ML080320443

Regulatory Framework for the Completion of Construction and Licensing Activities

ML080320443
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	01/29/2008
From:	Bajestani M Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
Download: ML080320443 (223)

Text

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381 -2000 January 29, 2008 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Mail Stop: OWFN P1-35 Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-391 Tennessee Valley Authority )

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) - UNIT 2 - REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE COMPLETION OF CONSTRUCTION AND LICENSING ACTIVITIES FOR UNIT-2 This letter describes the regulatory framework for the completion of construction and licensing activities for Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 as committed in TVA's August 3, 2007, letter to the NRC, "Reactivation of Construction Activities" (Reference 1).

In addition, responses are provided to address informational needs requested in NRC's letter of October 23, 2007 (Reference 2).

The regulatory framework for WBN Unit 2 was developed based on key assumptions provided in TVA's letter of April 3, 2007, (Reference 3) and NRC staff requirements memorandum SECY-07-0096 (Reference 4) that concluded:

1. The current licensing basis for Unit 1 will be used as the reference basis for the review and licensing of Unit 2.

2. Activities that have not been completed on Unit 2 will be completed in the same manner as Unit 1. In the event an activity cannot be completed in the same manner as Unit 1, the alternate approach will be provided to the NRC for review and approval.

3. Significant changes to this licensing approach by NRC Staff would be allowed where the existing backfit rule would be met or as necessary to support dual unit operation.

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 January 29, 2008 Using the assumptions above, TVA determined the scopeof WBN Unit 2 licensing activities, identified those activities requiring an alternate approach, and developed a closure process for those activities considered as "implementation only" actions (e.g.,

approach approved, but modification, procedure or some other action is required to close).

Given that a significant amount of the Unit 2 licensing basis had been reviewed and approved concurrent with the Unit 1 operating license process, a comparison was conducted of the NRC Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants (SRP) NUREG-0800 (Revision 2, July 1981) and the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and its Supplements related to the operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2 (NUREG-0847) in order to identify whether the sections had or had not been approved for Unit 2. Once the initial comparison process was completed, a review was conducted to determine whether the outcome remains valid under current circumstances and/or assumptions, and whether the reviewed section has been affected by generic communications. The process was presented to NRC at a meeting on December 12, 2007. The following provides four practical results of the comparison and review process:

1. The Unit 2 licensing basis has been reviewed and approved and remains valid with no further action required.

2. The Unit 2 licensing basis was previously approved; however, it is no longer current.

An update is necessary requiring NRC review and approval.

3. The Unit 2 licensing basis has not been approved or has been affected by generic communication, and the methodology used to resolve the issue on Unit 1 will be implemented. It is recommended that items in this category be approved consistent with the Unit 1 licensing basis with verification that implementation actions are complete.

4. The Unit 2 licensing basis has not been approved, or an action different than Unit 1 will be implemented, or the Unit 1 license basis has been modified in accordance with the 10 CFR 50.59 process. Items in this category require NRC review and approval.

To present the results of TVA's review of the WBN Unit 2 licensing basis, a series of tables (Tables 1 - 3) were developed. The four results described above were applied as appropriate to each of the tables. A brief description of these tables is provided below:

• Table 1 - Standard Review Plan/Safety Evaluation Report and Supplements (NUREG 0847) Review Matrix This table provides the previously described comparison of the Standard Review Plan to the Watts Bar Safety Evaluation Report and Supplements. TVA documented the results of the evaluation of Generic Communications in References 5 and 6. Open Generic Communications from that review that align with the Standard Review Plan/Safety Evaluation Sections are discussed in the applicable section of Table 1.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 January 29, 2008

• Table 2 - Other Generic Communications Affecting WBN Unit 2 License Basis This table captures the generic communications from the review that did not align with the standard review plan sections detailed in Table 1.

• Table 3 - Corrective Action Programs and Special Programs Table 3 provides a description of the Watts Bar Nuclear Performance Plan (NPP)

(Reference 7) Corrective Action Programs (CAPs) and Special Programs (SPs) and a summary of their proposed resolution for Unit 2. TVA evaluated these CAPs and SPs and determined that, with two exceptions, they will be resolved using the methodology employed for Unit 1.

At the request of your Staff, three additional tables (4-6) have been developed and sorted by the results of TVA's review. Table 4 contains those items requiring no further action, Table 5 contains the items recommended for implementation action review, and Table 6 contains items requiring NRC review and approval.

In Reference 2, the NRC Staff requested information to facilitate the reconstitution of the Unit 2 licensing basis. Enclosure 1 to this letter provides a response to each of the four items requested. In cases where information is not available at this time, a response date is provided. Enclosure 2 to this letter provides a summary of these dates as well as commitments associated with the actions outlined in Tables 1, 2, and 3.

New generic communications issued during the completion of construction and licensing activities for Unit 2 (e.g., Generic Letter 2008-01) will be responded to in accordance with the schedule requirement for the individual generic communication. This will allow consideration of both WBN units and aligns the licensing and design basis of the units to the fullest extent practicable.

During the review and development of Table 1, potential impacts to the Security and Emergency Plans were evaluated. It was determined that selected security boundaries may be altered during construction of Unit 2; however, these modifications would not result in a change to the Security Plan. At this time, it was also determined that the Emergency Plan was not affected. Future considerations are addressed under Unit 1's operating license, and are not discussed further in the regulatory framework.

Should TVA determine, based on further review or other emerging issues, that a different approach or additional action is appropriate, TVA will submit such changes to the NRC for review and concurrence. TVA will also provide periodic updates to the regulatory framework tables as actions are completed.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 4 January 29, 2008 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on the 29th day of January 2008. If you have any questions, please contact me at (423) 365-2351.

Sincerely, Masoud aj stani Watts B r it 2 Vice President

References:

1. TVA letter dated August 3, 2007, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 -

Reactivation of Construction Activities" (T90 070803 001)

2. NRC letter dated October 23, 2007, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 - Information Needed for Licensing Review Reconstitution" (L44 071106 003)

3. TVA letter dated April 3, 2007, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) - Unit 2 - Key Assumptions for the Possible Completion of Construction Activities" (L44 070403 001)

4. NRC Staff Requirements Memorandum SECY-07-0096, dated July 25, 2007, "Possible Reactivation of Construction and Licensing Activities for the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2"

5. TVA letter dated September 7, 2007, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) - Unit 2 -

Generic Communications Issued Prior to 1995" (T90 070911 001)

6. TVA letter dated September 7, 2007, 'Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) - Unit 2 - Initial Responses to Bulletins and Generic Letters" (T90 070911 002)

7. TVA letter dated September 6, 1991, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) - Nuclear Performance Plan, Volume 4, Revision 1" (L44 910906 804)

Enclosures cc: See page 5

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 5 January 29, 2008 Cc (Enclosures):

Lakshminarasimh Raghavan U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MS 08H4A One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738 Joseph Williams, Senior Project Manager (WBN Unit 2)

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738 Loren R. Plisco, Deputy Regional Administrator for Construction U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center, Suite 23T85 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8931 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303-8931 NRC Resident Inspector Unit 2 Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381

Enclosure 1 TVA Response to NRC's Request of Information Needed for Licensing Review Reconstitution In NRC's Letter entitled "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 - Information Needed for Licensing Review Reconstitution" (Reference 2), the following information was requested of TVA. In response, either an answer to the question or a date that TVA plans to submit an answer is provided.

1. In its August 3, 2007, letter, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) stated that it plans to provide a "red-line"version of the WBN Unit I Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), documenting differences between the current FSAR and the FSAR in place at the time the Unit 1 operating license was issued. This submittal will assist the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff in fulfilling the Commission's direction to use the Unit I current licensing basis as the reference basis for Unit 2. To fully implement the Commission's direction, please ensure your submittal addresses the following topics:

a. Describe the differences between WBN Units I and 2 expected at the time Unit 2 licensing is anticipated. For example, does TVA plan to request that Unit 2 be licensed at the power level currently describedin its operatinglicense application3411 megawatts thermal (MWt) or at the current Unit I licensed power level (3459 MWt) ?

b. Describe the process for evaluation of WBN Unit I modifications to be implemented on Unit 2 to identify whether a previous NRC safety evaluation will need to be revised. Existing licensing reviews for WBN Unit 2 containedin NUREG-0847, and its supplements, are for plant configurationsas describedin various revisions of the operating license application FSAR. It is the NRC's understandingthat TVA has completed modifications to WBN Unit I that it intends to implement on Unit 2, as well. If these modifications affect the configuration described in previous NRC safety evaluations,those evaluations may need to be revised to reflect the plant configuration as it will be completed.

c. Describe how TVA will ensure that engineeringand Title 10, Code of FederalRegulations, Section 50.59 evaluationsfor WBN Unit I modifications implemented since initiallicensing will remain valid when WBN Unit 2 begins operations.

d. Describe changes to the W..BN Unit I licensing basis that will be requiredto accommodate multi-unit operations Ado'. dscribe how TVA will demonstrate that the existing WBN Unit I configurationis applirableto Unit 2 for multi-unit operations.

Response

TVA plans to submit a "red-line" Final Safety Analysis Report on or before February 8, 2008. A response to each of the questions above will be provided in the submittal.

2. Operationof WBN Unit 2 will rely on common systems and structuresthat have alreadybeen in use supporting Unit I full-power operationsince 1996. Based on the expected completion of WBN Unit 2 in 2012 and issuance of a 40-year operatinglicense, these common systems and structures will be requiredto perform their intended functions well beyond the originalterm of the Unit I operating license. Additionally, Unit 2 components and structuresalready installed may have experienced degradationduring the period of time construction was suspended. Therefore, TVA should describe how it will ensure these common and previously-constructedsystems, structures, and components will be capable of performing their intended functions for the entire license term expected for WBN Unit 2.

Response

The common systems and structures that have already been in use supporting Unit 1 full-power operation will be subjected to an aging management review in accordance with 10CFR54. This review will be completed prior to Unit l's license expiration date.

Previously constructed systems and structures will be inspected and tested prior to turnover to plant operations. Any system, structure or component determined not to meet acceptance criteria will be repaired or replaced prior to system testing and turnover.

3. TVA has indicated that it intends to apply NuclearPerformance Plan (NPP)corrective action and special programsused for WBN Unit I to WBN Unit 2. The staff notes that the NRC has not issued a safety evaluation for these programs for WBN Unit 2. Therefore, TVA should confirm that previous NPP submittals for WBN Unit I are also applicableto Unit 2. TVA should identify if there are any cases where TVA wishes to revise a corrective action or special program for use on WBN Unit 2, along with a schedule for submittingjustification for the revision to NRC for its review.

Response

See Table 3 of the regulatory framework letter.

4. Please identify submittal dates for the following items:

a. Application for extension of the WBN Unit 2 construction permit

Response

TVA plans to submit an application for extension of the WBN Unit 2 construction permit on or before March 21, 2008.

b. Items given in Attachment 6 of the August 3, 2007, letter, if no date was provided.

Response

The following status is provided for the items listed on Attachment 6.

i. TVA will provide a regulatory framework submittal for WBN Unit 2 completion by January 31, 2008. Complete ii. TVA plans to provide a red-ine version of the WBN Unit 1 FSAR early in the project.

The schedule for submitting this markup FSAR will be provided in the regulatory framework document. As noted previously, TVA plans to submit the "red-line" FSAR on or before February 8, 2008.

iii. Subsequent to the initial submittal, TVA intends to provide updates, as appropriate, to the regulatory framework submittal until the WBN Unit 2 commitments related to fuel load, startup and power operation are complete. On-going iv. The WBN Unit 2 Pre-service Inspection (PSI) Program was last submitted to NRC on April 30, 1990. TVA will provide a revised program for NRC approval. TVA plans to submit the pre-service inspection program on or before October 30, 2008. TVA plans to submit PSI related relief requests on or before September 24, 2010.

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v. TVA will provide the Pressure Temperature Limits Report for WBN Unit 2 for NRC approval. TVA plans to submit the Pressure Temperature Limits Report with the license application update on or before March 26, 2010.

c. Topics that TVA has already identified as requiring NRC review to complete WBN Unit 2 licensing.

Response

TVA plans to submit the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement "Completion and Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2" on or before February 22, 2008.

TVA plans to submit a response to Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems," on or before October 10, 2008.

TVA plans to submit a waiver request to allow operators to hold a combined operating license for WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2 on or before October 23, 2009.

TVA plans to submit a WBN Unit 2 license application update including the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Technical Specifications, and Technical Requirements Manual on or before March 26, 2010.

Additional items known to require NRC review have been identified in the tables of the regulatory framework letter and this enclosure. At this time, no other items have been identified. If TVA determines, based on new information or emerging issues, that additional review action is required, TVA will notify NRC at the earliest opportunity.

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Enclosure 2 List of Commitments Summary of commitments from Tables 1, 2 and 3 and Enclosure 1 of this letter:

1. Update FSAR for present and projected population over the lifetime of the plant.

2. Update FSAR for potential external hazards and hazardous materials.

3. Update FSAR for projected annual number of aircraft flights.

4. Update FSAR for present and projected use of local and regional groundwater.

5. B 83-06, "Nonconforming Material Supplied by Tube-Line" - Implement as necessary.

6. B 80-04, "Analysis of PWR Main Steam Line Rupture with Continued Feedwater Addition" -

Complete analysis for Unit 2.

7. B 80-11, "Masonry Wall Design" - Complete implementation for Unit 2.

8. B 74-03, "Failure of Structural or Seismic Support Bolts on Class I Components" - Implement per NUREG-0577 as was done for Unit 1.

9. B 75-03, "Incorrect Lower Disc Spring and Clearance Dimension in Series 8300 8302 ASCO Solenoid Valves" - Modify valves not modified at factory.

10. B 75-05, "Operability of Category I Hydraulic Shock and Sway Suppressors" - Install proper' suppressors.

11. B 82-02, "Degradation of Threaded Fasteners in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of PWR Plants" - Implement same approach as Unit 1.

12. B 88-05, "Nonconforming materials supplied by Piping Supplies, Inc. and West Jersey Manufacturing Co. (WJM)" - Complete review to locate installed WJM material and perform in-situ hardness testing for Unit 2.

13. B 88-11, "Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification" - Complete modifications to accommodate surge line thermal movements and incorporate a temperature limitation during heatup and cooldown operations into Unit 2 procedures.

14. B 89-02, "Stress Corrosion Cracking of High Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Preloaded Bolting in Anchor Darling Model S350W Swing Check Valves or Valves of Similar Nature" -

Replace the flapper assembly hold-down bolts fabricated on the 14 (12 valves are installed)

Atwood and Morrell Mark No. 47W450-53 check valves. Replacement bolts are to be fabricated from ASTM F593 Alloy 630. A review of the remaining Unit 2 safety related swing check valves will be performed.

15. GL 95-07, "Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves" - Perform evaluation for pressure locking and thermal binding of safety related power-operated gate valves and take corrective actions for those valves identified as being susceptible.

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16. GL 80-14, "LWR Primary Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves" - Incorporate guidance into Technical Specifications.

17. GL 89-04, "Guidelines on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs" - Submit an ASME Section Xl Inservice Test Program for the first ten year interval six months before receiving an Operating License.

18. GL 89-10, "Safety Related Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Testing and Surveillance" -

Implement pressure testing and surveillance program for safety-related MOVs, satisfying the intent of GL 89-10.

19. GL 96-05, "Periodic Verification (PV) of Design Basis Capability of Safety-Related MOVs" -

TVA will implement the Joint Owner's Group recommended GL 96-05 MOV PV program and begin testing during the first refueling outage after startup.

20. B 78-04, "Environmental Qualification of Certain Stem Mounted Limit Switches Inside Reactor Containment" - Ensure NAMCO switches have been replaced.

21. ll.B.2, "Plant Shielding" - Complete Design Review of EQ of equipment for spaces/systems which may be used in post accident operations.

22. GL 93-04, "Rod Control System Failure and Withdrawal of Rod Control Cluster Assemblies" -

Implement modifications and testing.

23. B 96-01, "Control Rod Insertion Problems" - Issue Emergency Operating Procedure and provide core map.

24. TVA will use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

25. GL 86-09, "Technical Resolution of Generic Issue B-59-(N-1) Loop Operation in BWRs and PWRs"- Confirm Technical Specifications prohibit (N-I) Loop Operation.

26. Use Eagle-21 for Unit 2. NRC requested additional information December 27, 2007. -

Provide the additional information for NRC review.

27. TVA will replace the LPMS. Provide the startup test results and the alert level settings.

28. GL 82-28/l1.F.2, "Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation System". TVA to install the Westinghouse Common Q Post-Accident Monitoring System. - Install Westinghouse Common Q PAM system.

29. GL 96-03, "Relocation of the Pressure Temperature Limit Curves and Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System Limits" - Submit P-T limits and similar to Unit 1, upon approval, incorporate into licensee-controlled document.

30. GL 90-06, "Resolution of Generic Issues 70, "PORV and Block Valve Reliability," and 94, "Additional LTOP Protection for PWRs" - 1) Revise operating instruction and surveillance procedure; and 2) Incorporate testing requirements in the Technical Specifications.

31. ll.D.1, "Relief and Safety Valve Test Requirements" -1) Testing of relief and safety valves;

2) Reanalysis of fluid transient loads for pressurizer relief and safety valve supports and any required modifications; 3) Modifications to pressurizer safety valves, PORVs, PORV block valves and associated piping; and 4) Change motor operated block valves.

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32. GL 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Stainless Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants" - Implement program.

33. GL 97-01, "Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations" - Provide a report to address the inspection program.

34. B 88-09, "Thimble Tube Thinning in Westinghouse Reactors" - Inspect the thimble tubes during the first refueling outage.

35. B 01-01, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Head Penetration Nozzles" - Perform baseline inspection.

36. B 02-01, "RPV Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity" -

Perform baseline inspection.

37. B 02-02, "RPV Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection Program" - Perform baseline inspection.

38. B 03-02, "Leakage from RPV Lower Head Penetrations and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity" - Perform baseline inspection.

39. B 04-01, "Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at PWRs" - Provide details of pressurizer and penetrations and apply Material Stress Improvement Process.

40. Submit Inservice inspection (ISI) program within 6 months after receiving an operating license.

41. GL 88-11, "NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Material and its Impact on Plant Operations" - Use RG 1.99, Rev. 2 methodology for Pressure-Temperature (P-T) Limits curves. The Pressure Temperature Limits Report will be submitted with the license application on or before March 26, 2010.

42. GL 85-02, "Recommended Actions Stemming From NRC Integrated Program for the Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issues Regarding Steam Generator Tube Integrity" -

Perform SG inspection.

43. GL 95-03, "Circumferential Cracking of Steam Generator (SG) Tubes" - Perform baseline inspection.

44. GL 97-05, "SG Inspection Techniques" - TVA will employ the same approach used on the original Unit 1 SGs.

45. GL 97-06, "Degradation of SG Internals" - Perform SG inspections during each refueling outage.

46. GL 04-01, "Requirements for SG Tube Inspection" - Perform baseline inspection.

47. GL 06-01, "SG Tube Integrity and Associated Technical Specifications" - Include TSTF-449 in TS.

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48. B 89-01, "Failure of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Mechanical Plugs" - Remove SG tube plugs.

49. B 88-02, "Rapidly Propagating Fatigue Cracks in Steam Generator Tubes" - Evaluate E/C data to determine anti-vibration bar penetration depth; perform T/H analysis to identify susceptible tubes; modify, if necessary.

50. Verify that the RHR flow alarm to alert the operator to initiate alternate cooling modes in the event of loss of RHR pump suction is installed.

51. GL 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal" - Implement modifications to provide RCS temperature, RV level and RHR system performance.

52. B 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor Cooling Systems" - Implement program to prevent thermal stratification.

53. B 88-04, "Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss" - Perform calculations and install check valves to prevent pump to pump interaction.

54. GL 81-21 "Natural Circulation Cooldown" - Issue operating procedures.

55. ll.B.1," Installation of reactor coolant vents" - Verify installation of reactor coolant vents.

56. 11.F.1," Accident monitoring instrumentation containment pressure" - Verify installation of containment pressure indication.

57. II.F.1 ," Accident monitoring instrumentation containment water level" - Verify installation of containment water level monitors.

58. B 77-04, "Calculation Error Affecting Performance of a System for Controlling pH of Containment Sump Water Following a LOCA" - Ensure Technical Specifications includes limit on Boron concentration.

59. II.E.4.2," Containment isolation dependability" - Reflect valve opening restriction (lower containment isolation valves are physically blocked to an opening angle of 50 degrees or less.) in the Technical Specifications.

60. The hydrogen recombiners will be removed from the Unit 2 design and licensing basis based on 10 CFR 50.44 (final rule September 16, 2003) and abandoned in place.

61. 11.F.1," Accident monitoring instrumentation containment hydrogen" - Verify installation of containment hydrogen accident monitoring instrumentation.

62. GL 97-04, "Assurance of Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head for Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Heat Removal Pumps" - Install new sump strainers, and perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.

63. GL 98-02, "Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Associated Potential for Loss of Emergency Mitigating Functions While in a Shutdown Condition" - 1) Review the ECCS designs to ensure they do not contain design features which can render them susceptible to common-cause failures; and 2) document the results.

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64. GL 98-04, "Potential for Degradation of the ECCS and the Containment Spray System Because of Construction and Protective Coating Deficiencies and Foreign Material in Containment" - Install new sump strainers, and perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.

65. GL 04-02, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at PWRs - Install new sump strainers, and perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.

66. B 79-24,"Frozen Lines" - Insulate the section of piping in the containment spray full-flow test line that is exposed to outside air. Confirm installation of heat tracing on the sensing lines off the feedwater flow elements.

67. B 80-18, "Maintenance of Adequate Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal Charging Pumps Following a Secondary Side High Energy Rupture" - Implement design and procedure changes.

68. GL 03-01, "Control Room Habitability" - Incorporate TSTF-448 into Technical Specifications.

69. GL 89-08, "Erosion / Corrosion Induced Pipe Wall Thinning" - Prepare FAC procedure and perform baseline inspections.

70. Resolve issue of methodology for determining, setting, and evaluating as-found setpoints for drift susceptible instruments using the BFN TS-453 precedent (see NRC ML061680008).

71. B 79-21, "Temperature Effects on Level Measurements" - Update accident calculation.

72. B 80-06, "Engineered Safety Features Reset Control" - Perform verification during the preoperational testing.

73. B 79-27, "Loss of Non-class 1 E I&C Power System Bus During Operation" - Issue appropriate emergency procedures.

74. II.F.1.2, "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation" - Install Noble gas (NCO850192009), Iodine /

particulate sampling, and Containment High Range Monitors.

75. GL 89-19, "Request for Actions Related to Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47 "Safety Implication of Control Systems in LWR Nuclear Power Plants" - Perform evaluation of common mode failures due to fire.

76. lI.D.3, "Valve Position Indication" - Verify installation of the acoustic monitoring system to PORV to indicate position.

77. II.K.3.9, "Proportional Integral Derivative Controller Modification" - Set the derivative time constant to zero.

78. GL 2006-02, "Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power" - complete the two unit baseline electrical calculations and implementing procedures.

79. GL 1996-01, "Testing of Safety-Related Circuits" - Implement Recommendations.

80. GL 2007-01, "Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients" - Complete testing of four additional cables.

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81. II.E.3.1, "Emergency Power for Pressurizer Heaters" - Implement procedures and testing.

82. GL 79-36, "Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages" - Perform verification of adequacy of voltages during the preoperational testing.

83. II.G.1, "Power Supplies for Pressurized Relief Valves, Block Valves and Level Indicators" -

Implement modifications such that PORVS and associated Block Valves are powered from same train but different buses.

84. Implement SBO requirements.

85. B 89-03, "Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations" -

Ensure that requirements for fuel assembly configuration, fuel loading and training are included in Unit 2.

86. B 84-03, "Refueling Cavity Water Seal" - Ensure appropriate abnormal operating instructions (AOIs) are used for Unit 2.

87. B 96-02/GL 81-07, "Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor, or Over Safety-Related Equipment" - Unit 2 Heavy Loads Program will be in compliance with NUREG-0612.

88. Implement NEI guidance on heavy loads.

89. Appropriate measures will be taken to ensure that the ERCW system is fully capable of meeting design requirements for two unit operation.

90. GL 89-13, "Service Water Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment" - 1) Implement initial performance testing of the heat exchangers; and 2) Establish eddy current baseline data for the Containment Spray heat exchangers.

91. GL 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions" - Implement modification to provide containment penetration relief.

92. Relocate component cooling thermal barrier booster pumps above probable maximum flood (PMF) level for Unit 2.

93. GL 88-14, "Instrument Air Supply System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment" -

Complete Unit 2 implementation.

94. ll.B.3, "Post Accident Sampling" - Unit 2 Technical Specifications will eliminate requirements for the Post Accident Sampling System.

95. B 80-05/GL 80-21, "Vacuum Condition Resulting in Damage to Chemical Volume Control System Holdup Tank" - Complete surveillance procedures for Unit 2.

96. B 92-01, "Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System to Perform its Specified Fire Endurance Function" / GL 92-08, "Thermolag 330-1 Fire Barriers" - 1) Review Watts Bar design and installation requirements for Thermolag 330-1 fire barrier system and evaluate the Thermolag currently installed in Unit 2. 2) Remove and replace, as required, or prepare an approved deviation.

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97. Perform testing of communication systems on Unit 2.

98. Include secondary water chemistry monitoring and control program in the administrative section of the Technical Specifications.

99. B 85-01 / GL 88-03, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps" - Procedures and hardware will be in place to ensure recognition of indications of steam binding and maintenance of system operability until check valves are repaired and back leakage stopped.

100. I1.E. 1.1, "Auxiliary Feedwater System Evaluation, Modifications" - Perform Auxiliary Feedwater System analysis as it pertains to system failure and flow rate.

101. B 80-10, "Contamination of Non-radioactive Systems and Resulting Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release of Radioactivity to the Environment" - Correct deficiencies involving monitoring of systems.

102. II1.D.1.1, "Primary Coolant Outside Containment" - Include the waste gas disposal system in the leakage reduction program and incorporate in Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

103. II.F.1, "Accident monitoring instrumentation high range in- containment monitor"- Install high range in-containment monitor for Unit 2.

104. II1.D.3.3, "In-plant Monitoring of 12 radiation monitoring" - Complete modifications for Unit 2.

105. Implement the alternate ISEG that was approved for the rest of the TVA units including WBN Unit 1 by NRC August 26, 1999. The function will be performed by the site engineering organizations.

106. I.C.7, "NSSS vendor revision of procedures" - Revise power ascension and emergency procedures which were reviewed by Westinghouse.

107. l.C.8, "Pilot monitoring of selected emergency procedures for NTOLs" - Pilot monitor selected emergency procedures for NTOL.

108. I.C.1, "Short term accident and procedure review" - Implement upgraded EOPs, including validation and training.

109. II.K.3.3, "Reporting of SRVChallenges and Failures" (action from GL 82-16) - Include, as necessary, in Technical Specifications submittal.

110. Amend FSAR Chapter 14 to reflect the capability of each CSST to carry the loads of one unit under LOCA conditions in addition to power required for shutting down the non-accident unit.

111. Notify NRC within 30 days of any changes to the Startup Test Program made under 10 CFR 50.59.

112. GL 85-12/l1.K.3.5, "Implementation of TMI Item I1.K.3.5"- Implement modifications for automatic trip of reactor coolant pumps during a small break LOCA as required.

113. II.K.3.30/II.K.3.31, "Small break LOCA methods/Plant specific analysis" - Complete analysis for Unit 2.

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114. B 87-02, "Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance with Applicable Material Specifications" - Complete for Unit 2, using information used for Unit 1, as applicable.

115. Implement Maintenance Rule for Unit 2 systems 1 month prior to fuel load.

116. I.D.1, "Control Room Design Review" - TVA will complete the CRDR process. Perform rewiring in accordance with ECN 5982. TVA will take advantage of the completed Human Engineering reviews to ensure appropriate configuration for Unit 2 control panels. See CRDR Special Program Table 3.

117. II1.D.3.4, "Control Room Habitability" - Complete with CRDR completion. )

118. I.D.2/GL 82-33/GL 89-06, "Safety Parameter Display System" (SPDS)/"Requirements for Emergency Response Capability" - Install SPDS (NCO86001 1001) and have it operational prior to start-up after the first refueling outage.

119. IEB 74-15," Misapplication of Cutler-Hammer Three Position Maintained Switch Model No.

10250T" - Install modified A3 Cutler-Hammer 10250T switches.

120. IEB 75-08," PWR Pressure Instrumentation" - Ensure that Technical Specifications and Site Operating Instructions address importance of maintaining temperature and pressure within prescribed limits.

121. IEB 77-03," On-Line Testing of the W Solid State Protection System" - Include necessary periodic testing in test procedures.

122. IEB 80-10," Contamination of Non-radioactive System and Resulting Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release of Radioactivity to Environment" - Include proper monitoring of non-radioactive systems in procedures.

123. IEB 83-04," Failure of the Undervoltage Trip Function of Reactor Trip Breakers' - Install new undervoltage attachment with wider grooves on the reactor trip breakers.

124. IEB 85-02," Undervoltage Trip Attachment of W DB-50 Type Reactor Trip Breakers" - Install automatic shunt trip on the Westinghouse DS-416 reactor trip breakers on Unit 2.

125. IEB 88-10," Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers" - Replace those circuits not traceable to a circuit breaker manufacturer.

126. IEB 90-01," Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount" - For Unit 2, implement applicable recommendations from this bulletin including identification of potentially defective transmitters and an enhanced surveillance program which monitors transmitters for loss of fill oil.

127. GL 83-28, "Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events" - 2.2 -

Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface (All SR Components) - Enter engineering component background data in NPRDS for Unit 2. and 3.2 - Post-Maintenance Testing (All SR Components) -Test and maintenance procedures and Technical Specifications will include post-maintenance operability testing of other (than reactor trip system) safety-related components.

128. GL 88-20," Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerability" - Complete evaluation for Unit 2.

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129. 11.K.1.10," Operability status" - Confirm multi-unit operation will have no impact on administrative procedures with respect to operability status.

130. 11.K.3.10," Anticipatory trip at high power" - Unit 2 Technical Specifications and surveillance procedures will address this issue.

131. For the Unit 2 Cable CAP sub issues: cable jamming, cable pullbys, cable sidewall bearing pressure, pulling cable through 901 condulet and flexible conduit and computerized cable routing system software, TVA will submit a justification for use of a different approach by May 16, 2008. For the other cable CAP sub issues, Unit 2 will follow the Unit 1 approach.

132. For the Unit 2 Electrical Issues CAP sub issue coil-to-contact and contact-to-contact, TVA will submit a justification for use of a different approach by May 16, 2008. For the other Electrical Issues CAP sub issues, Unit 2 will follow the Unit 1 approach.

133. TVA will implement the following Corrective Action Programs for Unit 2 with the Unit 1 approach: Cable Tray Supports, Conduit Supports, Design Baseline Verification Program, Equipment Seismic Qualification, Fire Protection, Hanger Update and Analysis Program, Heat Code Traceability, HVAC duct Supports, Instrument Sensing Lines, QA Records, Q-List, Replacement Items, Seismic Analysis, Vendor Information and Welding.

134. TVA will implement the following Special Programs for Unit 2 with the Unit 1 approach:

Containment Cooling, Control Room Design Review, Equipment Qualification, Master Fuse List, Mechanical Equipment Qualification, Microbiologically Induced Corrosion, Moderate Energy Line Break, Radiation Monitoring System and Use-as-is CAQs.

135. TVA plans to submit the "red-line" Final Safety Analysis Report on or before February 8, 2008.

136. The common systems and structures that have already been in use supporting Unit 1 full-power operation will be subjected to an aging management review in accordance with 10CFR54. This review will be completed prior to Unit l's license expiration date.

137. The application for extension of the WBN Unit 2 construction permit is scheduled for submittal on or before March 21, 2008.

138. TVA will provide a revised pre-service inspection program for NRC approval. TVA plans to submit the pre-service inspection program on or before October 30, 2008. TVA plans to submit PSI related relief requests on or before September 24, 2010.

139. TVA will provide the Pressure Temperature Limits Report for WBN Unit 2 for NRC approval.

TVA plans to submit the Pressure Temperature Limits Report with the license application update on or before March 26, 2010.

140. TVA plans to submit the Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement "Completion and Operation of Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2" on or before February 22, 2008.

141. TVA plans to submit a response to Generic Letter 2008-01, "Managing Gas Accumulation in Emergency Core Cooling, Decay Heat Removal, and Containment Spray Systems," on or before October 10, 2008.

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142. TVA plans to submit a waiver request to allow operators to hold a combined operating license for WBN Unit 1 and Unit 2 on or before October 23, 2009.

143. TVA plans to submit a WBN Unit 2 license application update including Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), Technical Specifications, and Technical Requirements Manual on or before March 26, 2010.

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Table 1 - Standard Review Plan I Safety Evaluation Report and Supplements (NUREG 0847) Review Matrix Chapter 2 - Site Characteristics Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems Chapter 4 - Reactor Chapter 5 - Reactor Coolant System and Connected Systems Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Controls Chapter 8 - Electric Power Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems Chapter 10 - Steam and Power Conversion System Chapter 11 - Radioactive Waste Management Chapter 12 - Radiation Protection Chapter 13 - Conduct of Operations Chapter 14 - Initial Test Program Chapter 15 - Accident Analysis Chapter 16 - Technical Specifications Chapter 17 - Quality Assurance Chapter 18 - Control Room Design Review The NRC issued an OL Safety Evaluation Report (SER), NUREG-0847 for Watts Bar Unit 1 and Unit 2 in June 1982. The SER documented NRC's review of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 design against Federal Regulations, construction permit criteria, and the NRC Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for Nuclear Power Plants ("SRP") otherwise known as NUREG-0800 (Revision 2 dated July 1981). Open issues raised by the review in the SER that were not closed out when the SER was issued were classified into outstanding issues, confirmatory issues, and proposed license conditions. The staff listed 17 outstanding issues in the SER. Additional outstanding issues were added in Supplemental SERs (SSERs) for a total of 28. The SER listed 42 confirmatory actions; issue 43 was added in SSER6. There were 44 proposed Licensing Conditions.

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information Chapter 2 - Site Characteristics 2.1.1 - Site Location and Original 1982 SER Description 2.1.2 - Exclusion Area Original 1982 SER Authority and Control 2.1.3 - Population Original 1982 SER L- SRP requirement. Unit 2 action - Update FSAR for Distribution present and projected population over the lifetime of the plant.

2.2.1 - 2.2.2 - Original 1982 SER L- SRP requirement. Unit 2 action - Update FSAR for Identification of Potential potential external hazards and hazardous materials.

Hazards in Site Vicinity 3.5.1.5 - Site Proximity Original 1982 SER L- SRP requirement. Unit 2 action - Update FSAR for Missiles (Except Aircraft) projected annual number of aircraft flights.

3.5.1.6 - Aircraft Hazards 2.2.3 - Evaluation of Original 1982 SER Potential Accidents 2.3.1- Regional Original 1982 SER Climatology 2.3.2 - Local Meteorology Original 1982 SER 2.3.3 - Onsite Original 1982 SER Meteorological Measurements Programs 2.3.4 - Short-term Original 1982 SER Dispersion Estimates for Accidental Atmospheric Releases T1 - 2 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 2.3.5 2.3.5 - Long-term Original 1982 SER Diffusion Estimates 2.4.2 2.4.1 - Hydrologic Original 1982 SER Description 2.4.3 2.1.1 -Site Location and Original 1982 SER Description 2.4.3 2.4.2 Floods Original 1982 SER GL 89-22 C - GL 89-22, "Potential For Increased Roof Load Due to Changes in Maximum Precipitation" - Answer to informal question provided in TVA letter dated December 16, 1981, and subsequently included in FSAR. GL did not require a response. No further action required.

2.4.3 2.4.3 - Probable Original 1982 SER Maximum Flood (PMF) on Streams and Rivers 2.4.3 2.4.4 - Potential Dam Original 1982 SER Failures 2.4.3, 2.4.10 - Flooding Original 1982 SER 2.4.10 Protection Requirements 2.4.6 2.4.11 - Cooling Water Original 1982 SER Supply 2.4.7 - 2.4.12 - Groundwater 2.4.8 - Confirmatory SSER3 - January C - Amendment 50 to the FSAR (May 1, 1984) provided a 2.4.8 issue for design basis 1985 description of the analysis used to determine the 25-year groundwater level for groundwater level for the ERCW pipeline. Staff closed ERCW pipeline issue in SSER3.

2.4.9 2.4.13 - Accidental Original 1982 SER L- SRP requirement. Unit 2 action - Update FSAR for Releases of Liquid present and projected use of local and regional Effluents in Ground and groundwater.

Surface Waters T1 -3 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 2.4.2- 2.4.14 - Technical Original 1982 SER 2.4.3 Specifications and Emergency Operation Requirements 2.5, 2.5.1 2.5.1 - Basic Geologic Original 1982 SER and Seismic Information 2.5 2.5.2 - Vibratory Ground Original 1982 SER Motion 2.5 2.5.3 - Surface Faulting Original 1982 SER 2.5.4 2.5.4 - Stability of 2.5.4 - Outstanding SSER3 - January C - Amendment 50 to the FSAR (May 1, 1984) provided a Subsurface Materials and issue on liquefaction 1985 description of the underground barriers along the ERCW Foundations beneath ERCW pipelines. Staff agreed the barriers provide sufficient pipelines and Class 1E confinement to any liquefied soil. Staff closed issue in electrical conduit. SSER3.

2.5.4 - Confirmatory SSER3 - January C - Staff performed audit in September 1982, and issue for material and 1985 determined TVA had used reasonable assumptions. Staff geometric damping in closed issue in SSER3.

soil-structure interaction (SSI) analysis 2.5.4 - Confirmatory SSER3 - January C - Staff performed audit in September 1982, and issue for analysis of 1985 determined TVA had used reasonable assumptions. Staff sheetpile walls closed issue in SSER3.

2.5.4 - Confirmatory SSER3 - January C - Analysis was presented to staff in September 1983.

issue for design 1985 Staff found analysis and results acceptable. Staff closed differential settlement of issue in SSER3.

piping and electrical components 2.5.5 2.5.5 - Stability of Slopes Original 1982 SER T1 - 4 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information Chapter 3 - Design of Structures, Components, Equipment, and Systems 3.2.1 3.2.1 - Seismic 3.2.1 - Confirmatory SSER5 - C - Staff verified that required portion of ERCW had been Classification Issue for ERCW November 1990 upgraded or replaced satisfactorily in SSER5 and closed upgrade to seismic this issue.

category 1 3.2.1 - Confirmatory SSER5 - C - Staff closed issue on ERCW seismic category upgrade issue for seismic November 1990 and seismic classification in SSER5.

classification of structures, systems, and components important to safety 3.2.2 3.2.2 - System Quality Original 1982 SER B 83-06 I - B 83-06, "Nonconforming Material Supplied by Tube-Group Classification Line" - NRC SER for both units dated September 23, 1991, provided an alternate acceptance for fittings supplied by Tube-Line. Unit 2 Action - Implement as necessary.

3.3.1 3.3.1 -Wind Loadings Original 1982 SER 3.3.2 3.3.2 -Tornado Loadings Original 1982 SER 3.4 3.4.1 - Flood Protection Original 1982 SER 3.5.1.1 3.5.1.1 - Internally Original 1982 SER Generated Missiles (Outside Containment) 3.5.1.2 3.5.1.2 - Internally Original 1982 SER Generated Missiles (Inside Containment) 3.5.1.3 3.5.1.3 - Turbine Missiles Original 1982 SER 3.5.1.4 3.5.1.4- Missiles Original 1982 SER Generated by Natural Phenomenon T1 - 5 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

r Approval Guidance 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unitfor 2 WBN Approval Reference (GL, Bulletins)

Note 1 Additional Information 3.5.1.4 3.5.1.5 - Site Proximity Original 1982 SER Missiles (Except Aircraft) 3.5.2 3.5.2 - Structures, 3.5.2 - Confirmatory SSER2 - January C - TVA submitted a proposed design modification for Systems, and Issue for modifications to 1984 installation of a reinforced concrete curb around the diesel Components to be protect Diesel exhaust stacks to protect them from damage in a letter protected from Externally Generators dated November 24, 1982. The staff found this acceptable Generated Missiles and closed this issue in SSER2.

3.5.3 3.5.3 - Barrier Design Original 1982 SER Procedures 3.6.1 3.6.1 - Plant Design for 3.6.1 - Outstanding SSER14 - C - In a letter dated November 30, 1992, TVA submitted a Protection Against issue involving main December 1994 new evaluation for both Units 1 and 2 accounting for Postulated Piping Failures steam line break (MSLB) increased environmental temperatures in the MSVV rooms in Fluid Systems Outside outside containment

• due to release of superheated steam and later submitted, Containment by letter dated March 28, 1994, additional information related to the assumptions made in this analysis. The staff reviewed this information together with their detailed evaluation and acceptance of the same methodology applied at Sequoyah and concluded that the MSLB analysis for the WBN MSVV rooms, including the effects of superheated steam, was acceptable and identified this issue as resolved in SSER14.

3.6.2 3.6.2 - Determination of Original 1982 SER B 80-04 I - B 80-04, "Analysis of PWR Main Steam Line Rupture Rupture Locations and with Continued Feedwater Addition" - IR 50-390/85-60 and Dynamic Effects 50-391/85-49 (December 6, 1985) required completion of Associated with the actions that included determination of temperature profiles Postulated Rupture of inside and outside of containment following a MSLB for Piping Unit 1. Unit 2 Action - Complete analysis for Unit 2.

NA 3.6.3 - Leak-Before- Not addressed in New section SRP Break Evaluation Original 1982 SER 1987 - Approved Procedures in SSER5-I I_ I November 1990 T1 - 6 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 3.7.1 3.7.1 - Seismic Design 3.7 - Outstanding issue SSER8 - January C - The staff reviewed FSAR Amendment 68 and found Parameters involving update of 1992 that required changes had been incorporated into the FSAR for seismic design FSAR, as committed to in TVA letter dated December 18, issues 1990, and issue was deemed resolved in SSER8.

3.7.2 3.7.2 - Seismic System 3.7.2.1.2 - Outstanding SSER8 - January C - In a letter dated May 8, 1991, TVA provided Analysis issue involving mass 1992 clarification that actual mass eccentricities from such items eccentricity as equipment hatch and lock used in evaluating the steel containment vessel for an earthquake load were replaced by a 5% accidental eccentricity. This was demonstrated to be conservative. TVA also proposed a revision to the FSAR to document this change. The staff found this acceptable and resolved this issue in SSER8.

3.7.2.12 - Outstanding SSER1 1 - C - The staff considered this item (opened in SSER6) issue involving April 1993 resolved in SSER1 1 based on audits and inspections comparison of Set A vs. since SSER6.

Set B response 3.7.3 3.7.3 - Seismic 3.7.3 - Outstanding SSER8 - January C - In a letter dated May 8, 1991, WVA proposed to revise Subsystem Analysis issue involving number 1992 the FSAR for ASME Section III Class I piping analysis to of peak cycles to be include the assumption of 5 OBEs and 1 SSE and a used for OBE minimum of 10 peak stress cycles per event. The staff accepted this in SSER8.

-+ *1-3.7.3 - Outstanding Code case use, C - The staff reviewed the list of specific ASME Code issue involving use of damping factors cases TVA intended to use and found that they were either code cases, damping for conduit incorporated into the ASME Code or endorsed in Position factors for conduit and SSER8 - January C.1 of RG 1.84. This issue was considered resolved in use of worst case, 1992, (CAP/SP SSER8. For damping, the staff found the use of 4%

critical case and implementation damping for OBE and 7% damping for SSE acceptable bounding case issue resolved in based on the information in a TVA letter dated August 22, IR 390/93-201) 1991, and considered the issue resolved in SSER8.

T1 - 7 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1- Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information I - Deficiencies identified in the use of worst case, critical case and bounding calculations were resolved in IR 50-390/93-201, and this issue was considered resolved for Unit 1 in SSER12. Unit 2 Action - CAP/SP see Table 3.

The Unit 1 approach will be used for Unit 2.

1- Conduit Supports Corrective Action Program. Process was reviewed and determined to be acceptable for Unit 1 in SER dated September 1, 1989. Unit 2 Action - CAP/SP see Table 3. The Unit 1 approach will be used for Unit 2.

3.7.3 - Outstanding SSER9 - C - The staff reviewed verification studies performed by issue involving 1.2 June 1992 TVA to justify the use of a 1.2 multi-mode factor in seismic multi-mode factor evaluation of certain sub-systems in SSER8 and SSER9 and, after TVA provided further confirmation of supporting calculations, the use of Complete Quadratic Combinations and validity of two degree of freedom predictions in a letter dated October 10, 1991, the staff considered this issue resolved in SSER9.

3.7.4 3.7.4 - Seismic Original 1982 SER Instrumentation NA 3.8.1 - Concrete Reviewed using SRP 3.8.2 and 3.8.3.

Containment 3.8.1 3.8.2 - Steel Containment 3.8.1 - Confirmatory SSER3 - January C.- In response to staff concern, TVA submitted a letter issue to verify buckling 1985 dated May 16, 1984, stating that TVA calculations already methodology accounted for new information from NRC-sponsored research programs, particularly information concerning reinforcement around shell (vessel) opening. Based on their review of the response, the staff closed this issue in SSER3.

T1 -8 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Approval for WBN 1G1 Approval uidance (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2. Reference Note I Additional Information 3.8 - Outstanding issue SSER9 - C - In response to staff concerns regarding use of ductility involving load June 1992 ratio when considering thermally induced stresses, TVA combinations and stress stated in a letter dated April 6, 1992, that they would use a allowables methodology consistent with SRP 3.8.4 for the design of steel members and use the linear elastic provision of DG-C 1.6.12, Rev. 1, "Evaluation of Steel Structures with Thermal Restraint," except for the energy balance provision of Section C.2.3.1. The staff found this acceptable. TVA also agreed, in its May 8, 1991, letter, that any further sampling of structural welds after the issuance of NCIG-2, Rev. 2 would be to that revision. This issue was resolved in SSER9.

3.8.2 3.8.3 - Concrete and Steel Original 1982 SER Internal Structures of Steel or Concrete Containments 3.8.3 3.8.4 - Other Seismic Original 1982 SER B 80-11 I - B 80-11, "Masonry Wall Design" - NRC accepted all but Category I Structures completion of corrective actions in IR 50-390/93-01 and 50-391/93-01(February 25, 1993) and closed for Unit 1 in IR 50-390/95-46 (August 1, 1995). Unit 2 Action -

Complete implementation for Unit 2.

3.8.4 3.8.5 - Foundations Original 1982 SER 3.9.1 3.9.1 -Special Topics for 3.9.1 - Outstanding SSER13 - C - In response to NRC concern regarding TVA's piping Mechanical Components issue involving April 1994 analysis that postulated failure of certain supports, TVA assumption in piping submitted an August 4, 1992, letter stating that, where analysis for possible, supports were upgraded in the analysis to water-hammer due to maintain structural integrity during the postulated loading check valve slam scenario. The issue was resolved in SSER13.

T1 - 9 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information 3.9.2.1, 3.9.2 - Dynamic Testing Original 1982 SER 3.9.2.2, and Analysis of Systems, 3.9.2.3 Components, and and Equipment 13.9.2.4 3.9.3.1, 3.9.3 - Special Topics for 3.9.3.1 - Outstanding SSER8 - C - TVA stated in a letter dated December 18, 1990, that it 3.9.3.2, Mechanical Components issue involving use of March 1985 was performing a verification program to validate the 3.9.3.3 experience data to original seismic design basis for Category I(L) piping, and qualify category I(L) including a screening criteria based on earthquake 3.9.3.4 piping experience data to identify items requiring further evaluation and bounding case analysis to demonstrate the conservatism of the screening criteria. In a September 20, 1991, letter, TVA provided revised criteria for the bounding case analysis. Based on the staffs' evaluation, the issue was considered resolved in SSER8.

B 74-03 I - B 74-03, "Failure of Structural or Seismic Support Bolts on Class I Components" - Approach accepted in IR 50-390/85-08 and 50-391/85-08 (March 29, 1985).

Unit 2 Action - Implement per NUREG-0577 as was done for Unit 1.

B 75-03 I - B 75-03, "Incorrect Lower Disc Spring and Clearance Dimension in Series 8300 8302 ASCO Solenoid Valves" -

NRC accepted in IR 50-390/75-6 and 50-391/75-6 (August 21, 1975). Unit 2 Action - Modify valves not modified at factory.

B 75-05 I - B 75-05, "Operability of Category I Hydraulic Shock and Sway Suppressors" - NRC accepted in IR 50-390/75-6 and 50-391/75-6 (August 21, 1975). Unit 2 Action - Install proper suppressors.

T1 - 10 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information B 79-02 I - B 79-02, "Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts" - NRC review of HAAUP Program in NUREG-1232, SSER6 (April 1991) and SSER8 (January 1992). Unit 2 Actions - CAP/SP see Table 3. Conduct a complete review of affected support calculations, and perform the necessary revisions to design documents and field modifications to achieve compliance.

B 79-14 I - B 79-14, "Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems" - NRC review of HAAUP Program in NUREG-1232, SSER6 (April 1991) and SSER8 (January 1992) - Unit 2 Actions - CAP/SP see Table 3. Initiate a Unit 2 hanger walkdown and hanger analysis program similar to the program for Unit 1. Complete re-analysis of piping and associated supports as necessary. Perform modifications as required by re-analysis.

B 82-02 I - B 82-02, "Degradation of Threaded Fasteners in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of PWR Plants" -

Approach accepted in IR 50-390/85-08 and 50-391/85-08 (March 29, 1985). Unit 2 Action - Implement same approach as Unit 1.

B 88-05 I - B 88-05, "Nonconforming materials supplied by Piping Supplies, Inc. and West Jersey Manufacturing Co. (WJM)"

- NRC reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

Unit 2 Action - Complete review to locate installed WJM material and perform in-situ hardness testing for Unit 2.

T1 - 11 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

I I Approval for WBN Approval I Guidance (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information B 88-11 I - B 88-11, "Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification"

- NRC SER on "Leak-Before-Break" (April 28, 1993) and review in SSER16 (September 1995). Unit 2 Action -

Complete modifications to accommodate Surge Line thermal movements and incorporate a temperature limitation during heatup and cooldown operations into Unit 2 procedures.

B 89-02 I - B 89-02, "Stress Corrosion Cracking of High Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Preloaded Bolting in Anchor Darling Model S350W Swing Check Valves or Valves of Similar Nature" - NRC reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995). Unit 2 Actions - Replace the flapper assembly hold-down bolts fabricated on the 14 (12 valves are installed) Atwood and Morrell Mark No. 47W450-53 check valves. Replacement bolts are to be fabricated from ASTM F593 Alloy 630. A review of the remaining Unit 2 safety related swing check valves will be performed.

3.9.3.3 - Outstanding SSER7 - C - In a letter dated June 21, 1991, TVA responded to issue involving operating September 1991 NRC concerns regarding the design and installation of characteristics of main MSSVs stated th'*t all valves and piping components were steam safety valves analyzed for all MSSV discharge loads acting simultaneously, combined with other required loads and this was accepted by the staff. In the same letter, TVA also provided the method used to establish the MSSV adjustment ring settings for plant valves and this was acceptable to the staff. This resolved the issue in SSER7.

T1 - 12 C - Item dosed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information GL 95-07 I - GL 95-07, "Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves" - Unit 1 SER for GL 95-07 dated Sept 15, 1999. Unit 2 Action -

Perform evaluation for pressure locking and thermal binding of safety related power-operated gate valves and take corrective actions for those valves identified as being susceptible.

3.9.3.4 - Outstanding SSER4 - C - In a letter dated May 14, 1984, TVA provided results of issue, staff was awaiting March 1985 a sampling program and determined that compressive TVA concurrence on stresses for pipe supports did not exceed acceptance their position with criteria established by NRC and staff considered this issue respect to margin for resolved in SSER4.

critical buckling of pipe GL 78-02 C - GL 78-02, "Asymmetric Loads Background and supports Revised Request for Additional Information" - NRC reviewed in SSER1 5 - Appendix C (June 1995) -

Resolved by approval of leak-before-break analysis.

GL 80-14 T - GL 80-14, "LWR Primary Coolant System Pressure.

Isolation Valves" - NRC reviewed in SSER6 (April 1991).

Unit 2 Action - Incorporate guidance into Technical Specifications.

GL 80-46/47 C - GL 80-46/47, "Fracture Toughness and Additional Guidance on Potential for Low Fracture Toughness and Lamellar Tearing on PWR Steam Generator and Coolant Pump Supports." - No response was required for this GL and NUREG-0577 states that the lamellar tearing aspect of this issue was resolved by the NUREG. Further, the NUREG states that for plants under review, the fracture toughness issue was resolved.

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T1 - 13 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

I I Approval for WBN Approval Guidance (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 3.9.3.4 - Confirmatory SSER8 - January C - The TVA response to this issue, in a letter dated July issue involving 1992 26, 1991, described an update to the previous response baseplate flexibility and for B 79-02 and its civil design standard for concrete its effect on anchor bolt anchorage, which incorporated an increase in anchor loads stiffness and consideration of prying forces for thin baseplates analyzed by hand. The staff determined that this adequately resolved the issue in SSER8.

3.9.3.4 - Outstanding SSER8 - January C - TVA program to demonstrate that change in design issue involving stiffness 1992 criteria which uses stiffness and deflection limits for and deflection limits for Category I pipe supports did not compromise the seismic Category I pipe adequacy of pipe supports was found to be acceptable by supports the staff and the issue was resolved in SSER8.

3.9.3.3 - LC - Relief and SSER3 -January C - Staff found TVA approach in response to this issue, safety valve testing 1985 using information from EPRI valve test program and (Il.D.1) performing modifications to safety and relief discharge piping and supports, was acceptable. Issue was considered resolved in SSER3.

3.9.4 3.9.4 - Control Rod Drive Original 1982 SER Systems 3.9.5 3.9.5 - Reactor Pressure Original 1982 SER Vessel Internals T1 - 14 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 3.9.6 3.9.6 - Inservice Testing 3.9.6 - Outstanding SSER14 - T - The safety evaluation in SSER14 states that the staff of Pumps and Valves issue required that December 1994 did not find any IST issues that would prevent issuance of Technical Specifications an operating license for Unit 1. The item was resolved in include limiting condition SSER14. Unit 2 Action - Submit Technical Specifications.

for operation that GL 89-04 L - GL 89-04, "Guidelines on Developing Acceptable requires plant shutdown Inservice Testing Programs"- NRC reviewed in SSER14 or system isolation when (December 1994). Unit 2 Action - Submit an ASME leak limits are not met. Section XI Inservice Test Program for the first ten year Staff had not reviewed interval six months before receiving an Operating License.

Technical Specifications.

GL 89-10 I - GL 89-10, "Safety Related Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Testing and Surveillance" - NRC accepted approach in September 14, 1990, letter and reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995). Unit 2 Action - Implement pressure testing and surveillance program for safety-related MOVs, satisfying the intent of GL 89-10.

GL 96-05 I - GL 96-05, "Periodic Verification (PV) of Design Basis Capability of Safety-Related MOVs" - SE of TVA response to GL 96-05 dated July 21, 1999. Unit 2 Action -

Implement the Joint Owner's Group recommended GL 96-05 MOV PV program, as described in Topical Report No. OG-97-018, and begin testing during the first refueling outage after startup.

I 3.9.6 - LC - Inservice SSER12 - C - TVA committed to submit a revised ASME Section XI testing of pumps and October 1993 Inservice Pump and Valve Test Program six months valves before the projected date of operating license issuance in an August 21, 1989, letter. On this basis, the staff considered that the proposed license condition was no longer required in SSER12.

L ________________________ +/- .J. L T1 - 15 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information 3.10 3.10 - Seismic and 3.10 - Generic Approved all but C - For reconciling the impact for equipment actually Dynamic Qualification of outstanding issues adequacy of mounted using welding but tested with mounting by Mechanical and Electrical involving adequacy of frequency test bolting, in-situ test results were provided to NRC (in letters Equipment frequency test, peak SSER6 - dated April 30, 1985, and January 30, 1986) along with broadening of response April 1991; Westinghouse report on seismic qualification by analysis spectra, reconciling adequacy of and testing for the main control board. The staff reviewed actual field mounting by frequency test these results and on the basis of the consistency of all welding vs. testing SSER9 - results provided, concluded that the issue was resolved in configuration mounted June 1992 SSER6.

by bolting and need for C - Staff concerns on the impact of aging on seismic surveillance and performance were resolved in SSER6 based on maintenance programs discussions with TVA technical personnel and review of to address aging. maintenance and surveillance instruction manuals.

C - In a letter dated December 1, 1982, TVA provided justification for single-frequency tests to seismically qualify the Reactor Protection System cabinet. This showed that test response spectra (TRS) were substantially higher than broadened required response spectra (RRS) throughout the required frequency range. The staff evaluated test results and building seismic behavior and considered this aspect of the testing issue closed in SSER6.

C - There was a specific issue on installing spacers for the 125-V-DC vital batteries as was done during qualification testing and required by the manufacturer. The issue was closed in SSER6 when it was determined that spacers had been installed.

T1 - 16 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information C - With regard to the overall issue on adequacy of testing, the staff performed an audit as part of SSER9 (Appendix S). This included a review of the TVA approach, criteria and action plan to address effect of directional coupling and verification that acceleration at each device location is less than .95g because relay chatter at higher acceleration levels is expected. TRS enveloped RRS for all directions. The staff found the above to be in accordance with SRP 3.10 and IEEE 344-1975 and closed the issue.

3.10- Outstanding issue SSER8 - January C - In its May 8, 1991, letter, TVA proposed to analyze involving seismic 1992 conduits as Seismic Category I subsystems. Additionally, classification of cable in a September 18, 1991 letter, TVA agreed to perform tray and conduits cable tray qualification using conventional linear elastic analysis methods, considering nonlinear response behavior on a case-by-case basis and to submit these cases to the staff for approval. The staff resolved this issue in SSER8.

3.11 3.11 - Environmental 3.11 - Outstanding issue SSER15- C - The EQ program was submitted after issuance of the Qualification of - TVA program not June 1995 SER. It was reviewed and found acceptable in SSER1 5.

Mechanical and Electrical submitted at time of SER Equipment B 78-04 I - B 78-04, "Environmental Qualification of Certain Stem Mounted Limit Switches Inside Reactor Containment" - IR 50-390/82-13 and 50-391/82-10 (April 22, 1982) accepted approach. Unit 2 Action - Ensure NAMCO switches have been replaced.

NUREG-0737, I - 11.B.2, "Plant Shielding" - NRC reviewed in SSER16 II.B.2 (September 1995). Unit 2 Action' Complete Design Review of EQ of equipment for spaces/systems which may be used in post accident operations.

T1 - 17 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information Chapter 4 - Reactor 4.2.1, 4.2 - Fuel System Design 4.2.2 - Confirmatory SSER2 - January C - Thermal performance analysis was performed using a 4.2.2, issue on thermal 1984 revised model (PAD-3.3) and found acceptable. Staff 4.2.3, performance analysis closed issue in SSER2.

4.2.4 code. GL 93-04 I - GL 93-04, "Rod Control System Failure and Withdrawal of Rod Control Cluster Assemblies" - NRC letter December 9, 1994, accepted TVA commitments for both units.

Unit 2 action - Implement modifications and testing.

B 96-01 I - B 96-01, "Control Rod Insertion Problems" - NRC acceptance letter for Unit 1 dated July 22, 1996. - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. Unit 2 action -

Issue Emergency Operating Procedure and provide core map.

4.2.2 - Confirmatory SSER2 - January T - The staff reviewed the calculation for the predicted issue on cladding 1984 cladding collapse for the most limiting Watts Bar fuel and collapse calculations found it acceptable. Staff closed issue in SSER2.

Unit 2 action - Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

4.2.3 - Confirmatory SSER2 - January C - In SSER2, the staff concluded TVA had an acceptable issue to identify margins 1984 means of analyzing the effects of fuel rod bowing and and to offset reduction in determining any residual rod bowing penalties on the DNBR due to fuel rod departure from nucleate boiling ratio and total peaking bowing and power. Staff closed issue in SSER2.

incorporating residual bow penalty into the Technical Specifications.

4.3.1, 43- Nuclear Design Original 1982 SER T1 - 18 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 4.4.1, 4.4 - Thermal and Original 1982 SER GL 86-09 T - GL 86-09, "Technical Resolution of Generic Issue B-4.4.2, Hydraulic Design 59-(N-1) Loop Operation in BWRs and PWRs - N-1 Loop 4.4.3, operation was addressed in original 1982 SER (4.4.7).

4.4.4, Unit 2 Action - Confirm Technical Specifications prohibit 4.4.5, (N-i) Loop Operation.

4. .4 4.4.6, 4.4.3 - Outstanding L - This outstanding issue was opened in SSER6. Staff 4.4.7, issue concerning issued an SER dated June 13, 1989, for Unit 1 only that 4.4.8 removal of RTD bypass approved replacement of the RTD bypass system with an system Eagle-21 microprocessor system for monitoring reactor coolant temperature. TVA letter dated December 5, 2007, informs NRC of intent to use Eagle-21 for Unit 2. NRC requested additional information December 27, 2007.

Unit 2 Action - Provide the additional information for NRC review.

.4 4 +

4.4.5 - Confirmatory SSER3 - January L - TVA letters dated February 25, 1982 and Issue / LC on review of 1985 November 10, 1982, provided a description of operator Loose Parts Monitoring training and an evaluation of conformance to RG 1.133. In SSER5 -

System (LPMS) startup SSER3, the staff closed the confirmatory issue and November 1990 report and inclusion of opened a license condition to track submittal of the startup limiting conditions for test results and the alert level setting. In SSER5, the staff LPMS in Technical closed the LC to a TVA commitment to provide the startup Specifications test results and the alert level settings in a letter dated Sept 19, 1990, for both units. For Unit 2 due to obsolescence, TVA will replace the LPMS. Unit 2 action -

provide the startup test results and the alert level settings.

T1 - 19 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

I Approval for oGuidance WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 4.4.8 - LC - Detectors SSER10 - GL 82-28 / L - In the original SER, the review of the ICC for Inadequate core October 1992 NUREG-0737, instrumentation was incomplete. The January 24, 1992, cooling (II.F.2) II.F.2 letter superseded the previous responses on this issue.

GL 82-28/1I.F.2, "Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation System" - TVA letter for Units 1 and 2 January 24, 1992, committed to install Westinghouse ICCM-86 and associated hardware (NC0850119020). NRC completed the review for Units 1 and 2 in SSER1 0. For Unit 2 due to obsolescence of the ICCM-86 system, TVA intends to install the Westinghouse Common Q Post-Accident Monitoring System. Unit 2 action - Install Westinghouse Common Q PAM system.

4.5.1 4.5.1 - Control Rod Drive Original 1982 SER Structural Materials 4.5.2, 4.5.2 - Reactor Internal Original 1982 SER and Core Support Materials 4.6 4.6 - Functional Design of Original 1982 SER Control Rod Drive System Chapter 5 - Reactor Coolant System and Connected Systems with Original 1982 SER 5.2.1.1 -- Compliance Compliance with Original 1982 SER the Codes and Standards Rule, 10CFR50.55a 5.2.1.2 - Applicable Code Original 1982 SER Cases I T1 - 20 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 5.2.2 5.2.2 - Overpressure 5.2.2 - Outstanding SSER2 - January C - TVA letter dated April 18, 1983, provided the safety Protection issue on staff review of 1984 valve sizing information and information on differences sensitivity study of with the reference plant. Staff closed issue in SSER2.

required safety valve GL 96-03 I - GL 96-03, "Relocation of the Pressure Temperature flow rate versus trip Limit Curves and Low Temperature Overpressure parameter Protection System Limits" - GL 96-03 did not require a response. Unit 2 Action - Submit P-T limits and similar to Unit 1, upon approval, incorporate into licensee-controlled document.

GL 90-06 T - GL 90-06, "Resolution of Generic Issues 70, "PORV and Block Valve Reliability," and 94, "Additional LTOP Protection for PWRs" - NRC letter dated January 9, 1991, accepted TVA's response for both units. Unit 2 actions -

1) Revise operating instruction and surveillance procedure; and 2) Incorporate testing requirements in the Technical Specifications.

NUREG-0737, I - Il.D.1, "Relief and Safety Valve Test Requirements" -

Il.D.1, NRC reviewed in TER attached to SSER15 (June 1995).

Unit 2 actions - 1) Testing of relief and safety valves;

2) Reanalysis of fluid transient loads for pressurizer relief and safety valve supports and any required modifications;

3) Modifications to pressurizer safety valves, PORVs, PORV block valves and associated piping; and 4) Change motor operated block valves.

5.2.3 5.2.3 - Reactor Coolant Original 1982 SER Pressure Boundary Materials T1 - 21 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 5.2.4 5.2.4 - Reactor Coolant 5.2.4 - Outstanding Unit 1 only I- In the SER, the preservice inspection program was still Pressure Boundary issue - Unit 2 PSI SSERs 10, 12 under review. NRC reviewed the Unit 1 PSI program in Inservice Inspection and program submitted and 16 SSERs 10, 12 and 16. Unit 2 Action - Submit Unit 2 PSI Testing April 30, 1990, with a program.

partial listing of relief GL 88-05 I - GL 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Stainless requests. This item Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR tracked the staff review. Plants" - NRC acceptance letter dated August 8, 1990 for both units. Unit 2 action - Implement program.

GL 97-01 I - GL 97-01, "Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations" - NRC acceptance letter dated November 4, 1999 (Unit 1). Unit 2 Action - Provide a report to address the inspection program.

NRC Order C - NRC Order EA-03-009 - NA to Unit 2 EA-03-009 B 88-09 1 - B 88-09, "Thimble Tube Thinning in Westinghouse Reactors "- Reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

Unit 2 Action - TVA letter dated March 11, 1994, for both units committed to establish a program and inspect the thimble tubes during the first refueling outage.

B 01-01 I - B 01-01, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Head Penetration Nozzles"- NRC acceptance letter dated November 20, 2001 (Unit 1) -

Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.

Unit 2 Action - Perform baseline inspection.

B 02-01 I - B 02-01, "RPV Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity" - NRC review of 15 day response in letter dated May 20, 2002 - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. Unit 2 action - Perform baseline inspection.

T1 -22 C - Item closed for-WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information B 02-02 I - B 02-02, "RPV Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection Program" - NRC acceptance letter dated December 20, 2002 (Unit 1) - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. Unit 2 Action - Perform baseline inspection.

B 03-02 I - B 03-02, "Leakage from RPV Lower Head Penetrations and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity" - NRC acceptance letter dated October 6, 2004 (Unit 1) - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. Unit 2 Action -

Perform baseline inspection.

B 04-01 I - B 04-01, "Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at PWRs" - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. Unit 2 actions - Provide details of pressurizer and penetrations and apply Material Stress Improvement Process.

LC - Inservice SSER12 - L - The ISI program is required to be submitted within inspection (ISI) program October 1993 6 months of the date of issuance of the operating license.

The applicable ASME Code edition and addenda are determined by reference to 50.55a(b) 12 months preceding the date of issuance of the OL. In SSER12, the LC was resolved by a TVA commitment to submit the program within six months after receiving the operating license. Unit 2 action - Submit ISI program.

5.4.5 5.2.5 - Reactor Coolant Original 1982 SER Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection 5.3.1 5.3.1 - Reactor Vessel Original 1982 SER Materials T1 - 23 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information 5.3.2 5.3.2 - Pressure- 5.3.2 -Outstanding issue T - In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that the Temperature (P-T) Limits on P-T limits for Unit 2 review of the Unit 2 P-T limits would be completed as part not provided. Staff will of the review of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

review as part of Unit 2 Unit 2 action - Submit P-T limits.

Technical Specifications.

5.3.3 5.3.3 - Reactor Vessel 5.3.3 - Outstanding T - In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that the Integrity issue for staff to review of the Unit 2 P-T limits would be completed as part complete evaluation of of the review of the Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

Unit 2 after receipt of Unit 2 action - Submit P-T limits.

P-T limits GL 88-11 L - GL 88-11, "NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Material and its Impact on Plant Operations" - NRC acceptance letter dated June 29, 1989, for both units. Unit 2 action - Use RG 1.99, Rev. 2 methodology for P-T curves.

GL 92-01 C - GL 92-01, R1, "Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity" -By letter dated May 11, 1994, for both units NRC confirmed TVA had provided the information requested in GL 92-01.

NRC issued GL 92-01 revision 1, supplement 1 on May 19, 1995. By letter dated July 26, 1996, NRC closed GL 92-01, revision 1, supplement 1 for both Watts Bar units.

NA 10 CFR 50.61 Fracture Not addressed in original C - NRC SE for both units March 11, 1993 concluded that Toughness Requirements 1982 SER the Watts Bar reactor vessels satisfy the requirements of 10 CRF 50.61.

5.4.1.1, 5.4 - Reactor Coolant Original 1982 SER 5.4.2.1, System Components and 5.4.2.1 Subsystem Design 5.4.1.1 5.4.1.1 - Pump Flywheel Original 1982 SER Integrity (PWR) 5.4.2.1 5.4.2.1 - Steam Generator Original 1982 SER Materials T1 - 24 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Approval for WBN SI Approval Guidance (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information 5.4.2.2 5.4.2.2 - Steam Generator 5.4.2.2 - Outstanding SSER4 - C - In the original 1982 SER, the staff concluded that Tube Inservice Inspection issue for staff to March 1985 because of the generic problem of tube degradation evaluate TVA's caused by flow induced vibration in Westinghouse model proposed resolution to D steam generators, operation would be limited to 50%.

concerns about flow TVA's May 27, 1983, letter committed to implement the induced vibrations in NUREG-0966 modifications. In SSER4, staff concluded Model D-3 SGs pre-heat the modification was acceptable to operate at 100%.

region GL 85-02 I - GL 85-02, "Recommended Actions Stemming From NRC Integrated Program for the Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issues Regarding Steam Generator Tube Integrity"

- TVA responded to the GL on June 17, 1985.

Unit 2 Action - Perform SG inspection.

GL 95-03 I - GL 95-03, "Circumferential Cracking of Steam Generator (SG) Tubes" - NRC acceptance letter dated May 16, 1997 (Unit 1).- Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. TVA responded to a request for additional information on December 17, 2007.

Unit 2 Action - Perform baseline inspection.

GL 97-05 I - GL 97-05, "SG Inspection Techniques" - NRC acceptance letter dated September 22, 1998 (Unit 1) -

Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.

Unit 2 action - Employ the same approach used on the original Unit 1 SGs. TVA responded to a request for additional information on December 17, 2007.

GL 97-06 I - GL 97-06, "Degradation of SG Internals" - NRC acceptance letter dated October 19, 1999 (Unit 1). - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. TVA responded to a request for additional information on December 17, 2007. Unit 2 action - Perform SG inspections during each refueling outage.

T1 -25 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information GL 04-01 I - GL 04-01,."Requirements for SG Tube Inspection" -

NRC acceptance letter dated April 8, 2005 (Unit 1) - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. Unit 2 action -

Perform baseline inspection.

GL 06-01 T - GL 06-01, "SG Tube Integrity and Associated Technical Specifications" - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. Unit 2 action - Include TSTF-449 in TS.

B 89-01 I - B 89-01, "Failure of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Mechanical Plugs" - NRC acceptance letter dated September 26, 1991 for both units. Unit 2 action -

Remove SG tube plugs.

B 88-02 I - B 88-02, "Rapidly Propagating Fatigue Cracks in Steam Generator Tubes" - NRC acceptance letter dated June 7, 1990, for both units. Unit 2 actions - Evaluate E/C data to determine anti-vibration bar penetration depth; perform T/H analysis to identify susceptible tubes; modify, if necessary.

5.4.3 5.4.7 - Residual Heat 5.4.3 - Confirmatory SSER2 resolved I - In the SER, staff accepted TVA's commitment to Removal (RHR) System issues to verify testing of dump provide, before startup, an RHR flow alarm to alert the installation of an RHR valves operator to initiate alternate cooling modes in the event of flow alarm and proper loss of RHR pump suction. Unit 2 action - Verify alarm function of dump valves installation.

when actuated manually C - In SSER2, based on the relief capacity of 3 of the 4 valves, NRC agreed that manual actuation testing of the atmospheric relief valves was not necessary.

GL 87-12 C - GL 87-12, "Loss of Residual Heat Removal While the Reactor Coolant System is Partially Filled" - This GL was superseded by GL 88-17 per NRC letter dated December 5, 1988.

T1 - 26 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information GL 88-17 I - GL 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal" - NRC acceptance letter dated March 8, 1995 (Unit 1).

Unit 2 Action - Implement modifications to provide RCS temperature, RV level and RHR system performance.

B 88-08 I - B 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor Cooling Systems" - NRC acceptance letter dated September 19, 1991, for both units. Unit 2 Action -

Implement program to prevent thermal stratification.

B 88-04 I - B 88-04, "Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss" - NRC acceptance letter dated May 24, 1990, for both units.

Unit 2 Action - Perform calculations and install check valves to prevent pump to pump interaction.

I 5.4.3 - Outstanding SSER10 - C - Branch Technical Position requires a natural circulation issue involving natural October 1992 test with supporting analysis to demonstrate the ability to circulation test to cool down and depressurize the plant and that boron demonstrate ability to mixing is sufficient. Comparison with performance of cool down and previously tested plants of similar design is acceptable, if depressurize the plant, justified. July 11, 1991, TVA letter provided an and that boron mixing is assessment of the acceptability of the Diablo Canyon sufficient under such natural circulation tests to WBN. In SSER10, the NRC circumstances; or, if found the methods and conclusions acceptable.

necessary, other GL 81-21 I - GL 81-21 "Natural Circulation Cooldown" TVA applicable tests before responded December 3, 1981. .Unit 2 action-- Issue startup after first operating procedures.

refueling 5.4.4 5.4.11 - Pressurizer Relief Original 198 E

_ _ [Tank98 I__ S R T1 - 27 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Approval for WBN I Approval I Guidance (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information 5.4.5 5.4.12 - Reactor Coolant LC - Installation of NUREG-0737, I - In the original SER, the NRC found TVA's commitment System High Point Vents reactor coolant vents II.B.1 to install reactor coolant vents acceptable pending (11.1.1) verification. This was completed for Unit 1 only in SSER5 (IR 390/84-37). Unit 2 action - Verify installation of reactor coolant vents.

Chapter 6 - Engineered Safety Features 6.1.1 6.1.1 - Engineered Safety Original 1982 SER Features Materials 6.1.2 6.1.2 - Protective Coating Original 1982 SER Systems (Paints) Organic Materials 6.2.1 6.2.1 - Containment Original 1982 SER (contains Functional Design 6.2.1.1 to 6.2.2.5) 6.2.1.1 6.2.1.1.B - Ice Condenser 6.2.1.1 - Confirmatory SSER3 - January C - In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated it would Containments issue involves reviewing 1985 confirm the contention that containment external pressure analysis that ensures transients could not exceed the design value of 2.0 psig.

that containment TVA submitted the information June 4, 1982. In SSER3, external pressure will not NRC concluded that the design provided adequate exceed design value of protection against damage from external pressure 2.0 psi transients.

LC - (6d) Accident NUREG-0737, I - In SSER5, NRC closed the LC for Unit 1 only monitoring II.F.1 (IR 390/84-59) - November 1990. Unit 2 action -Verify instrumentation II.F.1 - installation of containment pressure indication.

containment pressure.

LC - (6e) Accident NUREG-0737, I - In SSER5, NRC closed the LC for Unit 1 only monitoring II.F.1 (IR 390/84-85) - November 1990. Unit 2 action - Verify instrumentation II.F.1 - installation of containment water level monitors.

T1 - 28 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information containment water level B 77-04 T - B 77-04, "Calculation Error Affecting Performance of a System for Controlling pH of Containment Sump Water Following a LOCA" - Reviewed in Original 1982 SER.

Unit 2 action - Ensure Technical Specifications includes limit on Boron concentration.

6.2.1.2 6.2.1.2 - Subcompartment Original 1982 SER Analysis 6.2.1.1.1 6.2.1.3 - Mass and Original 1982 SER Energy Release Analysis for Postulated Loss-of-Coolant Accidents (LOCAs) 6.2.1.1.1 6.2.1.4 - Mass and Original 1982 SER Energy Release Analysis for Postulated Secondary System Pipe Ruptures 6.2.1.3 6.2.1.5 - Minimum Original 1982 SER Containment Pressure Analysis for Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Studies 6.2.2 6.2.2 - Containment Heat Original 1982 SER Removal Systems 6.2.3 6.2.3 - Secondary Original 1982 SER Containment Functional Design 6.2.4 6.2.4 - Containment 6.2.4 - Confirmatory SSER5 - C - In the original 1982 SER, the containment isolation Isolation System issue to install November 1990 provisions for the main and auxiliary feedwater lines, safety-grade isolation feedwater bypass lines and the chemical feedlines to the valves on 1" chemical steam generators did not meet GDC 57. This was feed lines joining I I resolved by FSAR Amendment 55. In SSER5, the NRC TI - 29 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information feedwater lines to main concluded that the containment isolation provisions for the steam line. main and auxiliary feedwater lines, feedwater bypass lines LC - Modification of and the chemical feedlines were acceptable.

chemical feedlines 6.2.4 - Outstanding SSER3 - January T - In the original 1982 SER, NRC concluded that WBN issue for NRC to 1985 met all the requirements of NUREG-0737, item I1.E.4.2 complete review of SSER5 - except subsection (6) concerning containment purging information provided by November 1990 during normal operation. In SSER3, the outstanding issue TVA to address was closed and the License Condition left open. NRC Containment Purging completed the review and issued a TER for both units July During Normal Plant 12, 1990. NRC concluded that the isolation valves can Operation close against the buildup of pressure in the event of a LC - Containment design basis accident if the lower containment isolation isolation dependability valves are physically blocked to an opening angle of 50 degrees or less. Unit 2 Action - Reflect valve opening restriction in the Technical Specifications.

6.2.4 - Outstanding SSER12 - C - This outstanding issue was opened in SSER7. In issue involving October 1993 SSER1 2, the NRC concluded that the systems in question containment isolation were "closed loops outside containment" and reaffirmed using closed systems the previous conclusion of acceptability.

6.2.5 6.2.5 - Combustible Gas 6.2.5 - Outstanding SSER4 - C - In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that additional Control in Containment issue for review of March 1985 information was required concerning the analysis of the TVA-provided additional production and accumulation of hydrogen within the information relative to containment during a design basis LOCA. This discussion added to information was provided in FSAR amendments and FSAR to address evaluated by NRC in SSER4. In SSER4, the NRC analysis of the concluded that the design of the combustible gas control production and system was acceptable and the outstanding issue closed.

T1 - 30 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

T Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information accumulation of L- Unit 2 action - The hydrogen recombiners will be hydrogen within removed from the Unit 2 design and licensing basis based containment following on 10 CFR 50.44 (final rule September 16, 2003) and onset of a LOCA abandoned in place.

LC - (6f) Accident NUREG-0737, I - In SSER5, NRC closed the LC for Unit 1 only monitoring II.F.1 (IR 390/84-85) - November 1990. Unit 2 action - Verify instrumentation II.F.1 - installation of containment hydrogen accident monitoring containment hydrogen instrumentation.

LC - (9) Hydrogen SSER8 - January C - In the original 1982 SER, an LC was raised to track control measures 1992 resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-48, "Hydrogen Control Measures and Effects of Hydrogen Burns on Safety Equipment." In SSER8, the NRC reviewed the hydrogen mitigation system (igniters) and concluded it met the requirements of the final rule {10 CFR 50.44(c)(3)}.

6.2.6 6.2.6 - Containment Original 1982 SER Leakage Testing T1 - 31 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 6.2.7 6.2.7 - Fracture 6.2.7 - Confirmatory SSER4 - C - In SSER4, NRC reviewed the confirmatory information Prevention of issue for TVA to confirm March 1985 submitted and concluded for both units that the reactor Containment Pressure that the lowest containment pressure boundary materials will behave in a Boundary temperatures which will non-brittle manner and the requirements of GDC 51 were be experienced by the satisfied. NRC provided the technical basis in SSER4, limiting materials of the Appendix H.

reactor containment pressure boundary under the conditions cited by GDC 51 will be in compliance with the temperatures identified in the staffs analysis of fracture toughness requirements for load bearing component of the containment system 6.3 6.3 - Emergency Core 6.3.3 - Confirmatory SSER2 - January C - In the original 1982 SER, NRC found the design of the Cooling System issue to provide a 1984 containment sump against debris acceptable subject to the detailed survey of acceptability of a detailed survey of insulation materials. In insulation material that SSER2, the NRC review of the survey confirmed the staff's could become debris initial conclusion that the design to provide protection post-LOCA against sump debris Was acceptable.

GL 97-04 I - GL-97-04, "Assurance of Sufficient Net Positive-Suction Head for Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Heat Removal Pumps" - NRC acceptance letter dated June 17, 1998 (Unit 1). - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. Unit 2 actions - Install new sump strainers,. and perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.

T1 - 32 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1 1I Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information GL 98-02 I - GL 98-02, "Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Associated Potential for Loss of Emergency Mitigating Functions While in a Shutdown Condition" - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.

Unit 2 actions - 1)Review the ECCS designs to ensure they do not contain design features which can render them susceptible to common-cause failures; and 2) document the results.

GL 98-04 I - GL 98-04, "Potential for Degradation of the ECCS and the Containment Spray System Because of Construction and Protective Coating Deficiencies and Foreign Material in Containment" - NRC closure letter dated November 24, 1999 (Unit 1). - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. Unit 2 actions - Install new sump strainers, and perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.

GL 04-02 I - GL 04-02, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at PWRs - NRC Audit Report dated February 7, 2007 (Unit 1). - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. Unit 2 actions - Install new sump strainers, and perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.

B 79-24 I - B 79-24,"Frozen Lines." Unit 2 Actions - Insulate the section of piping in the containment spray full-flow test line that is exposed to outside air. Confirm installation of heat tracing on the sensing lines off the feedwater flow elements.

T1 -33 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information B 80-18 I - B 80-18 "Maintenance of Adequate Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal Charging Pumps Following a Secondary Side High Energy Rupture" - IR 50-390/85-60 and 50-391/85-49 (Unit 1). Unit 2 action - Implement design and procedure changes.

6.3.1 - Outstanding SSER7 - C - The Upper Head Injection (UHI) system design was issue - involving removal September 1991 approved in the original 1982 SER. TVA letter dated of upper head injection September 19, 1985, informed NRC that UHI would not be system installed on Unit 2. In SSER7, NRC concluded it was acceptable to delete UHI from both units.

6.3.3 - Outstanding SSER9 - C - In the original 1982 SER, the staff approved the issue involving June 1992 proposed sump design in the FSAR. A deviation between containment sump the installed and proposed design was discovered during screen design an NRC inspection. In SSER9, the staff concluded that the as-installed sump screen was acceptable.

6.4 6.4 - Control Room Original 1982 SER GL 03-01 T - GL 03-01 "Control Room Habitability" - Initial response Habitability System for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. Unit 2 action -

Incorporate TSTF-448 into Technical Specifications.

6.5.1.1 to 6.5.1 - ESF Atmosphere Original 1982 SER 6.5.1.4 Cleanup Systems 6.5.2 6.5.2 - Containment Spray Original 1982 SER as a Fission Product Cleanup System 6.5.3 6.5.3 - Fission Product Original 1982 SER Control Systems and Structures 6.5.4 6.5.4 - Ice Condenser as Original 1982 SER a Fission Product

, __ Cleanup System T1 - 34 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

I I Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information 6.6 6.6 - Inservice Inspection 6.6 - Outstanding issue L - NRC reviewed the preservice inspection program (PSi) of Class 2 and 3 on additional information for Unit 1 only in SSER10 - October 1992. Unit 2 action -

Components required on preservice Submit Unit 2 PSI program.

inspection program and GL 89-08 I - GL 89-08 "Erosion / Corrosion Induced Pipe Wall identification of plant Thinning" - Unit 1 FAC program reviewed in IR 390/94-89 specific areas where (February 1995). Unit 2 actions - Prepare procedure and ASME Code Section XI perform baseline inspections.

requirements cannot be met and supporting technical justification Chapter 7 - Instrumentation and Controls 7.1.1 7.1 - Instrumentation and 7.1.3.1 - Confirmatory SSER4 - C - In the original 1982 SER, the staff indicated the intent Controls - Introduction issue to provide a list of March 1985 to perform an audit of the setpoint methodology. TVA all safety related provided information in letters dated April 25, 1983, functions and a September 4, 1984, and October 16, 1984. The NRC summary of the setpoint reviewed the information and found the methodology analysis acceptable in SSER4.

T - Staff requested discussion of methodology for determining, setting, and evaluating as-found setpoints for drift susceptible instruments. Unit 2 action - Resolve this issue using the BFN TS-453 precedent (see NRC ML061680008).

7.2.1 to 7.2 - Reactor Trip System 7.2.5 - Confirmatory SSER2 - January C - TVA performed an evaluation of SG level 7.2.6 issue to address 1984 instrumentation for a major pipe rupture in containment IEB 79-21 to alleviate and determined that it was not necessary to insulate the SSER14 -

temperature SG reference legs. As a result, the July 27, 1994, letter December 1994 dependence problem withdrew a previous commitment to install insulation. In associated with SSER1 4, the staff reviewed TVA's proposal and accepted measuring SG water it.

level T1 - 35 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

TGuidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information B 79-21 I - B 79-21, "Temperature Effects on Level Measurements"

- Reviewed in SSER14 (December 1994). Unit 2 action -

Update accident calculation.

7.3.1 to 7.3 - Engineered Safety 7.3.2 - Confirmatory SSER2 - January C - In the original SER, staff identified a concern that 7.3.6 Features Systems issue is commitment to 1984 debris in the containment sump could block the inlets to make a design change the differential pressure transmitters and result in a loss of to provide protection that the permissive signal to the initiation logic for the prevents debris from automatic switchover from the injection to the recirculation entering containment mode of the emergency core cooling system. In a sump level sensors September 15, 1983, letter PVA notified NRC that the level sensors had been moved from inside the sump wall to outside the sump wall with the sense line opening protected by a cap with small holes. Staff closed the issue in SSER2.

7.3.5 - Confirmatory SSER3 - January C - In the original SER, staff concluded that the design issue to perform 1985 modifications for Bulletin 80-06 were acceptable subject to confirmatory tests to review of the electrical schematics that were not available satisfy IEB 80-06 (to at the time. In SSER3, the staff found the modifications ensure that no device acceptable and closed the confirmatory issue.

will change position B 80-06 I - B 80-06, "Engineered Safety Features Reset Control" -

solely due to reset TVA response dated March 11, 1982. Unit 2 action -

action) and staff review Perform verification during the preoperational testing.

of electrical schematics for modifications that ensure that valves remain in emergency mode after ESF reset 7.4.1 to 7.4 - Safe Shutdown Original 1982 SER 7.4.3 Systems I T1 - 36 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 7.5.1 to 7.5 - Information Systems 7.5.2 - Outstanding SSER9 - C - In the original 1982 SER, the staff stated that WBN did 7.5.4 Important to Safety issue involving RG 1.97 June 1992 not use RG 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled instruments following Nuclear Power Plants to Assess Plants and Environs course of an accident Conditions During and Following an Accident," for the design because the design predated the RG. In SSER7, an outstanding issue was opened. TVA provided NRC information on exceptions to RG 1.97. A detailed review was performed for both units (SSER9 - Appendix V). The staff concluded that WBN conforms to or has adequately justified deviations from the guidance of RG 1.97, Revision 2.

B 79-27 I - B 79-27, "Loss of Non-class 1E I&C Power System Bus During Operation" - TVA responded to the Bulletin on March 1, 1982. Reviewed in Original 1982 SER.

Unit 2 action - Issue appropriate emergency procedures.

NUREG-0737, I - II.F.1.2, "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation" -

I1.F.1.2 Reviewed in SSER9 (June 1992). Unit 2 actions- Install Noble gas, Iodine / particulate sampling, and Containment High Range Monitors.

7.6.1 to 7.6 - Interlock Systems 7.6.5 - Confirmatory SSER4 - C - In the original 1982 SER, the staff found the design of 7.6.9 Important to Safety issue to install switches March 1985 the overpressure protection during low temperature on the main control features acceptable pending review of the drawings and board for the operator to FSAR description. In SSER4, the staff documented manually arm this completion of the review and closed the confirmatory system (overpressure issue.

protection provided by pressurizer PORVs)

T1 - 37 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information 7.7.1 to 7.7 - Control Systems 7.7.2 - LC - Status SSER7 - C - In the original 1982 SER, the staff requested TVA 7.7.7 monitoring system, September 1991 address RG 1.47, "Bypassed and Inoperable Status Bypassed and Indications for Nuclear Power Plant Safety Systems." IVA Inoperable Status addressed RG 1.47 by letters dated January 29, 1987, and Indication October 22, 1990. In SSER7, the staff documented completion of the review and closed the issue.

I - GL 89-19, "Request for Actions Related to Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47 "Safety Implication of Control Systems in LWR Nuclear Power Plants" - TVA responded by letter dared March 22, 1990. NRC acceptance letter dated October 24, 1990, for both units.

Unit 2 action - Perform evaluation of common mode failures due to fire.

7.8 NA 7.8.1 - LC - Confirm NUREG-0737, I - ll.D.3, "Valve Position Indication" - The design was NUREG- installation of acoustic ll.D.3 reviewed in the original 1982 SER and found acceptable 0737 monitoring system on pending confirmation of installation of the acoustic Items Unit 2 monitoring system. In SSER5 (IR 390/84-35), the staff closed the LC for Unit 1 only. Unit 2 action - verify installation of the acoustic monitoring system to PORV to indicate position.

NUREG-0737, I - II.K.3.9, "Proportional Integral Derivative Controller I1.K.3.9 Modification" - Reviewed in Original 1982 SER.

Unit 2 action - Set the derivative time constant to zero.

T1 - 38 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information Chapter 8 - Electrical Power Systems 8.1 8.1 - Electrical Power- Original 1982 SER Introduction 8.2.1 to 8.2 - Offsite Power 8.2.2.1 - Confirmatory SSER2 - January C - In the original 1982 SER, NRC concluded that the 8.2.4 System issue to document 1984 offsite power system circuits at the Watts Bar Hydro Plant additional information in SSER13 - Switchyard met GDC 17 pending documentation in the FSAR on control power April 1994 FSAR. The information was added to the FSAR. In supplies and distribution SSER2, NRC closed the issue. In SSER1 3, the staff system for the Watts Bar reviewed revised information and concluded that it Hydro Plant Switchyard supported the original conclusion in SSER2.

GL 2006-02 I - GL 2006-02, "Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power" - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. Unit 2 action -

complete the two unit baseline electrical calculations and implementing procedures.

• 8.2.2.2/8.2.2.3/ 8.2.2.4 - SSER13 - C - In SSER1 3, the NRC documented the review of design Outstanding issue April 1994 changes to minimize the probability of losing all AC power, involving compliance of compliance with GDC 17 and minimizing the probability of design changes to the a two unit trip following a one unit trip. These issues were offsite power system resolved in SSER1 3.

with GDC 17 and 18.

8.3.1.1 to 8.3.1 - AC Power 8.3.1.1 - Confirmatory SSER2 - January C - In the original 1982 SER, NRC concluded that the 8.3.1.9, Systems (Onsite) issue to incorporate new 1984 offsite power system with a dedicated transformer for each 8.3.3.1 to design that provides preferred offsite circuit met GDC 17 pending 8.3.3.6 dedicated transformer documentation in the FSAR. The information was added for each preferred offsite to the FSAR. In SSER2, NRC closed the issue.

circuit in FSAR GL 1996-01 I - GL 1996-01, "Testing of Safety-Related Circuits" - TVA responded for both units on April 18, 1996. Unit 2 action -

Implement Recommendations.

T1 - 39 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information GL 2007-01 L - GL 2007-01, "Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients" - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. Unit 2 action - Complete testing of four additional cables.

NUREG-0737, I - II.E.3.1, "Emergency Power for Pressurizer Heaters" -

I1.E.3.1 Reviewed in original 1982 SER. Unit 2 action - Implement procedures and testing.

8.3.1.2 - Confirmatory SSER13 - GL 79-36 I - This item and the GL tracked compliance with BTP issue to verify voltage April 1994 PSB-1, "Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System drop analysis and testing Voltages." This item was dosed for Unit 1 in SSER1 3 based on results of the preoperational test. Unit 2 Action -

Perform verification during the preoperational testing.

8.3.1.6 - Confirmatory SSER7 - C - In SSER2, NRC indicated that it would verify DG issue to provide diesel September 1991 qualification testing. TVA provided a copy of the DG generator reliability qualification test report. In SSER7, the NRC concluded qualification test report that the DGs had been satisfactorily tested in accordance with IEEE 387-1977.

8.3.3.1.2 - Confirmatory SSER2 - January C - In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that the issue to verify design for 1984 design for bypass of thermal overload protective devices bypass of thermal on safety-related motor operated valves would be verified overload protective during the electrical drawing review. The staff device subsequently reviewed the drawings and closed the issue in SSER2.

8.3.3.2.3 - Confirmatory SSER2 - January C - In the original SER, NRC indicated that the design for issue for design of 1984 - sharing of raceway systems between units would be sharing raceway verified during the electrical drawing review. The staff systems between units confirmed that cable routing was in accordance with accepted separation criteria and closed the issue in SSER2.

T1 - 40 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance 1 Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 8.3.3.5.2 - Confirmatory SSER2 - January C - In the original 1982 SER, the NRC found the issue to incorporate 1984 commitment to test DGs one at a time acceptable pending commitment to test only its incorporation into the FSAR. In SSER2, NRC reviewed one of four diesel the documentation and closed the issue.

generators at one time 8.3.3.6 - Confirmatory SSER7 - C - In the original 1982 SER, staff required a reevaluation issue involving September 1991 of the penetrations' capability to withstand, without seal evaluation of failure, the total range of available time-current penetrations' ability to characteristics assuming a single failure of any overcurrent withstand failure of protective device. In SSER3, staff found the results of the overcurrent protection evaluation acceptable pending the information being device incorporated in the FSAR. The staff reviewed the FSAR and closed the issue in SSER7.

8.3.3.1.1 - Confirmatory SSER13 - C - In the original 1982 SER, staff stated that the design issue involving April 1994 for the automatic deenergizing of loads as a result of a submergence of LOCA would be verified as part of the site visit. During the electrical equipment as August 1991, visit and in a letter dated September 13, result of a LOCA 1991, TVA committed to revise the FSAR. The information was added to the FSAR. In SSER13, NRC closed the issue.

8.3.3.2 - Confirmatory SSER3 - January C - In the original 1982 SER, the staff stated that the issue to revise FSAR to 1985 description and analysis of shared onsite AC and DC reflect requirements of systems was under review but was acceptable pending SSER13 -

shared safety systems revision of the FSAR. In SSER3, the confirmatory issue April 1994 was left open to track additional information to be incorporated in the FSAR. In a letter dated September 13, 1991, TVA provided the additional information. In SSER1 3, NRC closed the issue.

T1 - 41 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information 8.3.1.6 - LC - (12) SSER2 - January C - In the original 1982 SER, NRC required that the Diesel generator 1984 capability of the DGs to start at normal temperature be reliability qualification demonstrated. TVA's August 31, 1983, letter confirmed testing at normal tests had been performed on a DG identical to those at operating temperature WBN. In SSER2, NRC closed the issue.

8.3.2.1 to 8.3.2 - DC Power 8.3.2.4 - Confirmatory SSER2 - January C - In the original 1982 SER, staff indicated the design 8.3.2.4, Systems (Onsite) issue to include diesel 1984 analysis for demonstrating compliance of the DGs with 8.3.3.1 to generator design regulatory requirements and guidelines was acceptable 8.3.3.6 analysis in FSAR pending incorporation of the analysis in the FSAR. The analysis was incorporated in the FSAR, and the issue closed in SSER2.

8.3.2.2 - LC - DC SSER3 - January C - In SSER3, the staff determined that some items were monitoring and 1985 omitted from the design of the DG DC monitoring and annunciation system SSER13 - annunciation system. In TVA letter dated September 13, April 1994 1991, TVA provided the additional information. In SSER1 3, NRC closed the issue.

8.3.3.2.4 - LC - SSER3 - January C - In the original 1982 SER, staff required that all possible Possible sharing of DC 1985 interconnections between redundant divisions through control power to AC normal and alternate power sources to various loads be switchgear identified in the FSAR. TVA letter dated January 17, 1984, provided the information. NRC closed the issue in SSER3.

8.3.3.3 - LC - Testing of SSER3 - January C - In the original 1982 SER, staff required that protective associated circuits 1985 devices used to isolate non-Class 1 E from Class 1 E circuits be of high quality commensurate with their importance to safety and be periodically tested. TVA letter dated January 17, 1984, provided the information. NRC closed the issue in SSER3.

T1 - 42 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Approval for WBN 1 Approval Guidance (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 8.3.3.3 - LC - Testing of SSER3 -January C - In the original 1982 SER, staff required that protective non-class 1 E cables 1985 devices used to isolate non-Class 1 E from Class 1 E circuits be of high quality commensurate with their importance to safety and be periodically tested. TVA letter dated January 17, 1984, provided the information. NRC closed the issue in SSER3.

8.3.3.4 - LC - Low SSER7 - NUREG-0737, I - II.G.1, "Power Supplies for Pressurized Relief Valves, temperature September 1991 II.G.1 Block Valves and Level Indicators" - Reviewed in Original overpressure protection 1982 SER and SSER7 (September 1991). Unit 2 Action -

power supplies, II.G.1 Implement modifications such that PORVS and associated Block Valves are powered from same train but different buses.

8.3.3.6 - LC - Testing of SSER2 - January C- In the original 1982 SER, staff required that the reactor coolant pump 1984 redundant fault current protective devices for the reactor breakers coolant pump circuits meet RG 1.63. In SSER2, staff reviewed the design and concluded it met RG 1.63.

NA 8.4 Station Blackout Not addressed in original I - SE for both units- March 18, 1993 1982 SER SSE for both units - September 9, 1993. Unit 2 Action -

Implement SBO requirements.

Chapter 9 - Auxiliary Systems 9.1.1 - Criticality Safety of Original 1982 SER I - B 89-03, "Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin Fresh and Spent Fuel During Refueling Operations"- NRC acceptance letter Storage and Handling dated June 22, 1990. Unit 2 Action - Ensure that requirements for fuel assembly configuration, fuel loading and training are included in Unit 2.

T1 - 43 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information NA 10 CFR 50.68 - Criticality Not addressed in original C - The new fuel storage vault and the spent fuel storage Accident Requirements 1982 SER racks are shared equipment that is in service to support operation of Unit 1. Criticality of fuel assemblies outside the reactor is precluded by adequate design of fuel transfer and storage facilities and by administrative control procedures in accordance with 10 CFR 50.68(b).

9.1.2 9.1.2 - New and Spent Original 1982 SER B 84-03 I - B 84-03, "Refueling Cavity Water Seal" - Reviewed in Fuel Storage IR 390/93-11. Unit 2 Action - Ensure appropriate abnormal operating instructions (AOIs) are used for Unit 2.

9.1.3 9.1.3 - Spent Fuel Pool Original 1982 SER Cooling and Cleanup System 9.1.4 9.1.4 - Light Load Original 1982 SER Handling System (Related to Refueling) 9.1.4 9.1.5 - Overhead Heavy LC - Control of heavy Resolved C - The staff concluded in SSER13 that the license Load Handling Systems loads (NUREG-0612) SSER13 - condition was no longer necessary based on their review April 1994 of TVA's response to NUREG-0612 guidelines for Phase I in TVA letter dated July 28, 1993.

B 96-02 I - B 96-02/GL 81-07, "Movement of Heavy Loads Over GL 81-07 Spent Fuel, Over Fuel in the Reactor, or Over Safety-Related Equipment" - NRC closure letter dated May 20, 1998. Unit 2 Action - Unit 2 Heavy Loads Program will be in compliance with NUREG-0612.

I - Implement NEI guidance on heavy loads.

9.1.4 15.7.5-Spent Fuel Cask Original 1982 SER Drop Accidents I I I T1 -44 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1 Approval for WBN

[ Approval Guidance (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 9.2.1 9.2.1 - Station Service No open issues in the L - Appropriate measures will be taken to ensure that the Water System original 1892 SER. ERCW system is fully capable of meeting design SSER18 concludes requirements for two unit operation.

ERCW does not conform GL 89-13 I - GL 89-13, "Service Water Problems Affecting Safety-to GDC 5 for two-unit Related Equipment" - NRC letters dated July 9, 1990 and operation. June 13, 1997, accepting approach. Unit 2 Actions -

1) Implement initial performance testing of the heat exchangers; and 2) Establish eddy current baseline data for the Containment Spray heat exchangers.

GL 96-06 I - GL 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions" - NRC letter dated April 6, 1999, accepting TVA response for Unit 1. Unit 2 Action - Implement modification to provide containment penetration relief.

9.2.2 9.2.2 - Reactor Auxiliary 9.2.2 - Confirmatory I - TVA committed to relocate the pumps above PMF level Cooling Water Systems issue to relocate and the staff found this acceptable. Implementation for component cooling this issue was resolved for Unit 1 when the staff verified in thermal barrier booster IR 390/84-20 that the pumps had been relocated.

pumps above probable Unit 2 Action - Relocate pumps for Unit 2.

maximum flood (PMF) NUREG-0737, C - II.K.3.25, "Power on Pump Seals" - NRC reviewed and level before receipt of an II.K.3.25 closed in IR 390/84-35 based on DG power to pump OL sealing cooling system.

9.2.3 9.2.3 - Demineralized Original 1982 SER Water Makeup System 9.2.4 9.2.4 - Potable and Original 1982 SER Sanitary Water Systems 9.2.5 9.2.5 - Ultimate Heat Sink Original 1982 SER 9.2.6 9.2.6 - Condensate Original 1982 SER I Storage Facilities T1 - 45 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 9.3.1 9.3.1 - Compressed Air Original 1982 SER GL 88-14 I - GL 88-14, "Instrument Air Supply System Problems System Affecting Safety-Related Equipment" - NRC letter dated July 26, 1990, closing the issue. Unit 2 Action - Complete Unit 2 implementation.

9.3.2 9.3.2 - Process and 9.3.2 - LC - Resolved C - TVA submitted a final procedure for estimating degree Post-Accident Sampling Post-Accident Sampling SSER14- of core damage by letter dated June 10, 1994, and the Systems System December 1994 license condition was deleted in SSER14.

NUREG-0737, T - ll.B.3, "Post Accident Sampling" - NRC reviewed in ll.B.3 SSER16 (September 1995). TVA submitted a TS improvement to eliminate requirements for the Post AccidentSampling System using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process in a letter dated October 31, 2001. Unit 2 Actions - Unit 2 Technical Specifications will eliminate requirements for the Post Accident Sampling System.

9.3.3 9.3.3 - Equipment and Original 1982 SER Floor Drainage System 9.3.4 9.3.4 - Chemical and Original 1982 SER B 80-05/GL 80-21 I - B 80-05/GL 80-21, "Vacuum Condition Resulting in Volume Control System Damage to Chemical Volume Control System Holdup (PWR) (Including Boron Tank" - Closed in IR 50-390/84-59 and 50-391/84-45.

Recovery System) Unit 2 Action - Complete surveillance procedures for Unit 2.

9.4.1 9.4.1 - Control Room Area Original 1982 SER Ventilation System 9.4.2 9.4.2 - Spent Fuel Pool Original 1982 SER Area Ventilation System 9.4.3 9.4.3 - Auxiliary and Original 1982 SER Radwaste Area Ventilation System T1 - 46 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

T Approval for WBN Approval Guidance (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 9.4.4 9.4.4 - Turbine Area Original 1982 SER Ventilation System 9.4.5 9.4.5 - Engineered Safety Original 1982 SER Feature Ventilation System 9.5.1.1 to 9.5.1 - Fire Protection 9.5.1.2 - Outstanding Resolved C - In SSER18, the staff concluded that the Fire Protection 9.5.1.9 Program issue for Fire Protection SSER1 8 - program for Watts Bar conformed to the requirements of Program October 1995 10CFR50.48 and was acceptable except for the fire barrier 9.5.1.3 - Confirmatory SSER1 9 - seal program and emergency lighting inside the Reactor issue - Electrical November 1995 Building. Additionally, the staff considered the penetrations confirmatory issue involving electrical penetration documentationdocumentation resolved in SSER18 on the basis of the safety evaluation of the revised Fire Protection program 9.5.1.3 - LC - Fire included in Appendix FF of SSER1 8. In SSER1 9, protection program Appendix FF, a safety evaluation of the Fire Protection program contains a detailed evaluation of fire barrier penetration seals. The staff concluded that TVA's penetration seal program adequately demonstrates the fire resistive rating of the penetrations, and that they conform to the guidelines of Positions D.1 .j and D.3.d of Appendix A to BTP 9.5.1 and were acceptable. The safety evaluation also includes TVA's revised position on emergency lighting, which was found to be acceptable.

B 75-04 C - B 75-04, "Cable Fire at BFNPP" - This bulletin is included in the Fire Protection Program.

T1 - 47 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information B 92-01 I - B 92-01, "Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier GL 92-08 System to Perform its Specified Fire Endurance Function" /

GL 92-08, "Thermolag 330-1 Fire Barriers" - Reviewed in SSER1 8 (October 1995) and accepted in NRC letter dated January 6, 1998 (includes a supplemental SE).

Unit 2 Actions - 1) Review Watts Bar design and installation requirements for Thermolag 330-1 fire barrier system and evaluate the Thermolag currently installed in Unit 2. 2) Remove and replace, as required, or prepare an approved deviation.

GL 06-03 I - GL 06-03, "Potentially Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire Barrier Materials" - TVA does not rely on Hemyc or MT materials to protect electrical and instrumentation cables or equipment that provide safe shutdown capability during a postulated fire. Unit 2 Action - CAP/SP see Table 3. The Fire Protection Corrective Action Program will ensure Unit 2 conforms with NRC requirements and applicable guidelines.

9.5.2.1, 9.5.2 - Communications 9.5.2 - LC - Resolved SSER5 I - The staff resolved this license condition in SSER5 9.5.2.2 Systems Performance testing of - November 1990 based on TVA's letter of March 18, 1985, which described communications system its testing of communications systems. Unit 2 Action -

Perform testing of communication systems on Unit 2.

9.5.3 9.5.3 - Lighting Systems No open issues I I T1 - 48 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information 9.5.4.1, 9.5.4 - Emergency Diesel 9.5.4.1 - Outstanding Resolved SSER5 C - The staff reviewed standards to which emergency 9.5.4.2 Engine Fuel Oil Storage issue for staff to - November 1990 diesel engine skid mounted auxiliary system piping and and Transfer System complete review to associated components were designed, as well as the determine if diesel testing and inspections to be performed on these systems, generator auxiliary and concluded that they were acceptable in SSER5. The support systems can staff considered this issue resolved. This resolution perform their design applies to the fuel oil, cooling water, air starting, safety functions under all lubrication, and combustion air intake and exhaust conditions, after receipt systems.

of all requested information 9.5.4.1 - Confirmatory Resolved SSER5 C - In SSER5, the staff verified that plant operating issue to include required - November 1990 procedures had been revised to incorporate requirements language in operating that ensure that operational no-load and low-load instruction to ensure conditions will not harm the diesel generators.

no-load and low-load operation is minimized and revise operating procedures to address increased diesel generator load after it has run for an extended period of time at low or no load 9.5.4.2 - Outstanding Resolved SSER5 C - See discussion in 9.5.4.1 issue to design skid- - November 1990 mounted piping and components from the day tank to the diesel engine as seismic Category I and to ASME Section III, Class 3 T1 - 49 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1- Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information 9.5.4.2 - Confirmatory Resolved SSER5 C - The staff found TVA's commitment to provide missile issue to provide missile - November 1990 protection for the fuel oil storage tank vent lines acceptable protection for fuel oil and verified that the protection had been installed and storage tank vent lines considered this issue resolved in SSER5.

9.5.4.1 - LC - Diesel Resolved SSER5 C - The staff verified that the modifications necessary to Generator reliability - November 1990 comply with NUREG/CR-0660 had been completed and, as stated above, requirements had been incorporated into operating procedures. Thus, this license condition was resolved in SSER5.

9.5.5 9.5.5 - Emergency Diesel 9.5.5 - Outstanding Resolved SSER5 C - See discussion in 9.5.4.1 Engine Cooling Water issue to design engine - November 1990 System cooling water system piping and components for all engines up to the engine interface, including auxiliary skid mounted piping, to ASME Section III, Class 3 9.5.6 9.5.6 - Emergency Diesel 9.5.6 - Outstanding Resolved SSER5 C - See discussion in 9.5.4.1 Engine Starting System issue to design engine - November 1990 air-starting system piping components for all engines up to the engine interface, including auxiliary skid mounted piping, to ASME Section III, Class 3 TI - 50 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information 9.5.7 9.5.7 - Emergency Diesel 9.5.7 - Outstanding Resolved SSER5 C - In response to a staff concern regarding dry diesel Engine Lubrication issue to perform - November 1990 engine starting, TVA proposed using the manufacturers' System additional modification, modification and provided justification for its ability to or provide justification ensure lubrication of all parts of the diesel engine. The for acceptability of staff found this acceptable in SSER5.

proposed modification, to ensure lubrication of all wearing parts of the diesel engine either on an interim or continuous basis 9.5.7 - Outstanding Resolved SSER5 C - See discussion in 9.5.4.1 issue to design standby - November 1990 diesel engine lube oil system piping and components up to the engine interface, including skid mounted piping, to ASME Section III, Class 3 9.5.7 - Outstanding Resolved SSER5 C - TVA submittal of March 18, 1995, responded to a staff issue to provide a more - November 1990 request to describe the features that protect the diesel detailed description of engine crankcase from exploding. In SSER5, on the basis the lubricating oil system of this submittal, the staff concluded that the emergency and a description of the diesel engine lubrication oil system can perform its safety diesel engine crankcase function and is acceptable. This issue was resolved.

explosion protection features

.1 L L ~.

T1 - 51 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information

.5.8 9 .5.8 - Emergency Diesel 9.5.8 - Outstanding Resolved SSER5 C - See discussion in 9.5.4.1 Engine Combustion Air issue to design standby - November 1990 Intake and Exhaust diesel engine System combustion air intake and exhaust system piping and components up to the engine interface to ASME Section I11,Class 3 and recommendations of RG 1.26 Chapter 10 - Steam and Power Conversion System 10.2.1, 10.2 - Turbine Generator Original 1982 SER 10.2.2 10.2.2 10.2.3 - Turbine Rotor Original 1982 SER Integrity 10.3.1 to 10.3 - Main Steam Supply 10.3.4 - LC - Secondary T - The staff determined that the secondary water 10.3.4 System water chemistry chemistry monitoring and control program was being monitoring and control included in the administrative section of the Technical program Specifications and resolved this for Unit 1 in SSER5 (November, 1990). Unit 2 Action - Take same action for Unit 2.

10.3.3 10.3.6 - Steam and Original 1982 SER Feedwater System Materials 10.4.1 10.4.1 - Main Condensers Original 1982 SER 10.4.2 10.4.2 - Main Condenser Original 1982 SER Evacuation System I T1 - 52 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

I Approval for WBN Additional Information 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 10.4.3 10.4.3 - Turbine Gland Original 1982 SER Sealing System 10.4.4 10.4.4 - Turbine Bypass Original 1982 SER System 10.4.5 10.4.5 - Circulation Water Original 1982 SER System 10.4.6 10.4.6 - Condensate Original 1982 SER Cleanup System 10.4.7 10.4.7 - Condensate and Original 1982 SER Feedwater System 10.4.8 10.4.8 - Steam Generator Original 1982 SER Blowdown System (PWR) 10.4.9 10.4.9 - Auxiliary Original 1982 SER SER - July 20, B 85-01/GL 88-03 I - B 85-01 / GL 88-03, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater System (PWR) 1988 Feedwater Pumps" - NRC accepted approach in letter dated July 20, 1988, and reviewed response in SSER16 (September 1995). Unit 2 Action - Procedures and hardware will be in place to ensure recognition of indications of steam binding and maintenance of system operability until check valves are repaired and back leakage stopped.

NUREG-0737, I- ilI.E.1.1, "Auxiliary Feedwater System Evaluation, II.E.1.1 Modifications"- Reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

Unit 2 Action - Perform Auxiliary Feedwater System analysis as it pertains to system failure and flow rate.

I ________________ I _______________ ___________ I ___________ I T1 - 53 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER SRP TITLE 2 WBN Unitfor Approval 1 Approval Reference f Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

Note 1 Additional Information Chapter 11 - Radioactive Waste Management 11.1 11.1 -Source Terms Original 1982 SER 11.2 11.2 - Liquid Waste Original 1982 SER Management System 11.3 11.3 - Gaseous Waste Original 1982 SER Management System 11.4 11.4 - Solid Waste Original 1982 SER Management System 11.5 11.5 - Process and Original 1982 SER B 80-10 I - B 80-10, "Contamination of Non-radioactive Systems Effluent Radiological and Resulting Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Monitoring Release of Radioactivity to the Environment."

Instrumentation and Unit 2 Action - Correct deficiencies involving monitoring of Sampling Systems systems.

11.7 NA - NUREG -0737 items 11.7.1 - LC - (6a) Resolved SSER5 C - TVA committed to have Unit 2 shielding building vent Accident monitoring - November 1990 monitor in place and high range noble gas monitor instrumentation II.F.1 - installed and operational prior to Unit 1 fuel loading and Noble Gas monitor the staff then considered license condition 6a resolved in SSER5.

11.7.1 - LC - (6b) Resolved SSER6 C - TVA committed to have the capability for continuous Accident monitoring - April 1991 collection of samples of plant gaseous effluents for post instrumentation II.F.1 - accident releases of iodine particulate by fuel load. The Iodine particulate staff reviewed this in SSER5 and SSER6 and considered sampling the issue resolved in SSER6.

T1 - 54 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information 11.7.2 - LC - Primary NUREG-0737, T - III.D.1.1, "Primary Coolant Outside Containment" -

coolant outside II1.D.1.1 Resolved for Unit 1 only in SSER10 (October 1992),

containment III.D.1.1 reviewed in SSER1 6 (September 1995). Unit 2 Actions -

Include the waste gas disposal system in the leakage reduction program and incorporate in Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

Chapter 12- Radiation Protection 12.2 12.1 - Assuring that Original 1982 SER Occupational Radiation Exposures are As Low As Reasonably Achievable 12.3 12.2 - Radiation Sources Original 1982 SER 12.4 12.3, 12.4 - Radiation Original 1982 SER Protection Design Features 12.5, 12.6 12.5 - Operational 12.6 - Outstanding issue Resolved C - The staff reviewed TVA's RADCON program (formerly Radiation Protection involving Health Physics SSER10- the HP program) and found that the WBN organizational Program Program October 1992 structure can provide adequate support for the RADCON program and that organizational changes described in the FSAR amendments met the staff's acceptance criteria.

They considered this issue-resolved in SSER10.

12.7 NA- NUREG-0737 items 12.7.2 LC - (6c) I - In SSER5 (November 1990), the staff resolved this Accident monitoring, license condition for Unit 1 (IR 390/84-09 & IR 390/84-28) instrumentation - due to verification that TVA's commitments regarding the containment radiation high range in-containment monitor were satisfactory and monitor that it was installed. Unit 2 Action - Install high range in-containment monitor for Unit 2.

T1 - 55 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

I.Approval for WBN 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Additional Information

~~~I

- III.D.3.3, "In-plant Monitoring of 12 radiation monitoring" -

NRC reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

Unit 2 Action - Complete modifications for Unit 2.

Chapter 13 - Conduct of Operations 13.1.1 13.1.1 - Management and Original 1982 SER Technical Support Organization 13.1.2, 13.1.2, 13.1.3 - Operating 13.1.3 - LC - Use of Resolved SSER8 C - In the original 1982 SER, NRC provided for an LC to 13.1.3 Organization experienced personnel - January 1992 ensure TVA augmented the shift staff with individuals that during startup had prior experience with large pressurized water reactor operations. TVA's commitment to comply with RG 1.8, "Personnel Selection and Training," provided adequate assurance, and in SSER8, NRC eliminated the LC.

13.2.1 13.2.1 - Reactor Operator Original 1982 SER Requalification Program, Reactor Operator Training 13.2.2 13.2.2 - Non-Licensed Original 1982 SER Plant Staff Training 13.3 13.3 - Emergency 13.3 - LC - Emergency Resolved C - The NRC review of Emergency Preparedness in Planning Preparedness IIl.A.1, SSER13 - SSER13 superseded the review in the original 1982 SER.

III.A.2, III.A.2 April 1994 In SSER1 3, the staff concluded that the WBN Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) provided an adequate planning basis for an acceptable state of onsite emergency preparedness, and the LC was deleted. The NRC completed the review of the REP in SSER20.

T1 - 56 ,C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 13.4 13.4 - Operational 13.4 - LC - Independent L - Resolved for Unit 1 only in SSER8 - January 1992.

Programs Safety Engineering Unit 2 action - Implement the alternate ISEG that was Group (ISEG) I.B.1.2 approved for the rest of the TVA units including WBN Unit 1 by NRC August 26, 1999. The function will be performed by the site engineering organizations.

13.5.1, 13.5.1 - Administrative 13.5.2 - Outstanding Resolved SSER9 C - In the original 1982 SER, this issue was used to track 13.5.2 Procedures issue involving - June 1992 the staffs review of the emergency operating procedures operating, maintenance generation package. In SSER9, the staff concluded that and emergency the outstanding issue was no longer needed as the staff procedures no longer performed such reviews. The emergency operating procedure development program review is performed under IP 42000, "Emergency Operating Procedures." This inspection will be performed before issuance of an operating license.

13.5.2 - LC - Review of Resolved NUREG-0737, I - I.C.7, "NSSS vendor revision of procedures" - IR 50-power ascension test SSER1 0 - I.C.7 390/391 85-08 closed this item for Unit 1, and NRC also procedures and October 1992 reviewed in SSER16. Unit 2 Action - Revise power emergency operating ascension and emergency procedures which were procedures by the NSSS reviewed by Westinghouse.

vendor I.C.7 13.5.2 - LC - Resolved NUREG-0737, I - I.C.8, "Pilot monitoring of selected emergency Modifications to SSER1O - I.C.8 procedures for NTOLs" - IR 50-390/391 85-08 closed this Emergency Operating October 1992 item for Unit 1, and NRC also reviewed in SSER16.

instructions I.C.8 Unit 2 Action - Pilot monitor selected emergency I_ I I procedures for NTOL.

T1 - 57 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 13.5.3 NA - NUREG-0737, items 13.5.3 - LC - Report on Resolved SSER3 C - In the original 1982 SER, the NRC accepted TVA's outage of emergency - January 1985 commitment to develop and implement a plan to collect core cooling system emergency core cooling system outage information. In I1.K.3.17 SSER3, the staff accepted a revised commitment from an October 28, 1983, letter to participate in the nuclear power reliability data system and comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 NUREG-0737, I - I.C.1, "Short term accident and procedure review" -

I.C.1 NRC reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

Unit 2 Action - Implement upgraded EOPs, including validation and training.

NUREG-0737, T - I1.K.3.3, "Reporting of SRV Challenges and Failures" 11.K.3.3 (action from GL 82-16) - NRC reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995). Unit 2 Action - Include, as necessary, in Technical Specifications submittal.

13.6 13.6 - Physical Security 13.6 - Outstanding issue Resolved C - In the original 1982 SER, the staff identified certain to file appropriate SSER1 5 - outstanding issues with TVA's Physical Security Plan. In revision to the Physical June 1995 SSER15, NRC provided a safety evaluation that concluded Security Plan that WBN conforms to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

13.6.4 - LC - Physical Resolved C - In the original 1982 SER, part of the Physical Security security of fuel in SSER10 - Plan (PSP) was not in accordance with the regulation.

containment October 1992 TVA submitted a new PSP on June 17, 1992. In SSER10, the staff concluded that the provisions for protection of the containment during major refueling and maintenance met the intent of the regulation.

T1 - 58 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance 1 Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 1 Reference Note Additional Information Chapter 14 - Initial Test Program SER 14 14.2 - Initial Plant Test 14.0 - Confirmatory Resolved SSER3 C - In SSER3, NRC accepted a 30 day period for making Program - Design issues - Availability of - January 1985 approved preoperational test procedures available to staff.

Certification and new preoperational test License Application procedures 60 days before test.

14.0 - Confirmatory., Resolved SSER3 C - In the original 1982 SER, NRC noted that the FSAR issue - FSAR references - January 1985 did not reflect conformance of preoperational tests with to Regulatory Guides. RG 1.20, Revision 2, RG 1.52, Revision 2 and RG 1.79, Revision 1. The FSAR was subsequently revised. In SSER3, the NRC closed the issue.

14.0 - Confirmatory Resolved SSER3 C - In the original 1982 SER, NRC noted that the FSAR issue - Additional - January 1985 did not include preoperational tests for a number of systems to be tested as systems that NRC determined to be important to the safe part of the initial test operation of the plant. The FSAR was subsequently program revised. In SSER3, the NRC found the revised preoperational test abstracts acceptable.

14.2 - Unit 2 issue to I - This issue was raised in SSER14 and resolved for verify capability of each Unit 1 only. In SSER14, the NRC stated that before an OL common station service can be issued for Unit 2, TVA would have to demonstrate transformer to carry load the capability of each CSST to carry the loads of one unit required to supply ESF under LOCA conditions in addition to power required for loads of I unit under shutting down the non-accident unit. TVA agreed with the LOCA condition in NRC position in a January 5, 1995 letter. Unit 2 action -

addition to power Amend FSAR Chapter 14 to reflect the capability of each required for shutdown on CSST to carry the loads of one unit under LOCA non-accident unit conditions in addition to power required for shutting down the non-accident unit.

T1 - 59 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; 1 - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 14.2 - LC - Report Resolved SSER7 I - In the original 1982 SER, this LC was intended to changes to Initial Test - require TVA report to NRC within 30 days of modifying an Program September 1991 approved initial test. In SSER7, the NRC accepted a commitment in TVA's July 1, 1991, letter to notify NRC within 30 days of any changes to the Startup Test Program made under 10 CFR 50.59. Unit 2 action - Notify NRC within 30 days of any changes to the Startup Test Program made under 10 CFR 50.59.

Chapter 15 - Accident Analysis 15.1 15 - Introduction - Original 1982 SER Transient and Accident Analysis 15.2 15.3.1 - 15.3.2 - Loss of Original 1982 SER Forced Reactor Coolant Flow Including Trip of Pump Motor and Flow Controller Malfunctions 15.2.1 15.2.1 - 15.2.5 - Loss of Original 1982 SER External Load; Turbine Trip; Loss of Condenser Vacuum;-Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve (BWR); and Steam Pressure Regulator Failure (Closed) 15.2.1 15.2.6 - Loss of Original 1982 SER Nonemergency AC Power to Station Auxiliaries T1 - 60 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 15.2.1 15.2.7 - Loss Normal Original 1982 SER Feedwater Flow 15.2.2, 15.1.1 - 15.1.4- Decrease Original 1982 SER 15.2.3 in Feedwater Temperature, Increase in Feedwater Flow, Increase in Steam Flow, and Inadvertent Opening of a Steam Generator Relief or Safety Valve 15.2.3 15.5.1 - 15.5.2 - Original 1982 SER Inadvertent Operation of ECCS and Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction that Increases Reactor Coolant Inventory 15.2.4.1 15.4.1 - Uncontrolled Original 1982 SER Control Rod Assembly Withdrawal from a Subcritical or Low Power Startup Condition 15.2.4.2 15.4.2 - Uncontrolled Original 1982 SER Control Rod Assembly Withdrawal at Power 15.2.4.3 15.4.3 - Control Rod Original 1982 SER Maloperation (System Malfunction or Operator Error)

T1 - 61 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information NA 15.4.4 - 15.4.5 Startup of Not addressed in SER an Inactive Loop or Recirculation Loop at an Incorrect Temperature, and Flow Controller Malfunction Causing an Increase in BWR Core Flow Rate 15.2.4.4 15.4.6 - Chemical and 15.2.4.4 - Outstanding Resolved SSER4 C - In a letter dated November 2, 1984, TVA stated that Volume Control Systems issue for evaluation of - March 1985 the boron dilution alarm system receives signals from two Malfunction that Results Boron dilution and single independent channels which are independently powered.

in a Decrease in Boron failure criteria Additionally, testing of these circuits was described. The Concentration in the staff concluded in SSER4 that the system is adequately Reactor Coolant (PWR) protected from single failure and closed this item.

15.2.4.5 15.4.7 - Inadvertent Original 1982 SER Loading and Operation of a Fuel Assembly in an Improper Position 15.2.6 15.4.8 - Spectrum of Rod Original 1982 SER Ejection Accidents (PWR) 15.3.1 15.6.5 - Loss-of-Coolant Original 1982 SER Accidents Resulting From Spectrum of Postulated Piping Breaks Within the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 15.3.2 15.1.5 - Steam System Original 1982 SER Piping Failures Inside and Outside Containment (PWR)

T1 - 62 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance 1982 SER SRP TITLE Approval 2 WBN Unitfor Approval Reference Bulletins)

(GL,Note 1 Additional Information 15.3.3 15.2.8 - Feedwater Original 1982 SER System Pipe Breaks Inside and Outside Containment (PWR) 15.3.4, 15.3.3 - 15.3.4 - Reactor Original 1982 SER 15.3.5 Coolant Pump Rotor Seizure and Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Break 15.3.6 15.8 - Anticipated LC - Anticipated Resolved SSER5 C - In SSER5, the staff found TVA's response to a Transients Without Scram Transients Without - November 1990 number of items in GL 83-28 acceptable, including Item Scram (Generic Letter 4.3, as stated in NRC letter dated June 18, 1990, and thus 83-28, Item 4.3) eliminated this license condition.

15.4.1 15.6.5.A - Radiological Original 1982 SER Consequences of a Design Basis Loss-of-Coolant Accident Including Containment Leakage Contribution 15.4.2, 15.6.5.B - Radiological Original 1982 SER 15.4.6 Consequences of a Design Basis Loss-of-Coolant Accident:

Leakage from Engineered Safety Feature Components Outside Containment T1 - 63 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

J 1 Approval for WBN Approval Guidance (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 15.4.2 15.1.5.A - Radiological Original 1982 SER Consequence of Main Steam Line Failures Outside Containment of a PWR 15.4.3 15.6.3 - Radiological LC - Steam Generator Resolved C - In SSER12, the staff identified 5 items that required Consequences of Steam tube rupture SSER12 - resolution involving 1) operator action times; 2) radiation Generator Tube Failure October 1993, offsite consequence analysis; 3) systems and 4) and SSER14 - associated components credited for accident mitigation in December 1994 SG tube rupture emergency operating procedures; and 5) system compatibility with bounding analysis. Items 2-5 were resolved in SSER12. In SSER14, the staff stated that a revised SG tube rupture analysis was more conservative and did not alter the conclusions of their original safety evaluation. With regard to operator response times, TVA letters dated April 21, 1994, and August 15, 1994, and NRC letter dated June 28, 1994, dealt with simulator runs to address response times and operator performance during simulated SG tube ruptures.

The staff concluded, after review of the TVA letters, that the times assumed in the tube rupture analysis were satisfactorily verified and deleted this condition.

15.4.4 15.4.8.A - Radiological Original 1982 SER Consequences of a Control Rod Ejection Accident (PWR) 15.4.5 15.7.4 - Radiological Original 1982 SER Consequences of Fuel Handling Accidents TI - 64 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information 15.4.6 15.6.2 - Radiological Original 1982 SER Consequences of the Failure of Small Lines Carrying Primary Coolant Outside Containment 15.4.7 15.7.3 - Postulated Original .1982 SER Radioactive Releases Due to Liquid-Containing Tank Failures 15.5.1 - NA - NUREG-0737 items LC - Effect of high Resolved SSER4 C - In SSER4, the staff concluded that there was 15.5.2 pressure injection for - March 1985 reasonable assurance that vessel integrity would be small beak LOCA with maintained for small breaks with an extended loss of all no auxiliary feedwater - feedwater and that the USI A-49, "Pressurized Thermal

I.K.2.13 Shock," review did not have to be completed to support the full-power license. They considered this condition resolved.

LC - Voiding in the Resolved SSER4 C - The staff reviewed the generic resolution of this reactor coolant system - - March 1985 license condition in SSER4 and approved the study in I1.K.2.17 question, thereby resolving this license condition.

15.5.3 15.6.1 - Inadvertent LC - PORV isolation Resolved SSER5 NUREG-0737, C - II.K.3.1/3.2, "Auto PORV isolation/Report on PORV Opening of a PWR system - I1.K.3.1, I1.K.3.2 - November 1990 II.K.3.1, II.K.3.2 Failures"- Reviewed in SSER5 and resolved based on Pressurizer Pressure NRC conclusion that there is no need for an automatic Relief Valve or a BWR PORV isolation system (NRC letter dated June 29, 1990).

Pressure Relief Valve 15.5.4- NA - NUREG-0737 items LC - Automatic trip of. Resolved SSER4 GL 85-12; I - GL 85-12/1I.K.3.5, "Implementation of TMI Item I1.K.3.5" 15.5.5 reactor coolant pumps - March 1985 NUREG-0737, - The staff determined that their review of Item I1.K.3.5 did during a small break 11.K.3.5 not have to be completed to support the full power license LOCA and considered this license condition resolved in SSER4.

The item was further reviewed in SSER1 6 (September 1995). Unit 2 Action - Implement modifications as required.

T1 - 65 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information LC- Revised small Resolved SSER5 NUREG-0737, I - II.K.3.30/II.K.3.31, "Small break LOCA methods/Plant break LOCA analysis - November 1990 II.K.3.30, I1.K.3.31 specific analysis" - The staff determined in SSER4 that their review of Items II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31 did not have to be completed to support the full-power license and considered this license condition resolved in SSER4. In SSER5, the staff further reviewed responses to these items, and concluded that the Units 1 and 2 FSAR methods and analysis met the requirements of II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31. This item was further reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995). Unit 2 Action - Complete analysis for Unit 2.

Chapter 16 - Technical Specifications 16 16 - Technical Original 1982 SER T - Unit 2 Action - Submit Technical Specifications.

Specifications I Chapter 17 - Quality Assurance 17.1,17.2 17.1 - Quality Assurance Original 1982 SER I - B 87-02, "Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance (QA) During the Design with Applicable Material Specifications" - NRC closed in and Construction Phase letter dated August 18, 1989. Unit 2 Action - Complete for Unit 2, using information used for Unit 1, as applicable.

T1 - 66 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note 1 Additional Information 17.3, 17.4 17.2 - QA During the Outstanding issue QA Resolved SSER2 C - The staff reviewed the description of the QA program Operations Phase program - January 1984 and concluded in SSER2 that the description was in Updated SSER5 compliance with NRC regulations. The staff reviewed the

- November 1990 organization for the QA program and the NQA Plan, and presented their conclusions in SSER5. They concluded Resolved that the program was acceptable for the operations phase SSER13 - of Watts Bar. It was noted, however, that Amendment 63 April 1994 stated that identification of safety related features would be addressed later and the staff left the outstanding issue unresolved. In SSER1 3, the staff concluded that TVA had established appropriate programmatic controls for identification of safety related features and considered this issue resolved.

17.3 17.3 - Quality Assurance Original 1982 SER Program Description NA 10 CFR 50.65- Not addressed in SER I - Unit 2 action - Implement Maintenance Rule for Unit 2 Maintenance Rule systems 1 month prior to fuel load Chapter 18- Control Room Design Review 18 18 - Human Factors LC - Detailed Control Resolved for Unit NUREG-0737, I -I.D.1, "Control Room Design Review" - NRC reviewed in Engineering Room Design review 1 in SSER15- I.D.1 SSER5 (November 1990), SSER6 (April 1991), SSER15 I.D.1 June 1995, with (June 1995) and SSER16 (September 1995).

onsite audit of Unit 2 Actions - Complete the CRDR process. Perform Unit 1 control rewiring in accordance with ECN 5982. Take advantage of room the completed Human Engineering reviews to ensure improvements - appropriate configuration for Unit 2 control panels. See same resolution CRDR Special Program.

for Unit 2 NUREG-0737, I - III.D.3.4, "Control Room Habitability" - NRC reviewed in III.D.3.4 SER and SSER16 (September 1995). Unit 2 Action -

Complete with CRDR completion.

T1 - 67 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Guidance Approval for WBN Approval (GL, Bulletins) 1982 SER SRP TITLE Unit 2 Reference Note I Additional Information LC - Make Safety Open item for NUREG-0737, I -I.D.2/GI 82-33/GL 89 "Safety Parameter Display Parameter Display Unit 2 - resolution I.D.2, GL 82-33, System" (SPDS)/"Requirements for Emergency Response System operable prior to requires a GL 89-06 Capability" - NRC reviewed in SSER5 (November 1990),

startup from the first functional system SSER6 (April 1991) and SSER15 (June 1995).

refueling outage before fuel load Unit 2 Action - Install SPDS and have it operational prior and on-line to start-up after the first refueling outage.

testing after Unit 2 is operational; then an operational certification (GL 89-06)

Notes:

1. While a specific Bulletin or Generic Letter may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections, it is only addressed in this table with the first or the most appropriate section.

T1 - 68 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Table 2 - Other Generic Communications Affecting WBN Unit 2 License Basis Item Title Additional Information IEB 74-15 Misapplication of Cutler-Hammer Three Position Maintained Switch I - Install modified A3 Cutler-Hammer 10250T switches.

Model No. 10250T IEB 75-08 PWR Pressure Instrumentation T - Ensure that Technical Specifications and Site Operating Instructions address importance of maintaining temperature and pressure within prescribed limits.

IEB 77-03 On-Line Testing of the W Solid State Protection System I - Include necessary periodic testing in test procedures.

IEB 80-10 Contamination of Non-radioactive System and Resulting Potential I - Include proper monitoring of non-radioactive systems in procedures.

for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release of Radioactivity to Environment IEB 83-04 Failure of the Undervoltage Trip Function of Reactor Trip Breakers I - Install new undervoltage attachment with wider grooves on the reactor trip breakers.

IEB 85-02 Undervoltage Trip Attachment of W DB-50 Type Reactor Trip I - Install automatic shunt trip on the Westinghouse DS-416 reactor trip breakers on Breakers Unit 2.

IEB 88-10 Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers I - Replace those circuits not traceable to a circuit breaker manufacturer.

IEB 90-01 Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount I - For Unit 2, implement applicable recommendations from this bulletin including identification of potentially defective transmitters and an enhanced surveillance program which monitors transmitters for loss of fill oil.

T2-1 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Table 2 - Other Generic Communications Affecting WBN Unit 2 License Basis Item Title Additional Information GL 83-28 Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (See SRP/SER Review Matrix for additional GL 83-28 items):

2.2 - Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface I - Enter engineering component background data in Equipment Performance and (All SR Components) Information Exchange System for Unit 2.

3.2 - Post-Maintenance Testing (All SR Components) I - Test and maintenance procedures and Technical Specifications will include post-maintenance operability testing of other (than reactor trip system) safety-related components.

GL 88-20 Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident Vulnerability I - Complete evaluation for Unit 2.

NUREG-0737 TMI Items:

I1.K.1.10 - Operability status I - Confirm multi-unit operation will have no impact on administrative procedures with respect to operability status.

II.K.3.10 - Anticipatory trip at high power Tissue.

- Unit 2 Technical Specifications and surveillance procedures will address this T2-2 C - Item closed for WBN Unit 2; I - Proposed implementation only item; L - NRR approval required; T - Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Table 3 - Corrective Action Programs and Special Programs Unit 2 Status and Program Description References IVA Commitments CAP - Cable Issues: CAP Plan:

STVA letter dated

1. Silicone Rubber Insulated Cables Silicone Rubber Insulated January 13, 1994, Hi-pot testing of silicone rubber insulated cables manufactured by American Insulated Wire (AIW), Rockbestos, Cables - CAP is open Revision 3 to the CAP and Anaconda revealed a significant number of failures in AIW cables. TVA decided to replace all AIW cables. (Design & Physical Plan for Cable Issues Rockbestos and Anaconda cables were successfully tested at Wyle Laboratories for 40 year qualified life. Modification). Replace any AIW cables used on Unit 2.

NRC Approval of Approach:

2. Cable Jamming " Safety Evaluation for WB Cable Jamming - CAP is Since WBN documents did not address cable jam ratio, there was the potential for undetected cable damage. Unit 1 - Corrective Action open (Design & Physical Program (CAP) Plan for Modification). Based on When single conductors with unacceptable jam ratios are pulled into a conduit, the cable may align in a flat configuration with a resultant jamming. Cable Issues, the work performed on April 25, 1991 Unit 1, no corrective For Unit 1, Class 1E conduits were evaluated to identify those segments most likely to have experienced " Supplemental Safety actions are required to jamming during installation. These segments were ranked according to their calculated percent sidewall Evaluation (SSER) 7, of resolve this issue on Unit 2.

bearing pressure. Cables were removed and inspected, and no evidence of damage due to jamming was NUREG-0847, Safety See Note 1.

identified. The inspected cables included those with the highest calculated side wall bearing pressure and were Evaluation Report considered to bound the lower ranked cables. This evaluation addressed both Unit 1 and Unit 2 cable Related to the Operation populations potentially subject to jamming. of WBNP, Units 1 and 2, dated September 1991

3. Cable Support in Vertical Conduits Cable Support in Vertical

" SSER9, June 1992 A concern was raised that cables in long vertical conduits were inadequately supported, and that random Conduit - CAP is open

" NRC letter February 14, (Design & Physical failures due to cutting of the insulation and conductor creep may occur during normal service condition, 1994 Modification). For Unit 2, especially for silicone rubber insulated cables.

the Unit 1 approach will be For Unit 1, TVA identified the critical cases of silicone rubber insulated cables in vertical conduits, with cable used.

bearing pressure occurring at the edge of the condulet the determining factor. A comparison was made of WBN critical cases with those already tested at SQN. If SQN conduits enveloped WBN, no cable testing by.WBN was performed. If SQN conduits did not envelope WBN, cable was replaced or in situ cable testing was performed; any cable found unacceptable was replaced. TVA also evaluated Class 1E conduits containing cables of all insulation types and added cable supports when acceptance criteria were not satisfied. In addition, cable installation specification and site procedures were revised to incorporate appropriate cable support requirements for cable installed in vertical conduits, and thereby prevent recurrence.

Conduits that exceeded the support requirements of General Construction Specification G-38 were analyzed and conduit suppporpointswith bearinqgpressurejreater than allowable were inspected and supports added as

i f Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments required.

4. Cable Support in Vertical Trays Cable Support in Vertical Trays - CAP is open TVA's specifications require that cables in vertical trays be supported in accordance with the National Electric (Design & Physical Code to prevent long term cable damage and that this support may be provided by tie wraps. However, TVA had no basis to verify that cable ties could provide adequate support. Modification). For Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach will be used.

TVA evaluated the acceptability of various tie wrap configurations as support systems. If a configuration was found to be inadequate, it was shown by analysis, similarity to other installations, or testing that no cable damage had occurred or would occur. Cable support was added when manufacturers' limits were exceeded.

To prevent recurrence, TVA revised the cable installation specification and site procedures to identify acceptable methods for support of cables in vertical trays.

5. Cable Proximity to Hot Pipes Cable Proximity to Hot Pipe

- CAP is open (Design &

Cable design did not include the local effects of hot pipes which increase local temperature and can degrade the Physical Modification). For cable insulation and shorten the life of the cables. For Unit 1, criteria were developed to detail required Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach clearances between cable/raceways and hot pipes/valves to eliminate this potential impact. Class 1 E cables will be used.

were walked down against the criteria to ensure that adequate separation existed between the cables and hot pipes/valves. Deviations were resolved by analysis, change of pipe insulation or raceway rework.

6. Cable Pullbys Cable Pullbys - CAP is open (Design & Physical Cable insulation damage was found in the Unit 2 Reactor Protection System and determined to be the result of Modification). TVA will cable pullby. When additional cables were removed, damage was also found. These deficiencies were addressed at the time. propose a different approach for Unit 2. See Note 1.

For Unit 1, TVA identified those locations where cable pull tension and cable side wall bearing pressure had exceeded certain safe threshold values, and cables were most susceptible to this damage mechanism based on the conduit-configuration. All cables that were in high risk conduits Were replaced. The threshold between low and high risk categories was validated via hi-pot testing or visual inspection, and cables in the low risk category conduits were accepted as is based on the hi-pot tests performed on a sample of low-risk category conduits.

7. Cable Bend Radius Cable Bend Radius - CAP is open (Design & Physical The minimum bend radius recommended by the Insulated Cable Engineers Association had been violated at Modification). For Unit2, WBN. To resolve this issue on Unit 1, TVA established bend radius parameters (upper and lower bounds) for the Unit 1 approach will be class 1E cables and revised General Construction Specification G-38 to include the bend radius requirements used.

for cable installation. Cable was then categorized based on 10 CFR 50.49 requirements, classification and voltage level; and inspected and replaced, retrained or their qualified life reduced, based on bending or kinking relative to upper and lower bound bend radii.

T3-2

Unit 2 Status and Program Description J References TVA Commitments

8. Cable Splices Cable Splices - CAP is To resolve a concern that the installed splices may not conform to the qualified configurations and materials open (Design & Physical tested by the vendor, a list of Class 1 E cable splices in harsh and mild environments was developed. Cables Modification). For Unit 2, and splices were identified by reviewing equipment qualification binders and construction records to determine the Unit 1 approach will be which equipment uses pigtails for field cable connection. All 10 CFR 50.49 harsh environment cable splices used.

requiring Raychem Type N material were replaced and some mild environment cable splices were reworked. A sampling program was implemented to verify that the splice list was complete for intermediate splices.

9. Cable Sidewall Bearing Pressure Cable Sidewall Bearing At WBN, sidewall bearing pressure (SWBP) was not properly addressed in the design and installation process Pressure (SWBP) - CAP is and installations may have exceeded the allowable value. To resolve this issue on Unit 1, TVA conducted a complete. Based on the walk down to identify worst case conduit configuration, calculated the expected pulling tension and SWBP for results of the Unit 1 those worst case conduits and performed a test to determine increased allowable SWBP values, based on program for this issue, actual cables used at TVA nuclear plants. which included Unit 1 and 2 cables and did not find TVA revised construction specifications to require that SWBP be limited to the values determined by the above excessive SWBP, no activities and site installation procedures were revised to provide explicit cable SWBP restriction to cable pulling corrective action will be limits. required for Unit 2. See Note 1.

Analysis of the 81 severe case conduits against these limits revealed that the cable in one conduit may have exceeded these values, and this cable was replaced. An additional sample of 40 conduits, all in harsh environment, was examined and none exceeded allowable SWBP.

10. Pulling Cable Through 900 Condulet and Flexible Conduit Pullinq Cable Through 90° A concern was raised for the potential damage to cables in 900 condulets due to the small supporting surface the Condulet and Flexible inside corners of condulets provide for cables under tension. These comers can, in time, cut into the insulation, Conduit - CAP is complete.

or the conductor can creep through the insulation, reducing the insulation level of the cables. There was also a Since no cable damage concern that when cable is pulled through a flexible conduit segment in a bend, in the middle of a conduit run, it was found during the Unit 1 can be subjected to very high frictional forces that can tear the cable jacket and insulation. program due to this activity and no such damage has TVA evaluated cables pulled through mid-route flexible conduits which had been tested for pullby damage, and been found at any of the inspected cables removed, and confirmed that no damage was caused by the mid-route flexible conduits. WVA Nuclear sites, no corrective action is necessary. See Note 1.

T3-3

Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments

11. Computerized Cable Routing System Software and Database Verification and Validation Computerized Cable CCRS was used to document information regarding cable routing. The information includes cable route in tray Routing System software -

and conduits, cable type, cable weight, cable splices, circuit function and separation. There were concerns for CAP is complete. Since all the adequacy of CCRS. CCRS has been replaced by new software called ICRDS. cable data has been transferred to the Integrated Cable and Raceway Design System, no further corrective action is necessary for this issue.

CAP - Cable Tray Supports: CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design and Deficiencies with cable trays and their supports included inadequate tray connections, inconsistencies between TVA letter dated Physical Modification). For as-designed versus as-built tray configurations and their orientation, and failure to evaluate all loading on cable tray November 18,1988, Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach members. Corrective Action will be used.

Program Plan for The CAP for Unit 1 assured the structural adequacy and compliance with design criteria and licensing requirements Category I Cable Tray by: and Cable Tray Supports

" Review and revision of design criteria. NRC Approval of Approach:

" Review or development of design output requirements to comply with design criteria and to adequately translate

• Safety Evaluation of the TVA design requirements. This included validation calculations for typical hardware configurations and critical WB CAP Plan for cases. Category I Cable Tray

" Walkdown of field configurations to identify deviations from design output. and Cable Tray Supports, output September 13, 1989

• Modifications to field conditions, where necessary, to ensure that they are consistent with design documents.

• SSER6, April 1991 T3-4

Unit 2 Status and Program Description References j TVA Commitments CAP - Conduit Supports: CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design and Specific structural deficiencies with conduit supports including inadequate conduit clamps, conduit runs supported at TVWA letter dated Physical Modification). For only one location, and excessively cantilevered conduit fell into four primary categories: November 18, 1988, Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach

" Design Basis discrepancies. Corrective Action will be used.

" Design output not enveloping all design parameters. Program (CAP) Plan for Conduit Support

" Installed configurations not in compliance with design documents. Installation

" Discrepancies between as-installed configurations and inspection documentation.

NRC Approval of Approach:

The CAP for Unit 1 assured the structural adequacy and compliance with design criteria and licensing requirements Safety Evaluation of the by: WB CAP Plan for

" Revisions to design criteria Electrical Conduit and

" Updated design output documents including specifications to factor in changes to design criteria, changes to typical Conduit Supports, support details and new support details. Critical case attributes were defined and critical case evaluations September 1, 1989 performed to qualify installations..SE6,Arl19

" Walk downs first to support critical case evaluations, then to identify configurations not enveloped by critical cases.

" Modifications, as required.

" Revisions of implementing procedures to ensure the adequacy of new or modified supports.

CAP - Design Baseline Verification Program: CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design). For WBN licensing and design basis documentation as well as plant configuration issues included: TVWA letter dated Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach

• Inconsistencies between the FSAR and WBN design documentation. October 20, 1988, will be used.

esin inutad Incoplee sme iconistnt nfomaton.Corrective Action

• Inompete iputinfomaton.Program nd omeincosisentdesin (CAP) Plan for

• Missing, incomplete and out-of-date design calculations. the Design Baseline and

• Inconsistencies between the actual plant configuration and the as-constructed drawings. Verification Program (DBVP) for Unit 1 and The causes of these conditions were found to be: Common Features

" Lack of effective procedures and data bases to ensure that design requirements were properly controlled. TVWA letter dated March 8,

" Insufficient definition of design criteria and system descriptions. 1994, Revision 7 to the

• Lack of a listing to establish the full scope of calculations needed for WBN and inadequate procedures to ensure CAP Plan for DBVP calculations are properly controlled.

" Lack of an effective process to maintain drawings for configuration control and keep appropriate drawings "as- NRC Approval of Approach:

constructed as plant changes are made. *Safety Evaluation Report on the WB Nuclear T3-5

Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments Performance Pe m Plan P

The underlying root cause of this situation was determined to be ineffective design and configuration control -

measres.(WBNPP) measures. NUREG-1232, Volume 4, each December 28, 1989 Based on these issues, the WBN Design Baseline and Verification Program (DBVP) had four major components, having objectives that addressed one or more of the above problems. These were: Inspection Report

" Licensing Verification -to assure that commitments to NRC are captured in the appropriate controlling document 50-390/95-36 dated and establish procedures to maintain compatibility between commitments and controlling documents. June 21, 1995

" Design Basis Development - to establish design basis documents (DBD) that contain or reference appropriate engineering requirements and establish procedures to maintain the design basis consistent with the plant, technical requirements and licensing commitments.

• Calculation Verification - to assure the existence and retrievability of calculations that are technically adequate and consistent with the "safety-related" plant design and establish a process to status calculations to maintain them current with plant configuration.

• Configuration Control to develop and implement an improved design change control system with a single set of configuration control drawings (CCDs); and to utilize walk downs, evaluations or testing to verify that the functional configurations of the portions of systems that mitigate design basis events are consistent with CCDs.

CAP - Electrical Issues: CAP Plan:

• TVA letter dated

1. Flexible Conduit Installation Flexible Conduit February 15, 1989, CAP Installations - CAP is open The problems identified with flexible conduits were: Plan for Electrical Issues (Design & Physical

• Inadequate length to account for seismic/thermal movement Modification). For Unit 2, NRC Approval of Aporoach:

" Lack of compliance with minimum bend radius requirements the Unit 1 approach will be

• Safety Evaluation of the used.

• Loose Fittings WB Unit 1 CAP Plan for Electrical Issues, To resolve these issues for Unit 1, TVA revised design output documents to more specifically define flexible September 11, 1989 conduit requirements for:

" NUREG-1232

- Seismic/thermal movement

- Minimum bend radius

- Tightness of fittings A list of flexible conduits attached to Class 1E pipe mounted devices was then developed to identify those flexible conduits which would experience both seismic and thermal movement. Finally, TVA walked down all Class 1 E flexible conduits, and reworked those found to be damaged or in noncompliance with the design output documents.

T3-6

Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments

2. Physical Cable Separation and Electrical Isolation Physical Cable Separation and Electrical Isolation -

There were isolated cases of redundant closed raceways with less than the minimum required 1-inch separation.

CAP is open (Design &

For Unit 1, this issue was subdivided into three issues, and each was reso!ved separately. The issues were: Physical Modification). For Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach

" Separation between redundant divisions of Class 1 E raceways.

will be used to address

• Internal panel separation between redundant divisions of Class 1E cables. separation between

" Coil-to-contact and contact-to-contact isolation between Class 1E and non-Class 1E circuits redundant divisions of Class 1E raceways and For inadequate separation between redundant divisions of Class 1E raceways, the raceways were reworked to internal panel separation meet the minimum 1-inch separation requirement, and site implementing procedures were revised to require between redundant specific signoffs for raceway separation attributes. divisions of class 1E cable.

Since no coil-to-contact or For inadequate internal panel separation between redundant divisions of Class 1 E cables, design criteria were contact-to-contact isolation revised to include more detailed requirements for internal panel cable separation, an engineering output breakage was identified on document was issued to define these requirements and a list of all panels with redundant divisions of Class 1 E Unit 1, no action is required cables was developed. Panels containing cables of redundant divisions were walked down to identify cables for Unit 2 on this issue.

which did not comply with the revised engineering output document, and these were evaluated to determine See Note 1.

acceptability or reworked to meet required separation distances.

For coil-to-contact and contact-to-contact isolation between Class 1E and non-Class 1E circuits, a calculation was developed to determine acceptability; design criteria were revised to specify acceptable isolation methods; and the existing Class 1 E coil and contact devices used as isolators were reviewed to determine that they were qualified for their intended use.

3. Contact and Coil Rating of Electrical Devices Contact and Coil Rating of Electrical Devices - CAP is Design and procurements of inductive devices contained in circuits did not consider the inductive load ratings of open (Design & Physical contacts or the maximum credible voltage available at the device terminals.

Modification). For Unit 2, To resolve this for Unit 1, WVA reviewed devices that performed inductive load switching, and determined if the the Unit 1 approach will be used.

contacts had acceptable current ratings and reviewed inductive devices to determine if coils were qualified for the highest and lowest credible voltages. If a device could not be qualified, design output documents were issued to require replacement, and qualified devices were installed.

T3-7

I I Unit 2Status and Program Description j References j TVA Commitments

4. Torque Switch and Overload Relay By-Pass Capability for Active Safety Related Valves Torque Switch and Thermal overload and torque switch bypass capability was not provided for certain active safety-related valves, as Overload Relay By-Pass required by Regulatory Guide 1.106. Capability for Active Safety Related Valves - CAP is For Unit 1, TVA issued design criteria to provide the basis for determining which active valves were required to open (Design & Physical have their thermal overload relays and torque switches bypassed and issued a calculation to identify these valves. Modification). For Unit 2, System design criteria or system descriptions were revised to identify which valves within a system require this the Unit 1 approach will be capability; design output documents were revised to provide the required capability; and thermal overload and used.

torque switch bypasses were installed where they did not already exist and were required.

5. Adhesive Backed Cable Support Mounts Adhesive Backed Cable Adhesive Back Cable Support Mounts (ABCSMs) were used inside equipment to support and restrain wire and Support Mounts - CAP is field cables in a neat and orderly fashion. The ABCSMs sometimes separated from the inside of the equipment open (Design & Physical and, as a result, may not have properly secured the wire or cable. Modification). For Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach will be For Unit 1, TVA contacted the vendors of the panels/equipment to ascertain the technical requirements for the used.

ABCSMs for the vendor's wiring, evaluated the use of ABCSMs for field wiring and issued a calculation identifying the technical requirements for existing ABCSMs. WVA then evaluated the as-installed conditions to determine if any corrective action was required, issued and implemented design output documents in the field and revised site implementing procedures to incorporate the necessary installation requirements and to restrict the use of ABCSMs.

T3-8

1Unit 2 Status an Program Description References [ -VA Commitments CAP - Equipment Seismic Qualification (ESQ): CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design and Deficiencies in seismic qualification of equipment involved configuration and document control issues, and specific TVA letter dated Physical Modification). For technical issues identified by TVA internal reviews. June 29, 1989 - WBN Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach Equipment Seismic will be used.

To provide assurance that Category I and I (L) equipment is seismically qualified, that the qualification documentation Qualification Corrective is retrievable, and that this documentation is consistent with the design and licensing basis, the ESQ: Action Program Plan,

" Reviewed design bases to ensure that they were technically adequate and consistent interfaces existed between Revision 1 them and other design bases NRC Approval of Approach:

" Resolved specific technical issues utilizing: . Safety Evaluation of the

- Document retrieval WB Unit 1 Corrective

- Walk downs to identify and describe actions required to resolve them Action Program Plan for Engineering evaluations and modifications when equipment could not be qualified in the as-built configuration Equipment Seismic

- Qualification,

" Developed and populated an ESQ database September 11, 1989

" Performed process improvements to prevent recurrence. . NUREG-1232 SSER15, June 1995 CAP - Fire Protection: CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design and The issues that resulted in the determination to initiate the Fire Protection CAP included: TVA letter dated Physical Modification). For March 28, 1990, Revision Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach

• Fire-rated walls were breached by HVAC ducts without fire dampers, violating Appendix R requirements for fire to CAP Plan for Fire will be used.

rated walls that separate safety-related equipment of redundant trains, Protection

• Review of SQN Appendix R discrepancies for applicability to WBN.

• Deficiencies with the Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA). NRC Approval of Approach:

In response to the above issues and other more specific deficiencies, the Unit 1 FP Program (for Unit 1 and common . SSER18, October, 1995 areas) contained the following actions: . SSER19,

" Documentation of the measures taken to evaluate violation of the Appendix R requirements and issuance of DCNs November, 1995 to correct the deficiencies.

" Review of SQN Appendix R allegations, as well as issues raised by the NRC during SQN inspections, for Above approval was for both applicability to WBN and issuance of DCNs to correct the deficiencies. units.

" Fire Protection Compliance Review to ensure WBN conformance with NRC requirements and applicable guidelines. The review included:

- Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA),

T3-9

Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments

- Area Heat-up Analysis,

- Fire hazards Analysis,

- Lighting and Communication,

- Post-Fire procedures,

- Associated Circuits,

- Modification Compliance Review, and

- Fire Protection Training/Administrative Procedures.

The results of the Compliance Review were used as the basis for developing the remaining scope of work (calculations/analysis, DCNs and document updates) and the consolidation of fire protection documentation into an organized package to support and substantiate the Compliance Review.

The SSA was updated based on the latest as-constructed plant configuration and the lessons learned from the SQN and BFN Appendix R programs.

CAP - Hanger Update and Analysis Program CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design and Piping and support deficiencies identified during the design and construction of WBN, as a result of responses to TVA letter dated Physical Modification). For June 29,1989, WBNP - Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 and internal findings, were incorporated into the following categories:

Revision to Corrective will be used.

" Control of Design Input/Output Action Program Plan for Design input was not consistently defined and controlled. Hanger and Analysis Update Program Design output was not dearly defined and, thus, was not consistently implemented by Construction.

• Design/Analysis Methodology NRC Approval of Approach:

Design criteria for piping analysis and pipe support design did not specify a consistent and comprehensive set of

• NUREG-1232 design/analysis methods. In some cases, relevant industry issues were not considered. SSER6, April 1991

" Level of Design Documentation Requirements for closure of unverified assumptions and documentation of engineering judgments were neither fully defined nor procedurally controlled.

The scope of the HAAUP activities for Unit 1 included Seismic Category I piping, Seismic Category I (L) piping and

'those instrument lines that could not be decoupled from their process piping, and associated supports. Those instrument lines that could be decoupled were addressed in the Instrument Line CAP. The following corrective actions were taken to address the deficiencies:

- Review of governing criteria and procedures to ensure compliance with industry practices and, where necessary, T3-10

Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments revision of the implementing criteria and procedures.

" Walkdowns of installed piping and associated pipe supports to obtain as-built information.

" Updating or regeneration of pipe stress and support calculations to:

- Incorporate changes in the seismic response spectra input to envelope sets B and C, and to add consideration of mass participation above 33 hz.

- Qualify as-built conditions in design documents.

- Ensure drawings and calculations are in compliance with current design criteria and procedures

" Update of design documents to incorporate as-built piping and support configurations, and other open items.

" Perform modifications, as required CAP - Heat Code Traceability: CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design and Traceability concerns involved ASME loose piping and fitting material and ASTM material installed as welded STVA letter dated Physical Modifications).

attachments on ASME piping systems, and were categorized as: September 21, 1989, For Unit 2, the Unit 1 Revision to the CAP Plan approach will be used.

" ASME Class 1 systems that may contain ASME Class 2, Class 3 and/or ASTM piping for which adequate NDE for Heat Code may not have been performed Traceability

• ASME Class 2 systems that may contain class 3 piping, and ASME Class 2 and Class 3 systems that may contain ASTM piping for which adequate NDE may not have been performed NRC Approval of Aporoach:

" ASME systems that may have ASTM plate material attached (welded). " Inspection Report 50-390/89-09 and For the Unit 1 program, which included common systems, the following corrective actions were taken: 50-391/89-09 dated September 20, 1989

" Accuracy of the information contained in the Heat Code Database (HCDB) was verified, and this information was used to flag situations where the same ASME material was used in systems of different classifications. " NUREG-1232

" For Class 1 piping, surface NDE was performed on all piping materials where the heat number was the same as for material used in a non-Class 1 system. When NDE was not feasible, alternate analysis prescribed by the ASME Code was performed. Material which could not be examined or technically justified was replaced.

" For Class 2 and 3 piping, required NDE was performed when classification traceability was questionable and items were installed in locations where stress ratios exceeded 0.80 for welded carbon steel and 0.85 for welded stainless steel. For cases involving ASTM, ASME Section II, and ASME Section III material which may have been upgraded to ASME Section III, Class 2 or 3 materials, the items were re-verified as meeting all other requirements of Section III on a sampling basis. Engineering evaluations were performed on non-complying items to provide a basis of acceptance. Material determined to be unacceptable was replaced.

T3-11

Program Description References r UnitCommitments TVA 2 Status and

" ASTM plate attachment material used in ASME applications was determined to be acceptable by verifying equivalence to an ASME specification, that it was supplied to an acceptable QA program and the necessary NDE was performed. Material that could not be verified or justified as being acceptable was replaced.

" Recurrence control included revising the General Construction Specification to include specific ASME requirements for reclassification of material and site implementing procedures to require CMTR traceability of materials to be installed.

CAP - HVAC Duct Supports: CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design and Adverse conditions involving HVAC Duct and Duct Supports can be programmatically characterized as: incomplete TVA letter dated Physical Modification). For design basis; inadequate design documents; as-built configurations not in conformance with existing design November 18, 1988, Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach documents; inadequate or incomplete inspection documentation; and incomplete instructions. Corrective Action will be used.

Program for Heating, For Unit 1, TVA resolved these issues via the following four tasks: Ventilation, and Air

• Completing the design basis by reviewing and revising the design criteria; issuing supporting calculations and Conditioning Duct and updating the FSAR to be consistent with the upgraded design criteria. Duct Supports

" Updating design output documents to be consistent with the completed design basis. NRC Approval of Approach:

" Revising construction, maintenance and QA procedures to incorporate design output documents. Safety Evaluation of the WB CAP Plan for

" Developing bounding critical cases of existing installations and evaluating their adequacy, and performing unique Safety-Related Heating, evaluations or modifying installations when they could not be qualified by the critical case evaluations. Ventilation and Air Condition Duct and Duct Supports, October 24, 1989

• NUREG-1232

• SSER6,April 1991 CAP - Instrument Sensing Lines: CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design and The problems identified with instrument lines fell into two categories:

• TVA letter dated March Physical Modification). For

• Functional problems related to instrument line minimum slope requirements. The number of lines involved and the 11, 1994, WBN Unit 1 - Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach Revision to Corrective will be used.

lack of adequate configuration control for these lines resulted in preparation of an Engineering Requirements (ER)

Specification; isometric and support drawings; analysis of lines identified for rework; and installation and inspection Action Program Plan for per design output requirements. Instrument Lines (R3)

In addition to the ER Specification, other recurrence control measures included site implementing procedures to incorporate ER requirements in the process for the installation, maintenance, and inspection.

T3-12

Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments Structural problems related to: NRC Approval of Approach:

Thermal effects

• NUREG-1232 Pipe and tube bending devices SSER6, Appendix K, Compression fittings April 1991 Installation documentation discrepancies Supplemental SER The scope of the structural issues included Seismic Category I and I (L) instrument lines, and their associated May 6, 1994 supports, which are analytically decoupled from the process lines.

Thermal Effects Instrument lines and associated supports were not designed to consider the effects of thermal expansion and operating modes indicated that portions of systems will be subjected to thermal effects. These Unit 1 lines were field sketched to identify material and configuration; then analyzed for dead weight, seismic and thermal effects; line isometric drawings prepared showing required line configuration and material; and deficiencies corrected by design changes.

Pine and Tube Bending Devices Site implementing procedures used to qualify pipe and tube bending devices were not rigorously executed and qualification records for the bending were not always maintained. A sample of bends was evaluated considering wall thickness reduction, ovality, acceptable bend contour, and surface condition and found to be acceptable, and bender qualification records were updated to incorporate the results of the evaluation.

Compression Fittings Compression fitting installations were found that did not satisfy the manufacturer's installation requirements.

Discrepancies included: tubing cuts that were not deburred, tubing that was not bottomed out inside the fittings, nuts that were not properly tightened, and ferrules that were unidentifiable, missing, or reversed.

Discrepant compression fitting installations were vibration and pressure tested. This included testing of the effect on flow rate due to the presence of tubing burrs and testing of the integrity of fittings with various installation deficiencies by tensile pullout, and vibration and seismic tests. The results demonstrated that for the instances where tube ends were not deburred, tubes were not bottomed out, or nuts were not properly tightened, fitting performance was still satisfactory. Also, normal operation vibration testing did not result in leaks in any of the samples tested and seismic testing only produced very slight leakage in 2 of the 47 samples.

The test program for fittings with missing, reversed, or unidentified ferrules determined that: missing ferrules would cause a definite leak durinq pressure testing; reversed ferrules would leak if they are "CPI"fittings and would not T3-13

Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments leak if they are reversed "Hi-Seal" ferrules.

It was determined that for these questionable ferrule installations, unacceptable installations would be detected during pressure testing due to leakage and for instrument lines that are not pressure tested, there would be no driving force to create any significant leakage. Therefore, the following corrective actions were taken:

- Instrument lines designated as Seismic Category I or I(L) were pressure tested in accordance with appropriate piping code requirements Fittings seeing radioactive service in lines not pressure tested (i.e., drains) were re-inspected to verify installation in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations, and discrepancies repaired or replaced.

Since pressure testing was performed as required and leaking compression fittings were repaired or replaced, the final configurations were ultimately acceptable.

Installation Discrepancies Support documentation for some instrument lines was determined to be lost or incorrect. A sample of instrument line supports was selected for a detailed evaluation to determine the acceptability of the as-built condition, and it was determined that the instrument lines and supports would comply with existing design basis requirements provided all attachment clamps and bolts were properly installed. The supports were then walked down and, when necessary, they were reworked.

Recurrence controls for each of the above structural issues consisted of revising specifications, design drawings and procedures, and required training.

T3-14

Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments CAP - QA Records: CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design). For A number of the quality records required for licensing: TVA letter dated Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach April 6,1994, WBN Unit 1 will be used.

" Were not retrievable in a timely manner or potentially missing

" Were not maintained in proper storage - CAP Plan for QA Records, Revision 6

" Had quality problems (were incomplete, technically or administratively deficient)

NRC Approval of Approach:

for these records: SR 9 June 1992 To address these issues, the QA Records CAP was developed with the following objectives

• SSER9, June 1992

" Ensure adequate storage and retrievability. WB Unit 1- Staff Position

" Resolve quality and technical problems. on Certain Aspects of QA

" Ensure programs are established which are adequate to prevent reoccurrence of records problems. Records CAP, January 12, 1993 During the course of implementation of the CAP, additional records issues were identified. Evaluation of these issues

• Supplemental Safety indicated a need to expand the scope to address the full extent of condition by including a broader set of records Evaluation on the QA categories. This was accomplished through incorporating an Additional Systematic Records Review (ASRR) of all Records CAP Plan, ANSI N45.2.9, Appendix A record types into the CAP. This review involved both records and hardware and was April 25, 1994 based on sampling and statistical analysis. It provided a high level of confidence in the adequacy of QA Records.

CAP - Q-List: CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design). For The problems associated with the WBN Q-List Program included: TVA letter dated Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach July 8,1993, WBN CAP will be used.

• Multiple Q-Lists

• Inadequate training Plan for Q-List (R5)

• Lack of and improper classifications NRC Approval of Approach:

• Wrong component identification.

• NRC letter - CAP Plan for Quality Assurance The objectives of the Q-List CAP were to: List, September 11, 1989

" Develop a new Q-List. SSER6, April 1991

• Compare this new Q-List to the old Q-List to identify upgraded components.

" Review maintenance and modification activities performed since 1984 to assure that those activities had the

• SSER13, April 1994 appropriate QA program controls applied.

• Supplemental SER 1994 March 17, As part of corrective action for this CAP, over 5000 component classification upgrades were identified during the comparison of the new and old Q-Lists. No field work resulted from these upgraded components.

T3-15

Program Description I

References r

[

Unit 2Status and VACommitments CAP - Replacement Items: CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design). For Previous TVA policies and procedures had not adequately directed and controlled engineering involvement in the TVWA letter dated Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach procurement process used to purchase replacement items, and had not incorporated industry guidance or complied August 7, 1989, will be used. The with NRC Generic Letters 89-02 and 91-05. WBN Unit 1 - Revision to Procurement Engineering CAP Plan for Group function will be The CAP grouped the issues into four categories: Replacement Items embedded in the

" Current and future purchases, Program (Piece Parts) Engineering organization.

• Current warehouse inventory, TVWA letter dated January 20, 1995,

" Plant installed items from previous maintenance activity, and WBN Unit 1 - Revision 6

" Replacement items installed by previous construction activities, to CAP Plan for Replacement Items To address these categories, TVA: Program

" Created the Procurement Engineering Group, which reviewed and evaluated procurements made for safety-related NRC Approval of Approach:

applications, and developed a process for these activities. Safety Evaluation of the

" Created the Material Improvement Project to evaluate the adequacy of current inventory with respect to technical WB Unit 1 CAP Plan for adequacy, QA receipt inspection and material storage. the Replacement Items

" Back checked materials installed from previous maintenance activities to ensure that a proper documentation trail Program, existed from the warehouse to maintenance history for each item. November 22, 1989

" Reviewed the construction group's procurements of replacement items. This review indicated that all requiredNU G-23 documentation for parts traceability was available and that the materials were procured properiy with engineering .SSER6, April 1991 involvement. This also included a review of material staged for Unit 2. *NRC letter dated February 6, 1995 T3-116

T Unit 2 Status and Program Description References "TVACommitments CAP - Seismic Analysis: CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design). For Concerns were identified with the following aspects of seismic analysis calculations for Category I structures: TTVA letter dated Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach May 9, 1990, Revision to will be used.

" Integration time step used in time history analysis.

the CAP Plan for Seismic

" Soil properties and soil-structure interaction. Analysis (R2)

" Torsional modeling of structures. NRC Approval of Approach:

" Criteria for the Additional Diesel Generator Building. Safety Evaluation of

• The effect of floor and wall flexibility on design of structures, systems and components (SSCs) in Category I WBN Unit 1 - CAP for buildings. Seismic Analysis, September 7, 1989 To address these categories, TVA: Safety Evaluation of

" Reviewed seismic analysis criteria and licensing requirements for Category I structures. WBNP Unit 1 - Validation of SASSI Computer Code

" Reviewed seismic analysis calculations for Category I structures and revisions as required, or prepared new for Soil-Structure calculations when necessary. Interaction Analysis,

" Dispositioned identified issues. October, 31, 1989

" Defined criteria or future evaluations and new designs or modifications of structures, systems and components.

• NUREG-1232

. SSER6, April 1991 CAP - Vendor Information: CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design). For Problems with vendor information included: "VA letter dated Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach February 4, 1993, will be used.

" Vendor informationdidn't match the plant configuration.

" Vendor information was inconsistent with associated TVA-developed design input/output documents. WBN Unit 1 - Revision 4

• Vendor documents were incorrect or out of date. to CAPPlan for Vendorn Information

" Vendor manuals were lost or were uncontrolled.

NRC Approval of Approach:

The Vendor Information CAP for Unit 1 addressed the problems and their causes via the following actions: ° WB Unit 1 - V/olume 4

" Relevant vendor information for safety-related and quality-related Unit 1, common, and Unit 2 components needed NPP, Chapter III, Vendor for Unit 1 operation was identified, reviewed for technical adequacy, and consolidated into applicable vendor Information, Safety technical manuals and documents, which were issued as controlled documents. Evaluation,

• A TVA procedure was issued to control vendor manual update activities. September 11, 1990

. Open item reports were generated, tracked, and controlled to resolve the inconsistencies found in the vendor ° SSER1 1, April 1993 T3-17

Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments documents.

" Vendor drawings which included information necessary to support safety-related plant activities, but were not in "Approved" status, were reviewed and approved.

• DCNs were issued to resolve identified design discrepancies/open items.

CAP - Welding: CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design and Programmatic and implementation deficiencies associated with safety-related welding activities resulted in initiation of TVA letter dated Physical Modification). For the TVA Welding Project to review and determine the adequacy of the overall welding program. Subsequently, the July 31, 1990, WBN - Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach Welding CAP was established to ensure that Unit 1 safety-related welds met licensing requirements and that Welding CAP Program - will be used.

corrective actions were implemented to address the prior issues and those identified by the Welding Project. The Revisions to CAP Plan CAP included deficiencies which were related to weld quality, inspections, NDE, fabrication/installation code and Plant I Weld Report compliance, and associated documentation.

NRC Approval of Approach:

The CAP consisted of three phases: . Inspection Report Nos.

" A programmatic assessment. 50-390/89-04 and

" An in depth review of the implementation of the welding program and corrective actions to address specific 50-391/89-04, discrepancies. August 9, 1989 enhancements to prevent recurrence. Inspection Report Nos.

SProgram ea50-390/90-04 and 50-391/90-04, The programmatic assessment and program enhancements to prevent recurrence applied to Unit 2 as well as Unit 1. May 17,1990 The specific deficiencies that had to be addressed for Unit 1 involved structural steel, piping components, pipe

• Letter dated supports, instrument panels, HVAC ductwork and vendor supplied component such as tanks and heat exchangers. March 5, 1991, The types of deficiencies included: WB Unit 1 - Review of

• Designs that did not satisfy design criteria for welding. Two Submittals

• Lack of documentation of required visual inspections. Regarding the Welding CAP

• Indications or weld discontinuities.

• Radiographs accepted with rejectable indications, inadequate radiographic techniques, and identification NUREG-1232 discrepancies.

• Misinterpretation of the ASME Code.

• Discrepancies on vendor performed welds.

• Errors on installation documentation.

These problems were addressed by a combination of techniques that included the following:

T3-18

Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments

" Re-inspections to validate results and support analysis.

" Conservative bounding analysis.

" Evaluation of as-is condition to determine acceptability.

" Repairs, if necessary.

SP - Containment Cooling: SP Plan: SP is open (Design and Post-accident pressure and temperature analysis for the lower compartment in containment failed to consider the

• Nuclear Performance Physical Modification).

long-term effects of a main steam line break inside containment for a plant going to hot standby conditions as opposed Plan Vol 4, R1(NPP), For Unit 2, the Unit 1 to cold shutdown. In order to ensure that 10 CFR 50.49(e).1 is satisfied, TVA performed the Containment Cooling Section 111.3.2, approach will be used.

Special Program to develop time dependent temperature profiles for the lower compartment, which were then used for Containment Cooling, EQ. This was accomplished by the following tasks: September 6, 1991 Correcting the long-term containment temperature profile for the lower compartment considering the design basis NRC Approval of Approach:

Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) event.

WB Unit 1 -

• Upgrading the Lower Compartment Cooler (LCC) units and associated ducting. Supplemental Safety

• Evaluating containment coatings transport and replacing non-qualified coatings. Evaluation of the Special Program on Containment

• Using the revised calculated MSLB temperature profile to qualify components in the lower containment that are Cooling, May 21, 1991 important to safety.

• Replacing components in the lower compartment to meet 10 CFR 50.49 requirements.

SP - Control Room Design Review: SP Plan: SP is open (Design and The Control Room Design Review (CRDR) program, was developed to identify and correct human factor discrepancies TVA letter dated Physical Modification). For in the control room. The CRDR included a Preliminary Design Assessment (PDA) to identify any Human Engineering October, 1987, WBN - Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach Discrepancies (HEDs) and completion of a full CRDR at a later date. Detailed Control Room will be used.

Design Review Summary TVA performed a PDA, and discrepancies identified resulted in commitments to implement corrective actions to Report resolve these discrepancies and a CRDR Summary Report was identified as a license condition. TVA conducted the CRDR and submitted a CRDR Summary Report in October 1987. The CRDR addressed the man-machine interfaces NPP, Section Detailed Control 111.3.3, Room and potential misapplication of human factor principles in the main control room, the auxiliary control room, and the Design Review adjacent switch transfer rooms. TVA established a review program plan incorporating accepted human factor principles, gathered and reviewed required plant.design information, surveyed the Control Room, identified and. NRC Approval of Approach:

assessed HEDs, determined design improvements required, and verified that improvements would address deficiencies and not create new ones. . NUREG-1232

• SSER5, November 1990 The CRDR Program ultimately included development of HED corrective actions for Unit 1, common equipment

_ _______November_1990 T3-19

Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments needed for Unit 1, and Unit 2 equipment needed to support Unit 1.

• SSER6, April 1991 Actions to ensure recurrence controls included issuing Human Factor Design Guides and Human Factor Design

• SSER15, June 1995 Criteria, and the Design Change Process requiring human factors to be addressed.

SP - Equipment Qualification: SP Plan: SP is open (Design and TVA determined that much of the equipment qualification documentation to support 10 CFR 50.49 requirements was NPP, Section 111.3.4, Physical Modification). For not fully auditable and, in some cases, the documentation available did not demonstrate full qualification. The Equipment Qualification Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach Equipment Qualification Special Program was initiated to document that safety-related electrical equipment installed in Program will be used.

the plant was qualified to perform its designated function in the environment to which it will be subjected during normal plant operation as well as during postulated accidents; and that programs and procedures have been established to ensure that qualification is maintained as future plant modifications are made. The processes put in place to NRC Approval of Approach:

accomplish these objectives included: NUREG-1232

• Procedures to maintain EQ over the operating life of the plant.

• Consistent documentation requirements for electrical equipment located in harsh environments and required to function after an accident, and the EQ Documentation Package providing evidence of the qualification of equipment for its specific application and environment.

" Incorporation of EQ considerations into maintenance activities The activities performed using these processes were:

• Analyses of the effects of pipe breaks on temperature, humidity, dose and water level at various locations in containment and auxiliary buildings to establish the environmental parameters for all areas of the plant containing equipment that must meet 10 CFR 50.49 requirements.

" Identification of all 10 CFR 50.49 equipment in these areas, the 50.49 list, including electrical equipment located in harsh environment and required to function after an accident It was developed through a series of steps:

- A systems analysis to determine for each DBA those equipment items required to ensure completion of a safety-related function.

- For each item, a review of drawings to identify those ancillary devices and cable required to operate or maintain electrical integrity to ensure completion of the item's safety-related function.

- Reduction of this list by failure analysis to eliminate those components whose failure would not prevent achievement of the required safety action.

• Establishment of EQ binders that contain the qualification information in an auditable manner. A package was developed for each Unit 1 equipment type. The package included:

- Items comprising the equipment type

- Checklist for evaluation of qualification T3-20

I I Unit 2 Status and Program Description j References TVA Commitments Analysis and justification of qualification Qualification documents Field verification data Qualification Maintenance Data Sheets Open items and deficiencies SP - Master Fuse List: SP Plan: SP is open (Design and Lack of control of over current protection devices and the misapplication of Bussman KAZ actuators as protective ° NPP, Section 111.3.5 - Physical Modification). For devices on the master fuse list and the lack of procedural guidance for the development of the Master Fuse List Master Fuse List Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach resulted in design and configuration control deficiencies. . TVA letter dated will be used.

This Special Program included three primary elements to resolve these deficiencies: July 31, 1990, Response to Concerns in NRC SER

• To address configuration control deficiencies, a baseline master fuse list was developed using design input to for WBN NPP Volume 4 -

establish a comprehensive list of 1E fuses needed to support the operation of Unit 1 systems; then walk downs Master Fuse List were performed to gather as-installed information to be included on the list. TVA letter dated

" To resolve the Bussman KAZ actuator misapplication, a review of schematic and connection drawings identified May 31, 1991, Response KAZ locations, and a DCN was developed to replace KAZ devices with conventional fuses, to NRC Supplemental

" To correct deficiencies involving redundancy provided to electrical penetration assemblies, an analysis was SER Concerning the was provided and, when not the case, identified deficiencies were WBN NPP on the Master corrected. to verify that redundant protection conducted Fuse List While the principle focus of the program was on 1E safety-related equipment, the program has evolved to establish NRC Aporoval of Approach:

similar controls and practices for all fuses needed to support the operation of the station.

. NUREG-1232

• NRC letter dated February 6, 1991, WB Unit 1 - Special Program on Master Fuse List SSER9, June 1992 T3-21

Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments SP - Mechanical Equipment Qualification (MEQ): SP Plan: SP is open (Design and The MEQ Program included a documented evaluation of the ability of safety-related mechanical equipment located in . NPP, Section 111.3.6 - Physical Modification). For harsh environment to perform its intended functions, as required by GDC-4 of Appendix A of 10 CFR50. Mechanical Equipment Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach Qualification will be used.

The Unit 1 program utilized existing temperature and dose conditions developed for electrical equipment to satisfy 10 CFR 50.49. The program then identified active safety-related mechanical equipment located in harsh NRC Approval of Approach:

environments; analyzed the non-metallic subcomponents for effect of thermal and radiation conditions; produced

• NUREG-1232 controlled binders to establish and maintain qualified status for life of plant; and issued DCNs to modify the plant consistent with qualification tests and analyses.

• SSER15,June1995 SP - Microbioloqically Induced Corrosion (MIC): SP Plan: SP is open (Design and Due to leakage events in several water systems including Essential Raw Cooling Water and MIC degradation at other o TVA letter dated Physical Modification). For TVAN plants, TVA committed to a corporate program to address MIC in 1987. In addition, TVA committed to specific February 26, 1991, WBN Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach actions to address requirements of NRC Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Water System Problems Affecting Safety- - Microbiologically will be used.

related Equipment," and the potential for existing MIC conditions in Unit 1. Induced Corrosion Program Report The special program for Unit 1 included: NPP, Section 111.3.7 -

• Identifying systems potentially affected by MIC. Microbiologically Induced

" Performing visual inspections and assessing MIC-infested locations. Corrosion

" Using pre-existing NDE results to identify vulnerable locations.

• Repairing unacceptable damage to Code requirements. NRC Approval of Anaroach:

" Installing improved biocide treatment and a long term chemical clean up system. SSER8, January, 1992

• SSER10, October, 1992 This was later augmented by the implementation of SPP-9.7, Corrosion Control Program, which specifies the programmatic and organizational requirements for management of the MIC and Macrofouling Program.

T3-22

I Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments SP - Moderate Energy Line Break (MELB) Floodinq: SP Plan: SP is open (Design and For moderate energy lines, documentation did not adequately justify that there were no unacceptable consequences NPP, Section 111.3.8 - Physical Modification). For as a result of flooding in a Category I structure outside of containment following an MELB. Moderate Energy Line Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach Break (MELB) Flooding will be used.

For Unit 1, essential equipment and structures were evaluated to ensure that they were either unaffected by postulated flooding due to an MELB, or were designed, specified, and/or qualified for the environment caused by such NRC Approval of Approach:

flooding. The evaluation involved pipe break analyses, determination of postulated break locations, determination of postulated flooding levels, and equipment qualification evaluations. In those instances where it was determined that NUREG-1232 an item was impacted and it could not be qualified, modifications providing curbs, raising junction boxes, and adding SSER1 1, April 1993 or removing weather stripping were performed.

SP - Radiation Monitoring System: SP Plan: SP is open (Design and Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) deficiencies involved RMS design, documentation, installation, and hardware, . NPP, Section 111.3.9 - Physical Modification). For and are categorized in three areas of concern. These are: Radiation Monitoring Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach

• Sample line deficiencies involved line length, heat tracing, minimum bend radius, slope, and separation will be used.

requirements. NRC Approval of Approach:

• Design and documentation deficiencies involved: NUREG-1232

- Design of sample flow equipment

- Purge capability following an accident

- System interlocks with containment isolation in the containment upper and lower compartment monitor design

- Documentation of modifications to RMS rate meters

- RMS rate meter cable damage.

" Inadequate documentation of primary calibration records and uncertainty in the validity of equipment calibration.

The actions to address these deficiencies for Unit 1 were to review and update the RMS design basis, including applicable requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97; evaluate the RMS against this design basis; and implement modifications to correct RMS deficiencies. This also included an evaluation of the RMS design, documentation, and installations against the updated design criteria to verify the acceptability of the installation or to identify required modifications for those monitors included in the Technical Specifications and modifications or reworking of existing documentation to correct identified documentation deficiencies.

T3-23

Unit 2 Status and Program Description References TVA Commitments SP - Use-as-is CAQs: SP Plan: SP is open (Design and Engineering at WBN identified that use-as-is and repair non-conformance dispositions were not reflected on drawings; . TVA letter dated Physical Modifications).

there was inadequate justification for disposition of these types of non-conformances; and no project level procedural September 14, 1988, For Unit 2, the Unit 1 guidance was provided for use-as-is and repair dispositions. The Use-As-Is CAQs special program was initiated to WB Unit 1 and Unit 2 approach will be used.

address these issues. Use-As-Is and Repair Dispositions for To prevent recurrence, engineering procedures were issued to establish the requirements for handling CAQs including Construction ensuring that design documents reflect the approved configuration for any use-as-is or repair disposition, and that the Nonconformance Reports basis for approval of any use-as-is or repair dispositions be documented. - WBRD-50-390/87-05 and WBRD-50-391/87-05 For Unit 1, this was followed by the identification of CAQs that had a final disposition of either use-as-is or repair and Final Report technical reviews of the latest revision of design documents considering the impact of the CAQ.

TVA letter dated September 6, 1991, WBN

- NPP Volume 4, Revision 1, Section 111.3.11, Use-As-Is Special Program NRC Approval of Approach:

NUREG-1232 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

T3-24

Table 4 - Items Requiring No Further Action ITEMS REQUIRING NO FURTHER ACTION 1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

---

- (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information SER 14 14.0: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - C In the original 1982 SER, NRC noted that the FSAR did not FSAR references to Regulatory reflect conformance of preoperational tests with RG 1.20, Guides. Revision 2, RG 1.52, Revision 2 and RG 1.79, Revision 1. The FSAR was subsequently revised. In SSER3, the NRC closed Resolved SSER3 - January 1985 the issue.

SER 14 14.0: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - C In the original 1982 SER, NRC noted that the FSAR did not Additional systems to be tested as include preoperational tests for a number of systems that NRC part of the initial test program determined to be important to the safe operation of the plant.

The FSAR was subsequently revised. In SSER3, the NRC Resolved SSER3 - January 1985 found the revised preoperational test abstracts acceptable.

NA Not addressed in original 1982 SER C NRC SE for both units March 11, 1993 concluded that the Watts Bar reactor vessels satisfy the requirements of 10 CRF 50.61 10 CFR 50.61 Fracture Toughness Requirements NA Not addressed in original 1982 SER C The new fuel storage vault and the spent fuel storage racks are shared equipment that is in service to support operation of Unit

1. Criticality of fuel assemblies outside the reactor is precluded 10 CFR 50.68: Criticality Accident by adequate design of fuel transfer and storage facilities and by Requirements administrative control procedures in accordance with 10 CFR 50.68(b).

10.2.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

10.2.3: Turbine Rotor Integrity 10.2.1, 10.2.2 Original 1982 SER C See "approval for Unit 2" column.

10.2: Turbine Generator Page 1 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

- - - - - - --------------------------------------- (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 10.3.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

10.3.6: Steam and Feedwater System Materials 10.4.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

10.4.1: Main Condensers 10.4.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

10.4.2: Main Condenser Evacuation System 10.4.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

10.4.3: Turbine Gland Sealing System 10.4.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

10.4.4: Turbine Bypass System 10.4.5 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

10.4.5: Circulation Water System 10.4.6 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

10.4.6: Condensate Cleanup System 10.4.7 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

10.4.7: Condensate and Feedwater System Page 2 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

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-------------------------- (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 10.4.8 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

10.4.8: Steam Generator Blowdown System (PWR) 11.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

11.1: Source Terms 11.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

11.2: Liquid Waste Management System 11.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

11.3: Gaseous Waste Management System 11.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

11.4: Solid Waste Management System 12.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

12.1: Assuring that Occupational Radiation Exposures are As-Low As Reasonably Achievable 12.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

12.2: Radiation Sources 12.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

12.3, 12.4: Radiation Protection Design Features Page 3 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I

• Additional Information 12.5, 12.6 12.6: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C The staff reviewed TVA's RADCON program (formerly the HP involving Health Physics Program program) and found that the WBN organizational structure can provide adequate support for the RADCON program and that 12.5: Operational Radiation Resolved SSER10 - October 1992 organizational changes described in the FSAR amendments Protection Program met the staff s acceptance criteria. They considered this issue resolved in SSER1 0.

13.1.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

13.1.1: Management and Technical Support Organization 13.1.2, 13.1.3 13.1.3: LICENSE CONDITION - C In the original 1982 SER, NRC provided for an LC to ensure Use of experienced personnel TVA augmented the shift staff with individuals that had prior during startup experience with large pressurized water reactor operations.

TVA's commitment to comply with RG 1.8, "Personnel Selection 13.1.2, 13.1.3: Operating Resolved SSER8 - January 1992 and Training," provided adequate assurance, and in SSER8, Organization NRC eliminated the LC.

13.2.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

13.2.1: Reactor Operator Requalification Program, Reactor Operator Training 13.2.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

13.2.2: Non-Licensed Plant Staff Training 13.3 13.3: LICENSE CONDITION - C The NRC review of Emergency Preparedness in SSER1 3 Emergency Preparedness III.A.1, superseded the review in the original 1982 SER. In SSER13, III.A.2, III.A.2 the staff concluded that the WBN Radiological Emergency Plan (REP) provided an adequate planning basis for an acceptable 13.3: Emergency Planning Resolved SSER1 3 -April 1994 state of onsite emergency preparedness, and the LC was deleted. The NRC completed the review of the REP in SSER20.

Page 4 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; e:Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T:. Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1

• Additional Information 13.5.1, 13.5.2 13.5.2: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C In the original 1982 SER, this issue was used to track the staffs involving operating, maintenance review of the emergency operating procedures generation and emergency procedures package. In SSER9, the staff concluded that the outstanding issue was no longer needed as the staff no longer performed 13.5.1: Administrative Procedures Resolved SSER9 - June 1992 such reviews. The emergency operating procedure development program review is performed under IP 42000, "Emergency Operating Procedures." This inspection will be performed before issuance of an operating license.

13.6 13.6.4: LICENSE CONDITION - C In the original 1982 SER, part of the Physical Security Plan Physical security of fuel in (PSP) was not in accordance with the regulation. TVA containment submitted a new PSP on June 17; 1992. In SSER10, the staff concluded that the provisions for protection of the containment 13.6: Physical Security Resolved SSER10 - October 1992 during major refueling and maintenance met the intent of the regulation.

13.6 13.6: OUTSTANDING ISSUE to file C In the original 1982 SER, the staff identified certain outstanding appropriate revision to the Physical issues with TVA's Physical Security Plan. In SSER15, NRC Security Plan provided a safety evaluation that concluded that WBN conforms to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

13.6: Physical Security Resolved SSER1 5- June 1995 SER 14 14.0: CONFIRMATORY ISSUEs - C In SSER3, NRC accepted a 30 day period for making approved Availability of preoperational test preoperational test procedures available to staff.

procedures 60 days before test.

14.2: Initial Plant Test Program - Resolved SSER3 - January 1985 Design Certification and new License Application 15.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15 - Introduction - Transient and Accident Analysis Page 5 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

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SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 15.2.2, 15.2.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.1.1 thru 15.1.4: Decrease in Feedwater Temperature, Increase in Feedwater Flow, Increase in Steam Flow, and Inadvertent Opening of a Steam Generator Relief or Safety Valve 15.4.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.1.5.A: Radiological Consequence of Main Steam Line Failures Outside Containment of a PWR 15.3.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.1.5: Steam System Piping Failures Inside and Outside Containment (PWR) 15.2.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.2.1 thru 15.2.5: Loss of Extemal Load; Turbine Trip; Loss of Condenser Vacuum; Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve (BWR);

and Steam Pressure Regulator Failure (Closed) 15.2.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.2.6: Loss of Nonemergency AC Power to Station Auxiliaries 15.2.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.2.7: Loss Normal Feedwater Flow Page 6 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

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SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1

• Additional Information 15.3.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.2.8: Feedwater System Pipe Breaks Inside and Outside Containment (PWR) 15.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.3.1 thru 15.3.2: Loss of Forced Reactor Coolant Flow Including Trip of Pump Motor and Flow Controller Malfunctions 15.3.4, 15.3.5 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.3.3 thru 15.3.4: Reactor Coolant Pump Rotor Seizure and Reactor Coolant Pump Shaft Break 15.2.4.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.4.1: Uncontrolled Control Rod Assembly Withdrawal from a Subcritical or Low Power Startup Condition

................................................ m...............l........... l......................................................... ...... *-mmmlm .....................................

15.2.4.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.4.2: Uncontrolled Control Rod Assembly Withdrawal at Power-*

15.2.4.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.4.3: Control Rod Maloperation (System Malfunction or Operator Error)

Page 7 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

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SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information NA Not addressed in SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.4.4: 15.4.5 Startup of an Inactive Loop or Recirculation Loop at an Incorrect Temperature, and Flow Controller Malfunction Causing an Increase in BWR Core Flow Rate 15.2.4.4 15.2.4.4: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C In a letter dated November 2, 1984, TVA stated that the boron for evaluation of Boron dilution and dilution alarm system receives signals from two independent single failure criteria channels which are independently powered. Additionally, testing of these circuits was described. The staff concluded in 15.4.6: Chemical and Volume Resolved SSER4 - March 1985 SSER4 that the system is adequately protected from single Control Systems Malfunction that failure and closed this item.

Results in a Decrease in Boron Concentration in the Reactor Coolant (PWR)

.... *...................*..................................................................................................................................m...........................

15.2.4.5 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.4.7: Inadvertent Loading and Operation of a Fuel Assembly in an Improper Position 15.4.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.4.8.A: Radiological Consequences of a Control Rod Ejection Accident (PWR) 15.2.6 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2'" column.

15.4.8: Spectrum of Rod Ejection Accidents (PWR)

Page 8 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UINIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Referenice Note 1

• Additional Information 15.2.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.5.1 thru 15.5.2: Inadvertent Operation of ECCS and Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction that Increases Reactor Coolant Inventory 15.5.3 LICENSE CONDITION - PORV NUREG-0737, C I1.K.3.1/3.2, "Auto PORV isolation/Report on PORV Failures" -

isolation system - II.K.3.1, II.K.3.2 I1.K.3.1, II.K.3.2 Reviewed in SSER5 and resolved based on NRC conclusion that there is no need for an automatic PORV isolation system 15.6.1: Inadvertent Opening of a Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 (NRC letter dated June 29, 1990).

PWR Pressurizer Pressure Relief Valve or a BWR Pressure Relief Valve 15.4.6 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.6.2: Radiological Consequences of the Failure of Small Lines Carrying Primary Coolant Outside Containment 15.4.3 LICENSE CONDITION - Steam C In SSER12, the staff identified 5 items that required resolution Generator tube rupture involving 1) operator action times; 2) radiation offsite consequence analysis; 3) systems and 4) associated 15.6.3: Radiological Consequences Resolved SSER12 - October 1993, components credited for accident mitigation in SG tube rupture of Steam Generator Tube Failure and SSER14- December 1994 emergency operating procedures; and 5) system compatibility with bounding analysis. Items 2-5 were resolved in SSER12. In SSER14, the staff stated that a revised SG tube rupture analysis was more conservative and did not alter the conclusions of their original safety evaluation. With regard to operator response times, TVA letters dated April 21, 1994, and August 15, 1994, and NRC letter dated June 28, 1994, dealt with simulator runs to address response times and operator performance during simulated SG tube ruptures. The staff concluded, after review of the TVA letters, that the times assumed in the tube rupture analysis were satisfactorily verified and deleted this condition.

Page 9 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

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SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 15.4.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.6.5.A: Radiological Consequences of a Design Basis Loss-of-Coolant Accident Including Containment Leakage Contribution 15.4.2, 15.4.6 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.6.5.B: Radiological Consequences of a Design Basis Loss-of-Coolant Accident: Leakage from Engineered Safety Feature Components Outside Containment 15.3.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.6.5: Loss-of-Coolant Accidents Resulting From Spectrum of Postulated Piping Breaks Within the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 15.4.7 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.7.3: Postulated Radioactive Releases Due to Liquid-Containing Tank Failures 15.4.5 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column; 15.7.4: Radiological Consequences of Fuel Handling Accidents 9.1.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

15.7.5 -Spent Fuel Cask Drop Accidents Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

10

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 15.3.6 LICENSE CONDITION - C In SSER5, the staff found TVA's response to a number of items Anticipated Transients Without in GL 83-28 acceptable, including Item 4.3, as stated in NRC Scram (Generic Letter 83-28, Item letter dated June 18, 1990, and thus eliminated this license 4.3) condition.

15.8: Anticipated Transients Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 Without Scram 17.3, 17.4 OUTSTANDING ISSUE QA program C The staff reviewed the description of the QA program and concluded in SSER2 that the description was in compliance with NRC regulations. The staff reviewed the organization for the QA 17.2 - QA During the Operations Resolved SSER2 - January 1984 program and the NQA Plan, and presented their conclusions in Phase SSER5. They concluded that the program was acceptable for Updated SSER5 - November 1990 the operations phase of Watts Bar. It was noted, however, that Amendment 63 stated that identification of safety related Resolved SSER1 3- April 1994 features would be addressed later and the staff left the outstanding issue unresolved. In SSER13, the staff concluded that PVA had established appropriate programmatic controls for identification of safety related features and considered this issue resolved.

17.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

17.3 - Quality Assurance Program Description 2.1.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.1.1: Site Location and Description 2.4.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.1.1: Site Location and Description 2.1.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.1.2: Exclusion Area Authority and Control Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

11

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

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SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 2.2.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.2.3: Evaluation of Potential Accidents 2.3.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.3.1: Regional Climatology 2.3.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.3.2: Local Meteorology 2.3.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.3.3: Onsite Meteorological Measurements Programs 2.3.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.3.4: Short-term Dispersion Estimates for Accidental Atmospheric Releases

.............................................................................................................................. m......................................................

2.3.5 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.3.5: Long-term Diffusion Estimates 2.4.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.4.1: Hydrologic Description 2.4.3, 2.4.10 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.4.10: Flooding Protection Requirements Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

12

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

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SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 2.4.6 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.4.11: Cooling Water Supply 2.4.7 - 2.4.8 2.4.8: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for C Amendment 50 to the FSAR (May 1, 1984) provided a design basis groundwater level for description of the analysis used to determine the 25-year ERCW pipeline groundwater level for the ERCW pipeline. Staff closed issue in

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SSER3.

2.4.12: Groundwater SSER3 - January 1985 2.4.2 - 2.4.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.4.14 - Technical Specifications and Emergency Operation Requirements 2.4.3 Original 1982 SER GL 89-22 C GL 89-22, "Potential For Increased Roof Load Due to Changes in Maximum Precipitation" - Answer to informal question provided inTVA letter dated December 16, 1981, and 2.4.2: Floods subsequently included in FSAR. GL did not require a response.

No further action required.

2.4.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.4.3: Probable Maximum Flood (PMF) on Streams and Rivers 2.4.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.4.4: Potential Dam Failures 2.5, 2.5.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.5.1: Basic Geologic and Seismic Information 2.5 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.5.2: Vibratory Ground Motion Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

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SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 2.5 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.5.3: Surface Faulting

........................... *......................................................*...........................m...........................u.............................................

2.5.4 2.5.4: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for C Analysis was presented to staff in September 1983. Staff found design differential settlement of analysis and results acceptable. Staff closed issue in SSER3.

piping and electrical components 2.5.4: Stability of Subsurface SSER3 - January 1985 Materials and Foundations 2.5.4 2.5.4: OUTSTANDING ISSUE (1) C Amendment 50 to the FSAR (May 1, 1984) provided a on liquefaction beneath ERCW description of the underground barriers along the ERCW pipelines and Class 1E electrical pipelines. Staff agreed the barriers provide sufficient conduit. confinement to any liquefied soil. Staff closed issue in SSER3.

2.5.4: Stability of Subsurface SSER3 - January 1985 Materials and Foundations 2.5.4 2.5.4: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for C Staff performed audit in September 1982, and determined TVA material and geometric damping in had used reasonable assumptions. Staff closed issue in SSER3.

soil-structure interaction (SSI) analysis 2.5.4: Stability of Subsurface SSER3 - January 1985 Materials and Foundations 2.5.4 2.5.4: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for C Staff performed audit in September 1982, and determined TVA analysis of sheetpile walls had used reasonable assumptions. Staff closed issue in SSER3.

2.5.4: Stability of Subsurface SSER3 - January 1985 Materials and Foundations 2.5.5 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

2.5.5: Stability of Slopes Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

14

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 3.10 3.10: Generic outstanding issues C For reconciling the impact for equipment actually mounted using involving adequacy of frequency welding but tested with mounting by bolting, in-situ test results test, peak broadening of response were provided to NRC (in letters dated April 30, 1985, and spectra, reconciling actual field January 30, 1986) along with Westinghouse report on seismic mounting by welding vs. testing qualification by analysis and testing for the main control board.

configuration mounted by bolting The staff reviewed these results and on the basis of the and need for surveillance and consistency of all results provided, concluded that the issue was maintenance programs to address resolved in SSER6.

aging.

3.10: Seismic and Dynamic Approved all but adequacy of Qualification of Mechanical and frequency test SSER6 - April 1991; Electrical Equipment adequacy of frequency test SSER9

- June 1992 3.10 3.10: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C In its May 8, 1991, letter, TVA proposed to analyze conduits as involving seismic classification of Seismic Category I subsystems. Additionally, in a September cable tray and conduits 18, 1991 letter, TVA agreed to perform cable tray qualification using conventional linear elastic analysis methods, considering 3.10: Seismic and Dynamic SSER8 - January 1992 nonlinear response behavior on a case-by-case basis and to Qualification of Mechanical and submit these cases to the staff for approval. The staff resolved Electrical Equipment this issue in SSER8.

3.10 3.10: Generic outstanding issues C With regard to the overall issue on adequacy of testing, the staff involving adequacy of frequency performed an audit as part of SSER9 (Appendix S). This test, peak broadening of response included a review of the TVA approach, criteria and action plan spectra, reconciling actual field to address effect of directional coupling and verification that mounting by welding vs. testing acceleration at each device location is less than .95g because configuration mounted by bolting relay chatter at higher acceleration levels is expected. TRS and need for surveillance and enveloped RRS for all directions. The staff found the above to maintenance programs to address be in accordance with SRP 3.10 and IEEE 344-1975 and closed aging. the issue.

3.10: Seismic and Dynamic Approved all but adequacy of Qualification of Mechanical and frequency test SSER6 - April 1991; Electrical Equipment adequacy of frequency test SSER9

- June 1992 Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

15

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I

• Additional Information 3.10 3.10: Generic outstanding issues C There was a specific issue on installing spacers for the 125-V-involving adequacy of frequency DC vital batteries as was done during qualification testing and test, peak broadening of response required by the manufacturer. The issue was closed in SSER6 spectra, reconciling actual field when it was determined that spacers had been installed.

mounting by welding vs. testing configuration mounted by bolting and need for surveillance and maintenance programs to address aging.

3.10: Seismic and Dynamic Approved all but adequacy of Qualification of Mechanical and frequency test SSER6 - April 1991; Electrical Equipment adequacy of frequency test SSER9

- June 1992 3.10 3.10: Generic outstanding issues C Staff concerns on the impact of aging on seismic performance involving adequacy of frequency were resolved in SSER6 based on discussions with TVA test, peak broadening of response technical personnel and review of maintenance and surveillance spectra, reconciling actual field instruction manuals.

mounting by welding vs. testing configuration mounted by bolting and need for surveillance and maintenance programs to address aging.

3.10: Seismic and Dynamic Approved all but adequacy of Qualification of Mechanical and frequency test SSER6 -April 1991; Electrical Equipment adequacy of frequency test SSER9

- June 1992 Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

16

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; IT: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

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SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 3.10 3.10: Generic outstanding issues C In a letter dated December 1, 1982, TVA provided justification involving adequacy of frequency for single-frequency tests to seismically qualify the Reactor test, peak broadening of response Protection System cabinet. This showed that test response spectra, reconciling actual field spectra (TRS) were substantially higher than broadened mounting by welding vs. testing required response spectra (RRS) throughout the required configuration mounted by bolting frequency range. The staff evaluated test results and building and need for surveillance and seismic behavior and considered this aspect of the testing issue maintenance programs to address closed in SSER6.

aging.

3.10: Seismic and Dynamic Approved all but adequacy of Qualification of Mechanical and frequency test SSER6 - April 1991; Electrical Equipment adequacy of frequency test SSER9

- June 1992 3.11 3.11: OUTSTANDING ISSUE - C The EQ program was submitted after issuance of the SER. It TVA program not submitted at time was reviewed and found acceptable in SSER15.

of SER 3.11: Environmental Qualification of SSER1 5- June 1995 Mechanical and Electrical Equipment 3.2.1 3.2.1: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for C Staff closed issue on ERCW seismic category upgrade and seismic classification of structures, seismic classification in SSER5.

systems, and components important to safety 3.2.1: Seismic Classification SSER5 - November 1990 3.2.1 3.2.1: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for C Staff verified that required portion of ERCW had been upgraded ERCW upgrade to seismic category or replaced satisfactorily in SSER5 and closed this issue.

1 3.2.1: Seismic Classification SSER5 - November 1990 3.3.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.3.1: Wind Loadings Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

17

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

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SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 3.3.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.3.2: Tornado Loadings 3.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.4.1 - Flood Protection 3.5.1.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.5.1.1: Internally Generated Missiles (Outside Containment) 3.5.1.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.5.1.2: Internally Generated Missiles (Inside Containment) 3.5.1.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.5.1.3: Turbine Missiles 3.5.1.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.5.1.4: Missiles Generated by Natural Phenomenon 3.5.1.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.5.1.5: Site Proximity Missiles (Except Aircraft) 3.5.2 3.5.2: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for C TVA submitted a proposed design modification for installation of modifications to protect Diesel a reinforced concrete curb around the diesel exhaust stacks to Generators protect them from damage in a letter dated November 24, 1982.

-- ------------------------------------------- - The staff found this acceptable and closed this issue in SSER2.

3.5.2: Structures, Systems, and SSER2 - January 1984 Components to be protected from Externally Generated Missiles Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

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SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1

• Additional Information 3.5.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.5.3: Barrier.Design Procedures 3.6.1 3.6.1: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C In a letter dated November 30, 1992, TVA submitted a new involving main steam line break evaluation for both Units 1 and 2 accounting for increased (MSLB) outside containment environmental temperatures in the MSW rooms due to release of superheated steam and later submitted, by letter dated 3.6.1: Plant Design for Protection SSER14 - December 1994 March 28, 1994, additional information related to the Against Postulated Piping Failures assumptions made in this analysis. The staff reviewed this in Fluid Systems Outside information together with their detailed evaluation and Containment acceptance of the same methodology applied at Sequoyah and concluded that the MSLB analysis for the WBN MSW rooms, including the effects of superheated steam, was acceptable and identified this issue as resolved in SSER14.

NA Not addressed in Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.6.3: Leak-Before- Break New section SRP 1987 - Approved Evaluation Procedures in SSER5 - November 1990 3.7.1 3.7: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C The staff reviewed FSAR Amendment 68 and found that involving update of FSAR for required changes had been incorporated into the FSAR, as seismic design issues committed to in TVA letter dated December 18, 1990, and issue was deemed resolved in SSER8.

3.7.1: Seismic Design Parameters SSER8 - January 1992 3.7.2 3.7.2.1.2: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C In a letter dated May 8, 1991, TVA provided clarification that involving mass eccentricity actual mass eccentricities from such-items as equipment hatch and lock used in evaluating the steel containment vessel for an 3.7.2: Seismic System Analysis SSER8 - January 1992 earthquake load were replaced by a 5% accidental eccentricity.

This was demonstrated to be conservative. TVA also proposed a revision to the FSAR to document this change. The staff found this acceptable and resolved this issue in SSER8.

3.7.2 3.7.2.12: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C The staff considered this item (opened in SSER6) resolved in involving comparison of Set A vs. SSER11 based on audits and inspections since SSER6.

Set B response 3.7.2: Seismic System Analysis SSER1 I - April 1993 Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

- (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 3.7.3 3.7.3: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C The staff reviewed verification studies performed by TVA to involving 1.2 multi-mode factor justify the use of a 1.2 multi-mode factor in seismic evaluation of certain subsystems in SSER8 and SSER9 and, after TVA 3.7.3: Seismic Subsystem Analysis SSER9 - June 1992 provided further confirmation of supporting calculations, the use of Complete Quadratic Combinations and validity of two degree of freedom predictions in a letter dated October 10, 1991, the staff considered this issue resolved in SSER9.

3.7.3 3.7.3: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C The staff reviewed the list of specific ASME Code cases TVA involving use of code cases, intended to use and found that they were either incorporated damping factors for conduit and use into the ASME Code or endorsed in Position C.1 of RG 1.84.

of worst case, critical case and This issue was considered resolved in SSER8. For damping, bounding case the staff found the use of 4% damping for OBE and 7% damping for SSE acceptable based on the information in a TVA letter 3.7.3: Seismic Subsystem Analysis Code case use, damping factors for dated August 22, 1991, and considered the issue resolved in conduit SSER8 - January 1992, SSER8.

(CAP/SP implementation issue resolved in IR 390/93-201)

................... .i.... I... ... ... ... ,

3.7.3 3.7.3: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C In a letter dated May 8, 1991, TVA proposed to revise the FSAR involving number of peak cycles to for ASME Section III Class I piping analysis to include the be used for OBE assumption of 5 OBEs and 1 SSE and a minimum of 10 peak stress cycles per event. The staff accepted this in SSER8.

3.7.3: Seismic Subsystem Analysis SSER8 - January 1992 3.7.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.7.4: Seismic Instrumentation NA C Reviewed using SRP 3.8.2 and 318.3 3.8.1: Concrete Containment 3.8.1 3.8.1: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - C In response to staff concern, TVA submitted a letter dated May verify buckling methodology 16, 1984, stating that TVA calculations already accounted for new information from NRC-sponsored research programs, 3.8.2: Steel Containment SSER3 - January 1985 particularly information concerning reinforcement around shell (vessel) opening. Based on their review of the response, the staff closed this issue in SSER3.

Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 3.8.1 3.8: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C In response to staff concerns regarding use of ductility ratio involving load combinations and when considering thermally induced stresses, TVA stated in a stress allowables letter dated April 6, 1992, that they would use a methodology consistent with SRP 3.8.4 for the design of steel members and 3.8.2: Steel Containment SSER9 - June 1992 use the linear elastic provision of DG-C 1.6.12, Rev. 1, "Evaluation of Steel Structures with Thermal Restraint," except for the energy balance provision of Section C.2.3.1. The staff found this acceptable. TVA also agreed, in its May 8, 1991, letter, that any further sampling of structural welds after the issuance of NCIG-2, Rev. 2 would be to that revision. This issue was resolved in SSER9.

3.8.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.8.3: Concrete and Steel Internal Structures of Steel or Concrete Containments 3.8.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.8.5: Foundations 3.9.1 3.9.1: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C In response to NRC concem regarding TVA's piping analysis involving assumption in piping that postulated failure of certain supports, TVA submitted an analysis for water-hammer due to August 4, 1992, letter stating that, where possible, supports check valve slam were upgraded in the analysis to maintain structural integrity during the postulated loading scenario. The issue was resolved 3.9.1: Special Topics for SSER13 -April 1994 in SSER13.

Mechanical Components 3.9.2.1, 3.9.2.2, 3.9.2.3 and 3.9.2.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.9.2: Dynamic Testing and Analysis of Systems, Components, and Equipment Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1

• Additional Information 3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 3.9.3.4: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE C The TVA response to this issue, in a letter dated July 26, 1991, involving baseplate flexibility and its described an update to the previous response for B 79-02 and effect on anchor bolt loads its civil design standard for concrete anchorage, which incorporated an increase in anchor stiffness and consideration 3.9.3 - Special Topics for SSER8 - January 1992 of prying forces for thin baseplates analyzed by hand. The staff Mechanical Components determined that this adequately resolved the issue in SSER8.

3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 GL 80-46/47 C GL 80-46/47, "Fracture Toughness and Additional Guidance on Potential for Low Fracture Toughness and Lamellar Tearing on 3.9.3 - Special Topics for PWR Steam Generator and Coolant Pump Supports." - No Mechan-SpcicalCompo ts fresponse was required for this GL and NUREG-0577 states that Mechanical Components the lamellar tearing aspect of this issue was resolved by the NUREG. Further, the NUREG states that for plants under review, the fracture toughness issue was resolved.

3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 3.9.3.4: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C TVA program to demonstrate that change in design criteria involving stiffness and deflection which uses stiffness and deflection limits for Category I pipe limits for seismic Category I pipe supports did not compromise the adequacy of pipe supports supports was found to be acceptable by the staff and the issue was resolved in SSER8.

3.9.3 - Special Topics for SSER8 - January 1992 Mechanical Components 3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 GL 78-02 C GL 78-02, "Asymmetric Loads Background and Revised Request for Additional Information" - NRC reviewed in SSER15

- Anppendix C (.June 1995'* - Resolved by anoroval of leak-3.9.3 - Special Topics for before-break

" -- ....... C. analysis.

(June 19 .. 5 - ........ . ,/ -- r ro a of........

Mechanical Components 3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 3.9.3.4: OUTSTANDING ISSUE, C In a letter dated May 14, 1984, TVA provided results of a staff was awaiting TVA concurrence sampling program and determined that compressive stresses for on their position with respect to pipe supports did not exceed acceptance criteria established by margin for critical buckling of pipe NRC and staff considered this issue resolved in SSER4.

supports 3.9.3 - Special Topics for SSER4 - March 1985 Mechanical Components Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 3.9.3.3: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C In a letter dated June 21, 1991, TVA responded to NRC involving operating characteristics of concerns regarding the design and installation of MSSVs stated main steam safety valves that all valves and piping components were analyzed for all MSSV discharge loads acting simultaneously, combined with 3.9.3 - Special Topics for SSER7 - September 1991 other required loads and this was accepted by the staff. In the Mechanical Components same letter, TVA also provided the method used to establish the MSSV adjustment ring settings for plant valves and this was acceptable to the staff. This resolved the issue in SSER7.

3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 3.9.3.1: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C TVA stated in a letter dated December 18, 1990, that it was involving use of experience data to performing a verification program to validate the original seismic qualify category I(L) piping design basis for Category I(L) piping, including a screening criteria based on earthquake experience data to identify items 3.9.3 - Special Topics for SSER8 - March 1985 : requiring further evaluation and bounding case analysis to Mechanical Components demonstrate the conservatism of the screening criteria. In a September 20, 1991, letter, TVA provided revised criteria for the bounding case analysis. Based on the staffs' evaluation, the issue was considered resolved in SSER8.

3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 3.9.3.3: LICENSE CONDITION - C Staff found TVA approach in response to this issue, using Relief and safety valve testing information from EPRI valve test program and performing (ll.D.1) modifications to safety and relief discharge piping and supports, was acceptable. Issue was considered resolved in SSER3.

3.9.3 - Special Topics for SSER3 -January 1985 Mechanical Components 3.9.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.9.4: Control Rod Drive Systems 3.9.5 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

3.9.5: Reactor Pressure Vessel Intemals Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

-- (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 3.9.6 3.9.6: LICENSE CONDITION - C TVA committed to submit a revised ASME Section XI Inservice Inservice testing of pumps and Pump and Valve Test Program six months before the projected valves date of operating license issuance in an August 21, 1989, letter.

On this basis, the staff considered that the proposed license 3.9.6 - Inservice Testing of Pumps SSER12 - October 1993 condition was no longer required in SSER1 2.

and Valves 4.2.1,4.2.2,4.2.3,4.2.4 4.2.3: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - C In SSER2, the staff concluded TVA had an acceptable means of identify margins and to offset analyzing the effects of fuel rod bowing and determining any reduction in DNBR due to fuel rod residual rod bowing penalties on the departure from nucleate bowing and incorporating residual boiling ratio and total peaking power. Staff closed issue in bow penalty into the Technical SSER2.

Specifications.

4.2: Fuel System Design SSER2 - January 1984 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4 4.2.2: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE on C Thermal performance analysis was performed using a revised thermal performance analysis code. model (PAD-3.3) and found acceptable. Staff closed issue in SSER2.

4.2: Fuel System Design SSER2 - January 1984 4.3.1, 4.3.2, 4.3.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

4.3: Nuclear Design 4.5.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

4.5.1: Control Rod Drive Structural Materials 4.5.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

4.5.2: Reactor Internal and Core Support Materials 4.6 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

4.6: Functional Design of Control

• Rod Drive System Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

- (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 5.2.1.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

5.2.1.1: Compliance with the Codes and Standards Rule, 10CFR50.55a 5.2.1.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

5.2.1.2: Applicable Code Cases 5.2.2 5.2.2: OUTSTANDING ISSUE on C TVA letter dated April 18, 1983, provided the safety valve sizing staff review of sensitivity study of information and information on differences with the reference required safety valve flow rate plant. Staff closed issue in SSER2.

versus trip parameter 5.2.2: Overpressure Protection SSER2 - January 1984 5.2.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

5.2.3: Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Materials 5.2.4 NRC Order EA C NRC Order EA-03-009 - NA to Unit 2 009 5.2.4: Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Inservice Inspection and Testing 5.4.5 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

5.2.5: Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection 5.3.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

5.3.1: Reactor Vessel Materials Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

- - - - - - - ---------- --------------------------- (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 5.3.3 GL 92-01 C GL 92-01, R1, "Reactor Vessel Structural Integrity" -By letter dated May 11, 1994, for both units NRC confirmed TVA had provided the information requested in GL 92-01. NRC issued 5.3.3: Reactor Vessel Integrity GL 92-01 revision 1, supplement 1 on May 19, 1995. By letter dated July 26, 1996, NRC closed GL 92-01, revision 1, supplement I for both Watts Bar units.

5.4.1:1, 5.4.2.1, 5.4.2.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

5.4 - Reactor Coolant System Components and Subsystem Design 5.4.1.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

5.4.1.1: Pump Flywheel Integrity (PWR) 5.4.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

5.4.11: Pressurizer Relief Tank

....................................... *..............................................................................................................................m...............

5.4.2.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

5.4.2.1: Steam Generator Materials 5.4.2.2 5.4.2.2: OUTSTANDING ISSUE for C In the original 1982 SER, the staff concluded that because of staff to evaluate TVA's proposed the generic problem of tube degradation caused by flow induced resolution to concerms about flow vibration inWestinghouse model D steam generators, operation induced vibrations in Model D-3 SGs would be limited to 50%. TVA's May 27, 1983, letter committed pre-heat region to implement the NUREG-0966 modifications. In SSER4, staff

-- ------------------------------------------- - concluded the modification was acceptable to operate at 100%.

5.4.2.2: Steam Generator Tube SSER4 - March 1985 Inservice Inspection Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first~or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 5.4.3 5.4.3: CONFIRMATORY ISSUEs to C In SSER2, based on the relief capacity of 3 of the 4 valves, NRC verify installation of an RHR flow agreed that manual actuation testing of the atmospheric relief alarm and proper function of dump valves was not necessary.

valves when actuated manually 5.4.7: Residual Heat Removal SSER2 resolved testing of dump (RHR) System valves 5.4.3 5.4.3: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C Branch Technical Position requires a natural circulation test with involving natural circulation test to supporting analysis to demonstrate the ability to cool down and demonstrate ability to cool down and depressurize the plant and that boron mixing is sufficient.

depressurize the plant, and that Comparison with performance of previously tested plants of boron mixing is sufficient under such similar design is acceptable, if justified. July 11, 1991, TVA circumstances; or, if necessary, letter provided an assessment of the acceptability of the Diablo other applicable tests before startup Canyon natural circulation tests to WBN. In SSER10, the NRC after first refueling found the methods and conclusions acceptable.

5.4.7: Residual Heat Removal SSER10 - October 1992 (RHR) System 5.4.3 GL 87-12 C GL 87-12, "Loss of Residual Heat Removal While the Reactor Coolant System is Partially Filled" - This GL was superseded by c~i 88-17 net NRC letter d~ted lecembher 5. 1988 5.4.7: Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System 6.1.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

6.1.1: Engineered Safety Features Materials 6.1.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

6.1.2: Protective Coating Systems (Paints) Organic Materials Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 6.2.1.1 6.2.1.1: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE C In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated it would confirm the involves reviewing analysis that contention that containment external pressure transients could ensures that containment external not exceed the design value of 2.0 psig. TVA submitted the pressure will not exceed design information June 4, 1982. In SSER3, NRC concluded that the value of 2.0 psi design provided adequate protection against damage from external pressure transients.

6.2.1.1.B: Ice Condenser SSER3 - January 1985 Containments 6.2.1.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

6.2.1.2: Subcompartment Analysis 6.2.1.1.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

6.2.1.3: Mass and Energy Release Analysis for Postulated Loss-of-Coolant Accidents (LOCAs) 6.2.1.1.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

6.2.1.4: Mass and Energy Release Analysis for Postulated Secondary System Pipe Ruptures 6.2.1.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

6.2.1.5: Minimum Containment Pressure Analysis for Emergency Core Cooling System Performance Studies 6.2.1 (contains 6.2.1.1 to 6.2.2.5) Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

6.2.1: Containment Functional Design Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, theyare only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 6.2.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

6.2.2: Containment Heat Removal Systems 6.2.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

6.2.3: Secondary Containment Functional Design 6.2.4 6.2.4: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - C In the original 1982 SER, the containment isolation provisions install safety-grade isolation valves for the main and auxiliary feedwater lines, feedwater bypass on 1" chemical feed lines joining lines and the chemical feedlines to the steam generators did not feedwater lines to main steam line. meet GDC 57. This was resolved byFSAR Amendment 55. In SSER5, the NRC concluded that the containment isolation LICENSE CONDITION - provisions for the main and auxiliary feedwater lines, feedwater Modification of chemical feedlines bypass lines and the chemical feedlines were acceptable.

6.2.4: Containment Isolation System SSER5 - November 1990 6.2.4 6.2.4: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C This outstanding issue was opened in SSER7. In SSER12, the involving containment isolation NRC concluded that the systems in question were "closed loops using closed systems outside containment" and reaffirmed the previous conclusion of acceptability.

6.2.4: Containment Isolation System SSER12 - October 1993 6.2.5 6.2.5: OUTSTANDING ISSUE for C In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that additional review of TVA-provided additional information was required concerning the analysis of the information relative to discussion production and accumulation of hydrogen within the added to FSAR to address analysis containment during a design basis LOCA. This information was of the production and accumulation provided in FSAR amendments and evaluated by NRC in of hydrogen within containment SSER4. In SSER4, the NRC concluded that the design of the following onset of a LOCA combustible gas control system was acceptable and the outstanding issue closed.

6.2.5: Combustible Gas Control in SSER4- March 1985 Containment Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

- (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 6.2.5 LICENSE CONDITION - (9) C In the original 1982 SER, an LC was raised to track resolution of Hydrogen control measures Unresolved Safety Issue A-48, "Hydrogen Control Measures and Effects of Hydrogen Bums on Safety Equipment." In SSER8, 6.2.5: Combustible Gas Control in SSER8 - January 1992 the NRC reviewed the hydrogen mitigation system (igniters) and Containment concluded it met the requirements of the final rule {10 CFR 50.44(c)(3)}.

6.2.6 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

6.2.6: Containment Leakage Testing 6.2.7 6.2.7: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE for C In SSER4, NRC reviewed the confirmatory information TVA to confirm that the lowest submitted and concluded for both units that the reactor temperatures which will be containment pressure boundary materials will behave in a non-experienced by the limiting materials brittle manner and the requirements of GDC 51 were satisfied.

of the reactor containment pressure NRC provided the technical basis in SSER4, Appendix H.

boundary under the conditions cited by GDC 51 will be in compliance with the temperatures identified in the staffs analysis of fracture toughness requirements for load bearing component of the containment system 6.2.7: Fracture Prevention of SSER4 - March 1985 Containment Pressure Boundary 6.3 6.3.1: OUTSTANDING ISSUE - C The Upper Head Injection (UHI) system design was approved in involving removal of upper head the original 1982 SER. TVA letter dated September 19, 1985, injection system informed NRC that UHI would not be installed on Unit 2. In SSER7, NRC concluded it was acceptable to delete UHI from 6.3: Emergency Core Cooling SSER7 - September 1991 both units.

System 6.3 6.3.3: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C In the original 1982 SER, the staff approved the proposed sump involving containment sump screen design in the FSAR. A deviation between the installed and design proposed design was discovered during an NRC inspection. In SSER9, the staff concluded that the as-installed sump screen 6.3: Emergency Core Cooling SSER9 - June 1992 was acceptable.

System Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL F(OR UNIT 2 Guidance

- (GL, Bulletins) ---

SRP TITLE Approval R eference Note 1 Additional Information 6.3 6.3.3: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - C In the original 1982 SER, NRC found the design of the provide a detailed survey of containment sump against debris acceptable subject to the insulation material that could acceptability of a detailed survey of insulation materials. In become debris post-LOCA SSER2, the NRC review of the survey confirmed the staffs initial conclusion that the design to provide protection against sump 6.3: Emergency Core Cooling SSER2 - January 1984 debris was acceptable.

System 6.5.1.1 to 6.5.1.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

6.5.1: ESF Atmosphere Cleanup Systems 6.5.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

6.5.2: Containment Spray as a Fission Product Cleanup System 6.5.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

6.5.3: Fission Product Control Systems and Structures 6.5.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

6.5.4: Ice Condenser as a Fission Product Cleanup System 7.1.1 7.1.3.1: Confirmatory issue to C In the original 1982 SER, the staff indicated the intent to perform provide a list of all safety related an audit of the setpoint methodology. TVA provided information functions and a summary of the in letters dated April 25, 1983, September 4, 1984, and October setpoint analysis 16, 1984. The NRC reviewed the information and found the methodology acceptable in SSER4.

7.1: Instrumentation and Controls - SSER4 - March 1985 Introduction Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 7.2.1 to 7.2.6 7.2.5: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

address IEB 79-21 to alleviate temperature dependence problem associated with measuring SG water level 7.2: Reactor Trip System SSER2 - January 1984 SSER14 - December 1994 7.3.1 to 7.3.6 7.3.5: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - C In the original SER, staff concluded that the design perform confirmatory tests to satisfy modifications for Bulletin 80-06 were acceptable subject to IEB 80-06 (to ensure that no device review of the electrical schematics that were not available at the will change position solely due to time. In SSER3, the staff found the modifications acceptable reset action) and staff review of and closed the confirmatory issue.

electrical schematics for modifications that ensure that valves remain in emergency mode after ESF reset 7.3: Engineered Safety Features SSER3 - January 1985 Systems 7.3.1 to 7.3.6 7.3.2: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE is C In the original SER, staff identified a concern that debris in the commitment to make a design containment sump could block the inlets to the differential change to provide protection that pressure transmitters and result in a loss of the permissive prevents debris from entering signal to the initiation logic for the automatic switchover from the containment sump level sensors injection to the recirculation mode of the emergency core cooling system. In a September 15, 1983, letter TVA notified 7.3: Engineered Safety Features SSER2 - January 1984 NRC that the level sensors had been moved from inside the Systems sump wa~lto outside the sump wall With the sense line opening protected by a cap with small holes. Staff closed the issue in SSER2.

7.4.1 to 7.4.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

7.4: Safe Shutdown Systems Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 7.5.1 to 7.5.4 7.5.2: OUTSTANDING ISSUE C In the original 1982 SER, the staff stated that WBN did not use involving RG 1.97 instruments RG 1.97, "Instrumentation for Light Water Cooled Nuclear following course of an accident Power Plants to Assess Plants and Environs Conditions During and Following an Accident," for the design because the design 7.5: Information Systems Important SSER9 - June 1992 predated the RG. In SSER7, an outstanding issue was opened.

to Safety TVA provided NRC information on exceptions to RG 1.97. A detailed review was performed for both units (SSER9 - Appendix V). The staff concluded that WBN conforms to or has adequately justified deviations from the guidance of RG 1.97, Revision 2.

7.6.1 to 7.6.9 7.6.5: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - C In the original 1982 SER, the staff found the design of the install switches on the main control overpressure protection during low temperature features board for the operator to manually acceptable pending review of the drawings and FSAR arm this system (overpressure description. In SSER4, the staff documented completion of the protection provided by pressurizer review and closed the confirmatory issue.

PORVs) 7.6: Interlock Systems Important to SSER4 - March 1985 Safety 7.7.1 to 7.7.7 7.7.2 - LICENSE CONDITION - C In the original 1982 SER, the staff requested TVA address RG Status monitoring system, Bypassed 1.47, "Bypassed and Inoperable Status Indications for Nuclear and Inoperable Status Indication Power Plant Safety Systems." TVA addressed RG 1.47 by letters dated January 29, 1987, and October 22, 1990. In 7.7: Control Systems SSER7 - September 1991 SSER7, the staff documented completion of the review and closed the issue.

8.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

8.1: Electrical Power - Introduction Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 8.2.1 to 8.2.4 8.2.2.1: CONFIRMATORY C In the original 1982 SER, NRC concluded that the offsite power ISSUE - document additional system circuits at the Watts Bar Hydro Plant Switchyard met information in FSAR on control GDC 17 pending documentation in the FSAR. The information power supplies and distribution was added to the FSAR. In SSER2, NRC closed the issue. In system for the Watts Bar Hydro SSER13, the staff reviewed revised information and concluded Plant Switchyard that it supported the original conclusion in SSER2.

8.2: Offsite Power System SSER2 - January 1984 SSER13 - April 1994 8.2.1 to 8.2.4 *8.2.2.2/8.2.2.3/ 8.2.2.4: C In SSER13, the NRC documented the review of design changes OUTSTANDING ISSUE involving to minimize the probability of losing all AC power, compliance compliance of design changes to with GDC 17 and minimizing the probability of a two unit trip the offsite power system with GDC following a one unit trip. These issues were resolved in 17 and 18. SSER13.

8.2: Offsite Power System SSER13 -April 1994 8.3.1.1 to 8.3.1.9, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.3.1.1: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE C In the original 1982 SER, staff stated that the design for the involving submergence of electrical automatic deenergizing of loads as a result of a LOCA would be equipment as result of a LOCA verified as part of the site visit. During the August 1991, visit and in a letter dated September 13, 1991, TVA committed to 8.3.1: AC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER1 3- April 1994 revise the FSAR. The information was added to the FSAR. In SSER13, NRC closed the issue.

........................................ u...............u................

8.3.1.1 to 8.3.1.9, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.3.2: CONFIRMATORY C In the original 1982 SER, the staff stated that the description ISSUE - revise FSAR to reflect and analysis of shared onsite AC and DC systems was under requirements of shared safety review but was acceptable pending revision of the FSAR. In systems SSER3, the confirmatory issue was left open to track additional information to be incorporated in the FSAR. In a letter dated 8.3.1: AC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER3 - January 1985 September 13, 1991, TVA provided the additional information.

In SSER13, NRC closed the issue.

SSER13 - April 1994 Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 8.3.1.1 to 8.3.1.9, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.3.6: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE C In the original 1982 SER, staff required a reevaluation of the involving evaluation of penetrations' penetrations' capability to withstand, without seal failure, the ability to withstand failure of total range of available time-current characteristics assuming a overcurrent protection device single failure of any overcurrent protective device. In SSER3, staff found the results of the evaluation acceptable pending the 8.3.1: AC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER7 - September 1991 information being incorporated in the FSAR. The staff reviewed the FSAR and closed the issue in SSER7.

8.3.1.1 to 8.3.1.9, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.3.2.3: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE C In the original SER, NRC indicated that the design for sharing of for design of sharing raceway raceway systems between units would be verified during the systems between units electrical drawing review. The staff confirmed that cable routing was in accordance with accepted separation criteria and closed 8.3.1: AC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER2 - January 1984 the issue in SSER2.

8.3.1.1 to 8.3.1.9, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.1.1: CONFIRMATORY C In the original 1982 SER, NRC concluded that the offsite power ISSUE - incorporate new design system with a dedicated transformer for each preferred offsite that provides dedicated transformer circuit met GDC 17 pending documentation in the FSAR. The for each preferred offsite circuit in information was added to the FSAR. In SSER2, NRC closed the FSAR issue.

8.3.1: AC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER2 - January 1984 8.3.1.1 to 8.3.1.9, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.3.1.2: CONFIRMATORY C In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that the design for ISSUE - verify design for bypass bypass of thermal overload protective devices on safety-related of thermal overload protective device motor operated valves would be verified during the electrical drawing review. The staff subsequently reviewed the drawings 8.3.1: AC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER2 - January 1984 and closed the issue in SSER2.

8.3.1.1 to 8.3.1.9, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.1.6: CONFIRMATORY C In SSER2, NRC indicated that it would verify DG qualification ISSUE - provide diesel generator testing. TVA provided a copy of the DG qualification test report.

reliability qualification test report In SSER7, the NRC concluded that the DGs had been satisfactorily tested in accordance with IEEE 387-1977.

8.3.1: AC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER7 - September 1991 Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 8.3.1.1 to 8.3.1.9, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.1.6: LICENSE CONDITION - C In the original 1982 SER, NRC required that the capability of the (12) Diesel generator reliability DGs to start at normal temperature be demonstrated. TVA's qualification testing at normal August 31, 1983, letter confirmed tests had been performed on operating temperature a DG identical to those at WBN. In SSER2, NRC closed the issue.

8.3.1: AC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER2 -January 1984 8.3.1.1 to 8.3.1.9, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.3.5.2: CONFIRMATORY C In the original 1982 SER, the NRC found the commitment to test ISSUE - incorporate commitment DGs one at a time acceptable pending its incorporation into the to test only one of four diesel FSAR. In SSER2, NRC reviewed the documentation and closed generators at one time the issue.

8.3.1: AC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER2 - January 1984 8.3.2.1 to 8.3.2.4, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.3.3: LICENSE CONDITION - C In the original 1982 SER, staff required that protective devices Testing of associated circuits used to isolate non-Class I E from Class 1 E circuits be of high quality commensurate with their importance to safety and be 8.3.2: DC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER3 - January 1985 periodically tested. TVA letter dated January 17, 1984, provided the information. NRC closed the issue in SSER3.

8.3.2.1 to 8.3.2.4, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.3.3 - LICENSE CONDITION - C In the original 1982 SER, staff required that protective devices Testing of non-class 1 E cables used to isolate non-Class 1E from Class 1E circuits be of high quality commensurate with their importance to safety and be 8.3.2: DC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER3 - January 1985 periodically tested. TVA letter dated January 17, 1984, provided the information. NRC closed the issue in SSER3.

8.3.2.1 to 8.3.2.4, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.3.2.4: LICENSE CONDITION - C In the original 1982 SER, staff required that all possible Possible sharing of DC control interconnections between redundant divisions through normal power to AC switchgear and alternate power sources to various loads be identified in the FSAR. TVA letter dated January 17, 1984, provided the 8.3.2: DC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER3 - January 1985 information. NRC closed the issue in SSER3.

8.3.2.1 to 8.3.2.4, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.2.2 - LICENSE CONDITION - C In SSER3, the staff determined that some items were omitted DC monitoring and annunciation from the design of the DG DC monitoring and annunciation system system. In TVA letter dated September 13, 1991, TVA provided the additional information. In SSER13, NRC closed the issue.

8.3.2: DC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER3 - January 1985 SSER13 - April 1994 Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 8.3.2.1 to 8.3.2.4, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.2.4: CONFIRMATORY C In the original 1982 SER, staff indicated the design analysis for ISSUE - include diesel generator demonstrating compliance of the DGs with regulatory design analysis in FSAR requirements and guidelines was acceptable pending incorporation of the analysis in the FSAR. The analysis was 8.3.2: DC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER2 - January 1984 incorporated in the FSAR, and the issue closed in SSER2.

8.3.2.1 to 8.3.2.4, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.3.6: LICENSE CONDITION - C In the original 1982 SER, staff required that the redundant fault Testing of reactor coolant pump current protective devices for the reactor coolant pump circuits breakers meet RG 1.63. In SSER2, staff reviewed the design and

---

- concluded it met RG 1.63.

8.3.2: DC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER2 - January 1984 9.1.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

9.1.3: Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System 9.1.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

9.1.4: Light Load Handling System (Related to Refueling) 9.1.4 LICENSE CONDITION - Control of C The staff concluded in SSER13 that the license condition was heavy loads (NUREG-0612) no longer necessary based on their review of TVA's response to

---

---------------------------------------- - NUREG-0612 guidelines for Phase I in TVA letter dated July 28, 9.1.5: Overhead Heavy Load Resolved SSERI3 - April 1994 1993.

Handling Systems 9.2.2 NUREG-0737, C I1.K.3.25, "Power on Pump Seals" - NRC reviewed and closed in II.K.3.25 IR 390/84-35 based on DG power to pump sealing cooling system.

9.2.2: Reactor Auxiliary Cooling Water Systems 9.2.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

9.2.3: Demineralized Water Makeup System Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

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-- (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1

• Additional Information 9.2.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

9.2.4: Potable and Sanitary Water Systems 9.2.5 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

9.2.5: Ultimate Heat Sink

......................... ............................................................................................................................................. o..............

9.2.6 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

9.2.6: Condensate Storage Facilities 9.3.2 9.3.2: LICENSE CONDITION - C TVA submitted a final procedure for estimating degree of core Post-Accident Sampling System damage by letter dated June 10, 1994, and the license condition

---

- was deleted in SSER14.

9.3.2: Process and Post-Accident Resolved SSER14 -December 1994 Sampling Systems

......................... ............................................................................................................................................. °..............

9.3.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

9.3.3: Equipment and Floor Drainage System 9.4.1 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

9.4.1: Control Room Area Ventilation System 9.4.2 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

9.4.2: Spent Fuel Pool Area Ventilation System

......................... °.............................................................................................................................................°..............

9.4.3 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

9.4.3: Auxiliary and Radwaste Area Ventilation System Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

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- (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 9.4.4 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

9.4.4: Turbine Area Ventilation System 9.4.5 Original 1982 SER C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

9.4.5: Engineered Safety Feature Resolved SSER18 - October 1995 Ventilation System 9.5.1.1 to 9.5.1.9 9.5.1.2: OUTSTANDING ISSUE for C In SSER1 8, the staff concluded that the Fire Protection program Fire Protection Program for Watts Bar conformed to the requirements of 1 OCFR50.48 and was acceptable except for the fire barrier seal program and 9.5.1.3: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - emergency lighting inside the Reactor Building. Additionally, the Electrical penetrations staff considered the confirmatory issue involving electrical documentation penetration documentation resolved in SSER1 8 on the basis of the safety evaluation of the revised Fire Protection program 9.5.1.3: LICENSE CONDITION - included in Appendix FF of SSER18. In SSER19, Appendix FF, Fire protection program a safety evaluation of the Fire Protection program contains a detailed evaluation of fire barrier penetration seals. The staff 9.5.1: Fire Protection Program Resolved SSER18 - October 1995 concluded that TVA's penetration seal program adequately demonstrates the fire resistive rating of the penetrations, and SSER19- November 1995 that they conform to the guidelines of Positions D.1.j and D.3.d of Appendix A to BTP 9.5.1 and were acceptable. The safety evaluation also includes TVA's revised position on emergency lighting, which was found to be acceptable.

9.5.1.1 to 9.5.1.9 B 75-04 C B 75-04, "Cable Fire at BFNPP" - This bulletin is included in the Fire Protection Program.

9.5.1: Fire Protection Program 9.5.3 No open issues C See "Approval for Unit 2" column.

9.5.3: Lighting Systems Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

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SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 9.5.4.1, 9.5.4.2 9.5.4.2: OUTSTANDING ISSUE to C See discussion in 9.5.4.1 design skid-mounted piping and components from the day tank to the diesel engine as seismic Category I.

and to ASME Section III, Class 3 9.5.4: Emergency Diesel Engine Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System 9.5.4.1, 9.5.4.2 9.5.4.2: CONFIRMATORY C The staff found TVA's commitment to provide missile protection ISSUE - provide missile protection for the fuel oil storage tank vent lines acceptable and verified for fuel oil storage

- - tank

- vent- - lines - that the protection had been installed and considered this issue

- - - - resolved in SSER5.

9.5.4: - -

- - Emergency Diesel Engine Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System 9.5.4.1, 9.5.4.2 9.5.4.1: CONFIRMATORY C In SSER5, the staff verified that plant operating procedures had ISSUE - include required language been revised to incorporate requirements that ensure that in operating instruction to ensure no- operational no-load and low-load conditions will not harm the load and low-load operation is diesel generators.

• minimized and revise operating procedures to address increased diesel generator load after it has run for an extended period of time at low or no load 9.5.4: Emergency Diesel Engine Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL. FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

-- - (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 9.5.4.1, 9.5.4.2 9.5.4.1: OUTSTANDING ISSUE for C The staff reviewed standards to which emergency diesel engine staff to complete review to skid mounted auxiliary system piping and associated determine if diesel generator components were designed, as well as the testing and auxiliary support systems can inspections to be performed on these systems, and concluded perform their design safety functions that they were acceptable in SSER5. The staff considered this under all conditions, after receipt of issue resolved. This resolution applies to the fuel oil, cooling all requested information water, air starting, lubrication, and combustion air intake and exhaust systems.

9.5.4: Emergency Diesel Engine Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System 9.5.4.1, 9.5.4.2 9.5.4.1: LICENSE CONDITION - C The staff verified that the modifications necessary to comply with Diesel Generator reliability NUREG/CR-0660 had been completed and, as stated above, requirements had been incorporated into operating procedures.

9.5.4: Emergency Diesel Engine Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 Thus, this license condition was resolved in SSER5.

Fuel Oil Storage and Transfer System 9.5.5 9.5.5: OUTSTANDING ISSUE to C See discussion in 9.5.4.1 design engine cooling water system piping and components for all engines up to the engine interface, including auxiliary skid mounted piping, to ASME Section III, Class 3 9.5.5: Emergency Diesel Engine Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 Cooling Water System 9.5.6 9.5.6: OUTSTANDING ISSUE to C See discussion in 9.5.4.1 design engine air-starting system piping components for all engines up to the engine interface, including auxiliary skid mounted piping, to ASME Section III, Class 3 9.5.6: Emergency Diesel Engine Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 Starting System Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

-- (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 9.5.7 9.5.7: OUTSTANDING ISSUE to C In response to a staff concern regarding dry diesel engine perform additional modification, or starting, TVA proposed using the manufacturers' modification provide justification for acceptability and provided justification for its ability to ensure lubrication of all of proposed modification, to ensure parts of the diesel engine. The staff found this acceptable in lubrication of all wearing parts of the SSER5.

diesel engine either on an interim or continuous basis 9.5.7: Emergency Diesel Engine Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 Lubrication System 9.5.7 9.5.7: OUTSTANDING ISSUE to C See discussion in 9.5.4.1 design standby diesel engine lube oil system piping and components up to the engine interface, including skid mounted piping, to ASME Section III, Class 3 9.5.7: Emergency Diesel Engine Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 Lubrication System 9.5.7 9.5.7: OUTSTANDING ISSUE to C TVA submittal of March 18, 1995, responded to a staff request provide a more detailed description to describe the features that protect the diesel engine crankcase of the lubricating oil system and a from exploding. In SSER5, on the basis of this submittal, the description of the diesel engine staff concluded that the emergency diesel engine lubrication oil crankcase explosion protection system can perform its safety function and is acceptable. This features issue was resolved.

9.5.7: Emergency Diesel Engine Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 Lubrication System 9.5.8 9.5.8: OUTSTANDING ISSUE to C See discussion in 9.5.4.1 design standby diesel engine combustion air intake and exhaust system piping and components up to the engine interface to ASME Section III, Class 3 and recommendations of RG 1.26 9.5.8: Emergency Diesel Engine Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 Combustion Air Intake and Exhaust System Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 11.7 11.7.1: LICENSE CONDITION C TVA committed to have Unit 2 shielding building vent monitor in (6a) - Accident monitoring place and high range noble gas monitor installed and instrumentation II.F.1 - Noble Gas operational prior to Unit 1 fuel loading and the staff then monitor considered license condition 6a resolved in SSER5.

NA: NUREG -0737 items Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 11.7 11.7.1: LICENSE CONDITION C TVA committed to have the capability for continuous collection (6b) - Accident monitoring of samples of plant gaseous effluents for post accident releases instrumentation II.F.1 - Iodine of iodine particulate by fuel load. The staff reviewed this in particulate sampling SSER5 and SSER6 and considered the issue resolved in SSER6.

NA: NUREG -0737 items Resolved SSER6 - April 1991 15.5.1 - 15.5.2 LICENSE CONDITION - Effect of C In SSER4, the staff concluded that there was-reasonable high pressure injection for small assurance that vessel integrity would be maintained for small beak LOCA with no auxiliary breaks with an extended loss of all feedwater and that the USI A-feedwater- I1.K.2.13 49, "Pressurized Thermal Shock," review did not have to be completed to support the full-power license. They considered NA: NUREG-0737 items Resolved SSER4 - March 1985 this condition resolved.

15.5.1 ý 15.5.2 LICENSE CONDITION - Voiding in C The staff reviewed the generic resolution of this license the reactor coolant system - II.K.2.17 condition in SSER4 and approved the study in question, thereby resolving this license condition.

NA: NUREG-0737 items Resolved SSER4 - March 1985 13.5.3 13.5.3: LICENSE CONDITION - C In the original 1982 SER, the NRC accepted TVA's commitment Report on outage of emergency to develop and implement a plan to collect emergency core core cooling system II.K.3.17 cooling system outage information. In SSER3, the staff accepted a revised commitment from an October 28, 1983, letter NA: NUREG-0737, items Resolved SSER3 - January 1985 to participate in the nuclear power reliability data system and comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73 Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

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Table 5 - Items Recommended for Implementation Action Review ITEMS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPLEMENTATION ACTION REVIEW 1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information SER 14 14.2: LICENSE CONDITION - In the original 1982 SER, this LC was intended to require TVA Report changes to Initial Test report to NRC within 30 days of modifying an approved initial Program test. In SSER7, the NRC accepted a commitment in TVA's July 1, 1991, letter to notify NRC within 30 days of any changes to Resolved SSER7 - September 1991 the Startup Test Program made under 10 CFR 50.59.

Unit 2 action: Notify NRC within 30 days of any changes to the Startup Test Program made under 10 CFR 50.59.

SER 14 14.2: Unit 2 issue to verify capability This issue was raised in SSER14 and resolved for Unit 1 only.

of each common station service In SSER14, the NRC stated that before an OL can be issued for transformer to carry load required to Unit 2, TVA would have to demonstrate the capability of each supply ESF loads of 1 unit under CSST to carry the loads of one unit under LOCA conditions in LOCA condition in addition to power addition to power required for shutting down the non-accident required for shutdown on non- unit. TVA agreed with the NRC position in a January 5, 1995 accident unit letter.

Unit 2 action: Amend FSAR Chapter 14 to reflect the capability of each CSST to carry the loads of one unit under LOCA conditions in addition to power required for shutting down the non-accident unit.

NA Not addressed in SER I Unit 2 action: Implement Maintenance Rule for Unit 2 systems 1 month prior to fuel load 10 CFR 50.65- Maintenance Rule Page 1 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 10.4.9 Original 1982 SER B 85-01/GL 88-03 I B 85-01 / GL 88-03, "Steam Binding of Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps" - NRC accepted approach in letter dated July 20, 1988, and reviewed response in SSER16 (September 1995).

10.4.9: Auxiliary Feedwater System SER - July 20, 1988 kr-vvr*) Unit 2 Action: Procedures and hardware will be in place to ensure recognition of indications of steam binding and maintenance of system operability until check valves are repaired and back leakage stopped.

10.4.9 Original 1982 SER NUREG-0737, I II.E.1.1, "Auxiliary Feedwater System Evaluation, Modifications" II.E.1.1 - Reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

10.4.9: Auxiliary Feedwater System SER - July 20, 1988 Unit 2 Action: Perform Auxiliary Feedwater System analysis as (PWR) it pertains to system failure and flow rate.

11.5 Original 1982 SER B 80-10 I B 80-10, "Contamination of Non-radioactive Systems and Resulting Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release of 11.5: Process and Effluent Radiological Monitoring Unit 2 Action: Correct deficiencies involving monitoring of Instrumentation and Sampling systems.

Systems 13.5.1, 13.5.2 13.5.2: LICENSE CONDITION- NUREG.-0737, I.C.8, "Pilot monitoring of selected emergency procedures for Modifications to Emergency l.C.8 NTOLs" - IR 50-390/391 85-08 closed this item for Unit 1, and Operating instructions I.C.8 NRC also reviewed in SSER16.

13.5.1: Administrative Procedures Resolved SSER10 - October 1992 Unit 2 Action: Pilot monitor selected emergency procedures for NTOL.

13.5.1, 13.5.2 13.5.2: LICENSE CONDITION - NUREG-0737, I.C.7, "NSSS vendor revision of procedures" - IR 50-390/391 85-Review of power ascension test I.C.7 08 closed this item for Unit 1, and NRC also reviewed in procedures and emergency SSER16.

operating procedures by the NSSS vendor I.C.7 Unit 2 Action: Revise power ascension and emergency procedures which were reviewed by Westinghouse.

13.5.1: Administrative Procedures Resolved SSER10 - October 1992 Page 2 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

- (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 17.1, 17.2 Original 1982 SER B 87-02 I B 87-02, "Fastener Testing to Determine Conformance with Applicable Material Specifications" - NRC closed in letter dated August 18, 1989.

17.1 - Quality Assurance (QA)

Pusng me uesign ana uonstrucuon Unit 2 Action: Complete for Unit 2, using information used for Phase Unit 1, as applicable.

18 LICENSE CONDITION - Detailed NUREG-0737, II1.D.3.4, "Control Room Habitability" - NRC reviewed in SER Control Room Design review I.D.1 III.D.3.4 and SSER16 (September 1995).

18: Human Factors Engineering Resolved for Unit 1 in SSER15 - Unit 2 Action: Complete with CRDR completion.

June 1995, with onsite audit of Unit 1 control room improvements -

same resolution for Unit 2 18 LICENSE CONDITION - Detailed NUREG-0737, I.D.1, "Control Room Design Review" - NRC reviewed in SSER5 Control Room Design review I.D.1 I.D.1 (November 1990), SSER6 (April 1991), SSER15 (June 1995) and SSER16 (September 1995).

18: Human Factors Engineering Resolved for Unit 1 in SSER15 -

June 1995, with onsite audit of Unit Unit 2 Actions: Complete the CRDR process. Perform rewiring 1 control room improvements - in accordance with ECN 5982. Take advantage of the same resolution for Unit 2 completed Human Engineering reviews to ensure appropriate configuration for Unit 2 control panels. See CRDR Special Program.

18 LICENSE CONDITION - Make NUREG-0737, I.D.2/G1 82-33/GL 89 "Safety Parameter Display System" Safety Parameter Display System I.D.2, GL 82-33, (SPDS)/"Requirements for Emergency Response Capability" -

operable prior to startup from the GL 89-06 NRC reviewed in SSER5 (November 1990), SSER6 (April 1991) first refueling outage and SSER15 (June 1995).

18: Human Factors Engineering Open item for Unit 2 - resolution

• Unit 2 Action: Install SPDS and have it operational prior to start-requires a functional system before up after the first refueling outage.

fuel load and on-line testing after Unit 2 is operational; then an operational certification (GL 89-06) 3.11 B 78-04 I 1B78-04, "Environmental Qualification of Certain Stem Mounted Limit Switches Inside Reactor Containment" - IR 50-390/82-13 and 50-391/82-10 (April 22, 1982) accepted approach.

3.11: Environmental Qualification of Mechanical ana Eiectncal Equipment Unit 2 Action - Ensure NAMCO switches have been replaced.

Page 3 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 3.11 NUREG-0737, I II.B.2, "Plant Shielding" - NRC reviewed in SSER16 (September lI.B.2 1995).

3.11: Environmental Qualification of Unit 2 Action - Complete Design Review of EQ of equipment for Mechanical and Electrical Equipment spaces/systems which may be used in post accident operations.

3.2.2 Original 1982 SER B 83-06 I B 83-06, "Nonconforming Material Supplied by Tube-Line" -

NRC SER for both units dated September 23, 1991, provided an alternate acceptance for fittings supplied by Tube-Line.

3.2.2: System Quality Group Ulassmcation Unit 2 Action: Implement as necessary.

3.6.2 Original 1982 SER B 80-04 B 80-04, "Analysis of PWR Main Steam Line Rupture with Continued Feedwater Addition" - IR 50-390/85-60 and 50-391/85-49 (December 6, 1985) required completion of actions 3.6.2: Determination of Rupture that included determination of temperature profiles inside and Locations and Dynamic Effects outside of containment following a MSLB for Unit 1.

Associated with the Postulated R-(upture of Hipng Unit 2 Action: Complete analysis for Unit 2.

3.7.3 3.7.3: OUTSTANDING ISSUE Conduit Supports Corrective Action Program. Process was involving use of code cases, reviewed and determined to be acceptable for Unit 1 in SER damping factors for conduit and use dated September 1, 1989.

of worst case, critical case and bounding case Unit 2 Action: CAP/SP see Table 3. The Unit 1 approach will be used for Unit 2.

3.7.3: -Seismic Subsystem Analysis Code case use, damping factors for conduit SSER8 - January 1992, (CAP/SP implementation issue resolved in IR 390/93-201) 3.7.3 3.7.3: OUTSTANDING ISSUE Deficiencies identified in the use of worst case, critical case and involving use of code cases, bounding calculations were resolved in IR 50-390/93-201, and damping factors for conduit and use this issue was considered resolved for Unit 1 in SSER12.

of worst case, critical case and bounding case Unit 2 Action: CAP/SP see Table 3. The Unit 1 approach will be used for Unit 2.

3.7.3: Seismic Subsystem Analysis Code case use, damping factors for conduit SSER8 - January 1992, (CAP/SP implementation issue resolved in IR 390/93-201)

Page 4 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I

• Additional Information 3.8.3 Original 1982 SER B 80-11 B 80-11, "Masonry Wall Design" - NRC accepted all but completion of corrective actions in IR 50-390/93-01 and 50-391/93-01(February 25, 1993) and closed for Unit 1 in IR 50-3.8.4: Other Seismic Category I 390/95-46 (August 1, 1995).

Structures Unit 2 Action: Complete implementation for Unit 2.

3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 B 74-03 B 74-03, "Failure of Structural or Seismic Support Bolts on Class I Components" - Approach accepted in IR 50-390/85-08 and 50-391/85-08 (March 29,1985).

3.9.3 - Special Topics for MechLanical C-omponeriLS Unit 2 Action: Implement per NUREG-0577 as was done for Unit 1.

3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 GL 95-07 I GL 95-07, "Pressure Locking and Thermal Binding of Safety-Related Power-Operated Gate Valves" - Unit 1 SER for GL 95-07 dated Sept 15, 1999.

3.9.3 - Special Topics for Mechanical Components Unit 2 Action: Perform evaluation for pressure locking and thermal binding of safety related power-operated gate valves and take corrective actions for those valves identified as being susceptible.

.................................................................................... *...........°..........................................°...........................................

3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 B 89-02 B 89-02, "Stress Corrosion Cracking of High Hardness Type 410 Stainless Steel Preloaded Bolting in Anchor Darling Model S350W Swing Check Valves or Valves of Similar Nature" - NRC 3.9.3 - Special Topics for reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

Mechanical Components Unit 2 Actions: Replace the flapper assembly hold-down bolts fabricated on the 14 (12 valves are installed) Atwood and Morrell Mark No. 47W450-53 check valves. Replacement bolts are to be fabricated from ASTM F593 Alloy 630. A review of the remaining Unit 2 safety related swing check valves will be performed.

3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 B 88-11 I B 88-11, "Pressurizer Surge Line Thermal Stratification" - NRC SER on "Leak-Before-Break" (April 28, 1993) and review in 3.9.3 - Special Topics for SSER16 (September 1995).

Mechanical Components Unit 2 Action: Complete modifications to accommodate Surge Line thermal movements and incorporate a temperature limitation during heatup and cooldown operations into Unit 2

................................................................................................................... prcedre..

procedures. ........................................................

Page 5 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2-* Guidance Approval Reference (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Note I Additional Information 3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 B 82-02 B 82-02, "Degradation of Threaded Fasteners in the Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary of PWR Plants" - Approach accepted in IR 50-390/85-08 and 50-391/85-08 (March 29, 3.9.3 - Special Topics for 1985).

Mechanical Components Unit 2 Action: Implement same approach as Unit 1.

3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 B 79-14 B 79-14, "Seismic Analysis for As-Built Safety-Related Piping Systems" - NRC review of HAAUP Program in NUREG-1232, SSER6 (April 1991) and SSER8 (January 1992) -

3.9.3 - Special Topics for Mechanical Components Unit 2 Actions: CAP/SP see Table 3. Initiate a Unit 2 hanger walkdown and hanger analysis program similar to the program for Unit 1. Complete re-analysis of piping and associated supports as necessary. Perform modifications as required by re-analysis.

3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 B 75-03 I B 75-03, "Incorrect Lower Disc Spring and Clearance Dimension in Series 8300 8302 ASCO Solenoid Valves" - NRC accepted in IR 50-390/75-6 and 50-391/75-6 (August 21, 1975).

3.9.3 - Special Topics for I*wiedi IIal uCupU,It Unit 2 Action: Modify valves not modified at factory.

3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 B 79-02 I B 79-02, "Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts" - NRC review of HAAUP Program in NUREG-1232, SSER6 (April 1991) and SSER8 (January 1992).

3.9.3 - Special Topics for ev, an,,ca,, o.uIpu,,J,,*s Unit 2 Actions: CAP/SP see Table 3. Conduct a complete review of affected support calculations, and perform the necessary revisions to design documents and field modifications to achievecompliance.

3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 B 75-05 I B 75-05, "Operability of Category I Hydraulic Shock and Sway Suppressors" - NRC accepted in IR 50-390/75-6 and 50-391/75-6 (August 21, 1975).

3.9.3 - Special Topics for Mechanical Components Unit 2 Action: Install proper suppressors.

3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 B 88-05 I B 88-05, "Nonconforming materials supplied by Piping Supplies, Inc. and West Jersey Manufacturing Co. (WJM)" - NRC reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

3.9.3 - Special Topics for MVecLhacLal, *oumpueUnts Unit 2 Action: Complete review to locate installed WJM material and perform in-situ hardness testing for Unit 2.

Page 6 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

.1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 3.9.6 GL 96-05 GL 96-05, "Periodic Verification (PV) of Design Basis Capability of Safety-Related MOVs" - SE of TVA response to GL 96-05 dated July 21, 1999.

3.9.6 - Inservice Testing of Pumps CHa vIw Unit 2 Action - Implement the Joint Owner's Group recommended GL 96005 MOV PV program, as described in Topical Report No. OG-97-01 8, and begin testing during the first refueling outage after startup.

3.9.6 GL 89-10 GL 89-10, "Safety Related Motor-Operated Valve (MOV) Testing and Surveillance" - NRC accepted approach in September 14, 1990, letter and reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

3.9.6 - Inservice Testing of Pumps and Valves Unit 2 Action - Implement pressure testing and surveillance program for safety-related MOVs, satisfying the intent of GL 89-10.

.................... o..................................................

4.2.1,4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4 GL 93-04 GL 93-04, "Rod Control System Failure and Withdrawal of Rod Control Cluster Assemblies" - NRC letter December 9, 1994, accepted TVA commitments for both units.

4.2: Fuel System Design Unit 2 action: Implement modifications and testing.

4.2.1,4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4 B 96-01 I B 96-01, "Control Rod Insertion Problems" - NRC acceptance letter for Unit 1 dated July 22, 1996. - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.

4.2: Fuel System Design Unit 2 action: Issue Emergency Operating Procedure and provide core map.

5.2.2 NUREG-0737, I ll.D.1, "Relief and Safety Valve Test Requirements" - NRC II.D.1, reviewed in TER attached to SSER15 (June 1995).

5.2.2: Overpressure Protection Unit 2 actions: 1) Testing of relief and safety valves;

2) Reanalysis of fluid transient loads for pressurizer relief and safety valve supports and any required modifications;

3) Modifications to pressurizer safety valves, PORVs, PORV block valves and associated piping; and 4) Change motor operated block valves.

Page 7 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2: 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

---

(GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 5.2.2 GL 96-03 I GL 96-03, "Relocation of the Pressure Temperature Limit Curves and Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System Limits" - GL 96-03 did not require a response.

5.2.2: OverpressureProtection Unit 2 Action: Submit P-T limits and similar to Unit 1, upon approval, incorporate into licensee-controlled document.

........................................... *...........................................................w..................................................... 1........................

5.2.4 B 02-02 B 02-02, "RPV Head and Vessel Head Penetration Nozzle Inspection Program" - NRC acceptance letter dated December 20, 2002 (Unit 1) - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 5.2.4: Reactor Coolant Pressure 2007.

Boundary Inservice Inspection and ItLIll Unit 2 Action: Perform baseline inspection.

.......... * .l° .... ..... °l ................. ° .l..l.=.... .. °.....° °l.°.° .... l °..°...°l.. ... ...... ......... ........... " .l°° ........... "l° .l°° ...... ...... . ....... l° ....... .... °° .° 5.2.4 B 04-01 I B 04-01, "Inspection of Alloy 82/182/600 Materials Used in the Fabrication of Pressurizer Penetrations and Steam Space Piping Connections at PWRs" - Initial response for Unit 2 on 5.2.4: Reactor Coolant Pressure September 7, 2007.

Boundary Inservice Inspection and I LUnIY Unit 2 actions: Provide details of pressurizer and penetrations and apply Material Stress Improvement Process.

5.2.4 5.2.4: OUTSTANDING ISSUE - I In the SER, the preservice inspection program was still under Unit 2 PSI program submitted review. NRC reviewed the Unit 1 PSI program in SSERs 10, 12 April 30, 1990, with a partial listing and 16.

of relief requests. This item tracked the staff review. Unit 2 Action: Submit Unit 2 PSI program.

5.2.4: Reactor Coolant Pressure Unit 1 only SSERs 10, 12 and 16 Boundary Inservice Inspection and Testing

.................................... 1..................................................................i..............................................................................

5.2.4 B 03-02 I B 03-02, "Leakage from RPV Lower Head Penetrations and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity" - NRC acceptance letter dated October 6, 2004 (Unit 1) - Initial 5.2.4: Reactor Coolant Pressure response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.

Boundary Inservice Inspection and I esuing Unit 2 Action: Perform baseline inspection.

Page 8 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

- - - (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 5.2.4 B 01-01 1 B 01-01, "Circumferential Cracking of Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Head Penetration Nozzles" - NRC acceptance letter dated November 20, 2001 (Unit 1) - Initial response for Unit 2 5.2.4: Reactor Coolant Pressure on September 7, 2007.

Boundary Inservice Inspection and Testing Unit 2 Action: Perform baseline inspection.

5.2.4 B 88-09 B 88-09, "Thimble Tube Thinning in Westinghouse Reactors "-

Reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

5.2.4: Reactor Coolant Pressure Unit 2 Action: TVA letter dated March 11, 1994, for both units Boundary Inservice Inspection and committed to establish a program and inspect the thimble tubes Testing during the first refueling outage.

5.2.4 GL 88-05 I GL 88-05, "Boric Acid Corrosion of Carbon Stainless Steel Reactor Pressure Boundary Components in PWR Plants" -

5.2.4: Reactor Coolant Pressure NRC acceptance letter dated August 8, 1990 for both units.

Boundary Inservice Inspection and Unit 2 action: Implement program.

Testing 5.2.4 GL 97-01 I GL 97-01, "Degradation of Control Rod Drive Mechanism Nozzle and Other Vessel Closure Head Penetrations" - NRC 5.2.4: Reactor Coolant Pressure acceptance letter dated November 4, 1999 (Unit 1).

Boundary Inservice Inspection and Unit 2 Action: Provide a report to address the inspection Testing program.

5.2.4 B 02-01 l B 02-01, "RPV Head Degradation and Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Integrity" - NRC review of 15 day response in letter dated May 20, 2002 - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 5.2.4: Reactor Coolant Pressure 7, 2007.

Boundary Inservice Inspection and Testing Unit 2 action: Perform baseline inspection.

5.4.5 LICENSE CONDITION - Installation NUREG-0737, I In the original SER, the NRC found TVA's commitment to install of reactor coolant vents (ll.B.1) II.B.1 reactor coolant vents acceptable pending verification. This was

--- ------------------------------------- - completed for Unit 1 only in SSER5 (IR 390/84-37).

5.4.12: Reactor Coolant System High Point Vents Unit 2 action: Verify installation of reactor coolant vents.

Page 9 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 5.4.2.2 B 88-02 I B 88-02, "Rapidly Propagating Fatigue Cracks in Steam Generator Tubes"- NRC acceptance letter dated June 7, 1990, for both units.

5.4.2.2: Steam Generator Tube

,,,r, ce ,,,*i*tuu nsI Unit 2 Actions: Evaluate E/C data to determine anti-vibration bar penetration depth; perform T/H analysis to identify susceptible tubes; modify, if necessary.

5.4.2.2 B 89-01 I B 89-01, "Failure of Westinghouse Steam Generator Tube Mechanical Plugs" - NRC acceptance letter dated September 26, 1991 for both units.

5.4.2.2: Steam Generator Tube InIIrviV inspectiUU Unit 2 Action: Remove SG tube plugs.

.... ...=m.i°.m..............

... ... .......... ========.......==

.. ..... == == == =........................................... °*=.... =i=.. =...............m.o.=.. .... .. ==*==. =°. ==..............

5.4.2.2 GL 97-06 I GL 97-06, "Degradation of SG Intemals" - NRC acceptance letter dated October 19, 1999 (Unit 1). - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. TVA responded to a request for 5.4.2.2: Steam Generator Tube additional information on December 17, 2007.

Inservice Inspection Unit 2 Action: Perform SG inspections during each refueling outage.

5.4.2.2 GL 97-05 I GL 97-05, "SG Inspection Techniques" - NRC acceptance letter dated September 22, 1998 (Unit 1) - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.

5.4.2.2: Steam Generator Tube Inservice inspection Unit 2 Action: Employ the same approach used on the original Unit 1 SGs. TVA responded to a request for additional information on December 17, 2007.

5.4.2.2 GL 95-03 GL 95-03, "Circumferential Cracking of Steam Generator (SG)

Tubes" - NRC acceptance letter dated May 16, 1997 (Unit 1).-

Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007. TVA 5.4.2.2: Steam Generator Tube responded to a request for additional information on December Inservice Inspection 17, 2007.

Unit 2 Action: Perform baseline inspection.

5.4.2.2 GL 85-02 GL 85-02, "Recommended Actions Stemming From NRC Integrated Program for the Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issues Regarding Steam Generator Tube Integrity" - TVA 5.4.2.2: Steam Generator Tube responded to the GL on June 17, 1985.

Inservice Inspection Unit 2 Action: Perform SG inspection.

Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

10

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1

• Additional Information 5.4.2.2 GL 04-01 1 GL 04-01, "Requirements for SG Tube Inspection"- NRC acceptance letter dated April 8, 2005 (Unit 1) - Initial response 5.4.2.2: Steam Generator Tube for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.

Inservice Inspection Unit 2 Action: Perform baseline inspection.

5.4.3 GL 81-21 I GL 81-21 "Natural Circulation Cooldown" TVA responded December 3, 1981.

5.4.7: Residual Heat Removal Unit 2 action: Issue operating procedures.

(RHR) System 5.4.3 B 88-04 I B 88-04, "Potential Safety-Related Pump Loss" - NRC acceptance letter dated May 24, 1990, for both units.

5.4.7: Residual Heat Removal Unit 2 Action: Perform calculations and install check valves to (RHR) System prevent pump to pump interaction.

5.4.3 B 88-08 B 88-08, "Thermal Stresses in Piping Connected to Reactor Cooling Systems" - NRC acceptance letter dated September 19, 1991, for both units.

5.4.7: Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System Unit 2 Action: Implement program to prevent thermal stratification.

5.4.3 GL 88-17 I GL 88-17, "Loss of Decay Heat Removal" - NRC acceptance letter dated March 8, 1995 (Unit 1).

5.4.7: Residual Heat Removal Unit 2 Action: Implement modifications to provide RCS (RHR) System temperature, RV level and RHR system performance.

............................................................................................................................ m..................................... o...................

5.4.3 5.4.3: CONFIRMATORY ISSUEs to I In the SER, staff accepted TVA's commitment to provide, before verify installation of an RHR flow startup, an RHR flow alarm to alert the operator to initiate alarm and proper function of dump alternate cooling modes in the event of loss of RHR pump valves when actuated manually suction.

5.4.7: Residual Heat Removal SSER2 resolved testing of dump Unit 2 action: Verify alarm installation.

(RHR) System valves Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

11

C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1

• Additional Information 6.2.1.1 LICENSE CONDITION - (6d) NUREG-0737, In SSER5, NRC closed the LC for Unit 1 only (IR 390/84-59) -

Accident monitoring instrumentation II.F.1 November 1990.

II.F.1 - containment pressure.

Unit 2 action: Verify installation of containment pressure 6.2.1.1.B: Ice Condenser indication.

Containments 6.2.1.1 LICENSE CONDITION - (6e) NUREG-0737, I In SSER5, NRC closed the LC for Unit 1 only (IR 390/84-85) -

Accident monitoring instrumentation II.F.1 November 1990.

II.F.1 - containment water level Unit 2 action: Verify installation of containment water level 6.2.1.1.B: Ice Condenser monitors.

Containments 6.2.5 LICENSE CONDITION - (6f) NUREG-0737, I In SSER5, NRC closed the LC for Unit 1 only (IR 390/84-85) -

Accident monitoring instrumentation II.F.1 November 1990.

II.F.1 - containment hydrogen Unit 2 action: Verify installation of containment hydrogen 6.2.5: Combustible Gas Control in accident monitoring instrumentation.

Containment 6.3 GL 97-04 GL 97-04, "Assurance of Sufficient Net Positive Suction Head for Emergency Core Cooling and Containment Heat Removal Pumps" - NRC acceptance letter dated June 17, 1998 (Unit 1).

6.3: Emergency Core Cooling - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.

System Unit 2 actions: Install new sump strainers, and perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.

6.3 GL 98-02 I GL 98-;02, "Loss of Reactor Coolant Inventory and Associated Potential for Loss of Emergency Mitigating Functions While in a Shutdown Condition" - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 6.3: Emergency Core Cooling 7, 2007.

System Unit 2 actions: 1) Review the ECCS designs to ensure they do not contain design features which can render them susceptible to common-cause failures; and 2) document the results.

Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

12

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 6.3 GL 98-04 GL 98-04, "Potential for Degradation of the ECCS and the Containment Spray System Because of Construction and Protective Coating Deficiencies and Foreign Material in 6.3: Emergency Core Cooling Containment"- NRC closure letter dated November 24, 1999 System (Unit 1). - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.

Unit 2 actions: Install new sump strainers, and perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.

6.3 GL 04-02 GL 04-02, "Potential Impact of Debris Blockage on Emergency Recirculation During Design Basis Accidents at PWRs - NRC Audit Report dated February 7, 2007 (Unit 1). - Initial response 6.3: Emergency Core Cooling for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.

System Unit 2 actions: Install new sump strainers, and perform other modification-related activities identical to Unit 1.

6.3 B 79-24 I B 79-24,"Frozen Lines."

Unit 2 Actions: Insulate the section of piping in the containment 6.3: Emergency Core Cooling spray full-flow test line that is exposed to outside air. Confirm System installation of heat tracing on the sensing lines off the feedwater flow elements.

6.3 B 80-18 I B 80-18 "Maintenance of Adequate Minimum Flow Thru Centrifugal Charging Pumps Following a Secondary Side High Energy Rupture" - IR 50-390/85-60 and 50-391/85-49,(Unit 1).

6.3: Emergency Core Cooling ys em Unit 2 action: Implement design and procedure changes.

................................................................................................................................... *...................=..........*....................

6.6 GL 89-08 I GL 89-08 "Erosion-/ Corrosion Induced Pipe Wall Thinning" -

Unit 1 FAC program reviewed in IR 390/94-89 (February 1995).

6.6: Inservice Inspection of Class 2 Unit 2 actions: Prepare procedure and perform baseline and 3 Components inspections.

7.2.1 to 7.2.6 B 79-21 I B 79-21, "Temperature Effects on Level Measurements" -

Reviewed in SSER14 (December 1994)..

7.2: Reactor Trip System Unit 2 action: Update accident calculation.

Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

13

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 7.3.1 to 7.3.6 7.3.5: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - B 80-06 B 80-06, "Engineered Safety Features Reset Control" - TVA perform confirmatory tests to satisfy response dated March 11, 1982.

IEB 80-06 (to ensure that no device will change position solely due to Unit 2 action: Perform verification during the preoperational reset action) and staff review of testing.

electrical schematics for modifications that ensure that valves remain in emergency mode after ESF reset 7.3: Engineered Safety Features SSER3 - January 1985 Systems 7.5.1 to 7.5.4 B 79-27 I B 79-27, "Loss of Non-class 1E I&C Power System Bus During Operation" - TVA responded to the Bulletin on March 1, 1982.

Reviewed in Original 1982 SER.

7.5: Information Systems Important to Safety Unit 2 action: Issue appropriate emergency procedures.

7.5.1 to 7.5.4 NUREG-0737, I II.F.1.2, "Accident Monitoring Instrumentation" - Reviewed in I1.F.1.2 SSER9 (June 1992).

7.5: Information Systems Important Unit 2 actions: Install Noble gas, Iodine / particulate sampling, to Safety and Containment High Range Monitors.

7.7.1 to 7.7.7 GL 89-19 GL 89-19, "Request for Actions Related to Resolution of Unresolved Safety Issue A-47 "Safety Implication of Control Systems in LWR Nuclear Power Plants" - TVA responded by 7.7: Control Systems letter dared March 22, 1990. NRC acceptance letter dated October 24, 1990, for both units.

Unit 2 action: Perform evaluation of common mode failures due to fire.

8.2.1 to 8.2.4 GL 06-02 I GL 2006-02, "Grid Reliability and the Impact on Plant Risk and the Operability of Offsite Power" - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.

8.2: Offsite Power System Unit 2 action: Complete the two unit baseline electrical calculations and implementing procedures.

i=. i..... i................I ............... i ........ io.. ....I .... I .. I ..... I ....... o ... i ..... i ............ i .. I ..... i ..... i .. i .i. o... i.......I ........ i° .i ......... .. i .. i .. i .. i .... °I°° .°°* .

Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

14

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information GL 96-01 I GL 1996-01, "Testing of Safety-Related Circuits" - TVA 8.3.1.1 to 8.3.1.9, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.1.1: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - incorporatenew design responded for both units on April 18, 1996.

that provides dedicated transformer for each preferred offsite circuit in Unit 2 action: Implement Recommendations.

FSAR 8.3.1: AC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER2 - January 1984 8.3.1.1 to 8.3.1.9, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 NUREG-0737, I II.E.3.1, "Emergency Power for Pressurizer Heaters" - Reviewed II.E.3.1 in original 1982 SER.

8.3.1: AC Power Systems (Onsite) Unit 2 action: Implement procedures and testing.

8.3.1.1 to 8.3.1.9, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.1.2: CONFIRMATORY GL 79-36 I This item and the GL tracked compliance with BTP PSB-1, ISSUE - verify voltage drop "Adequacy of Station Electric Distribution System Voltages."

analysis and testing This item was closed for Unit 1 in SSER13 based on results of

-- ------------------------------------------------- the preoperational test.

8.3.1: AC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER1 3-April 1994 Unit 2 Action: Perform verification during the preoperational testing.

8.3.2.1 to 8,3.2.4, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 8.3.3.4 - LICENSE CONDITION - NUREG-0737, I II.G.1, "Power Supplies for Pressurized Relief Valves, Block Low temperature overpressure II.G.1 Valves and Level Indicators"- Reviewed in Original 1982 SER protection power supplies, II.G.1 and SSER7 (September 1991).

8.3.2: DC Power Systems (Onsite) SSER7 - September 1991 Unit 2 Action: Implement modifications such that PORVS and associated Block Valves are powered from same train but different buses.

NA Not addressed in original 1982 SER I SE for both units - March 18, 1993 SSE for both units - September 9, 1993.

8.4 Station Blackout Unit 2 Action: Implement SBO requirements.

9.1.1 Original 1982 SER B 89-03 I B 89-03, "Potential Loss of Required Shutdown Margin During Refueling Operations" - NRC acceptance letter dated June 22, 1990.

of Fresh 9.1.1 - Criticality Safety and Spent Fuel Storage and Unit 2 Action: Ensure that requirements for fuel assembly Handling configuration, fuel loading and training are included in Unit 2.

Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

15

C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

- (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 9.1.2 Original 1982 SER B 84-03 I B 84-03, "Refueling Cavity Water Seal"- Reviewed in IR 390/93-11.

9.1.2 - New and Spent Fuel Storage Unit 2 Action: Ensure appropriate abnormal operating instructions (AOIs) are used for Unit 2.

9.1.4 LICENSE CONDITION - Control of I Unit 2 Action: Implement NEI guidance on heavy loads.

heavy loads (NUREG-0612) 9.1.5: Overhead Heavy Load Resolved SSER13 - April 1994 Handling Systems 9.1.4 LICENSE CONDITION - Control of B 96-02 / GL 81-07 I B 96-02/GL 81-07, "Movement of Heavy Loads Over Spent Fuel, heavy loads (NUREG-0612) Over Fuel in the Reactor, or Over Safety-Related Equipment"-

---

----------- - NRC closure letter dated May 20, 1998.

9.1.5: Overhead Heavy Load Resolved SSER13 - April 1994 Handling Systems Unit 2 Action: Unit 2 Heavy Loads Program will be in compliance with NUREG-0612.

9.2.1 GL 89-13 GL 89-13, "Service Water Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment"- NRC letters dated July 9, 1990 and June 13, 1997, accepting approach.

9.2.1: Station Service Water System Unit 2 Actions: 1) Implement initial performance testing of the heat exchangers; and 2) Establish eddy current baseline data for the Containment Spray heat exchangers.

9.2.1 GL 96-06 GL 96-06, "Assurance of Equipment Operability and Containment Integrity During Design Basis Accident Conditions"

- NRC letter dated April 6, 1999, accepting TVA response for 9.2.1: Station Service Water System Unit 1.

Unit 2 Action: Implement modification to provide containment penetration relief.

)

Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

16

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1

• Additional Information 9.2.2 9.2.2: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE - TVA committed to relocate the pumps above PMF level and the relocate component cooling thermal staff found this acceptable. Implementation for this issue was barrier booster pumps above resolved for Unit 1 when the staff verified in IR 390/84-20 that probable maximum flood (PMF) the pumps had been relocated.

level before receipt of an OL Unit 2 Action: Relocate pumps for Unit 2.

9.2.2: Reactor Auxiliary Cooling Water Systems 9.3.1 Original 1982 SER GL 88-14 I GL 88-14, "Instrument Air Supply System Problems Affecting Safety-Related Equipment"- NRC letter dated July 26, 1990, closing the issue.

9.3.1: Compressed Air System

... l..ll.l..... ....... ii.l................... align. ,il. . I.. ll. I.il=..i .i...i..l...1.I ..ll.ili.ll.l."..11...i.......

Unit 2 Action:

... i.ll.ll......

Complete Unit

.... 'l.l...l...

2 implementation.

" ........... l .. l. l.".1 "l .i .i. ll. ...... I' 9.3.4 Original 1982 SER B 80-05/GL 80-21 I B 80-05/GL 80-21, 'Vacuum Condition Resulting in Damage to Chemical Volume Control System Holdup Tank" - Closed in IR 50-390/84-59 and 50-391/84-45.

9.3.4: Chemical and Volume Control System (PWR) (Including Unit 2 Action: Complete surveillance procedures for Unit 2.

Boron Recovery System) 9.5.1.1 to 9.5.1.9 GL 06-03 GL 06-03, "Potentially Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire Barrier Materials" - TVA does not rely on Hemyc or MT materials to protect electrical and instrumentation cables or equipment 9.5.1: Fire Protection Program that provide safe shutdown capability during a postulated fire.

Unit 2 Action: CAP/SP see Table 3. The Fire Protection Corrective Action Program will ensure Unit 2 conforms with NRC requirements and applicable guidelines.

9.5.1.1 to 9.5.1.9 B 92-01 I B 92-01, "Failure of Thermo-Lag 330 Fire Barrier System to Perform its Specified Fire Endurance Function" / GL 92-08, GL 92-08 "Thermolag 330-1 Fire Barriers"- Reviewed in SSER18 9.5.1: Fire Protection Program (October 1995) and accepted in NRC letter dated January 6, 1998 (includes a supplemental SE).

Unit 2 Actions: 1) Review Watts Bar design and installation requirements for Thermolag 330-1 fire barrier system and evaluate the Thermolag currently installed in Unit 2. 2) Remove and replace, as required, or prepare an approved deviation.

Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

17

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 9.5.2.1, 9.5.2.2 9.5.2: LICENSE CONDITION - The staff resolved this license condition in SSER5 based on Performance testing of TVA's letter of March 18, 1985, which described its testing of communications system communications systems.

9.5.2: Communications Systems Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 Unit 2 Action: Perform testing of communication systems on Unit 2.

7.8 NUREG-0737, I - II.K.3.9, "Proportional Integral Derivative Controller II.K.3.9 Modification" - Reviewed in Original 1982 SER.

NUREG-0737 Items Unit 2 action: Set the derivative time constant to zero.

NA 7.8 7.8.1: LICENSE CONDITION - NUREG-0737, lI.D.3, "Valve Position Indication" - The design was reviewed in Confirm installation of acoustic ll.D.3 the original 1982 SER and found acceptable pending NUREG-0737 Items monitoring system on Unit 2 confirmation of installation of the acoustic monitoring system. In SSER5 (IR 390/84-35), the staff closed the LC for Unit 1 only.

NA Unit 2 action: Verify installation of the acoustic monitoring system to PORV to indicate position.

............................................. m..................*.......

12.7 12.7.2 LICENSE CONDITION - (6c) I - In SSER5 (November 1990), the staff resolved this license Accident monitoring instrumentation condition for Unit 1 (IR 390/84-09 & IR 390/84-28) due to

- containment radiation monitor verification that TVA's commitments regarding the high range in-containment monitor were satisfactory and that it was installed.

NA: NUREG-0737 items Unit 2 Action: Install high range in-containment monitor for Unit 2.

12.7 NUREG-0737, III.D.3.3, "In-plant Monitoring of 12 radiation monitoring" - NRC Ill.D.3.3 reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

NA: NUREG-0737 items Unit 2 Action: Complete modifications for Unit 2.

Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

18

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 15.5.4- 15.5.5 LICENSE CONDITION - Automatic GL 85-12; GL 85-12/l1.K.3.5, "Implementation of TMI Item II.K.3.5"-The trip of reactor coolant pumps during NUREG-0737, staff determined that their review of Item II.K.3.5 did not have to a small break LOCA II.K.3.5 be completed to support the full power license and considered this license condition resolved in SSER4. The item was further NA: NUREG-0737 items Resolved SSER4 - March 1985 reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

Unit 2 Action: Implement modifications as required.

15.5.4 - 15.5.5 LICENSE CONDITION - Revised NUREG-0737, I II.K.3.30/lI.K.3.31, "Small break LOCA methods/Plant specific small break LOCA analysis ll.K.3.30, ll.K.3.31 analysis" - The staff determined in SSER4 that their review of Items II.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31 did not have to be completed to NA: NUREG-0737 items Resolved SSER5 - November 1990 support the full-power license and considered this license condition resolved in SSER4. In SSER5, the staff further reviewed responses to these items, and concluded that the Units I and 2 FSAR methods and analysis met the requirements of I1.K.3.30 and II.K.3.31. This item was further reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

Unit 2 Action: Complete analysis for Unit 2.

13.5.3 NUREG-0737, I I.C.1, "Short term accident and procedure review" - NRC I.C.1 reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

NA: NUREG-0737, items Unit 2 Action: Implement upgraded EOPs, including validation and training.

Page NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

19

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

ITEMS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPLEMENTATION ACTION REVIEW ITEM TITLE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION GL 83-28 Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem I Test and maintenance procedures and Technical Specifications will include ATWS Events (See SRP/SER Review Matrix for additional post-maintenance operability testing of other (than reactor trip system) safety-GL 83-28 items): related components.

3.2- Post-Maintenance Testing (All SR Components)

............................................................................................................................................................................... ,°.

GL 83-28 Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem I Enter engineering component background data in EPIX for Unit 2.

ATWS Events (See SRP/SER Review Matrix for additional GL 83-28 items):

2.2 - Equipment Classification and Vendor Interface (All SR Components)

GL 88-20 Individual Plant Examination for Severe Accident I Complete evaluation for Unit 2.

Vulnerability IEB 74-15 Misapplication of Cutler-Hammer Three Position Maintained I Install modified A3 Cutler-Hammer 10250T switches.

Switch Model No. 10250T IEB 77-03 On-Line Testing of the W Solid State Protection System I Include necessary periodic testing in test procedures.

IEB 80-10 Contamination of Non-radioactive System and Resulting I Include proper monitoring of non-radioactive systems in procedures.

Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release of Radioactivity to Environment IEB 83-04 Failure of the Undervoltage Trip Function of Reactor Trip I Install new undervoltage attachment with wider grooves on the reactor trip Breakers breakers.

IEB 85-02 Undervoltage Trip Attachment of W DB-50 Type Reactor I Install automatic shunt trip on the Westinghouse DS-416 reactor trip breakers Trip Breakers on Unit 2.

IEB 88-10 Nonconforming Molded-Case Circuit Breakers I Replace those circuits not traceable to a circuit breaker manufacturer.

Page I *: C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

ITEMS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPLEMENTATION ACTION REVIEW ITEM TITLE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IEB 90-01 Loss of Fill-Oil in Transmitters Manufactured by Rosemount I For Unit 2, implement applicable recommendations from this bulletin including identification of potentially defective transmitters and an enhanced surveillance program which monitors transmitters for loss of fill oil.

NUREG-0737 TMI Items: I Confirm multi-unit operation will have no impact on administrative procedures with respect to operability status.

ll.K.1.10 - Operability status Page 2 .: C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

ITEMS RECOMMENDED FOR IMPLEMENTATION ACTION REVIEW Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: I Silicone Rubber Insulated Cables CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design &

Cable Issues Physical Modification).

Hi-pot testing of silicone rubber insulated cables manufactured T TVA letter dated January 13, 1994, by American Insulated Wire (AIW), Rockbestos, and Anaconda Revision 3 to the CAP Plan for Cable Replace any AIW cables revealed a significant number of failures in AIW cables. TVA Issues used on Unit 2.

decided to replace all AIW cables. Rockbestos and Anaconda cables were successfully tested at Wyle Laboratories for 40 year qualified life. NRC Approval of Approach:

• Safety Evaluation for WB Unit 1 -

Corrective Action Program (CAP) Plan for Cable Issues, April 25, 1991

• Supplemental Safety Evaluation (SSER) 7, of NUREG-0847, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of WBNP, Units 1 and 2, dated September 1991

" SSER9, June 1992

" NRC letter February 14, 1994 Page 1 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: 3 Cable Support in Vertical Conduits CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design &

Cable Issues Physical Modification).

A concern was raised that cables in long vertical conduits were - TVA letter dated January 13, 1994, inadequately supported, and that random failures due to cutting Revision 3 to the CAP Plan for Cable For Unit 2, the Unit 1 of the insulation and conductor creep may occur during normal Issues approach will be used.

service condition, especially for silicone rubber insulated cables.

For Unit 1, TVA identified the critical cases of silicone rubber NRC Approval of Approach:

insulated cables in vertical conduits, with cable bearing pressure occurring at the edge of the condulet the determining factor. A " Safety Evaluation for WB Unit 1 -

comparison was made of WBN critical cases with those already Corrective Action Program (CAP) Plan tested at SQN. If SQN conduits enveloped WBN, no cable for Cable Issues, April 25, 1991 testing by WBN was performed. If SQN conduits did not envelope WBN, cable was replaced or in situ cable testing was

• Supplemental Safety Evaluation performed; any cable found unacceptable was replaced. TVA (SSER) 7, of NUREG-0847, Safety also evaluated Class 1E conduits containing cables of all Evaluation Report Related to the insulation types and added cable supports when acceptance Operation of WBNP, Units 1 and 2, criteria were not satisfied. In addition, cable installation dated September 1991 specification and site procedures were revised to incorporate appropriate cable support requirements for cable installed in

• SSER9, June 1992 vertical conduits, and thereby prevent recurrence.

" NRC letter February 14, 1994 Conduits that exceeded the support requirements of General Construction Specification G-38 were analyzed and conduit support points with bearing pressure greater than allowable were inspected and supports added as required.

Page 2 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: 4 Cable Support in Vertical Trays CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design &

Cable Issues Physical Modification).

TVA's specifications require that cables in vertical trays be - TVA letter dated January 13, 1994, supported in accordance with the National Electric Code to Revision 3 to the CAP Plan for Cable For Unit 2, the Unit 1 prevent long term cable damage and that this support may be Issues approach will be used.

provided by tie wraps. However, TVA had no basis to verify that cable ties could provide adequate support.

NRC Approval of Approach:

TVA evaluated the acceptability of various tie wrap configurations as support systems. If a configuration was found to be " Safety Evaluation for WB Unit I -

inadequate, it was shown by analysis, similarity to other Corrective Action Program (CAP) Plan installations, or testing that no cable damage had occurred or for CableIssues, April 25, 1991 would occur. Cable support was added when manufacturers' limits were exceeded. To prevent recurrence, TVA revised the " Supplemental Safety Evaluation cable installation specification and site procedures to identify (SSER) 7, of NUREG-0847, Safety acceptable methods for support of cables in vertical trays. Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of WBNP, Units 1 and 2, dated September 1991

" SSER9, June 1992

. NRC letter February 14, 1994 CAP: 5 Cable Proximity to Hot Pipes CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design &

Cable Issues Physical Modification).

Cable design did not include the local effects of hot pipes which - TVA letter dated January 13, 1994, increase local temperature and can degrade the cable insulation Revision 3 to the CAP Plan for Cable For Unit 2, the Unit 1 and shorten the life of the cables. For Issues approach will be used.

Unit 1, criteria were developed to detail required clearances between cable/raceways and hot pipes/valves to eliminate this potential impact. Class 1E cables were walked down against the NRC Approval of Approach:

criteria to ensure that adequate separation existed between the cables and hot pipes/valves. Deviations were resolved by - Safety Evaluation for WB Unit 1 -

analysis, change of pipe insulation or raceway rework. Corrective Action Program (CAP) Plan for Cable Issues, April 25, 1991

" Supplemental Safety Evaluation (SSER) 7, of NUREG-0847, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of WBNP, Units 1 and 2, dated September 1991

" SSER9, June 1992

• NRC letter February 14, 1994 Page 3 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: 7 Cable Bend Radius CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design &

Cable Issues Physical Modification).

The minimum bend radius recommended by the Insulated Cable - TVA letter dated January 13, 1994, Engineers Association had been violated at WBN. To resolve Revision 3 to the CAP Plan for Cable For Unit 2, the Unit 1 this issue on Unit 1, TVA established bend radius parameters Issues approach will be used.

(upper and lower bounds) for class 1E cables and revised General Construction Specification G-38 to include the bend radius requirements for cable NRC Approval of Approach:

installation. Cable was then categorized based on 10 CFR 50.49 requirements, classification and voltage level; and " Safety Evaluation for WB Unit 1 -

inspected and replaced, retrained or their qualified life reduced, for Cable Action Corrective Program (CAP) Plan based on bending or kinking relative to upper and lower bound Issues, April 25, 1991 bend radii.

• Supplemental Safety Evaluation (SSER) .7, of NUREG-0847, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of WBNP, Units 1 and 2, dated September 1991

• SSER9, June 1992

• NRC letter February 14, 1994 CAP: 8 Cable Splices CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design &

Cable Issues Physical Modification).

To resolve a concern that the installed splices may not conform - TVA letter dated January 13, 1994, to the qualified configurations and materials tested by the vendor, Revision 3 to the CAP Plan for Cable For Unit 2, the Unit 1 a list of Class 1E cable splices in harsh and mild environments Issues approach will be used.

was developed. Cables and splices were identified by reviewing equipment qualification binders and construction records to determine which equipment uses pigtails for field cable NRC Approval of Approach:

connection. All 10 CFR 50.49 harsh environment cable splices requiring Raychem Type N material were replaced and some " Safety Evaluation for WB Unit 1 -

mild environment cable-splices were reworked. A sampling Corrective Action Program (CAP) Plan program was implemented to verify that the splice list was for Cable Issues, April 25, 1991 complete for intermediate splices.

" Supplemental Safety Evaluation (SSER) 7, of NUREG-0847, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of WBNP, Units 1 and 2, dated September 1991

.o SSER9, June 1992

• NRC letter February 14, 1994 Page 4 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: Deficiencies with cable trays and their supports included CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design and Cable Tray inadequate tray connections, inconsistencies between as Physical Modification).

Supports designed versus as-built tray configurations and their orientation, - TVA letter dated November 18, 1988, and failure to evaluate all loading on cable tray members. Corrective Action Program Plan for For Unit 2, the Unit 1 Category I Cable Tray and Cable Tray approach will be used.

The CAP for Unit 1 assured the structural adequacy and Supports compliance with design criteria and licensing requirements by:

NRC Approval of Approach:

- Review and revision of design criteria.

• Safety Evaluation of the WB CAP Plan

- Review or development of design output requirements to for Category I Cable Tray and Cable comply with design criteria and to adequately translate Tray Supports, September 13, 1989 TVA design requirements. This included validation calculations for typical hardware configurations and " SSER6, April 1991 critical cases.

- Walkdown of field configurations to identify deviations from design output.

- Modifications to field conditions, where necessary, to ensure that they are consistent with design output documents.

Page 5 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: Specific structural deficiencies with conduit supports including CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design and Conduit Supports inadequate conduit clamps, conduit runs supported at only one Physical Modification).

location, and excessively cantilevered conduit fell into four - TVA letter dated November 18, 1988, primary categories: Corrective Action Program (CAP) Plan For Unit 2, the Unit 1 for Conduit Support Installation approach will be used.

- Design Basis discrepancies.

- Design output not enveloping all design parameters. NRC Approval of Approach:

- Installed configurations not in compliance with design " Safety Evaluation of the WB CAP Plan documents. for Electrical Conduit and Conduit Supports, September 1, 1989

- Discrepancies between as-installed configurations and inspection documentation. " SSER6, April 1991 The CAP for Unit 1 assured the structural adequacy and compliance with design criteria and licensing requirements by:

- Revisions to design criteria

- Updated design output documents including specifications to factor in changes to design criteria, changes to typical support details and new support details. Critical case attributes were defined and critical case evaluations performed to qualify installations.

- Walk downs first to support critical case evaluations, then to identify configurations not enveloped by critical cases.

- Modifications, as required.

- Revisions of implementing procedures to ensure the adequacy of new or modified supports.

Page 6 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: WBN licensing and design basis documentation as well as plant CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design).

Design Baseline configuration issues included:

Verification " TVA letter dated October 20, 1988, For Unit 2, the Unit I Program - Inconsistencies between the FSAR and WBN design Corrective Action Program (CAP) Plan approach will be used.

documentation. for the Design Baseline and Verification Program (DBVP) for Unit 1 Incomplete and some inconsistent design input and Common Features information.

- Missing, incomplete and out-of-date design calculations. " TVA letter dated March 8, 1994, Revision 7 to the CAP Plan for DBVP

- Inconsistencies between the actual plant configuration and the as-constructed drawings.

NRC Approval of Approach:

The causes of these conditions were found to be: " Safety Evaluation Report on the WB Nuclear Performance Plan (WBNPP)

- Lack of effective procedures and data bases to ensure that - NUREG-1232, Volume 4, design requirements were properly controlled. December 28, 1989

- Insufficient definition of design criteria and system " Inspection Report 50 390/95-36 dated descriptions. June 21, 1995

- Lack of a listing to establish the full scope of calculations needed for WBN and inadequate procedures to ensure calculations are properly controlled.

- Lack of an effective process to maintain drawings for configuration control and keep appropriate drawings "as-constructed" as plant changes are made.

The underlying root cause of this situation was determined to be ineffective design and configuration control measures.

Based on these issues, the WBN Design Baseline and Verification Program (DBVP) had four major components, each having objectives that addressed one or more of the above problems. These were:

- Licensing Verification - to assure that commitments to NRC are captured in the appropriate controlling document and establish procedures to maintain compatibility between commitments and controlling documents.

- Design Basis Development - to establish design basis documents (DBD) that contain or reference appropriate engineering requirements and establish procedures to Page 7 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status Commitments maintain the design basis consistent with the plant, technical requirements and licensing commitments.

- Calculation Verification - to assure the existence and retrievability of calculations that are technically adequate and consistent with the "safety-related' plant design and establish a process to status calculations to maintain them current with plant configuration.

- Configuration Control to develop and implement an improved design change control system with a single set of configuration control drawings (CCDs); and to utilize walk downs, evaluations or testing to verify that the functional configurations of the portions of systems that mitigate design basis events are consistent with CCDs.

CAP: I Flexible Conduit Installation CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design &

Electrical Issues Physical Modification).

The problems identified with flexible conduits were: - TVA letter dated February 15, 1989, CAP Plan for Electrical Issues For Unit 2, the Unit 1

- Inadequate length to account for seismic/thermal approach will be used.

movement NRC Approval of Approach:

- Lack of compliance with minimum bend radius

• Safety Evaluation of the WB Unit 1 requirements CAP Plan for Electrical Issues, September 11, 1989

• Loose Fittings

• NUREG-1232 To resolve these issues for Unit 1, TVA revised design output documents to more specifically define flexible conduit requirements for.

- Seismic/thermal movement

- Minimum bend radius

- Tightness of fittings A list of flexible conduits attached to Class 1E pipe mounted devices was then developed to identify those flexible conduits which would experience both seismic and thermal movement.

Finally, TVA walked down all Class 1E flexible conduits, and reworked those found to be damaged or in noncompliance with the design output documents.

Page 8 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: 3 Contact and Coil Rating of Electrical Devices CAP Plan: I Contact and Coil Rating Electrical Issues of Electrical Devices -

Design and procurements of inductive devices contained in - TVA letter dated February 15, 1989, CAP is open (Design &

circuits did not consider the inductive load ratings of contacts or CAP Plan for Electrical Issues Physical Modification).

the maximum credible voltage available at the device terminals.

NRC Approval of Approach: For Unit 2, the Unit 1 To resolve this for Unit 1, TVA reviewed devices that performed approach will be used.

inductive load switching, and determined if the contacts had - Safety Evaluation of the WB Unit 1 acceptable current ratings and reviewed inductive devices to CAP Plan for Electrical Issues, determine if coils were qualified for the highest and lowest September 11, 1989 credible voltages. If a device could not be qualified, design output documents were issued to require replacement, and - NUREG-1232 qualified devices were installed.

CAP: 4 Torque Switch and Overload Relay By-Pass Capability for Active CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design &

Electrical Issues Safety Related Valves Physical Modification).

- TVA letter dated February 15, 1989, Thermal overload and torque switch bypass capability was not CAP Plan for Electrical Issues For Unit 2, the Unit 1 provided for certain active safety-related valves, as required by approach will be used.

Regulatory Guide 1.106. NRC Approval of Approach:

For Unit 1, TVA issued design criteria to provide the basis for

• Safety Evaluation of the WB Unit 1 determining which active valves were required to have their CAP Plan for Electrical Issues, thermal overload relays and torque switches bypassed and September 11, 1989 issued a calculation to identify these valves. System design criteria or system descriptions were revised to identify which

• NUREG-1232 valves within a system require this capability; design output documents were revised to provide the required capability; and thermal overload and torque switch bypasses were installed where they did not already exist and were required.

Page 9 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2: I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: 5 Adhesive Backed Cable Support Mounts CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design &

Electrical Issues Physical Modification).

Adhesive Back Cable Support Mounts (ABCSMs) were used STVA letter dated February 15, 1989, inside equipment to support and restrain wire and field cables in CAP Plan for Electrical Issues For Unit 2, the Unit 1 a neat and orderly fashion. The ABCSMs sometimes separated approach will be used.

from the inside of the equipment and, as a result, may not have NRC Approval of Approach:

properly secured the wire or cable.

• Safety Evaluation of the WB Unit I For Unit 1, TVA contacted the vendors of the panels/equipment CAP Plan for Electrical Issues, to ascertain the technical requirements for the ABCSMs for the September 11, 1989 vendor's wiring, evaluated the use of ABCSMs for field wiring and issued a calculation identifying the technical requirements for

• NUREG-1232 existing ABCSMs. TVA then evaluated the as-installed conditions to determine if any corrective action was required, issued and implemented design output documents in the field and revised site implementing procedures to incorporate the necessary installation requirements and to restrict the use of ABCSMs.

CAP: Deficiencies in seismic qualification of equipment involved CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design and Equipment configuration and document control issues, and specific technical Physical Modification).

Seismic issues identified by TVA internal reviews.

• TVA letter dated June 29, 1989 - WBN Qualification Equipment SeismicQualification For Unit 2, the Unit 1 (ESQ) To provide assurance that Category I and I (L) equipment is Corrective Action Program Plan, approach will be used.

seismically qualified, that the qualification documentation is Revision 1 retrievable, and that this documentation is consistent with the design and licensing basis, the ESQ: NRC Approval of Approach:

- Reviewed design bases to ensure that they were " Safety Evaluation of the WB Unit 1 technically adequate and consistent interfaces existed Corrective Action Program Plan for between them and other design bases Equipment Seismic Qualification, September 11, 1989

- Resolved specific technical issues utilizing:

" NUREG-1232

• Document retrieval

" SSER15, June 1995

• Walk downs to identify and describe actions required to resolve them

• Engineering evaluations and modifications when equipment could not be qualified in the as-built configuration

- Developed and populated an ESQ database

- Performed process improvements to prevent recurrence.

Page 10 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: The issues that resulted in the determination to initiate the Fire CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design and Fire Protection Protection CAP included: Physical Modification).

- TVA letter dated March 28, 1990,

• Fire-rated walls were breached by HVAC ducts without Revision to CAP Plan for Fire For Unit 2, the Unit 1 fire dampers, violating Appendix R requirements for fire Protection approach will be used.

rated walls that separate safety-related equipment of redundant trains. NRC Approval of Approach:

" Review of SQN Appendix R discrepancies for applicability " SSER18, October, 1995 to WBN.

• SSER1 9, November, 1995

• Deficiencies with the Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA).

Above approval was for both units.

In response to the above issues and other more specific deficiencies, the Unit 1 FP Program (for Unit 1 and common areas) contained the following actions:

• Documentation of the measures taken to evaluate violation of the Appendix R requirements and issuance of DCNs to correct the deficiencies.

• Review of SQN Appendix R allegations, as well as issues raised by the NRC during SQN inspections, for applicability to WBN and issuance of DCNs to correct the deficiencies.

• Fire Protection Compliance Review to ensure WBN conformance with NRC requirements and applicable guidelines. The review included:

- Safe Shutdown Analysis (SSA),

- Area Heat-up Analysis,

- Fire hazards Analysis,

- Lighting and Communication, Post-Fire procedures,

- Associated Circuits,

- Modification Compliance Review, and

- Fire Protection Training/Administrative Procedures.

The results of the Compliance Review were used as the basis for developing the remaining scope of work (calculations/analysis, DCNs and document updates) and the consolidation of fire protection documentation into an organized package to support and substantiate the Compliance Review.

The SSA was updated based on the latest as constructed plant configuration and the lessons learned from the SQN and BFN Appendix R programs.

Page 11 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approachwill be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: Piping and support deficiencies identified during the design and CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design and Hanger Update construction of WBN, as a result of responses to Bulletins 79-02 Physical Modification).

and Analysis and 79-14 and internal findings, were incorporated into the - TVA letter dated June 29, 1989, Program following categories: WBNP - Revision to Corrective Action For Unit 2, the Unit 1 Program Plan for Hanger and approach will be used

- Control of Design Input/Output Analysis Update Program

- Design input was not consistently defined and controlled. NRC Approval of Approach:

- Design output was not clearly defined and, thus, was not consistently implemented by Construction. " NUREG-1232

- Design/Analysis Methodology " SSER6, April 1991 Design criteria for piping analysis and pipe support " SSER8, January 1992 design did not specify a consistent and comprehensive set of design/analysis methods. In some cases, relevant industry issues were not considered.

- Level of Design Documentation Requirements for closure of unverified assumptions and documentation of engineering judgments were neither fully defined nor procedurally controlled.

The scope of the HAAUP activities for Unit 1 included Seismic Category I piping, Seismic Category I (L) piping and those instrument lines that could not be decoupled from their process piping, and associated supports. Those instrument lines that could be decoupled were addressed in the Instrument Line CAP.

The following corrective actions were taken to address the deficiencies:

" Review of governing criteria and procedures to ensure compliance with industry practices and, where necessary, revision of the implementing criteria and procedures.

" Walkdowns of installed piping and associated pipe supports to obtain as-built information.

• Updating or regeneration of pipe stress and support calculations to:

- Incorporate changes in the seismic response spectra input to envelope sets B and C, and to add consideration of mass participation above 33 hz.

- Qualify as-built conditions in design documents.

Page 12 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; C:Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description Refe ren ces Status -Commitments

- Ensure drawings and calculations are in compliance with current design criteria and procedures

• Update of design documents to incorporate as-built piping and support configurations, and other open items.

" Perform modifications, as required Page 13 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: Traceability concerns involved ASME loose piping and fitting CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design and Heat Code material and ASTM material installed as welded attachments on Physical Modifications).

Traceability: ASME piping systems, and were categorized as: - TVA letter dated September 21, 1989, Revision to the CAP Plan for Heat For Unit 2, the Unit 1

" ASME Class 1 systems that may contain ASME Class 2, Code Traceability approach will be used.

Class 3 and/or ASTM piping for which adequate NDE may not have been performed NRC Approval of Approach:

" ASME Class 2 systems that may contain class 3 piping, and ASME Class 2 and Class 3 systems that may contain " Inspection Report 50-390/89-09 and ASTM piping for which adequate NDE may not have been 50-391/89-09 dated September 20, performed 1989

• ASME systems that may have ASTM plate material " NUREG-1232 attached (welded).

For the Unit 1 program, which included common systems, the following corrective actions were taken:

Accuracy of the information contained in the Heat Code Database (HCDB) was verified, and this information was used to flag situations where the same ASME material was used in systems of different classifications.

For Class 1 piping, surface.NDE was performed on all piping materials where the heat number was the same as for material used in a non-Class 1 system. When NDE was not feasible, alternate analysis prescribed by the ASME Code was performed. Material which could not be examined or technically justified was replaced.

For Class 2 and 3 piping, required NDE was performed when classification traceability was questionable and items were installed in locations where stress ratios exceeded 0.80 for welded carbon steel and 0.85 for welded stainless steel. For cases involving ASTM, ASME Section II, and ASME Section III material which may have been upgraded to ASME Section III, Class 2 or 3 materials, the items were re-verified as meeting all other requirements of Section III on a.sampling basis.

Engineering evaluations were performed on non complying items to provide a basis of acceptance.

Material determined to be unacceptable was replaced.

- ASTM plate attachment material used in ASME applications was determined to be acceptable by verifying equivalence to an ASME specification, that it was supplied to an acceptable QA program and the necessary Page 14 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed'for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments NDE was performed. Material that could not be verified or justified as being acceptable was replaced.

Recurrence control included revising the General Construction Specification to include specific ASME requirements for reclassification of material and site implementing procedures to require CMTR traceability of materials to be installed.

CAP: Adverse conditions involving HVAC Duct and Duct Supports can CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design and HVAC Duct be programmatically characterized as: incomplete design basis; Physical Modification).

Supports inadequate design documents; as-built configurations not in - TVA letter dated November 18, 1988, conformance with existing design documents; inadequate or Corrective Action Program for Heating, For Unit 2, the Unit 1 incomplete inspection documentation; and incomplete Ventilation, and Air Conditioning Duct approach will be used.

instructions. and Duct Supports For Unit 1, TVA resolved these issues via the following four tasks:

NRC Approval of Approach:

" Completing the design basis by reviewing and revising the design criteria; issuing supporting calculations and " Safety Evaluation of the WB CAP Plan updating the FSAR to be consistent with the upgraded for Safety-Related Heating, Ventilation design criteria. and Air Condition Duct and Duct Supports, October 24, 1989

• Updating design output documents to be consistent with the completed design basis.

• NUREG-1232

" SSER6, April 1991

" Revising construction, maintenance and QA procedures to incorporate design output documents.

• Developing bounding critical cases of existing installations and evaluating their adequacy, and performing unique evaluations or modifying installations when they could not be qualified by the critical case evaluations.

Page 15 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; t: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: The problems identified with instrument lines fell into two CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design and Instrument categories: Physical Modification).

Sensing Lines

• TVA letter dated March 11, 1994, WBN

" Functional problems related to instrument line minimum Unit 1 - Revision to Corrective Action For Unit 2, the Unit 1 slope requirements. The number of lines involved and Program Plan for Instrument Lines approach will be used.

the lack of adequate configuration control for these lines (R3) resulted in preparation of an Engineering Requirements (ER) Specification; isometric and support drawings; analysis of lines identified for rework; and installation and NRC Approval of Approach:

inspection per design output requirements.

" NUREG-1232 In addition to the ER Specification, other recurrence control measures included site implementing " SSER6, Appendix K, April 1991 procedures to incorporate ER requirements in the process for the installation, maintenance, and inspection. " Supplemental SER May 6, 1994

" Structural problems related to:

- Thermal effects

- Pipe and tube bending devices

- Compression fittings

- Installation documentation discrepancies The scope of the structural issues included Seismic Category I and I (L)instrument lines, and their associated supports, which are analytically decoupled from the process lines.

Thermal Effects Instrument lines and associated supports were not designed to consider the effects of thermal expansion and operating modes indicated that portions of systems will be subjected to thermal effects. These Unit 1 lines were field sketched to identify material and configuration; then analyzed for dead weight, seismic and thermal -effects; line isometric drawings prepared showing required line configuration and material; and deficiencies corrected by design changes.

Pipe and Tube Bending Devices Site implementing procedures used to qualify pipe and tube bending devices were not rigorously executed and qualification records for the bending were not always maintained. A sample of bends was evaluated considering wall thickness reduction, ovality, acceptable bend contour, and surface condition and found to be acceptable, and bender qualification records were updated to incorporate the results of the evaluation.

Compression Fittings Compression fitting installations were found that did not satisfy Page 16 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments the manufacturer's installation requirements. Discrepancies included: tubing cuts that were not deburred, tubing that was not bottomed out inside the fittings, nuts that were not properly tightened, and ferrules that were unidentifiable, missing, or reversed.

Discrepant compression fitting installations were vibration and pressure tested. This included testing of the effect on flow rate due to the presence of tubing burrs and testing of the integrity of fittings with various installation deficiencies by tensile pullout, and vibration and seismic tests. The results demonstrated that for the instances where tube ends were not deburred, tubes were not bottomed out, or nuts were not properly tightened, fitting performance was still satisfactory. Also, normal operation vibration testing did not result in leaks in any of the samples tested and seismic testing only produced very slight leakage in 2 of the 47 samples.

The test program for fittings with missing, reversed, or unidentified ferrules determined that: missing ferrules would cause a definite leak during pressure testing; reversed ferrules would leak if they are "CPI" fittings and would not leak if they are reversed "Hi-Seal" ferrules.

Itwas determined that for these questionable ferrule installations, unacceptable installations would be detected during pressure testing due to leakage and for instrument lines that are not pressure tested, there would be no driving force to create any significant leakage. Therefore, the following corrective actions were taken:

- Instrument lines designated as Seismic Category I or I(L) were pressure tested inaccordance with appropriate piping code requirements

- Fittings seeing radioactive service in lines not pressure tested (i.e., drains) were re-inspected to verify installation in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations, and discrepancies repaired or replaced.

Since pressure testing was performed as required and leaking compression fittings were repaired or replaced, the final configurations were ultimately acceptable.

Installation Discrepancies Support documentation for some instrument lines was determined to be lost or incorrect. A sample of instrument line supports was selected for a detailed evaluation to determine the Page 17 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status Commitments acceptability of the as-built condition, and it was determined that the instrument lines and supports would comply with existing design basis requirements provided all attachment clamps and bolts were properly installed. The supports were then walked down and, when necessary, they were reworked.

Recurrence controls for each of the above structural issues consisted of revising specifications, design drawings and procedures, and required training.

CAP: A number of the quality records required for licensing: CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design).

QA Records

• Were not retrievable in a timely manner or potentially - TVA letter dated April 6, 1994, WBN For Unit 2, the Unit 1 missing Unit 1 - CAP Plan for QA Records, approach will be used.

Revision 6

• Were not maintained in proper storage

" Had quality problems (were incomplete, technically or NRC Approval of Approach:

administratively deficient)

" SSER9, June 1992 To address these issues, the QA Records CAP was developed " WB Unit 1 - Staff Position on Certain with the following objectives for these records: Aspects of QA Records CAP, January 12, 1993

" Ensure adequate storage and retrievability.

" Supplemental Safety Evaluation on

" Resolve quality and technical problems. the QA Records CAP Plan, April 25, 1994

" Ensure programs are established which are adequate to prevent reoccurrence of records problems.

During the course of implementation of the CAP, additional records issues were identified. Evaluation of these issues indicated a need to expand the scope to address the full extent of condition by including a broader set of records categories. This was accomplished through incorporating an Additional Systematic Records Review (ASRR) of all ANSI N45.2.9, Appendix A record types into the CAP. This review involved both records and hardware and was based on sampling and statistical analysis. It provided a high level of confidence in the adequacy of QA Records.

Page 18 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; t: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: The problems associated with the WBN Q-List Program included: CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design).

Q-List

• Multiple Q-Lists

• TVA letter dated July 8, 1993, WBN For Unit 2, the Unit 1 CAP Plan for Q List (R5) approach will be used.

" Inadequate training

" Lack of and improper classifications NRC Approval of Approach:

" Wrong component identification.

• NRC letter - CAP Plan for Quality Assurance List, September 11, 1989 The objectives of the Q-List CAP were to:

• SSER6, April 1991 Develop a new Q-List.

• SSER13, April 1994

" Compare this new Q-List to the old Q-List to identify upgraded components. - Supplemental SER March 17, 1994

" Review maintenance and modification activities performed since 1984 to assure that those activities had the appropriate QA program controls applied.

As part of corrective action for this CAP, over 5000 component classification upgrades were identified during the comparison of the new and old Q-Lists. No field work resulted from these upgraded components.

Page 19 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: Previous TVA policies and procedures had not adequately CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design).

Replacement directed and controlled engineering involvement in the Items procurement process used to purchase replacement items, and STVA letter dated August 7, 1989, WBN For Unit 2, the Unit 1 had not incorporated industry guidance or complied with NRC Unit 1 - Revision to CAP Plan for approach will be used.

Generic Letters 89-02 and 91-05. Replacement Items Program (Piece The Procurement Parts) Engineering Group The CAP grouped the issues into four categories: function will be STVA letter dated January 20, 1995 embedded in the

" Current and future purchases, WBN Unit 1 - Revision 6 to CAP Plan Engineering organization.

for Replacement Items Program

" Current warehouse inventory,

• Plant installed items from previous maintenance activity, NRC Approval of Approach:

and

" Safety Evaluation of the WB Unit 1

• Replacement items installed by previous construction CAP Plan for the Replacement Items activities. Program, November 22, 1989 To address these categories, TVA:

• NUREG-1232

- Created the Procurement Engineering " SSER6, April 1991 Group, which reviewed and evaluated procurements made for safety-related

• NRC letter dated February 6, 1995 applications, and developed a process for these activities.

" Created the Material Improvement Project to evaluate the adequacy of current inventory with respect to technical adequacy, QA receipt inspection and material storage.

" Back checked materials installed from previous maintenance activities to ensure that a proper documentation trail existed from the warehouse to maintenance history for each item.

" Reviewed the construction group's procurements of replacement items. This review indicated that all required documentation for parts traceability was available and that the materials were procured properly with engineering involvement. This also included a review of material staged for Unit 2.

Page 20 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; t: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

• k Program Name Program Description References Status -Commitments CAP: Concerns were identified with the following aspects of seismic CAP Plan: CAP is open (Design).

Seismic Analysis analysis calculations for Category I structures:

• TVA letter dated May 9, 1990, Revision For Unit 2, the Unit 1

• Integration time step used in time history analysis. to the CAP Plan for Seismic Analysis approach will be used.

(R2)

" Soil properties and soil-structure interaction.

" Torsional modeling of structures. NRC Approval of Approach:

" Criteria for the Additional Diesel Generator Building. " Safety Evaluation of WBNP Unit 1 -

CAP for Seismic Analysis,

" The effect of floor and wall flexibility on design of September 7, 1989 structures, systems and components (SSCs) in Category I buildings. " Safety Evaluation of WBNP Unit 1 -

Validation of SASSI Computer Code for To address these categories, TVA: Soil-Structure Interaction Analysis, October, 31, 1989

. Reviewed seismic analysis criteria and licensing requirements for Category I structures. " NUREG-1232

° Reviewed seismic analysis calculations for Category I

• SSER6, April 1991 structures and revisions as required, or prepared new calculations when necessary.

" Dispositioned identified issues.

• Defined criteria or future evaluations and new designs or modifications of structures, systems and components.

Page 21 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: Problems with vendor information included: CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design).

Vendor Information

• Vendor information didn't match the plant configuration. - TVA letter dated February 4, 1993, For Unit 2, the Unit 1 WBN Unit 1 - Revision 4 to CAP Plan approach will be used.

• Vendor information was inconsistent with associated for Vendor Information TVA-developed design input/output documents.

" Vendor documents were incorrect or out of date. NRC Approval of Approach:

" Vendor manuals were lost or were uncontrolled. " WB Unit 1 - Volume 4 NPP, Chapter III, Vendor Information, Safety The Vendor Information CAP for Unit 1 addressed the problems Evaluation, September 11, 1990 and their causes via the following actions:

" SSER11, April 1993

• Relevant vendor information for safety-related and quality related Unit 1, common, and Unit 2 components needed for Unit 1 operation was identified, reviewed for technical adequacy, and consolidated into applicable vendor technical manuals and documents, which were issued as controlled documents.

" A TVA procedure was issued to control vendor manual update activities.

" Open item reports were generated, tracked, and controlled to resolve the inconsistencies found in the vendor documents.

" Vendor drawings which included information necessary to support safety related plant activities, but were not in "Approved" status, were reviewed and approved.

" DCNs were issued to resolve identified design discrepancies/open items.

Page 22 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: Programmatic and implementation deficiencies associated with CAP Plan: I CAP is open (Design and Welding safety-related welding activities resulted in initiation of the TVA Physical Modification).

Welding Project to review and determine the adequacy of the

• TVA letter dated July 31, 1990, WBN -

overall welding program. Subsequently, the Welding CAP was Welding CAP Program - Revisions to For Unit 2, the Unit I established to ensure that Unit 1 safety-related welds met CAP Plan and Plant I Weld Report approach will be used.

licensing requirements and that corrective actions were implemented to address the prior issues and those identified by the Welding Project. The CAP included deficiencies which were NRC Approval of Approach:

related to weld quality, inspections, NDE, fabrication/installation code compliance, and associated documentation.

• Inspection Report Nos. 50-390/89-04 and 50-391/89-04, August 9, 1989 The CAP consisted of three phases:

" Letter dated March 5, 1991, WB Unit 1 -

• A programmatic assessment. Review of Two Submittals Regarding the Welding CAP

" An in depth review of the implementation of the welding program and corrective actions to address specific " NUREG-1232 discrepancies.

• Program enhancements to prevent recurrence.

The programmatic assessment and program enhancements to prevent recurrence applied to Unit 2 as well as Unit 1.

The specific deficiencies that had to be addressed for Unit 1 involved structural steel, piping components, pipe supports, instrument panels, HVAC ductwork and vendor supplied component such as tanks and heat exchangers. The types of deficiencies included:

" Designs that did not satisfy design criteria for welding.

" Lack of documentation of required visual inspections.

" Indications or weld discontinuities.

• Radiographs accepted with rejectable indications, inadequate radiographic techniques, and identification discrepancies.

" Misinterpretation of the ASME Code.

" Discrepancies on vendor performed welds.

" Errors on installation documentation.

These problems were addressed by a combination of techniques that included the following:

Page 23 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; C:Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

(

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments

- Re-inspections to validate results and support analysis.

- Conservative bounding analysis.

• Evaluation of as-is condition to determine acceptability.

- Repairs, if necessary.

SP: Post-accident pressure and temperature analysis for the lower SP Plan: SP is open (Design and Containment compartment in containment failed to consider the long-term Physical Modification).

Cooling effects of a main steam line break inside containment for a plant - NPP, Section 111.3.2, Containment going to hot standby conditions as opposed to cold shutdown. In Cooling For Unit 2, the Unit 1 order to ensure that 10 CFR 50.49(e).1 is satisfied, TVA approach will be used.

performed the Containment Cooling Special Program to develop time dependent temperature profiles for the lower compartment, NRC Approval of Approach:

which were then used for EQ. This was accomplished by the following tasks:

• WB Unit 1 - Supplemental Safety Evaluation of the Special Program on

- Correcting the long-term containment temperature profile Containment Cooling, May 21, 1991 for the lower compartment considering the design basis Main Steam Line Break (MSLB) event.

" Upgrading the Lower Compartment Cooler (LCC) units and associated ducting.

• Evaluating containment coatings transport and replacing non-qualified coatings.

• Using the revised calculated MSLB temperature profile to qualify components in the lower containment that are important to safety.

" Replacing components in the lower compartment to meet 10 CFR 50.49 requirements.

Page 24 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments SP: The MEQ Program included a documented evaluation of the SP Plan: I SP is open (Design and Mechanical ability of safety related mechanical equipment located in harsh Physical Modification).

Equipment environment to perform its intended functions, as required by - NPP, Section 111.3.6 -Mechanical Qualification GDC-4 of Appendix A of Equipment Qualification For Unit 2, the Unit 1 (MEQ) 10 CFR50. approach will be used.

The Unit 1 program utilized existing temperature and dose NRC Approval of Approach:

conditions developed for electrical equipment to satisfy 10 CFR 50.49. The program then identified active safety related

• NUREG-1232 mechanical equipment located in harsh environments; analyzed the non-metallic subcomponents for effect of thermal and

• SSER1 5, June 1995 radiation conditions; produced controlled binders to establish and maintain qualified status for life of plant; and issued DCNs to modify the plant consistent with qualification tests and analyses.

SP: For moderate energy lines, documentation did not adequately SP Plan: I SP is open (Design and Moderate justify that there were no unacceptable consequences as a result Physical Modification).

Energy Line of flooding in a Category I structure outside of containment - NPP, Section 111.3.8 - Moderate Energy Break (MELB) following an MELB. Line Break (MELB) Flooding For Unit 2, the Unit 1 Flooding approach will be used.

For Unit 1, essential equipment and structures were evaluated to ensure that they were either unaffected by postulated flooding NRC Approval of Approach:

due to an MELB, or were designed, specified, and/or qualified for the environment caused by such flooding. The evaluation NUREG-1232 involved pipe break analyses, determination of postulated break locations, determination of postulated flooding levels, and SSER1 1, April 1993 equipment qualification evaluations. In those instances where it was determined that an item was impacted and it could not be qualified, modifications providing curbs, raising junction boxes, and adding or removing weather stripping were performed.

Page 25 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments SP: The Control Room Design Review (CRDR) program was SP Plan: I SP is open (Design and Control Room developed to identify and correct human factor discrepancies in Physical Modification).

Design Review the control room. The CRDR included a Preliminary Design

• TVA letter dated October 2, 1987, WBN Assessment (PDA) to identify any Human Engineering - Detailed Control Room Design For Unit 2, the Unit 1 Discrepancies (HEDs) and completion of afull CRDR at a later Review Summary Report approach will be used.

date.

• NPP, Section 111.3.3, Detailed Control WVA performed a PDA, and discrepancies identified resulted in Room Design Review commitments to implement corrective actions to resolve these discrepancies and a CRDR Summary Report was identified as a license condition. TVA conducted the CRDR and submitted a NRC Approval of Approach:

CRDR Summary Report in October 1987. The CRDR addressed the man-machine interfaces and potential misapplication of " NUREG-1232 human factor principles in the main control room, the auxiliary control room, and the adjacent switch transfer rooms. TVA " SSER5, November 1990 established a review program plan incorporating accepted human factor principles, gathered and reviewed required plant " SSER6, April 1991 design information, surveyed the Control Room, identified and assessed HEDs, determined design improvements required, and " SSER15, June 1995 verified that improvements would address deficiencies and not create new ones.

The CRDR Program ultimately included development of HED corrective actions for Unit 1, common equipment needed for Unit 1, and Unit 2 equipment needed to support Unit 1.

Actions to ensure recurrence controls included issuing Human Factor Design Guides and Human Factor Design Criteria, and the Design Change Process requiring human factors to be addressed.

Page 26 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments SP: Lack of control of over current protection devices and the SP Plan: I SP is open (Design and Master Fuse List misapplication of Bussman KAZ actuators as protective devices Physical Modification).

on the master fuse list and the lack of procedural guidance for " NPP, Section 111.3.5 - Master Fuse List the development of the Master Fuse List resulted in design and For Unit 2, the Unit 1 configuration control deficiencies.

• TVA letter dated July 31, 1990, approach will be used.

Response to Concerns in NRC SER This Special Program included three primary elements to resolve for WBN NPP Volume 4 - Master Fuse these deficiencies: List

" To address configuration control deficiencies, a baseline " TVA letter dated May 31, 1991, master fuse list was developed using design input to Response to NRC Supplemental establish a comprehensive list of 1 E fuses needed to SER Concerning the WBN NPP on support the operation of Unit 1 systems; then walk downs the Master Fuse List were performed to gather as-installed information to be included on the list.

" To resolve the Bussman KAZ actuator misapplication, a NRC Approval of Approach:

review of schematic and connection drawings identified KAZ locations, and a DCN was developed to " NUREG-1232 replace KAZ devices with conventional fuses.

" NRC letter dated February 6, 1991,

" To correct deficiencies involving redundancy provided to WB Unit 1 - Special Program on electrical penetration assemblies, an analysis was Master Fuse List conducted to verify that redundant protection was provided and, when not the case, identified deficiencies " SSER9, June 1992 were corrected.

While the principle focus of the program was on 1E safety-related equipment, the program has evolved to establish similar controls and practices for all fuses needed to support the operation of the station.

Page 27 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; t: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments SP: Due to leakage events in several water systems including SP Plan: I SP is open (Design and Microbiologically Essential Raw Cooling Water and MIC degradation at other Physical Modification).

Induced TVAN plants, TVA committed to a corporate program to address

• TVA letter dated February 26, 1991, Corrosion (MIC) MIC in 1987. In addition, TVA committed to specific actions to WBN - Microbiologically Induced For Unit 2, the Unit 1 address requirements of NRC Generic Letter 89-13, "Service Corrosion Program Report approach will be used.

Water System Problems Affecting Safety-related Equipment,"

and the potential for existing MIC conditions in Unit 1.

• NPP, Section 111.3.7 - Microbiologically Induced Corrosion The special program for Unit 1 included:

• Identifying systems potentially affected by MIC. NRC Approval of Approach:

" Performing visual inspections and assessing " SSER8, January, 1992 MIC-infested locations.

" SSER10, October, 1992

• Using pre-existing NDE results to identify vulnerable locations.

" Repairing unacceptable damage to Code requirements.

" Installing improved biocide treatment and a long term chemical clean up system.

This was later augmented by the implementation of SPP 9.7, Corrosion Control Program, which specifies the programmatic and organizational requirements for management of the MIC and Macrofouling Program.

Page 28 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments SP: Radiation Monitoring System (RMS) deficiencies involved RMS SP Plan: I SP is open (Design and Radiation design, documentation, installation, and hardware, and are Physical Modification).

Monitoring categorized in three areas of concern. These are: - NPP, Section 111.3.9 - Radiation System Monitoring For Unit 2, the Unit 1

" Sample line deficiencies involved line length, heat approach will be used.

tracing, minimum bend radius, slope, and separation requirements. NRC Approval of Approach:

" Design and documentation deficiencies involved:

• NUREG-1232

- Design of sample flow equipment

- Purge capability following an accident

- System interlocks with containment isolation in the containment upper and lower compartment monitor design

- Documentation of modifications to RMS rate meters

- RMS rate meter cable damage.

Inadequate documentation of primary calibration records and uncertainty in the validity of equipment calibration.

The actions to address these deficiencies for Unit 1 were to review and update the RMS design basis, including applicable requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97; evaluate the RMS against this design basis; and implement modifications to correct RMS deficiencies. This also included an evaluation of the RMS design, documentation, and installations against the updated design criteria to verify the acceptability of the installation or to identify required modifications for those monitors included in the Technical Specifications and modifications or reworking of existing documentation to correct identified documentation deficiencies.

Page 29 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments SP: Engineering at WBN identified that use-as-is and repair non- SP Plan: I SP is open (Design and Use-as-is CAQs conformance dispositions were not reflected on drawings; there Physical Modifications).

was inadequate justification for disposition of these types of non- "TVA letter dated September 14, 1988, conformances; and no project level procedural guidance was WB Unit 1 and Unit 2 Use-As-Is and For Unit 2, the Unit 1 provided for use-as-is and repair dispositions. The Use-As-Is Repair Dispositions for Construction approach will be used.

CAQs special program was initiated to address these issues. Nonconformance Reports -

WBRD-50 390/87-05 and To prevent recurrence, engineering procedures were issued to WBRD-50-391/87-05 Final Report establish the requirements for handling CAQs including ensuring that design documents reflect the approved configuration for any "TVA letter dated September 6, 1991, use-as-is or repair disposition, and that the basis for approval of WBN - NPP Volume 4, Revision 1, any use-as-is or repair dispositions be documented. Section 111.3.11, Use-As-Is Special Program For Unit 1, this was followed by the identification of CAQs that had a final disposition of either use-as-is or repair and technical reviews of the latest revision of design documents considering NRC Approval of Approach:

the impact of the CAQ.

- NUREG-1232 Page 30 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments SP: TVA determined that much of the equipment qualification SP Plan: I SP is open (Design and Equipment documentation to support 10 CFR 50.49 requirements was not Physical Modification).

Qualification fully auditable and, in some cases, the documentation available

• TVA letter dated September 6, 1991, did not demonstrate full qualification. The Equipment WBN - Nuclear Performance Plan For Unit 2, the Unit 1 Qualification Special Program was initiated to document that Volume 4, Revision 1, Section 111.3.4, approach will be used.

safety related electrical equipment installed in the plant was Equipment Qualification Program qualified to perform its designated function in the environment to which it will be subjected during normal plant operation as well as during postulated accidents; and that programs and procedures NRC Approval of Approach:

have been established to ensure that qualification is maintained as future plant modifications are made.

• NUREG-1232 The processes put in place to accomplish these objectives included:

• Procedures to maintain EQ over the operating life of the plant.

• Consistent documentation requirements for electrical equipment located in harsh environments and required to function after an accident, and the EQ Documentation Package providing evidence of the qualification of equipment for its specific application and environment.

" Incorporation of EQ considerations into maintenance activities The activities performed using these processes were:

" Analyses of the effects of pipe breaks on temperature, humidity, dose and water level at various locations in containment and auxiliary buildings to establish the environmental parameters for all areas of the plant containing equipment that must meet 10 CFR 50.49 requirements.

" Identification of all 10 CFR 50.49 equipment in these areas, the 50.49 list, including electrical equipment located in harsh environment and required to function after an accident. It was developed through a series of steps:

- A systems analysis to determine for each DBA those equipment items required to ensure completion of a safety-related function.

- For each item, a review of drawings to identify those ancillary devices and cable required to operate or Page 31 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References Status Commitments maintain electrical integrity to ensure completion of the item's safety-related function.

- Reduction of this list by failure analysis to eliminate those components whose failure would not prevent achievement of the required safety action.

Establishment of EQ binders that contain the qualification information in an auditable manner. A package was developed for each Unit 1 equipment type. The package included:

- Items comprising the equipment type

- Checklist for evaluation of qualification

- Analysis and justification of qualification

- Qualification documents

- Field verification data

- Qualification Maintenance Data Sheets

- Open items and deficiencies Page 32 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Table 6 - Items Requiring NRC Review and Approval ITEMS REQUIRING NRC REVIEW AND APPROVAL 1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

--- ------------------------------------ - (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 10.3.1 to 10.3.4 10.3.4: LICENSE CONDITION - T The staff determined that the secondary water chemistry Secondary water chemistry monitoring and control program was being included in the monitoring and control program administrative section of the Technical Specifications and

-- ------------------------------------------- - resolved this for Unit 1 in SSER5 (November, 1990).

10.3: Main Steam Supply System Unit 2 Action: Take same action for Unit 2.

13.4 13.4: LICENSE CONDITION - L Resolved for Unit 1 only in SSER8 - January 1992.

Independent Safety Engineering Group (ISEG) I.B.1.2 Unit 2 action: Implement the alternate ISEG that was approved

--- -------------- ------------------------ - for the rest of the TVA units including WBN Unit 1 by NRC 13.4: Operational Programs August 26, 1999. The function will be performed by the site engineering organizations.

16 Original 1982 SER T Unit 2 Action: Submit Technical Specifications.

16 - Technical Specifications 2.13 - 2.1.4 Original 1982 SER L SRP requirement.

Unit 2 action: Update FSAR for present and projected 2.1.3: Population Distribution population over the lifetime of the plant.

2.2.1 - 2.2.3 Original 1982 SER L SRP requirement.

2.2.1 thru 2.2.2: Identification of Unit 2 action:

hazardous materials. Update FSAR for potential external hazards and Potential Hazards in Site Vicinity 2.4.9 Original 1982 SER L SRP requirement.

2.4.13 - Accidental Releases of Unit local 2and action: regional Update groundwater. FSAR for present and projected use of and Liquid Effluents in Ground Surface Waters Page 1 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1

• Additional Information 2.2.2 Original 1982 SER L SRP requirement.

Unit 2 action: Update FSAR for projected annual number of 3.5.1.5: Site Proximity Missiles aircraft flights.

(Except Aircraft) 3.5.1.6: Aircraft Hazards 3.9.3.1, 3.9.3.2, 3.9.3.3 and 3.9.3.4 GL 80-14 T GL 80-14, "LWR Primary Coolant System Pressure Isolation Valves"- NRC reviewed in SSER6 (April 1991).

3.9.3 - Special Topics for Unit 2 Action: Incorporate guidance into Technical Mechanical Components Specifications.

3.9.6 GL 89-04 L GL 89-04, "Guidelines on Developing Acceptable Inservice Testing Programs" - NRC reviewed in SSER14 (December 1994).

3.9.6 - Inservice Testing of Pumps anu vIw Unit 2 Action - Submit an ASME Section XA Inservice Test Program for the first ten year interval six months before receiving an Operating License.

3.9.6 3.9.6: OUTSTANDING ISSUE T The safety evaluation in SSER14 states that the staff did not find required that Technical any IST issues that would prevent issuance of an operating Specifications include limiting license for Unit 1. The item was resolved in SSER14.

condition for operation that requires plant shutdown or system isolation Unit 2 Action - Submit Technical Specifications.

when leak limits are not met. Staff had not reviewed Technical Specifications.

3.9.6 - Inservice Testing of Pumps SSER14- December 1994 and Valves 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3, 4.2.4 4.2.2: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE on T The staff reviewed the calculation for the predicted cladding cladding collapse calculations collapse for the most limiting Watts Bar fuel and found it acceptable. Staff closed issue in SSER2.

4.2: Fuel System Design SSER2 - January 1984 Unit 2 action: Use Westinghouse RFA-2 fuel as currently installed in Unit 1 for the initial cycle.

Page 2 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 4.4.1,4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.4.3: OUTSTANDING ISSUE L This outstanding issue was opened in SSER6. Staff issued an 4.4.6, 4.4.7, 4.4.8 concerning removal of RTD bypass SER dated June 13, 1989, for Unit 1 only that approved system replacement of the RTD bypass system with an Eagle-21 microprocessor system for monitoring reactor coolant 4.4: Thermal and Hydraulic Design temperature. TVA letter dated December 5, 2007, informs NRC of intent to use Eagle-21 for Unit 2. NRC requested additional information December 27, 2007.

Unit 2 Action: Provide the additional information for NRC review.

4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, 4.4.5: CONFIRMATORY ISSUE / L TVA letters dated February 25, 1982 and November 10, 1982, 4.4.6, 4.4.7, 4.4.8 LICENSE CONDITION on review of provided a description of operator training and an evaluation of Loose Parts Monitoring System conformance to RG 1.133. In SSER3, the staff closed the (LPMS) startup report and inclusion confirmatory issue and opened a license condition to track of limiting conditions for LPMS in submittal of the startup test results and the alert level setting. In Technical Specifications SSER5, the staff closed the LC to a TVA commitment to provide the startup test results and the alert level settings in a letter 4.4: Thermal and Hydraulic Design SSER3 - January 1985 dated Sept 19, 1990, for both units. For Unit 2 due to obsolescence, TVA will replace the LPMS.

SSER5 - November 1990 Unit 2 action: Provide the startup test results and the alert level settings.

4.4.1,4.4.2,4.4.3,4.4.4,4.4.5, 4.4.8: LICENSE CONDITION - GL 82-28 / L In the original SER, the review of the ICC instrumentation was 4.4.6, 4.4.7, 4.4.8 Detectors for Inadequate core NUREG-0737, incomplete. The January 24, 1992, letter superseded the cooling (ll.F.2) II.F.2 previous responses on this issue. GL 82-28/11.F.2, "Inadequate Core Cooling Instrumentation System" - TVA letter for Units 1 4.4: Thermal and Hydraulic Design SSER10 - October 1992 and 2 January 24, 1992, committed to install Westinghouse ICCM-86 and associated hardware. NRC completed the review for Units 1 and 2 in SSER10. -For Unit 2 due to obsolescence of the ICCM-86 system, TVA intends to install the Westinghouse Common Q Post-Accident Monitoring System.

Unit 2 action: Install Westinghouse Common Q PAM system.

4.4.1,4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, Original 1982 SER GL 86-09 T GL 86-09, "Technical Resolution of Generic Issue B-59-(N-1) 4.4.6, 4.4.7, 4.4.8 Loop Operation in BWRs and PWRs - N-1 Loop operation was addressed in original 1982 SER (4.4.7).

4.4: Thermal and Hydraulic Design Unit 2 Action: Confirm Technical Specifications prohibit (N-i)

Loop Operation.

Page 3 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note I Additional Information 5.2.2 GL 90-06 T GL 90-06, "Resolution of Generic Issues 70, "PORV and Block Valve Reliability," and 94, "Additional LTOP Protection for PWRs" - NRC letter dated January 9, 1991, accepted TVA's 5.2.2: Overpressure Protection response for both units.

Unit 2 actions: 1) Revise operating instruction and surveillance procedure; and 2) Incorporate testing requirements in the Technical Specifications.

............ .. .. ........... .. .. .. ... .. .... Inservice........

LICENSE.............CONDITION.....

5.2.4 LICENSE CONDITION - Inservice L The ISI program is required to be submitted within 6 months of inspection (ISI) program the date of issuance of the operating license. The applicable ASME Code edition and addenda are determined by reference 5.2.4: Reactor Coolant Pressure SSER12 - October 1993 to 50.55a(b) 12 months preceding the date of issuance of the Boundary Inservice Inspection and OL. In SSER12, the LC was resolved by a TVA commitment to Testing submit the program within six months after receiving the operating license.

Unit 2 action: Submit ISI program.

5.3.2 5.3.2 -OUTSTANDING ISSUE on P- T In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that the review of the T limits for Unit 2 not provided. Staff Unit 2 P-T limits would be completed as part of the review of the will review as part of Unit 2 Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

Technical Specifications.

Unit 2 action: Submit P-T limits.

5.3.2: Pressure-Temperature (P-T)

Limits 5.3.3 GL 88-11 L GL 88-11, "NRC Position on Radiation Embrittlement of Reactor Vessel Material and its Impact on Plant Operations" - NRC acceptance letter dated June 29, 1989, for both units.

5.3.3: Reactor Vessel Integrity Unit 2 action: Use RG 1.99, Rev. 2 methodology for P-T curves.

5.3.3 5.3.3: OUTSTANDING ISSUE for T In the original 1982 SER, NRC indicated that the review of the staff to complete evaluation of Unit 2 Unit 2 P-T limits would be completed as part of the review of the after receipt of PDIT limits Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

5.3.3: Reactor Vessel Integrity Unit 2 action: Submit P-T limits.

Page 4 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1

• Additional Information 5.4.2.2 GL 06-01 T GL 06-01, "SG Tube Integrity and Associated Technical Specifications" - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.

5.4.2.2: Steam Generator Tube Inservice Inspecuon Unit 2 Action: Include TSTF-449 in TS.

6.2.1.1 B 77-04 T B 77-04, "Calculation Error Affecting Performance of a System for Controlling pH of Containment Sump Water Following a LOCK' - Reviewed in Original 1982 SER.

6.2.1.1.B: Ice Condenser

• dii CI Lont.Ui Unit 2 action: Ensure Technical Specifications includes limit on Boron concentration.

6.2.4 6.2.4: OUTSTANDING ISSUE for T In the original 1982 SER, NRC concluded that WBN met all the NRC to complete review of requirements of NUREG-0737, item II.E.4.2 except subsection information provided by TVA to (6) conceming containment purging during normal operation. In address Containment Purging SSER3, the outstanding issue was closed and the License During Normal Plant Operation Condition left open. NRC completed the review and issued a TER for both units July 12, 1990. NRC concluded that the LICENSE CONDITION - isolation valves can close against the buildup of pressure in the Containment isolation dependability event of a design basis accident ifthe lower containment isolation valves are physically blocked to an opening angle of 50 6.2.4: Containment Isolation System SSER3 - January 1985 degrees or less.

SSER5 - November 1990 Unit 2 Action: Reflect valve opening restriction inthe Technical Specifications.

6.2.5 6.2.5: OUTSTANDING ISSUE for L Unit 2 action: The hydrogen recombiners will be removed from review of TVA-provided additional the Unit 2 design and licensing basis based on 10 CFR 50.44 information relative to discussion (final rule September 16, 2003) and abandoned in place.

added to FSAR to address analysis of the production and accumulation of hydrogen within containment following onset of a LOCA 6.2.5: Combustible Gas Control in SSER4 - March 1985 Containment Page 5 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; 1: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance

-- --------------- -------------------------- (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 6.4 Original 1982 SER GL 03-01 T GL 03-01 "Control Room Habitability" - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 2007.

6.4: Control Room Habitability Unit 2 action: Incorporate TSTF-448 into Technical System Specifications.

6.6 6.6: OUTSTANDING ISSUE on L NRC reviewed the preservice inspection program (PSI) for Unit additional information required on 1 only in SSER1 0- October 1992.

preservice inspection program and identification of plant specific areas Unit 2 action: Submit Unit 2 PSI program.

where ASME Code Section XI requirements cannot be met and supporting technical justification 6.6: Inservice Inspection of Class 2 and 3 Components 7.1.1 T Staff requested discussion of methodology for determining, setting, and evaluating as-found setpoints for drift susceptible instruments.

7.1: Instrumentation and Controls -

Introduction Unit 2 action: Resolve this issue using the BFN TS-453 precedent (see NRC ML061680008).

8.3.1.1 to 8.3.1.9, 8.3.3.1 to 8.3.3.6 GL 07-01 L GL 2007-01, "Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients" - Initial response for Unit 2 on September 7, 8.3.1: AC Power Systems (Onsite) 2007.

Unit 2 action: Complete testing of four additional cables.

9.2.1 No open issues in the original 1892 L Unit 2 Action: Appropriate measures will be taken to ensure that SER. SSER18 concludes ERCW the ERCW system is fully capable of meeting design does not conform to GDC 5 for two- requirements for two unit operation.

unit operation.

9.2.1: Station Service Water System Page 6 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

.: C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

1982 SER APPROVAL FOR UNIT 2 Guidance (GL, Bulletins)

SRP TITLE Approval Reference Note 1 Additional Information 9.3.2: LICENSE CONDITION -

9.3.2 NUREG-0737, T ll.B.3, "Post Accident Sampling" - NRC reviewed in SSER16 Post-Accident Sampling System 11.3.3 (September 1995). TVA submitted a TS improvement to eliminate requirements for the Post Accident Sampling System 9.3.2: Process and Post-Accident Resolved SSER14 -December 1994 using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process in a Sampling Systems letter dated October 31, 2001.

Unit 2 Actions: Unit 2 Technical Specifications will eliminate requirements for the Post-Accident Sampling System.

11.7 11.7.2: LICENSE CONDITION - NUREG-0737, T III.D.1.1, "Primary Coolant Outside Containment" - Resolved for Primary coolant outside containment II1.D.1.1 Unit 1 only in SSER10 (October 1992), reviewed in SSER16 II1.D.1.1 (September 1995). Unit 2 Actions - Include the waste gas disposal system in the leakage reduction program and NA: NUREG -0737 items incorporate in Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

13.5.3 NUREG-0737, T I1.K.3.3, "Reporting of SRV Challenges and Failures" (action ll.K.3.3 from GL 82-16)- NRC reviewed in SSER16 (September 1995).

NA: NUREG-0737, items Unit 2 Action: Include, as necessary, in Technical Specifications submittal.

Page 7 NOTE 1: Specific Bulletins or GLs may be associated with multiple Standard Review Plan sections; however, they are only addressed with the first or the most appropriate section.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

ITEMS REQUIRING NRC REVIEW AND APPROVAL ITEM TITLE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IEB 75-08 PWR Pressure Instrumentation T Ensure that Technical Specifications and Site Operating Instructions address importance of maintaining temperature and pressure within prescribed limits.

NUREG-0737 TMI Items: T Unit 2 Technical Specifications and surveillance procedures will address this issue.

I1.K.3.10 - Anticipatory trip at high power Page 1 .: C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

ITEMS REQUIRING NRC REVIEW AND APPROVAL Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: 2 Cable Jamming CAP Plan: L CAP is open (Design &

Cable Issues Physical Modification).

Since WBN documents did not address cable jam ratio, there - TVA letter dated January 13, 1994, was the potential for undetected cable damage. When single Revision 3 to the CAP Plan for Cable Based on the work conductors with unacceptable jam ratios are pulled into a Issues performed on Unit 1, no conduit, the cable may align in a flat configuration with a resultant corrective actions are jamming. required to resolve this NRC Approval of Approach: issue on Unit 2.

For Unit 1, Class 1E conduits were evaluated to identify those segments most likely to have experienced jamming during " Safety Evaluation for WB Unit 1 - See Note 1.

installation. These segments were ranked according to their Corrective Action Program (CAP) Plan calculated percent sidewall bearing pressure. Cables were for Cable Issues, April 25, 1991 removed and inspected, and no evidence of damage due to jamming was identified. The inspected cables included those " Supplemental Safety Evaluation with the highest calculated side wall bearing pressure and were (SSER) 7, of NUREG-0847, Safety considered to bound the lower ranked cables. This evaluation Evaluation Report Related to the addressed both Unit I and Unit 2 cable populations potentially Operation of WBNP, Units 1 and 2, subject to jamming. dated September 1991

• SSER9, June 1992

° NRC letter February 14, 1994 Page 1 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: 6 Cable Pullbys CAP Plan: L CAP is open (Design &

Cable Issues Physical Modification).

Cable insulation damage was found in the Unit 2 Reactor - TVA letter dated January 13, 1994, Protection System and determined to be the result of cable Revision 3 to the CAP Plan for Cable TVA will propose a pullby. When additional cables were removed, damage was also Issues different approach for found. These deficiencies were addressed at the time. Unit 2.

For Unit 1, TVA identified those locations where cable pull NRC Approval of Approach: See Note 1.

tension and cable side wall bearing pressure had exceeded certain safe threshold values, and cables were most susceptible " Safety Evaluation for WB Unit 1 -

to this damage mechanism based on the conduit configuration. Corrective Action Program (CAP) Plan All cables that were in high risk conduits were replaced. The for Cable Issues, April 25, 1991 threshold between low and high risk categories was validated via hi-pot testing or visual inspection, and cables in the low risk " Supplemental Safety Evaluation category conduits were accepted as is based on the hi-pot tests (SSER) 7, of NUREG-0847, Safety performed on a sample of low-risk category conduits. Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of WBNP, Units 1 and 2, dated September 1991

" SSER9, June 1992

" NRC letter February 14, 1994 CAP: 9 Cable Sidewall Bearing Pressure CAP Plan: L CAP is complete.

Cable Issues At WBN, sidewall bearing pressure (SWBP) was not properly - TVA letter dated January 13, 1994, Based on the results of addressed in the design and installation process and installations Revision 3 to the CAP Plan for Cable the Unit 1 program for may have exceeded the allowable value. To resolve this issue Issues this issue, which included on Unit 1, TVA conducted a walk down to identify worst case Unit 1 and 2 cables and conduit configuration, calculated the expected pulling tension and did not find excessive SWBP for those worst case conduits and performed a test to NRC Approval of Approach: SWBP, no corrective determine increased allowable SWBP values, based on actual action will be required for cables used at TVA nuclear plants. " Safety Evaluation for WB Unit 1 - Unit 2.

Corrective Action Program (CAP) Plan TVA revised construction specifications to require that SWBP be for Cable Issues, April 25, 1991 See Note 1.

limited to the values determined by the above activities and site installation procedures were revised to provide explicit cable " Supplemental Safety Evaluation SWBP restriction to cable pulling limits. (SSER) 7, of NUREG-0847, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Analysis of the 81 severe case conduits against these limits Operation of WBNP, Units 1 and 2, revealed that the cable in one conduit may have exceeded these dated September 1991 values, and this cable was replaced. An additional sample of 40 conduits, all in harsh environment, was examined and none " SSER9. June 1992 exceeded allowable SWBP.

• NRC letter February 14, 1994 Page 2 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: 10 Pulling Cable Through 90' Condulet and Flexible Conduit CAP Plan: L CAP is complete.

Cable Issues A concern was raised for the potential damage to cables in 900

• TVA letter dated January 13, 1994, Since no cable damage condulets due to the small supporting surface the inside comers Revision 3 to the CAP Plan for Cable was found during the Unit of condulets provide for cables under tension. These comers Issues 1 program due to this can, in time, cut into the insulation, or the conductor can creep activity and no such through the insulation, reducing the insulation level of the damage has been found cables. There was also a concern that when cable is pulled NRC Approval of Approach: at any of the TVA Nuclear through a flexible conduit segment in a bend, in the middle of a sites, no corrective action conduit run, it can be subjected to very high frictional forces that " Safety Evaluation for WB Unit 1 - is necessary.

can tear the cable jacket and insulation. Corrective Action Program (CAP) Plan for Cable Issues, April 25, 1991 See Note 1.

TVA evaluated cables pulled through mid-route flexible conduits which had been tested for pullby damage, and inspected cables " Supplemental Safety Evaluation removed, and confirmed that no damage was caused by the mid (SSER) 7, of NUREG-0847, Safety route flexible conduits. Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of WBNP, Units 1 and 2, dated September 1991

" SSER9, June 1992

• NRC letter February 14, 1994 CAP: 11 Computerized Cable Routing System Software and Database CAP Plan: L CAP is complete.

Cable Issues Verification and Validation CCRS was used to document information regarding cable routing. The information includes - TVA letter dated January 13, 1994, Since all cable data has cable route in tray and conduits, cable type, cable weight, cable Revision 3 to the CAP Plan for Cable been transferred to the splices, circuit function and separation. There were concerns for Issues Integrated Cable and the adequacy of CCRS. CCRS has been replaced by new Raceway Design System, software called ICRDS. no further corrective NRC Approval of Approach: action is necessary for this issue.

• Safety Evaluation for WB Unit 1 -

Corrective Action Program (CAP) Plan for Cable Issues, April 25, 1991

" Supplemental Safety Evaluation (SSER) 7, of NUREG-0847, Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Operation of- WBNP, Units 1 and 2, dated September 1991

• SSER9, June 1992

" NRC letter February 14, 1994 Page 3 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; I: Proposed implementation only item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal

Program Name Program Description References

• Status -Commitments CAP: 2 Physical Cable Separation and Electrical Isolation CAP Plan: L CAP is open (Design &

Electrical Issues Physical Modification).

There were isolated cases of redundant closed raceways with - TVA letter dated February 15, 1989, less than the minimum required 1-inch separation. CAP Plan for Electrical Issues For Unit 2, the Unit 1 approach will be used to For Unit 1, this issue was subdivided into three issues, and each NRC Approval of Approach: address separation was resolved separately. The issues were: between redundant

• Safety Evaluation of the WB Unit 1 divisions of Class 1E

- Separation between redundant divisions of Class 1 E CAP Plan for Electrical Issues, raceways and internal raceways. September 11, 1989 panel separation between redundant divisions of

- Internal panel separation between redundant divisions of

• NUREG-1232 class 1E cable. Since no Class 1E cables. coil-to-contact or contact-to-contact isolation

- Coil-to-contact and contact-to-contact isolation between breakage was identified Class 1E and non Class 1 E circuits on Unit 1, no action is required for Unit 2 on this For inadequate separation between redundant divisions issue. See Note 1.

of Class 1E raceways, the raceways were reworked to meet the minimum 1-inch separation requirement, and site implementing procedures were revised to require specific signoffs for raceway separation attributes.

For inadequate internal panel separation between redundant divisions of Class 1 E cables, design criteria were revised to include more detailed requirements for internal panel cable separation, an engineering output document was issued to define these requirements and a list of all panels with redundant divisions of Class 1E cables was developed. Panels containing cables of redundant divisions were walked down to identify cables which did not comply with the revised engineering output document, and these were evaluated to determine acceptability or reworked to meet required separation distances.

For coil-to-contact and contact-to-contact isolation between Class 1 E and non Class 1 E circuits, a calculation was developed to determine acceptability; design criteria were revised to specify acceptable isolation methods; and the existing Class 1 E coil and contact devices used as isolators were reviewed to determine that they were qualified for their intended use.

Page 4 Note 1: TVA will submit a justification for the issues where a different approach will be used for Unit 2. This information will be submitted by May 16, 2008.

• C: Item closed for Unit 2; C:Proposed implementationonly item; L: NRR approval required; T: Part of Technical Specifications submittal