST-RW-3001 AC-10A Raw Water Pump Quarterly Inservice Test 43

OP-ST-RW-3011 AC-10B Raw Water Pump Quarterly Inservice Test 38

OP-ST-RW-3021 AC-10C Raw Water Pump Quarterly Inservice Test 39

OP-ST-RW-3031 AC-10D Raw Water Pump Quarterly Inservice Test 40

PBD-17 Service Water Reliability 8

PED-SEI-16 Evaluation of Heat Exchanger Performance 12

PE-RR-CCW-0100 Disassembly, Cleaning, and Repair of Component April 8, 2014

Cooling Water Heat Exchanger - Raw Water Side

PE-RR-CCW-0101 Removal and Reinstallation of Shutdown Cooling Heat 8

Exchanger Heads

SDBD-AC-CCW-100 Component Cooling Water 51

SDBD-AC-RW-101 Raw Water 39

SDBD-AC-SFP-102 Spent Fuel Storage and Fuel Pool Cooling 24

SDBD-SI-130 Shutdown Cooling 22

SE-PFT-CCW-0001 Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers December 29,

Performance Testing 2012

USAR-9.3 Auxiliary Systems - Shutdown Cooling System 14

USAR-9.6 Auxiliary Systems - Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System 10

USAR-9.7 Auxiliary Systems - Component Cooling Water 16

System

USAR-9.8 Auxiliary Systems - Raw Water System 31

Condition Reports

2011-05215 2011-07340 2011-09401 2011-09401 2011-09477

2012-00735 2012-03097 2012-05663 2012-06497 2012-08288

2012-08289 2012-09565 2012-09570 2012-11617 2012-12984

2012-13312 2012-18305 2013-04538 2013-04540 2013-04542

-5-

Work Orders

175833 175833 188897 188897 201320

201320 248454 248454 386035 396226

408766 449032 462250 470243 477978

495067 496412 496609 497665 498870

Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator

Performance

Procedures

Number Title Revision

EOP/AOP Floating Steps 5a

AOP-05 Emergency Shutdown 12

AOP-22 Reactor Coolant Leak 34

AOP-33 CVCS Leak 9

EOP-00 Standard Post Trip Actions 31

EOP-04 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 28

EOP-05 Uncontrolled Heat Extraction 28

EPIP-OSC-1 Emergency Classifications 48a

EPIP-OSC-2 Command and Control Position Actions/Notifications 57

OI-EE-1 Normal Operation of 4160 Volt System 30a

OI-FW-2 Feedwater (FW) System Normal Operation 42

OP-3A Plant Shutdown 86

SO-G-105 Steam Generator Tube Leakage 22a

SO-O-1 Conduct of Operations 104

SO-R-1 Reportability Determinations 33

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision

Cycle 2014-02 As Left Evaluation 5

Simulator Fidelity 2014 Cycle 2

Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness

Procedures

Number Title Revision

FCSG-69 Maintenance Rule Implementing Instructions (MRII) 0

-6-

Procedures

Number Title Revision

FCSG-69-5 Failure Identification and Reporting 0

FCSG-69-6 Placement of SSCs into Category (a)(1), Goal Setting, 0

and Return of SSCs to Category (a)(2)

FCSG-69-7 Periodic Assessment 0

PBD-16 Maintenance Rule Program Basis Document 9a

PED-SED-34 Maintenance Rule Program 9

SDBD-VA-CR-140 Control Room Habitability 25a

USAR-9.10 Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System 33

Condition Reports

2011-1316 2011-1452 2011-2259 2011-2261 2011-5466

2011-7616 2012-04590 2014-04797 2014-05004 2014-05577

2014-06387

Miscellaneous Documents

Title Revision/Date

Functional Scoping Data Sheet for Control Room Air Conditioning 5

Status of Equipment in MR Category (a)(1) or (a)(1) review April 2, 2014

Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control

Procedures

Number Title Revision

FCSG-19 Performing Risk Assessments 17

MM-RR-CH-0001 Inspection and Repair of Charging Pump Hydraulic 10

Section

OP-ST-ESF-009 Channel A Safety Injection, Containment Spray and 59a

Recirculation Actuation Signal Test

SO-M-100 Conduct of Maintenance 57b

SO-M-101 Maintenance Work Control 103

NUMARC-93-01 Industry Guidance for Monitoring the Effectiveness of 4a

Maintenance At Nuclear Power Plants

Regulatory Guide Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear 3

1.160 Power Plants

-7-

Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments

Procedures

Number Title Revision

OP-FC-108-115 Operability Determinations 0a

SDBD-CH-108 Chemical and Volume Control Systems 29

UAS-9.2 Chemical and Volume Control System 27

Condition Reports

2014-05026 2014-05501 2014-05577 2014-06093 2014-06785

Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision

MM-PM-DG-0001 Diesel Generator DG-1 Inspection 13

OP-PM-AFW-0004 Third Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Verification 39

Work Orders

345936 504052 509872 510831 517327

522553

Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing

Procedures

Number Title Revision

IC-ST-ESF-0004 Channel Functional Test of Containment Pressure High 9a

Signal (CPHS) Switches

IC-ST-RPS-0014 Quarterly Functional Test of Steam Generator Low Water 5

Level Trip Units

OP-ST-SI-3001 Safety Injection System Category A and B Valve Exercise 37a

Test

SE-ST-CCW-3002 CCW Pump Base Line Curve Procedure 17

Work Orders

498231 510757

-8-

Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation

Procedures

Number Title Revision

AOP-6 Fire Emergency 28a

EPIP-EOF-7 Protective Action Guidelines 25

EPIP-OSC-1 Emergency Classifications 48a

EPIP-OSC-2 Command and Control Position Actions/Notifications 58

EPIP-OSC-9 Emergency Team Briefings 15

Miscellaneous Documents

Title Date

Scenario Manual Volume 1 Training Drill May 13, 2014

Condition Reports

2014-5960 2014-5961 2014-5972 2014-5993 2014-5994

2014-6051 2014-6054

Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Procedures

Number Title Revision

RP-202 Radiological Surveys 044

RP-204 Radiological Area Controls 066

RP-206 Radioactive Material Handling 022

RP-229 Changes in Radiological Conditions Due to Plant 001

Evolutions

RP-306 Hot Spot Identification and Tracking 021

RP-307 Use and Control of Temporary Shielding 021

RP-405 Radioactive Source Inventory Control 016

RP-AD-200 Radiation Protection Surveillance Program 036

RPP Radiation Protection Plan 029

RP-ST-RM-0002 Radioactive Material Sources Surveillance 008

-9-

Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls

Procedures

Number Title Revision

SO-G-01 Radiation Worker Practices 039

SO-O-47 Spent Fuel Pool Inventory Control 009

Audits, Self-Assessments, and Surveillances

Number Title Date

RA-2013-2241 Radiation Protection Audit Report: Audit NOSA-FCS-13-58 July 27, 2013

Radiological Surveys

Number Title Date

M-20130625-5 B S/G Walkway, Elevation 1013 June 25, 2013

M-20130719-2 B S/G Walkway, Elevation 1013 Post Survey July 19, 2013

M-20131119-5 Containment, Elevation 994 November 19, 2013

M-20140307-2 AUX 1007/Room 31, Source Storage March 7, 2014

M-20140310-3 RW Building Room, Room 509 March 10, 2014

M-20140416-6 AUX 1025/Room 3, Spent Fuel Pool April 16, 2014

Condition Reports

2012-00734 2013-02595 2013-12045 2013-13938 2013-13531

2013-14124 2013-14258 2013-14472 2013-14652 2013-14693

2013-15026 2013-15029 2013-16119 2013-16705 2013-17201

2013-17323 2013-20766 2013-21217 2014-01875 2014-05225

Radiation Work Permits

Number Title Revision

11-0020 Operations Support for the 2011 RFO 00

14-0100 Minor Maintenance in Radiation Areas (no System 02

Breaches)

14-2201 Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High 02

Radiation Areas

14-2203 SI/AC Maintenance in Radiation Areas and in High 01

Radiation Areas

14-2204 VA, CCW, RW and FP Maintenance in Radiation Areas 01

and High Radiation Areas

14-2208 DTS Maintenance and Waste Processing 00

- 10 -

Radiation Work Permits

Number Title Revision

14-2209 Post Outage Recovery 00

14-3304 Minor Maintenance in RHRAs of the Auxiliary/Radwaste 01

Buildings

14-3307 Regulatory Inspections 00

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date

6080 2014 National Source Tracking System - Annual Inventory January 14, 2014

Reconciliation

FC-1217 Non-Fuel Material Spent Fuel Pool Inventory Ledger October 2013

FC-RP-ST-RM-2 Radioactive Source Inventory and Leak Test November 12, 2013

Section 2RS2: Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls

Procedures

Number Title Revision

RP-212 Diving Operations within Radiologically Controlled Areas 12

RP-301 ALARA Planning/ RWP Development and Control 51

RP-AA-400-2000 Department Dose Zealot 0

RP-AD-300 ALARA Program 28a

SO-G-116 Station ALARA Program 1

Condition Reports

2013-12805 2013-12891 2013-13277 2013-13394 2013-13401

2013-13531 2013-13544 2013-14124 2013-14125 2013-14666

2013-15805 2013-15854 2013-15961 2013-16020 2013-16354

2013-16378 2013-17135 2013-17150 2013-17489 2013-18601

2013-19791 2013-20016 2013-20121 2013-20419 2013-20592

2013-20858 2013-21334 2013-22928 2014-00486 2014-00872

2014-00918 2014-01528 2014-01692 2014-01875 2014-02366

2014-02525 2014-02526 2014-02527 2014-02891 2014-03355

2014-04982 2014-05055 2014-05056 2014-05057 2014-05058

2014-05062 2014-05208

Radiation Work Permits

Number Title Revision

12-2201 SI/AC System Maintenance in High Radiation Area 0

13-2552 Replace Union Attached to bottom of CH208 and 0

Associated Tasks

- 11 -

Radiation Work Permits

Number Title Revision

13-2565 RC-3C Seal Piping Supports and Associated Tasks 0

13-3554 Upper Guide Structure Underwater Modifications and Associated 0

Tasks

14-2201 Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High 0

Radiation Areas

14-2201 Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High 1

Radiation Areas

14-2201 Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High 2

Radiation Areas

14-2202 CVCS Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation Areas 0

14-2202 CVCS Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation Areas 1

14-2202 CVCS Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation Areas 2

14-2203 SI/AC Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation Areas 0

14-2203 SI/AC Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation Areas 1

14-2208 DTS Maintenance and Waste Processing 0

ALARA Work Control Plans

Number Title Date

RWP 12-2201 SI/AC System Maintenance in High Radiation Areas November 10, 2011

RWP 13-2552 Replace Union Attached to bottom of CH208 and March 20, 2013

Associated Tasks

RWP 13-2565 RC-3C Seal Piping Supports and Associated Tasks October 18, 2013

RWP 13-3554 Upper Guide Structure Underwater Modifications and August 2, 2013

Associated Tasks

RWP 14-2201 Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High December 4, 2013

Radiation Areas

RWP 14-2201 Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High January 6, 2014

Radiation Areas

RWP 14-2201 Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High February 24, 2014

Radiation Areas

RWP 14-2201 Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High March 4, 2014

Radiation Areas

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ALARA Work Control Plans

Number Title Date

RWP 14-2202 CVCS Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation December 4, 2013

Areas

RWP 14-2202 CVCS Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation February 27, 2014

Areas

RWP 14-2203 SI/AC Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation December 4, 2013

Areas

RWP 14-2203 SI/AC Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation January 6, 2014

Areas

RWP 14-2208 DTS Maintenance and Waste Processing January 17, 2014

Work in Progress Reviews

Number Title Date

1 RWP 13-2552 Replace Ch 208 Union October 26, 2013

2 RWP 13-2552 Replace Ch 208 Union November 9, 2013

1 RWP 14-2202 CVCS Maintenance in Radiation Areas April 9, 2014

and High Radiation Areas

1 RWP 14-2201 Waste Disposal Maintenance February 20, 2014

2 RWP 14-2201 Waste Disposal Maintenance April 9, 2014

1 RWP 13-3554 Upper Guide Structure Underwater August 14, 2013

Modifications and Associated Tasks

Radiological Surveys

Number Title Date

M-20130729-3 Lower cavity July 29, 2013

M-20130730-2 Lower cavity July 30, 2013

M-20130801-1 Lower cavity August 1, 2013

M-20130801-2 Lower cavity August 1, 2013

M-20130808-1 Upper cavity August 8, 2013

M-20130808-2 Upper cavity August 8, 2013

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Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Date

Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station 2014-2018 Dose Excellence

Plan

13-NOS-087 Radiation Protection Audit Report Audit NOSA-FCS-13-58 July 27, 2013

Section 2RS4: Occupational Dose Assessment

Procedures

Number Title Revision/Date

CH-ST-RV-0010 Environmental Monthly Progress Report Receipt 9

FC-RP-605-1 Exposure Evaluation Report 1

FCSG-24-1 Condition Report Initiating 6

FCSG-24-3 Condition Report Screening 12a

IC-CP-02-0229 Calibration of MGP Telepole 7

IC-CP-07-008 Calibration of Eberline PM-7 Portal Monitor 8a

OP-ST-SI-3003 LP Safety Injection and Containment Spray System Pump June 14, 2013

and Check Valve Test

RP-203 Air Sample Collection and Analysis 20

RP-204 Radiological Area Controls 66

RP-205 DAC-Hour Tracking 7

RP-602 Personnel Dosimetry Issuance and Changeout 24

RP-605 TLD and Exposure Evaluation Reports 14

RP-606 Special Dosimetry Issue, Control and Use 17

RP-650 Internal Dosimetry Program 12

RP-670 Declared Pregnancy/Anticipated Pregnancy Procedure 0

RP-910 Radiological Risk Assessment 0

RP-AD-200 Radiation Protection Surveillance Program 36

RP-AD-600 Dosimetry Program 22

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Procedures

Number Title Revision/Date

RPG-037 Radiation Protection Outage Guideline 17

RPG-071 Human Performance Tool for Investigating Dosimeter 1

Alarms

RPI-6 Alternate Access Control of Radiologically Controlled Area February 16, 2006

RPP Radiation Protection Plan 29

RW-218 10CFR61 Classification 15

SO-G-101 Radiation Worker Practices 39

TQG 19-27-17 Task Qualification Guide - Radiation Contamination Guide 18

Condition Reports

2012-19508 2013-15026 2014-04927 2011-9947 2012-01086

2012-02171 2012-02483 2012-02950 2012-10913 2012-13074

2012-19142 2013-02498 2013-03542 2013-04833 2013-13416

2013-14121 2013-14651 2013-14661 2013-17225 2013-18776

2013-20292 2014-01126

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision/Date

National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program 2014

TLD Exposure Record Read Results13-008 Personnel Contamination Report

EA-FC-92-071 Engineering Analysis 10CFR20 Revision Bioassay October 13, 1992

Program Recommendations

RA-12-002 Evaluation of Instrument Response to Measured Plant 2

Radionuclide Mix

Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification

Procedures

Number Title Revision

CH-ANL-RA-0018 Determination of Gamma Isotopic Activity Using Canberra 1

APEX System

CH-ST-RC-0003 Reactor Coolant DEI Activity 5

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Procedures

Number Title Revision

NOD-QP-37 Performance Indicator Program 27

NOD-QP-40 NRC Performance Indicator Program 8

OP-ST-RC-3001 Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leak Rate Test 36

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision

Control Room Logs from 12/1/13 through 3/31/14

NEI 99-02 Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline 7

Condition Reports (CRs)

2014-05066

Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution

Procedures

Number Title Revision

FCSG-24-1 Condition Report Initiation 6

FCSG-24-10 Corrective Action Program Trending 5

FCSG-24-3 Condition Report Screening 12a

FCSG-24-4 Condition Report and Cause Evaluation 8a

FCSG-24-5 Cause Evaluation Manual 7a

FCSG-24-6 Corrective Action Implementation and Condition Report 12a

Closure

SO-R-2 Condition Reporting and Corrective Action 53b

Section 4OA3: Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion

Procedures

Number Title Revision

FCSG-23 10 CFR 50.59 Resource Manual 8

EPIP-TSC-2 Catastrophic Flooding Preparations 17

AOP-1 Acts of Nature 40

IC-CP-01-5043 Calibration of Stator Cooling Water System Conductivity 5

Elements and Recorder

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Procedures

Number Title Revision

NOD-QP-3 10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 Reviews 37

SO-R-1 Reportability Determinations 33

TDB-EPIP-OSC- Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety 2

11T Emergency Levels

Condition Reports (CRs)

2014-03381

Miscellaneous Documents

Number Title Revision

50214 Reactor Plant Event Notification

AOP-1 Technical Specification 2.16 River Level

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