ML14038A109

Response to Request for Additional Information License Amendment to Transition to NFPA 805

ML14038A109
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	01/29/2014
From:	Joseph Pacher Constellation Energy Nuclear Group, EDF Group
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML14038A109 (75)

Text

Joseph Pacher Office: 585-771-5200 Site Vice President Fax: 585-771-3943 Email: Joseph.Pacher@cengllc.com CENG.

a joint venture of Constellation Energy eDr January 29, 2014 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT:

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Renewed Facility Operating License No. DPR-l 8 Docket No. 50-244 Response to Request for Additional Information RE: License Amendment to transition to NFPA 805

REFERENCES:

(a) Letter from Mr. Joseph E. Pacher (Ginna LLC) to Document Control Desk (NRC) dated March 28, 2013,

Subject:

License Amendment Request Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90: Adoption of NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants (MLI 3093A064)

By Reference (a), R.E. Ginna Nuclear Plant, LLC (REG) submitted a request for the adoption of NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants.

On October 9, 2013, the NRC requested additional information regarding this submittal. Attached please find the second in the set of three responses to the staff's questions. There are no regulatory commitments identified in this letter.

Should you have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Thomas Harding at 585-771-5219.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on January 29, 2014.

Sincerely, JP/KC

Attachment:

(1) 90-Day Responses to Request for Additional hIfonrnation for NFPA 805 (72 pages)

P001,4 R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, LLC PýK 1503 Lake Road, Ontario, New York 14519-9364

Document Control Desk January 29, 2014 Page 2 cc: NRC Regional Administrator, Region I N'RC Project Manager, Ginna NRC Resident Inspector, Ginna A.L. Peterson, NYSERDA

Attachment (1) 90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 FM RAI 03 Section 4.5.1.2, "Fire PRA" of the Transition Report states that fire modeling was performed as part of the Fire PRA development (NFPA 805, Section 4.2.4.2). Reference is made to Attachment J, "Fire Modeling V&V," for a discussion of the verification and validation (V&V) of the fire models that were used. Furthermore Section 4.7.3, "Compliance with Quality Requirements in Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805" of the Transition Report states that "calculational models and numerical methods used in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) were verified and validated as required by Section 2.7.3.2 of NFPA 805."

1. LAR Table J-1 lists Detection Activation Model (Heat and Smoke Detection), which is not validated in NUREG-1824 (as the other referenced models in Table J-1). Table J-1 has a footnote that states that the model "is the prevailing model for estimating activation times."

This statement does not provide sufficient basis to determine the adequacy of the V&V.

Provide additional information and documentation to determine the acceptability of the model.

Response

The general approach for crediting automatic detection and suppression in the R.E.Ginna Fire PRA is:

Automatic detection is credited in every fire zone where the system is available. This approach is consistent with crediting manual suppression using the manual suppression failure probability curves in Chapter 14 of Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850, as the system will provide indication to start the fire response.

Automatic suppression is credited only when necessary based on the risk contribution (i.e.,

CDF and LERF contribution) for the individual scenario.

The smoke detection model used in the Fire PRA is the Method of Mowrer described in Chapter 11 of NUREG-1805. The heat detection model used in the Fire PRA is the model described in Chapter 10 of NUREG-1805. These models are not part of the Fire Modeling verification and validation (V&V) study in NUREG-1824. As a consequence, a quantitative V&V for determining whether the model was used within its range of applicability, or justification for why the model was used outside the range, was not performed. In addition, the fire scenarios at R.E.Ginna are characterized by complex configurations that would not be covered by the limited testing validating these models.

The activation models have been applied conservatively. Automatic detection and suppression capabilities are not credited to protect the initial target set in fire scenarios.

These systems are credited only after the initial target set is damaged by fire. From a fire modeling perspective, this approach assumes that the ignition source and the first target set (i.e., cable trays) are on fire before the system starts. For the automatic sprinkler systems this is a conservative approach as the sprinklers are located within the cable trays.

Therefore, assuming that some cable trays are on fire before the sprinklers start is bounding as the damage and ignition of cables occurs at higher damage thresholds compared to the activation temperature of the sprinklers. A similar approach is applied to the Halon system credit in the Relay Room (Fire Compartment RR-C1). The ignition source (relay panels in most cases) and the cable tray(s) immediately above the ignition source are failed without suppression credit. Credit is then assigned to subsequent scenarios (which include FM RAI 03 1

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 additional targets) to which the fire propagates from the initial target set. Given that the system is activated by a smoke detection signal, this is a conservative practice because a relatively large fire (ignition source and cable trays) is postulated before the Halon system is credited in applicable scenarios.

In summary, the scenario configuration has been considered to ensure that relatively severe fire conditions in close proximity to the activation device and initial target set damage are postulated before the automatic suppression is credited. That is, the specific timing results from the activation models are not explicitly used. They are only used as indications that the system can activate before the ignition source and the initial target set are assumed damaged, so that they can be credited for subsequent fire scenarios.

2. LAR Attachment J (page J-2) refers to the draft RG DG-1218 published in March 2009 for the acceptability of the fire models that were used in the application. Draft RG DG-1218 is the preliminary draft to RG 1.205 and therefore is not the approved guidance. Clarify that the models used in the application are in accordance with the approved guidance.

Response

The first paragraph of LAR Attachment J, Section 1, "Fire Models," will be revised to state:

"Fire modeling tools are used in the R.E. Ginna NFPA 805 transition process in the Fire PRA only. The fire models listed in Table J-1 of the LAR were used within the Fire PRA to assess the extent of fire generated conditions for the different fire scenarios postulated and quantified for CDF and LERF. Table J-1 includes the model identification, the technical references for the model, and the validation work available for it. The selected models are listed in NEI 04-02 (Revision 2 Section 5.1.2), and are considered acceptable by the NRC if each model is shown to have been appropriately applied within the range of its applicability and V&V (RG 1.205 Revision 1, Section 4.2). The appropriate use of each model listed in Table J-1 of the LAR is demonstrated in the document titled "Verification and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Fire PRA at R.E. Ginna" (G1-FSS-F006)."

3. The licensee states on page J-4 of the LAR that "The dimensionless parameters for the CFAST files were not evaluated against the available V&V criteria in NUREG-1824. It should be noted that in some calculations, particularly those associated with the reactor and turbine buildings, there are relatively complex configurations not explicitly covered by the V&V criteria in NUREG-1824." This statement does not provide sufficient basis to determine the adequacy of the V&V. Provide additional information and documentation to determine the acceptability of the model, in particular in terms of its use in the NUREG 1824 validation range.

Response

A document titled "Verification and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Fire PRA at R.E. Ginna" (G1-FSS-F006) will be prepared to provide the V&V documentation for CFAST.

The V&V methodology evaluates whether CFAST is used within its V&V range of applicability as defined in NUREG-1824. Normalized parameters describing the fire scenarios in the R.E. Ginna Fire PRA are calculated and compared against the model FM RAI 03 2

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 validation ranges. When parameters fall outside the validation range, sensitivity cases are evaluated to determine the impact on the conclusions and to provide justification for the use of CFAST in the particular fire scenario.

4. Based on review of Attachment J to the LAR, no reference to the use of FDS is provided.

However, based on discussions during the audit, it is clear that FDS was used to conduct the main control room abandonment fire modeling. Confirm that this is the only location where FDS was used. If it was used in other fire areas, describe how (what was objective) and where (fire areas/zones) it was used.

Response

Table J-1, "Fire Models used in the Analysis," has been revised to include Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS). FDS is used solely in the Main Control Room analysis in the R.E. Ginna fire PRA. The Main Control Room analysis notebook, G1-FSS-F004 documents the application of FDS to determine hot gas layer conditions. All remaining hot gas layer calculations for areas outside of the Main Control Room utilize CFAST as documented in appendices I through AS in the detailed fire modeling notebook, G1-FSS-FOO1.

FM RAI 03 3

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 FM RAI 04 Section 4.7.3, "Compliance with Quality Requirements in Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805," of the Transition Report states that "Engineering methods and numerical models used in support of compliance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) are used and were used as required by Section 2.7.3.3 of NFPA 805."

Regarding the limitations of use:

1. Algebraic models cannot be used outside the range of conditions covered by the experiments on which the model is based. NUREG-1805, "Fire Dynamics Tools (FDTs),"

has a section on assumptions and limitations that provides guidance to the user in terms of proper and improper use for each FDT. The general limitations of use for the algebraic equations that has been utilized for hand calculation was discussed. It is not clear, however, how these limitations were enforced on the individual fire areas or for the multi-compartment analysis. Provide a description of how the limit of applicability was determined for each fire area.

Response

The validation for algebraic models used at R.E. Ginna will be addressed in Appendix B of the report titled "Verification and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Fire PRA at R.E.

Ginna" (G1-FSS-F006). The algebraic functions are validated using NUREG-1824 as the basis. Supplemental validation is provided in certain cases that do not fall within the NUREG-1824 non-dimensional parameter space. This supplemental validation includes correlation ranges on which the original models are based and validation efforts conducted by the Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) for the Point Source Model. The results of the verification and validation study indicates that all R.E. Ginna Fire PRA applications fall within the NUREG-1824 validation space, the original correlation range, or the validation space of the SFPE. The R.E. Ginna Fire PRA is being updated to reflect the results of the verification and validation study.

a. Include a list of all areas, zones, transient zones and scenarios for which algebraic models were used to calculate flame height, plume temperature and point source radiation. Specify for each use whether the model was used within its range of applicability, or, justify why the model was used outside the range.

Response

Sections 8.2.1 through 8.2.3 of the Verification and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Fire PRA Fire Scenario Selection and Analysis, G1-FSS-F006 will document the validation of the flame height, plume temperature, and point source models. A summary of the results of the validation process for each algebraic model is below.

Flame Height:

The validation of the flame height calculation as used in the R.E. Ginna fire PRA is not necessary because it can be explicitly shown that the plume temperature is always the limiting condition when determining the critical fire size for targets located above the plan area of the ignition source. That is, the heat release rate necessary FM RAI 04 1

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 for generating a damaging plume temperature at a given height is always less than the heat release rate necessary to generate a flame height reaching that same height. Consequently, the severity factors calculated following the guidance in Appendix E of NUREG/CR-6850 are always higher when the plume temperature is selected as a model for determining the lowest heat release rate value that would generate damage above the fire source.

Plume temperature:

NUREG 1824, Volume 3 provides a validation basis for the Heskestad plume model as applied to nuclear power plants. The validation is applicable within specific ranges of non-dimensional parameters, two of which are applicable to a thermal plume calculation:

" Ratio of the target height to the dimensionless fire diameter (H/D*) between 3.6 and 16; and,

• A fire Froude Number (Fr) between 0.4 and 2.4.

Table 88 in G1-FSS-F006, will show that the ratio of the target height to the dimensionless fire diameter (H/D*) falls between 3.6 and 16 for the majority of the fire scenarios (i.e., 923 of 966 scenarios).

No scenario presented a dimensionless fire diameter below the validation range.

Those Fire PRA screening scenarios in which the H/D* ratio exceeded the upper limit of 16 have outcomes in which the plume temperature is lower than the damage criteria for thermoplastic cable (i.e., no target damage). This is expected since the large H/D* ratio suggests that the target is relatively high in the plume zone. These scenarios were reassessed at a height corresponding to the upper H/D* ratio of 16.

The exposure temperature at this height is less than the critical target temperature of 2050C; therefore, the targets are not predicted to be damaged at a lower point within the same thermal plume. Because this lower point is within the validation basis, it is concluded that target damage is not predicted for an application that is within the validation range.

Table 1, at the end of this RAI response, provides a list of all areas, zones, transient zones and scenarios for which algebraic models were used to calculate flame height, plume temperature and point source radiation. In the table, the H/D ratio represents the target separation over the dimensionless fire diameter. The Froude number is also listed to compare to the validation range in NUREG-1824, and Q215/D is the critical fire size divided by the dimensionless fire diameter.

Point Source:

NUREG 1824, Volume 3 provides a validation basis for the Point Source Model heat flux as applied to nuclear power plants. The validation is applicable within specific ranges of non-dimensional parameters, one of which is applicable to a thermal radiation calculation.

• Radial distance ratio (RID) between 2.2 and 5.7.

FM RAI 04 2

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 The following table includes list of all areas, zones, transient zones and scenarios for which algebraic models were used to calculate flame radiation with the point source model. The RID ratio documents the parameter that validates the model. R represents the target separation or the radial distance and D is the dimensionless fire diameter.

FM RAI 04 3

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Scenarios Using Algebraic Models for Plume Temperature Calculations Equipment Location Target Fire Critical RID Within Room ID/Equipment Factor Separation Diameter Fire Size Ratio Validation Type (ft) (ft) (kW) Range?

TB-1 11-C-03-T1/TRTB 1 1 2 23 4.7 Yes TB-1 CSA03/AC 1 1 2 23 4.7 Yes TB-2 TEBDCPSC/EC 1 1 2 23 4.7 Yes TY-E TY-E-T2/TRPW 1 1 2 23 4.7 Yes TY-E TY-E-T2_TRWPW 1 1 2 23 4.7 Yes FM RAI 04 4

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 The above table indicates all of the applications at R.E. Ginna have RID ratios that are within the NUREG-1824 validation range.

b. Include a list of areas, zones and scenarios for which algebraic models were used to calculate sprinkler, heat detector and smoke detector activation. Specify for each use whether the model was used with its range of applicability, or, justify why the model was used outside the range.

Response

Algebraic models are not currently used in the R.E. Ginna fire PRA to determine when to credit sprinkler, heat detector, and smoke detector activation. Automatic detection is credited in every fire zone where the system is available. The approach is consistent with crediting manual suppression using the manual suppression failure probability curves in Chapter 14 of Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850, as the system will provide indication to start the fire response. Automatic detection capabilities are not credited to protect the initial target set in fire scenarios. Detection is credited only after the initial target set is damaged by fire.

Models for sprinkler activation were not explicitly used in the Ginna Fire PRA.

Instead, sprinkler activation has been conservatively estimated. Automatic suppression capabilities are not credited to protect the initial target set in fire scenarios. These systems are credited only after the initial target set is damaged by fire. From a fire modeling perspective, this approach assumes that the ignition source and the first target set (i.e., cable trays) are on fire before the system starts.

For the automatic sprinkler systems this is a conservative approach as the sprinklers are located within the cable trays. Therefore, assuming that some cable trays are on fire before the sprinklers start is bounding as the damage and ignition of cables occurs at higher damage thresholds compared to the activation temperature of the sprinklers. A similar approach is applied to the Halon system credit in the Relay Room (Fire Compartment RR-C1). The ignition source (relay panels in most cases) and the cable tray(s) connecting to the ignition source are failed without suppression credit. Credit is then assigned to subsequent scenarios (which include additional targets) to which the fire propagates from the initial target set. Given that the system is activated by a smoke detection signal, this is a conservative practice because a relatively large fire (ignition source and connected cables/conduits) is postulated before the Halon system is credited in applicable scenarios.

In summary, the scenario configuration has been considered to ensure that relatively severe fire conditions in close proximity to the activation device and initial target set damage are postulated before the automatic suppression is credited. That is, the specific timing results from the activation models are not explicitly used. They are only used as indications that the system can activate before the ignition source and the initial target set are assumed damaged, so that they can be credited for subsequent fire scenarios.

FM RAI 04 5

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805

2. The range of the Froude number in the analyses for the plant calculations (with the exception of the MCR) ranges from 0.7 to 3.1, whereas the range of validation is between 0.4 and 2.4. Hence, for larger heat release rates, the Froude number will exceed the validated range. Explain why it is acceptable to exceed the validation range.

Response

During post-LAR submittal analysis, the range of Froude numbers listed in Appendix G of the detailed fire modeling notebook, G1-FSS-FOO1 will be updated to 0.04 to 4.69 and reflect the ranges which will be documented in G1-FSS-F006, the verification and validation of R.E. Ginna fire modeling calculations. Section 8.2.2 of G1-FSS-F006 will calculate the fire Froude Number for each fire scenario in which an algebraic equation was used. The results indicate that the fire Froude Number does not fall within the NUREG-1824 validation range for most fire PRA scenarios. The Froude number ranges from 0.04 to 4.69 for the updated R.E. Ginna calculations, which envelopes the previous 0.7 to 3.1 values discussed in the question. The values above the maximum validation range of 2.4 are associated with conservative modeling of oil fires with a relatively high heat release rate in a relatively small fire diameter. Such configuration produces larger flame heights which in turn, results in time to damage of approximately 2 minutes. Within this 2 minute time frame, the full zone of influence is failed as a conservative practice. In most cases in which the fire Froude Number is outside the validation range, it is lower than the minimum range value of 0.4. It is shown that the low fire Froude Number applications at R.E. Ginna will over-predict the temperature and flame height.

In the development of MCR abandonment times, it was indicated that the electric panel and transient fire areas were chosen so that the Froude number is in the NUREG-1824 validation range (0.4-2.4). Provide justification for fixing the fire areas in the analysis, such that the Froude number falls within the validated range. Also, confirm that fire areas used in the simulation are consistent with actual panel configurations in the MCR, or explain why it is allowable to use a fire area inconsistent with plant configuration.

Response

The response to this RAI is divided into sections. The first section discusses electrical cabinet fires. The second section discusses transient fires.

Electrical cabinet fires:

There is no simple or obvious way to compute a meaningful fire Froude Number for fires in electrical panels (i.e., NUREG/CR-6850, Appendix E, Cases 1, 2, 3, and 4). This is because the combustion primarily occurs within the panel and the transfer of heat and mass to the surrounding enclosure occurs across the panel vents and any gaps that may exist or form during the fire. The current method for evaluating electrical panel fires per NUREG/CR-6850 and NUREG/CR-6850, Supplement 1 is to assume an open configuration source fire with a base height equal to the panel height or 0.3 m (1 ft) below the panel top, depending on the panel configuration. This is a conservative alternative to modeling the fire conditions within the panel and the mass and energy flows between the panel and the surroundings. When using this method to bound the mass and energy transfer across the panel boundaries and thus into the thermal plume, it is assumed that the open configuration is such that the fire FM RAI 04 6

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 diameter produces a fire Froude Number within the NUREG-1 824, Volume 1 validation range. Essentially, the method for modeling electrical panel fires is to treat them as an open source fire that has a fire Froude Number that falls within the range considered by NUREG-1824, Volume 1.

Transient fires:

As described in the R.E.Ginna Main Control Room Calculation, 32-9073294-002 the Froude Number for transient fires is set to the lower limit of applicability listed in NUREG-1 824, Volume 1. Given transient fires can have numerous configurations, the transient areas have been chosen so that the most conservative results within the validation range are obtained.

The selected transient fire areas are consistent with the main control room configuration.

When this occurs, the thermal plume that is expected from the ignition source fire could be wider than the range evaluated NUREG-1824, Volume 1. A wider thermal plume will have a greater entrainment rate than one associated with a similar heat release rate fire that has a smaller diameter. This means that the conditions relative to a source fire that falls within the validation range will be less severe both in terms of the concentration of combustion products and the temperature. The sensitivity analyses performed in section 6.2 of the Main Control Room Fire Modeling report, suggest that the use of a fire diameter associated with the lower limit of validation for the Froude number and the transient heat release rate values recommended in Appendix G of NUREG/CR-6850 resulted in bounding abandonment conditions. It should be further noticed that in terms of fire risk contribution from abandonment scenarios in the main control room, the electrical cabinet fires present a higher contribution, given the higher fire intensities associated with these ignition sources.

Therefore, the impact of determining fire diameters setting the Froude number to the lowest validation limit is further minimized.

3. Zone models may not suitable for compartments with a high length-to-width or height-to-width aspect ratio (e.g. the Cable Tunnel compartment, G2-EXT (N End Box) compartment).

In addition, the hot gas layer temperature close to the fire might be significantly higher than the hot gas layer temperature calculated by a zone model. Verify that the CFAST model was always used within the range of acceptable room length-to-width and height-to-width aspect ratio, or, if not, explain why it was acceptable to use CFAST.

Response

The justification for the use of CFAST with regards to the room geometries will be provided in G1-FSS-F006. The aspect ratios for each fire zone were compared against the validation range for the experiments used in NUREG-1824. When the aspect ratio was outside of the range, a sensitivity analysis was conducted adjusting the room dimensions in the conservative direction so that they fell within the applicable range. In all cases, the results of the sensitivity analyses suggested no change in the conclusions made using aspect ratios outside the limits of applicability.

FM RAI 04 7

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805

4. Identify uses, if any, of CFAST outside the limits of applicability of the model and for those cases explain how the use of CFAST was justified. Include a list of areas, zones and scenarios for which CFAST was used to confirm hot gas layer development.

Response

G1-FSS-F006 will document the verification and validation of the use of CFAST using the guidance documented in NUREG 1824. The table below summarizes the scenarios in which CFAST is used to determine hot gas layer temperatures. The table also lists the results of the evaluation of the applicable non-dimensional parameters. For the scenarios in which the CFAST calculation falls outside of the validation range, sensitivity analyses are conducted adjusting the input parameters in the conservative direction so that all the normalized parameters are within the validation range. The results of the sensitivity analyses suggested no change in the conclusions made with the using aspect rations outside the limits of applicability.

FM RAI 04 8

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 CFAST Files Names for V&V Study Equivalence Ratio, (p, Compartment Aspect Fire Zone CFAST in V&V Range Fire Froude Number Flame Length Ratio based on Natural Ratio Ventilation Al-CHG Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes ABB-C1 No Yes Yes Yes No ABM-C1 No Yes Yes No No ABO-C1 No Yes Yes Yes No BR1A No Yes Yes No Yes BR1B No Yes Yes No Yes CT No Yes Yes No No G2-EXT No Yes Yes No Yes IBN-1 No Yes Yes Yes No K-EDG1A No Yes Yes No Yes K-EDG11B No Yes Yes No Yes RR-C1 No Yes Yes No No SH-1 No Yes Yes No Yes SH-2 No Yes Yes No No TB-1 No Yes Yes No Yes TB-2 No Yes Yes No No Al-Z-AB15 No Yes Yes Yes Yes CPB No Yes No No Yes SB-1 No Yes Yes No No SH-1-CWP No Yes Yes No Yes TB-1 FP No Yes Yes No Yes TB-3 No Yes Yes No No FM RAI 04 9

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 CFAST Files Names for V&V Study Equivalence Ratio, (p, Compartment Aspect Fire Zone CFAST in V&V Range Fire Froude Number Flame Length Ratio based on Natural Ratio Ventilation A1-L-10A No Yes Yes No Yes Al -Z-AB04 No Yes Yes No Yes Al-Z-AB06 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes A1-Z-AB07 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Al-Z-AB22 No Yes Yes No No A2-Z-AC02 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes A2-Z-AC06 No Yes Yes No No A2-Z-AC19 No Yes Yes No Yes A3-Z-AD15 No Yes Yes No Yes AHR No Yes Yes No Yes Z1-SC No Yes Yes No No TSC-1M No Yes Yes No Yes SB-2 No Yes Yes No No IBN-2 No Yes Yes Yes No RC-1 No Yes Yes No No RC-2 No Yes Yes No Yes FM RAI 04 10

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805

5. Identify uses, if any, of FDS outside the limits of applicability of the model and for those cases explain how the use of FDS was justified.

Response

FDS was only used to perform detailed hot gas layer calculations for the main control room.

Appendix C of the R.E. Ginna Fire PRA-MCR Calculation, 32-9073294-002, documents the verification and validation of the FDS calculations performed for the main control room.

The table below summarizes the validation of the R.E. Ginna MCR.

FM RAI 04 11

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Normalized Parameter Calculations for the Transient Fuel Package Fires in the R. E. Ginna MCR.

Quantity Normalized Parameter Calculation Validation In Range?

Range Fire Froude Number 5 0 .

(W*) 1102D -0.4es Flame length to ceiling Lf -0.22 height ratio H - Hf 0.2-1.0 Yes Lf Df (3.7 *,/5 - 1.02) = 1.32 Ceiling jet radius relative to the ceiling Not applicable. 1.2-1.7 N/A height Equivalence ratio based on opening area =° / 1 =1.04 0.04-0.6 No

((P) (AH0 2 ) (0.23 x ZOH-)

Equivalence ratio= - = 0.02-0.15 0.04-0.6 Yes/No (Scenario based on HVAC (qoj) - (oV Ho02(p -V) Dependent)*

Compartment aspect ratios L W

-=2.9; -- =2.1 0.6-5.7 Yes (fl* ) H H (H-Hf HHf FM RAI 04 12

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Normalized Parameter Calculations for the Transient Fuel Package Fires in the R. E. Ginna MCR.

Quantity Normalized Parameter Calculation Validation Range In Range?

Target distance to fire R = At least 4.2 2.2-5.7 Yes/No (Scenario diameter Df Dependent)*

• The normalized parameter calculation indicates the values will both fall within and outside of the validation range based on a variety of fire configurations and room conditions. Where the values are outside of the validation range, the effect on the model is discussed in the paragraphs below.

FM RAI 04 13

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 The table above indicates that the fire Froude Number is within the NUREG 1824 V&V range for all scenarios considered. This is by design as described in Assumption 4.16 and Section 5.5 of 32-9073294-002. The flame length to ceiling height ratio is within the V&V range for all scenarios considered except for the lowest electrical panel fire bins. In these cases, the flame length can be up to fifteen percent shorter than the NUREG 1824 V&V range. This is not a serious concern in this application because the flame shape is consistent with the NUREG 1824 V&V cases (i.e., no flame impingement on ceiling boundary).

The natural and forced ventilation parameters suggest that there will combinations where the oxygen to fuel ratio (equivalence ratio) falls outside the V&V range. On the low end of the scale, the limit is not considered to invalidate the model results as the values simply indicate that there is more oxygen available than even the most well ventilated fire test. Depending on the stage of the test fire, the oxygen ratio would have passed through a value comparable to the values observed in the R. E. Ginna cases given the ratio is zero at the start of all fires. Cases where the equivalence ratio is too high generally occur for the larger heat release rate bins of the panel fire or the no forced ventilation scenarios for the transient fire. In these cases, a number of observations may be made. First, the largest panel fire having the greatest equivalence ratio (greater than one) result in abandonment in less than 10 minutes. At these times, the fire size has not reached the peak value and the equivalence ratio at the time abandonment is predicted is much lower, though possibly still greater than 0.6. Second, the initial oxygen reservoir in the control room can support the fires in the absence of additional ventilation for the twenty minute fire durations considered in this calculation. An assessment of this potential may be made using the following equation:

Mo, = 0.23pc1 oV where M02 is the initial mass of oxygen in the MCR (kg), po, is the density of the air (kg/m 3), and V is the enclosure volume (M 3 ). The mass of oxygen is thus in excess of 318 kg. The combustion energy that the initial oxygen mass can support is given by the following:

E0 2 = Mo2 AH0 2 where E0 2 is the total amount of combustion energy that could be realized by the initial oxygen mass in the control room (kJ) and AHo, is the heat of combustion of oxygen (13,100 kJ/kg). The total amount of combustion energy that could be realized by the initial oxygen mass is thus 4,166 MJ.

This energy content could support a 317 kW transient fire for about three hours, or six times longer than the time interval of interest. A 1,462 kW panel fire could be supported for forty-seven minutes, about 2.5 times longer than the time interval of interest. This suggests that the postulated fire scenarios are not large enough, nor do they burn long enough, to transition to a FM RAI 04 14

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 ventilation limited condition. Since the actual fires do not become ventilation limited, the equivalence ratio within the enclosure is expected to remain within the tested range for the time scales of interest. This expectation is confirmed by the FDS results showing that the fire size is exactly as specified (i.e., the ventilation conditions do not cause a heat release rate reduction).

It could also be asserted that based on these results, the equivalence ratio as defined in the above table does not apply because there is a sufficient reservoir of oxygen within the enclosure to sustain the fires.

In the case of the radiant heat flux (target positions), the minimum distance in all cases considered is within the NUREG 1824 V&V range. Depending on the actual fire size (and fire diameter) and the operator location, the distance could be greater than the NUREG 1824 V&V range. However, at these remote distances, the heat flux contribution from the fire diminishes.

This is further amplified by the orientation of the target (upward) and the assumption that the operators can adjust their position such that they are not located within the fire ZOI. This means that the parameter is not significant for the type of analysis conducted, and when it is outside the NUREG 1824 V&V range, it is at a remote distance where the contribution from this parameter is minimal compared to other sources of heat flux (hot gas layer).

FM RAI 04 15

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function H/D* Fire Fr 2/5 Q2/5 Target Critical Room Equipment IDIEquipment Location Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D/D Type Factor Size Ratio within within at within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

A1-CHG A1-CHG-T1/TRCAR 1 8.4 264 14.88 Yes 0.83 Yes 15.26 Yes A1-CHG A1-CHG-T1/TRWCAR 1 8.4 264 14.88 Yes 0.83 Yes 15.26 Yes A1-CHG PCH01A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No A1-CHG PCH01A/ZO1 1 10.4 405 15.52 Yes 1.27 Yes 18.11 Yes A1-CHG PCH01A/ZO2 1 10.4 405 15.52 Yes 1.27 Yes 18.11 Yes A1-CHG PCH01 B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No A1-CHG PCH01B/ZO1 1 10.4 405 15.52 Yes 1.27 Yes 18.11 Yes A1-CHG PCH01B/Z02 1 10.4 405 15.52 Yes 1.27 Yes 18.11 Yes A1-CHG PCH01C/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No A1-CHG PCH01C/ZO1 1 10.4 405 15.52 Yes 1.27 Yes 18.11 Yes A1-CHG PCH01C/Z02 1 10.4 405 15.52 Yes 1.27 Yes 18.11 Yes A1-Z-AB06 A1-Z-AB06-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No A1-Z-AB06 A1-Z-AB06-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No A2-Z-AC02 A2-Z-AC02-T1iTRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No A2-Z-AC02 A2-Z-AC02-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No A3-Z-AD15 A3-Z-AD15-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No A3-Z-AD15 A3-Z-AD15-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No A3-Z-AD15 PCH03B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABB-C1 A1-L-7A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C1 A1-L-7A-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C1 A1-L-8A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C1 A1-L-8A-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FM RAI 04 16

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1 : Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fr 02/5 22/5 Critical H/D* Fire Target Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Fire H/D* Ratio Number D Type Factor (ft) Size Ratio within Number within Ratio within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

ABB-C1 A1-L-9A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C1 A1-L-9A-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C1 A1-N-10A-T1/TRCAR 1 7.3 201 14.42 Yes 0.63 Yes 13.68 Yes ABB-C1 A1-N-10A-T1/TRWCAR 1 7.3 201 14.42 Yes 0.63 Yes 13.68 Yes ABB-C1 A1-N-5A-T1iTRCAR 1 3 45 10.78 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes ABB-C1 A1-N-5A-T1/TRWCAR 1 3 45 10.78 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes ABB-C1 A1-N-6A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C1 A1-N-6A-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C1 A1-N-7A-T1/TRCAR 1 6.3 153 13.88 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.27 Yes ABB-C1 A1-N-7A-T1ITRWCAR 1 6.3 153 13.88 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.27 Yes ABB-C1 A1-N-8A-T1/TRCAR 1 8.4 264 14.88 Yes 0.83 Yes 15.26 Yes ABB-C1 A1-N-8A-T1/TRWCAR 1 8.4 264 14.88 Yes 0.83 Yes 15.26 Yes ABB-C1 A1-N-9A-T1/TRCAR 1 8.4 264 14.88 Yes 0.83 Yes 15.26 Yes ABB-C1 A1-N-9A-T1/TRWCAR 1 8.4 264 14.88 Yes 0.83 Yes 15.26 Yes ABB-C1 A1-Z-AB17-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C 1 A1 -Z-AB17-T1iTRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C1 A1-Z-AB18-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C1 A1-Z-AB18-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C1 A2-Z-AC16-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C1 A2-Z-AC16-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C1 A2-Z-AC17-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C1 A2-Z-AC17-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C1 A2-Z-AC18-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABB-C 1 A2-Z-AC18-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FM RAI 04 17

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function 25 Fr l/ Q ~l Critical H/D* Fire Fr 2 Target ReEquipment DEquipment Location Fire HID* Ratio Froude N r DD Room Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Fude within R within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

ABB-CI BAECP/EC 2.6 52 8.82 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes ABB-C1 GACP/EC 4.7 116 11.57 Yes 0.36 No 10.98 Yes ABB-C1 GSCP/EC 5.4 116 13.29 Yes 0.36 No 10.98 Yes ABB-C1 PAC03/PMP 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABB-C" PAC03/ZO1 12.7 615 16.04 No 1.92 Yes 21.40 Yes ABB-C' PAC03/ZO2 12.7 615 16.04 No 1.92 Yes 21.40 Yes ABB-C' PAC05/PMP 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABB-C1 PAC05/ZO1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABB-C1 PAC05/ZO2 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABB-C1 PAC07AIPMP 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABB-C1 PAC07A/ZO1 12.7 615 16.04 No 1.92 Yes 21.40 Yes ABB-C' PAC07A/ZO2 12.7 615 16.04 No 1.92 Yes 21.40 Yes ABB-C1 PAC07B/PMP 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABB-C1 PAC07B/ZO1 12.7 615 16.04 No 1.92 Yes 21.40 Yes ABB-C' PAC07B/ZO2 12.6 615 15.91 Yes 1.92 Yes 21.40 Yes ABB-C1 PSI01A/PMP 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABB-C1 PS101 AZO1 12.8 625 16.06 No 1.95 Yes 21.54 Yes ABB-C1 PS101A/ZO2 12.8 625 16.06 No 1.95 Yes 21.54 Yes ABB-C1 PSI01 B/PMP 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABB-C1 PSI01 B/ZO1 12.8 625 16.06 No 1.95 Yes 21.54 Yes ABB-C1 PS101 B/ZO2 12.8 625 16.06 No 1.95 Yes 21.54 Yes ABB-C1 PS101C/PMP 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABB-C' PSIO1C/ZO1 12.8 15 71.39 No 0.05 No 4.85 No ABB-C1 PS101 C/Z02 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No FMV RAI 04 18

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Critical H/D* Fe/5 Fr Equipment ID/Equipment Location Tarat Fire HID* Ratio Fre Number D Type Factor Sati Size Ratio within Number within R within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

ABB-C1 PSI01D/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABB-C1 PSI02A/ZO1 1 13 650 16.06 No 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes ABB-C1 PSI02B/ZO1 1 13 650 16.06 No 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes ABB-C1 WDPW1/EC 1 5.4 116 13.29 Yes 0.36 No 10.98 Yes ABB-C1 WDPW2/EC 1 5A4 116 13.29 Yes 0.36 No 10.98 Yes ABM-C1 90/MCCD/EC 1 3.3 60 10.57 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes ABM-C1 A2-L-7A-T1ITRCAR 1 8.2 252 14.80 Yes 0.79 Yes 14.98 Yes ABM-C1 A2-L-7A-T1/TRWCAR 1 8.2 252 14.80 Yes 0.79 Yes 14.98 Yes ABM-C1 A2-L-8A-T1ITRCAR 1 6.3 153 13.88 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.27 Yes ABM-C1 A2-L-8A-T1rTRWCAR 1 6.3 153 13.88 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.27 Yes ABM-C1 A2-L-9A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABM-C1 A2-L-9A-T1rTRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABM-C1 A2-N-10A-T1/TRCAR 1 6 140 13.70 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes ABM-C1 A2-N-10A-T1/TRWCAR 1 6 140 13.70 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes ABM-C1 A2-N-5A-TlrrRCAR 1 7.9 235 14.66 Yes 0.73 Yes 14.57 Yes ABM-C1 A2-N-5A-T1/TRWCAR 1 7.9 235 14.66 Yes 0.73 Yes 14.57 Yes ABM-C1 A2-N-6A-TIrTRCAR 1 7.75 225 14.63 Yes 0.70 Yes 14.32 Yes ABM-C1 A2-N-6A-T1FTRWCAR 1 7.75 225 14.63 Yes 0.70 Yes 14.32 Yes ABM-C1 A2-N-7A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABM-C1 A2-N-7A-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABM-C1 A2-N-8A-T1/TRCAR 1 6.6 166 14.07 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.68 Yes ABM-C1 A2-N-8A-T1/FRWCAR 1 6.6 166 14.07 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.68 Yes ABM-C1 A2-N-9A-T1/TRCAR 1 6 140 13.70 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes ABM-C1 A2-N-9A-T1/TRWCAR 1 6 140 13.70 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes FM RAI 04 19

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr 02/5 02/5 Tagt Fire Fr H/D*

/* Ratio Rto Froude Number Nubr DD Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Type Factor Size Ratio within Fude within R within (ft) (kW) Range?

(WRagRange? Number Ratio Range?

ABM-C1 ACPDPAB1O/EC 1 4.75 93 12.77 Yes 0.29 No 10.05 Yes ABM-C1 ACPDPAB11/EC 1 4.75 93 12.77 Yes 0.29 No 10.05 Yes ABM-C1 ACPDPAB12/EC 1 4.75 93 12.77 Yes 0.29 No 10.05 Yes ABM-C1 ACPDPAB13/EC 1 4.75 93 12.77 Yes 0.29 No 10.05 Yes ABM-C1 ARB1RC16/EC 1 3.6 60 11.53 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes ABM-C1 BAXPump/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABM-C1 BUS16/11A/EC 1 4.3 60 13.77 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes ABM-C1 BUS16/12A/EC 1 4.3 60 13.77 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes ABM-C1 BUS16/13A/EC 1 4.3 60 13.77 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes ABM-C1 BUS16/14A/EC 1 4.3 60 13.77 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes ABM-C1 BUS16/15A/EC 1 4.3 60 13.77 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes ABM-C1 BUS16/16A/EC 1 4.3 60 13.77 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes ABM-C1 BUS16/17A/EC 1 4.3 60 13.77 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes ABM-C1 MCCCABC/EC 1 6 191 12.10 Yes 0.60 Yes 13.41 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/01B/EC 1 3.3 52 11.19 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/02B/EC 1 3.3 52 11.19 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/03D/EC 1 3.3 52 11.19 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/04B/EC 1 3.3 52 11.19 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/05B/EC 1 3.3 52 11.19 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/06C/EC 1 3.3 52 11.19 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/07C/EC 1 3.3 52 11.19 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/08C/EC 1 3.3 52 11.19 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/09C/EC 1 3.3 52 11.19 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/1OC/EC 1 3.3 52 11.19 Yes 0.16 No 7.97 Yes FM RAI 04 20

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function H/D* Fire Fr QZ/5 Q2/5 Target Critical Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Citeicalwtin Fir Number D Type FactorSize Ratio within Fwithin within RomTp atr (ft) (kW) Range? u r Range? Rto Range?

ABM-C1 MCCD/11C/EC 1 3.6 59 11.61 Yes 0.18 No 8.38 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/12C/EC 1 3.6 59 11.61 Yes 0.18 No 8.38 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/13C/EC 1 3.6 59 11.61 Yes 0.18 No 8.38 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/14C/EC 1 3.6 59 11.61 Yes 0.18 No 8.38 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/15B/EC 1 3.6 59 11.61 Yes 0.18 No 8.38 Yes ABM-C1 MCCD/16B/EC 1 3.6 59 11.61 Yes 0.18 No 8.38 Yes ABM-C1 MCCDABC/EC 1 6 191 12.10 Yes 0.60 Yes 13.41 Yes ABM-C1 MCCM/01B/EC 1 4.3 255 7.72 Yes 0.80 Yes 15.05 Yes ABM-C1 MCCM/02C/EC 1 4.3 255 7.72 Yes 0.80 Yes 15.05 Yes ABM-C1 MCCM/03B/EC 1 4.3 255 7.72 Yes 0.80 Yes 15.05 Yes ABM-C1 MCCM/04B/EC 1 4.3 255 7.72 Yes 0.80 Yes 15.05 Yes ABM-C1 PHCC/EC 1 4.75 93 12.77 Yes 0.29 No 10.05 Yes ABM-C1 PXABSS016/PX 1 3.6 60 11.53 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes ABO-Cl A3-L-10A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-C1 A3-L-10A-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-C1 A3-L-7A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-C1 A3-L-7A-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-C1 A3-L-8A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-C1 A3-L-8A-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-C1 A3-L-9A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-C1 A3-L-9A-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-C1 A3-N-03-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-Cl A3-N-03-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-C1 A3-N-10A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FM RAI 04 21

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fr .. /5/

Fire Fu br /

_2/5 Target Critical HID*

Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D D Room Type Factor S fti Size Ratio within umer ithin Ratio within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

ABO-Cl A3-N-10A-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-Cl A3-N-3A-Tl/TRCAR 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-Cl A3-N-3A-TlFTRWCAR 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-Cl A3-N-4A-Tl/TRCAR 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-Cl A3-N-4A-TliTRWCAR 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-Cl A3-N-5A-Tl/TRCAR 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-Cl A3-N-5A-Tl/TRWCAR 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-Cl A3-N-6A-Tl/TRCAR 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-C1 A3-N-6A-Tl/TRWCAR 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-Cl A3-N-7A-Tl/TRCAR 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-Cl A3-N-7A-Tl/TRWCAR 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-Cl A3-N-8A-Tl/TRCAR 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-Cl A3-N-8A-Tl/TRWCAR 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-Cl A3-N-9A-Tl/TRCAR 0.5 15 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No ABO-Cl A3-N-9A-Tl/TRWCAR 0.5 15 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No

• ABO-C1 ARAl RC14/EC 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl BUS14/18A/EC 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No 1

ABO-Cl BUS14/19A/EC 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No 1

ABO-Cl BUS14/20A/EC 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No 1

ABO-Cl BUS14/21A/EC 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No 1

ABO-Cl BUS 14/22A/EC 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No 1

ABO-Cl BUS14/23A/EC 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No 1

ABO-Cl BUS 14/24A/EC 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No 1

ABO-Cl MCCC/01 B/EC 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No FM FMV RAI 04 22 22

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function 5

Critical H/D* Fr ./Q Tagt Fire HID* Ratio Frue NumberD Equipment ID/Equipment Location Target CiriticalRatio Fire Nubr 2/ QD Room cto Separation Size Ratio within Number within RatioD within Type Factor (kW) Range? Range? Range?

ABO-Cl MCCC/02B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCC/03B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCC/04B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCC/05B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCC/06C/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCC/07C/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCC/08C/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCC/09C/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCC/10C/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCC/11C/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCC/12C/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCC/13B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCC/14C/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCC/15C/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCC/16B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCE/01B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCE/02B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCE/03B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCE/04B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCE/05B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCE/06B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCE/07B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCE/08B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MCCI01 B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No FM RAI 04 23

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fire Fr 02/5 02/5 Target Critical HID*

Equipment ID/Equipment Location Fire HID* Ratio Fd Number D Type Factor Size Ratio within within D within (ft) Size R wn Number ?Ratio (kW) Range? Range? Ratio?

ABO-Cl MCCL/02C/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-C1 MCCL/03B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-C1 MO/ABEF1GNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-C1 MO/ABFTA/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-C1 MO/ABFTB/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-C1 MO/ABFTH/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-C1 MO/MTDP/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-C1 MO/PCF1ANSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-C1 MO/PCF1BNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl MO/SAHU/VSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl PAC02A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl PAC02B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl PCH03A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-C1 PCH08A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-C1 PCH08B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-Cl PXABO05/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No ABO-C1 PXABSS014/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No AHR ACPDPCB04/EC 1 4 373 6.17 Yes 1.17 Yes 17.52 Yes AHR AKF03NSS 1 8.75 15 48.80 No 0.05 No 4.85 No AHR AKP05NSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No AHR G1-F1-11-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No AHR G1-F1-11-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No AHR G1-F-11-T1/TRCAR 1 7.5 230 14.04 Yes 0.72 Yes 14.44 Yes AHR G1-F-11-T1/TRWCAR 1 7.6 230 14.22 Yes 0.72 Yes 14.44 Yes FM RAI 04 24

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Critical HID* Fire Fr 2 Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire HID* Ratio Firihe Number Dati RomType Factor Seartio Size Ratio within Frumber within Rai within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

AHR PXCB005/PX 1 2 130 4.70 Yes 0.41 Yes 11.50 Yes BRlA BTRYA/BAT 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No BR*A BYCA/BC 1 1.4 19 7.10 Yes 0.06 No 5.33 No BRI*A BYCA1/BC 1 5.2 15 29.00 No 0.05 No 4.85 No BRIA DCPDPCB01A/EC 1 5.75 105 14.73 Yes 0.33 No 10.55 Yes BR1A DCPDPCB02A/EC 1 1 32 4.12 Yes 0.10 No 6.56 No BRlA DCPDPCB03A/EC 1 4.5 15 25.10 No 0.05 No 4.85 No BRiA DCPDPCB05A/EC 1 6.5 15 36.25 No 0.05 No 4.85 No BR1A G1-F1-12-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No BRIA G1-F1-12-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No BR1A G1-F-12-T1FTRCAR 1 8.75 285 15.03 Yes 0.89 Yes 15.74 Yes BR1A G1-F-12-T1ITRWCAR 1 8.75 285 15.03 Yes 0.89 Yes 15.74 Yes BR1A INVTA/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No BRIB BTRYB/BAT 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No BRIB BYCB/BC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No BR 1B BYCB1/BC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No BR1B CVTA2/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No BR1B DCPDPCB01B/EC 1 5.75 105 14.73 Yes 0.33 No 10.55 Yes BR1B DCPDPCB02B/EC 1 7.5 94 20.08 No 0.29 No 10.10 Yes BR1B DCPDPCB03B/EC 1 2.1 15 11.71 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No BRIB DCPDPCB05B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No BR1B G1-F1-13-T1/TRCAR 1 5.1 105 13.06 Yes 0.33 No 10.55 Yes BR1B G1-F1-13-T1/TRWCAR 1 5.1 105 13.06 Yes 0.33 No 10.55 Yes BR1B G1-F1-13-T2/TRCAR 1 5.1 105 13.06 Yes 0.33 No 10.55 Yes FM RAI 04 25

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fr O/S Ol Fire Fmr D52/

Target Critical HID*

Rom EupetI/qimet Lcto eaain Fire H/D* Ratio Frue Number 02ID D TpFatr (ft) (kW) Range? Range? Ratio?

Room EquipmentType ID/Equipment Factor Location Separation Size Ratio Ratin within Nude Number within D within Range?

BRlB G1-Fl T2/TRWCAR 5.1 105 13.06 Yes 0.33 No 10.55 Yes BR1B G1-F-13-T1/TRCAR 8.75 285 15.03 Yes 0.89 Yes 15.74 Yes BRIB G1-F-13-T1/TRWCAR 8.75 285 15.03 Yes 0.89 Yes 15.74 Yes BR1B Gl-F- 13-T2iTRCAR 8.75 285 15.03 Yes 0.89 Yes 15.74 Yes BR1B G 1-F-13-T2/TRWCAR 8.75 285 15.03 Yes 0.89 Yes 15.74 Yes BR1B INVTB/EC 3.4 55 11.28 Yes 0.17 No 8.15 Yes BR1 B INVTB/EC 3.4 130 7.99 Yes 0.41 Yes 11.50 Yes CT C1-EW-T1/TRPW 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No CT C1-EW-T1/TRWPW 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No CT Cl-MID-Tli/TRPW 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No CT C1-MID-TI/TRWPW 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No CT Ci-NS-TlTRPW 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No CT C1-NS-T1/-RWPW 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No G2-EXT AKA05A/DR 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No G2-EXT AKA05B/DR i 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No G2-EXT AKF10AIVSS 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No G2-EXT AKF10BNSS 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No G2-EXT G2-EXT-Ti-rTRCAR 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No G2-EXT G2-EXT-Ti/TRWCAR 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No G2-EXT MCCN/01 E/EC 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No G2-EXT MCCP/01E/EC 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No G2-EXT PPSPRCP12A/EC 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No G2-EXT PPSPRCP12B/EC 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No IBN-1 CRDMGACP/EC 2.4 98 6.32 Yes 0.31 No 10.27 Yes FM FMV RAI 04 26 26

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr 2 Equipment ID/Equipment Location Targti Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D within Room Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Number within Ratio (kW) Range? Range? Range?

IBN-1 CRDMGBCP/EC 1 2.4 98 6.32 Yes 0.31 No 10.27 Yes IBN-1 CRDMLC/EC 1 4.5 374 6.93 Yes 1.17 Yes 17.54 Yes IBN-1 CRDMPC1AC/EC 1 6.1 144 13.77 Yes 0.45 Yes 11.98 Yes IBN-1 CRDMPC1BD/EC 1 4.1 144 9.25 Yes 0.45 Yes 11.98 Yes IBN-1 CRDMPC2AC/EC 1 5 374 7.70 Yes 1.17 Yes 17.54 Yes IBN-1 CRDMPC2BD/EC 1 5 374 7.70 Yes 1.17 Yes 17.54 Yes IBN-1 HMSLCPA/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No IBN-1 HMSLCPB/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No IBN-1 IBELIP/EC 1 4.9 98 12.90 Yes 0.31 No 10.27 Yes IBN-1 MX5PS/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No IBN-1 P1-F-03-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-1 P1-F-03-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-1 P1-F-04-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-1 P1-F-04-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-1 P1-G-03-T1iTRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-1 P1-G-03-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-1 P1-G-04-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-1 P1-G-04-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-1 PAF01A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No IBN-1 PAF01A/ZO1 1 19 1500 16.80 No 4.69 No 30.58 Yes IBN-1 PAF01A/ZO2 1 19 1500 16.80 No 4.69 No 30.58 Yes IBN-1 PAF01B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No IBN-1 PAF01B/ZO1 1 19 1500 16.80 No 4.69 No 30.58 Yes IBN-1 PAF01B/ZO2 1 19 1500 16.80 No 4.69 No 30.58 Yes FM RAI 04 27

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function H/D* Fire Fr 02/5 _2/5 Target Critical Equipment ID/Equipment Location Fire H/D* Ratio Number D Room Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Froude within D within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

IBN-1 PAF03/PMP 1 5.3 15 29.56 No 0.05 No 4.85 No IBN-1 PAF03/ZO1 1 5.3 875 5.81 Yes 2.74 No 24.65 Yes IBN-1 PAF03/ZO2 1 5.3 875 5.81 Yes 2.74 No 24.65 Yes IBN-1 PLO10/PMP 1 4 15 22.31 No 0.05 No 4.85 No IBN-1 PLO10/ZO1 1 4 1300 3.74 Yes 4.07 No 28.88 Yes IBN-1 PLO10/Z02 1 4 1300 3.74 Yes 4.07 No 28.88 Yes IBN-1 RXTSWGR/EC 1 10 374 15.41 Yes 1.17 Yes 17.54 Yes IBN-1 SCI03A/PMP 1 4 15 22.31 No 0.05 No 4.85 No IBN-1 SCI03A/ZO1 1 4 1300 3.74 Yes 4.07 No 28.88 Yes IBN-1 SCI03A/ZO2 1 4 1300 3.74 Yes 4.07 No 28.88 Yes IBN-1 SCI03B/PMP 1 4 15 22.31 No 0.05 No 4.85 No IBN-1 SCI03B/ZO1 1 19 1500 16.80 No 4.69 No 30.58 Yes IBN-1 SCI03B/ZO2 1 19 1500 16.80 No 4.69 No 30.58 Yes IBN-2 AIF01NSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No IBN-2 MSHAP/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No IBN-2 P2-F-03-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-2 P2-F-03-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-2 P2-F-04-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-2 P2-F-04-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-2 P2-F-05-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-2 P2-F-05-T1iTRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-2 P2-F-06-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-2 P2-F-06-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-2 P2-F-07-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FM RAI 04 28

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fr /s Ql Fire Fubr D/2 Target Critical HID*

Fire HID* Ratio Froude Number D D Room EquipmentType TpFatr lD/Equipment Factor Location (ft) ftSie Separation (kW)

Size Rto Ratio Range?

wtn within Nubr Number within Range? Ratio?

Rai within Range?

IBN-2 P2-F-07-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-2 P2-G-03-T1ITRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-2 P2-G-03-T1ITRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-2 P2-G-04-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBN-2 P2-G-04-T1lTRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBS-1 ASF07ANSS 1 6 15 33.46 No 0.05 No 4.85 No IBS-1 ASF07BNSS 1 6 15 33.46 No 0.05 No 4.85 No IBS-1 HRACP/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No IBS-1 HRBCP/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No IBS-1 P1-H-03-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBS-1 P1-H-03-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No IBS-1 P1-J-03-T1ITRCAR 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes IBS-1 P1-J-03-T1/TRWCAR 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes IBS-1 P1-K-03-T1ITRCAR 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes IBS-1 P1-K-03-T1/TRWCAR 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes IBS-1 P1-M-03-T1/TRCAR 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes IBS-1 P1-M-03-T1/TRWCAR 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes KO-EDG1A KO-EDG1A-T1/TRCAR 1 2.5 35 9.94 Yes 0.11 No 6.80 No KO-EDGIA KO-EDG1A-T1/TRWCAR 1 2.5 35 9.94 Yes 0.11 No 6.80 No KO-EDG1B KO-EDG1B-T1/TRCAR 1 2.5 35 9.94 Yes 0.11 No 6.80 No KO-EDG1B KO-EDG1B-T1/TRWCAR 1 2.5 35 9.94 Yes 0.11 No 6.80 No KO-EDGAX KO-EDGAX-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No KO-EDGAX KO-EDGAX-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No K-EDG1A K1-EDG1A-T1/TRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FM RAI 04 29

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fr 02/5 02/5 Critical H/D* Fire Target Equipment DEquipment m Location SFire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D D RT pe n Fctior S ti Size Ratio within Number within Ratio within Type Factor (kW) Range? Range? Range?

K-EDG1A K1-EDG1A-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No K-EDG1A KDG01A/DG 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No K-EDG1A KDG01A/ZO1 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No K-EDG1A KDG01A/ZO2 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No K-EDG1A MCCH/01B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No K-EDG1A MCCH/02B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No K-EDG1B 52/EGlB3/EC 1 7.25 200 14.35 Yes 0.63 Yes 13.66 Yes K-EDG1B K1-EDG1B-T1iTRCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0,00 No 1.64 No K-EDGIB K1-EDG1B-T1/TRWCAR 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No K-EDG1B KDG01B/DG 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No K-EDG1B KDG01B/ZO1 1 12.25 650 15.13 Yes 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes K-EDG1B KDG01B/Z02 1 12.25 650 15.13 Yes 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes K-EDG1B MCCJ/01B/EC 1 3.5 300 5.89 Yes 0.94 Yes 16.06 Yes K-EDG1B MCCJ/02B/EC 1 3.6 300 6.06 Yes 0.94 Yes 16.06 Yes PA-NE ACPDPWW15/EC 1 1 14 5.73 Yes 0.04 No 4.71 No PA-NE PA-NE-T1/TRPW 1 1 14 5.73 Yes 0.04 No 4.71 No PA-NE PA-NE-T1ITRWPW 1 1 14 5.73 Yes 0.04 No 4.71 No PA-NE PXYD24/PX 1 1 14 5.73 Yes 0.04 No 4.71 No RC-1 ACF09AIVSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-1 ACF09BNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-1 ACO01A/DR 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-1 ACO01B/DR 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-1 ACO01C/DR 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-1 ACO01D/DR 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No FM RAI 04 30

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Critical H/D* FireFr 2/

Equipment ID/Equipment Location arat Fire HD* Ratio F Number RoomSize Ratio within Froude within D within (ft) (kW) Range? Number Range? Ratio Range?

RC-1 ACPDPCV01/EC 1 1.83 25 8.32 Yes 0.08 No 5.94 No RC-1 ACPDPCV08/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-1 ACPDPCV09/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-1 MO/NCT02A/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-1 MO/NCT02B/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-1 POC02A/PMP 1 6.83 180 14.10 Yes 0.56 Yes 13.09 Yes RC-1 POC02B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-1 PSB02A/PMP 1 6.83 180 14.10 Yes 0.56 Yes 13.09 Yes RC-1 PSB02B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC,1 PSSO1/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-1 RCSFMDC-A/EC 1 1.83 25 8.32 Yes 0.08 No 5.94 No RC-1 RCSFMDC-B/EC 1 1.83 25 8.32 Yes 0.08 No 5.94 No RC-1 T1-NE-T1/TRHW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No RC-1 T1-NW-T1/TRHW 1 4.83 95 12.87 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes RC-1 Ti-SE-T1/TRHW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No RC-1 Ti-SW-Ti/TRHW 0.5 15 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No RC-1 TWD01A/HT 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 ACF08A/VSS 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 ACF08BNSS 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 ACF08CNSS 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 ACF08DNSS 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 ACP02NSS 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 ACP03NSS 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 ACP04NSS 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No FMV RAI 04 31

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Critical HID* Fire Fr 02/5 ý2/,

Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D Type Factor (ft) Size Ratio within Number within Ratio within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

RC-2 ACP05NSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 ACPDPCV02/EC 1 4.8 95 12.79 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes RC-2 ACPDPCV06/EC 1 4.8 95 12.79 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes RC-2 ACPDPCV07/EC 1 6 455 8.55 Yes 1.42 Yes 18.97 Yes RC-2 ILRTATP/EC 1 4.8 95 12.79 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes RC-2 MO/SRCO1/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 MO/SRC02/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 MO/SRC03/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 MO/SRC04/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 SWD03A/VSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 SWD03BNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 T2-NE-T1/TRHW 1 3.75 15 20.92 No 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 T2-NE-TlTRHW 1 3.75 65 11.63 Yes 0.20 No 8.71 Yes RC-2 T2-NW-T1/TRHW 1 4.1 73 12.14 Yes 0.23 No 9.13 Yes RC-2 T2-SE-T1/TRHW 1 9.8 15 54.66 No 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-2 T2-SW-T1ITRHW 1 4.1 73 12.14 Yes 0.23 No 9.13 Yes RC-3 ACF02ANSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 ACF02BNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 ACF03NSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 ACF04NSS 1 1.25 17 6.63 Yes 0.05 No 5.09 No RC-3 ACPDPCV03/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 ACPDPCV04/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 ACPDPCV05/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 ACPDPCV10/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No FM RAI 04 32

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Critical HID* Fr 2/5/

Equipment Location TDgEquipment Fire HID* Ratio Number D Room Separation Froude D Type Factor Size Ratio within within within (f) (W (kW) agRange?Number Range? Ratio Range?

RC-3 ACPDPCV11/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 ACPDPCV12/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 ACPDPCV13/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 CFHRC02/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 CMCCP/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No.

RC-3 COHRC01/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 CVE/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 MCC/CFHRC02/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 MO/CVFTH/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 PXCV003/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 PXCV006/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RC-3 T3-NE-T1ITRHW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No RC-3 T3-NW-T1/TRHW 1 7.42 215 14.27 Yes 0.67 Yes 14.06 Yes RC-3 T3-SE-T1ITRHW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No RC-3 T3-SW-T1ITRHW 1 3.25 60 10.41 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes RR-C1 ADFCS-RACK/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RR-C1 ARA1CC14/EC 1 5.3 112 13.23 Yes 0.35 No 10.83 Yes RR-C1 ARB1CC16/EC 1 5.3 112 13.23 Yes 0.35 No 10.83 Yes RR-C1 CIAI/EC 1 8.3 258 14.84 Yes 0.81 Yes 15.12 Yes RR-C1 CIA2/EC 1 8.3 258 14.84 Yes 0.81 Yes 15.12 Yes RR-Cl CIBI/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RR-C! CIB2/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RR-C1 CVCS1/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RR-C1 CVCS2/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No FM RAI 04 33

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function H/D* Fire Fr _2/5

_2/5 Tagt Target Critical Fire H/D* Ratio Number QD Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Size Rati witin Froude D Room Type Factor (ft) Size Ratio within Number within Ratio within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

RR-C1 EHCC1/EC 1 1.4 18 7.26 Yes 0.06 No 5.21 No RR-C1 EHCC1/EC 1 1.4 18 7.26 Yes 0.06 No 5.21 No RR-C1 EHCC2/EC 1 2.4 34 9.65 Yes 0.11 No 6.72 No RR-C1 EHCC2/EC 1 2.4 34 9.65 Yes 0.11 No 6.72 No RR-C1 EHCC3/EC 1 2.4 34 9.65 Yes 0.11 No 6.72 No RR-C1 EHCC3/EC 1 2.4 34 9.65 Yes 0.11 No 6.72 No RR-C1 FOX1/EC 1 10.1 381 15.45 Yes 1.19 Yes 17.67 Yes RR-C1 FOX2/EC 1 10.1 381 15.45 Yes 1.19 Yes 17.67 Yes RR-C1 FOX3/EC 1 2.3 32 9.47 Yes 0.10 No 6.56 No RR-C1 FOX3/EC 1 2.3 34 9.25 Yes 0.11 No 6.72 No RR-C1 G2-F1-11-T1/TRCAR 1 7 186 14.26 Yes 0.58 Yes 13.27 Yes RR-C1 G2-F1-11-T1/TRWCAR 1 7 186 14.26 Yes 0.58 Yes 13.27 Yes RR-C1 G2-F1-12-T1/TRCAR 1 6.5 162 14.00 Yes 0.51 Yes 12.55 Yes RR-C1 G2-F1-12-T1/TRWCAR 1 6.5 162 14.00 Yes 0.51 Yes 12.55 Yes RR-C1 G2-F-11-T1/TRCAR 1 5.4 116 13.29 Yes 0.36 No 10.98 Yes RR-C1 G2-F-11-T1/TRWCAR 1 5.4 116 13.29 Yes 0.36 No 10.98 Yes RR-C1 G2-F-12-T1/TRCAR 1 6.5 162 14.00 Yes 0.51 Yes 12.55 Yes RR-C1 G2-F-12-T1/TRWCAR 1 6.5 162 14.00 Yes 0.51 Yes 12.55 Yes RR-C1 HMSRCPA/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RR-C1 IBPDPCBA/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RR-C1 IBPDPCBB/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RR-C1 IBPDPCBC/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RR-C1 IBPDPCBD/EC 1 .1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RR-C1 MI/EC 1 3.5 57 11.44 Yes 0.18 No 8.27 Yes FM RAI 04 34

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Critical H/D* Fr 1 Q1 Critical HID* Fire Fu br 2//

Target Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire HID* Ratio Froude N r DD Type Factor Sati Size Ratio within Fude within R within (kW) Ra?(ft)

Range? Number Range? Ratio Range?

RR-C1 M2/EC 1 3.5 57 11.44 Yes 0.18 No 8.27 Yes RR-C1 MCCK/01B/EC 1 2 26 8.95 Yes 0.08 No 6.04 No RR-C1 MRPI1/EC 1 3.5 57 11.44 Yes 0.18 No 8.27 Yes RR-C1 MRPI2/EC 1 3.5 57 11.44 Yes 0.18 No 8.27 Yes RR-C1 MRPI3/EC 1 3.5 57 11.44 Yes 0.18 No 8.27 Yes RR-C1 MUX1/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RR-Cl MUX2/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RR-C1 MUX3/EC 1 9.4 330 15.23 Yes 1.03 Yes 16.69 Yes RR-C1 MUXATP/EC 1 9.4 330 15.23 Yes 1.03 Yes 16.69 Yes RR-C1 RAI/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No RR-C1 RA2/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No RR-C1 RA3/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No RR-C1 RB1I/EC 1 4 70 12.05 Yes 0.22 No 8.97 Yes RR-C1 RB2/EC 1 0.75 15 4.18 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No RR-C1 RCS1/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No RR-C1 RCS2/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No RR-C1 RLTR1/EC 1 3.9 67 11.95 Yes 0.21 No 8.82 Yes RR-C1 RLTR2/EC 1 4 70 12.05 Yes 0.22 No 8.97 Yes RR-C1 RR1/EC 1 4 70 12.05 Yes 0.22 No 8.97 Yes RR-C1 RR2/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No RR-C1 RVLMS1/EC 1 4.6 88 12.64 Yes 0.28 No 9.83 Yes RR-C1 RVLMS2/EC 1 2.5 35 9.94 Yes 0.11 No 6.80 No RR-C1 RWI/EC 1 4 70 12.05 Yes 0.22 No 8.97 Yes RR-C1 RW2/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No FM RAI 04 35

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fire Fr ý2/5 ý2/5 Target Critical H/D*

Room EquipmentType ID/Equipment Location Factor Tarat (ft) Fire Size H/D* Ratio Number D D Ratio within Number within Ratio within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

RR-C1 RYI/EC 1 3.9 67 11.95 Yes 0.21 No 8.82 Yes RR-C1 RY2/EC 1 4 70 12.05 Yes 0.22 No 8.97 Yes RR-C1 SA/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No RR-C1 SIAI/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No RR-C1 SIA2/EC 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No RR-C1 SIBI/EC 1 3.5 57 11.44 Yes 0.18 No 8.27 Yes RR-C1 SIB2/EC 1 3.5 57 11.44 Yes 0.18 No 8.27 Yes RR-C1 SSA/EC 1 4.6 88 12.64 Yes 0.28 No 9.83 Yes RR-C1 SSAUVLOC/EC 1 5.3 112 13.23 Yes 0.35 No 10.83 Yes SH-1 DISC/PCD20/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-1 PCD20/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-1 UI1-BB-06-T1/TRPW 1 5 45 17.97 No 0.14 No 7.52 Yes SH-1 U1-BB-06-T1/TRWPW 1 5 45 17.97 No 0.14 No 7.52 Yes SH-1 U1-CC-06-T1/TRPW 1 6.3 155 13.81 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.33 Yes SH-1 U1-CC-06-T1/TRWPW 1 6.3 155 13.81 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.33 Yes SH-1 U1-EE-05-T1/TRPW 1 4 72 11.91 Yes 0.23 No 9.08 Yes SH-1 U1-EE-05-T1/TRWPW 1 4 72 11.91 Yes 0.23 No 9.08 Yes SH-1 U1-EE-06-T1/TRPW 1 4.3 80 12.28 Yes 0.25 No 9.47 Yes SH-1 U1-EE-06-T1/TRWPW 1 4.3 80 12.28 Yes 0.25 No 9.47 Yes SH-1 U1-F-05-T1/TRPW 1 8 255 14.37 Yes 0.80 Yes 15.05 Yes SH-1 U1-F-05-T1/TRWPW 1 8 255 14.37 Yes 0.80 Yes 15.05 Yes SH-1 U1-G-05-T1ITRPW 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No SH-1 U1-G-05-T1ITRWPW 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No SH-1 U1-H-05-T1/TRPW 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No FM RAI 04 36

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1 : Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fr / 2/

HID* Fire Fr 2 Target Critical Tarat Fire HID* Ratio Froude Number Room EquipmentType TpFatr ID/Equipment Factor Location (ft) ftSie Separation (kW)

Size Rto Ratio Range?

wtn within Nubr Number within Range? Ratio?

Rai within Range?

SH-1 U1-H-05-T1/TRWPW 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No SH-1 U1-l-05-T1/TRPW 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No SH-1 U1-I-05-T1/TRWPW 1 1 13 5.91 Yes 0.04 No 4.58 No SH-2 ACPDPSH05/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 ARA2CC18/EC 1 2 85 5.57 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes SH-2 ARA2RC18/EC 1 2 85 5.57 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes SH-2 ARB2CC17/EC 1 4.58 85 12.76 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes SH-2 ARB2RC17/EC 1 4.58 85 12.76 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes SH-2 BUS17/25A/EC 1 4.58 85 12.76 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes SH-2 BUS17/26B/EC 1 4 85 11.15 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes SH-2 BUS17/27A/EC 1 2 85 5.57 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes SH-2 BUS18/29A/EC 1 4.7 85 13.10 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes SH-2 BUS18/30A/EC 1 2 85 5.57 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes SH-2 BUS18/31A/EC 1 4 85 11.15 Yes 0.27 No 9.70 Yes SH-2 KFP01/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 MCCG/01 B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 MCCG/02B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 MCCG/03B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 MCCG/04B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PCW01A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PCW01A/ZO1 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PCW01A/ZO2 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PCW01 B/AC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PCW01 B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No FM RAI 04 37

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Tagt Fire Critical H/D* H/D*

Ratio Fire Frue Fir Number

_2/5

_/5 0/D25 Target Room Equipment IDIEquipment Location Separation Size Ratio within within within Type Factor (ft) Number Ratio (kW) Range? Range? Range?

SH-2 PFP01/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PFP02/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PSW01A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PSW01B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PSW01C/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PSW01D/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PXSH006/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PXSH007/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PXSH008/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PXSH009/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PXSHSS017/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 PXSHSS018/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No SH-2 TCD12/BO 1 2 26 8.95 Yes 0.08 No 6.04 No SH-2 U2-B-01-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-B-01-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-B-02-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-B-02-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-B-03-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-B-03-T1ITRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-B-04-T1iTRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-B-04-T1ITRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-BB-05-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-BB-05-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-BB-06-T1/TRPW 1 7.58 215 14.57 Yes 0.67 Yes 14.06 Yes FM RAI 04 38

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function HID* Fire Fr _2/5

_2/5 Target Critical Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D Room TypeSize Ratio within Number within Ratio within (ft) (kW) Range? Range? Range?

SH-2 U2-BB-06-T1FTRWPW 1 7.58 215 14.57 Yes 0.67 Yes 14.06 Yes SH-2 U2-C-01-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-C-01-T1FTRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-C-02-T1iTRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-C-02-Tl/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-C-03-T1ITRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-C-03-T1JTRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-C-04-T1ITRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-C-04-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-CC-05-T1fITRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-CC-05-T1FTRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-CC-06-T1iTRPW 1 7.6 215 14.61 Yes 0.67 Yes 14.06 Yes SH-2 U2-CC-06-T1ITRWPW 1 7.6 215 14.61 Yes 0.67 Yes 14.06 Yes SH-2 U2-D-01-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-D-01-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-D-02-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-D-02-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-D-03-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-D-03-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-D-04-T1ITRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-D-04-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-E-01-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-E-01-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-E-02-T1FTRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FM RAI 04 39

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr ý2/S Q2/5 Equipment DEquipment Location TaFire H/D* Ratio Fre Number - D Room Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Froude within D within (ft) (kW) Range? Range? Range?

SH-2 U2-E-02-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-E-03-T1iTRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-E-03-T1ITRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-E-04-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-E-04-T1iTRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-EE-05-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-EE-05-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-EE-06-T1ITRPW 1 7.6 215 14.61 Yes 0.67 Yes 14.06 Yes SH-2 U2-EE-06-T1fTRWPW 1 7.6 215 14.61 Yes 0.67 Yes 14.06 Yes SH-2 U2-F-01-T1FFRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-F-01-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-F-02-T1ITRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-F-02-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-F-03-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-F-03-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-F-04-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-F-04-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-F-05-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-F-05-TIFTRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-G-01-TlITRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-G-01-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-G-02-T1fTRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-G-02-T1/FRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-G-03-T1iTRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FM RAI 04 40

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fr l5 Ql Fire Fr D Tagt Target Fire Critical H/D* HID*

Ratio Numbede /O Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Size Ratio within Froue within D within Type Factor (ft) Size Range Number Rang Ratio within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

SH-2 U2-G-03-T1iTRWPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-G-04-T1/TRPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No i

SH-2 U2-G-04-T1/TRWPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-H-01-T1/TRPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-H-01-T1/TRWPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-H-02-T1/TRPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No i

SH-2 U2-H-02-T1/TRWPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-H-03-T1/TRPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-H-03-T1/TRWPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-H-04-T1/TRPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-H-04-TliTRWPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-H-05-Tl1/TRPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-H-05-T1/TRWPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-1-01-TifTRPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-1-01-Ti/TRWPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-1-02-T1/TRPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-1-02-T1/1-RWPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-1-03-T1/TRPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-1-03-T1/TRWPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-1-04-TliTRPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-1-04-T1/TRWPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

SH-2 U2-1-05-T1/TRPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No SH-2 U2-1-05-T1/TRWPW 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 i11-A-05-T 1/TRTB 1 6.33 155 13.87 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.33 Yes TB-1 11-A-05-T1 RTB FM RAI 04 41

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Critical H/D* Fire Fr 02/5 02/5 Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire HID* Ratio Froude Number D Type Factor (ft) Size Ratio within Number within Ratio (kW) Range? Range? Range?

TB-1 11-A-05-T1/TRWTB 1 6.33 155 13.87 Yes 0.48 Yes 12.33 Yes TB-1 11-A-06-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11 -A-06-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-A-07-T1FTRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-A-07-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-A-08-T 1ITRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-A-08-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-A-09-T1ITRTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-A-09-T1 fFRWTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-A-10-H2/H2 1 32.8 1000 34.10 No 3.13 No 26.00 Yes TB-1 11-A-10-T1/TRTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-A-10-T1/TRWTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-A-11-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11 -A-11 -T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-A-12-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-A-12-T1/TRVVTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-A-4E-T1/TRTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-A-4E-T1/TRWTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-B-05-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-B-05-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-B-06-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-B-06-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-B-07-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-B-07-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FM RAI 04 42

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Target Critical H/D* Fire Fr 2 Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D D TypeSize Ratio within Number within Ratio within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

TB-1 11-B-09-T1/TRTB 1 4.83 95 12.87 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes TB-1 11-B-09-T1/TRWTB 1 4.83 95 12.87 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes TB-1 11-B-10-T1/TRTB 1 4.83 95 12.87 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes TB-1 11-B-10-T1/TRWTB 1 4.83 95 12.87 Yes 0.30 No 10.14 Yes TB-1 11-B-11-TIFTRTB 1 9 317 14.81 Yes 0.99 Yes 16.42 Yes TB-1 11-B-1 I-TiITRWTB 1 9 317 14.81 Yes 0.99 Yes 16.42 Yes TB-1 11-B-12-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 i 1-B-12-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-B-4E-T1 TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-B-4E-T1FFTRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11 -C-03-T1i/TRWTB 1 9.25 15 51.59 No 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 11-C-04-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-C-04-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-C-05-T1FTRTB 1 2.5 146 5.61 Yes 0.46 Yes 12.04 Yes TB-1 11-C-05-T1FTRWTB 1 2.5 146 5.61 Yes 0.46 Yes 12.04 Yes TB-1 11-C-06-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-C-06-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-C-07-T1FTRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-C-07-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-C-08-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-C-08-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-C-09-T1i/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11 -C-09-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-C-10-T1ITRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FM RAI 04 43

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Critical H/D* Fire Fr 2 IDEquipment Location Target TEquipment Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D D Room Typecto Separation Size Ratio within Number within Ratio (kW) Range? Range? Range?

TB-1 11 -C-10-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11 -C-11 -TI /FRTB 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 1i1-C-1i1-Ti/TRWTB 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 1i1-C-12-TiITRTB 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 1i1-C-12-TiTRWTB 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-D-03-T1/TRTB 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-D-03-Ti/TRWTB 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11 -D-04-T1ITRTB 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-i 11 -D-04-T1iTRWTB 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-i 11 -D-05-T1iTRTB 6.42 165 13.72 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-i 11-D-05-T1/TRWTB 6.42 165 13.72 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-i I i-D-06-T1/TRTB 6.42 1 165 13.72 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-i 11-D-06-Ti1TRWTB 6.42 1 165 13.72 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-i 11-D-07-Ti/TRTB 6.42 165 13.72 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-i 1 1-D-07-T1/TRWTB 6.42 165 13.72 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-i 11 -D-08-T1/TRTB 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-i 11 -D-08-Ti/TRWTB 0.5 1 8.24 Yes. 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-i 11 -D-09-T 1TRTB 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-i 11 -D-09-T1/TRWTB 0.5 1i 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-i 1i1-D-10-Ti/TRTB 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No i

TB-i 11 -D-10-T1FTRWTB 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No i

TB-i 1 i-D-1i1-TiITRTB 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No .1.64 No 1

TB-i 11 -D-11 -T1 /TRWTB 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No 1

TB-i 11 -D-12-TI/TRTB 0.5 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FM FMV RAI 04 44 44

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Critical H/D* Fire Fr 02/5 02/5 Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D wit Type Factor (ft) Size Ratio within Number Ratio (kW) Range? Range? Range?

TB-1 11 -D-12-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-E1-03-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-E1-03-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-E1-04-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-E1-04-T1/TRVVTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-E1-05-T1/TRTB 1 8.75 290 14.93 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes TB-1 11-E1-05-T1/TRWTB 1 8.75 290 14.93 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes TB-1 11-E1-06-T1/TRTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-E1-06-T1/TRWTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-E1-07-T1/TRTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-E1-07-T1/TRWTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-E1-08-T1/TRTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-E1-08-TiTRWTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-E1-09-T1/TRTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-E1-09-T1/TRWTB 1 6.5 165 13.89 Yes 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-EI-10-T1/TRTB 1 7.58 165 16.20 No 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-EI-10-T1/FRWTB 1 7.58 165 16.20 No 0.52 Yes 12.65 Yes TB-1 11-E-11-T1I/TRTB 1 6.5 220 12.38 Yes 0.69 Yes 14.19 Yes TB-1 11-E-11-T1/TRWTB 1 6.5 220 12.38 Yes 0.69 Yes 14.19 Yes TB-1 11-E-12-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 11-E-12-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 CIA02A/AC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 CIA02A/ZO1 1 13 650 16.06 No 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes TB-1 CIA02A/ZO2 1 13 650 16.06 No 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes FM RAI 04 45

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Critical H/D* Fire Fr 2/5 Q2/5 Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D Type Factor (ft) Size Ratio within Number within Ratio within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

TB-1 CIA02B/AC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 CIA02B/ZO1 1 13 650 16.06 No 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes TB-1 CIA02B/ZO2 1 13 650 16.06 No 2.03 Yes 21.88 Yes TB-1 CIA02C/AC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 CIA02C/ZO1 1 12.25 570 15.95 Yes 1.78 Yes 20.76 Yes TB-1 CIA02C/ZO2 1 12.25 570 15.95 Yes 1.78 Yes 20.76 Yes TB-1 CSA02/AC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 CSA02/ZO1 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 CSA02/ZO2 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 CSA03/ZO1 1 12.25 570 15.95 Yes 1.78 Yes 20.76 Yes TB-1 CSA03/ZO2 1 12.25 570 15.95 Yes 1.78 Yes 20.76 Yes TB-1 DCPDPTBO1 B/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 DCPDPTB03/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 FCD05/DR 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 MCCA/01 B/EC 1 2 55 6.63 Yes 0.17 No 8.15 Yes TB-1 MCCA/02B/EC 1 2 55 6.63 Yes 0.17 No 8.15 Yes TB-1 MCCA/03B/EC 1 2 55 6.63 Yes 0.17 No 8.15 Yes TB-1 MCCA/04B/EC 1 2 55 6.63 Yes 0.17 No 8.15 Yes TB-1 MCCA/05B/EC 1 2 55 6.63 Yes 0.17 No 8.15 Yes TB-1 MCCA/06B/EC 1 2 55 6.63 Yes 0.17 No 8.15 Yes TB-1 MCCA/07B/EC 1 2 55 6.63 Yes 0.17 No 8.15 Yes TB-1 MCCA/08C/EC 1 2 55 6.63 Yes 0.17 No 8.15 Yes TB-1 MCCA/09B/EC 1 2 55 6.63 Yes 0.17 No 8.15 Yes TB-1 MO/OERIB/VSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No FM RAI 04 46

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Critical H/D* Fire Fr _/_ _2/5 Target Tagt Fire H/D* Ratio Number -- /D Location Separation Size Rati witi n Nur Froude D Dan Room Equipm ent ID/Equipment Tye acor (ft)

(f) Size (kW) Ratio within Range? Number Range? Ratio Range?

TB-1 PCD01A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PCD01B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PCD01C/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PCD02A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PCD02A/ZO1 1 5.75 130 13.52 Yes 0.41 Yes 11.50 Yes TB-1 PCD02A/ZO2 1 5.75 130 13.52 Yes 0.41 Yes 11.50 Yes TB-1 PCD02B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PCD02B/ZO1 1 5.75 135 13.32 Yes 0.42 Yes 11.67 Yes TB-1 PCD02B/ZO2 1 5.75 135 13.32 Yes 0.42 Yes 11.67 Yes TB-1 PCD02C/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PCD02C/ZO1 1 5.75 135 13.32 Yes 0.42 Yes 11.67 Yes TB-1 PCD02C/ZO2 1 5.75 135 13.32 Yes 0.42 Yes 11.67 Yes TB-1 PCDO3A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PCD03A/ZO1 1 11 465 15.53 Yes 1.45 Yes 19.14 Yes TB-1 PCD03A/ZO2 1 11 465 15.53 Yes 1.45 Yes 19.14 Yes TB-1 PCD03B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PCD03B/ZO1 1 11 465 15.53 Yes 1.45 Yes 19.14 Yes TB-1 PCD03B/ZO2 1 11 465 15.53 Yes 1.45 Yes 19.14 Yes TB-1 PCD04/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PCP01A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PCP01B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PGS03B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PLOO1/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PLO03/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No FM RAI 04 47

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fr 2/5 02/5 Critical H/D* Fire Target Equipment ID/Equipment Location Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D D Room Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Number within Ratio within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

TB-1 PLO04/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PLO05/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PLO08/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PLO09/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PSBO1/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PWT19/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 PWT21/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 SIA03G/DR 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1FP 11-A-03-T1FTRTB 1 7 185 14.29 Yes 0.58 Yes 13.24 Yes TB-1FP 11-A-03-T1/TRWTB 1 7 185 14.29 Yes 0.58 Yes 13.24 Yes TB-1FP 11-A-04-T1/TRTB 1 7 185 14.29 Yes 0.58 Yes 13.24 Yes TB-1FP 11-A-04-T1/TRWTB 1 7 185 14.29 Yes 0.58 Yes 13.24 Yes TB-1FP 11 -B-03-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1FP 11-B-03-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1FP 11-B-04-T1IFTRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 FP 11-B-04-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-1 FP FWTP/EC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 FP MO/FPRSFNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1 FP PFP03/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-1FP PFW01A/MFWP 1 7 185 14.29 Yes 0.58 Yes 13.24 Yes TB-1FP PFW01B/MFWP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 12-A-03-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-A-03-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-A-04-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FM RAI 04 48

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fr /5 Q/

H/D* Fire Fr 2 Target Critical RoEqimn DEupet Lcto Seaain Fire H/D* Ratio Frue Number D2/D Room EquipmentType TpFatr IDEquipment Factor Location (ft)

Separation Size (kW)

Size Ratio RatioRange?

within Froude Number within Range? Ratio?

D within Range?

TB-2 12-A-04-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-A-05-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-A-05-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-A-06-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-A-06-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-A-08-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-A-08-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-A-12-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-A-12-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-B-03-T1ITRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-B-03-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-B-05-T1/ITRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-B-05-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-B-06-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-B-06-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-B-07-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-B-07-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-B-10-T1iTRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-B-10-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-B-11-T1iITRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-B- 11-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-C-05-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-C-05-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-C-06-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FM RAI 04 49

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1 : Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function 2 5 Fr lS Q /~

Target Critical H/D* Firer Room Equipment ID/Equipment Type Location Factor Tarat Separation Fire HID* Ratio Fre Number witi wQ Size Ratio within Froude within D within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

TB-2 12-C-06-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-C-08-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-C-08-TiITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-C-09-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-C-09-T1iTRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-C-10-Ti/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-C-10-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-C-11-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-C-11-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-03-TliTRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-03-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-04-TliTRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-04-T1iTRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-05-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-05-T1FTRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-06-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-06-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-07-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-07-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-08-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-08-T1FTRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-09-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-09-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-10-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FM RAI 04 50

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Critical H/D* Fire Fr /)

Equipment IDEquipment Location STarget Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D Room Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Number within within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

TB-2 12-D-10-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-D-11-T1/TRTB 1 6.08 140 13.88 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes TB-2 12-D-11-T1/TRWTB 1 6.08 140 13.88 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes TB-2 12-D-12-T1/TRTB 1 6.08 140 13.88 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes TB-2 12-D-12-T1JTRWTB 1 6.08 140 13.88 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes TB-2 12-E1-03-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-E1-03-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-EI-04-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-E1-04-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-E1-05-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-E1-05-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-E1-06-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-E1-06-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-E1-07-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-El-07-T1/TRW1TB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-E1-08-T1ITRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-E1-08-T1/TRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-E1-09-T1/TRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-E1-09-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-E1-10-T1/ITRTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-E1-10-T1ITRWTB 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TB-2 12-E-11-T1ITRTB 1 6.08 140 13.88 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes TB-2 12-E-11-T1ITRWTB 1 6.08 140 13.88 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes TB-2 12-E-12-T1/TRTB 1 6.08 140 13.88 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes FM RAI 04 51

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fr /5 Q/

H/D* Fire Fu br _ _/)

RomTearaetion Target Critical e HD* Rai Froude D Rom Equipment lDlEquipment Location Seaain Fire HID* Ratio Frue Number D2/D Type Factor S fti Size Ratio within Number within Ratio within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

TB-2 12-E-12-T1/FRWTB 1 6.08 140 13.88 Yes 0.44 Yes 11.84 Yes TB-2 4KVBD11A-TB/BD 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 4KVBD11 B-TB/BD 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 BB-PPSA-12A-TB/BD 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 BB-PPSB-12B-TB/BD 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 BUS11A/01/EC 1 2.75 45 9.88 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11A/02/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11A/03/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11A/04/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11A/05/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS1 1A/06/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11A/07/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11AN08/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11A/09/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11A/1O/EC 1 3.1 45 11.14 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11A/11/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11B/21/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11B/22/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11B/23/EC 1 3.1 45 11.14 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11B/24/EC 1 2 45 7.19 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11B/25/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11B/26/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11B/27/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11B/28/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52, Yes FM RAI 04 52

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fr / Q/

Fire Fu br D/2 Target Critical H/D*

Room Equipment IDIEquipment Location Separation Fire HD* Ratio NumberwithN Di wih Type Factor (ft) Size Ratio within within within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

TB-2 BUS11B/29/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11B/30/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS11B/31/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS12A/12/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS12A/13/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS12A/14/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS12A/15/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS12A/16/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS12B/17/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS12B/18/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS12B/19/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS12B/20/EC 1 3.08 45 11.07 Yes 0.14 No 7.52 Yes TB-2 BUS13/06A/EC 1 3.5 60 11.21 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes TB-2 BUS13/07A/EC 1 3.5 60 11.21 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes TB-2 BUS13/08A/EC 1 3.5 60 11.21 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes TB-2 BUS13/09A/EC 1 3.5 60 11.21 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes TB-2 BUS13/10A/EC 1 3.5 60 11.21 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes TB-2 BUS15/01A/EC 1 3.5 60 11.21 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes TB-2 BUS15/02A/EC 1 3.5 60 11.21 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes TB-2 BUS15/03A/EC 1 3.5 60 11.21 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes TB-2 BUS15/04A/EC 1 3.5 60 11.21 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes TB-2 BUS15/05A/EC 1 3 60 9.61 Yes 0.19 No 8.44 Yes TB-2 ISOBDTB-2/ISD 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 MCCB/01B/EC 1 8.75 290 14.93 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes FM RAI 04 53

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fr O/* Ol Fire Fr D Target Critical HID*

Equipment ID/Equipment Location Fire HID* Ratio Number RaD Room Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Froude within D w (f) (kW) Range? Nubr Range? Rto Range?

TB-2 MCCB/03B/EC 1 8.75 290 14.93 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes TB-2 MCCB/04C/EC 1 8.75 290 14.93 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes TB-2 MCCB/05B/EC 1 8.75 290 14.93 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes TB-2 MCCB/06B/EC 1 8.75 290 14.93 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes TB-2 MCCB/07B/EC 1 8.75 290 14.93 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes TB-2 MCCB/08B/EC 1 8.75 290 14.93 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes TB-2 MO/CLO02C-ANVSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 MO/CLO02C-BNVSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 MO/GEF/VSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 MO/TWV1DNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 MO/TWV1ENSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 MOiTWV1FNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 MOITVVV1GNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 MOi--VV1 HNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 MORTWVV1JNSS 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 MX4PS/EC 1 8.9 290 15.18 Yes 0.91 Yes 15.85 Yes TB-2 PEHO1/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 PEH02/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 PXTBSS013/PX 1 6 15 33.46 No 0.05 No 4.85 No TB-2 PXTBSS015/PX 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No T-LOOPA POC01A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No T-LOOPA PRC01A/RCP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No T-LOOPA PRC01A/ZO1 1 10.5 420 15.44 Yes 1.31 Yes 18.38 Yes T-LOOPA PRC01A/ZO2 1 10.5 420 15.44 Yes 1.31 Yes 18.38 Yes FM RAI 04 54

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function H/D* Fire Fr 02/5 Q2/5 Target Critical Room Equipment ID/Equipment Location Separation Fire H/D* Ratio Froude Number D Type Factor Size Ratio within Number within RatioD within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

T-LOOPA Ti-LOOPA-T1/TRHW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No T-LOOPA T2-LOOPA-T1/TRHW 1 8.5 317 13.99 Yes 0.99 Yes 16.42 Yes T-LOOPA T3-LOOPA-T1/TRHW 1 10.83 15 60.40 No 0.05 No 4.85 No T-LOOPB POC01 B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No T-LOOPB PRC01B/RCP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No T-LOOPB PRC01B/ZO1 1 10.5 420 15.44 Yes 1.31 Yes 18.38 Yes T-LOOPB PRC01 B/Z02 1 10.5 420 15.44 Yes 1.31 Yes 18.38 Yes T-LOOPB Ti-LOOPB-T1iTRHW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No T-LOOPB T2-LOOPB-T1ITRHW 1 8.5 317 13.99 Yes 0.99 Yes 16.42 Yes T-LOOPB T3-LOOPB-T1/TRHW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No T-PRZR CJCRC08/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No T-PRZR T2-PRZR-T1IFTRHW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No T-PRZR T3-PRZR-T1/TRHW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No T-REACTOR CJCRC09/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No T-REACTOR CMRRC11/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No T-REACTOR MO/RCC/EM 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No T-REACTOR PWD19A/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No T-REACTOR PWD19B/PMP 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No T-REACTOR Ti-REACTOR-Ti/TRHW 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No T-REACTOR T2-REACTOR-T1/TRHW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No T-REACTOR T3-REACTOR-TliTRHW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TY-E TY-E-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TY-E TY-E-T1fTRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TY-E TY-E-T4/TRPW 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FMV RAI 04 55

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Table 1: Non-Dimensional Parameters for Scenarios Modeled with the TpHeskestad Function Fire Fr 02/5 ý2/5 Target Critical H/D*

Equipment ID/Equipment Location Fire HID* Ratio Froude Number D Room Type Factor Separation Size Ratio within Fude within D within (kW) Range? Range? Range?

TY-E TY-E-T4/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TY-W PXYD011/OXC 1 1 15 5.58 Yes 0.05 No 4.85 No TY-W TY-W-T1/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TY-W TY-W-T1ITRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TY-W TY-W-T2/TRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No TY-W TY-W-T2/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No Zi-SC Z1-SC-T1ITRPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No Z1-SC Z1-SC-T1/TRWPW 1 0.5 1 8.24 Yes 0.00 No 1.64 No FM RAI 04 56

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 FM RAI 06 Section 4.7.3, "Compliance with Quality Requirements in Section 2.7.3 of NFPA 805" of the Transition Report states that "Uncertainty analyses were performed as required by 2.7.3.5 of NFPA 805 and the results were considered in the context of the application. This is of particular interest in fire modeling and Fire PRA development."

Regarding the uncertainty analysis for fire modeling:

1. NFPA 805, Section 2.7.3.5 states that, when a performance-based approach is used, an uncertainty analysis shall be performed to provide reasonable assurance that the performance criteria have been met. According to NUREG-1855, Volume 1, "Guidance on the Treatment of Uncertainties Associated with PRAs in Risk-Informed Decision Making,"

there are three types of uncertainty associated with fire modeling calculations:

a. Parameter Uncertainty: Input parameters are often chosen from statistical distributions or estimated from generic reference data. In either case, the uncertainty of these input parameters affects the uncertainty of the results of the fire modeling analysis.

Explain how the parameter uncertainty was addressed in the detailed fire modeling analyses.

Response

A discussion on uncertainty in fire modeling will be included in Section 6.2 of the Detailed Fire Modeling Fire PRA notebook (G1-FSS-FO01). Parameter Uncertainty is addressed by: (1) using conservative inputs, or (2) varying inputs in sensitivity cases. The following response describes specific treatments of parameter uncertainty throughout the analysis.

Main Control Room Abandonment Study In the Fire PRA main control room (MCR) calculation, document 32-9073294-002, heat release rates are varied over the range of the probability distribution described in Appendix E of NUREG/CR-6850. Specifically, the heat release rates are varied from 17 kW to 1002 kW, with the upper value being the 98th percentile of a case 5 electrical cabinet fire (table E-1 NUREG/CR-6850). In addition, the MCR calculation considers the potential for model error to affect the analysis results. This is documented in Appendix C of the MCR abandonment calculation. The results indicate that there is approximately a 0% probability of a model over-prediction based on temperature, suggesting that the results are not sensitive to model uncertainty.

Sinqle Compartment Analysis For the CFAST modeling, documented in Fire PRA notebook G1-FSS-001, bounding configurations of ignition source and cable trays, and 98th percentile heat release rates, are used. If predicted temperatures are close to damage temperatures, then damage is assumed. In a new report being created, G1-FSS-F006 titled "Verification and Validation of Fire Models Supporting the Fire PRA at FM RAI 06 1

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 R.E.Ginna," sensitivity cases are run which vary the room dimensions and ventilation conditions.

For fire scenarios along a wall or in a corner, the 'image' method is implemented for fire modeling using algebraic equations. The image method conservatively models the fire as an equivalent open fire that is two or four times larger in both heat release rate and plan area. For the case of hand calculations used throughout the analysis, the 98th percentile heat release rates were used to ensure bounding heat release rate values. The use of these equations was also included in the fire modeling verification and validation analysis to ensure the use is within the validation range.

b. Model Uncertainty: Idealizations of physical phenomena lead to simplifying assumptions in the formulation of the model equations. In addition, the numerical solution of equations that have no analytical solution can lead to inexact results.

Response

The fire modeling verification and validation analysis will be documented in report G1-FSS-F006. This analysis covers all the fire modeling, including CFAST and hand calculations, used in the R.E. Ginna Fire PRA. FDS V&V is documented in the R.E. Ginna main control room abandonment calculation, document 32-9073294-002. The verification and validation analysis determines whether models are used within their validated range. If the models are found to be used outside of the range, then the input parameters are varied in a conservative direction (i.e., more challenging fire conditions) and the revised model results are used as input to the Fire PRA; i.e., the R.E. Ginna fire modeling analysis results are applied considering the model validation range. It should be noted that for fire models used outside the range of applicability, sensitivity cases are run, as suggested in NUREG-1 824 and NUREG-1 934.

c. Completeness Uncertainty: This refers to the fact that a model is not a complete description of the phenomena it is designed to simulate. Some consider this a form of model uncertainty because most fire models neglect certain physical phenomena that are not considered important for a given application.

Explain how the model and completeness uncertainty were addressed in the detailed fire modeling analyses.

Response

Completeness associated with fire models is addressed in the R.E. Ginna Fire PRA within the overall quantification process, as the PRA is an integrated analysis. Fire Modeling provides inputs to a broad comprehensive Fire PRA which includes modeling of electrical systems, operator actions, and the plant systems and components needed to shutdown the plan. One of the first steps in the fire modeling process is to identify the fire scenarios that will be analyzed. In some situations, the scenario analysis invokes fire modeling capabilities that are not currently available, generating the completeness uncertainty situation described in the question. When the fire modeling does not provide a full answer or an answer with sufficient resolution, the scenario definition and target mapping FM RAI 06 2

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 within the Fire PRA conservatively compensates for the lack of information. The Fire PRA allows the analyst to conservatively compensate for the lack of fire modeling capabilities outside the fire modeling analysis so that the scenario is properly modeled in the Fire PRA. Some examples are listed below:

• The determination of time to automatic suppression. The sprinkler activation model is not fully applicable to many of the postulated scenarios; therefore, as part of the scenario definition, targets are failed intentionally before the automatic suppression is credited.

• Both zones of multi-compartment combinations are failed conservatively when fire modeling propagation calculations from one compartment to another are not conducted.

• Full main control board panels are failed due to the lack of analytical fire modeling methods, with appropriate verification and validation studies, to predict flame propagation within a panel.

The three examples above illustrate how the completeness uncertainty associated with fire modeling calculations is addressed "outside of the fire modeling" by conservatively failing targets in the fire scenarios so that the risk contribution is bounding.

FM RAI 06 3

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 PRA RAI 18 According to NUREG/CR-6850, where water from fire suppression efforts will likely enter a potentially vulnerable component (e.g., a panel with unsealed penetrations or an unshielded electrical motor), it is appropriate to include that component in the fire scenario damage set.

Verify that the impact of suppression system activation on component operation has been addressed according to Section 11.5.1.2 of NUREG/CR-6850.

Response

Fire suppression efforts can affect equipment operation. The two main areas of concern are manual suppression efforts and automatic suppression efforts. The wide spray areas and non-discerning nature of the automatic systems causes this aspect of fire suppression efforts to drive the delta impacts between fire damage and fire suppression efforts damage. The manual suppression efforts are directed by the fire brigade captain. The Fire Response Procedure set (FRPs) are structured such that the major equipment important for safe shutdown is identified in the forefront of the procedure, along with hazard identification, and important notes relative to the specific fire zone, such that the impact to the equipment from fire fighting activities is minimized if possible. With this knowledge, the fire brigade is able to focus on fire suppression efforts to the extent necessary to control the fire without damaging equipment unnecessarily.

Areas where automatic water suppression systems are installed were reviewed for potential impacts in the event of a fire.

For areas where a hot gas layer (HGL) could form and reach a temperature above that required to set off the sprinkler heads in the area, PRA equipment in the area were either conservatively assumed to be failed or individual equipment was inspected relative to the sprinkler head location to determine if spray could affect the equipment. Note that areas SH-2 and TB-2 cannot generate a hot gas layer hot enough to set off sprinkler heads so only sprinkler heads that could be set off by individual ignition sources were assessed. It should also be noted that full compartment burn areas already assume the loss of all equipment. As such, these areas are not reviewed for additional impacts as all equipment is already lost.

In some fire scenarios, sprinkler heads are activated by localized fires but area wide sprinkler activation does not occur. As with the HGL evaluation, either all equipment in the area was conservatively considered failed or individual equipment was inspected relative to each sprinkler head. In the cases where individual equipment was inspected, ignition sources, including transient packages, were identified and it was determined, based on the zone of influence (ZOI) for the source, whether the source could cause one or more sprinkler heads to actuate. The ZOI used was that of sprinkler head activation which is much lower than the thermoset damage point (e.g. 65 C versus 205 C). From these evaluations, it was determined whether any PRA components would be impacted by the spray. If components were impacted, an additional screening was done to determine if the component could be affected by water. If a component was impacted, but not affected, the explanation is documented (e.g. spray block by intervening object, spray shields installed to prevent impact, etc.). The details are documented in Ginna Key Input 89 and the associated files.

This will impact the delta risk calculations. The delta risk calculations are not available at this time. This information will be provided as part of PRA RAI 44 which combines all the effects from the RAIs that effect the delta risk calculations.

PRA RAI 18 1

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 PRA RAI 25 Section 2.4.3.3 of NFPA 805 states that the PRA approach, methods, and data shall be acceptable to the NRC. RG 1.205 identifies NUREG/CR-6850 as documenting a methodology for conducting a fire PRA and endorses, with exceptions and clarifications, NEI 04-02, revision 2, as providing methods acceptable to the staff for adopting a fire protection program consistent with NFPA-805. RG 1.200 describes a peer review process utilizing an associated ASME/ANS standard (currently ASME/ANS-RA-SA-2009) as one acceptable approach for determining the technical adequacy of the PRA once acceptable consensus approaches or models have been established for evaluations that could influence the regulatory decision. The primary results of a peer review are the F&Os recorded by the peer review and the subsequent resolution of these F&Os.

Address the following questions on the dispositions to the fire F&Os and SR assessment identified in Attachment V of the LAR that have the potential to impact the fire PRA results and do appear to be fully resolved.

a) CS-Al-01. According to discussion with the licensee, Ginna contains current transformers (CTs) with a turn ratio greater than 1200:5. The phenomena identification and ranking table (PIRT) panel results, documented in NUREG/CR-7150, has not concluded that such CTs are not risk significant. Provide a sensitivity study that evaluates CDF, LERF, delta-CDF and delta-LERF for CTs of turn ratios greater than 1200:5, assuming a fire induced secondary open circuit will cause a secondary fire.

Include a description and justification of the method and associated probability applied in the quantification. VFDR-BR1 B-008 appears to be an example of this; however, it was evaluated qualitatively.

Response

While the PIRT panel results were unable to conclude that secondary fires are not risk significant (i.e., could not conclude that such events were "incredible"), neither did they find that such events are likely. The PIRT panel judged that the likelihood of secondary fires from higher ratio CTs to be very low, and recommended that additional testing be performed to confirm this judgment. In fact, the conclusion appears to be that while the PRA panel has indicated they cannot determine a conditional probability for this event, such an occurrence would be considered "unlikely." This conclusion, that this is neither incredible nor likely, but no number has been determined by the experts, makes the conduct of a credible sensitivity study impossible at this time, for the following reasons:

" Using a conditional probability of 1.0, while bounding, would be conservative by at least two orders of magnitude, and likely by more. This is clearly true because if the conditional probability were on the order of 0.1+-, the evidence would be clear enough for the PRA panel to assign such a value, and it would be considered "likely," not "unlikely." Therefore, such a sensitivity study would be so conservative as to provide no useful information.

" The RAI states that one option is to "Include a description and justification of the method and associated probability applied in the quantification." Given that the experts on the panel, after thorough consideration of the evidence, were not able to determine and justify a probability it is not reasonable to expect that Ginna or its contractors could provide such a value and justification that could stand up to PRA RAI 25 1

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Inforimation for NFPA 805 scrutiny. To attempt to do so would clearly result in an "unreviewed analysis method" (UAM) being applied to the model. NRC, in a generic RAI for NFPA 805 plants, proscribes the use of UAMs. The text of this RAI states "Identify and describe all UAMs or deviations from NUREG/CR-6850, its supplements, and approved FAQs, and clarify whether guidance from the June 21, 2012, memo from NRC to NEI, "Recent Fire PRA Methods review Panel Decisions and EPRI 1022993, 'Evaluationof Peak Heat Release Rates in Electrical Cabinets Fires"' was used in applying related methods. For identified deviations from NUREG/CR-6850 that fall outside this guidance memo, provide a sensitivity study that estimates the impact of their removal on the LAR Table W-4 CDF, LERF, delta-CDF,and delta-LERF."

Therefore, the performance of a sensitivity analysis that injects a UAM is not a reasonable solution to addressing this phenomenon.

Given this situation, it is not possible to provide a credible and acceptable sensitivity analysis at this time. Ginna proposes to continue to monitor the developments in the understanding of this phenomenon in the future update of Volume 2 of NUREG/CR-7150 and to incorporate in future updates of the FPRA new findings and information as it becomes available. Once sufficient information is available in Volume 2 upon which to base an interim probability, the appropriate way to define an acceptable approach to modeling this phenomenon in a FPRA would be through the FPRA FAQ process or a methodology development under the EPRI/NRC-RES MOU.

b) FQ-F1-02. The disposition of the finding should be updated to be consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.200, Rev. 2 which defines a significant sequence slightly different that that noted in the disposition, i.e., 95% versus 90%.

Response

A significant cutset or accident sequence is defined as the top 95% of the CDF/LERF per Regulatory guide 1.200, Rev. 2. In future versions of our quantification notebook, we will consider as significant, accident sequences and cutsets that are within and including the top 95% of CDF and/or LERF.

c) FSS-C1-01. Please provide a description of the resolution of this finding (the disposition cites a reference for the resolution).

Response

Section 6.1.3.8 of G1-FSS-F001, the detailed fire modeling notebook, describes the disposition of finding FSS-C1-01. The HRR (heat release rate) model implemented in the Ginna Fire PRA is based on the guidance available in Appendix E and Appendix F of NUREG/CR-6850. The first point used is that associated with the severity factor. It is the minimum HRR needed to damage a PRA target or ignite an intervening combustible.

Specifically:

Calculatinq the First Point PRA RAI 25 2

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Inforimation for NFPA 805 The first point is the critical heat release rate to trigger the scenario progression. The value represents the lowest heat release rate required to propagate the fire from the ignition source to intervening combustibles or in scenarios with no intervening combustible, the lowest heat release rate required to generate target damage.

The selection of the first point as the lowest heat release rate to trigger a sequence of events ensures that the contribution from fire intensities larger than the critical values (i.e., including the full range of the probability distribution to the right of the critical heat release rate value) is accounted for in the risk quantification process. That in part suffices the supporting requirement FSS-C1 of selecting a fire intensity model that encompass low likelihood, but potentially risk contributing, fire events in the context of both fire intensity and duration given the nature of the fire ignition sources present.

When suppression is not credited in a fire scenario, a decision has been made that the risk contribution of such scenario is not high enough to merit further detailed analysis (the scenario is not among the top risk contributors). In this case, the FSS-C1 is not applicable.

Determining the Second Point The second point of the heat release rate model is based fire suppression credit assigned to the fire scenario.

Scenarios Crediting Manual Suppression Only:

For scenarios receiving manual suppression credit only, the second point heat release rate value is the 98th percentile of the distribution characterizing the heat release rate for the ignition source. The use of the 98th percentile as the second point ensures the following:

1. Meets the SR FSS-C1 requirement of including in the analysis low likelihood, high consequence conditions since this percentile is the maximum value postulated in the Fire PRA as the NUREG/CR-6850 guidance suggests that higher values can be screened from the analysis as risk contributors.

2. As the highest value used in the analysis, the use of the 98th percentile should generally result in the shortest time to target damage and the largest zone of influence, even in scenarios where the timing is governed by the characteristics of intervening combustibles. Consequently, shorter damage times will result in the highest non suppression probabilities when calculated following the guidance in Chapter 14 of Supplement 1 to NUREG/CR-6850. Recall that the non suppression probability is calculated as Pns = EXP(-At) where t is the time available for suppression. The shorter the time, the closer to 1.0 the P, value is expected to be.

The two points selected for the analysis ensures that the scenario, as reflected in the analysis bounds its corresponding risk contribution. At the same time, the parameters PRA RAI 25 3

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Inforimation for NFPA 805 are based on detailed fire modeling calculations for determining the critical heat release rate and the time to damage associated with the fire scenario.

Crediting Automatic Suppression Only:

Although manual suppression is always available, there are scenarios where automatic suppression is only credited. For scenarios receiving automatic suppression credit only, the second point heat release rate value is the lowest heat release rate that would activate the system. In some cases, this heat release rate value is the same as the critical heat release rate used for calculating severity factors. This heat release rate selection is based on the expectation that the lowest fire intensity will generate the longest response times for the system. Consequently, the number of targets affected before automatic suppression can be credited is maximized.

The above described strategy presents the following characteristics:

1. Meets the SR FSS-C1 requirement of including in the analysis low likelihood, high consequence conditions since this percentile is the maximum value postulated in the Fire PRA as the NUREG/CR-6850 guidance suggests that higher values can be screened from the analysis as risk contributors.

2. It should be recognized that when crediting automatic suppression, some of the targets within the 98th percentile zone of influence are protected by the automatic suppression. In many scenarios, the time to fire propagation to the first few intervening combustibles and/or targets in the zone of influence is used as an indication for activation of the automatic suppression system. Consequently, the evaluation of fire conditions using two or more points from the heat release rate probability distribution may not offer any new insights as the activation time is primarily governed by the fire propagation through intervening combustibles.

• A good example includes sprinklers located within cable trays. Damage or ignition assumed in a cable tray immediately below the sprinkler is used as the time to sprinkler activation and protection for trays above the sprinkler. Notice that in this approach, the tray under the sprinkler is not receiving automatic suppression credit.

• Another example includes automatic Spray or Halon systems that are activated by smoke detection signals. These systems may operate sooner than the time it takes a fire to propagate through the intervening combustibles and/or targets within the zone of influence.

The two points selected for the analysis ensures that the scenario, as reflected in the analysis will bound its corresponding risk contribution. At the same time, the parameters are based on detailed fire modeling calculations for determining the critical heat release rate and the time to damage associated with the fire scenario.

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90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Crediting Both Automatic and Manual Suppression:

Appendix P of NUREG/CR-6850 provides guidance on how to credit automatic and manual suppression in calculating non suppression probabilities. The guidance is based on an event tree model that is solved at specific points in time characterizing the sequence of events in a fire scenario. For scenarios receiving automatic and manual suppression credit, the second point heat release rate value should be determined by evaluating the results of the detection suppression event tree model described in Appendix P of NUREG/CR-6850.

1. Given activation of the automatic suppression, shorter times available for manual suppression would generally result in higher non suppression probabilities.

2. Similarly, for scenario sequences where the automatic detection or suppression has not activated, shorter times available for manual suppression would generally result in higher non suppression probabilities.

d) FSS-D1-01. Please provide a description of the resolution of this finding (the disposition cites a reference for the resolution).

Response

Finding FSS-D1-01 addresses that the Fire PRA software requires a verification and validation process to make sure the outputs are accurate. The Ginna Fire Modeling Database was subjected to an independent verification and validation process. Ginna Fire PRA notebook G1-FSS-F005, Verification and Validation (V&V) of the Ginna Fire Modeling Database, documents the V&V in detail. The scope of the V&V includes the quantification of fire ignition frequencies and the data manipulation associated with the preparation of the input tables for quantification. The independent V&V results concluded that the Ginna Fire Modeling Database is processing the data and information for scenario input correctly.

e) FSS-D7-01. SR FSS-D7 is related to detection and suppression systems unavailability, including consideration of system outlier unavailability. Provide a discussion on how capability category II was addressed and the conclusion with respect to meeting capability category I1.

Response

Total system failure probabilities for credited systems are documented in Table 1 of G1-FSS-FOO1 Rev 1, Detailed Fire Modeling Notebook. To address plant specific system unavailability, Ginna Key Input 76 identifies unavailability factors for selected fire systems using control room log data from January 1 st, 2007 to December 3 1 st, 2011.

The unavailability time for each system was summed and divided by the total time period for specific factors. These factors are added to the generic estimates of total system unavailability and applied in the Ginna Fire Modeling Database. For example, system S18, an automatic sprinkler system, has an unavailability factor of 3.2E-03. The generic PRA RAI 25 5

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 estimate for an automatic sprinkler system to fail on demand is 0.02 (2E-02), therefore the total failure likelihood (failure on demand plus unavailability) used in the PRA is 2.32E-02 (2.32E-02 = 2E-02 + 3.2E-03). The credited systems are installed and maintained under the Ginna Fire Protection Program, EPM-FPPR. Based on the review in Key Input 76, there is no outlier behavior of the credited systems. The availability factors for the specific credited systems are added to the generic estimates to account for systems unavailability during plant operations. This approach meets capability category IIfor FSS-D7.

f) FSS-F1-01. During the audit it was noted that the finding was related to potential fires in the hydrogen storage room and the turbine lube oil storage room with respect to a multi-compartment impact on the diesel generator room. Given this clarification of the finding, please clarity the disposition of this F&O.

Response

Areas where the fire sources are considered to be high-hazard and capable of structural damage to multiple areas were analyzed for the hydrogen storage room, the turbine lube oil storage room, and the two diesel generator rooms. Due to the hazard in these areas, scenarios were analyzed given a fire that may extend through the adjacent compartment to additional compartments. The results of this analysis are included in Appendix B and Appendix C of G1-FSS-F003, Multi-Compartment Analysis. The tables below identify the compartment combinations considered as well as the combination barriers between the areas.

High Hazard Fire Combinations identified for analysis Exposing Cmpt Cmpt Description Exposed Cmpt 1-Cmpt 2 Exposed Cmpt 2 TB External Gen Hydrogen K1-H2 Bottle Store House K1-TO-K-EDG1A K-EDG1A KI-TO TB External Oil Storage Room K-EDG1A-K-EDG1B K-EDG1B K-EDG1A Diesel Generator Room A K1-TO K1-H2 K-EDG1B Diesel Generator Room B K-EDG1A K1-TO High Hazard Fire Combination Barriers Exposing Cmpt 1 Cmpt 2 Cmpt Barrier Type Barrier Type Barrier Failure Pr 1 Barrier Failure Pr 2 K1-H2 Wall Wall 1.20E-03 1.20E-03 K1-TO Wall Wall 1.20E-03 1.20E-03 K-EDG1A Wall Wall 1.20E-03 1.20E-03 K-EDG1B Wall Wall 1.20E-03 1.20E-03 Note: Column "Barrier Failure Pr 1" is the probability of the failure of the first barrier between the exposing compartment and the adjacent compartment. Column "Barrier Failure Pr 2" is the barrier between the first exposed compartment and the second exposed compartment.

PRA RAI 25 6

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Applying the screening methods in NUREG/CR-6850 for multi-compartment scenarios, the combined barrier failure probabilities, including the propagating of the fire failing two barriers are shown below.

MultiComplD Comment Frequency K1-H2-TO-K1-TO-TO-K-EDG1A Frequency below 1E-8 2.16E-09 K1-TO-TO-K-EDG1A-TO-K-EDG1B Frequency below 1E-8 8.02E-10 K-EDG1A-TO-K1-TO-TO-K1-H2 Frequency below 1E-8 2.88E-09 K-EDG1B-TO-K-EDG1A-TO-K1-TO Frequency below 1E-8 2.88E-09 The room layout is shown within the Plant Partitioning Notebook (G1-PP-FOO1, Rev.2 Page C-16, pdf page 48-of-54). The four compartments are all in a row on the north side of the turbine building. K1-H2 is the furthest room to the west followed by Ki-TO then by K-EDG1A. Compartments K1-H2 and K1-TO contain no PRA equipment and have no associated PRA operator action travel paths. Compartments K1-H2, K1-TO, and K-EDG1A are all conservatively assumed to fail a low significance turbine building electrical panel TB-02 due to a lack of coordination. As such, fires involving K-EDG1A already include a bounding impact as no new impacts are introduced. Therefore, considering multi-compartment combinations beyond two compartments adds no new impacts. Therefore these combinations are screened from final quantification.

g) IGN-B2-01. Please indicate the guidance used in addressing the ignition frequency bins noted in the finding.

Response

Section 4 of G1-IGN-F001, the ignition frequency notebook, was updated to reflect the ignition frequency basis for those ignition frequencies not directly obtained from NUREG/CR 6850 Supplement 1.

• For bins 5, 11, and 31 (Cable Fires Caused by Welding and Cutting), and bins 6 and 24 (Transient fires caused by welding and cutting), the data comes from the September 27, 2011, NEI submitted letter on "Recent Fire PRA Methods Review Panel Decision: Clarification for Transient Fires and Alignment Factor for Pump Oil Fires." This letter coupled with the endorsement contained in RECENT FIRE PRA METHODS REVIEW PANEL DECISIONS AND EPRI 1022993, "EVALUATION OF PEAK HEAT RELEASE RATES IN ELECTRICAL CABINET FIRES" (ML12171A583) provides the basis for these frequencies.

• The data for Bin 19 (Misc. Hydrogen Fires) was taken from NUREG 6850 Supplement 1 Section 10.2.1. However, per the guidance of Appendix N (section N.2.4) of NUREG/CR-6850, only 10% of miscellaneous hydrogen fires (Bin 19) lead to a damaging fire outside of the ignition source. Therefore, a reduction factor of 0.1 was applied to the generic ignition frequency to account for PRA RAI 25 7

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 miscellaneous hydrogen fire explosions damaging additional targets separate from the ignition source.

h) QNS-C1-01. The disposition notes the criteria for screening CDF and LERF, but does not indicate the results of the screening with respect to the clarification in Regulatory Guide 1.200, Revision 2 for QNS-C1-01. Please discuss the results also. Please provide a description of the resolution of this finding (the disposition cites a reference for the resolution).

Response

No fire scenarios were removed from consideration using the QNS-C1-01 screening criteria. All fire scenarios were maintained in this step. This criteria was initially used in the model development phase to determine which scenarios required detailed fire modeling. As not doing detailed fire modeling is conservative, this does not impact the fire analysis.

i) SF-Al-01. The finding notes that not all fire areas were walked down. The disposition indicates that for those not walked down a qualitative assessment was performed. This may not necessarily be sufficient such as for fire areas with a potentially significant CCDP or CLERP. Since the focus of supporting requirement SF-Al is on initiating events, identifying unique fire ignition source scenarios may be important. For fire areas which have not been walked down and are potential risk significant in the Fire PRA, either perform a walkdown or provide in further detail the justification for determining that unique sources do not exist or are already known for such fire areas.

Response

Seismic-Fire Notebook (G1-SF-FOO1, Rev 1) Table 1 provides an assessment for each fire compartment that was not walked down. The assessments include review of the IPEEE walkdowns as well as consideration of the CDF/LERF for the compartment.

Overall, 37 fire compartments were not walked down. For 26 of the 37 compartments, there are no fire scenarios developed, only full compartment burn. Any incremental increase in ignition frequency that may result from a seismically induced fire is more than offset in the risk calculation by assuming a full compartment burn for any fire.

Of the 11 remaining fire compartments, seven are inside containment. The Plant Area Summary Sheets from the seismic IPEEE walkdowns were reviewed for these fire areas.

All ignition sources in the fire areas are accounted for in the Fire PRA. Per the seismic IPEEE, all components in these areas were found to be well-anchored and there were no concerns with falling hazards. Based on this review, it is concluded that no unique seismic-fire sources exist in these areas inside containment and all ignition sources are captured in the Fire PRA.

Two of the remaining four fire compartments are low fire risk, with CCDP less than 1.OE-04 and CLERP less than 1.OE-05.

Assessments of the remaining two fire compartments are as follows:

PRA RAI 25 8

90-Day Responses to Request for Additional Information for NFPA 805 Control Room. The Control Room (CR) is a unique fire compartment that is analyzed separately in Task 11 of the Fire PRA. The rigorous examination of ignition sources and estimate of CR fire frequency ensures that all potential ignition sources are captured, even those that might result from a seismic event.

Cable Tunnel. The Cable Tunnel (CT) contains cable trays and conduit. There are no fixed ignition sources in the tunnel. Per the seismic IPEEE, all trays and conduits are rigidly mounted and/or anchored and there are no concerns with falling hazards. Based on review, it is concluded that no unique seismic-fire sources exist in the tunnel.

j) SF-A2-01. Please provide addition information discussing the reviews and assessments performed to meet supporting requirement SF-A2.

Response

Section 2.4 of the Seismic-Fire Notebook (G1-SF-FOO1, Rev 1) provides a detailed assessment of the performance of fire protection features following a seismic event. The assessment includes review of the following:

• Compliance with NRC Standards and industry codes to ensure that seismically induced failures do not adversely impact safety-related equipment

• Previous fire protection system walkdowns during the IPEEE seismic evaluation

" Spurious operation of suppressions systems that could impact the response to post earthquake fires

" Potential diversion of gaseous and water-based suppression systems

• Loss of common suppression systems

• Seismic impact on manual hose stations The assessments determined that there are no deviations from the installation standards which might adversely impact safe shutdown. In addition, current fire emergency procedures are adequate to respond to spurious operation of alarms and/or suppression systems, loss of suppression systems, or diversion of suppressants from areas where they might be needed.

PRA RAI 25 9