ML113500239
| ML113500239 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Watts Bar  |
| Issue date: | 12/20/2011 |
| From: | Justin Poole Watts Bar Special Projects Branch |
| To: | Skaggs M Tennessee Valley Authority |
| Poole Justin/DORL/ 301-415-2048 | |
| References | |
| TAC ME3091 | |
| Download: ML113500239 (6) | |
Text
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 December 20, 2011 Mr. Michael D. Skaggs Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation Development and Construction Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT! UNIT 2 - AUDIT REPORT OF FIRE PROTECTION RELATING TO FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ACCIDENT ANALYSES (TAC NO. ME3091)
Dear Mr. Skaggs:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff conducted an audit related to the Fire Protection Report review in support of Tennessee Valley Authority's license application for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2. The audit took place from October 25 to 27, 2011, at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant in Spring City, Tennessee. Enclosed is the audit summary report prepared by the NRC staff.
If you should have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-2048.
Justin C. Poole, Project Manager Watts Bar Special Projects Branch Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-391
Enclosure:
Audit Summary cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv
REGULATORY AUDIT
SUMMARY
RELATED TO FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT SECTION 9.5.1 FIRE PROTECTION WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 By letter dated January 29,2008, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the applicant for an operating license for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2, submitted a description of the regulatory framework for the completion of licensing activities for WBN Unit 2. The Division of Risk Assessment (DRA) staff, consisting of members of the Fire Protection Branch, is performing a review of TVA's license application.
From October 25 to 27,2011, DRA staff conducted an audit at the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant in Spring City, Tennessee. Region II inspectors also participated in the audit. NRC staff audited the plant configuration that was described in the application.
The audit team consisted of the following staff on site:
Daniel Frumkin, Team Leader, Fire Protection Branch, DRA Bernard Litkett, Reactor Engineer, Fire Protection Branch, DRA Justin Poole, Project Manager, Special Projects Branch, Division of Operator Reactor Licensing LaDonna Suggs, Senior Reactor Inspector, Region II Eric Patterson, Construction Inspector, Region II The team also interfaced with Tomy Nazario, Senior Resident Inspector - Construction at WBN Unit 2 TVA and TVA's contractor staff that were involved or contacted during the audit were as follows.
Name Organization Gordon Arent Tennessee Valley Authority William D. Crouch, Tennessee Valley Authority Frank A. Koontz, Jr Tennessee Valley Authority Steven A. Hilmes Tennessee Valley Authority DJ Allen Tennessee Valley Authority S. Switzer Tennessee Valley Authority John Sterchi Tennessee Valley Authority George Senicz Bechtel J.J. Pierce Engineering Planning and Management, Inc (EPM)
Charles Brush EPM Rochellia Goines Bechtel Ernest T. Haston Tennessee Valley Authority Brenda Simril Tennessee Valley Authority Dorris Charlton Tennessee Valley Authority
- 2 Dennis O. Myers Tennessee Valley Authority Roger Smith Bechtel David Stinson Tennessee Valley Authority Edwin Freemar Tennessee Valley Authority Walt Elliott Tennessee Valley Authority John S. Martin Bechtel Christopher Bennett Tennessee Valley Authority C. L. Stephenson Tennessee Valley Authority John Howell Bechtel Michelle L. Baker-Lindsey Tennessee Valley Authority Jerry Schlessel Tennessee Valley Authority Terry Knuettel Tennessee Valley Authority Gregory Scott Tennessee Valley Authority The regulatory audit scope and the results of those audited sections are described below.
Installed plant fire protection features A large number of installed plant fire protection features were observed. For example, the arrangement of water curtains in stairwells was observed. The water curtain configuration was consistent with the information provided in the fire protection report (FPR). Fire barriers, fire doors and fire protection wraps were observed. These were consistent with the information provided in the FPR.
Fire water system Both the diesel fire pump building and the fire pumps in the intake pumping station were observed to be installed consistent with the design information provided in the FPR. A section of degraded header loop, that had leaked and been removed from the header, was observed. Pipe corrosion tubercles were consistent with the degradation that TVA described in the FPR. Accessible valves that connect the A and B safety headers and the fire loop were observed to be open.
Tour Auxiliary Control Room The Auxiliary Control Room is in the clean side of the Auxiliary Building and readily accessible from the Main Control Room. The staff timed the travel from the Main Control Room to the Auxiliary Control Room to be consistent with the times listed in the FPR. The Auxiliary Control Room is equipped with significant numbers of indicators and controls and diverse communication systems. The indicators in the Auxiliary Control Room are clearly labeled. According to discussion with TVA staff the plant has a simulator for the Auxiliary Control Room and simulates plant shutdown using that simulator.
Tour Auxiliary Building Due to ongoing WBN Unit 2 construction, the Auxiliary Building was obstructed to a large extent by scaffolding and craft work areas. The staff was able to observe the suppression
- 3 systems and, using column lines, identify the buffer zones between analysis volumes. The combustibles in the buffer zones were consistent with the description in the FPR. There were no oil filled transformers in the buffer zones.
The staff confirmed that the oil filled transformers were identified as retrofit with silicone based transformer fluid.
Appendix R safe shutdown components, that would be manually operated in response to a fire, were labeled with reflective placards. The staff also spot checked for emergency lighting in the area of the safe shutdown components and found that access paths and components had battery backed Appendix R lighting in the immediate vicinity consistent with the description in the FPR.
Tour Control Building The staff confirmed that rooms were separated by fire barriers. The staff also verified that the description of the fire hazards in rooms in the Control Building that lacked suppression were consistent with the description of those fire hazards in the FPR. The staff observed the fire alarm panel in the Main Control Room and its printer. The fire alarm panel is readily accessible to both the Unit 1 and Unit 2 control room operators.
Tour Unit 2 Containment The Unit 2 Containment is still under construction. The staff observed the portion of the oil collection system that had been installed, which includes some of the drain pans and drain lines. These were consistent with the descriptions in the FPR. No radiant energy shields had been installed.
Staffing and training for Operator Manual Actions (OMAs)
The staff reviewed TVA's staffing and training information on site. The information was consistent with the descriptions provided in the FPR.
III.G.20MAs and Alternate Safe Shutdown OMAs For III.G.2 and alternate safe shutdown OMAs the staff walked down a selection of OMAs.
The areas for the actions were readily accessible and the time to access the areas was consistent with the information provided in the FPR.
No task to training matrix was available for Unit 2. The staff reviewed the task to training matrix for Unit 1 and had no open items.
Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room C02 System The staff toured the Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room. The configuration of the room and the C02 system was consistent with the description in the FPR. Fire doors to the room were UL rated.
-4 Large Fire Dampers The staff toured the areas where the large fire dampers were located. The dampers were not accessible to the staff due to being enclosed in ducting and also being located high above the floor. The construction of the ventilation systems appeared robust and there were not significant fire hazards in the areas of the dampers.
December 20, 2011 Mr. Michael D. Skaggs Senior Vice President Nuclear Generation Development and Construction Tennessee Valley Authority 6A Lookout Place 1101 Market Street Chattanooga, TN 37402-2801
SUBJECT:
WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT 2 - AUDIT REPORT OF FIRE PROTECTION RELATING TO FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT ACCIDENT ANALYSES (TAC NO. ME3091)
Dear Mr. Skaggs:
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff conducted an audit related to the Fire Protection Report review in support of Tennessee Valley Authority's license application for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2. The audit took place from October 25 to 27,2011, at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant in Spring City, Tennessee. Enclosed is the audit summary report prepared by the NRC staff.
If you should have any questions, please contact me at 301-415-2048.
Sincerely.
IRA!
Justin C. Poole, Project Manager Watts Bar Special Projects Branch Division of Operating Reactor Licensing Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket No. 50-391
Enclosure:
Audit Summary cc w/encl: Distribution via Listserv DISTRIBUTION:
RidsOgcRp Resource RidsRgn2MailCenter Resource PUBLIC RidsNrrDraAfpb Resource RidsNrrDorlLpwb Resource LPWB Reading File RidsNrrPMWattsBar2 Resource RidsNrrLABClayton Resource RidsAcrsAcnw_MailCTR Resource DFrumkin, NRR CMoulton, NRR LSuggs. RII EPatterson. RII BLitkett. NRR ADAMS Accession No. ML113500239
- via memo OFFICE NAME DATE LPWB/PM JPoole 12/19/11 LPWB/LA BClayton 12/19/11 AF P Brream Lead DFrumkin*
12/14/11 LPWB/BC SCampbell 12/20/11 OFFICIAL AGENCY RECORD