ML12222A457
| ML12222A457 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Indian Point  |
| Issue date: | 08/09/2012 |
| From: | Roberts K, Helfand I, Kanter A, Mccally M, Tiwari J Physicians for Social Responsibility |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| SECY RAS | |
| References | |
| RAS 23280, 50-247-LR, 50-286-LR, ASLBP 07-858-03-LR-BD01 | |
| Download: ML12222A457 (32) | |
Text
CLE000060 Submitted August 9, 2012 The U.S. AND Nuclear Terrorism AB7::2/<53@=CA:GC<>@3>/@32
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/19<=E:3253;3<BA The publication of this report was made possible thanks to generous financial contribu-tions from an anonymous donor and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. PSR and the report authors are grateful for their support.
The authors of this report are indebted to many of their colleagues and issue experts for sharing their insight and comments on various drafts of this report. We extend our sincere thanks to all of these individuals. In particular we wish to recognize Shelley Hearne, Dr. PH of Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Irwin Redlener, MD of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia Universitys Mailman School of Public Health, Tim Takaro, MD of Simon Fraser University, and Ed Lyman Ph.D. of the Union of Concerned Scientists. Their thoughtful comments and critique of report drafts were invaluable.
The U.S. AND Nuclear Terrorism AB7::2/<53@=CA:GC<>@3>/@32 AUTHORS Ira Helfand, MD Andy Kanter, MD Michael McCally, MD, Ph.D.
Kimberly Roberts Jaya Tiwari CONTRIBUTORS John Pastore, MD Catherine Thomasson, MD Peter Wilk, MD
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PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 1012 Washington, DC 20009 Telephone: (202) 667- 4260 Fax: (202) 667- 4201 E-mail: psrnatl@psr.org Web www.psr.org US Affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
CLE000060 Submitted August 9, 2012 The U.S. AND Nuclear Terrorism AB7::2/<53@=CA:GC<>@3>/@32
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/19<=E:3253;3<BA The publication of this report was made possible thanks to generous financial contribu-tions from an anonymous donor and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War. PSR and the report authors are grateful for their support.
The authors of this report are indebted to many of their colleagues and issue experts for sharing their insight and comments on various drafts of this report. We extend our sincere thanks to all of these individuals. In particular we wish to recognize Shelley Hearne, Dr. PH of Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Irwin Redlener, MD of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia Universitys Mailman School of Public Health, Tim Takaro, MD of Simon Fraser University, and Ed Lyman Ph.D. of the Union of Concerned Scientists. Their thoughtful comments and critique of report drafts were invaluable.
The U.S. AND Nuclear Terrorism AB7::2/<53@=CA:GC<>@3>/@32 AUTHORS Ira Helfand, MD Andy Kanter, MD Michael McCally, MD, Ph.D.
Kimberly Roberts Jaya Tiwari CONTRIBUTORS John Pastore, MD Catherine Thomasson, MD Peter Wilk, MD
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PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 1012 Washington, DC 20009 Telephone: (202) 667- 4260 Fax: (202) 667- 4201 E-mail: psrnatl@psr.org Web www.psr.org US Affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
Executive Summary and Recommendations ive years after September 11, 2001, the evaluated the medical consequences of three United States remains dangerously un- hypothetical nuclear and radiological attack sce-prepared to deal with the aftermath of a narios: a 12.5 kiloton nuclear weapon explosion terrorist attack involving nuclear weap- in New York City, an attack on a nuclear power ons, dirty bombs or explosions at nuclear power plant near Chicago, and a dirty bomb explosion in plants. Washington, D.C. PSR then examined the steps This summer America marks two somber an- that should be taken to try to minimize the deaths niversaries. On August 29, we were reminded of and injuries these events would cause.
the death and destruction unleashed on the Gulf Coast by Hurricane Katrina. On September 11, Americans will pause to remember the anniversary 47<27<5A of the worst terrorist attack in the history of our ! Five years after September 11, 2001, the U.S.
country. government still does not have a workable, pub-As we mourn the victims of these disasters and lic plan to respond to the medical needs of the contemplate the loss of life and property we must huge numbers of people who would be injured ask whether the United States is prepared to protect in a nuclear terrorist attack. Thousands of its citizens from even more devastating disasters. American civilians injured by a nuclear terrorist In early 2001, a bipartisan task force established attack might survive with careful preparedness by the Department of Energy concluded, The planning.
most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons ! The governments ability to quickly and effec-of mass destruction or weapons useable material tively evacuate communities or shelter popula-in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or tions downwind will be the single most impor-hostile nation states and used against American tant factor in minimizing casualties in each of troops abroad or citizens at home. these three scenarios. The United States still Nuclear terrorism remains a very real threat. does not have a plan for deciding, in response to Since 1993 the International Atomic Energy a specific attack and prevailing weather condi-Agency has documented 175 cases of nuclear traf- tions, whether people should try to evacuate or ficking, 18 of which involved highly enriched ura- shelter in place.
nium or plutonium, the raw material for nuclear explosives. ! There is no plan for communicating such a deci-To assess U.S. preparedness for nuclear terror- sion to the public, for carrying out an evacuation ism, Physicians for Social Responsibility (PSR) if needed or for supporting populations who
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are asked to take shelter in their homes. The re- ! One of the most critical elements of an effective sponse to Hurricane Katrina suggests there is no disaster management plan is the identification clearly designated individual or group to make of a central coordinating authority empowered the decision to evacuate or shelter and no clearly to immediately step in to direct the response defined criteria for making that decision. The and rescue efforts. No such central coordinating failure to make such plans could lead to hun- authority has been designated.
dreds of thousands of preventable deaths in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack. ! Clear communication with the public is equally critical. Without timely and understandable in-
! Each of the nuclear terrorism scenarios gener- formation from trusted sources the public can-ates a need for emergency medical care for hun- not be expected to take appropriate or directed dreds to hundreds of thousands of victims. The actions.
U.S. does not have adequate plans for establish-ing field medical care, for mobilizing medical ! Health care experts have proposed that hos-personnel or deploying additional medical sup- pitals in major urban areas not be the site of plies to the site of an attack. health care first response in a disaster because they could be quickly jammed with injured, anx-
! The 50 Disaster Medical Assistance Teams main- ious and contaminated victims compromising tained by the Department of Homeland Security the ability to deliver care to existing patients.
and deployed to the Gulf following Hurricane Rather, a system of disaster medical care centers Katrina were overwhelmed quickly. The failure should be prepared with pre-positioned supplies to develop plans to deploy adequate medical and equipment.
resources could prevent hundreds of thousands of Americans from receiving life saving medical ! A comprehensive plan for providing emergency care following a terrorist attack in which even and continuing patient care will be effective more people are injured. only if communities have adequate teams of health professionals available to them and ac-
! The U.S. public health system, which would cess to essential medical equipment and sup-bear a large burden in responding to nuclear plies required for mass treatment. Decision-terrorism, is currently under-funded and un- makers must work to develop creative solutions der-staffed. New sources of funding and other to this challenge.
resources are desperately needed to strengthen the existing public health system, so that the ! Even with extensive preparedness planning, a U.S. can better respond to a wide range of nuclear terrorist attack would create human threats. casualties and economic destruction on a scale unprecedented in our national history. The
! Though an attack on the U.S. with a nuclear U.S. response to this threat must include more weapon or dirty bomb would be a unique disas- vigorous effort to prevent terrorists from gain-ter, advance planning can significantly reduce ing the ability to commit such acts in the first the resulting damage. Currently, there is no place.
communication with the public on prepared-ness for nuclear terrorism and little evidence of serious consideration of potential scenarios by preparedness planners.
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@31=;;3<2/B7=<A Train and equip first responders so they can Physicians for Social Responsibility has a three quickly identify a radiological emergency and point prescription to address these dangerous perform their duties while also ensuring their deficiencies in planning, organization, and com- own safety.
munication. PSR recommends the Department of Establish Disaster Medical Care Centers in Homeland Security adopt the following measures: high risk urban areas and mobile field hospi-tals that can be moved quickly to areas where Planning: existing medical facilities are overwhelmed.
Designate a central coordinating authority and a clear chain of command that would be Communication:
activated in the event of a nuclear terrorist at- Establish a plan for communicating evacua-tack or natural disaster to direct the response tion or sheltering decisions to the public and and rescue efforts. educate the public in advance about these
Establish and communicate clear criteria to issues so that they will follow instructions in guide this authority in deciding whether to the chaotic aftermath of an attack.
evacuate people or shelter them in place. Ensure that the coordinating authority has Establish plans for carrying out any evacua- access to real time information and can com-tions deemed appropriate and for supporting municate the location and expected spread of populations instructed to shelter in place. radioactive fallout plumes.
Include nuclear scenarios in most regular desk-top and field planning exercises and give the U.S. Weather Service capacity to map and /<=B3=<<C1:3/@
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time. While there is much work to be done in the area of preparedness for a nuclear terrorist attack, PSR Organization: recognizes that even the best efforts in this area
Establish an adequate National Disaster will not be enough to keep our communities safe.
Medical System with significantly increased Given the potentially devastating consequences numbers of Disaster Medical Assistance of a nuclear terrorist attack, prevention strategies Teams and establish a mechanism for quickly centered on moving the U.S. and other nuclear mobilizing existing military medical teams weapons powers toward the elimination of nuclear and integrating volunteer health profession- weapons are key to our long-term safety.
als. At the same time, well-funded and rigorously
Pre-position radiation protection and moni-enforced programs aimed at keeping nuclear weap-toring equipment in areas felt to be high risk ons and materials out of the hands of terrorists, potential targets. Pre-position stockpiles of should be considered mainstays of prevention of medical supplies that can be moved quickly to nuclear terrorism. These should include securing the affected areas in response to nuclear ter- the facilities that house this dangerous material rorism or natural disasters such as hurricanes and reducing and ultimately eliminating U.S. reli-or floods. ance on nuclear weapons and nuclear power.
Understanding Nuclear Terrorism hile the magnitude of death and Moreover, terrorists may choose to use our own destruction associated with a technology against us, as they did with jetliners on nuclear terrorist attack is difficult September 11. Nuclear power plants have previous-to comprehend, it is not difficult ly been identified as the targets for terrorism, and to envision how such an attack might occur. Today, their radioactive cores and waste storage facilities much of the knowledge required to build a crude already are in place throughout the country.4 nuclear device is widely available in open literature and on the internet. The ability to put it all togeth-er requires little more than a basic understand- C<23@AB/<27<51C@@3<BC A >=:71G
ing of nuclear physics and engineering. Access to =<<C1:3/@B3@@=@7A;>@3>/@32<3AA nuclear weapons material is the greatest barrier for The federal government has an absolute and clear terrorist organizations.1 responsibility to prepare for nuclear terrorist at-However, this barrier is not insurmountable, tacks. In 2005, the Department of Homeland and more than 55 countries, including Russia and Security (DHS) released its National Preparedness Pakistan, have poorly guarded military and civil- Goal (NPG) and a series of National Planning ian facilities which collectively store hundreds of Scenarios (NPS) that analyze a variety of potential tons of fissile material.2 The International Atomic threats and responses, including those involving a Energy Agency (IAEA), the organization charged nuclear terrorist attack. Despite repeated warnings with monitoring nuclear materials worldwide, has by high-level government officials and independent documented more than 175 cases of nuclear traf- experts about the likelihood of a nuclear terrorist ficking in the last decade, 18 of which involved attack, the DHS has not developed the comprehen-highly enriched uranium or plutonium, essential sive plans needed to respond to such an attack. 5 ingredients to make a nuclear bomb.3 In fact, the bipartisan September 11 Commissions 1 Matthew Bunn, Anthony Wier, John P. Holdren, Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan; also see Linda Rothstein, Catherine Auer and Jonas Siegel, Rethinking doomsday Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2004.
2 Center for American Progress, Agenda for Security: Controlling the Nuclear Threat February 2005, page 7. Also see David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, Fissile Material: Stockpiles Still Growing, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2004.
3 International Atomic Energy Agency, Calculating the new global nuclear terrorism threat, IAEA Press Release, November 1, 2001.
4 Ibid.
5 Sam Nunn, William Perry and Eugene Habiger, Still Missing: A Nuclear Strategy, Washington Post, May 21, 2002.
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final report, released on December 5, 2005, gave While DHS has yet to develop a robust plan for failing grades to the federal governments efforts disaster preparedness programs, it certainly rec-to prevent or effectively respond to a large scale ognizes the potential threats including nuclear terrorist attack. The Commission gave an F to threats. DHSs own analysis, as reflected in its the governments efforts to prevent terrorists from April 2005 official use only report titled National acquiring weapons of mass distruction and warned Planning Scenarios (NPS), detailed the devastating that the United States is woefully unprepared to human, economic, and environmental impacts a handle a terrorist attack involving nuclear weapons nuclear bomb explosion or a terrorist attack with or material.6 a dirty bomb would have on a U.S. city.9 Although The need to review existing infrastructure and the NPS report does not describe the impact of a to plan and prepare for disasters has been rec- power plant core meltdown resulting from a terror-ognized at the highest levels of government for ist attack, it does acknowledge that such an attack many years. Acknowledging this critical need for would cause significant damage.10 improvement in U.S. disaster planning and mitiga- The NPS report underscores the urgency of tion efforts, President Bush issued the Homeland planning for the aftermath of a possible nuclear Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8) in terrorist attack. According to the report, a terror-December 2003. The stated goal of the HSPD-8 ist attack with a nuclear weapon or a dirty bomb was to establish would require immediate mobilization of federal, state and local authorities, as well as resources on a policies to strengthen the preparedness of the scale far greater than those required for respond-United States to prevent and respond to threat- ing to the terrorist attack on the World Trade ened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major Center or to Hurricane Katrina.
disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a However, the intent and the rhetoric of the national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal, NPS or the NPG have not translated into a focused establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of effort on the part of the government to demon-Federal preparedness assistance to State and local strably improve preparedness. Congressional and governments, and outlining actions to strengthen Government Accountability Office (GAO) inqui-preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and ries into the federal governments response to local entities.7 Hurricane Katrina makes it clear that, despite the creation of the DHS and its drafting of the National However, almost three years after HSPD-8 was Preparedness Goal, the federal government still has first issued, movement on disaster preparedness not settled the most basic preparedness questions.
programs has been almost non-existent. To date, the only tangible progress has been the draft of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) paper /<C1:3/@3F>:=A7=<
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sets forth goals but has no clear plan or timeline The most catastrophic form of nuclear terrorism for implementing them.8 would be the detonation of a nuclear bomb in a 6 The 9-11 Commission, Final Report Card on the Governments Preparedness Efforts, December 2005, http://www.9-11pdp.org/
press/2005-12-05_report.pdf 7 The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-8, December 17, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/re-leases/2003/12/20031217-6.html 8 http://www.marc.org/emergency/meetings/rhscc-hspd8.pdf 9 DHS, National Planning Scenarios, see scenario # 1 and 11.
10 DHS, National Planning Scenarios, ii
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Source: Ira Helfand, Lachlan Farrow and Jaya Tiwari, Nuclear Terrorism, British Medical OF Journal, Vol. 324, February 9, 2002, 356-359.
densely populated urban area. Terrorists could August 1945 used approximately 13 pounds of Pu achieve this by acquiring an intact nuclear weapon (the approximate size of a grapefruit). Many mod-or by obtaining highly enriched uranium (HEU) ern weapon designs require even less Pu.
or plutonium (Pu) and building a bomb. This is Terrorists may be able to obtain HEU or Pu not just a theoretical possibility, but represents a from a variety of sources, such as weapons labora-real danger. To make a simple nuclear bomb (like tories in nuclear weapon states, civilian research the one dropped on Hiroshima in August, 1945), centers, nuclear reactors, and fuel storage facilities.
less than 120 pounds of HEU would be needed; The global HEU stockpile is estimated to be be-some more advanced designs using explosives tween 1,300 and 2,100 metric tons. More than 100 would require as little as 75 pounds of HEU. HEU tons enough for 20,000 nuclear weapons of is highly dense material that is easily transported. surplus bomb grade Pu is currently stockpiled in For example, 125 pounds of HEU has the equiva- unsafe facilities in Russia and remains vulnerable lent volume of eight soda cans. If terrorists suc- to theft or smuggling.
ceeded in acquiring Pu, they would need an even Even before the September 11 attacks, the smaller quantity of it than HEU to build a bomb. likelihood that fissile material or even intact The plutonium weapon dropped on Nagasaki in nuclear weapons would end up in the hands of a
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non-state group was well recognized. A bipartisan many as 238,000 people would be exposed to direct Department of Energy task force warned in its 2001 radiation emanating from the blast. Of those ex-report that, The most urgent unmet national secu- posed, a projected 44,000 individuals would suffer rity threat to the United States today is the danger radiation sickness; and 10,000 of these individuals that weapons of mass destruction or weapons use- would receive lethal doses of radiation.
able material in Russia could be stolen and sold to Figure 1 depicts the blast radius and the corre-terrorists or hostile nation states and used against sponding casualty rate resulting from a 12.5 kilo-American troops abroad or citizens at home. In ton bomb explosion in lower Manhattan.
the less bureaucratic language of General Eugene After the explosion, the area surrounding New Habiger, former head of the Department of York City would experience nuclear fallout, a Energys nuclear anti-terror programs, It is not a phenomenon in which a cloud of radioactive de-matter of if; its a matter of when. bris is carried by prevailing winds, often traveling The consequences of a nuclear bomb explosion hundreds of miles. Depending on wind patterns would be death and destruction unprecedented and other weather conditions, portions of Long in U.S. history. Shortly after the September 11 at- Island and other localities would be affected with-tack, PSR published a study in the British Medical in 24-48 hours.
Journal (BMJ ) that indicated that a 12.5 kiloton The BMJ case study predicted that another one nuclear bomb detonated by terrorists at a dock and a half million people could be exposed to ra-in lower Manhattan would kill hundreds of thou- dioactive debris in the few days following a nuclear sands of people.11 The scenario was developed explosion. Unless the exposed population was using specialized software, the Hazard Prediction evacuated or sheltered; this fallout could kill an and Assessment Capability (HPAC) provided by additional 200,000 people, and cause several hun-the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the dred thousand cases of acute radiation sickness.
Consequence Assessment Tool Set from FEMA. In addition, care facilities would face a major It contemplated a terrorist attack using a nuclear disruption. The BMJ case study found that such bomb smuggled by a cargo ship into New York City. an attack would destroy 1,000 acute care hospital This is not an unlikely scenario. The Port of beds, and another 8,700 acute care beds would New York ranks as the largest port complex on the need to be abandoned because they would lie in East Coast. With capacity to handle the highest the area of heavy radioactive fallout.14 container volume in North America, the Port of Figure 2 shows the distance the radioactive New York receives thousands of cargo shipments plume would travel and the corresponding expo-each day from around the world.12 Given that less sures level for the affected population.
than five percent of cargo containers entering U.S. More recently, in a March 2005 report, the DHS ports are ever screened, a determined terrorist analyzed a very similar hypothetical scenario detail-group has numerous opportunities for transport- ing an attack in which terrorists explode a 10 kilo-ing a concealed nuclear device.13 ton bomb in downtown Washington, D.C., blocks The BMJ case study found that the nuclear bomb from the White House.15 In the DHS study, the im-blast would decimate much of lower Manhattan. mediate blast effects from the explosion would kill The heat and blast from the explosion would kill an estimated 15,000 people and wound 31,000. The an estimated 52,000 people immediately, while as report also predicts that there would be 190,000 11 Ira Helfand, Lachlan Forrow, Jaya Tiwari, Nuclear terrorism, British Medical Journal, February 9, 2002, 356.
12 The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, Cargo Capabilities, available electronically at http://www.panynj.gov.
13 Michael E. OHanlon, Cargo Security, Congressional Testimony: Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, March 20, 2003.
14 Ira Helfand, Lachlan Farrow, and Jaya Tiwari, Nuclear Terrorism, British Medical Journal, Vol. 324, February 9, 2002, 356-359.
15 DHS, National Planning Scenarios, Scenario 1.
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Source: Ira Helfand, Lachlan Farrow, and Jaya Tiwari, Nuclear Terrorism, British Medical Journal, Vol. 324, February 9, 2002, 356-359.
prompt, or immediate, deaths and 264,000 injuries /</BB/19=</<C1:3/@>=E3@>:/<B from short term radiation exposure in an area 19 The United States is home to 104 nuclear power miles to the east from the explosion if the popu- plants and 36 non-power research reactors licensed lation is not adequately sheltered or evacuated. by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).17,18 Additionally, the DHS study predicts that there These nuclear power plants generate eight percent would be chronic radiation exposure in an area 198 of the energy consumed in the U.S.19 An attack miles to the north and east of Washington, D.C., against one of these plants has long been consid-causing 49,000 cases of cancer, of which 25,000 ered a serious threat.
would be fatal.16 Figure 3 and 4 respectively show As early as 1982, the Argonne National the blast radius and the corresponding casualties Laboratory conducted a study detailing the likely from a 10 kiloton bomb explosion in downtown damage that a commercial jet plane could inflict Washington, D.C., the distance the radioactive on the concrete containment walls protecting plume would travel and the levels of radioactive ex- nuclear reactors. At that time, the concern was posure likely for the affected population. that an accidental airline crash could compromise 16 DHS, National Planning Scenarios, Scenario 1, Appendix 1-A, pp 1-15 to 1-17.
17 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Power Reactors, available electronically at www.nrc.gov/reactors/power.html 18 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Non-Power Reactors, available electronically at www.nrc.gov/reactors/non-power.html 19 Amory Lovins, Energy Security Facts: Details and Documentation, Rocky Mountain Institute, June 2, 2003.
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W\bVS1S\b`OZ0caW\Saa2Wab`WQb]TEOaVW\Ub]\21 Source: Department of Homeland Security, National Planning Scenarios, Created for Use in National, Federal, State, and Local Homeland Security Preparedness Activities, Draft Report, April 2005, 1-15.
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27AB/<13 a nuclear power plants primary containment wall a nuclear plant. In this scenario, we imagine that and interior structure. The scenario showed that a terrorist group hijacks a jet plane and crashes it even if only one percent of a jetliners fuel pen- into the plant.
etrated the containment and ignited after impact, Braidwood is a pressurized water reactor pro-this would create an explosion equivalent to 1,000 ducing 2500 megawatts (MW) of electricity at full pounds of dynamite inside a reactor building. Such capacity. Pressurized water reactors, like most nu-an explosion could create simultaneous failures clear power plants, require huge amounts of water in key safety measures leading to a loss of reactor to cool the reactor and maintain continuous steam coolant that cannot be mitigated and a meltdown production to power the turbines. A catastrophic of nuclear fuel.20 loss of coolant, from either a direct attack against The PSR study considers the effects of a hy- the primary coolant system, or from a reactor ves-pothetical attack against the Braidwood Nuclear sel breach resulting from a commercial jetliner Power plant21 located 60 miles southwest of accident, would uncover the core of the reactor, Chicago.22 Overall, there are eleven operating causing it to melt and burn.
reactors in Northern Illinois, making Chicago Exposure of the reactor core, a containment particularly susceptible to a terrorist threat against breach, would release the reactors superheated 20 Dr. Ed Lyman, Security of the Nations 103 Nuclear Reactors, Nuclear Control Institute and Committee to Bridge the Gap News Press Conference, September 25, 2001, transcript available electronically at http://www.nci.org.
21 The Braidwood power plant and its owner, the Exelon Corporation, were recently sued by Illinois Attorney General. The Braidwood unit was found to be leaking tritium that contaminated groundwater and tritium has been found in private wells of nearby property owners. See, Matthew L Wald, Nuclear Reactors Found to Be Leaking Radioactive Water, The New York Times, March 17, 2006.
22 Similar to the BMJ Study, the scenario described here was created using specialized software called Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability (HPAC) provided by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Consequence Assessment Tool Set (CATS) from the FEMA.
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27AB/<13 radioactive fuel into the air. It is important to note estimated that more than 7.5 million people would that nuclear power plant cores typically contain be exposed to radiation (receiving greater than 20 to 40 times the amount of radioactive materials the maximum allowed annual population dose), of released in a small nuclear bomb explosion (as the which 4.6 million would receive a dose equivalent one described in the first hypothetical scenario). of the maximum allowable occupational exposure In this power plant attack scenario, the Braidwood for one year.24 More than 200,000 would receive reactor is presumed to have suffered a catastrophic high enough doses to develop radiation sickness failure. The resulting plume of radioactive materi- and 20,000 might receive a lethal dose (LD 50),
als would extend north from the reactor itself to according to our projections.
the northern edges of metropolitan Chicago, and The acute exposure levels shown in Figure 6 be-east into Indiana and Michigan. low reveal the intensity of radioactivity, the risk to Figure 5 shows the distance the radioactive first responders, and the size of the area requiring plume would travel. evacuation. Radiation doses that are high enough The population would be exposed to different to produce acute radiation sickness would affect levels of radiation depending on the distance from an area encompassing parts of Kankakee, Will the reactor, duration of exposure (for this simula- and Grundy counties. The area that would require tion, it is assumed that the exposure would con- evacuation or other protective measures is shown tinue for one week), and the wind pattern.23 It is as the orange area in Figure 6 identified as EPA 23 These figures are for the total effective dose equivalent which is a combination of external radiation and radiation from internally consumed radioactive particles (primarily inhaled).
24 Population estimates are based on 1990 Census data. Actual numbers are likely to be significantly greater.
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they do not require mastering complex physics pro-cesses, and they do not use bomb-grade plutonium and uranium, which are difficult to obtain. and the blast aerosolizes the source of radioactive The conventional explosion which occurs in material and sprays it over a wide area.
a dirty bomb can cause local injuries and death. A dirty bomb is a modified conventional weap-However, the major danger is the air-borne disper- on, likely made of either commercial or military sal of radioactive materials, as the pulse of heat explosive or an oil and fertilizer mixture, com-25 All figures and details of Indian Point nuclear power plant core meltdown study cited hereinafter come from Edwin Lyman, Chernobyl on the Hudson? The Health and Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack at the Indian Point Nuclear Plant (Washington, DC: Union of Concerned Scientists, September 2004); also see Mark Thompson and Bruce Crumley, Are These Towers Safe? Why Americas Nuclear Power Plants are Still so Vulnerable to Terrorist Attack--and How to Make them Safer, a special in depth investigation, Time, June 20, 2005, 34.
26 All figures and details of Indian Point nuclear power plant core meltdown study cited hereinafter come from Edwin Lyman, Chernobyl on the Hudson? The Health and Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack at the Indian Point Nuclear Plant (Washington, DC: Union of Concerned Scientists, September 2004); also see Mark Thompson and Bruce Crumley, Are These Towers Safe? Why Americas Nuclear Power Plants are Still so Vulnerable to Terrorist Attack--and How to Make them Safer, a special in depth investigation, Time, June 20, 2005, 34.
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KING GEORGE S P O T S Y LV A N I A bined with some form of radioactive material.27 the source of the radioactive contamination. The They are fairly simple to engineer, as they only following scenario describes the effects of a dirty require readily accessible materials, such as ra- bomb attack in downtown Washington, D.C.
dium or certain cesium isotopes that are used in In this scenario, a terrorist group explodes a a variety of medical diagnostics and treatments. moderate size dirty bomb, containing 2000 cu-Other sources of radioactive material include food ries of cesium-137 (Cs-137), in the vicinity of the or seed irradiation equipment, portable power sup- 15th and H streets, Northwest, D.C (around the plies, and highly radioactive fission products from corner from the White House). This scenario as-nuclear power plant waste.28,29 sumes that only 10 pounds of TNT is used as the Dirty bomb simulations can vary significantly explosive and that the bomb could be concealed based on the size of the conventional explosive and in a car or another vehicle. The time of the explo-27 Michael A. Levi and Henry C. Kelly, Weapons of Mass Disruption Scientific American, November, 2002.
28 Council on Foreign Relations, Terrorism: Q&A, Fact Sheet, available electronically at http://www.terrorismanswers.com/weapons/
dirtybomb.html 29 Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Radiological Dispersal Devices: An Initial Study to Identify Radioactive Materials of Greatest Concern and Approaches to Their Tracking, Tagging, and Disposition, Report prepared by the DOE/NRC Interagency Working Group on Radiological Dispersal Devices for the NRC and Secretary of Energy, May 7, 2003, available electroni-cally at http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/doe/DOE052003.pdf
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sion is around noon, when the city would be most spread. The area in the immediate vicinity of the crowded. blast might require long-term evacuation, as the The explosion and local winds would spread cesium can chemically bind to the windows, roads, radioactive particles over many miles, heavily con- and buildings. Farther out, buildings would require taminating the area in the immediate vicinity of intensive washing and even sandblasting. Roads the explosion. and sidewalks would need to be blasted clean or re-Figure 7 shows the blast radius and the cor- moved entirely. Topsoil would need to be removed responding contamination from this dirty bomb and much of the vegetation would need to be ei-explosion. ther extensively cut back or removed.31 The scenario also predicts that the fallout would The DHS National Planning Scenarios report spread across the National Mall area, affecting describes a hypothetical dirty bomb explosion in many of the federal government buildings in the downtown Washington, D.C. In this study, a terror-vicinity; depending on weather and wind condi- ist group uses stolen seed irradiators (containing tions, fallout would travel over the Anacostia River approximately 2,300 curies of Cs-137) in a 3000 in Maryland and toward Andrews Air Force Base. pound TNT car bomb. The study predicts that In most scenarios, including the one described such an attack would kill 180 people from the blast above, the conventional explosion would cause the alone and contaminate another 20,000 with radio-vast majority of acute injuries and deaths. These active material.32 The radioactive debris from the would likely number in the tens to hundreds. explosion would contaminate up to 36 city blocks.
However, the radiation would be spread over a The DHS analysis predicts that, as a conse-large area and would require substantial effort quence of such a dirty bomb attack, an increase in to decontaminate. Whether one uses the Nuclear morbidity and mortality related to cancer would Regulatory Commission cutoff of 25 mrem per also be expected over the longer term. In addition, year, or the EPA maximum of 15 mrem per year, the study estimates that 5,000-20,000 individuals the area required to be decontaminated would would require mental health services to help them include the White House, the National Mall, the deal with the psychological impact of such attack.
House of Representatives office buildings, as well An additional impact of a dirty bomb attack as Fort McNair and the Navy Yard.30 would be the social disruption associated with the The use of a large amount of radioactive mate- evacuation and clean up. This event would likely rial, or material such as nuclear waste (in the form require decontamination of tens of square blocks of of a spent fuel rod), could significantly increase the urban neighborhoods. The DHS National Planning adverse health effects from the radiation exposure. Scenarios document outlines the significant cleanup Also, the larger the explosive capacity of the bomb, required, including demolition of buildings, repav-the farther the radioactive contamination would ing of roads, surface cleaning of sidewalks, re-roof-30 Because of the damaging health effects associated with radiation exposure, regulatory bodies in the United States, and internation-ally, set up and enforce radiation protection standards to protect public health. These radiation protection standards are based on the maximum allowable level of radiation doses, or the quantity of radiation or energy, received by the members of the public or workers, as part of their occupational exposure. The basic unit for measuring ionizing radiation received is called rad (radiation absorbed dose). To determine an individuals biological risk and the probability of harmful health effect, rads are converted to rems.
The rem reflects tissue dose and takes into account the type of radiation absorbed and the likelihood of damage from the different types of radiation. Because exposures are normally in fractions of a rem, a more commonly used unit of exposure and regulatory enforcement is the millirem (mrem). The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, for example, requires (in accordance with Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations under Part 20) that any NRC licensed nuclear facility limit maximum radiation exposure to individual members of the public to 100 mrem per year, and limit occupational radiation exposure to adults working with radioactive material to 5,000 mrem per year. Source: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/bio-effects-radiation.html 31 Michael A. Levi and Henry C. Kelly, Weapons of Mass Disruption Scientific American, November, 2002.
32 DHS, National Planning Scenarios, Scenario 11, page (11-1, 11-7)
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ing, removal and replacement of all surface soil, not available.36 In some cases, the cost associated decontamination of all exterior building surfaces, with decontaminating an area for continued human decontamination of interiors of buildings, and habitation could be so high that the only practical stripping of all interior materials, in addition to choice might be to abandon it for as long as radio-thorough capture and disposal of solid and water active hazards persisted.37 In addition, inhabitants waste from the decontamination effort. The cost might feel uncomfortable living, working, or doing of decontamination, according to the DHS study, business in the area, due to fears of radiation sick-would be in the billions of dollars.33 ness. It could be decades before the economic and The extent of the damage from a dirty bomb public health costs associated with a dirty bomb attack would also depend on the location of the attack are realized. It is also important to note that explosion. Should such an attack take place in a the potential cleanup cost in the aftermath of a confined urban area, such as a tunnel or subway dirty bomb attack remains one of biggest worries for station, the number of casualties would be far federal officials dealing with such an incident.
greater than if it occurred in an open area where the dangerous particles would be more widely dispersed. A dirty bomb explosion would send ra- @3A>=<27<5B=/<C1:3/@
dioactive dust particles to the very reaches of the 1@7A7A(/@3E3>@3>/@32-
dust cloud, leaving every person in the immediate As we have seen, a nuclear bomb explosion or an area exposed and making adequate clean-up and attack on a nuclear power plant in a large urban decontamination very difficult, if not impossible. area would bring about death and destruction on While under most circumstances the initial an unprecedented scale, and a dirty bomb explo-injury and death toll from a dirty bomb explosion sion would cause significant casualties and social would be roughly the same as from a conventional disruption. Given these realities, the federal gov-bomb attack, there would be additional injuries be- ernment must have in place a well-coordinated cause of acute radiation exposure in the days and response plan that will limit the casualties and weeks following the attack. There will be extensive injuries in the immediate post-attack period. The mental health effects as people worry that they following section presents some elements of an ef-have been exposed to radiation. These worried fective response to the scenarios described above, well will flood local health care facilities in a large compares these best practices with the current U.S.
area around the actually site of the explosion.34 state of preparedness, and identifies weaknesses in The radioactive material also will cause long existing plans that merit further consideration.
term effects. As a recent report by a National Academy of Sciences panel recently concluded, there is no dose threshold at which exposure to 13<B@/:1==@27</B7=<
radiation is safe.35 One in ten individuals in the =427A/AB3@@3A>=<A3 exposed population would experience an increased An effective response to a nuclear attack on a risk of death from cancer if decontamination were large U.S. city requires coordination across many 33 Ibid, page 11-1.
34 For example, during the 1995 Sarin gas attack on Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo cult, approximately 80 percent of the casualties, about 4000 people, arriving at local hospitals were worried well. These individuals did not have actual chemical injuries but believed they were ill or suffering as a result of possible exposure to Sarin gas because of their being in the vicinity of the nerve gas attack and demanded medical attention thereby overwhelming available medical resources. See, National Academy of Sciences, High-Impact Terrorism: Proceedings of a Russian-American Workshop (Washington, DC: NAS, 2002), 129.
35 Health Risks From Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: BEIR VII Phase 2 June 29, 2005, http://fermat.nap.edu/cata-log/11340.html.
36 Michael A. Levi and Henry C. Kelly, Weapons of Mass Disruption Scientific American, November, 2002.
37 Ibid.
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jurisdictions and from multiple federal, state and 3D/1C/B7=</<2A63:B3@7<5
local agencies. Consequently, one of the most criti- In the aftermath of a nuclear explosion or an at-cal decisions, in the event of such an emergency, tack on a nuclear reactor near a population cen-would be to establish a clear central coordinating ter, the largest number of deaths will result from authority that would immediately step in to direct radiation exposure. The governments ability to the response and rescue efforts. The lack of such a quickly and effectively evacuate communities or body has been repeatedly identified as a key weak- shelter populations downwind will be the single ness in current U.S. disaster preparedness and most important factor in minimizing the casualties planning policy. When the DHS was designated and injuries. Unfortunately, current federal pre-the main disaster coordinating government body paredness plans do not make clear who would be in 2002, the move was touted as a solution to the charged with deciding whether to shelter or evacu-range of coordination and communication chal- ate, and these plans do not include clear criteria to lenges associated with disaster response. While assist those charged with making these important this consolidation did force a number of domestic decisions. Wind direction and speed and estimates agencies to share more information, it did little to of the isotope content of the fallout cloud will all establish any one body as the coordinating author- have an impact on how radiation will be spread, ity. This was made abundantly clear in the days and this information must be communicated in and weeks following Hurricane Katrinas landfall real time to anyone responsible for making evacu-in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast region. A re- ation/sheltering decisions. Confusion over evacua-cent Government Accountability Office (GAO) tion routes and lack of transportation for many un-inquiry into the federal governments response to derprivileged urban dwellers is likely to compound the hurricane listed the lack of a clear chain of these problems.
command and unclear leadership as the big- Further there do not appear to be plans in place gest factors limiting relief efforts.38 The report to effectively communicate an evacuation/shelter blamed the lack of a central coordinating author- decision to the general public, or to carry out an ity and the unclear command issues at DHS for evacuation if that is needed. There is no clear ensuing internal confusion and an indecisive, slow understanding of how to support populations and haphazard response at the federal level. The who need to shelter in place for several days, nor report further noted that other federal agencies is there a program in place to adequately educate had an incomplete understanding of roles and the population in advance about this issue so that responsibilities under the DHS new National people will heed instructions they are given. It is Response Plan.39 important to remember the chaotic circumstances under which these important evacuation and shel-We need to be able to have somebody who tering decisions will be made. Government officials is clearly responsible and accountable to the will be forced to respond quickly on the basis of president, who has the authority of the president incomplete information and then communicate these decisions both to responsible agencies and to to deal with the overall response, the public. Federal preparedness plans must take GAO Comptroller General David Walker, into account public fears and misconceptions with on February 1, 2006, presenting the initial GAO report on the failure of the federal government in responding regard to the consequences of a nuclear attack.
to hurricane Katrina to a Special House Investigative Panel. In the event of a nuclear explosion in a city, ones 38 USA Today, Report: U.S. lacks sufficient prep for catastrophic disasters, available online at http://www.usatoday.com/news/wash-ington/2006-02-01-gao-report_x.htm.
39 USA Today, Report: U.S. lacks sufficient prep for catastrophic disasters, available online at http://www.usatoday.com/news/wash-ington/2006-02-01-gao-report_x.htm.
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instinct will be to flee the area. But, depending on No such national system is currently in place.
the wind conditions, it may be safer to try to shel- A recent study by the Trust for Americas Health ter in place for a period of time. In a government warns, {hospitals in nearly one-third of states{
analysis of a hypothetical nuclear bomb attack on are not sufficiently prepared, through planning Washington. D.C., people who tried to evacuate or coordination with local health agencies, to care in the first 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> received nearly seven times for a surge in extra patients by using non-health as much radiation as those who sheltered in their facilities, such as community centers sports are-basements for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> before trying to evacuate.40 nas, or hotels.41 This assessment is confirmed by The federal government must work with states and an analysis conducted by the American Hospital leaders in the public health community to educate Association, which concludes that most hospitals, the public about the best strategies to keep their particularly in the major metropolitan areas, have families safe in the event of an attack. only four to six percent of their total beds available for a potential influx of patients in an emergency In the absence of timely and decisive action and clear situation.42 Nationally, 62% of all hospitals sur-veyed reported capacity problems during routine leadership responsibility and accountability, there were operation.43 Given increasingly strict criteria for multiple chains of command. hospital admission, few hospitalized patients can GAO Comptroller General David Walker, February 1, 2006, be discharged prematurely without seriously com-presenting the initial GAO report on the failure of the promising their care. Many hospital emergency federal government in responding to Hurricane Katrina to a Special House Investigative Panel. rooms, especially in large metropolitan areas, are full of patients awaiting the availability of inpatient treatment rooms, making it unlikely that they can 6=A>7B/:AC@531/>/17BG accommodate a sudden influx of new patients.
In the event of any major urban disaster, hospitals The DHS National Preparedness Goal document can expect to see thousands of patients in need of emphasizes the urgent need to strengthen U.S.
intensive medical care (or hundreds of thousands, medical surge capacity, because it would play a crit-if radiation sickness is one of the hazards). In a ical role in determining how to handle effectively nuclear attack, many hospitals that lie within the large numbers of patients requiring immediate fallout zone of a nuclear explosion may have to be hospitalization following a major terrorist attack.44 abandoned because they will have been destroyed The NPG calls for the development of a system or contaminated with radiation. Thus, there will where Emergency Medical Service (EMS) resourc-be an urgent need for temporary field hospitals. es are effectively and appropriately dispatched and These should be located close enough to the scene are able to provide pre-hospital triage, treatment, for easy evacuation of patients, but far enough to transport, tracking of patients, and documenta-avoid ongoing radiation exposure and contamina- tion of care appropriate for the incident, while tion. A coordinated system must be in place for maintaining the capabilities of the EMS system for transporting patients to field hospitals and making continued operations.45 Such a system could be ac-beds available at existing facilities. tivated in anticipation of a mass casualty incident 40 DHS, National Planning Scenarios, scenario #1, Appendix 1-A, p 1-29.
41 Trust for Americas Health, Protecting the Publics Health from Disease, Disasters, and Bioterrorism, Washington, D.C., December 2005, page 3.
42 Peter D. Marghella, Surge Capacity Planning in Health Care Organizations: Hitting the Mark on Enhancing National Preparedness, Homeland Defense Journal, September 2005, page 12.
43 The Lewin Group Analysis of AHA ED and Hospital Capacity Survey, 2002.
44 DHS, National Preparedness Goal, page 20.
45 DHS, National Preparedness Goal, page 11.
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that requires supplementing the aggregate surge monitoring equipment, decontamination facili-capacity of local hospitals with an influx of supple- ties, or personnel to manage them. To adequately mental healthcare assets from mutual-aid partners, address the care and treatment of victims, an im-the State, and the Federal government.46 However, mediate mobilization and deployment of trained no such system has yet been developed. medical professionals and supplies from outside the affected area would be required.48 Recognizing this need, the National Preparedness 27A/AB3@;3271/:1/@313<B3@A Goal document envisions a public-health system In the case of a major disaster, it would be impor- where, in the event of a national emergency, emer-tant that hospitals not be the site of triage and gency-ready medical personnel, hospitals, and oth-healthcare first response in a disaster. Rather, a er healthcare facilities would collaborate to handle system of community sites should be prepared with rapidly a myriad of injuries, including physical and pre-positioned supplies and equipment to conduct psychic trauma, burns, infections, bone marrow the initial medical response.47 The goal would be suppression, and other chemical- or radiation-in-to eliminate crowding, reduce travel, prevent infec- duced injury.49 tion and contamination, and maintain the ability While the National Preparedness Goal offers some of hospitals to offer complex services to their exist- useful recommendations for addressing the short-ing and referred disaster patients. One possible age of medical personnel, it does not address the solution to the problem of hospital surge capacity means to quickly deploy additional doctors, nurses, is the creation of a system of disaster medical care and other health professionals to a disaster zone.
centers. Disaster medical care centers would be The DHSs National Disaster Medical System cur-based in existing facilities, such as sports arenas or rently maintains more than 50 Disaster Medical schools that would be pre-supplied with military- Assistance Teams (DMAT). In the aftermath of like field equipment, including medical supplies. Hurricane Katrina, all DMAT were deployed to the In addition, a system of mobile field hospitals Gulf Coast area. It is quite clear that this level of should also be established to provide coverage for capacity is totally inadequate for dealing with the cities without disaster medical care centers and as casualties anticipated in a nuclear terrorist attack.
back-up for those with such centers. These field In fact, the DMAT in the New Orleans area were hospitals also would be useful where there is po- completely overwhelmed by the relatively small tential for a natural disaster, such as a major hur- number of patients they had to deal with during ricanes, earthquakes, or disease outbreaks. that crisis. 50 There is a critical need for the Federal Emergency Management Agency to increase the
- =07
- 7H/B7=<=493G@3A=C@13A( number of DMAT at its disposal and to establish a
- 3271/
- >3@A=<<3:/<2AC>>:73A system that can quickly mobilize military combat In all three scenarios described in this report, support hospitals and National Guard person-local medical personnel would be quickly over- nel in an emergency. FEMA also should create a whelmed by the numbers of critically ill patients. system that will absorb and quickly integrate doc-Many facilities would not have effective radiation tors, nurses, and other health professionals who 46 DHS, National Preparedness Goal, page 20.
47 Ref: Kipnis, K. Overwhelming Casualties: Medical ethics in a time of terror. In the Wake of Terror: Medicine and Morality in a Time of Terror J. D. Moreno editor MIT Press Cambridge MA 2004 pp 95-107.
48 DHS, National Preparedness Goal, 20.
49 Ibid.
50 Sarah A Lister, Hurricane Katrina: The Public Health and Medical Response, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.,
September 21, 2005, page 13.
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volunteer their services. In 2005, many doctors and sequences since the last major terrorist attack on nurses who volunteered to help and even traveled September 11, 2001. However, there remain fun-directly to the areas affected by Hurricane Katrina damental problems with the city-specific recom-could not be put to use because there was no sys- mendations and a clear need for a thoughtful and tem for integrating them into a coherent, function- effective plan for preparing communities in the ing, health care team. Many health professionals event of a nuclear attack.
volunteered by applying on the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) website but New York City were never contacted. The City of New York has published a prepared-Lastly, to best ensure an adequate and continu- ness guide that is available on-line at www.nyc.
ous flow of critical medical supplies and equip- gov/readyny. More than two million copies in eight ment, the federal government, in cooperation languages have been distributed to the public, with state and local governments, must develop a in an attempt to inform New Yorkers of the citys strategy for pre-positioning these essential materi- disaster preparedness and evacuation plan. Since als and communicating this plan to those who will the September 11 attacks, the city also has made need the supplies and equipment in their treatment vast improvements in its ability to communicate of patients. The National Preparedness Goal appropri- with the public by radio and television. In a survey ately designates this as a priority capability building of disaster preparedness for Americas fifty larg-area for an effective response to a terrorist attack or est cities, the American Disaster Preparedness a major natural disaster.51 There must be adequate Foundation ranked New York as the second best-stockpiles of bandages, IV solutions and equip- prepared city giving it high marks for public educa-ment, antibiotics, pain medication, and other com- tion and communication of its disaster planning mon medicines, as well as the ability to mobilize and first responders training. 52 adequate supplies of blood and blood products. The capacity of New York City officials to com-municate with each other and among various agencies, however, remains severely limited. Most
>@3>/@32<3AA>:/<A(<3EG=@9 importantly, four years after the Sept. 11 attacks 1671/5=/<2E/A67<5B=<2 1 and one year after Hurricane Katrina, there still While the magnitude of a nuclear terrorist attack is no single plan to evacuate all of New York City. 53 demands that the federal government assume Orderly and safe evacuation for a city of more than primary responsibility for this threat, there is an eight million people, the majority of whom are important role as well for local governments. A sur- without cars, is considered difficult to impossible, vey of state and city-specific preparedness planning even by the officials responsible for carrying out for the three cities selected in this study indicates such an evacuation.
that state and local governments have made some According to Joseph F. Bruno, New York Citys improvements in the management of health con- Emergency Management Commissioner, the city is 51 DHS, National Preparedness Goal, 20.
52 American Disaster Preparedness Foundation, How Prepared is Your City? A Study of the Preparedness of the Largest Metro Areas in the U.S., January 2006, page 24. Using data compiled from several sources, including city disaster plans, county disaster plans, meeting records, disaster records, mitigation plans, news reports, census data, government publications, interviews with emergency management and other government employees, non- governmental organization reports, accreditation records, interviews with resi-dents, and other sources, the American Disaster Preparedness Foundation report ranked selected cities preparedness levels based on a number of criteria. The report used criteria such as a citys disaster preparedness planning, training, public education, general awareness of the citys disaster plan, communication, the citys ability to help its most vulnerable and poor citizens, technology, infra-structure, external support to assign grades of A-F.
53 Sam Roberts, Planning the Impossible: New Yorks Evacuation, New York Times, September 11, 2005.
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O\RU] BVS\bVS^S`a]\cacOZZgZ))YaO\RTSSZa `S_cW`SR ¶
Excerpted from: The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Fact Sheet on Acute Radiation Syndrome (May 20, 2005).
Available at http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/ars.asp
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only prepared to move from 400,000 to two million low scores for uniformity of response, public educa-people out of the path of a hurricane, a challenge tion, and general awareness of disasters. The study made a little less daunting by advance warning; cites poor communication of evacuation plans to knowing which flood-prone areas to evacuate; and the public as the major concern. The study faults identifying how many poor, elderly, disabled, and Chicago for being one of the most tight-lipped cit-non-English speakers live there. 54 This reflects the ies in disseminating public information on disaster enormity of the problem in evacuating the major- preparedness. City officials refuse to release disas-ity of New York City residents following a nuclear ter-preparedness plans to the public, which makes attack with little notice. It seems clear that many it difficult to examine the citys strength or weak-of News York Citys population, if not most, would ness in this area. 56 need to shelter in place in the event of a major nu- Chicagos first responders have participated in clear attack, but there is no system to support them mock catastrophe exercises, for events ranging with basic necessities like food and water. from a terrorist attack to a major disease outbreak or a natural disaster. The city is equipped with Would it be difficult to move two million people? high-tech devices like emergency notification sys-tems and sensors that could detect the presence Absolutely, Mr. Bruno said. I hope we never have to of certain biological agents and chemicals. City do it. This means that evacuating eight million would officials plan to acquire radiological sensors in be beyond difficult. We have plans for area evacuations, the near future. However, it appears that Chicago first responders are neither prepared fully nor and if you take them to their logical conclusion an area equipped to quickly distinguish a radiological or could be the entire city of New York, Mr. Bruno said. nuclear attack from other emergencies.
Those are doomsday type things, a nuclear attack. Were Since the city government has not communicat-ed adequately with the public, the average resident, definitely not throwing our hands up. But it would be a and even some involved at a planning level, remain catastrophic event that would be extremely difficult for unaware of the details of Chicagos preparedness New York City to have to deal with. How long would it planning. The official advice in the event of a di-saster is to seek shelter and tune in to local radio take to virtually empty the city? I wouldnt even hazard and TV stations for evacuation information.
a guess, Mr. Bruno replied.
As a resident of Chicago, I know very little of what they are doing. This is the same level of irresponsibility we Chicago The American Disaster Preparedness Foundation saw in New Orleans: denial of the problem, reassurance ranked Chicago as one of the fifteen best-prepared without substance and lack of leadership.
cities among the 50 largest cities in the U.S. 55 The Charles Baum, Vice-President of Health Affairs for study gave Chicago an overall C+, with high marks the Alexian Brothers Hospital Network in Arlington Heights for technology and first responder training and and a member of the Cook County Department of Public Health Pandemic Disease Response Task Force 54 Roberts, New York Times.
55 American Disaster Preparedness Foundation, How Prepared is Your City? A Study of the Preparedness of the Largest Metro Areas in the U.S., January 2006, page 24.
56 Christina Le Beau, Thinking the unthinkable, December 2005. Available electronically at http://www.chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/mag/article.pl?article_id=25103&postDate=2005-12-31.
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evacuation. This is critical, as D.C. has no gover-nor to make the necessary decisions. City officials have identified fourteen evacuation routes out of allow a maximum number of cars to leave the city downtown Washington D.C. that commuters could and for some traffic signals to operate on four-use for an emergency evacuation. The map is pro- minute cycles. The evacuation plan provides no vided on the D.C. Department of Transportation specifics about how the District of Columbia would website, and the city government has attempted to coordinate with surrounding states Virginia and publicize it through local media and on the pub- Maryland or where the evacuated individuals lic transit system. 58 The official evacuation plan should go to once they are out of the D.C. city lim-shows evacuation routes extending toward the its. Thus, it is difficult to imagine how the city would Capital Beltway. manage the safe evacuation of hundreds of thou-However, there are no road signs to identify sands of people at once, given the traffic congestion emergency routes. During a major disaster, the on I-495 during a normal rush hour commute.
D.C. plan calls for traffic signals to be re-timed to 57 American Disaster Preparedness Foundation, How Prepared is Your City? A Study of the Preparedness of the Largest Metro Areas in the U.S., page 24.
58 The map is available at http://ddot.dc.gov/ddot/frames.asp?doc=/ddot/lib/ddot/information/pdf/ddot-event-map-large.
pdf&open=l32399l
Recommendations 8
he threat of a nuclear terrorist attack or numbers of Disaster Medical Assistance Teams other large-scale urban disaster is real, and establish a mechanism for quickly mobiliz-and the potential consequences are ing existing military medical teams and inte-disastrous. Five years after September grating volunteer health professionals.
11, the federal government still has not developed ! >`S^]aWbW]\`ORWObW]\^`]bSQbW]\O\R[]\W
an adequate response to these threats. The DHSs b]`W\US_cW^[S\b in areas felt to be high risk National Preparedness Goal and the work that went potential targets. Pre-position stockpiles of into developing the National Planning Scenarios rep- medical supplies that can be moved quickly to resent useful preliminary steps, but a fully devel- the affected areas in response to nuclear terror-oped and working plan is critical. ism or natural disasters such as hurricanes or Physicians for Social Responsibility has a three floods.
point prescription to address these dangerous ! B`OW\O\RS_cW^¿`ab`Sa^]\RS`a so they can deficiencies in planning, organization, and com- quickly identify a radiological emergency and munication. PSR recommends the Department of perform their duties while also ensuring their Homeland Security adopt the following measures: own safety.
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the U.S. Weather Service capacity to map and broadcast radiation fallout plumes in real time. PSRs study has raised a number of key focus areas for those charged with protecting communi-ties from the threats posed by major disasters. It
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ing to events like these, is currently underfunded public health needs to fund new preparedness and understaffed. Any thoughtful strategy on ad- initiatives. We must acknowledge that new sources dressing a nuclear terrorist attack must take this of funding and other resources are needed and into consideration. Future plans must consider must be supplied to strengthen the existing public preparations for a nuclear attack in the broader health system and guarantee that a preparedness context of competing public health priorities like system is in place to ensure an effective response flu prevention or natural disaster response. We to a wide range of threats.
cannot afford to pull funding away from existing
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- 1. Limit the availability of nuclear weapons and materials by:
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- 2. Protect nuclear power facilities by:
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Guided by the values and expertise of medicine and public health, Physicians for Social Responsibility works to protect human life from the gravest threats to health and survival. PSR is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization representing 26,000 physicians, public health professionals, and concerned citizens working to eliminate nuclear weapons and address the public health and environmental legacy created by our military and civilian nuclear enterprise, including the testing, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons. Since its founding forty-five years ago, PSR has dedicated its efforts to educating the medical and public health community, the public, policymakers and the media about the menace of accidental or intentional nuclear war and proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials.
PSR also has a long history of bringing to light the fallacy of U.S.
nuclear weapons policy and inadequacy of U.S. public health infrastructure in responding to a full-scale nuclear war scenario.
Throughout the Cold War years, PSR physicians published articles and studies in medical journals, such as the New England Medical Journal and the Journal of American Medical Association, detailing the medical consequences of a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Through research, public education and advocacy, PSR, with our international federation the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, highlighted the health effects associated with testing, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and the nations continued reliance on nuclear weapons and nuclear power. This work was recognized globally when IPPNW was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1985, in which PSR shared.
Over the last two decades, PSRs work has focused on educating the public and policy makers about the continuing threat of nuclear proliferation and the health legacies of nuclear weapons build-up during the Cold War. PSR continues to advocate for rapid reduction and eventual elimination of U.S. and global nuclear stockpiles ultimately the only sure way to eliminate the threat of the use of nuclear weapons whether by an adversary state or by a terrorist group.
Recognizing that new dangers now threaten us, PSR in 1992 expanded its mission to include environmental health, addressing issues such as global climate change, proliferation of toxics, and pollution.
PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 1875 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 1012 Washington, DC 20009 Telephone: (202) 667- 4260 Fax: (202) 667- 4201 E-mail: psrnatl@psr.org Web www.psr.org US Affiliate of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War