ML14211A602
| ML14211A602 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Calhoun  |
| Issue date: | 07/29/2014 |
| From: | Hay M NRC/RGN-IV/DRP |
| To: | Cortopassi L Omaha Public Power District |
| Hay M | |
| References | |
| IR-14-003 | |
| Download: ML14211A602 (41) | |
See also: IR 05000285/2014003
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
1600 E LAMAR BLVD
ARLINGTON, TX 76011-4511
July 29, 2014
Louis P. Cortopassi, Site Vice President
Omaha Public Power District
Fort Calhoun Station FC-2-4
P.O. Box 550
Fort Calhoun, NE 68023-0550
SUBJECT:
FORT CALHOUN - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
NUMBER 05000285/2014003
Dear Mr. Cortopassi:
On June 30, 2014, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at
your Fort Calhoun Station. On July 16, 2014, the NRC inspectors discussed the results of this
inspection with Mr. E. Dean, Plant Manager, and other members of your staff. Inspectors
documented the results of this inspection in the enclosed inspection report.
NRC inspectors documented one finding of very low safety significance (Green) in this report.
This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements.
If you contest the violation or significance of the NCV, you should provide a response within
30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001; with
copies to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; the Director, Office of Enforcement,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the NRC resident
inspector at the Fort Calhoun Station.
If you disagree with the cross-cutting aspect assignment in this report, you should provide a
response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your
disagreement, to the Regional Administrator, Region IV; and the NRC resident inspector at the
Fort Calhoun Station.
In accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.390, Public
Inspections, Exemptions, Requests for Withholding, a copy of this letter, its enclosure, and your
response (if any) will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRCs Public
L. Cortopassi
- 2 -
Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of the NRC's
Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible
from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic
Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Michael C. Hay
Chief, Project Branch F
Division of Reactor Projects
Docket: 50-285
License: DPR-40
Enclosure: NRC Inspection Report 05000285/2014003
w/Attachment: Supplemental
Information
SUNSI Review
By: MHay
Yes No
Publicly Available
Non-Publicly Available
Non-Sensitive
Sensitive
OFFICE
DRP/FCS
DRP/FCS
RIV/DRS
RIV/DRP
NAME
JKirkland/dll
JWingbach
HGepford
MHay
SIGNATURE
/RA/E-Hay
/RA/
/RA/
/RA/
DATE
7/24/14
7/28/14
7/25/14
7/29/14
Letter to Louis P. Cortopassi from from Michael C. Hay dated July 29, 2014
SUBJECT:
FORT CALHOUN - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT
NUMBER 05000285/2014003
DISTRIBUTION:
Regional Administrator (Marc.Dapas@nrc.gov)
Deputy Regional Administrator (Kriss.Kennedy@nrc.gov)
Acting DRP Director (Troy.Pruett@nrc.gov)
Acting DRP Deputy Director (Michael.Hay@nrc.gov)
DRS Director (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)
DRS Deputy Director (Jeff.Clark@nrc.gov)
Senior Resident Inspector (Max.Schneider@nrc.gov)
Resident Inspector (Jacob.Wingebach@nrc.gov)
Acting Senior Project Engineer, DRP/F (Peter.Jayroe@nrc.gov)
Project Engineer, DRP/F (Chris.Smith@nrc.gov)
FCS Administrative Assistant (Janise.Schwee@nrc.gov)
RIV Public Affairs Officer (Victor.Dricks@nrc.gov)
RIV Public Affairs Officer (Lara.Uselding@nrc.gov)
NRR Project Manager (Joseph.Sebrosky@nrc.gov)
RIV Branch Chief, DRS/TSB (Geoffrey.Miller@nrc.gov)
RIV RITS Coordinator (Marisa.Herrera@nrc.gov)
RIV Regional Counsel (Karla.Fuller@nrc.gov)
Congressional Affairs Officer (Jenny.Weil@nrc.gov)
OEMail Resource
OEWEB Resource (Sue.Bogle@nrc.gov)
Technical Support Assistant (Loretta.Williams@nrc.gov)
RIV/ETA: OEDO (Anthony.Bowers@nrc.gov)
RIV RSLO (Bill.Maier@nrc.gov)
ACES (R4Enforcement.Resource@nrc.gov)
MC 0350 Panel Chairman (Anton.Vegel@nrc.gov)
MC 0350 Panel Vice Chairman (Louise.Lund@nrc.gov)
MC 0350 Panel Member (Michael.Balazik@nrc.gov)
MC 0350 Panel Member (Michael.Markley@nrc.gov)
ROPreports
Distribution via Listserv for Fort Calhoun Station
-1-
Enclosure
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Docket:
05000285
License:
Report:
Licensee:
Omaha Public Power District
Facility:
Fort Calhoun Station
Location:
9610 Power Lane
Blair, NE 68008
Dates:
April 1 through June 30, 2014
Inspectors:
J. Kirkland, Senior Resident Inspector
S. Schneider, Senior Resident Inspector
J. Wingebach, Resident Inspector
C. Alldredge, Health Physicist
N. Greene, Ph.D., Health Physicist
P. Hernandez, Health Physicist
J. Larsen, Senior Physical Security Inspector
R. Latta, Senior Reactor Inspector
C. Speer, Resident Inspector
L. Willoughby, Senior Reactor Inspector
Approved By: Michael C. Hay, Chief, Project Branch F
Division of Reactor Projects
- 2 -
SUMMARY
IR 05000285/2014003; 04/01/2014 - 06/30/2014; Fort Calhoun Station; Radiological Hazard
Assessment and Exposure Control.
The inspection activities described in this report were performed between April 1 and
June 30, 2014, by the resident inspectors at Fort Calhoun Station and inspectors from the
NRCs Region IV office. One finding of very low safety significance (Green) is documented in
this report. This finding involved a violation of NRC requirements. The significance of
inspection findings are indicated by their color (i.e., greater than Green, or Green, White, Yellow,
Red), and determined using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination
Process dated June 2, 2011. Their cross-cutting aspects are determined using Inspection
Manual Chapter 0310, Components Within the Cross-Cutting Areas dated
December 19, 2013. All violations of NRC requirements are dispositioned in accordance with
the NRCs Enforcement Policy dated July 9, 2013. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe
operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor
Oversight Process revision 5.
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
Green. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, non-cited violation of Technical
Specification 5.11.1.b, which resulted from an individual entering a high radiation area
without being aware of the radiological conditions. Specifically, on July 19, 2013, an
operator was performing valve lineup work in the reactor building. Although the operator
was on a radiation work permit that allowed access to high radiation areas, access was
only allowed with knowledge of the dose rates in the areas entered. As immediate
corrective actions, the radiation protection supervisors coached the operator on properly
informing Radiation Protection of his planned work areas and coached the radiation
protection technician on having a more intrusive questioning attitude during briefings
so that radworkers are properly informed of all hazards and radiological conditions.
This issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Condition
Report CR 2014-14693.
The entry into a high radiation area without knowledge of the radiological conditions is a
performance deficiency and is a violation of Technical Specification 5.11.1.b. The
performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Occupational
Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of program and process (exposure control) and
adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health
and safety from exposure to radiation. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix C,
Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, dated
August 19, 2008, the inspectors determined the violation has very low safety significance
because: (1) it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, (2) there was no
overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability
to assess dose was not compromised. This violation has a cross-cutting aspect in the
human performance area, associated with teamwork, because the operator did not properly
communicate his work locations to the radiation protection technician for briefing and the
technician did not display a questioning attitude to understand the work locations for the
operator to properly brief him and ensure nuclear safety was maintained [H.4].
(Section 2RS1)
- 3 -
PLANT STATUS
The unit began the inspection period at 100% power. On April 15, 2014, the unit commenced a
plant shutdown in accordance with Technical Specification 2.0.1 due to two inoperable control
room air conditioners. One air conditioner was restored to operable status on April 15, 2014,
with reactor power at approximately 36% power and the shutdown was halted. The unit
returned to 100% power on April 18, 2014. On April 20, 2014, reactor power was decreased to
approximately 85% to perform condenser cleaning. The unit returned to 100% power on
April 26, 2014. On May 14, 2014, reactor power was decreased to 90% power to repair leaking
gaskets on the heater drain pump suction piping. The unit returned to 100% power on
May 16, 2014. On June 20, 2014, due to rising Missouri river levels the station commenced a
downpower to 30%. On June 23, 2014, high Missouri river levels were determined to not be an
operational restraint and reactor power was raised to 100% where it remained for the rest of the
inspection period.
REPORT DETAILS
1.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
.1 Readiness for Impending Adverse Weather Conditions
a.
Inspection Scope
On May 12, 2014, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations readiness for
impending adverse weather conditions due to severe thunderstorms in the area. The
inspectors reviewed plant design features, the licensees procedures to respond to
tornadoes and high winds, and the licensees planned implementation of these
procedures. The inspectors evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and
indications for those systems required to control the plant.
On June 16, 2014, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations readiness for
impending adverse weather conditions during a tornado watch. The inspectors reviewed
plant design features, the licensees procedures to respond to tornadoes and high winds,
and the licensees planned implementation of these procedures. The inspectors
evaluated operator staffing and accessibility of controls and indications for those
systems required to control the plant.
These activities constituted two samples of readiness for impending adverse weather
conditions, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
- 4 -
.2 Readiness to Cope with External Flooding
a.
Inspection Scope
From June 17 through June 23, 2014, the inspectors completed an inspection of the
stations readiness to cope with external flooding due to expected flooding on the
Missouri River.
The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures for coping with
flooding. The inspectors walked down selected areas to inspect the design features,
including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The inspectors
evaluated whether credited operator actions could be successfully accomplished.
These activities constituted one sample of readiness to cope with external flooding, as
defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.01.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1
Partial Walkdown
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial system walk-downs of the following risk-significant
systems:
April 30, 2014, partial alignment of the diesel generator system while DG-1 was
under a surveillance activity,
May 28, 2014, partial system alignment of the spent fuel cooling system while
spent fuel cooling pump AC-5A was out of service for maintenance, and
June 18, 2014, partial system alignment of the intake cell level control system
when the site anticipated river level would require their use.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees procedures and system design information to
determine the correct lineup for the systems. They visually verified that critical portions
of the systems were correctly aligned for the existing plant configuration.
These activities constituted three partial system walk-down samples as defined in
Inspection Procedure 71111.04.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
- 5 -
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
.1
Quarterly Inspection
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the licensees fire protection program for operational status
and material condition. The inspectors focused their inspection on four plant areas
important to safety:
May 21, 2014, Room 56E, East Switchgear Area, Fire Area 36A
May 21, 2014, Room 56W, West Switchgear Area, Fire Area 36B
May 28, 2014, Room 59, Pipe Penetration Area, Fire Area 23
June 19, 2014, Intake Structure, Fire Area 31
For each area, the inspectors evaluated the fire plan against defined hazards and
defense-in-depth features in the licensees fire protection program. The inspectors
evaluated control of transient combustibles and ignition sources, fire detection and
suppression systems, manual firefighting equipment and capability, passive fire
protection features, and compensatory measures for degraded conditions.
These activities constituted four quarterly inspection samples, as defined in Inspection
Procedure 71111.05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R06 Flood Protection Measures (71111.06)
a.
Inspection Scope
On April 29, 2014, the inspectors completed an inspection of the stations ability to
mitigate flooding due to internal causes. After reviewing the licensees flooding analysis,
the inspectors chose two plant areas containing risk-significant structures, systems, and
components that were susceptible to flooding:
Corridor 4, Basement and Personnel Corridor Area
Room 21, Safety Injection and Containment Spray Pump Area I
The inspectors reviewed plant design features and licensee procedures for coping with
internal flooding. The inspectors walked down the selected areas to inspect the design
features, including the material condition of seals, drains, and flood barriers. The
inspectors evaluated whether operator actions credited for flood mitigation could be
successfully accomplished.
These activities constitute completion of one flood protection measures sample as
defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.06.
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b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R07 Heat Sink Performance (71111.07)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed licensee programs to verify heat exchanger performance and
operability for the following heat exchangers:
Raw Water/Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger - AC-1B
Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger - AC-4A
Spent Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger - AC-8
The inspectors verified whether testing, inspection, maintenance, and chemistry control
programs were adequate to ensure proper heat transfer. The inspectors verified that the
periodic testing and monitoring methods, as outlined in commitments to NRC Generic
Letter 89-13, utilized appropriate industry heat exchanger guidance. Additionally, the
inspectors verified that the licensees chemistry program ensured that biological fouling
was properly controlled between tests. The inspectors reviewed previous maintenance
records of the heat exchangers to verify that the licensees heat exchanger inspections
adequately addressed structural integrity and cleanliness of their tubes. Specific
documents reviewed during this inspection are listed in the attachment.
These activities constitute completion of three triennial heat sink inspection samples as
defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.07-05.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator Performance
(71111.11)
.1
Review of Licensed Operator Requalification
a.
Inspection Scope
On April 17, 2014, the inspectors observed an evaluated simulator scenario performed
by an operating crew. The inspectors assessed the performance of the operators and
the evaluators critique of their performance.
These activities constitute completion of one quarterly licensed operator requalification
program sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
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.2
Review of Licensed Operator Performance
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the performance of on-shift licensed operators in the plants
main control room. At the time of the observations, the plant was in a period of
heightened activity. The inspectors also assessed the operators adherence to plant
procedures, including conduct of operations procedure and other operations department
policies. The inspectors observed the operators performance of the following activities:
April 15, 2014, Technical Specification required shutdown due to inoperable
control room air conditioning units
May 12, 2014, Plant downpower to 90% power due to leaking gaskets in heater
drain pump suction piping
Reactor Plant power maneuvers to support power ascension on
June 22 and 23, 2014
These activities constitute completion of three quarterly licensed operator performance
samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.11.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness (71111.12)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two instances of degraded performance or condition of safety-
related structures, systems, and components (SSCs):
April 15, 2014, failure of control room air conditioning Unit VA-46A
May 2, 2014, charging Pump CH-1A packing failure
The inspectors reviewed the extent of condition of possible common cause SSC failures
and evaluated the adequacy of the licensees corrective actions. The inspectors
reviewed the licensees work practices to evaluate whether these may have played a
role in the degradation of the SSCs. The inspectors assessed the licensees
characterization of the degradation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance
Rule), and verified that the licensee was appropriately tracking degraded performance
and conditions in accordance with the Maintenance Rule.
These activities constituted completion of two maintenance effectiveness samples, as
defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.12.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
- 8 -
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed two risk assessments performed by the licensee prior to
changes in plant configuration and the risk management actions taken by the licensee in
response to elevated risk:
April 3, 2014, risk management actions associated with the turbine driven
auxiliary feedwater Pump FW-10 being out of service for maintenance
April 29, 2014, risk management actions associated with the performance of
OP-ST-ESF-009, Channel "A" Safety Injection, Containment Spray and
Recirculation Actuation Signal Test
The inspectors verified that these risk assessments were performed timely and in
accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.65 (the Maintenance Rule) and plant
procedures. The inspectors reviewed the accuracy and completeness of the licensees
risk assessments and verified that the licensee implemented appropriate risk
management actions based on the result of the assessments.
In addition, on April 5, 2014, the inspectors also observed portions of one emergent work
activities that had the potential to affect the functional capability of the Chemical and
Volume Control System. Specifically, the inspectors observed portions of the emergent
rebuild of the A Charging Pump, CH-1A.
The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately developed and followed a work
plan for these activities. The inspectors verified that the licensee took precautions to
minimize the impact of the work activities on unaffected structures, systems, and
components (SSCs).
These activities constitute completion of three maintenance risk assessments and
emergent work control inspection samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.13.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R15 Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments (71111.15)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed four operability determinations that the licensee performed for
degraded or nonconforming structures, systems, or components (SSCs):
April 15, 2014, operability determination of control room air conditioning Unit
VA-46A after installation of a modification to bypass the low lube oil pressure
switch
April 23, 2014, operability determination of charging Pump CH-1B
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May 2, 2014, operability determination of reactor coolant system Loop 1A
charging line stop Valve HCV-238
June 4, 2014, operability determination of the auxiliary building while allowing
access down the main access gate while under a tornado warning
The inspectors reviewed the timeliness and technical adequacy of the licensees
evaluations. Where the licensee determined the degraded SSC to be operable, the
inspectors verified that the licensees compensatory measures were appropriate to
provide reasonable assurance of operability. The inspectors verified that the licensee
had considered the effect of other degraded conditions on the operability of the
degraded SSC.
These activities constitute completion of four operability review samples, as defined in
Inspection Procedure 71111.15.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed five post-maintenance testing activities that affected risk-
significant structures, systems, or components (SSCs):
May 23, 2014, post-maintenance testing following maintenance on Emergency
Diesel Generator 1 (EDG-1)
June 2, 2014, post-maintenance testing following maintenance on the diesel
driven auxiliary feedwater Pump, FW-54
April 17, 2014, post-maintenance testing following maintenance on control room
Air Conditioner VA-46A
May 1, 2014, post-maintenance testing following maintenance on raw water
piping
June 6, 2014, post-maintenance testing following maintenance on raw water
Strainer AC-12B
The inspectors reviewed licensing and design-basis documents for the SSCs and the
maintenance and post-maintenance test procedures. The inspectors observed the
performance of the post-maintenance tests to verify that the licensee performed the tests
in accordance with approved procedures, satisfied the established acceptance criteria,
and restored the operability of the affected SSCs.
These activities constitute completion of five post-maintenance testing inspection
samples, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.19.
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b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed four risk-significant surveillance tests and reviewed test results
to verify that these tests adequately demonstrated that the structures, systems, and
components (SSCs) were capable of performing their safety functions:
In-service tests:
May 1, 2014, Safety Injection System Category A and B Valve Exercise Test,
OP-ST-3001
Other surveillance tests:
April 4, 2014, Component Cooling Water Pump Base Line Curve Procedure,
SE-ST-CCW-3002
April 22, 2014, Quarterly Functional Test of Steam Generator Low Water Level
Trip Units, IC-ST-RPS-0014
April 10, 2014, Channel Functional Test of Containment Pressure High Signal
(CPHS) Switches
The inspectors verified that these tests met technical specification requirements, that the
licensee performed the tests in accordance with their procedures, and that the results of
the test satisfied appropriate acceptance criteria. The inspectors verified that the
licensee restored the operability of the affected SSCs following testing.
These activities constitute completion of four surveillance testing inspection samples, as
defined in Inspection Procedure 71111.22.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
Cornerstone: Emergency Preparedness
1EP6 Drill Evaluation (71114.06)
.1
Emergency Preparedness Drill Observation
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed an emergency preparedness drill on May 13, 2014, to verify the
adequacy and capability of the licensees assessment of drill performance. The
inspectors reviewed the drill scenario, observed the drill from the technical support
center, operations support center, simulator, emergency operations facility, and attended
the post-drill critique. The inspectors verified that the licensees emergency
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classifications, off-site notifications, and protective action recommendations were
appropriate and timely. The inspectors verified that any emergency preparedness
weaknesses were appropriately identified by the licensee in the post-drill critique and
entered into the corrective action program for resolution.
These activities constitute completion of one emergency preparedness drill observation
sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71114.06.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
2.
RADIATION SAFETY
Cornerstone: Occupational Radiation Safety
2RS1 Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls (71124.01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed the licensees performance in assessing the radiological
hazards in the workplace associated with licensed activities. The inspectors assessed
the licensees implementation of appropriate radiation monitoring and exposure control
measures for both individual and collective exposures. The inspectors walked down
various portions of the plant and performed independent radiation dose rate
measurements. The inspectors interviewed the Radiation Protection (RP) manager,
RP supervisors, and radiation workers. The inspectors reviewed licensee performance
in the following areas:
The hazard assessment program, including a review of the licensees evaluations
of changes in plant operations and radiological surveys to detect dose rates,
airborne radioactivity, and surface contamination levels
Instructions and notices to workers, including labeling or marking containers of
radioactive material, radiation work permits, actions for electronic dosimeter
alarms, and changes to radiological conditions
Programs and processes for control of sealed sources and release of potentially
contaminated material from the radiologically controlled area, including survey
performance, instrument sensitivity, release criteria, procedural guidance, and
sealed source accountability
Radiological hazards control and work coverage, including the adequacy of
surveys, RP job coverage and contamination controls, the use of electronic
dosimeters in high noise areas, dosimetry placement, airborne radioactivity
monitoring, controls for highly activated or contaminated materials (non-fuel)
stored within spent fuel and other storage pools, and posting and physical
controls for high radiation areas and very high radiation areas
Radiation worker and RP technician performance with respect to RP work
requirements
- 12 -
Audits, self-assessments, and corrective action documents related to radiological
hazard assessment and exposure controls since the last inspection
These activities constitute completion of one sample of radiological hazard assessment
and exposure controls as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.01.
b.
Findings
Introduction. The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, Green, non-cited violation of
Technical Specification 5.11.1.b, which resulted from the licensees failure to control
entry into a high radiation area (HRA) when an operator entered a posted HRA without
knowledge of the dose rates. As a result, the operator received a high dose rate alarm
upon entry into an area with greater than anticipated dose rates.
Description. On July 19, 2013, an operator entered a posted HRA without adequate
knowledge of the radiological conditions (dose rates) in the area. As a result, the
electronic alarming dosimeter (EAD) worn by the operator alarmed due to a high dose
rate. This unanticipated dose rate alarm was received while performing valve lineups on
the 1013 foot elevation of the reactor building, B steam generator (S/G) bay area. This
work was performed while signed onto Radiation Work Permit (RWP) 11-0020, Task 2,
OPS support (STs, walkdowns etc.), with alarm setpoints of 35 millirem for dose and
375 millirem per hour for dose rate. However, the inspectors determined that the
operator should have been signed onto Task 1, Valve Line-Up and Tag Outs, to perform
the specific duties of valve lineup; the Task 1 alarm setpoints were 30 millirem for dose
and 150 millirem per hour for dose rate. Both tasks of RWP 11-0020 allowed access to
an HRA, but only after being made knowledgeable of the dose rates in the areas to be
entered.
An RP technician briefed the operator on the general area radiological conditions of the
walk path for the job, but failed to provide detailed information on the work areas
surrounding the walk path. Per discussion with the licensee, the operator informed
the RP technician that he was performing valve lineup work in the B S/G bay area,
but he did not specify that he would veer from the walk path for which he was briefed.
The RP technician briefed the operator of the radiological conditions using
Survey M-20130625-5, dated June 25, 2013. The survey showed a maximum general
area dose rate of 20 millirem per hour on the walk path of the B S/G bay area. The
operator veered from this path to access a valve atop the reactor coolant pump volute
area, which was located a few feet away from the walk path below the shroud level of
the pump. Upon entry to this area, he received a high dose rate alarm of 476 millirem
per hour. As required, the operator stopped work and immediately exited the radiation
controlled area (RCA) to inform RP of the alarming dosimeter. A follow-up
survey, M-20130719-2, dated July 19 2013, was completed and showed a maximum
of 1,000 millirem per hour on contact and 450 millirem per hour at 30 cm in this specific
location.
The licensee determined in their investigation of the event that if better communication
had occurred between the operator and RP technician performing the briefing, this issue
could have been avoided. There are procedural requirements, developed and
maintained for the purpose of radiological protection of personnel, which also could have
also prevented this event. Section 7.12.3.A of Procedure RP-204, Radiological Area
Controls, Revision 66, states, in part, that a briefing shall be conducted PRIOR to initial
- 13 -
entry: (1) with the most recent survey data available, BRIEF workers on current
radiological conditions in the work area and travel path; (2) INFORM the workers of
areas to avoid; (3) BRIEF on EAD alarm settings and ENSURE they are adequate for
the work area; and (4) ENSURE workers are aware of entry only to briefed HRAs. In
addition, Section 4.5.3.B.1 of Procedure SO-G-101, Radiation Worker Practices,
Revision 39, states, in part, that entry into HRAs with an alarming dosimeter shall be
made only after the dose rate level(s) in the area have been established and personnel
have been made knowledgeable of the radiological conditions. These steps were not
followed by either the RP technician or the operator. Records show that the radworker
received a total of 9.9 millirem dose during the radiological controlled area (RCA) entry.
As immediate corrective actions, the RP supervisors coached the operator on properly
informing RP of his planned work areas and coached the RP technician on having a
more intrusive questioning attitude during briefings so that radworkers, in general, are
properly informed of all hazards and radiological conditions. In addition to these
immediate corrective actions, per discussion with the NRC inspectors, the licensee also
planned to post more detailed surveys at the entrance to large areas posted as HRAs to
better inform radworkers of the radiological conditions which they may encounter. This
issue was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Condition
Report CR 2014-14693.
Analysis. The entry into a HRA without knowledge of the radiological conditions is a
performance deficiency and is a violation of Technical Specification 5.11.1.b. The
performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the
Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of program and process (exposure
control) and adversely affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection
of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Additionally, this issue
resembles IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example 6(h). Using Inspection Manual
Chapter 0609, Appendix C, Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination
Process, dated August 19, 2008, the inspectors determined the violation has very low
safety significance because: (1) it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable
(ALARA) finding, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential
for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This
violation has a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area, associated with
teamwork, because the operator did not properly communicate his work locations to the
RP technician for briefing and the RP technician did not display a questioning attitude to
understand the work locations for the operator to properly brief him and ensure nuclear
safety was maintained [H.4].
Enforcement. Technical Specification (TS) 5.11.1.b states, in part, that any individual or
group of individuals permitted to enter a HRA shall be provided with a radiation
monitoring device which continuously integrates the radiation dose rates in the area and
alarms when a preset integrated dose is received and that entry into such areas with this
monitoring device may be made after the dose rate levels in the area have been
established and personnel have been made knowledgeable of them. Contrary to the
requirement of TS 5.11.1.b, on July 19, 2013, an operator entered a HRA with a
radiation monitoring device (electronic alarming dosimeter), but was not knowledgeable
of the dose rate levels in the area. Specifically, the operator veered from the walk path,
on which he was briefed for a maximum dose rate level of 20 millirem per hour, and
entered a HRA with dose rates of 450 millirem per hour at 30 cm. As a result, the
operator received a high dose rate alarm of 476 millirem per hour on his EAD.
- 14 -
Because this violation is of very low safety significance and was entered into the
licensees corrective action program as Condition Report CR 2014-14693, this violation
is being treated as a non-cited violation, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the
Enforcement Policy: NCV 05000285/2014003-01: Failure to Control an Entry to a High
Radiation Area Resulting in a Dose Rate Alarm.
2RS2 Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls (71124.02)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors assessed licensee performance with respect to maintaining occupational
individual and collective radiation exposures as low as is reasonably achievable
(ALARA). During the inspection, the inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and
reviewed licensee performance in the following areas:
Site-specific ALARA procedures and collective exposure history, including the
current 3-year rolling average, site-specific trends in collective exposures, and
source-term measurements
ALARA work activity evaluations/postjob reviews, exposure estimates, and
exposure mitigation requirements
The methodology for estimating work activity exposures, the intended dose
outcome, the accuracy of dose rate and man-hour estimates, and intended
versus actual work activity doses and the reasons for any inconsistencies
Records detailing the historical trends and current status of tracked plant source
terms and contingency plans for expected changes in the source term due to
changes in plant fuel performance issues or changes in plant primary chemistry
Radiation worker and RP technician performance during work activities in
radiation areas, airborne radioactivity areas, or high radiation areas
Audits, self-assessments, and corrective action documents related to ALARA
planning and controls since the last inspection
These activities constitute completion of one sample of occupational ALARA planning
and controls as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.02.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
2RS4 Occupational Dose Assessment (71124.04)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated the accuracy and operability of the licensees personnel
monitoring equipment, verified the accuracy and effectiveness of the licensees methods
- 15 -
for determining total effective dose equivalent, and verified that the licensee was
appropriately monitoring occupational dose. The inspectors interviewed licensee
personnel, walked down various portions of the plant, and reviewed licensee
performance in the following areas:
External dosimetry accreditation, storage, issue, use, and processing of active
and passive dosimeters
The technical competency and adequacy of the licensees internal dosimetry
program
Adequacy of the dosimetry program for special dosimetry situations, such as
declared pregnant workers, multiple dosimetry placement, and neutron dose
assessment
Audits, self-assessments, and corrective action documents related to dose
assessment since the last inspection
These activities constitute completion of one sample of occupational dose assessment
as defined in Inspection Procedure 71124.04.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, Barrier Integrity, Emergency
Preparedness, Public Radiation Safety, Occupational Radiation Safety, and
Security
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification (71151)
.1 Reactor Coolant System Specific Activity (BI01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees reactor coolant system chemistry sample
analyses for the period of December 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014 to verify the
accuracy and completeness of the reported data. The inspectors used definitions and
guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory
Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of
the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the reactor coolant system specific activity
performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
- 16 -
.2 Reactor Coolant System Total Leakage (BI02)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees records of reactor coolant system total leakage
for the period of December 1, 2013 through March 31, 2014 to verify the accuracy and
completeness of the reported data. The inspectors observed the performance of
OP-ST-RC-3001, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leak Rate Test on February 4, 2014.
The inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute
Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7,
to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the reactor coolant system leakage
performance indicator, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.3 Occupational Exposure Control Effectiveness (OR01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors verified there were no unplanned exposures or losses of radiological
control over locked high radiation areas and very high radiation areas during the period
of April 1, 2013, to March 31, 2014. The inspectors reviewed a sample of radiologically
controlled area exit transactions showing exposures greater than 100 millirem. The
inspectors used definitions and guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute
Document 99-02, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7,
to determine the accuracy of the reported data.
These activities constituted verification of the occupational exposure control
effectiveness performance indicator as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.4 Radiological Effluent Technical Specifications (RETS)/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
(ODCM) Radiological Effluent Occurrences (PR01)
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed corrective action program records for liquid or gaseous effluent
releases that occurred between April 1, 2013, and March 31, 2014, and were reported to
the NRC to verify the performance indicator data. The inspectors used definitions and
guidance contained in Nuclear Energy Institute Document 99-02, Regulatory
Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Revision 7, to determine the accuracy of
the reported data.
- 17 -
These activities constituted verification of the Radiological Effluent Technical
Specifications (RETS)/Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) radiological effluent
occurrences performance indicator as defined in Inspection Procedure 71151.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA2 Problem Identification and Resolution (71152)
.1
Routine Review
a.
Inspection Scope
Throughout the inspection period, the inspectors performed daily reviews of items
entered into the licensees corrective action program and periodically attended the
licensees condition report screening meetings. The inspectors verified that licensee
personnel were identifying problems at an appropriate threshold and entering these
problems into the corrective action program for resolution. The inspectors verified that
the licensee developed and implemented corrective actions commensurate with the
significance of the problems identified. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees
problem identification and resolution activities during the performance of the other
inspection activities documented in this report.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
.2
Annual Follow-up of Selected Issues
a.
Inspection Scope
The inspectors selected one issue for an in-depth follow-up:
On March 13, 2014, the inspectors assessed the licensees operator work-
arounds to determine if the mitigating system function is affected or the
operators ability to implement abnormal and emergency operating procedures
were affected. The inspectors verified that the licensee appropriately prioritized
the planned corrective actions and that these actions were adequate.
These activities constitute completion of one annual follow-up sample, which included
one operator work-around sample, as defined in Inspection Procedure 71152.
b.
Findings
No findings were identified.
- 18 -
4OA3 Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion (71153)
.1 (Opened) Licensee Event Report 05000285/2014-003-00: Reactor Trip Due to Stator Water
Cooling Leak During Maintenance
On March 17, 2014, at 12:02 Central Daylight Time (CDT), a turbine trip and subsequent
reactor trip occurred while operating at nominal 100 percent power. Maintenance was in
progress on the main generator stator cooling system when system inventory was lost
resulting in an automatic turbine trip due to low system pressure. Immediate response by
operations personnel included implementing procedure emergency operating procedure
(EOP)-00, Standard Post Trip Actions, and subsequent entry into procedure
EOP-01, Reactor Trip Recovery. Based on plant system response this is considered an
uncomplicated trip.
The station determined that the root cause of the plant trip was that operational risk was not
effectively identified or mitigated by individuals throughout the organization.
The leak was isolated shortly after the trip by fully removing the probe and closing the
isolation valve. Fort Calhoun Station will be implementing the Exelon risk management
procedure, WC-AA-104, Integrated Risk Management. This procedure provides direction
consistent with industry best practices, and requires individual review of each category of
risk identification and mitigation.
.2 Operator Response During Unplanned Events
For the plant event listed below, the inspectors reviewed and observed plant parameters,
reviewed personnel performance, and evaluated performance of mitigating systems. The
inspectors communicated the plant event to appropriate regional personnel. The inspectors
verified that Fort Calhoun made appropriate emergency classification assessments and
properly reported the event in accordance with 10 CFR Parts 50.72 and 50.73. The
inspectors reviewed Fort Calhouns follow-up actions related to the event to assure that Fort
Calhoun implemented appropriate corrective actions commensurate with their safety
significance.
Operator conduct of a plant downpower to approximately 30 percent power to
prepare for a potential plant shutdown due to rising Missouri river water level on
June 20, 2014 and Fort Calhoun actions to ready the plant to mitigate the
consequences of a significant flooding event from June 17 through June 22, 2014.
These activities constitute completion of two event follow-up samples, as defined in
4OA4 IMC 0350 Inspection Activities (92702)
On December 17, 2013, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued a Confirmatory Action
Letter to Fort Calhoun Stations (ML13351A395). The Confirmatory Action Letter confirms the
commitments in the December 2, 2013, Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), Integrated
Report to Support Restart of Fort Calhoun Station and Post-Restart Commitments for Sustained
Improvement. In the report, OPPD committed to take actions following restart of the
- 19 -
Fort Calhoun Station to ensure the improvements realized during the extended outage remain in
place and performance continues to improve at the facility. Included in the commitments are
completing actions detailed in the Flooding Recovery Action Plan.
Flood Recovery Action Item Plan 1.2.3.21, Inspect tank and equipment on demineralized
water tank for damage
a. Inspection scope
A water filled barrier was installed prior to the 2011 flood to protect the Deionized (DI)
Water Storage Tank and its associated utility building. Due to excessive stress on
the barrier in the tight installation configuration, the barrier failed and the tank was
exposed to flood water for several months.
A structural assessment of the DI Water Tank was conducted. The inspectors
reviewed the structural assessment, and performed visual inspection of the tank and
concluded that there was no damage to the tank or associated utility building.
The inspectors previously performed a review of the Demineralized and Potable
Water Systems. The scope of these reviews determined that the only equipment
affected were to the Reverse Osmosis Unit Water Storage Tank Inlet and Outlet
Pumps, DW-69 and DW-70. These pump motors were damaged after being
submerged in flood waters. These pump motors were replaced in accordance with
Flood Recovery Action Plan items 2.3.1.13, 2.3.1.14, 2.3.1.15, and 2.3.1.16, and
documented in inspection report 05000285/2012004 (ML12276A456).
This activity constitutes completion of action item 1.2.3.21 as described in the Flood
Recovery Action Plan and the December 17, 2013 Confirmatory Action Letter.
b. Findings
No findings were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
Exit Meeting Summary
On April 24, 2014, the inspectors presented the radiation safety inspection results to
Mr. M. Prospero, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee staff. The licensee
acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any proprietary information
reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed. One document, which remained in
the possession of an NRC inspector, was identified as proprietary after we left site. The NRC
inspector informed the licensee that this document was later identified as proprietary and the
licensee informed the NRC inspector to shred the document. Thus, the proprietary document
was shredded in an official security waste bin at the NRC office.
On June 12, 2014, the inspectors presented the final inspection results Mr. E. Dean, Plant
Manager and other members of the licensees staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues
presented. The inspector asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the
inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
- 20 -
On July 16, 2014, the inspectors presented the inspection results for the Heat Sink
Performance Inspection to Mr. E. Dean, Plant Manager, and other members of the licensee
staff. The licensee acknowledged the issues presented. The licensee confirmed that any
proprietary information reviewed by the inspectors had been returned or destroyed.
-1-
Attachment
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT
Licensee Personnel
S. Anderson, Manager, Design Engineering
D. Bakalar, Manager, Security
J. Bousum, Manager, Emergency Planning and Administration
D. Brehm, Engineer, Radiation Protection
C. Cameron, Supervisor Regulatory Compliance
L. Cherko, Health Physicist
L. Cortopassi, Site Vice President
S. Coufal, Health Physicist
E. Dean, Plant Manager
E. Durboraw, Health Physicist, Radiation Protection
M. Ferm, Manager, System Engineering
H. Goodman, Site Engineering Director
P. Gunderson, Supervisor, Radiological Operations
R. Hugenroth, Supervisor Nuclear Oversight
K. Ihnen, Manager, Site Nuclear Oversight
P. Kellogg, Supervisor, ALARA
J. Lindsey, Director, Training
D. Little, Rad Health Specialist
K. Maassen, Program Engineer, GL 89-13
T. Maine, Manager, Radiation Protection
E. Matzke, Senior Licensing Engineer
W. McCall, Health Physicist, Radiation Protection
J. McManis, Manager Engineering Programs
B. Obermeyer, Manager, Corrective Action Program
T. Orth, Director, Site Work Management
M. Prospero, Plant Manager
S. Shea, Supervisor, Operations Training
T. Simpkin, Manager, Site Regulatory Assurance
M. Stewart, Sr. Radiation Protection Technician
S. Swanson, Director, Operations
D. Whisler, Supervisor, ALARA
- 2 -
LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED
Opened
05000285/2014-003-00
LER
Reactor Trip Due to Stator Water Cooling Leak During
Maintenance (Section 4OA3)
Opened and Closed 05000285/2014003-01
Failure to Control an Entry to a High Radiation Area Resulting
in a Dose Rate Alarm
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Section 1R01: Adverse Weather Protection
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
Acts of Nature
40
NOD-PP-M-4
Severe Weather Procedure
13
Severe Weather and Natural Disaster Guidelines
12
EPIP-TSC-2
Catastrophic Flooding Peparations
17
Severe Weather Preparation and Response
0
SY-FC-101-146-AD-WEA Severe Weather Preparation and Response (FCS
Specific)
0
TBD-EPIP-OSC-1H
Recognition Category H - Hazards and Other
Conditions Affecting Plant Safety
1
PE-RR-AE-1003
Preparation of Station Non-Vital Assets fro External
Flooding
0
PE-RR-AE-1001
Flood Barrier and Sandbag Staging and Installation
20
Condition Reports
2014-07489
Section 1R04: Equipment Alignment
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
Acts of Nature
40
OI-DG-2
Diesel Generator No. 2
69
- 3 -
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
OI-SFP-1
Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Normal Operation
38
SDBD-AC-SFP-102
Spent Fuel Storage and Fuel Pool Cooling
24
Condition Reports
2011-10302
Drawings
Number
Title
Revision
11405-M-11
Auxiliary Coolant Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System Flow
Diagram P&ID
57
11405-M-257
Composite Flow Diagram Circulating Water P&ID
96
Section 1RO5: Fire Protection
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
OP-MW-201-0007
Fire Protection System Impairment Control
7
SO-G-102
18
SO-G-103
Fire Protection Operability Criteria and Surveillance
Requirements
27
SO-G-28
Station Fire Plan
87
SO-G-91
Control and Transportation of Combustible Materials
30
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision
EA-FC-97-001
Fire Hazards Analysis Manual
17
FC05814
UFHA Combustible Loading Calculation
11
USAR 9.11
Updated Safety Analysis Report, Fire Protection Systems
24
Section 1R06: Flood Protection Measures
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
EA08-010
0
- 4 -
Condition Reports
2007-2715
2007-3670
2008-3492
Section 1R07: Heat Sink Performance
Calculations
Number
Title
Revision
FC 05660
Check of CCW Flow Model Against Measured Data
0
FC 05664
Determination of Raw Water Flows to CCW Heat Exchanger
Performance
0
FC 05693
Component Cooling Water System Design Heat Loads and
Flows
1
FC 05742
Acceptance Criteria for CCW Heat Exchanger Performance
0
FC 05789
CCW System Design Basis Performance Criteria
0
FC 05888
Raw Water Flows to CCW Heat Exchangers
1
Miscellaneous
Number
Title
Date
Fort Calhoun Pre-NRC Triennial Heat Sink Inspection
June 6, 2014
Certificate of Calibration Flow Meter No. MT-22700
May 19, 2011
Certificate of Calibration Flow Meter No. MT-22701
November 30, 2011
Certificate of Calibration Flow Meter No. MT-22706
April 15, 2013
Component Cooling Water System Health Report
March 14, 2014
Raw Water System Health Report
March 14, 2014
Service Water System Health Report
March 14, 2014
Vendor Documents
Title
Revision
Instruction Manual for Component Cooling Heat
Exchangers
1
Instruction Manual for Shutdown Heat Exchangers
1
Instruction Manual for Storage Pool Heat
Exchangers
1
- 5 -
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision/Date
Microbiologically Induced/Influenced Corrosion
Monitoring Program
3
Environmental Inspection for Biofouling Organisms
3
IC-CP-01-AI-96
Calibration of Component Cooling Water and Raw
Water Outlet From Heat Exchanger AC-1A/B/C/D
1
NOD-OP-N-3
Strategic Water Plan
10
OP-ST-RW-3001
AC-10A Raw Water Pump Quarterly Inservice Test
43
OP-ST-RW-3011
AC-10B Raw Water Pump Quarterly Inservice Test
38
OP-ST-RW-3021
AC-10C Raw Water Pump Quarterly Inservice Test
39
OP-ST-RW-3031
AC-10D Raw Water Pump Quarterly Inservice Test
40
PBD-17
Service Water Reliability
8
PED-SEI-16
Evaluation of Heat Exchanger Performance
12
PE-RR-CCW-0100
Disassembly, Cleaning, and Repair of Component
Cooling Water Heat Exchanger - Raw Water Side
April 8, 2014
PE-RR-CCW-0101
Removal and Reinstallation of Shutdown Cooling Heat
Exchanger Heads
8
SDBD-AC-CCW-100
Component Cooling Water
51
SDBD-AC-RW-101
Raw Water
39
SDBD-AC-SFP-102
Spent Fuel Storage and Fuel Pool Cooling
24
SDBD-SI-130
22
SE-PFT-CCW-0001
Component Cooling Water Heat Exchangers
Performance Testing
December 29,
2012
USAR-9.3
Auxiliary Systems - Shutdown Cooling System
14
USAR-9.6
Auxiliary Systems - Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System
10
USAR-9.7
Auxiliary Systems - Component Cooling Water
System
16
USAR-9.8
Auxiliary Systems - Raw Water System
31
Condition Reports
2011-05215
2011-07340
2011-09401
2011-09401
2011-09477
2012-00735
2012-03097
2012-05663
2012-06497
2012-08288
2012-08289
2012-09565
2012-09570
2012-11617
2012-12984
2012-13312
2012-18305
2013-04538
2013-04540
2013-04542
- 6 -
Work Orders
175833
175833
188897
188897
201320
201320
248454
248454
386035
396226
408766
449032
462250
470243
477978
495067
496412
496609
497665
498870
Section 1R11: Licensed Operator Requalification Program and Licensed Operator
Performance
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
EOP/AOP Floating Steps
5a
Emergency Shutdown
12
Reactor Coolant Leak
34
CVCS Leak
9
Standard Post Trip Actions
31
Steam Generator Tube Rupture
28
Uncontrolled Heat Extraction
28
EPIP-OSC-1
Emergency Classifications
48a
EPIP-OSC-2
Command and Control Position Actions/Notifications
57
OI-EE-1
Normal Operation of 4160 Volt System
30a
OI-FW-2
Feedwater (FW) System Normal Operation
42
Plant Shutdown
86
SO-G-105
Steam Generator Tube Leakage
22a
SO-O-1
Conduct of Operations
104
SO-R-1
Reportability Determinations
33
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision
Cycle 2014-02 As Left Evaluation
5
Simulator Fidelity 2014 Cycle 2
Section 1R12: Maintenance Effectiveness
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
FCSG-69
Maintenance Rule Implementing Instructions (MRII)
0
- 7 -
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
FCSG-69-5
Failure Identification and Reporting
0
FCSG-69-6
Placement of SSCs into Category (a)(1), Goal Setting,
and Return of SSCs to Category (a)(2)
0
FCSG-69-7
Periodic Assessment
0
PBD-16
Maintenance Rule Program Basis Document
9a
PED-SED-34
9
SDBD-VA-CR-140
25a
USAR-9.10
Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning System
33
Condition Reports
2011-1316
2011-1452
2011-2259
2011-2261
2011-5466
2011-7616
2012-04590
2014-04797
2014-05004
2014-05577
2014-06387
Miscellaneous Documents
Title
Revision/Date
Functional Scoping Data Sheet for Control Room Air Conditioning
5
Status of Equipment in MR Category (a)(1) or (a)(1) review
April 2, 2014
Section 1R13: Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
FCSG-19
Performing Risk Assessments
17
MM-RR-CH-0001
Inspection and Repair of Charging Pump Hydraulic
Section
10
OP-ST-ESF-009
Channel A Safety Injection, Containment Spray and
Recirculation Actuation Signal Test
59a
SO-M-100
Conduct of Maintenance
57b
SO-M-101
Maintenance Work Control
103
Industry Guidance for Monitoring the Effectiveness of
Maintenance At Nuclear Power Plants
4a
Regulatory Guide
1.160
Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear
Power Plants
3
- 8 -
Section 1R15: Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
OP-FC-108-115
0a
SDBD-CH-108
Chemical and Volume Control Systems
29
UAS-9.2
Chemical and Volume Control System
27
Condition Reports
2014-05026
2014-05501
2014-05577
2014-06093
2014-06785
Section 1R19: Post-Maintenance Testing
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
MM-PM-DG-0001
Diesel Generator DG-1 Inspection
13
OP-PM-AFW-0004
Third Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Operability Verification
39
Work Orders
345936
504052
509872
510831
517327
522553
Section 1R22: Surveillance Testing
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
IC-ST-ESF-0004
Channel Functional Test of Containment Pressure High
Signal (CPHS) Switches
9a
IC-ST-RPS-0014
Quarterly Functional Test of Steam Generator Low Water
Level Trip Units
5
OP-ST-SI-3001
Safety Injection System Category A and B Valve Exercise
Test
37a
SE-ST-CCW-3002
CCW Pump Base Line Curve Procedure
17
Work Orders
498231
510757
- 9 -
Section 1EP6: Drill Evaluation
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
Fire Emergency
28a
EPIP-EOF-7
Protective Action Guidelines
25
EPIP-OSC-1
Emergency Classifications
48a
EPIP-OSC-2
Command and Control Position Actions/Notifications
58
EPIP-OSC-9
Emergency Team Briefings
15
Miscellaneous Documents
Title
Date
Scenario Manual Volume 1 Training Drill
May 13, 2014
Condition Reports
2014-5960
2014-5961
2014-5972
2014-5993
2014-5994
2014-6051
2014-6054
Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
RP-202
Radiological Surveys
044
RP-204
Radiological Area Controls
066
RP-206
Radioactive Material Handling
022
RP-229
Changes in Radiological Conditions Due to Plant
Evolutions
001
RP-306
Hot Spot Identification and Tracking
021
RP-307
Use and Control of Temporary Shielding
021
RP-405
Radioactive Source Inventory Control
016
RP-AD-200
Radiation Protection Surveillance Program
036
Radiation Protection Plan
029
RP-ST-RM-0002 Radioactive Material Sources Surveillance
008
- 10 -
Section 2RS1: Radiological Hazard Assessment and Exposure Controls
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
SO-G-01
Radiation Worker Practices
039
SO-O-47
Spent Fuel Pool Inventory Control
009
Audits, Self-Assessments, and Surveillances
Number
Title
Date
Radiation Protection Audit Report: Audit NOSA-FCS-13-58
July 27, 2013
Radiological Surveys
Number
Title
Date
M-20130625-5
B S/G Walkway, Elevation 1013
June 25, 2013
M-20130719-2
B S/G Walkway, Elevation 1013 Post Survey
July 19, 2013
M-20131119-5
Containment, Elevation 994
November 19, 2013
M-20140307-2
AUX 1007/Room 31, Source Storage
March 7, 2014
M-20140310-3
RW Building Room, Room 509
March 10, 2014
M-20140416-6
AUX 1025/Room 3, Spent Fuel Pool
April 16, 2014
Condition Reports
2012-00734
2013-02595
2013-12045
2013-13938
2013-13531
2013-14124
2013-14258
2013-14472
2013-14652
2013-14693
2013-15026
2013-15029
2013-16119
2013-16705
2013-17201
2013-17323
2013-20766
2013-21217
2014-01875
2014-05225
Radiation Work Permits
Number
Title
Revision
11-0020
Operations Support for the 2011 RFO
00
14-0100
Minor Maintenance in Radiation Areas (no System
Breaches)
02
14-2201
Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High
Radiation Areas
02
14-2203
SI/AC Maintenance in Radiation Areas and in High
Radiation Areas
01
14-2204
VA, CCW, RW and FP Maintenance in Radiation Areas
01
14-2208
DTS Maintenance and Waste Processing
00
- 11 -
Radiation Work Permits
Number
Title
Revision
14-2209
Post Outage Recovery
00
14-3304
Minor Maintenance in RHRAs of the Auxiliary/Radwaste
Buildings
01
14-3307
Regulatory Inspections
00
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Date
6080
2014 National Source Tracking System - Annual Inventory
Reconciliation
January 14, 2014
Non-Fuel Material Spent Fuel Pool Inventory Ledger
October 2013
FC-RP-ST-RM-2 Radioactive Source Inventory and Leak Test
November 12, 2013
Section 2RS2: Occupational ALARA Planning and Controls
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
RP-212
Diving Operations within Radiologically Controlled Areas
12
RP-301
ALARA Planning/ RWP Development and Control
51
RP-AA-400-2000 Department Dose Zealot
0
RP-AD-300
ALARA Program
28a
SO-G-116
Station ALARA Program
1
Condition Reports
2013-12805
2013-12891
2013-13277
2013-13394
2013-13401
2013-13531
2013-13544
2013-14124
2013-14125
2013-14666
2013-15805
2013-15854
2013-15961
2013-16020
2013-16354
2013-16378
2013-17135
2013-17150
2013-17489
2013-18601
2013-19791
2013-20016
2013-20121
2013-20419
2013-20592
2013-20858
2013-21334
2013-22928
2014-00486
2014-00872
2014-00918
2014-01528
2014-01692
2014-01875
2014-02366
2014-02525
2014-02526
2014-02527
2014-02891
2014-03355
2014-04982
2014-05055
2014-05056
2014-05057
2014-05058
2014-05062
2014-05208
Radiation Work Permits
Number
Title
Revision
12-2201
SI/AC System Maintenance in High Radiation Area
0
13-2552
Replace Union Attached to bottom of CH208 and
Associated Tasks
0
- 12 -
Radiation Work Permits
Number
Title
Revision
13-2565
RC-3C Seal Piping Supports and Associated Tasks
0
13-3554
Upper Guide Structure Underwater Modifications and Associated
Tasks
0
14-2201
Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High
Radiation Areas
0
14-2201
Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High
Radiation Areas
1
14-2201
Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High
Radiation Areas
2
14-2202
CVCS Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation Areas
0
14-2202
CVCS Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation Areas
1
14-2202
CVCS Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation Areas
2
14-2203
SI/AC Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation Areas
0
14-2203
SI/AC Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation Areas
1
14-2208
DTS Maintenance and Waste Processing
0
ALARA Work Control Plans
Number
Title
Date
RWP 12-2201
SI/AC System Maintenance in High Radiation Areas
November 10, 2011
RWP 13-2552
Replace Union Attached to bottom of CH208 and
Associated Tasks
March 20, 2013
RWP 13-2565
RC-3C Seal Piping Supports and Associated Tasks
October 18, 2013
RWP 13-3554
Upper Guide Structure Underwater Modifications and
Associated Tasks
August 2, 2013
RWP 14-2201
Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High
Radiation Areas
December 4, 2013
RWP 14-2201
Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High
Radiation Areas
January 6, 2014
RWP 14-2201
Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High
Radiation Areas
February 24, 2014
RWP 14-2201
Waste Disposal Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High
Radiation Areas
March 4, 2014
- 13 -
ALARA Work Control Plans
Number
Title
Date
RWP 14-2202
CVCS Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation
Areas
December 4, 2013
RWP 14-2202
CVCS Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation
Areas
February 27, 2014
RWP 14-2203
SI/AC Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation
Areas
December 4, 2013
RWP 14-2203
SI/AC Maintenance in Radiation Areas and High Radiation
Areas
January 6, 2014
RWP 14-2208
DTS Maintenance and Waste Processing
January 17, 2014
Work in Progress Reviews
Number
Title
Date
1
RWP 13-2552 Replace Ch 208 Union
October 26, 2013
2
RWP 13-2552 Replace Ch 208 Union
November 9, 2013
1
RWP 14-2202 CVCS Maintenance in Radiation Areas
April 9, 2014
1
RWP 14-2201 Waste Disposal Maintenance
February 20, 2014
2
RWP 14-2201 Waste Disposal Maintenance
April 9, 2014
1
RWP 13-3554 Upper Guide Structure Underwater
Modifications and Associated Tasks
August 14, 2013
Radiological Surveys
Number
Title
Date
M-20130729-3
Lower cavity
July 29, 2013
M-20130730-2
Lower cavity
July 30, 2013
M-20130801-1
Lower cavity
August 1, 2013
M-20130801-2
Lower cavity
August 1, 2013
M-20130808-1
Upper cavity
August 8, 2013
M-20130808-2
Upper cavity
August 8, 2013
- 14 -
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Date
Fort Calhoun Nuclear Station 2014-2018 Dose Excellence
Plan
13-NOS-087
Radiation Protection Audit Report Audit NOSA-FCS-13-58
July 27, 2013
Section 2RS4: Occupational Dose Assessment
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision/Date
CH-ST-RV-0010 Environmental Monthly Progress Report Receipt
9
FC-RP-605-1
Exposure Evaluation Report
1
FCSG-24-1
Condition Report Initiating
6
FCSG-24-3
Condition Report Screening
12a
IC-CP-02-0229
Calibration of MGP Telepole
7
IC-CP-07-008
Calibration of Eberline PM-7 Portal Monitor
8a
OP-ST-SI-3003
LP Safety Injection and Containment Spray System Pump
and Check Valve Test
June 14, 2013
RP-203
Air Sample Collection and Analysis
20
RP-204
Radiological Area Controls
66
RP-205
DAC-Hour Tracking
7
RP-602
Personnel Dosimetry Issuance and Changeout
24
RP-605
TLD and Exposure Evaluation Reports
14
RP-606
Special Dosimetry Issue, Control and Use
17
RP-650
Internal Dosimetry Program
12
RP-670
Declared Pregnancy/Anticipated Pregnancy Procedure
0
RP-910
Radiological Risk Assessment
0
RP-AD-200
Radiation Protection Surveillance Program
36
RP-AD-600
Dosimetry Program
22
- 15 -
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision/Date
RPG-037
Radiation Protection Outage Guideline
17
RPG-071
Human Performance Tool for Investigating Dosimeter
Alarms
1
RPI-6
Alternate Access Control of Radiologically Controlled Area February 16, 2006
Radiation Protection Plan
29
RW-218
10CFR61 Classification
15
SO-G-101
Radiation Worker Practices
39
TQG 19-27-17
Task Qualification Guide - Radiation Contamination Guide
18
Condition Reports
2012-19508
2013-15026
2014-04927
2011-9947
2012-01086
2012-02171
2012-02483
2012-02950
2012-10913
2012-13074
2012-19142
2013-02498
2013-03542
2013-04833
2013-13416
2013-14121
2013-14651
2013-14661
2013-17225
2013-18776
2013-20292
2014-01126
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision/Date
National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
2014
TLD Exposure Record Read Results13-008
Personnel Contamination Report
EA-FC-92-071
Engineering Analysis 10CFR20 Revision Bioassay
Program Recommendations
October 13, 1992
Evaluation of Instrument Response to Measured Plant
Radionuclide Mix
2
Section 4OA1: Performance Indicator Verification
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
CH-ANL-RA-0018
Determination of Gamma Isotopic Activity Using Canberra
APEX System
1
CH-ST-RC-0003
Reactor Coolant DEI Activity
5
- 16 -
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
NOD-QP-37
Performance Indicator Program
27
NOD-QP-40
NRC Performance Indicator Program
8
OP-ST-RC-3001
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Leak Rate Test
36
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision
Control Room Logs from 12/1/13 through 3/31/14
Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline
7
Condition Reports (CRs)
2014-05066
Section 4OA2: Problem Identification and Resolution
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
FCSG-24-1
Condition Report Initiation
6
FCSG-24-10
Corrective Action Program Trending
5
FCSG-24-3
Condition Report Screening
12a
FCSG-24-4
Condition Report and Cause Evaluation
8a
FCSG-24-5
Cause Evaluation Manual
7a
FCSG-24-6
Corrective Action Implementation and Condition Report
Closure
12a
SO-R-2
Condition Reporting and Corrective Action
53b
Section 4OA3: Follow-up of Events and Notices of Enforcement Discretion
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
FCSG-23
10 CFR 50.59 Resource Manual
8
EPIP-TSC-2
Catastrophic Flooding Preparations
17
Acts of Nature
40
IC-CP-01-5043
Calibration of Stator Cooling Water System Conductivity
Elements and Recorder
5
- 17 -
Procedures
Number
Title
Revision
NOD-QP-3
10 CFR 50.59 and 10 CFR 72.48 Reviews
37
SO-R-1
Reportability Determinations
33
TDB-EPIP-OSC-
11T
Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety
Emergency Levels
2
Condition Reports (CRs)
2014-03381
Miscellaneous Documents
Number
Title
Revision
50214
Reactor Plant Event Notification
Technical Specification 2.16 River Level