ML14049A014
| ML14049A014 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Browns Ferry  |
| Issue date: | 02/18/2014 |
| From: | NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | Tennessee Valley Authority |
| References | |
| Download: ML14049A014 (7) | |
Text
ILT 1306 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility: Browns Ferry NPP Date of Examination: 9/23/2013 Examination Level: RO Operating Test Number: 1306 Retake Administrative Topic Type Describe activity to be performed Code Conduct of Operations N 2.1.7 2/3-SR-2, Mode 3 Operator Rounds, Table 1.13 through 1.22 RO A1a Conduct of Operations N 2.1.25 Calculate Time to Reach Temperature Targets for Loss of Fuel Pool Cooling RO A1b Equipment Control M 2.2.44 SRM Operability Surveillance for Core Alterations RO A2 Radiation Control D 2.3.12 Locked High Radiation Area Entry Requirements RO A3 NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when all 5 are required.
(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)
(P)revious 2 exams (< 1; randomly selected)
(S)imulator
ILT 1306 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Reactor Operator
- 1. 2/3-SR-2, Mode 3 Operator Rounds, Table 1.13 through 1.22
- New
- 2-SR-2 or 3-SR-2, Instrument Checks and Observations
- Perform Operator logs in accordance with SR-2 Instrument Checks and Observations for log tables 1.13 through 1.22. Verify acceptance criteria are satisfied in accordance with notes.
- 2.1.7 Ability to evaluate plant performance and make operational judgments based on operating characteristics, reactor behavior, and instrument interpretation. Importance RO 4.4
- 2. Calculate Time to Reach Temperature Targets for Loss of Fuel Pool Cooling
- New
- 2/3-AOI-78-1, Fuel Pool Cleanup System Failure
- Calculates time to reach temperature targets for 125° F, 150° F and 200° F for Unit 2 / 3.
- 2.1.25 Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. Importance RO 3.9
- 3. SRM Operability Surveillance for Core Alterations
- Modified from Bank
- 2/3-SR-3.3.1.2.4, Source Range Monitor System Count Rate and Signal to Noise Ratio Check
- Perform SRM System Count Rate and Signal to Noise Ratio Checks to determine if core alterations can commence.
- 2.2.44 Ability to interpret control room indication to verify the status and operation of a system, and understand how operator actions and directives affect plant and system conditions. Importance RO 4.2
- 4. Locked High Radiation Area Entry Requirements
- Direct from Bank
- NPG-SPP 5.1 Radiological Controls
- Determine dress out requirements and estimate dose to verify within RWP and quarterly limits.
- 2.3.12 Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. Importance RO 3.2
ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Facility: Browns Ferry NPP Date of Examination: 9/23/2013 Exam Level: RO Operating Test No.: 1306 Retake Control Room Systems (8 for RO); (7 for SRO-I); (2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)
Safety System / JPM Title Type Code*
Function
- b. Remove RFPT A from Service A, P, S 2
- c. Responds to a Stuck Open SRV A, D, S 3
- d. Control Valve Tightness Test A, L, D, S 4
- e. Vent Drywell IAW 2-AOI-64-1 N, EN, S 5
- f. Transfer 4KV Unit Board 2B D, S 6
- g. CAD to Drywell Control Air A, D, S 8
- h. Return Drywell Continuous Air Monitor to Service D, S 9 In-Plant Systems@ (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)
- i. Control Room Abandonment Pressure Control R, D, E 3
- j. Reset Battery Chargers 1, 2B and 3 in an SSI Fire N, E 6
@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.
- Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U (A)lternate path 4-6/2-3 (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank < 9/< 8/<4 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant > 1/> 1/>1 (EN)gineered safety feature - / - />1 (control room system)
(L)ow-Power / Shutdown >1/>1/>1 (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) > 2/> 2/>1 (P)revious 2 exams < 3/< 3/< 2 (randomly selected)
(R)CA >1/>1/>1 (S)imulator
ILT 1306 Control Room/In-Plant Systems JPM Narrative Control Room Systems:
- Alternate Path / Low Power / Direct from Bank / Simulator
- 2/3-AOI-85-3, CRD System Failure
- 201001 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System A2.01 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the CONTROL ROD DRIVE HYDRAULIC SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Pump Trips IMPORTANCE: RO 3.2
- Operator will continue plant startup by withdrawing control rods. Operator will range IRMs as necessary to avoid a Reactor Scram and allow control rod movement. During control rod withdraw the operating CRD Pump will trip and the standby CRD Pump will fail to start.
With Reactor Pressure less than 900 psig and unable to restore charging water pressure above 940 psig the Operator will be required to insert a Reactor Scram.
- b. Remove RFPT A from Service (Unit 2 or 3)
- Alternate Path / Previous Exam / Simulator
- 2/3-OI-3, Reactor Feedwater System
- 259001 Reactor Feedwater System A4.04 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the Control Room: System valves. IMPORTANCE: RO 3.1
- Operator will be directed remove the 2A/3A RFPT from service in accordance with OI-3, Reactor Feedwater System. The operator will identify that the RFPT A discharge check valve fails to close and take actions in accordance with OI-3
- c. Responds to a Stuck Open SRV (Unit 2 or 3)
- Alternate Path / Direct from Bank / Simulator
- 2/3-AOI-1-1, Relief Valve Stuck Open
- 239002 Relief / Safety Valves A2.03 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Relief / Safety Valves; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Stuck open SRV IMPORTANCE: RO 4.1
- Responds to a stuck open SRV IAW AOI-1-1, and closes the SRV when the MSRV AUTO ACTUATION LOGIC INHIBIT, 2-XS-1-202 is placed in INHIBIT.
ILT 1306 Control Room/In-Plant Systems JPM Narrative
- d. Control Valve Tightness Test (Unit 2 or 3)
- Alternate Path / Low Power / Direct from Bank / Simulator
- 2/3-OI-47 Turbine Generator System
- 245000 Main Turbine Generator and Auxiliary Systems A3.05 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MAIN TURBINE GENERATOR and AUXILIARY SYSTEMS including: Control valve operation IMPORTANCE: RO 3.0
- Control Valve Tightness Test IAW OI-47 section 6.9, responds to high turbine vibrations and trips the Main Turbine
- e. Vent Drywell IAW 2-AOI-64-1 (Unit 2)
- New / Engineered Safety Feature / Simulator
- 2-AOI-64-1 Drywell Pressure and/or Temperature High, or Excessive Leakage into Drywell
- 223001 Primary Containment System and Auxiliaries A4.07 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: Drywell pressure IMPORTANCE: RO 4.2
- Vent the Drywell IAW AOI-64-1 and then secure Drywell venting.
- f. Transfer 4KV Unit Board 2B (Unit 2)
- Direct from Bank / Simulator
- 0-OI-57A, Switchyard and 4160V AC Electrical System
- 262001 Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: A4.03 Local operation of breakers IMPORTANCE: RO 3.2
- Operator transfers 4KV Unit Board 2B from the USST to the Start Bus per 0-OI-57A.
ILT 1306 Control Room/In-Plant Systems JPM Narrative
- g. CAD to Drywell Control Air (Unit 2 or 3)
- Alternate Path / Direct from Bank / Simulator
- 2/3-EOI Appendix-8G Crosstie CAD to Drywell Control Air
- 295019 Partial or Complete Loss of Instrument Air AA1.01 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to PARTIAL OR COMPLETE LOSS OF INSTRUMENT AIR: Backup Air Supply IMPORTANCE: RO 3.5 SRO 3.3
- Operator is directed to crosstie CAD to Drywell Control Air, once crosstie is complete operator verifies no leakage and discovers that Drywell Control Air Header System B has indication of leakage and isolates CAD System B.
- h. Return Drywell Continuous Air Monitor to Service (Unit 2 or 3)
- Direct from Bank / Simulator
- 2/3-AOI-100-1, Reactor Scram
- 272000 Radiation Monitoring System A2.10 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the Radiation Monitoring System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Loss of Coolant Accident IMPORTANCE: RO 3.9
- Operator is directed to restore the Drywell Continuous Air Monitor to service IAW 2/3-AOI-100-1.
ILT 1306 Control Room/In-Plant Systems JPM Narrative In-Plant Systems:
- i. Control Room Abandonment Pressure Control
- RCA / Direct from bank / Emergency or Abnormal In-Plant
- AOI-100-2 Control Room Abandonment Section 4.2 steps 2 thru 6
- 295016 Control Room Abandonment AA1.08 Ability to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to Control Room Abandonment: Reactor Pressure IMPORTANCE: RO 4.0 SRO 4.0
- The operator will transfer control power for Safety Relief Valves to the Backup Control Panel 2-25-32, close the Main Steam Isolation Valves and control reactor pressure in the directed band with safety relief valves IAW 2-AOI-100-2, Control Room Abandonment.
- j. Reset Battery Chargers 1, 2B and 3 in an SSI Fire
- New / Emergency in Plant
- 0-SSI-1-5, Unit 1, Reactor Building Fire EL 621 and 639 North of Column Line R
- 295004 Partial or Complete Loss of DC Power AA1.02 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Partial or Complete Loss of DC Power: Systems necessary to assure safe plant shutdown IMPORTANCE: RO 3.8
- Perform field actions to reset Battery Chargers 1, 2B and 3 and to bypass 480V load shed logic for Battery Charger 2B, IAW 0-SSI-1-5.
- Direct from Bank / Emergency or Abnormal In-Plant
- 212000 Reactor Protection System A2.20 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following on the REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those abnormal conditions or operations: Full system activation (full-SCRAM) IMPORTANCE: RO 4.1 SRO 4.2