ML12236A165
| ML12236A165 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 07/19/2012 |
| From: | Tennessee Valley Authority |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| WBN-UFSAR-12-01 | |
| Download: ML12236A165 (168) | |
Text
WBNP-Table 2.4-14 Floods From Postulated Seismic Failure of Upstream Dams (Plant Grade is Elevation 728)
Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Elevation OBE Failures With One-half Probable Maximum Flood
- 1. Norris and Tellico 728.67
- 2. Cherokee, Douglas, and Tellico 729.07
- 3. Fontanaa and Tellico 720.65
- 4. Fontana a, Tellico, Hiwassee, Apalachia, and Blue Ridge 722.01 SSE Failures with 25-Year Flood
- 5. Norris, Cherokee, Douglas and Tellico b 731.17
- a. Includes failure of four ALCOA and one Duke Energy dams--Nantahala (Duke Energy formerly ALCOA), upstream; Santeetlah, on a downstream tributary, and Cheoah, Calderwood, and Chilhowee, downstream. Fort Loudoun gates are inoperable in open position.
- b. Gate opening at Fort Loudoun prevented by bridge failure.
2.4-100
WBNP-Table 2.4-15 Well and Sorina Inventory Within 2-mile Radius of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site (1972 Survey Only)
(Page 1 of 4)
Map Location Estimated Elevation Ident Ground Water Surface Casing No. Litude n ue Deh -------feet-- -I Pump Data 1 35036'08' 87047'03" 200+ 743 712 0.5 *No pump 2 35o36'24"' 84047'41" 59 726 723 0.5 *No pump 3 35036'10" 84047'50" 102 721 704 0.5 *No pump 4 35o36'003 84047'480 43.5 730 718 0.5 *No pump 5 35035'42' 84047'49" 45 710 687 0.5 *No pump 6 35035'55 84047'48" 6 705 705 2.5 *No pump 3
7 35G 6'04" 84048'16" 107 710 .684 0.5 *No pump 8 35036'11" 84048'16" 30 702 684 4.0 *No pump 9 35036'23" 84048'06 -. - 740 - No pump 10 35037'15" 84049'04" 99 742 696 0.5 1/3 hp 11 35'37'06" 84049'10" 87 753 Unknown 0.5 1/2 hp 12 35o37'03" 84049'04" 150 704 700 0.5 1/2 hp 13 35037'05' 84°49'02" 175 704 698 0.5 1 hp 14 35o37'15' 84049'01" 140 740 720 0.5 1 hp 15 35037'03' 84048'48' 83 729 693 0.5 Hand pump 16 35036'46, 84048'18' 205 780 665 0.5 Submerged, Unknown 17 35036'34' 84048'13" 28 768 768 0.5 1 hp 18 35o36'30" 84048'20" 95 794 777 0.5 1 hp 19 35o35'35" 84048'52" 111 713 715 0.6 No pump, 1 gpm 20 35036'54 84049'10" 68 710 Unknown 0.5 Unknown 21 35036'18' 84049'24" 125 725 695 0.5 1/2 hp 22 35036'20" 84049'20' 130 729 655 0.5 3/4 hp 23 35035'20" 84048'55' 225 730 715 0.5 1 hp 24 35035'15" 84048'56' 79 715 705 0.5 1/2 hp 25 35o35'44" 84049'07" 14 805 804 8.0 No pump 26 35035'46" 84049'31" 385 718 Unknown 0.5 1/2 hp 27 35035'29" 84049'16" 240 770 600 Unknown Unknown 28 35037'14" 84047'04 .
- . - Watts Bar Lake - 2, 50 hp=500 gpm 735 - 745 29 35037'19" 84045'57" 100 706 660 0.5 1 hp 30 35036'39" 84045'59 65 714 unknown 0.5 1/2 hp 31 35035'49" 84146'15" Spring - 710 - No pump 2.4-101
WBNP-Table 2.4-15 Well and Spring Inventory Within 2-mile Radius of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site (Continued)
(1972 Survey Only)
(Page 2 of 4)
Map Location Estimated Elevation Ident Ground Water Surface Casing N2. Latitude itue Depth -- feet- size Pump Data 32 35036'19" 84045'21 32.5 747 740 2-10" Windlass and bucket, Square no pump 33 35035'26' 84046'44" Spring - 800 No pump 34 35035'25" 84047'02" 120 725 705 Unknown 4 hp 35 35°35'12" 84047'15" 225 730 710 0.5 No pump 36 35,35'19" 84047'25" 110 734 715 0.5 3/4 hp 37 35o35'1 5" 84047'25" 175 730 710 0.7 No pump 38 35035'14' 84047'27" 100 730 710 0.7 3/4 ho 39 35037'26' 84045'50' 40 710 702 0.5 1/4 hp 40 35o35'16" 84047'28" 165 725 705 0.5 3/4 hp 41 35O35'19" 84047'30" 110 734 695 0.5 3/4 hp 42 35O35'14" 84047'28" 73 724 724 0.5 No pump 43 35035"14" 84047'22" 105 724 720 0.5 1/2 hp 44 35O35'12" 84047'29" Spring - 710 - 1/2 hp 45 35035'15" 84047'16" 125 730 690 0.5 1/2 hp 46 35035'09" 84047'31" 105 730 722 0.5 1-1/2 hp 47 35035'14" 84047'41" 164 764 755 0.5 1-1/2 hp 48 35o36'55" 84045'35" Spring - 720 - 3/4 hp 49 35°35'00" 84047'50' 100 748 708 0.5 1-1/2 hp 50 35o34'48' 84047'42" 80 710 688 0.5 3/4 hp 51 35035'02" 84o47'38" 100 750 720 0.5 1/2 hp 52 35034'58" 84047'34" 99 722 711 0.5 2 hp 53 35034'55" 84047'37" 54 719 691 0.5 3/4 hp 54 35034'44" 84047'48" 52 718 703 3.0 Not used 55 35°34'39" 84047'50" 257 720 692 0.5 5 gpm for five houses, lowered well 20 feet 56 35034'39' 84147'29" 56 701 691 0.5 1hp 57 35o34'37" 84047'32" 252 714 602 0.5 125 gph, 1 hp 58 35034'59" 84047'33" Spring - 710 - Not used 59 35135'03" 84047'38" Spring 730 Cattle pond 60 35035'04" 84O47'58 Spring 710 Not used Investigation made on January 10-11, 1972.
- Residence purchased for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant construction.
Spring fed pond of approximately 50 feet in diameter.
Watts Bar Dam, Steam Plant, and Pete Smith Resort water supply taken from Watts Bar Lake.
2.4-102
WBNP-Table 2.4-15 Well and Spring Inventory Within 2-mile Radius of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site (Continued)
(1972 Survey Only)
(Page 3 of 4)
Map Location Estimated Elevation Ident Ground Water Surface Casing
......--feet ----.
. . . Pump Data size 61 35036'58" 84045'22" NA* 750 NA NA NA 62 35036'50" 84045'24" NA 710 NA NA NA 63 35035'42" 84047'32" 150 742 INK** 0.5 Yes 64 35037'16" 84049'00" 100 740 50 0.33 Yes 65 35036'29" 84048'20" 200 710 19 0.5 Yes 66 35036'52" 84049'08" 70-83 700 INK 0.5 Yes 67 35036'50" 84049'080 70-83 700 INK 0.5 Yes 68 35036'49" 84049'09" 70-83 700 INK 0.5 Yes 69 35036'47" 84049'10" 70-83 700 INK 0.5 Yes 70 35037'03" 84049'090 NA 750 NA NA No 71 35037'05" 84049'10" NA 750 NA Hand dug No 72 35035'41" 84049'16" NA 720 NA NA NA 73 35035'43" 84048'48" NA 800 NA NA NA 74 35036'53" 84048'49" INK 720 INK INK Yes 75 35 35'07" 84o47'58" 100+ 760 Below River INK Yes 76 35035'07' 84048'00' INK 740 INK INK Yes 77 35 35'06" 84048'01" NA 720 NA NA NA 78 35035'08'. 84048'01" NA 720 NA NA NA 79 35o35'09" 84047'54" NA 800 NA NA NA 80 35035'11" 84047'42" NA 760 NA NA NA 81 35 35'14" 84047'41'" NA 760 NA NA NA 82 35o35'13" 84047'37" 400+ 760 INK 0.5 Yes 83 35o35'14" 84047'37" 300+ 760 INK 0.5 Yes 84 35035"10" 84047'34" NA 740 NA NA NA 85 35035'14" 84047'31" NA 720 NA NA NA 86 35-35'18" 84047'26" 450 720 20 0.125 Yes 87 35035'24" 84047'14' 300 740 INK INK Yes 88 35035'17" 84047"15" 300 730 INK 0.5 Yes 89 35035'19" 84047'12' 265 730 INK 0.5 Yes 90 35°35'18" 84047'12" 150 730 INK 0.5 Yes 91 35035'17" 84o47'09' NA 730 NA NA NA 92 35035'14" 84047'13" NA 720 NA NA NA 0
93 35 35'06" 84047'17" 210 720 20 0.5 Yes 2.4-103
WBNP-Table 2.4-15 Well and Sprino Inventory Within 2-mile Radius of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Site (Continued)
(1972 Survey Only)
(Page 4 of 4)
Map Location Estimated Elevation Ident Ground Water Surface Casing N2. Latitude Ljajuj Depth --..---- feet ------..... Size Pumo Data 94 35035'08" 84046'58" 130 760 15 0.5 Yes 95 35035'08" 84046'55" NA 800 NA NA NA 96 35o35'19" 84046'41" 80 990 20 0.5 Yes 97 3593522" 84046'34" 600 960 INK 0.5 Yes 98 35o35'39" 84046'34" INK 740 INK INK Yes S-99 35037'04" 84048'59" Spring 710 No S-100 35135'45" 84D49'04" Spring 840 No S-101 35035'40, 84049'14" Spring 730 No S-102 35035'16" 84046'44" Spring 980 No S-103 35035'06" 84046'57" Spring 800 No none available, many of these residences appeared to be summer houses, 2-3 attempts to locate home owners in the evening hours and on the weekend were unsuccessful.
"-Information not knowvn by homeowner.
- Nopump sizes were known by current homeowners.
2.4-104
ENCLOSURE 1 EVALUATION OF PROPOSED CHANGES ATTACHMENT 3 Proposed WBN Unit 1 UFSAR Figures (Public)
WBNP-Legend
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WATTS BAR r LUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYS IS REPORT USGS Hydmiol )1c Units within the Tennessee Friver Watershed Figuire 2.4-1 Figure 2.4-1 USGS Hydrologic Units within the Tennessee River Watershed 2.4-105
WBNP-0U)
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Figure 2.4-2 TVA Water Control System 2.4-106
WBNP-686 685
~68 0683 S 682
-j
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677 w
w 676 675 674 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Seasonal Operating Curve, Chickamauga Figure 2.4-3 (Sheet 1 of 12)
Figure 2.4-3 Seasonal Operating Curve, Chickamauga (Sheet I of 12) 2.4-107
WBNP-746 746 -- TOP OFGATQES. 74_45.0
- 744 743
> =NORMAL OPERATING ZONE Z 742
-J Z 741 w
740 IL 739 z 738 0
- 0. TOP OF NORMAL 737E u'"736 V
/80TT0M OF NORMAL 'OPERATING ZONE 735 734 1 -SPILLWAY CREST: EL. 711,0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC WATTS 3AR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY AN*ALYSIS REPORT Seasonal C)perating Curve, Watts Bar Figure 2.4-3 (Sheet 2 of 12)
Figure 2.4-3 Seasonal Operating Curve, Watts Bar (Sheet 2 of 12) 2.4-108
WBNP-817
-- TELLICO EMERGENCY SPILLWAY CREST: EL 817.0 816
~815 -- 8TOP OF GATES: EL. 815.0 (FORT LOUDOUN AND TELLICO) 0814 S = NORMAL OPERATING ZONE
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- ' 810 Z 0 TOP OF NORMAL 0 OPERATING ZONE
- - 809
.j MUXMAELEATION 80BOTTOM OF NORMAL OPERATING ZONE 806
-FT. LOUDOUN SPILLWAY CREST: EL. 783.0 -- TELLICO SPILLWAY CREST: EL. 773.0 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC WA17S BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Seasonal Operating Curve, Fort Loudoun - Tellico Figure 2.4-3 (Sheet 3 of 12)
Figure 2.4-3 Seasonal Operating Curve, Fort Loudoun - Tellico (Sheet 3 of 12) 2.4-109
WBNP-1390 1385 ---------------------------------- -T mn.(2c.G -am- - EL. 10 §2 ......
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am 0 0
, FLOOD GUIDE
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40 0 MEDIAN 0 1375 0
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-- PLW YCES:E015.
01370 a k-w t3U a 1365 0 001 1360 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Seasonal Operating Curve, Boone Figure 2,4-3 (Sheet 4 of 12)
Figure 2.4-3 Seasonal Operating Curve, Boone (Sheet 4 of 12) 2.4-110
WBNP-1080 1070 N
S1060 a 1050 1040 z
0 41030
'U UJ 1020 1010 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC WATTS 3AR NUCLEAR PLANT F:INAL SAFETY AN,ALYSIS REPORT Seasonal C)perating Curve, Cherokee Figure 2.4-3 (Sheet 5 of 12)
Figure 2.4-3 Seasonal Operating Curve, Cherokee (Sheet 5 of 12) 2.4-1ll
WBNP-1010 1000 990 a
.j 980 970 F-950 I.-
-J 940 930 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Seasonal Operating Curve, Douglas Figure 2.4-3 (Sheet 6 of 12)
Figure 2.4-3 Seasonal Operating Curve, Douglas (Sheet 6 of 12) 2.4-112
WBNP-1720 1710
" 1700 a
1690 z
-J U) t 1660 0
1670 w
U-z o 1660 F-164
.-I 165 1630 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANIALYSIS REPORT Seasonal Operating Curve, Fontana Figur
- 2.4-3 (Sheet 7 of 12)
Figure 2.4-3 Seasonal Operating Curve, Fontana (Sheet 7 of 12) 2.4-113
WBNP-1264 ac 1263 gC4 i
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>0 1262 z
.j aU) 1261 w
1260 I-uJ w 1259 0
1- 1258
-J w 1257
-SPILLWAY CREST: EL. 1228.0 1256 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Seasonal Operating Curve, Fort Patrick Henry Figure 2.4-3 (Sheet 8 of 12)
Figure 2.4-3 Seasonal Operating Curve, Fort Patrick Henry (Sheet 8 of 12) 2.4-114
WBNP-797 0 - ~~~-TOP OF GATES: EL. 796.0 ----
796 0
cm 0
0 795 z
-J 794 w 793 Lu w
0 792 U- 791 2
_o
-J wi 790
---SPILLWAY CREST: EL. 754.0 789 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Seasonal Operating Curve, Melton Hill Figure 2.4-3 (Sheet 9 of 12)
Figure 2.4-3 Seasonal Operating Curve, Melton Hill (Sheet 9 of 12) 2.4-115
WBNP-1040
-TOP OF GATES: EL. 1034.0 1030
( 1020 .--. 1.WI1I WAY *.FI=T / ..... I L
_j EL. 1020.0/ 0 FLOOD GUIDE
- 0 uin 0
. . .. .0 .
1010 a ru elO 0 LIt MEDIA ~N z0 1000 00 0 LJ
-J 990 98o JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Seasonal Operating Curve, Norris Figure 2.4-3 (Sheet 10 of 12)
Figure 2.4-3 Seasonal Operating Curve, Norris (Sheet 10 of 12) 2.4-116
WBNP-1745
-- CREST OF MORNING GLORY SPILLWAY: EL. 1742.0 1740 1735 C,, 1730
" *FLOOD GUIDE 2 1725 wo 1720
< MEDIAN w 1715 z
0 r 1710 1705 1700 1695 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC WATTS BAF NUCLEAR PLANT FINi AL SAFETY ANAL')ISIS REPORT Seasonal Operat ing Curve, South Holston Figure 2.4- 3 (Sheet 11 of 12)
Figure 2.4-3 Seasonal Operating Curve, South Holston (Sheet 11 of 12) 2.4-117
WBNP-1980
-- CREST OF MORNING GLORY SPILLWAY: EL. 1975.0 1975
- 1970
-j1965 0 1960 w FLOOD GUIDE
'OR......
030 0 0
- 1955 0 z MEDIAN
- 0 0 000Q S.,
,.J 1950 1945 1940 JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY AN,ALYSIS REPORT Seasonal Operating Curve, Watauga Figure 2.4-3 (Sheet 12 of 12)
Figure 2.4-3 Seasonal Operating Curve, Watauga (Sheet 12 of 12) 2.4-118
WBNP-fquJ 720
--TOP OF GATES: EL 665.44 680 I 660 z
-SPILLWAY CREST: EL 648.0 640 o.JuI I I I* I P 0 500 1000 1600 2000 2600 3O0 3500 VOLUME IN THOUSANDS OF ACRE-FEET WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Chickamauga Figure 2.4-4 (Sheet I of 13)
Figure 2.4-4 Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Chickamauga (Sheet I of 13) 2.4-119
WBNP-
'Mu 770 ________
~750 .9--TOIP OF OATES: EL ?45.0
~.730-7 / --SPILLWAY CREST: EL. 713.0 70 S690 M- 670 650 630 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3OOO 350a VOLUME IN THOUSMNDS OF ACRE-FEET WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Watts Bar Figure 2.4-4 (Sheet 2 of 13)
Figure 2.4-4 Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Watts Bar (Sheet 2 of 13) 2.4-120
WBNP-
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-TOP OF GATES: EL 815.0 I
800 70PILLWAY CREST: EL 783.0 780 I 760 740 720 0 200 400 600 600 1000 1200 VOLUME IN THOUSANDS OF ACRE-FEET WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Fort Loudoun Figure 2.4-4 (Sheet 3 of 13)
Figure 2.4-4 Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Fort Loudoun (Sheet 3 of 13) 2.4-121
WBNP-820 70
~760 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 VOLUME IN THOUSANDS OF ACRE-FEET WATTS BAR NUJCLEAR PLANT FINAL S;AFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Reservoir Elev. ation - Storage Relationsh ip, Tellico Figure 2.4-4 ( Sheet 4 of 13)
Figure 2.4-4 Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Tellico (Sheet 4 of 13) 2.4-122
WBNP-1420 1400 0 TOP OF GATES: EL 1385.0-1380 i 130 J -SPILLWAY 'CCREST: EL. 1350.0 1340 1320 o 1300 1280 ____
1250 1240 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 VOLUME IN THOUSANDS OF ACREFEET WA1TS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Boone Figure 2.4-4 (Sheet 5 of 13)
Figure 2.4-4 Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Boone (Sheet 5 of 13) 2.4-123
WBNP-1110 1090 TOP OF GATES, EL 1078,0--
1070 1050
-SPILLWAY
- CREST: EL. 1043.0 1030 1010 970 910 9500 930 910 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 VOLUME IN THOUSANDS OF ACRE.FEET WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Cherokee Figure 2.4-4 (Sheet 6 of 13)
Figure 2.4-4 Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Cherokee (Sheet 6 of 13) 2.4-124
WBNP-9-SPILWAV CREST: EL. 0700 ieo[
90
~900 880 a N00 1000 1500 2000 2500 VOLUME INThOUSAN#S OF ACRS+.I WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Douglas Figure 2.4-4 (Sheet 7 of 13)
Figure 2.4-4 Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Douglas (Sheet 7 of 13) 2.4-125
WBNP-174011 TOP OF oATM*,$EL..1710.0.**
1SU.LWAY CREST: EL 17O0,-
Im p
I 1490 1440 0 200 400 Noo 800 1000 1200 1400 tow0 16w020 0 VOLUME IN THOUSANDS OF ACRB4E+B WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Fontana Figure 2.4-4 (Sheet 8 of 13)
Figure 2.4-4 Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Fontana (Sheet 8 of 13) 2.4-126
WBNP-lawJ 1280 _.*
J --TOP OF GATES:'EL. 1283.0 1260 I 1240- -
- SPILLWAY CREST: EL 1228.0 1220-z 0
F 4
1200 1180 1160 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 VOLUME IN THOUSANDS OF ACRE-FEET WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Fort Patrick Henry Figure 2.4-4 (Sheet 9 of 13)
Figure 2.4-4 Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Fort Patrick Henry (Sheet 9 of 13) 2.4-127
WBNP-0 I
i I;;
I Hf 50 100 150 200 260 300 350 400 VOLUME INTHOUSANDS OF ACRE-FEET WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Melton Hill Figure 2.4-4 (Sheet 10 of 13)
Figure 2.4-4 Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Melton Hill (Sheet 10 of 13) 2.4-128
WBNP-1100 1050 TOP OF GATES: EL 1034.0--
1000 900 am 0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3600 4000 VOLUME IN THOUSANDS OF ACRE-FEET WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Norris Figure 2.4-4 (Sheet 11 of 13)
Figure 2.4-4 Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Norris (Sheet 11 of 13) 2.4-129
WBNP-1760__ __ _ __ _ _ _
17500 -SPILLWAY CREST: EL 1742.0 if 1700.-
1650 BA.
16/0 I
1450 I t I I 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 600 9oO 1000 1100 VOLUME IN THOUSANDS OF ACRE-FEET WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, South Holston Figure 2.4-4 (Sheet 12 of 13)
Figure 2.4-4 Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, South Holston (Sheet 12 of 13) 2.4-130
WBNP-2000 _____ -"____
-- SPILLWAY CREST:
EL. 1975.0 I
I 18000_0 F
1750 ___ _
17M.
1650 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 VOLUME IN THOUSANDS OF ACRE-FEET WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Watauga Figure 2.4-4 (Sheet 13 of 13)
Figure 2.4-4 Reservoir Elevation - Storage Relationship, Watauga (Sheet 13 of 13) 2.4-131
WBNP-60 0 0i 36 A __
40 0
+.:--~~ ~~~~ . . . .. *..... -+'o+++*. . q +o .++....
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--mom _ _ _
13 P99w00gdi AM CM WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT o ubmula . .-- FINAL SAFETY
£ £'-AmU p~uoa 40w~~ANALYSIS REPORT Tennessee River Mile 404.2 -
Distribution of Floods at Chattanooga, Tennessee Figure 2.4-5 Figure 2.4-5 Tennessee River Mile 464.2 - Distribution of Floods at Chattanooga, Tennessee 2.4-132
WBNP-WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Probable Maximum Precipitation lsohyets for 21,400 Sq. Mi. Event, Downstream Placement Figure 2.4-6 Figure 2.4-6 Probable Maximum Precipitation Isohyets for 21,400 Sq. Mi. Event, Downstream Placement 2.4-133
WBNP-WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Probable Maximum Precipitation Isohyets for 7980 Sq. Mi. Event, Centered at Bulls Gap, TN Figure 2.4-7 Figure 2.4-7 Probable Maximum Precipitation Isohyets for 7980 Sq. Mi. Event, Centered at Bulls Gap, TN 2.4-134
WBNP-100 8o ao I.
40 0
20 0 12 24 36 48 60 7:2 TIME - HOURS WA-ITS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Rainfall Time Distribution -
Typical Mass Curve Figure 2.4-8 Figure 2.4-8 Rainfall Time Distribution - Typical Mass Curve 2.4-135
WBNP-KY 1 26
~314
->27 ~-
37 U,;
34 U
2.1
't2 NC 45
ý448 44A -
!y /
42 GA WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Drainage Areas above Chickamauga Dam AL Figure 2.4-9 Figure 2.4-9 Drainage Areas above Chickamauga Dam 2.4-136
WBNP-50,000 45,000 40,000 35,000
, 30,000 n2,000
- 20,000 15,000 10,1000 6,000 0
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 TIME-HOURS
-AREA 1 - FRENCH BROAD RIVER AT ASHEVILLE; 944.4 SQ. MI.: 6-HOUR DURATION
- - - AREA 2 - FRENCH BROAD RIVER. NEWPORT TO ASHEVILLE: 913.1 SQ. MI.: 6-HOUR DURATION
...... AREA 3 - PIGEON RIVER AT NEWPORT: 667.1 S. MI.; 6-HOUR DURATION
.. AREA 4 - NOUCHUCKY RIVER AT EM8REEVILLE; 804.8 SQ. MI.; 4-HOUR DURATION
....- AREA 5 - NOUCHUCKY LOCAL: 378.7 SQ. MI.: 6-HOUR DURATION WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unit Hydrographs, Areas 1-5 Figure 2.4-10 (Sheet I of 11)
Figure 2.4-10 Unit Hydrographs, Areas 1-5 (Sheet I of 11) 2.4-137
WBNP-50,000 45,000-40,000 35,000 -
30,000
-- - -- - -'. ,,;+4* - --*, - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -...........-
50 25.000-20,000 15,000 -
10.000- . ..... .. .. . .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. . ... . . . . . . . . .
- - - - -- - - - -- - - --*.- - - .- - -- - ------ -. - - - ---- --- - -o .
6,000 !.-- ----- S - -, -- - r.., . - - -- - - - - .+o..-
0 0 12 24 36 48 60 TIME - HOURS
- AREA6- DOUGLAS DAM LOCAL; 835.0 SO. ML: 61-1OUR OURATION
- - - AREA 7 - LITTLE PIGEON RIVER AT SEVIERVILLE: 352.1 S. MI.: 4-HOUR DURATION
- . -. AREA 8 - FRENCH BROAD LOCAL; 206.5 SQ. MI.; 6-HOUR DURATION
...... AREA 9- SOUTH HOLSTON DAM: 703.2 SQ. MI.; 6-HOUR DURATION WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unit Hydrographs, Areas 6-9 Figure 2.4-10 (Sheet 2 of 11)
Figure 2.4-10 Unit Hydrographs, Areas 6-9 (Sheet 2 of 11) 2.4-138
WBNP-46,000 40,000 35,000 30,000 uA 6000 -
= 20,000
/ ----.............
\, ,..................:......................
115,000 -/- - - -------------------------------------------------------------
10,000 6,000- 4/
. f... .. . , * ... ------- . . - --..............
0- ze:
0 12 24 36 48 60 TIME-HOURS
-AREA 10 - WATAUGA DAM; 468.2 SQ. MI.; 4.HOUR DURATION
- - - AREA 11 - BOONE LOCAL: 667.7 SQ. MI.: 6-HOUR DURATION
...... AREA 12 - FORT PATRICK HENRY DAM; 62-8 SQ. MI.; 6-HOUR DURATION
- --- AREA 13- NORTH FORK HOLSTON RIVER NEAR GATE CITY: 688.9 SQ. MI.; 8-HOUR DURATION WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unit Hydrographs, Areas 10-13 Figure 2.4-10 (Sheet 3 of 11)
Figure 2.4-10 Unit Hydrographs, Areas 10-13 (Sheet 3 of 11) 2.4--139
WBNP-30,000 25,000 20,000 u,
mu 15,000
- 10,000 5,000 0
0 12 24 36 48 60 TIME - HOURS
-AREAS 14 & 15 - CHEROKEE LOCAL; 854.6 SQ. MI.; 6-HOUR DURATION
- - - AREA 18- HOLSTON RIVER LOCAL. CHEROKEE DAM TO KNOXVILLE GAUGE: 319.6 SQ. MI.: 8-HOUR DURATION
...... AREA 17 - LITTLE RIVER; 378.6 SO. MI.: 4-HOUR DURATION
- -. AREA 18 - FORT LOUDOUN LOCAL. 323.4 SQ. MI.; 8-HOUR DURATION WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unit Hydrographs, Areas 14-18 Figure 2.4-10 (Sheet 4 of 11)
Figure 2.4-10 Unit Hydrographs, Areas 14-18 (Sheet 4 of 11) 2.4-140
WBNP-3,OOO 21,000 20,000 U0
- O10,000 5,000 0 12 24 36 48 60 TIME - HOURS
-AREA 19 - LITLflE TENNESSEE RRIVER AT NEEDMORE; 438.5 SO. MI.; 6-HOUR DURATION
- - - AREA 20 - NANTAHALA DAM; 90.9 SQ. MI.; 2-HOUR DURATION
...... AREA 21 - TUCKASEGEE RIVER AT BRYSON CITY; 653.8 SQ. MI.; 6-HOUR DURATION
. AREA 22 - FONTANA LOCAL; 389.8 SQ. MI.; 4-HOUR DURATION WATT.S BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY kNALYSIS REPORT Unit Hydrographs, Areas 19-22 Figu re 2.4-10 (Sheet 5 of 11)
Figure 2.4-10 Unit Hydrographs, Areas 19-22 (Sheet 5 of 11) 2.4-141
WBNP-80,000 48,000 .. . . . . .- - - -- - - - - - - - -
40,000 35,000-U ss,ooo 30,000 U'
0 28,000 20,000 a -- - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- -
1,000o 10,000. ..... ......
8,000 0
0 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 9a TIME - HOURS
-AREA 23 - UTTLE TENNESSEE RIVER LOCAL. FONTANA TO CHILHOWEE DAM; 404.7 SQ. MI.: 6-HOUR DURATION
- - - AREA 24 - uLTTLE TENNESSEE RIVER LOCAL, CHILHOWEE TO TELLICO DAM: 650.2 SQ. MI.: 6-HOUR DURATION AREA......
25 - WATTS BAR LOCAL ABOVE CLINCH RIVER; 295.3 SQ. MI.; 8-HOUR DURATION
.... AREA 28 - CUNCH RIVER AT NORRIS DAM; 2,912.8 SQ. MI.; 6-HOUR DURATION
.. AREA 27 - MELTON HILL LOCAL 431.9 SQ. MI.: 6-HOUR DURATION WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unit Hydrographs, Areas 23-27 Figure 2.4-10 (Sheet 6 of 11)
Figure 2.4-10 Unit Hydrographs, Areas 23-27 (Sheet 6 of 11) 2.4-142
WBNP-10.000 U.
U U'
ID a,000a a
0 0 12 24 36 48 60 TIME - HOURS
-AREA 33 - CUNCH RIVER LOCAL ABOVE MILE 16; 37.2 SQ. MI.; 2-HOUR DURATION
- - - AREA 34 - POPLAR CREEK AT MOUTH; 1352 SQ. MI.; 2-HOUR DURATION
...... AREA 36 - CLINCH RIVER LOCAL. MOUTH TO MILE 16; 29.3 SQ. MI.; 2-HOUR DURATION WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unit Hydrographs, Areas 33, 34, 36 Figure 2.4-10 (Sheet 7 of 11)
Figure 2.4-10 Unit Hydrographs, Areas 33, 34, 36 (Sheet 7 of 11) 2.4-143
WBNP-P 48,000 40,000 35,000 ..
30,000-U) m.
w U
25.000 20,000 4OOO ... . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
15,000 10,000 .. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
5,000:
f,=
0 12 24 36 48 s0 "iME-HOURS
-AREA 36 - EMORY RIVER AT MOUTH; 888.8 SO. MI.; 4-HOUR DURATION
- - - AREA 37 - WATTS BAR LOCAL BELOW CLINCH RIVER 408.4 SO. MI.; 6-HOUR DURATION WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unit Hydrographs, Areas 35, 37 Figuire 2.4-10 (Sheet 8 of 11)
Figure 2.4-10 Unit Hydrographs, Areas 35, 37 (Sheet 8 of 11) 2.4-144
WBNP-60,000 46,000 40,000 36,000 U
SL U 30,000 -jS w
ID - ---------------------------------------------
25,000-z U 20,000-U 16,000-10,000-6,000 0-0 12 24 36 TIME -HOURS
-AREA 38 - CHATUGE DAM: 189.1 SQ. MI.; 1-HOUR DURATION
- - - AREA 39 - NOTTELY DAM: 214.3 SQ. ML; I-HOUR DURATION AREA 41 - APALACHIA LOCAL; 49.8 SQ. MI.; I-HOUR DURATION
.... AREA 42 - BLUE RIDGE DAM; 231.6 SQ. MI.; 2-HOUR DURATION WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FlINAL SAFETY ANA LYSIS REPORT Unit Hydrogr aphs, Areas 38, 39, 41, 42 Figure 2.4-10 (Sheet 9 of 11)
Figure 2.4-10 Unit Hydrographs, Areas 38, 39, 41, 42 (Sheet 9 of 11) 2.4-145
WBNP-30,000 25,000-
- 20,000 U.
15,000 10,000 5,000 0
a 12 24 36 48 60 72 84 96 TIME - HOURS
-AREA 40-HIWASSEE VER LOCAL4 M65.I SO. PA.;.HOUR DURATION
-- - AREA 43- OCOEE NO. I LOCAL 382.6 SO MI.; 6.HOUR DURATION
...... AREA 44A - HIWASSEE RIVER FROM CHARLESTON TO APAAICHIA AND OCOEE NO. 1:6866 SQ. MI.: 6-HOUR DURATION
- -. -AREA 449 - I*WASSEE RIVER FROM MOUTH TO CHARLESTON; 388.0 50. MI.; 0.HOUR DURATION WAITS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unit Hydrographs, Areas 40, 43, 44A, 44B Figure 2.4-10 (Sheet 10 of 11)
Figure 2.4-10 Unit Hydrographs, Areas 40, 43, 44A, 44B (Sheet 10 of 11) 2.4-146
WBNP-40,000 36,000 30,000 --------------------- ------ -----------------------------------------------------------------------
0 2,000 ------------------ - ------------- -------------------------------- ---------------------------------
IL U
w 20,000 .............. ............................. ..................... ------------ ....................
U 0
15,000 10,000 5,000 -------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------- ----------
0 0 12 24 36 TIME - HOURS
-AREA 45 - CHICKAMAUGA LOCAL; 72.1 SQ. MI.; 6-HOUR DURATION WAI TS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unit Hydrographs, Area 45 Fi.1pure 2.4-10 (Sheet 1i of 11)
Figure 2.4-10 Unit Hydrographs, Area 45 (Sheet 11 of 11) 2.4-147
WBNP-740 I I I I I 730 720. ________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
710- I 4 4 4 -~----- 4 -.-. ~-' S
- -- TOP OF SOUTH EMB EL, 707.0
-TOP OF NORTH EMB: EL. 706.0 700 9 1 *t-~~----1 -. I 8 --TOP OF GATES: EL 68544 0
670. -
ill 850 650
--SPILLWAY CREST: 645 0 64 - - HEAfWATER O RATING CURRENT CONFIGURATION 40 I- -- IrAILWAIER RATING3 620-0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 DISCHARGE - 1000 CFS WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Discharge Rating Curve, Chickamauga Dam Figure 2.4-11 (Sheet 1 of 13)
Figure 2.4-11 Discharge Rating Curve, Chickamauga Dam (Sheet I of 13) 2.4-148
WBNP-780 770 TOP OF EMBANKMENT: EL 770.0 760
'750
- TOP OF GATES: EL 746.0 740 730 z
0 720
-- SPILLWAY CREST: EL 713.0.,
710 S- *'HEADWATER RATING 700 -___ _ I_- -- TAILWATER RATING
" -* RIM LEAK AT WEIR #7 RATING 690 1 _ _ LL 680 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 1300 DISCHARGE - 1000 CFS WATTS BA,R NUCLEAR PLANT Fil NAL SAFETY ANAI YSIS REPORT Discha irge Rating Curve, atts Bar Dam Figure 2.,4-11 (Sheet 2 of 13)
Figure 2.4-11 Discharge Rating Curve, Watts Bar Dam (Sheet 2 of 13) 2.4-149
WBNP-850 840
- TOP OF EMBANKMENT: EL 837.0 830 820
- TOP OF GATES: EL 816.0
" 810 0
~800 S790 F780 oo-
- SPILLWAY CREST: EL 783.0 - "
LU 770
- HEADWATER RATING 760 SI-- rTAILWATER RATING 750 740 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 600 550 600 DISCHARGE - 1000 CFS WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINA L SAFETY ANALY SIS REPORT Discharg e Rating Curve, Fort Lioudoun Dam Figure 2.4-1I (Sheet 3 of 13)
Figure 2.4-11 Discharge Rating Curve, Fort Loudoun Dam (Sheet 3 of 13) 2.4-150
WBNP-850.
840
-- TOP OF EMBANKMENT EL_833.0 830 820.
-- EMERGENCY SPILLWAY CREST: EL 817.0 0 -- TOPO GATESE 8150 810 '
I
!I,,
---SPLLWAY CREST. EL 7730 U. 770 -*-
760 - HEADVTER RATING TMI.WATER RATING" TL--
750
- ___ -
- Includes emergency spilfway dicharge "4 Tallwoter shown at Tellico Dam 730 I I I I 0 100 200 300 400 500 G00 700 800 900 1000 1100 1200 DISCHARGE - 1000 CFS WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Discharge Rating Curve, Tellico Dam Figure 2.4-11 (Sheet 4 of 13)
Figure 2.4-11 Discharge Rating Curve, Tellico Dam (Sheet 4 of 13) 2.4-151
WBNP-
-TOP OF EMBANKMENT." EL 1408,5 1400-___{___ ___ ______
DAM EL 132.0 1 -TOP OF CONCRETE
- -TOPOFGAT MEL 13850 a1380 1370 11360 1350 _ _ _ -SPILLWAY CREST: EL. 13500 NIW: Talvam' rang n* s~wn, no uct an outflow.-"A
____________I I 0 50 10 150 200 250 300 350 DISCHARGE - 1000 CF8 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Discharge Rating Curve, Boone Dam Figure 2.4-11 (Sheet 5 of 13)
Figure 2.4-11 Discharge Rating Curve, Boone Dam (Sheet 5 of 13) 2.4-152
WBNP-1100
.-TOP OF EARTH SADDLE DAMS- EL 1092 75 1080
-TOP OF GATES EL 1075 0 IM8
- SPILLWAY CREST EL 10430 1040 ml 1020 01 1000 980 960
- HEADWATER RATING
- - - TAILWATER RATING 940 a
920 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 DISCHARGE - 1000 CFS WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Discharge Rating Curve, Cherokee Dam Figure 2.4-11 (Sheet 6 of 13)
Figure 2.4-11 Discharge Rating Curve, Cherokee Dam (Sheet 6 of 13) 2.4-153
WBNP-1040
-ITOP OF IADDLE DAMS EL 10235
-TOP OF CONCRETE OAM- EL 1022 5 1020
-- TOP OF GATES EL 10020 ________"
1000 9aO
--SPILLWAY CREST EL 970 0 960 940 0 920 w
900
- HEADWATER RATING
- - - TAILWATER RATING 88M 860 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 DISCHARGE -1000 CFS WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Discharge Rating Curve, Douglas Dam Figure 2.4-11 (Sheet 7 of 13)
Figure 2.4-11 Discharge Rating Curve, Douglas Dam (Sheet 7 of 13) 2.4-154
WBNP-1760 1740 1 -TOPOF MAIN DAM: EL 1727.0 1720 I 1700 1700.-TOP OF GATES: EL 1710.0 F
-SPILLWAY CREST EL. 1875.0 1640 1620 Note: TuI~water ,a~ng no~atom, no s~san aculfow.
0 100 200 300 400 50o DISCHARGE - 1000 C1S WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Discharge Rating Curve, Fontana Dam Figure 2.4-11 (Sheet 8 of 13)
Figure 2.4-11 Discharge Rating Curve, Fontana Dam (Sheet 8 of 13) 2.4-155
WBNP-1280, j1280-S1270 - TOP OF DAM: EL 1270.0-12SO~ oo~s~ 2 11250 1240o 1230
--SPiLLWAY CREST- EL. 1228.0 Note: TalhWnz razing not ihwn feto uo 1220 1 0 so 100 1I0 200 250 300 350 DISCHARGE- 1000 CFS WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Discharge Rating Curve, Fort Patrick Henry Dam Figure 2.4-11 (Sheet 9 of 13)
Figure 2.4-11 Discharge Rating Curve, Fort Patrick Henry Dam (Sheet 9 of 13) 2.4-156
WBNP-810.
-~-TOP OF NORTH NONOVERFLOW DAM: EL. 806.48
- 0 ___-TOP -_____OF SOUTH1NONOVERFLOW DAM: EL 802.0
-TOP
- OF GATES: EL 790.0
'no 790
-SPILLWAY CREST: EL 754.0 Note. Tiwaftevr mtng not shown, no effect on outflow 750 __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
0 so 100 is0 200 250 300 350 DISCHARGE - 1000 CFS WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Discharge Rating Curve, Melton Hill Dam Figure 2.4-11 (Sheet 10 of 13)
Figure 2.4-11 Discharge Rating Curve, Melton Hill Dam (Sheet 10 of 13) 2.4-157
WBNP-
]lul -
I, 1-TOP OF DAM: EL 1081.0 1.1040 1034.0
"-.-TOPOFGATES:EL 10 .o 10i0 1000 Tailwaler raftk not l aw,. moefean spdtVwaym~w.
NoMte-NO I I I I 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 2a0 400 DISCHARGE - 100 CF8 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Discharge Rating Curve, Norris Dam Figure 2.4-11 (Sheet 11 of 13)
Figure 2.4-11 Discharge Rating Curve, Norris Dam (Sheet 11 of 13) 2.4-158
WBNP-1765 --- TOP OF AM EL. 1765.0 I
I I 1755.
1750. ___________-_
1745 Z'101ý
-BENT CREEK SPILLWAY CREST EL. 1744.0 IINote: not shown, no efec on ouflow.
I I
---MORNING GLORY SPILLWAY CREST: EL 1742.0 ITuIt~teraln I 1740 a 50 100 150 200 250 DISCHARGE - 1000 CF3 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Discharge Rating Curve, South Holston Dam Figure 2.4-11 (Sheet 12 of 13)
Figure 2.4-11 Discharge Rating Curve, South Holston Dam (Sheet 12 of 13) 2.4-159
WBNP-LU .
-TOP OF DAM EL 20120 2010 2005 2000 1995.____
W 1990 .START OTHROATCONTROL EL. 19890 TO 19900 F1985.
1980 1975 *-:ORNING GLORY SPILLWAY CREST EL 1975 0 Note laitwater rating not shown no effect on outflow 1970 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 t00 DISCHARGE 1000 CFI WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Discharge Rating Curve, Watauga Dam Figure 2.4-11 (Sheet 13 of 13)
Figure 2.4-11 Discharge Rating Curve, Watauga Dam (Sheet 13 of 13) 2.4- 160
WBNP-Cherokao Damn HRM 62M3 Dougas Dam Forksof VwRkvF RM3230 Forks of :1. River TRI=_ I TRM 602.70 RM 0.60 TeUlto Dam' LITRM 0.30 WATTS BAR NLUCLEAR PLANT Chfhwaon Dam LRM 3E0. FINAL SAFETY ANALYSI S REPORT Fort Loudoun - Tellico SOCH Unsteady Flow Model Schematic Figure 2.4-12 Figure 2.4-12 Fort Loudoun - Tellico SOCH Unsteady Flow Model Schematic 2.4-161
WBNP-a ¶WA(~.
- 305 tn's-u".,"-
INK,..
1KM~ I
$10 005 I-3114173 3Y11573 316173 3117/13 311873 319073 3Y20773 3Y21/73 OATE WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unsteady Flow Model Fort Loudoun Reservoir March 1973 Flood Figure 2.4-13 (Sheet 1 of 2)
Figure 2.4-13 Unsteady Flow Model Fort Loudoun Reservoir March 1973 Flood (Sheet I of 2) 2.4-162
WBNP-840 920 I 100
- ~ c~,. ~v.
~ug0 1w4*im '4
- C..3,,~ 4.r.~
~.4R..., - 0~..4 Or. TW4*~ '3 g..fS'4~ 4 RJ 560 ml.
- (~0M4 4.X~
- ~c.,R... .. Ct4'4J Ot.r..J IL.,
~840 Cr..MO 01.4...
3,14f73 3M1V73 311673 3Y17173 3118173 311W73 3r2013 3r21r3 DATE WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unsteady Flow Model Fort Loudoun Reservoir March 1973 Flood Figure 2.4-13 (Sheet 2 of 2)
Figure 2.4-13 Unsteady Flow Model Fort Loudoun Reservoir March 1973 Flood (Sheet 2 of 2) 2.4-163
WBNP-818 40L,,., 474 14444 s~~¶ 4
- Ca.nn4144 4.
t.e.#J.O., In INK .44~-
814 813 812 51303 &Q403 515103 515103 W17103 8 03 5W101035111103 5112103 1W13103 5114103 511S503M1103 5117103 5115103 OATS WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unsteady Flow Model Fort Loudoun - Tellico Reservoir May 2003 Flood Figure 2.4-14 (Sheet 1 of 3)
Figure 2.4-14 Unsteady Flow Model Fort Loudoun - Tellico Reservoir May 2003 Flood (Sheet I of 3) 2.4-164
WBNP-930 1W.
120 M-..
'0e D. 4t.4 Sal ____
rum. nI
£7o~
6=3103 5141 £503 0 MW 503 103 5M3 5I0 51C0M3 S6 103 5112103 /13/3 5103 5/16103 51W03 5V1IM036)1=03 DATE WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unsteady Flow Model Fort Loudouin - Tellico Reservoir May 2003 Flooc Figure 2.4-14 (Sheet 2 of 3 Figure 2.4-14 Unsteady Flow Model Fort Loudoun - Tellico Reservoir May 2003 Flood (Sheet 2 of 3) 2.4-165
WBNP-837
- 812 o818 831 t
.I87 w. fl..R 0W-1I.116 817 820 0-014 el
- 815
...... tVeY.Or
- 814 fIS.iI-813 812 813503 Vf4103 SAM 51M3 f71303 81 G1M3 81M0103V111103811303 6"143
- 814103 6/115/02813803 M 117)03 58103 DATE WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unsteady Flow Model Fort Loudoun - Tellico Reservoir May 2003 Flood Figure 2.4-14 (Sheet 3 of 3)
Figure 2.4-14 Unsteady Flow Model Fort Loudoun - Tellico Reservoir May 2003 Flood (Sheet 3 of 3) 2.4-166
WBNP-Melton Hill Dam CRM 23.1 Fort Loudoun Dam Mile 602.3 River Tellico Dam LTRM 0.3 Watts Bar Dam TRM S29.9 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Watts Bar SOCH Unsteady Flow Model Schematic Figure 2.4-15 Figure 2.4-15 Watts Bar SOCH Unsteady Flow Model Schematic 2.4-167
WBNP-76s 760 - 00... 4IN..
A 1WI"4 0, 1.~. rwI1s FF4-Np-S755 C-pý 4 AF.,-
hks IN P.. 4 rw#.w~re. Inn
~.; ,
0 p 745 CptI.4 INIF.... *1 F..,..,~,. IF....,. IRs 9
.VSFI- IWI 1PM 740 735 31M4173 31/73 3116M73 3117173 3118173 3/19173 3120173 3121173 DATE WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unsteady Flow Model Watts Bar Reservoir March 1973 Flood Figure 2.4-16 Figure 2.4-16 Unsteady Flow Model Watts Bar Reservoir March 1973 Flood 2.4-168
WBNP-760 °-
a,WWI, A.
I 745 CS T IN TV, kV,.l.I" Stok I. 745
'U K 1 ,t4-!N Ua+/-t. INI 740 "Imm
'.1 %4 735 6=3103 51483 5M503 515M03 517M03 51=103 515103 5110103 5111103 5112V03 6113103 W14103 5115103 5116103 5117103 5118503 DATE WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unsteady Flow Model Watts Bar Reservoir May 2003 Flood Figure 2.4-17 Figure 2.4-17 Unsteady Flow Model Watts Bar Reservoir May 2003 Flood 2.4-169
WBNP-Wlap set Dam
"~MS29 TRM 419.4 Chtaiteeton Gaug HRM1UJ Chiecimau~a Dam TRM 474.0 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Chickamauga SOCH Unsteady Flow Model Schematic Figure 2.4-18 Figure 2.4-18 Chickamauga SOCH Unsteady Flow Model Schematic 2.4-170
WBNP-700 R- tW M~IR TVJ"g 695 kma
-j 690 r N
"*A as
- C-I,~d Tk 68o W-0 r 675 -
3114W73 3V1513 3116173 3117173 311B173 3119173 3120173 3121173 DATE WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unsteady Flow Model Chickamauga Reservoir March 1973 Flood Figure 2.4-19 Figure 2.4-19 Unsteady Flow Model Chickamauga Reservoir March 1973 Flood 2.4-171
WBNP-U. C -p. INW.
8l3. h¶ I
1-"0 Inc Sx.Ot-~
?AM04 65 Lm V=10 51410 51513 SSW3 57103 MW10 51503 5110103 5111103 6012103 IW131035114103 6115M0 61161036*17103 6118103 DATEv. *~n~. '., ~..~,RC~ U O cZVC WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Unsteady Flow Model Chickamauga Reservoir May 2003 Flood Figure 2.4-20 Figure 2.4-20 Unsteady Flow Model Chickamauga Reservoir May 2003 Flood 2.4-172
WBNP-750 740
-J a
730 "G L 4
,.cx~ ,.',s F
4 720 710 1 470 480 490 500 510 520 530 TENNESSEE RIVER MILE WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Chickamauga Steady State Profile Comparisons Figure 2.4-21 Figure 2.4-21 Chickamauga Steady State Profile Comparisons 2.4-173
WBNP-745 740 no 715 K7cý~
RA44(f44 7310 Tos ............
us 4 ----- ---- -------
695 905 650 0 100 200 300 400 S00 G00 700 g00 0oo 1000 1100, 1200 1300 1400 DISCHARGE 11000-CFS)
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Tailwater Rating Curve, Watts Bar Dam Figure 2.4-22 Figure 2.4-22 Taillwater Rating Curve, Watts Bar Dam 2.4-174
WBNP-1.250.000-PEAK 0 1,088,625 1,000,000-750,000
'I)
LL 500,000 U)
F 250,000 -
w 3V15 3
3116 3il7 3/18 3/19 3/20 3/21 3/22 3/23 3/24 3/25 3/26 3/27 DATE WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT PMF Discharge Hydrograph at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Figure 2.4-23 Figure 2.4-23 PMF Discharge Hydrograph at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2.4-175
WBNP-CO ea 03 i.
9 C.
5.
CL F.
a.
Figure 2.4-24 West Saddle Dike Location Plan and Section 2.4-176
WBNP-745 r 740 ------ -,- t PEAK EL 739"16 735 ...... .... ..... .... ..... ..........-- -
7720 10 .........-
705 -----
w ...... ------- ------- ------ --- .I.--- .--
725 710 ...................... ".......................................................................
715 - ---- . . . . ----
.L..... ---
Z 700.........*......... .. ..... .... .. .. i....
4....
705 - - -- - -- - - - - -
67-3/15 3/18 3117 31;8 3119 3/20 3/21 3/22 3/23 3&2 3/25 3/26 3/27 DATE WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT PMF Elevation Hydrograph at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Figure 2.4-25 Figure 2.4-25 PMF Elevation Hydrograph at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2.4- 177
WBNP-
+ - u 745 PROBABLE. MAXINIU1.1 FLOOD
- PROBABLE. MAXIMUM FLOOD -t I I I> T i 735 PL AT GRADE EL. --
Il 20WATTS BAR DAM 725 r41 715 -- - - -
E
- - ---------- -- --------- ~---------------
I I 705 MARCH 1973 FLOOD I I I I . ______ _____
695 I-----------
iI~
_z............."-r,..........MEDIAN SUMMER EL.
682, -
I
- -z-- ...
I I4-
-- t ... ,,[':" " '
I -----
--- - t*
4 -
-J 685 -- -~ -- * - -- --- - - - -- - - * ---- - - --- -
BOTO. PROFILE 675 ---- - --- - - ------- -----
YVti , , I 1 665 ! o I i I t
- - 1 .
655 1i V+~ATTS BAR PLA *:1 645 5.26 526.5 527 527.5 528 528.5 529 52915 MILES ABOVE MOUTH WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Probable Maximum Flood and Bottom Profiles Figure 2.4-26 Figure 2.4-26 Probable Maximum Flood and Bottom Profiles 2.4-178
Security-Related Information -Withheld Under IOCFR2.390 C
a CF C,
L-0 0~
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Security-Related Information -Withheld Under IOCFR2.390 I CD 00 4NM Figure 2.4-28 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Wind Wave Fetch
WBNP-50 0
z a.
a Afrt - I I b K0 a MARCH WIND SPEEDS ADJUSTED TO 30 FEET It' o*
I I I I I r-rr-i 0e 0
100 200 300 400500 1000 I0 so 60 70 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT LOI 105 UO 120 L50 2 2.5 3 4 5 10 15 202530 4050 FINAL SAFETY RECURRENCE INTERVAL-YEARS ANALYSIS REPORT Extreme Value Analysis 30-Minute Wind Speed I I I , I , I I ,.
=,, I I 0
J I m I I i n w From the Southwest Chattanooga, TN 1948-74
-1,0 Io 2.0 3.0 4.0 REDUCED VARIATE-Y Figure 2.4-29 Figure 2.4-29 Extreme Value Analysis 30-Minute Wind Speed From the Southwest Chattanooga, TN 1948-74 2.4-181
WBNP-Figure 2.4-30 thru Figure 2.4-40 Are Not Used 2.4-182
WBNP-CL CL Figure 2.4-40a Main Plant Site Grading And Drainage System For Flood Studies Sheet 1 2.4-183
WVB'NP-en 0
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"11 Figure 2.4.40b Main Plant General Plan 2.4-184
WBNP-O C
Figure 2.4-40c Yard Site Grading and Drainage System For Flood Studies 2.4-185
W3BNP-2..
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Figure 2.4-40d Main Plant Plant Perimeter Roads Plan and Profile. Sheet I 2.4-186
WBNP-
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Added by Amendment SO WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT MAINPLANT PLANTPERIMETER ROACS PLANANDPROFILE SHIETZ TVA OW, NO. 1011211R4 FIGUREL444d SHEET2 Figure 2.4-40d Main Plant Plant Perimeter Roads Plan and Profile - Sheet 2 2.4-187
WBNP-4-u-- *55~495U.~~ 1515a sq. sf.4
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uwa.au SScaW 041 SECT/CM4.45 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT s'4, SLaIJO- a.-.
- ~S5 at'- a-a f-a., a.-. aradOtfg.Is FINAL SAFETY
-- Mista.., at atasa.
ANALYSIS REPORT 0.41 1*0 SE'-~V MAINPLANT PLANTPERIMETER ROADS PLANANDPROFILE s-se. m~a~Lte 2IEET 3 TVAOWV(i1. IOHNZZ RIO FIGURE2.443d SHEET3 Figure 2.4-40d Main Plant Plant Perimeter Roads Plan and Profile - Shoot 3 2.4-188
WBNP-WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT I FINAL SAFETY ANAYSS EPOR FrIGM L24-4O 9 SKT t I ~Added by Awaodpent 50 72L meor lp-lao nu&
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Figure 2.4-40e Access Highwal ~TVA DWG 1001M202 R4 SheetlI 2.4-189
WBNP-WATTSBARUCLEARPLANT I FINAL SAFETY Add.4byhftaduonl 50 AAYI EOI INADUIKOO*120R TVAM 1021121 9
-IU L-0 Figure 2.4-400 Access Highway TVA DWG. 1001 H201 R4 -Sheet 2 2.4-190 K
WBNP-(A c.
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Figure 2A440f Main Plant Tracks Plan - Shoot I 2.4-191
WIBNP -___________
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FINAL SAFETY L-X"W "mmr. ANALYSIS REPORT MAIN PLANT MAIN PLANT TRACKS SECTION & PROFILES
_______________ ~~~~~~~2.4-192 ___________________
WBNP-I I I I I I I 1iI i th R, A ,- 1,,
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W~BNP-F.
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I? a- g JI*. . ACM.-M rat 1.Cn Iw IAeww ow (.w "d
_____________________ I I-~l l~
WATTS BAR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
-rtcrawfc.cArcs
-- a,.
- cat YARD
,am S~4 M ca.r.at GRADING. DRAINAGE AND SURFACING TRANSFORMER & SWITCHYARD 0-0 SHEET 2 TVA DWG ND. ION238 RD FIGURE 2.4-40G SH 2 2.4-195
VWBNP-nw , Qr* $2*e T7FAC COMM'f 8VITIR 0' .01 ~
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WATTS BAR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT YARD CRADINC. DRAINAGE AND SURFACING TRANSFORMER & SWITCHYARD SHEET 3 TVA DWC NO. 10N239 RC FIGURE 2.4-40G SH 3 2.4-196
WiBNP-PROZJABLK MAXIMUM PRECIPITATION MUD~ ON MYDROMMIOROWGIChL NVOW110 . 56 RAWIF&L (mm"~s WE) (UINUlES) 0 M
N z
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Figure 2.4-40h Probable Maximum Precipatlon Point Rainfall 2.4-197
WBNP-Figure 2.4-41 thru Figure 2.4-60 Are Not Used 2.4-198
0~
0%
4.
Figure 2.4-61 Is Not Used
WBNP-Figure 2.4.62 Is Not Used 2.4-200
i 0 (4
Figure 2.4-3 Is Not Used
WBNP-Figure 2.4-64 Is Not Used 2.4-202
WBNP-Figure 2.4-65 through Figure 2.4-67 Are Not Used 2.4-203
WBNP-TYPICAL &OCK- JPluwAy
.. I 1610, Mvres:
SErCTON -POWERNOASErf -.061 Vvl/A40v.&# toeerV~
LnI~lP DIAGRAM#El CM uPUFTr PEsSuRE ASSLWeo IU forces 6gsun'es~ OOPV UpUPT DIAGR~AM VI~? N~Lf ACr OFVO aJ'BA$E AREA Aorwjrvnq/&jy~4di;p 1J.iruf t-nesa~qC jssuuip M mreVcd/'Vat the bae" AsCTzw iX OF; OASCAREA Note A: andwy47fedup Mec
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6131~o~T i 37 feV *5ats that rgqd for M, P ,sA~fy of/.es' 4.51~~~ PR(5UE. 'a ssavd Av be eaflh A6Ese aww.
~ 2~?3 %~, I#~jA AsV 5J~
RttrAmiv a I RZSULT3OIrADLYSIS =FM Mo'.613 0.r 40svI 9^5 21 4~a Z~pa; r~
X .i N4,es lz?t. .S2pos,A04 "rvDV Amendwent 63 Figure 2.4468 Powerhouse & Spillway Results of Analysis For Operating Basis Earthquake -Watts Bar Dam 2.4-204
WBNP-Figure 2.4-69 Is Not Used 2.4-205
WB3NP-Figure 2.4-70 Is Not Used 2.4-206
WBNP-XxvP~ 621.1~4W 1.75" A4Ci 4W /40% X0FBASe' MAA ACT Off /00 OfA4W(A-'6f FSheops tAatis eod f.,&-/
d' Mer A*eS.~f
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6.05 Ar 0c.
79.s,
,8AM"AAMWSJ/S FINAL ULARPLANT
£~Ac15 ANALYSIS R ZIV 4c.Olfw~l. MTS OFA34ILYSISFORl Figure 2.4-71 Powerhouse & Spillway Results of Analysis For Operating Basis Earthquake -Fort Loudoun Dam 2.4-207
WBNP-o Of~~Gt kran too4igDf4&
di'Ju./dFp
~ ~~
Tb ON (Sao Fort Loudoun PrOjed Orow*' 1aIMn-4 Fiel
- aafwwjasvjg maya" kmocaol aMwr:MM
,haigo of 50836.9 wasoc~oed.
"4AC& £6E44SAW~ JrrO I ~q mum urn I I ~mm mm I I Pat &a~a I Figure 2.4.72 Embankment Results Of Analysis For Operating Basis Earthquake - Fort Loudoun Dam 2.4-208
WBNP-Figure 2.4-73 Is Not Used 2.4-209
WBNP-Figure 2.4-74 Is Not Used 2.4-210
WBNP-Figure 2.4-75 Is Not Used 2.4-211
WBNP-0 CD
.=-
w Figure 2.476 Analysis For ODE & 112 PMF Assumed Condition of Dam After Failure Norris Dam 2.4-212
- 1BNP-
.4'Av9w'es 4-.97
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.6A-V PAN0 Ar 61 5M *Shar,S Me/ tS revdJ*r Q-/ 4 50.7' fo,"Id 4.a6V' . iAs deswna dd, he dw/kd 4eed.
- ,*Sho.-pee s"ss, re47d fee 0-/
c4*s,,deri,y, wih1'7 ofhose h7 BA-Se QA'eS$Z1,?. cowl4DCSS/iOd 1;*Sbcaof cp/U WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT
.4eSO dS.ee. FINAL SAFETY I ~A,' I5 AL-9 Ine IM2 1 I&rA&*d/
or on' ANALYSIS REPFOT NO*77 .t i
ishar rooi... L- . ....
. .: 0 S,------ IM 6 I I *. *- .
- Is~~oM~~vI. "Amf6;,iX/I 13'T's Figure 2.4-77 Spilhvay & Nonoverflow Results of Analysis For Operating Basis Earthquake .Cherokee Dam 2.4-213
WBNP-rd'ACJorwey rJA. ars J**WWI0 ACMWtIGtWr MOM: g 9 (w1 WMWWCMWO 1091 WVSI WO lo-i2).
Pl*d dmwtwpIMa TrA LU =MR--/2u WAi""ftwSwflw' rO.Sur ZIA&M I Mae- ft.I Figure 2.4-78 Embankment Results of Analysis For Operating Basis Earthquake - Cherokee Dam 2.4-214
VWTBNP-(A 0
C.
S C.
C 0Fd Figure 2.4-70 Assumed Condition of Dam After Failure OBE And 112 Probable Max Flood -Cherokee Dam 2.4-215
WBNP-
~J,*e er/ ~acg'of 04 of AMe has wAs ae,'F spwof. ,ip awd 4 0.06 -a.'r/dc/p~ M bj*vw4S mrterasoe #beAV 0M As.
-A 0It Me A&1 OC~dr~lIA2deo.lh 2.SA*-AýP~ Ad'c 0
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SAS6- PRMUS11A9C WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY
[f ZNjxy
~~A S4 .svrSI fegof *- '1I,.M9I~
rf" ANALYSIS REPORT SPILZJM.Y & MwiVWTf REUUlS W AFALnS, FOR OPAIATM BAS*TSEAPRTIOM 54~3A'24 /096i4ps,' oks~si 525,O~i ,06 Doe*,l Dom
/0.01 ko 5'44Wh64.W) /6s Flpcw 2 .4.-80 Figure 2.4-80 Spllhway & Nonoverfiow Results of Analysis For Operating Basis Earthquake - Douglas Dam 2.4-216
WBNP-PAX~CWOOL SA,--,TY A-S. a .0 k
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-5,&M dW 'SedO in 0-g11 c0 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
.SA49DD1 DAMI No. /
WIM.'Ts ;A, MVIM.IS V:WrU*4,
?" gu~rc 2 . 1-8 Figure 2.4-81 Saddle Dam No. 1 Results of Analysis For Operating Basis Earthquake - Douglas Dam 2.4-217
WBNP*-
CA 5.
I0 a.
- 3 0-
- 3 a
Figure 2.4-82 Douglas Dam Assumed Condition of Dam After Failure OBE And 1/2 Probable Maximum Flood *-DouglasProject 2.4-218
VWBNP-0-
0 Figure 2.4-83 Fontana Dam Assumed Condition of Dam after Failure OBE And 1/2 Probable Maximum Flood 2.4-219
WBNP-Figums 2.4-84 and 2.4-5 Are Not Used 2.4-220
WBNP-5'., heal v2 hcl,/e4f,?4M.t d6OWVNAT6&su WOS daloam,,ed to J C&r/Jf rn .w~, reo MMMEmM/ef, OW fZ#A, 11A~rAIAMMel.44 101h~ A f0A55 'A/h '0k
,rl O.700 ASCLA 7 E@~6dr0 d CS0/? A-W OBASE me'SM 4r d-WATTSBARNNCEUR PLANT I FINAL SAFET X,_I -
Zy I A,,,'ISeq 5 -C4,,~As .kflI5REfPRT.
I ZY JAC&Iit,oI-W71 A I~tjW"+!,A/.6 ee I~~p~ i'*.JR0.9 MI
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?16"U@
Figure 2.4-86 Spillway Results of Analysis For SSE Earthquake Fort Loudoun Dam 2.4-221
WBNP-Ile0 OW0 AS &M
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-AV O&MMe I-im a f 0a .dw"Oaov to rIICU &WAW EN SECTON Figure 2.447 Embunkment Results of Analysis For SSE Earttiquako Fort Loudoun Dam 2.4-222
WBNP-CD 5"
0 S.
0 F.
C3 "1
Figre2.488For f am ftr Ludon Filre am ssmedCodlon
$EComind itha 5 YarFlod Fot oudunDa 2.4-223
WBNP-C.
CD CL Figure 2A4-89 Tellico Dam Assumed Condition of Dam After Failure SSE Combined With a 25 Year Flood Tellco Project 2.4-224
WBNP-a.
5.
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A) a Figure 2.4-00 Norris Dam SSE + 28 Year Flood Judged Condition of Darn After Failure - Norris Darn 2.4-225
WBNP-I w- I p-.
- AZ
."r LA
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- /WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT
- .. / FINAL. SAFETY m* ,*ANALYSIS REPORT 4ADM 58 WITH EPICiN ZNI Figure 2.4-91 SSE With Epicenter In North Knoxville Vicinity 2.4-226
WBNP-Figure 2.4-92 Is Not Used 2.4-227
WBNP-Figure 2.4-93 SSE With Epicenter In West Knoxville Vicinity 2.4-228
WBNP-
"'K-W ;- IA7'7 hr
'0$0W win-*
FINAL SAET CAT WCATIO 010( I O 6WIIT*AD1 DOULA 80MA" I L .. L Figue Smulaneos 24.04Loct~onof Filur at.
SE orDugla an FonanaDam 2.4-229
WBNP-Figures 2.4-95 through 2.4-98 Are Not Used 2.4-230
WBNP-I~It IIr
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.w ........... .. ' .. 45155 CU'M,.- ___4il 1514,5' W*ATFTS,"AR'iUPUEAR P!.*LANT FINAL: SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT t;wx a -.. ... ..
F-"- it 0.re2A. '99 Figure 2+4-99 Grading PlanIntake Channel
,2-423 1
WBNP-Fgures 2-4-100 and 2.4-101 Am Not Used 2.4-232
WRNP.
4 9 WATTS eAR DAM 444
- 6*
L8-GEN AMENDMENT 83
- WELlt
- sPrno WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT
-- RoAD~s FINAL SAFETY O IRADu5*or t.AHT sin ANALYSIS REPORT WELL AND SPRING INVENTORY WITHIN 2 MILE RADIUS OF WAWTS BAR RNUCLEAR PLANT SITE
.FSAR 0.4-102 FIG Figure 2.4-102 Wells And Sprdng Inventory Within 2-Mile Radius of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant SIte 2.4-233
WBNP-740 .740 730 730 720 720 710 710 4
700 700 S690 690 685 685 680 680 675 WATTS FINAL BAR NUCLEAR SAFETY PLANT 675
. .ANALYSIS
.. REPORT Figure 2.4-103 Water-Lavel Rlucluallons In Observation Wells at Tha Watts Bar Site 2.4-234
WBNP-NOTE:
lbpographlc base from UG.S.S - T.V.A. 7.5 minute quadrangle, Decatur, Term., 118-SE,Contomu ltervql 20 faet.
LEGEND:
ound-water observation well sho*&g number.
Gr--
SCALE:
- 00* M-2 Feet WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT I~r .7 1000"FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT Revised by Amendment 50 LOCATIONS OF GROUND .WATER OBSERVATION WELLS FIGURE 2A-104 Figure 2.4-104 Locations of Ground - Water Observation Wells 2.4-235
WBNP-EXPLANAION:
'-" 700'-.- - Wo toble mntour, ln feet above mean we level.
- General direilctb Ofgroun-water mowemerd.
SCALE'. Revised by Amendment 50 WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT Feet FINAL.SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT CCNUte KAP Figure 2.T,-1.O0 Figure 2.4-105 Generalzed Water-Table Contour Map January 1972 2.4-236
WBNP-f~1 I~I 151 lol ..... *-.......,.tas. ....
O..,,.. as0*O n*a.n...V!I .. - ,
. .... . * *. -Q.-,
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- 4. !
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- ri. . .. I S WATTS BAR FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
& REACTOR POWERHOUSE BLDC UNITS 1 2 AUX vECHIAN ICAL-FLOW DI[AGRAM FUEL POOL AND CLEANING COOLING; SYSTEM A DWC N. -47W855-1 R25 FINUSET2Y4-106 Figure 2.4-108 Mechanical -Flow Diagram Fuel Pool Cooling end Cleaning System 2.4-237
WIBNP-11 INS I M
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51(5 WIUkI~u* ~t 50W S.,.
US L~ 1 RAMP I
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SYSTEM TVA DOW NO. 1-47' . .-
VAL R18 FIGURE 2.4-107 Figure 2.4-107 Powerhouse Units I & 2 Flow Diagram - Residual Heat Removal System 2.4-238
WBNP-4*iUXIAT Bonn1 to P81t-TPTAUR10O11.
- N-S -4 18 II~ MI FelLcmvi F~lA* - 011118 K* IKIAI (1/ 31) /-C1117Gal
,307111 731811 (*I~EII *)
SPOl. IZS CNMETI4I.1881 ell C lSiC l l/P hl I WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT SCND(TIC FLOW DIAGRAM FLOOD PROTPROTION FOVIBION5 I OP]l RFCTOR Co0LI'nO (mnt 1 shown, unt 2Szull&F) eFimure 2Kill?08 Figure 2.4-108 Schematic Flow Diagram Flood Protection Previsions Open Reactor Cooling (Unit ¶ Shown, Unit 2 Similar) 2.4-239
WBNP-Vanm) RMa.
mamma, nis 3 cl/vul)
NOTEst ORAW.NOOZS 040TIWNUCIK VV4TILA'iOH 3"S. 9WER600Y POMP Sys.. WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT VAMruH"OS.,fh9ThA3~ Or &XCWLOAO5. FINAL SAFETY SP.O PIce conNEccftN.
ANALYSIS REPORT SCHMATIC FLOW DIAGRAM FLOOD PROTETION PROVISIONS NATURAL CONVMCTION COOLID (unit 1 shomn, unit 2 similazr)
Figure 2.-.-lo9 Figure 2.4-109 Schematic Flow Diagram Flood Protection Provisions Natural Convection Cooling (Unit I Shown, Unit 2 Similar) 2.4-240
WBNP-i.+ :I i .- '
A ....
C NOTE: Times shown allow 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for communications and forecast computations.
....... :Z..-' - =
Ii *; 1..
71 -A ---fr- +* II. +. . r'm'=
- i. /-" I
, *f. . i Fig ure'2.41 10 (Sheet 1) Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Rainfall Flood.Warnilng Trime Basis For Safe Shujtdown Far.Piant Flooding; Winter.Events 2.4-241
WBNP-ItI J.17 Ijtt~; b-1i 7u
'lI j:~
I-
~
rv 1~ 747.
- 71 1ýi7 V rI
... *,.a MU
- - -a-.----
At
- 11 - lit
aC NOTE: Times shown allow 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for communications and forecast comput .ations.
"I I 1
+!*+_Lr f Fv'
++'+"* , +5----I, Ii B,
Figure 2.4-110 (Sheet 2) Watts Bar Nuclear PlantiRainfall Flood Warning Time Basis For Safe Shutdown ForPlant Flooding - Summer Events 2.4-242
WBNP-Figum 2A-111 Is Not Used 2.4-243
WBNP-Figure 2.4-112 OBE with Epicenter Within Area Shown 2.4-244
WBNP-Figure 2.44113 Is Nfot Used 2.4-245
WBNP-740 S PEAK ELEV. 731.17 It Q PLANT GRADE KIEV. 72o8
-- "1-ft I s* i / I i n7*
p.-....
0 710 .
- ...... ...-.~..... ... -. . . ,...............-.......-.
6M0 6/5 6/6 6/7 6/8 Date Figure 2.4-114 SSE Failure of Norris, Cherokee, Douglas, and Tellico Dams with 26.Year Flood Failure Wave at Watls Bar Nuclear Plant 2.4-246
WBNP-735 w
730 - i -
PEAK* ELEV. 728.67
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72S 715-3/24 3/25 3/26 3/27 3/28 Date Figure 2.4-115 OBE Failure of Norris and Tellico Dams with 112 PMF Event Failure Wave at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2.4-247
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3/24 3/25 3D/26 3/7 3/28 Figure 2.4-116 OBE Failure of Cherokee, Douglas and Tellico Dams with 1/2 PMF Event Failure Wave at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 2.4-248
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING On March 29, 2012, a Category 1 public meeting was held between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and representatives of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) at NRC Headquarters, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss TVA's planned submittal of a license amendment request to revise the licensing and design basis for hydrologic engineering as described in the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN), Unit I Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR).
Following this pre-application meeting, the NRC Staff published a meeting summary, "Summary of March 29, 2012, Pre-Application Meeting with Tennessee Valley Authority on Changing the Licensing Basis for Hydrologic Engineering (TAC No. ME8200)," dated April 11, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12097A306). In this letter, the NRC Staff recommended that TVA consider addressing the following issues in the submittal.
- 1. The chronology and basis for the changes made to the hydrologic engineering design basis from 1995 to 1998 to 2009.
The probable maximum flood (PMF) for WBN Unit 1 at the time of Operating License issuance was elevation 738.1 ft, and included assumptions based on the existing understanding of dam structural stability and capability during seismic and extreme flood events in the 1970's. In the 1980's and 1990's, TVA implemented a Dam Safety Program (DSP) that resulted in dam safety modifications that increased dam structural stability and capability Between 1995 and 1998, TVA completed a hydrologic reanalysis to credit the results of the dam safety modifications that had been completed. This reanalysis resulted in lowering the WBN Unit 1 calculated PMF to elevation 734.9 ft, but no physical changes to WBN Unit 1 site flooding protection features were implemented as a result of the decreased design basis flood (DBF) elevations. In 2009, TVA completed a hydrologic reanalysis to address closure of issues involving the hydrologic analysis for the application for a combined operating license (COLA) for the proposed Bellefonte Nuclear Plant (BLN) Units 3 and 4, in accordance with 10 CFR 52. This reanalysis resulted in raising the WBN Unit 1 calculated PMF to elevation 738.8 ft. Although this was higher than the original and earlier revised PMF, no physical changes to WBN Unit 1 site flooding protection features were required. This is described in Section 1.0 of Enclosure 1, Summary Description.
- 2. An update of the status of TVA's resolution of long-term hydrology issues, per the staffs request in the NRC letter dated January 25, 2012.
On May 31, 2012, a Category 1 public meeting was held between the NRC staff and representatives of the TVA at NRC Headquarters, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss (1) the current licensing basis for flooding at WBN Unit 1 and Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (SON), (2) the status of WVA's current licensing basis reanalysis, (3) flood protection and flood mode operation at WBN and SON, (4) modular flood barriers at WVA dams, and (5)
WVA's flooding reevaluation plan regarding the NRC's Fukushima 50.54(f) letter dated March 12, 2012.
Following this senior management meeting, the NRC Staff published a meeting summary, "Summary of May 31, 2012, Senior Management Meeting with Tennessee Valley Authority on the Licensing Basis for Flooding/Hydrology," dated June 6, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12157A457). The TVA slide presentation is provided in ADAMS Accession No.
Page 1 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING ML12156A076. In the meeting summary, the NRC Staff acknowledged the following related to the status of TVA's resolution of long-term hydrology issues:
- a. TVA discussed the challenges faced with the complexities of the revised hydrology modeling used for the licensing basis re-analysis, and TVA acknowledged the lack of timeliness in resolving the flooding issue.
- b. TVA discussed the management commitment for regaining safety margin for flooding and updating the current licensing basis through a high quality analysis, ensuring plant operability, and improved timeliness.
- c. TVA answered questions from the NRC Staff based on TVA's slide presentation with support from the TVA staff present, noting that, based on their draft re-analysis results, the PMF level at the WBN site will raise an additional 0.4 feet to 739.2 feet. At that level, some safety-related flood mitigation equipment will be flooded without compensatory measures. TVA stated that their current operability determinations will be reevaluated once the re-analysis is completed. These operability determinations have now been completed and appropriate actions have been taken in accordance with established corrective action program requirements.
- d. TVA made a number of commitments at the end of the presentation. These commitments have now been formalized in the TVA Submittal to NRC Document Control Desk, "Commitments Related to Updated Hydrologic Analysis Results for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1," dated June 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12171A053).
Therefore, the NRC Staff including senior management has been provided an updated status based on the TVA presentation, responses provided by TVA during the presentation, and the commitments provided by TVA regarding future actions to complete the hydrologic analysis and applicable permanent plant and dam embankment modifications. With the exception of implementing the commitments provided to the NRC, there are no other actions required for this issue for WBN Unit 1.
- 3. The relationship and use of the 25-year flood level versus the May 2003 flood level in TVA's new analysis.
As described in the second paragraph of Section 3.2 of Enclosure 1, Uncertainties, per NUREG/CR-7046 the only manner to address the uncertainty in the hydrologic analysis is through calibration of the model to historic flood events or sensitivity analyses. TVA calibrated the model to historic flood events using the two highest recent flood events where data exists. The floods used for calibration are March 1973 and May 2003 with elevations at WBN of approximately 697 ft and 694 ft for those two storms. The May 2003 flood event was a much larger flood than the 25-year flood. The May 2003 flood reached a maximum elevation of 657.2 feet on May 8, 2003 on the Tennessee River at the Walnut Street gage at Tennessee River Mile (TRM) 464.2. This compares with the March 1973 flood, the maximum flood of record since regulation by the TVA system, which reached a maximum elevation of 658.06 feet on March 18, 1973. Based on the flood frequency elevations at the Walnut Street gage the May 2003 flood was about a 100-year event as shown in the tabulation below.
Page 2 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING The flood frequency elevations at the Walnut Street gage TRM 464.2 are as follows:
Flood Elevation (ft.) 1 1-year 644.0 2-year 649.2 5-year 650.6 10-year 653.4 50-year 655.9 100-year 657.0 500-year 663.6 1 National Geodetic Vertical Datum (NGVD) 1929 Based on review of observed elevations at key locations in the vicinity of WBN, the May 2003 flood event was about a 100-year event over the reach of interest with May 2003 maximum elevations exceeding flood of record elevations at some locations. A comparison of the maximum elevations reached during the May 2003 flood at key locations is shown in the tabulation below.
Location Maximum Elevation (ft.) NGVD 1929 Flood of Record May 2003 Chickamauga Dam Headwater 686.99 5/9/84 687.13 5/7/2003 Watts Bar Dam Tailwater 696.95 3/17/1973 694.17 5/7/2003 Using the calibrated model based upon the two highest recent flood events where data exists (i.e., March 1973 and May 2003), the 25-year flood event specified in RG 1.59 was used for application with the postulated Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) failure of upstream dams as described in Section 2.1 of Enclosure 1, Proposed Changes, under the subheading Section 2.4.4, Potential Dam Failures, Seismically Induced. The 25-year flood magnitude was developed using flood volume frequency relationships. The inflow hydrographs were developed using the March 1973 flood, the flood of record, and a large regional flood, scaled by the ratio of the 25-year volume to the 1973 volume. This provides an estimate of the 25-year flood based on historical watershed experience.
- 4. The justification for the proposed combinations of dam failure scenarios used in TVA's new analysis.
The methodology used to develop the controlling seismic/flood condition at WBN is the same as previously followed for the site evaluations described in the WBN Unit 1 UFSAR as follows:
- 1. A ground motion attenuation function was generated to describe the peak horizontal acceleration of rock at the free surface versus distance from the epicenter.
- 2. Using the attenuation relationship, the seismic base accelerations for various dams having large stored inventory (reservoir storage) and low spatial separation were determined.
Page 3 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING
- 3. The seismic stability of the dams for the seismic event centered at the dam (maximum base acceleration) and seismic events which cause dam failures at adjacent dams (less than maximum base acceleration) were then determined.
- 4. Based on the predicted seismic stability of the dams (individually and in combination) and reservoir storage, the potential seismic failure/flooding combinations were screened to identify the controlling case for WBN.
- 5. Hydrological routing for the potential controlling cases was then performed.
The ground motion attenuation functions to permit evaluation of simultaneous failure of two or more dams were based on the attenuation characteristics of an Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) and a SSE occurring in the geographic area encompassing the Tennessee Valley above Guntersville dam. Utilizing historical earthquake data from locations near the Tennessee Valley, an attenuation curve was developed. Using this OBE/SSE relationship, a representation of the earthquake was developed in the form of concentric circles radiating from a center 0.09g (OBE) or 0.18g (SSE) acceleration with each circle representing decreasing levels of base acceleration as the distance from the epicenter increased. The concentric circles centered at an acceleration of 0.09g/0.18g were then strategically moved around the dams above Guntersville Dam to determine potential multi-site critical base acceleration levels.
The dams above Guntersville were examined for seismic stability based on base acceleration level. During the period from 1970 to 1988, the initial seismic stability analyses were performed on the concrete dam sections and the earth embankments of critical dams.
In this evaluation, some of the concrete dams such as Apalachia, Fort Patrick Henry, Melton Hill and Ocoee No. 3 were not analyzed due to their relatively small storage volume and were postulated to fail. In other cases, more detailed seismic evaluations were performed, such as at Norris Dam. The more detailed evaluation of Norris dam concluded that the dam would not fail in OBE (coincident with one-half PMF) or SSE (coincident with 25-year flood).
However, for purposes of the seismic failure combinations Norris dam was conservatively postulated to fail with only the resulting debris field impeding flow.
Using the dam base accelerations and seismic stability evaluations (or failure assumptions) as screening criteria, various flood-seismic failure combinations were identified. Cases to be evaluated further were selected based on the potential reservoir flood volume released in seismic failures, the relative timing of those releases, and in some cases results of previous flood routing analysis.
The impact of multiple failures of the large reservoir dams identified in the screening evaluations bound the effects of a single dam failure. Thus, single dam failures were not further evaluated.
Using the earthquake attenuation function, the seismic stability determinations, reservoir volume, flood wave timing, and informal routing methods, the following cases were defined as having the potential to control at WBN for OBE coincident with one-half PMF:
- 1. Simultaneous failure of Norris and Tellico Dams: Melton Hill Dam located below Norris Dam is not failed with the OBE in this scenario to maximize the downstream impact of Page 4 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING the seismic failure wave from Norris Dam that overtops and fails Melton Hill Dam which is judged to be more critical.
- 2. Simultaneous partial failure of Fontana Dam and complete failure of Hiwassee, Apalachia, Blue Ridge, and Tellico Dams due to an OBE at a location between Hiwassee and Fontana: Fort Loudoun and Watts Bar Dams are seismically stable at OBE base accelerations for this epicenter.
- 3. Simultaneous partial failure of Fontana Dam and complete failure of Tellico Dam: Fort Loudoun and Watts Bar Dams are seismically stable at base OBE accelerations.
At least three other failure combinations evaluated in the original WBN Unit 1 UFSAR studies and judged not to be controlling were not re-evaluated as a part of the new analysis since they were not controlling in the original analysis.
The following failure combinations for the SSE coincident with the 25-year flood were defined as having the potential to control at WBN using the evaluation criteria:
- 1. Simultaneous failure of Norris, Cherokee, Douglas and Tellico Dams with SSE epicenter located in the North Knoxville vicinity: For this combination, Fort Loudoun, Watts Bar and Fontana Dams do not fail since the attenuated base acceleration at these dams is less than the base acceleration for which the dams are seismically stable. Melton Hill Dam is not failed seismically to maximize the downstream impact by allowing Melton Hill Dam to overtop and fail due to the Norris Dam failure wave.
- 2. Simultaneous failure of Norris, Douglas, Fort Loudoun and Tellico Dams: For this combination, Cherokee, Fontana and Watts Bar Dams do not fail since the attenuated base acceleration at these dams is less than the base acceleration for which the dams are seismically stable. Melton Hill Dam is not failed seismically to maximize the downstream impact by allowing Melton Hill to overtop and fail due to the Norris Dam failure wave.
At least seven other failure combinations evaluated in the original WBN Unit 1 UFSAR studies and judged not to be controlling were not re-evaluated as a part of the new analysis.
Flood simulations for the five failure combinations described above were performed to define the maximum bounding elevation at WBN. This is further described in Section 2.1 of Enclosure 1, Proposed Changes, under the subheading Section 2.4.4, Potential Dam Failures, Seismically Induced.
- 5. The purpose of the finite element analysis on the Fontana Dam.
As part of TVA's DSP and consistent with the Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety, TVA performed a review of Fontana Dam in the mid-1980s to determine if the dam was capable of withstanding a maximum credible earthquake (MCE) (
Reference:
Fontana Project Dam Safety Analysis Report, April 1986). The evaluation determined that Fontana Dam was capable of safely passing the PMF but the dam's ability to withstand earthquake loading was not assured. As a result of this finite element analysis, reinforcement of the upper portion of the non-overflow dam was recommended and subsequently implemented to ensure the dam would remain stable for the MCE.
Page 5 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING Since this original finite element analysis did not consider the alkali aggregate reaction (AAR) expansion issues at Fontana Dam, additional analysis were performed to evaluate the seismic/hydrostatic stability of the dam and the impacts of stresses associated with AAR expansion in the dam structure.
Patterned cracking was first observed in the dam in 1949. Also, it was noted that the dam was beginning to tilt in the upstream direction at that time. In 1972, cracking was observed in the walls of the drainage gallery in the curved concrete blocks of dam. A six-inch wide slot with a depth of about 95 feet was cut between November 1975 and July 1976 at the joint of Blocks 32/33 to relieve some of the stress. The slot had completely closed at the top of dam by October 1983. The top third (35 feet) of this slot required re-cutting to a width of five inches between October 1983 and January 1984. Slot closure measurements indicated that the slot closed gradually over time and require re-cutting in the next several years. The third slot cutting to a width of six inches was performed between February - May 1999 and January - May 2000.
Clearance problems were first detected in the spillway gates of the main spillway in 1967.
Pier tilting due to concrete growth was causing binding of the gates when they were being opened. The gates were trimmed four times between 1967 and 1989. In the late 1990's, it was concluded that slot cuts on each end of the spillway would help reduce the tilting of the end piers of the spillway. Two slots with same width of about 0.6 inches, and the depths of 82 and 57 feet at joint Blocks 34/35 and 41/42 respectively, were cut in January 1999. In November 1999, re-cutting of the spillway slots was undertaken. However, slots 34/35 and 41/42 had closed during the summer season at the top of the slot by 2001.
In summary, three slots have been cut in Fontana Dam (Blocks 32/33, Blocks 34/35, and Blocks 41/42) to address problems associated with AAR. The first slot was cut at Blocks 32/33 in 1975. The slot was required to eliminate the longitudinal force from the long straight portion of dam. The longitudinal force was tending to push the curved blocks upstream, thus creating the observed cracks. The two spillway slots located at each end of the spillway (Blocks 34/35 and Blocks 41/42) were installed to help control tilting of piers into the spillway.
A finite element analysis was used to evaluate the existing slots in either open or closed condition, the effects of cutting deeper slots, the effects of cutting additional slots, and to provide recommendations for long-term slot cutting strategy for best management of the Fontana Dam AAR problem. An August 2006 seismic/hydrostatic stability analysis performed by Acres International which considered the combined impacts of stresses associated with AAR expansion of the dam structure concluded that although the minimum sliding factor of safety is less than 1.0 for the critical section (FS = 0.814) when subjected to a sustained acceleration of 0.26g, the post-earthquake stability of the dam is acceptable.
- 6. Discuss whether approvals for the dam and river operations modifications are required from other agencies (e.g., U.S. Army Corps of Engineers).
TVA was created as a Federal agency by the Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 with specific responsibilities for the unified development of the Tennessee River system.
Approval is not required from other agencies for TVA's modifications to its dam and river system operations. However, modifications must be consistent with procedures set forth by Page 6 of 17
ENCLOSURE 2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which are the same requirement for all federal agencies.
As a procedural act, NEPA calls for Federal agencies to make informed decisions, consider alternatives, to have decision-making processes that consider the environmental impacts of their proposed actions, and requires full disclosure of the process as applied. The level of environmental review required for a given action depends on the expected impact on the environment and/or when the proposed action is likely to be controversial.
The most recent environmental reviews that effected modification of the TVA river system were completed as Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) as follows:
- 1. Tennessee River and Reservoir System Operation and Planning Review, TVA, December 1990. Record of Decision issued February 1991.
- 2. Reservoir Operations Study, TVA, February 2004. Record of Decision issued May 2004.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service were cooperating agencies on this EIS.
As a part of the NEPA process, other Federal agencies and the public are invited to participate in the process. Consistent with the NEPA process, the final decision on any action to be taken as a result of the environmental review rests with the initiating Federal agency. In the case of all reviews that have potential impact on modification of Tennessee River system operation, TVA makes the final decision on what actions are adopted for implementation.
The Act further gave TVA the power to construct dams and reservoirs on the Tennessee River and its tributaries to provide for navigation and control floods on the Tennessee and Mississippi River basins. To date, TVA has either acquired or constructed 49 dams located in seven different states as a part of the unified development of the region. The power given to TVA for construction of dams and reservoirs in the Tennessee River basin is much like the authority given to the USACE on other river systems.
TVA has had a DSP since the first dams were acquired and/or built. Dam safety ensures that the impoundments and dams are designed, constructed, operated and maintained as safely and reliable as is practical. The DSP was formalized in 1982 to ensure consistency with the Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety which was issued in 1979. The guidelines apply to management practices for dam safety of all Federal agencies responsible for the planning, design, construction, operation, or regulation of dams. Today, the Dam Safety Governance (DSG) procedures define TVA's dam safety responsibilities to ensure compliance with the Federal guidelines.
Since the DSP was formalized in 1982, TVA has systematically evaluated all of its dams for hydrologic and seismic adequacy which has resulted in several dams being physically modified. These modifications and operational changes as described above have been completed consistent with NEPA procedures.
The one location on the TVA system where an operational change would require the concurrence of the USACE is at Kentucky Dam. Kentucky Dam, located about 23.0 miles above the confluence of the Tennessee River with the Ohio River, is connected by a Page 7 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING navigation canal located just above each dam to Barkley Reservoir, owned by the USACE.
Thus, the Kentucky and Barkley Dams have to be operated in tandem. Further, the USACE has the authority to direct the operation of Kentucky reservoir during critical flood operations on the lower Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. The physical location and the large flood storage available allows Kentucky reservoir to provide significant flood reduction benefits on the lower Ohio and Mississippi Rivers.
There have been no operational changes proposed at Kentucky Dam that would require TVA to obtain concurrence from the USACE.
- 7. Discuss the overall uncertainties in TVA's revised analysis calculations.
The primary standards followed for development of the PMF are the American National Standard ANSI/ANS 2.8 and RG 1.59. These guidance documents state that the PMF be derived from the combination of circumstances that collectively represent a risk probability that is acceptable for nuclear plant accidents. Each element in the development of the PMF is based on best available data including PMP estimates from the National Weather Service, rain-runoff relationships developed from historical storms, time distribution of PMP consistent with storms in the region, seasonal and areal considerations of rainfall, current reservoir operations, and verification of runoff and stream course models against large historic floods. Per regulatory guidance, the design-basis flood for nuclear power plants is an estimation. The calculations which support the PMF analysis document all assumptions and approaches which are consistent with regulatory guidance. The PMF analysis is a best estimate and is consistent with current guidelines. However, it is realized that various elements of the analysis can result in different elevations, some higher and some lower, and those elements are discussed in further detail in Section 3.2 of Enclosure 1, Uncertainties, in order to explain why the PMF analysis is a reasonable best estimate.
- 8. Justification for the use of any compensatory measures as a result of TVA's revised analysis.
The updated DBF analysis for WBN indicated that some upstream dam earth embankments could be overtopped during the PMF. Four dams were identified as having embankments that could be overtopped during the PMF: Cherokee; Fort Loudoun; Tellico; and Watts Bar.
Once these earth embankment overtopping events were identified, actions were taken to prevent overtopping to ensure continued WBN operability. An evaluation of temporary flood barriers that could be installed in a short period of time and had a proven performance record for dependability led to the use of HESCO Concertainer units filled with stone. A total of approximately 18,000 feet of temporary flood barriers are installed at Cherokee, Fort Loudoun, Tellico and Watts Bar Dams. This installation was completed by the end of December 2009. The temporary flood barriers are located on the top of the earth embankments and/or on saddle dams as appropriate at each of the four dams. The temporary flood barrier configuration consists of HESCO Concertainer units from three feet in height to HESCO Concertainer units stacked based on manufacture recommendation up to seven feet.
The maintenance of the temporary flood barriers and closure of openings during emergency events is a River Operations (RO) - Asset Owner (AO) responsibility, as defined by Dam Safety procedure RO-SPP-27.0. The purpose of the Dam Safety procedure is to protect upstream and downstream lives and property by ensuring that impoundments and dams are Page 8 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING designed, constructed, operated and maintained as safely and reliable as is practical. This procedure describes the methods by which the RO Senior Vice-President (AO) will accomplish compliance with Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety and DSG.
As a part of the RO DSP, the temporary flood barriers are inspected on a regular basis.
They are inspected during plant monthly and quarterly inspections and during the 15 month comprehensive site inspections. Any noted damage to the HESCO Concertainer units from these inspections that would compromise the structural integrity or functionality of the temporary flood barriers is repaired promptly. Since completion of installation in December 2009, only minor repairs such as small holes up to three inches in diameter have had to be repaired. Also, as committed to in the TVA Submittal to NRC Document Control Desk, "Commitments Related to Updated Hydrologic Analysis Results for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1," dated June 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12171A053), TVA's Nuclear Power Group will issue and initially perform procedures for semi-annual inspections of the temporary HESCO flood barriers installed at Cherokee, Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar reservoirs by August 31, 2012. These inspections will:
- a. Ensure the temporary HESCO flood barriers remain in place and are not structurally degraded as specified by the manufacturer's written specifications and recommendations;
- b. Verify the inventory and staging of the material required to fill the gaps that exist; and
- c. Ensure that adequate physical security (e.g., fences and locks) is provided for the staged material against theft.
These inspections will continue until a permanent modification is implemented to prevent overtopping the Cherokee, Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar dams due to the PMF.
For each of the dams, Cherokee; Fort Loudoun; Tellico; and Watts Bar Dams, where the temporary flood barriers have been installed, a supplement to the project Emergency Action Plan (EAP) has been issued which describes the emergency notification responsibilities and procedures. The River Forecast Center has responsibility for identification of events which could exceed critical elevations at each dam consistent with their Emergency Notification procedure and notification to the AO of the flooding condition. The AO declares a Dam Safety emergency which following the Dam Safety procedure (RO-SPP-27.0) implements the Project PMF Barrier Closure Plan. Each of the four dams has openings in the temporary flood barriers which have to be closed. The EAP supplement details the methods to be used by TVA's construction partner GUBMK for closure of the openings. The closure of the opening can be accomplished by setup of the HESCO Concertainer units linked to the existing HESCO Concertainer units already in place or by overlap of the temporary flood barriers at a given location as appropriate. At each dam where material for closure of the temporary flood barriers is required, the materials (HESCO Concertainer units and stone) are stockpiled in a designated fenced enclosure as described in the supplement to the EAP.
Experience data on the use of the selected temporary flood barriers during historic floods and the vendor documentation on barrier testing were evaluated prior to selection and use.
The U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) has also tested the HESCO Concertainer units by performing hydrostatic testing, wave-induced hydrodynamic testing, overtopping testing, Page 9 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING and structural debris impact testing with a floating log. The debris impact testing was based on two different log sizes: 12 inch and 17 inch diameter logs (12 feet long) with an impact speed of five mph. The results of the laboratory testing showed that the HESCO Concertainer units were not damaged by the loading conditions used in the testing program.
Stability analysis of the temporary flood barriers was performed for seismic and hydrostatic (PMF) loadings. The analysis showed that the temporary flood barriers are stable under the seismic and PMF loading conditions. This is described in the proposed revision to WBN Unit 1 UFSAR Subsection 2.4.3.4, which states that while the flood barriers are temporary structures, there is a structural analysis for the headwater loading behind the temporary flood barriers that verifies that failure would not occur. Additionally, a seismic evaluation completed on the flood barriers (without headwater behind the barriers) verifies that failure of the temporary flood barriers would not occur.
The U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) has also tested the HESCO Concertainer units by performing hydrostatic testing, wave-induced hydrodynamic testing, overtopping testing, and structural debris impact testing with a floating log. The debris impact testing was based on two different log sizes: 12 inch and 17 inch diameter logs (12 feet long) with an impact speed of five mph. The results of the laboratory testing showed that the HESCO Concertainer units were not damaged by the loading conditions used in the testing program.
A potential exists for runaway barges to float downstream and impact the temporary flood barriers at two of the four dams where the barriers are in place. Barges along these reservoirs are typically tied off at barge terminals or mooring cells during high flow events, such as a PMF event. The mooring facilities, however, are not designed for PMF elevations and velocities, so the barges could break loose. There is no barge traffic on Cherokee Reservoir, so no potential for impact exists. The Fort Loudoun Reservoir has limited to moderate barge traffic. Using typical barge dimensions, the barge would have to weigh less than 70-80% of full load capacity in order to strike the barriers. However, the earthen embankments of the dam where the temporary flood barriers are placed are located at a distance from the main channel. The stream flow during a high flow event is directed toward the concrete overflow portion of the dam, and the barges would be carried by the current away from the temporary flood barriers. At the Tellico Reservoir, there is very infrequent barge traffic. Conservatively assuming there will be a barge on the reservoir, and using typical barge dimensions, the barge would have to weigh less than 40-50% of full load capacity in order to strike the barriers. However, the earthen embankments of the dam where the temporary flood barriers are placed are located at a distance from the main channel. The stream flow during a high flow event is directed toward the concrete overflow portion of the dam, and the barges would be carried by the current away from the temporary flood barriers. There is limited to moderate barge traffic at the Watts Bar Reservoir. An evaluation using typical barge dimensions for the Tennessee River, and conservatively assuming barges are empty (less draft allows for the barge to run closer to the top of the dam), demonstrates that barges are not likely to impact the temporary flood barriers. A spatial analysis shows that the closest edge of the temporary flood barrier would have to be at least 9.0 ft away from the upstream edge of the earthen embankment in order to prevent impact. The temporary flood barriers are located at least this distance from the edge of the earthen embankment, ensuring that there is no potential for barge impact.
As discussed in the NRC letter to TVA, "Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Long-Term Hydrology Issues for Operating Nuclear Plants - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, and Page 10 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING 3 (TAC Nos. ME5026, ME5027, and ME5028); Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2 (TAO Nos. ME5029 and ME5030); and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (TAC No. ME5031), dated January 25, 2012, Accession No. ML11241A166, the NRC Staff found that the sand baskets
[temporary flood barriers] are not capable of resisting debris impact. The NRC Staff further states that "documents [provided by TVA] neither discuss the ability of sand baskets to withstand debris impact, or mention whether the baskets are designed for impact of debris loads. The NRC staff is unable to conclude that these sand baskets were designed to withstand impacts from large debris during a -flood. If a design flood were to occur, there is a high likelihood that significant debris would accompany the flood waters which could impact the baskets. There is the potential for this debris to damage the baskets or push the individual baskets apart causing a breach. There would be no time to repair the baskets because the flood would already be in progress. Therefore, sand baskets that are not designed and constructed to withstand impacts from large debris are not acceptable as a long-term solution."
To resolve this issue, as committed to in the TVA Submittal to NRC Document Control Desk, "Commitments Related to Updated Hydrologic Analysis Results for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1," dated June 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12171A053), TVA will implement permanent modifications to prevent overtopping of the embankments of the Cherokee, Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar Dams due to the PMF. The final solution will be established in an evaluation conducted in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). Based on the current NEPA EIS schedule, these permanent modifications are scheduled to be installed by October 31, 2015.
Based on TVA RO procedures for the maintenance of the temporary flood barriers and closure of openings during emergency events; TVA RO and TVA's Nuclear Power Group periodic inspections of the temporary flood barriers and additional materials required for closure of openings; experience data on the use of the HESCO temporary flood barriers during historic floods; stability analysis of the temporary flood barriers for seismic and hydrostatic (PMF) loadings; USACE tests of the HESCO Concertainer units including hydrostatic testing, wave-induced hydrodynamic testing, overtopping testing, and structural debris impact testing with a floating log; and TVA's qualitative assessment of the potential for runaway barges to float downstream and impact the temporary flood barriers; it is concluded that use of the temporary flood barriers for the period of time required to implement the permanent modifications to prevent overtopping of the embankments of the Cherokee, Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar Dams is adequate.
The use of the temporary flood barriers is described in Section 2.1 of Enclosure 1, Proposed Changes, under subheading Subsection 2.4.3.4, Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) on Streams and Rivers. The credit or lack of credit for the temporary flood barriers in the hydrologic analysis is described in Section 2.1 of Enclosure 1, Proposed Changes, under subheadings Subsection 2.4.3.3, Runoff and Stream Course Model, and Subsection 2.4.4.1, Dam Failure Permutations, respectively. In the proposed WBN Unit 1 UFSAR Subsection 2.4.3.3, the increase in the height of the embankments are included in the discharge rating curves for Cherokee, Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar Dams that are used in the hydrologic analysis for rainfall-induced PMF events. Increasing the height of embankments at these four dams prevents embankment overflow and failure of the embankment. The vendor supplied temporary flood barriers were shown to be stable for the most severe PMF headwater/tailwater conditions using vendor recommended base friction values. In the Page 11 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING proposed WBN Unit 1 UFSAR Subsection 2.4.4.1, the temporary flood barriers are assumed to fail in the hydrologic analysis for seismically-induced dam failures for the cases where reservoir levels would increase to the top of the embankments, and are thus not credited for increasing the height of the embankments.
- 9. Discuss the temporary modification to the thermal barrier booster pump flood barrier protection in the UFSAR.
Temporary Modification (TACF) 1-09-0006-070 is a temporary barrier around the WBN Unit 1 Thermal Barrier Booster (TBB) Pump Motors that has been designed to be installed around the TBB Pump Motors prior to the event of a Stage I flood warning. Installation of the temporary flood protection barrier is in progress at WBN Unit 1. The barrier encompasses the TBB Pump Motors providing approximately 0.8 ft of margin above the DBF surge level. There are seven major components that are part of the barrier (three end attachment units and four panels), with two end attachment units that attach the L-shaped barrier to the West and South walls that are permanently attached to the surrounding structure walls. This compensatory measure is discussed in Section 3.3 of Enclosure 1, Margins.
As committed to in the TVA Submittal to NRC Document Control Desk, "Commitments Related to Updated Hydrologic Analysis Results for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1," dated June 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12171A053), TVA will install a permanent plant modification to provide flood protection with respect to the DBF level for the WBN, Unit 1 TBB Pump Motors by March 31, 2013.
- 10. Discuss any impact on TVA's individual plant examination of external events or final environmental impact statement due to the revised flood analysis.
The WBN Units 1 Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) Final Report for external flooding (
Reference:
TVA Letter to NRC Document Control Desk, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 Generic Letter 88-20, Supplements 4 and 5 - Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities (TAC No.
M83693), dated February 17, 1998, Accession Nos. ML073240218 and ML073460335) and the WBN Unit 2 IPEEE in support of WBN Unit 2 licensing (
Reference:
TVA Letter to NRC Document Control Desk, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 - Individual Plant Examination of External Events Design Report, dated April 30, 2010, Accession No. ML101240992) are both based on an assessment using the guidance in NUREG-1407, Procedural and Submittal Guidance for the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities. This guidance describes steps of a progressive screening approach which represent a series of analyses in increasing levels of detail, effort, and resolution. The screening approach consists of the following steps:
- 1. Review plant-specific hazard data and licensing bases.
- 2. Identify significant changes since the operating license was issued (or in the case of WBN Unit 2 utilize the proposed design basis).
- 3. Determine if the plant and facilities design meets the 1975 Standard Review Plan (SRP) criteria.
Page 12 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING Per NUREG-1407, the purpose of this screening approach is to determine if flooding should be further evaluated if the plant design basis does not meet the 1975 SRP criteria.
NUREG-1407 further states that: "For plants designed against, current criteria as described in RG 1.59 and applicable Standard Review Plan sections, particularly Section 2.4, floods pose no significant threat of a severe accident because the exceedance frequency of the design basis flood, excluding floods due to failure of upstream dams, is judged to be less than 10-5 per year (Chery, 1985), and the conditional core damage frequency for a design basis flood is judged to be less than 101. Thus core damage frequencies are estimated to be less than 10-8 per year for a plant designed against NRC's current criteria. However, the latest probable maximum precipitation (PMP) criteria published by the National Weather Service (NWS) call for higher rainfall intensities over shorter time intervals and smaller areas than have previously been considered; this could result in higher site flooding levels and greater roof ponding loads than have been used in previous design bases (GI 103).
Licensees are requested to assess the effects of applying these new criteria to their plants in terms of onsite flooding and roof ponding. Also, some older plants may have higher potential risk and need systematic examinations for plant-specific vulnerabilities."
The design basis of WBN Units 1 and 2 conforms with the Regulatory Position 2 of RG 1.59, Revision 2, August 1977, which specifies that at least those structures, systems, and components necessary for cold shutdown and maintenance thereof are designed with hardened protective features to remain functional while withstanding the entire range of flood conditions up to and including the worst site-related flood probable (e.g., PMF, seismically induced flood, hurricane, surge, seiche, heavy local precipitation) with coincident wind-generated wave action as discussed in Regulatory Position 1 of the RG.
With respect to the revised DBF levels described in the proposed changes to the WBN Unit 1 UFSAR for the limiting large rainfall and seismically induced dam failure floods, there are only two distinct changes to the physical flooding protection features of WBN Unit 1 required. All other safety-related systems, structures, and components identified in Regulatory Guide 1.29 are designed to withstand the flood conditions associated with the updated DBF elevations, and would remain functional during external floods. The UFSAR currently requires the Reactor Building and Diesel Generator Building to remain dry during flood mode. No barriers for these structures would be breached due to the revised flood elevations. In addition, the Intake Pumping Station (IPS) is designed to have the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System and the High Pressure Fire Protection (HPFP) System remain fully function for the DBF. As discussed further in Section 3.2 of Enclosure 1, TVA's established corrective action program requirements are being implemented to address the need for additional compensatory measures necessary to provide flood protection for the IPS internal systems and components, including the need for permanent plant modifications.
The Service, Turbine, Auxiliary, and Control Buildings are permitted to flood as the water exceeds the plant level entrances. No permanent barriers to specifically protect flood sensitive plant equipment exist in any of these structures although, as discussed further in Section 3.2 of Enclosure 1, temporary compensatory measures are in place to ensure adequate flood protection if a PMF event were to occur, and permanent plant modifications are planned to restore or gain additional margin between the revised DBF elevations and limiting safety-related systems, structures, and components in the Auxiliary Building.
Therefore, the design basis of WBN Units 1 and 2 continues to conform to the Regulatory Position 2 of RG 1.59, Revision 2, August 1977.
Page 13 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING For the WBN Unit 1 IPEEE, continuing conformance with the 'Regulatory Position 2 of RG 1.59, Revision 2, August 1977, is consistent with the WBN Unit 1 IPEEE Final Report
(
Reference:
TVA Letter to NRC Document Control Desk, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN)
Unit 1 Generic Letter 88-20, Supplements 4 and 5 - Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE) for Severe Accident Vulnerabilities (TAC No. M83693), dated February 17, 1998, Accession Nos. ML073240218 and ML073460335), and no update to the WBN Unit 1 IPEEE is required. The conformance to Regulatory Position 2 of RG 1.59, Revision 2, August 1977, is assured by the updated hydrologic analysis and commitments for permanent plant modifications where necessary to provide flooding protection features for safety-related systems, structures, and components affected by the revised DBF elevations.
For the WBN Unit 2 IPEEE, it was recognized when the IPEEE Design Report was provided to the NRC (
Reference:
TVA Letter to NRC Document Control Desk, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 - Individual Plant Examination of External Events Design Report, dated April 30, 2010, Accession No. ML101240992) that "Probable maximum flood (PMF) levels are currently being re-established by a TVA hydrology for all sites. The results of this ongoing hydrology study indicate that flood levels at WBN may increase. Any changes in PMF elevation are going to be handled by TVA as a WBN2 design issue; no further discussion is provided in this report." Based on the final PMF elevation, TVA will review the IPEEE conclusions and determine if any additional measures are required. This review will consider the results of the validation activities for evaluating the IPEEE Design Report conclusions for the actual as-built WBN Unit 2, and will be completed prior to fuel load, a final IPEEE Design Report will be submitted following certain validation activities as described in the IPEEE Design Report, including evaluation of external flooding hazards.
The Final Environmental Statement (FES) related to the operation of WBN Units 1 and 2 (NUREG-0498, Supplement 1, November 1994, Accession No. ML073470585), and the WBN Unit 2 Draft Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), (Draft NUREG-0498, Supplement 2, September 2011, Accession Nos. ML11298A094 and ML11298A095),
Subsection 2.2.1.1, Surface-Water Hydrology, describes the surface resources and hydrologic processes in and around the WBN site including existing water use and water quality in the environment in the vicinity of WBN Units 1 and 2. These descriptions of the affected environment for WBN Units 1 and 2 include recent citations to TVA provided information, and are not expected to be affected by the most current hydrologic information used in the updated hydrologic analysis. However, TVA will review the information contained in the updated hydrologic analysis and determine if any information provided in the 1994 FES or the 2011 Draft FEIS is affected, and the results of this review will be provided to the NRC, by September 30, 2012.
- 11. Discuss whether any flood barriers at the plant are impacted by the revised PMF level.
Only two distinct changes to the physical flooding protection features of WBN Unit 1 are required.
The IPS is designed to have the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) System and the High Pressure Fire Protection (HPFP) System remain fully function for the DBF. As discussed in Section 3.1 of Enclosure 1, Technical Evaluation, under subheading Section 2.4.14, Flooding Protection Requirement, the revised DBF elevation for the critical face of the IPS results in the possibility of flooding of the IPS possibly impacting internal systems and components required to be available during a plant flood. In addition, as discussed in Page 14 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING Section 3.3 of Enclosure 1, the IPS structure contains various equipment required to support the ERCW and HPFP systems. The IPS contains the ERCW and HPFP pumps, travelling water screens and support equipment including screen wash pumps, ERCW strainers and support equipment including backwash valves and pressure indicators, and HPFP strainers and support equipment including backwash valves and pressure indicators. During a DBF event, surge is accounted for by considering the sum of the wind wave and runup on the critical face of the IPS combined with the PMF stillwater elevation, which conservatively results in an internal flood elevation of 741.7 ft for the IPS. While this does not wet any flood-sensitive equipment on elevation 741.0 ft, the ERCW strainers and support equipment are located on elevation 722.0 ft of the IPS, connected to elevation 741.0 ft via stairwells and doors W001 and W002 at elevation 741.0 ft. The critical elevation of flood-sensitive equipment located on elevation 722.0 ft is several feet above the floor elevation. Doors W001 and W002 both have 0.5 ft concrete berms at the opening to elevation 741.0 ft, which raises the critical elevation for floodwaters to be capable of wetting elevation 722.0 ft to elevation 741.5 ft. As a result of this increase, a compensatory measure of staged sandbags to be constructed into a berm at any time prior to or during the event of a Stage I flood warning has been implemented. These sandbags will be constructed into a berm at least 12 inches in height to prevent water intrusion to elevation 722.0 ft. Additionally, two non-safety related sump pumps in each of the ERCW Train A and B strainer rooms, connected to safety-related power sources, are available to expel water leakage to this elevation outside the structure. TVA's established corrective action program requirements are being implemented to address the need for additional compensatory measures necessary to provide flood protection for the IPS internal systems and components, including the need for permanent plant modifications.
The Service, Turbine, Auxiliary, and Control Buildings are permitted to flood as the water exceeds the plant level entrances. No permanent barriers to specifically protect flood sensitive plant equipment exist in any of these structures although, as discussed further in Section 3.3 of Enclosure 1, Margins, temporary compensatory measures are in place to ensure adequate flood protection for the TBB Pump Motors if a PMF event were to occur.
Also, permanent plant modifications are planned to restore or gain additional margin between the revised DBF elevations and limiting safety-related systems, structures, and components in the Auxiliary Building.
As committed to in the TVA Submittal to NRC Document Control Desk, "Commitments Related to Updated Hydrologic Analysis Results for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1," dated June 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12171A053), TVA will install a permanent plant modification to provide flood protection with respect to the DBF level for the WBN, Unit 1 TBB Pump Motors by March 31, 2013.
- 12. Discuss the use and control of sand baskets (e.g., at the WBN recreational area).
Refer to the response to Issue 8 for more detailed description of use of the HESCO Concertainer units as a temporary flood barrier.
The temporary flood barriers installed in the vicinity of the recreational area at Watts Bar Dam are in place to prevent overtopping of the earth embankment during a PMF. There are three locations where closure of the access openings in the temporary flood barrier would be required to complete the floodwall in advance of a PMF event. A supplement to the Page 15 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING Emergency Action Plan for Watts Bar Dam has been issued to address procedures to be followed during such an event.
The HESCO Concertainer units (20-3x3x15 baskets) and stone (approximately 210 tons) needed to complete closure of the floodwall are stored in a designated fenced area near the campground and in proximity to the access points where they would be used. The HESCO Concertainer units are stored on pallets in a folded position.
The TVA River Forecast Center has responsibility for identification of events which could exceed critical elevations at the dam consistent with their Emergency Notification procedure and notification to the RO Senior Vice-President (AO) of the flooding condition. The AO declares a dam safety emergency which following the procedures implements the Watts Bar Dam PMF Barrier Installation Plan. The supplement details the methods, material and equipment to be used by TVA's construction partner GUBMK for closure of the openings through the floodwall. The closure of the opening can be accomplished by setup of the HESCO Concertainer units linked to the existing HESCO Concertainer units already in place or by overlap of the temporary flood barriers at a given location as appropriate.
Similar requirements for the use and control of the HESCO temporary flood barriers exist for Cherokee, Fort Loudoun, and Tellico Dams.
The use of the temporary flood barriers, and credit or lack of credit for the temporary flood barriers in the hydrologic analysis, is discussed further in the response to Issue 8.
As committed to in the TVA Submittal to NRC Document Control Desk, "Commitments Related to Updated Hydrologic Analysis Results for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, and Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 1," dated June 13, 2012 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12171A053), TVA will implement permanent modifications to prevent overtopping of the embankments of the Cherokee, Fort Loudoun, Tellico, and Watts Bar Dams due to the PMF. The final solution will be established in an evaluation conducted in compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).
Based on the current NEPA EIS schedule, these permanent modifications are scheduled to be installed by October 31, 2015.
- 13. Discuss the impact on any safety-related equipment other than the thermal barrier booster pumps.
As discussed in the response to Issue 11, the IPS is designed to have the ERCW System and the HPFP System remain fully function for the DBF. As discussed in Section 3.1 of Enclosure 1, Technical Evaluation, under subheading Section 2.4.14, Flooding Protection Requirement, the revised DBF elevation for the critical face of the IPS results in the possibility of flooding of the IPS possibly impacting internal systems and components required to be available during a plant flood. In addition, as discussed in Section 3.3 of Enclosure 1, the IPS structure contains various equipment required to support the ERCW and HPFP systems. The IPS contains the ERCW and HPFP pumps, travelling water screens and support equipment including screen wash pumps, ERCW strainers and support equipment including backwash valves and pressure indicators, and HPFP strainers and support equipment including backwash valves and pressure indicators. During a DBF event, surge is accounted for by considering the sum of the wind wave and runup on the critical face of the IPS combined with the PMF stillwater elevation, which conservatively Page 16 of 17
ENCLOSURE2 EVALUATION OF ISSUES FROM PRE-APPLICATION MEETING results in an internal flood elevation of 741.7 ft for the IPS. While this does not wet any flood-sensitive equipment on elevation 741.0 ft, the ERCW strainers and support equipment are located on elevation 722.0 ft of the IPS, connected to elevation 741.0 ft via stairwells and doors W001 and W002 at elevation 741.0 ft. The critical elevation of flood-sensitive equipment located on elevation 722.0 ft is several feet above the floor elevation. Doors W001 and W002 both have 0.5 ft concrete berms at the opening to elevation 741.0 ft, which raises the critical elevation for floodwaters to be capable of wetting elevation 722.0 ft to elevation 741.5 ft. As a result of this increase, a compensatory measure of staged sandbags to be constructed into a berm at any time prior to or during the event of a Stage I flood warning has been implemented. These sandbags will be constructed into a berm at least 12 inches in height to prevent water intrusion to elevation 722.0 ft. Additionally, two non-safety related sump pumps in each of the ERCW Train A and B strainer rooms, connected to safety-related power sources, are available to expel water leakage to this elevation outside the structure. TVA's established corrective action program requirements are being implemented to address the need for additional compensatory measures necessary to provide flood protection for the IPS internal systems and components, including the need for permanent plant modifications.
- 14. Discuss the impact of TVA's five proposed combinations of dam failure scenarios within its revised flood analysis.
As discussed in the response to Issue 4, the methodology used to develop the controlling seismic/flood condition at WBN is the same as previously followed for the site evaluations described in the WBN Unit 1 UFSAR. This is further described in Section 2.1 of Enclosure 1, Proposed Changes, under the subheading Section 2.4.4, Potential Dam Failures, Seismically Induced.
Page 17 of 17
ENCLOSURE3 LIST OF COMMITMENTS
- 1. The proposed technical changes to the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) described in Enclosure 1 include changes that incorporate updates previously submitted in support of the initial licensing of WBN Unit 2 as well as more recently discovered. input information. Given that the WBN Unit 1 UFSAR and Unit 2 Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) are separate documents at this time, TVA will submit an update to the affected sections of the WBN Unit 2 FSAR on or before August 30, 2012 to assure that the hydrology licensing bases are consistent.
- 2. For the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN Unit 2 Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE), it was recognized when the IPEEE Design Report was provided to the NRC
(
Reference:
TVA Letter to NRC Document Control Desk, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN)
Unit 2 - Individual Plant Examination of External Events Design Report, dated April 30, 2010, Accession No. ML101240992) that "Probable maximum flood (PMF) levels are currently being re-established by a TVA hydrology for all sites. The results of this ongoing hydrology study indicate that flood levels at WBN may increase. Any changes in PMF elevation are going to be handled by TVA as a WBN2 design issue; no further discussion is provided in this report." Based on the final PMF elevation, TVA will review the WBN Unit 2 IPEEE conclusions and determine if any additional measures are required. This review will consider the results of the validation activities for evaluating the IPEEE Design Report conclusions for the actual as-built WBN Unit 2, and will be completed prior to fuel load, a final IPEEE Design Report will be submitted following certain validation activities as described in the IPEEE Design Report, including evaluation of external flooding hazards.
- 3. The Final Environmental Statement (FES) related to the operation of WBN Units 1 and 2 (NUREG-0498, Supplement 1, November 1994, Accession No. ML073470585), and the WBN Unit 2 Draft Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS), (Draft NUREG-0498, Supplement 2, September 2011, Accession Nos. ML11298A094 and ML11298A095),
Subsection 2.2.1.1, Surface-Water Hydrology, describes the surface resources and hydrologic processes in and around the WBN site including existing water use and water quality in the environment in the vicinity of WBN Units 1 and 2. These descriptions of the affected environment for WBN Units 1 and 2 include recent citations to TVA provided information, and are not expected to be affected by the most current hydrologic information used in the updated hydrologic analysis. However, TVA will review the information contained in the updated hydrologic analysis and determine if any information provided in the 1994 FES or the 2011 Draft FEIS is affected, and the results of this review will be provided to the NRC, by September 30, 2012.
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