ML102870140

Initial Exam 2010-301 Draft Simulator Scenarios

ML102870140
Person / Time
Site:	Vogtle
Issue date:	04/12/2010
From:	NRC/RGN-II
To:	Southern Nuclear Operating Co
References
50-424/10-301, 50-425/10-301, ES-D-1
Download: ML102870140 (178)

Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 D

Facility: Vogtle Scenario No.:

1 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Examiners:

Lea Operators:

NEW Initial Conditions:

100% power, Blender automatic makeup OOS due to electrical control problems.

Manual make up using section 4.6 of 13009-1 will be required. (Malfunction CVO1). The SAT is in service supplying Unit 2.

Turnover: Category 5 Hurricane Zeus is approaching plant site with sustained winds that will require plant S/D in the next 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />.

Event MaIL Event Event No.

No.

Type*

Description 1

RC-1OA I

OATC Loop 1 RCS NR Cold leg temperature instrument fails high

@ 100%

l-SS TS-SS LCOs 3.3.1 (OTtT, OPT trips), 3.3.2 (FWI) 2 ELO2 C-UO Loss of power to 1AAO2, DG-1A trips during UV sequence C-SS ELO1A TS-SS LCOs 3.8.9, 3.8.1 25 sec TD Remote Functions Used:

EL22-1 NYR EL-24-1 NYRS EL33-1 ND1 Battery Charger EL35-1 ND3A Battery Charger Note SOP 13432-1 will direct UO to reset MFP B which will be locked up. This requires use of remote function FW24/25 to reset the alarm.

Note: Use Remote Function SF02 to swap Spent Fuel Pool Cooling to Train B.

3 RDO7 I-ALL Inadvertent turbine runback & rods fail to move in automatic TUO7 4

N/A R-ALL Crew lowers power 10% for plant S/D per 18013-C.

Hurricane Zeus has changed track unit must be SID in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

5 N/A N-OATC RCS Boration N-SS Scenario 1 Page 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 6

FW14 l-UO PT-508 drifts high resulting underfeed of all Steam Generators Ramp I-SS 75-0%

In 120 sec 7

PRO5 c M-ALL PRZR PORV fails open, resulting in RCS LOCA. PORV block valve 100%

is de-energized due to loss of power to 1AA02.

ESO1 8

GEl 2A C-UO Main generator output breaker fails to automatically open C-SS 9

ES22B C-OATC BIT isolation valve (HV-8801 B) fails to open on SI c-SS 10 ALL Report received that DG-1A ready to start. Faulty over speed sensor has been replaced.

NOTES:

Clear Malfunction ELOIA Remote Functions:

DGI2 local control DGO5 maintenance mode DGO3 reset all DG trip relays (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Event 1: RCS Narrow Range Cold Leg Temperature Instrument fails high (18001-C Section B)

Verifiable actions:

OATC Places rods in manual control, restores Tave to program value, bypasses failed channel from control circuits.

Consequences:

Rods will continuously insert resulting in Tave going below minimum temperature for critical operation or an automatic reactor trip on low PRZR pressure.

Technical srecifications:

LCO 3.3.1 OThT, OPT LCO 3.3.2 FWI Scenario 1 Page 2

Appendix 0 Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 2: Loss of power to IE electrical bus, DG-IA trips due to faulty relay (18031-C Section A).

Verifiable actions:

UO Reduce TDAFW pump speed to keep reactor power less than license limits, place train B equipment in service.

Consequences:

Positive reactivity transient on reactor with corresponding power increase.

Technical specifications:

LCO 3.8.1 AC Sources RAT, DG-1A LCO 3.8.9 AC Power Distribution Event 3: Turbine Runback and Rod Control System failure (18012-C)

Verifiable actions:

OATC Manually drives rods to maintain Tave on program and lower steam dump demand if steam dumps arm UO Stabilize turbine load with standby load control circuits, unarm steam dumps if necessary.

Consequences:

Tave not maintained on program value, continuous turbine load reduction.

Technical specifications:

N/A Event 4: Rapid power reduction due to Hurricane Zeus (18013-C)

Verifiable actions:

OATC

- Drive rods in to lower Tave, and keep AFD on target UO Lower turbine load on schedule to be in mode 3 in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Consequences:

Unit is not shutdown prior to losing off-site power from high winds from Hurricane.

Technical specifications:

N/A Scenario 1 Page 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 5: RCS Boration (SOP 13009-1 section 4.8)

Verifiable actions:

OATC Borate RCS using blender controls Consequences:

RIL/AFD limits exceeded Technical specifications:

N/A Event 6: MFP discharge pressure PT-508 slowly fails high (18016-C Section E)

Verifiable actions:

UQ Take manual control of MFPs speed and MFRVs as necessary to stabilize all SG levels at 65%.

Continue manual control of MFPs speed.

Consequences:

Reactor trip on SG Lo-Lo-levels if main feed pump speed not properly maintained.

Technical specifications:

N/A Event 7: RCS LOCA through PRZR PORV-455, PORV block valve failed open due to loss of power.

Verifiable actions:

OATC manually control charging to maintain PZR level, isolate letdown, starts a second charging pump Manually trip reactor when PRZR pressure cannot be maintained (Auto reactor trip failure).

Consequences:

Exceed DNBR protective limits if reactor is not manually tripped Event 8: Main generator output breaker fails to open on turbine trip Verifiable actions:

UO Manually open output breaker Consequences:

Main generator is motorized from grid causing turbine/generator damage. (OE Fermi)

Technical specifications:

N/A Scenario 1 Page 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 9: BIT Discharge valve fails to open on SI Verifiable actions:

OATC manually opens BIT valve Consequences:

No HHSI flow, exacerbating loss of reactor coolant accident Technical specifications:

N/A Event 10: Power restored to bus IAAO2 from DG-IA Verifiable actions:

UO Manually starts DG-1A.

Consequences:

RCS LOCA continues if 1AAO2 is not re-energized.

CRITICAL STEPS:

1. Open Main Generator output breaker to prevent damage to main generator.

2. Open BIT valves to establish HHSI flow during RCS LOCA Scenario 1 Page 5

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 1 of 4 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

RCS NR Temperature Instrument Fails High (Tcold) on loop # 1. This will require the OATC to perform lOAs to stop inward control rod motion by placing rods in MANUAL.

The crew will then enter AOP-1 8001 section B Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation to complete the corrective actions for this failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior Diagnose NR Temperature Instrument Failure:

(Loop 1 T-cold fails high)

Symptoms I alarms:

OATC RC LOOP DELTA T / AUCT DELTA T HI-LO DEV RC LOOP TAVG / AUCT TAVG HI-LO DEV OVERPOWER liT ROD BLOCK AND RUNBACK ALERT OVERTEMPAT ROD BLOCK AND RUNBACKALERT OT liT Runback bistable lit on TSLB board OP liT Run back bistable lit on TSLB board Indications:

Rapid inward control rod motion.

Loop 1 Tavg / Delta T indications deviating from other loops.

OATC 18001-C SECTION B IMMEDIATE ACTION Bi.

Place ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH in MAN position.

SS Enters AOP 18001-C, Section B. (Crew Update)

Verifies immediate action step Bi with OATC OATC 18001-C Section B Subsequent Actions B2.

Restore TAVG to program band.

1

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 2 of 4 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

RCS NR Temperature Instrument Fails High (Tcold) on loop # 1. This will require the OATC to perform lOAs to stop inward control rod motion by placing rods in MANUAL.

The crew will then enter AOP-1 8001 section B Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation to complete the corrective actions for this failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC B3.

Select affected ioop on TS-412T TAVG DEFEAT SEL 412 B4.

Select affected loop on TS-41 1 F DELTA T DEFEAT SEL.

411 OATC B5.

Place ROD BANK SELECTOR SWITCH in AUTO position, if desired.

NOTE: Crew will probably return rods to 228 steps SS B6.

Notify I & C to initiate repairs.

Calls SS to perform the following:

Notify Operations Duty of AOP entry Write a Condition Report Notify Maintenance of the failure SS B7.

Bypass the affected instrument channel using 13509-C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION, if desired.

NOTE: Expect the SS will NOT bypass the channel.

SS B8.

Trip the affected channel bistables and place the associated MASTER TEST switches in TEST position per TABLE Bi within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. (TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.2)

NOTE: The SS is expected to leave bistables untripped during the allowed out of service time to facilitate l&C trouble shooting of the failed channel.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 3 of 4 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

RCS NR Temperature Instrument Fails High (Tcold) on loop # 1. This will require the OATC to perform lOAs to stop inward control rod motion by placing rods in MANUAL.

The crew will then enter AOP-1 8001 section B Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation to complete the corrective actions for this failure.

TABLE BI Initial

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

()

(.)

(.)

()

()

CAUTIONS ALL test switches for the loop with RTD failure should be tripped. Only one loop should be tripped.

The bistable input is placed in the tripped state by positioning the Selector Switch on the specified test card to TEST.

The bistable input identified by the switch number should agree with the location specified by CAB, CARD, and B/S before tripping a bistable input.

If a discrepancy exists, CAB-CARD-B/S should be used, not switch number.

Bypassing another channel for Surveillance Testing with a channel inoperable is permitted provided the inoperable channel is in the tripped condition and the channel being tested is not bypassed for more than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Loop I RTD Failure (Channel 1)

FRAME SSPS INPUT CAB

/CARD B/S SWITCH Overpower Delta T Trip 1

8/22 1

TS-41 1 G Overpower Delta T Run back 1

8/22 2

TS-41 1 H Overtemp Delta T Trip 1

8/22 3

TS-41 1 C Overtemp Delta T Runback 1

8/22 4

TS-41 1 D MASTER TEST SWITCH 8/72 1

MASTER TEST SWITCH 8/72 2

MASTER TEST SWITCH 8/72 3

MASTER TEST SWITCH 8/72 4

Lo-LoTAVG Stm Dump Block 1

8/21 1

TS-412D Low TAVG FW Isolation 1

8/21 2

TS-412G MASTER TEST SWITCH 4/55 1

MASTER TEST SWITCH 4/55 2

3

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 4 of 4 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

RCS NR Temperature Instrument Fails High (Tcold) on loop # 1. This will require the OATC to perform lOAs to stop inward control rod motion by placing rods in MANUAL.

The crew will then enter AOP-1 8001 section B Failure of RCS Narrow Range Temperature Instrumentation to complete the corrective actions for this failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS B9.

Initiate the applicable actions of:

TS 3.3.1 Function 6 OTAT Trip Condition E TS 3.3.1 Function 7 OPtIT Trip Condition E TS 3.3.2 Function 5b FW1 Condition I OATC!UO BlO.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

SS

• B1 1 Check repairs and surveillances

- COMPLETE.

RNO

• B1 1.

Perform the following:

a.

WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform Step 812.

b.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 1 of 14 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The RAT supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip due to a fault with the RAT. DG 1A will start, close its output breaker, and begin sequencing UV loads. During the load sequence, the DG will emergency trip on a faulty over speed sensor. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power < 100%, and shift electrical loads to the B train 1 E bus, as well as implementing tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnose loss of power to 1AAO2:

OATC SS Alarms:

RESVAUXXFMR 1NXRA HI SIDE PHOC LOR TRIP DG1A TRIP OVERSPEED DG1A DISABLED NONRESET OF EMERGENCY TRIP DG1A EMERGENCY START DG1A LOW PRESS STARTING AIR 4160V SWGR 1AAO2 TROUBLE Indications:

Control room lighting dims due to loss of l/2 of the lights 1AAO2 white bus potential lights go out DG-1A starts and its output breaker shuts DG-1A trips and its output breaker opens SS Enters AOP 18031 -C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems (Crew Update)

OATC 18031-C

• 1.

Check Reactor power - LESS THAN 100%:

UQ1 118

- LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100% MWT for the applicable unit.

NIs

- LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.

T

- LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 100%.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No:

I Page 2of 14 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The RAT supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip due to a fault with the RAT. DG 1A will start, close its output breaker, and begin sequencing UV loads. During the load sequence, the DG will emergency trip on a faulty over speed sensor. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power < 100%, and shift electrical loads to the B train 1 E bus, as well as implementing tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO RNO

• 1.

Perform the following:

a.

Reduce TDAFW pump speed to not less than 1535 rpm.

b.

Throttle affected MDAFW pump discharge valves.

NOTE: These valves will not have any power IF Reactor power is still greater than 100%, THEN reduce turbine load at approximately 10 megawatt increments to maintain Reactor power less than 100%.

UO 2.

Check affected train Diesel Generator

- RUNNING.

SS RNO 2.

Go to Section A LOSS OF POWER WITH DG FAILING TO TIE TO BUS UO 18031-C, SECTION A Al.

Verify NSCW pumps on unaffected train (B)

- TWO RUNNING.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 3 of 14 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The RAT supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip due to a fault with the RAT. DG 1A will start, close its output breaker, and begin sequencing UV loads. During the load sequence, the DG will emergency trip on a faulty over speed sensor. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power < 100%, and shift electrical loads to the B train 1 E bus, as well as implementing tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC A2.

Verify charging pump

- RUNNING:

NCR

-OR-Unaffected train CCP.

UO A3.

Verify CCW pumps on unaffected train

- TWO RUNNING.

NOTE: Will start 2 train B CCW pumps SS A4.

Check RHR status:

a.

Check RHR

- REQUIRED FOR SHUTDOWN COOLING.

RNO A4.

Go to Step A5 OATC/UO A5.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO

• A6.

Check AFW status:

a.

Check AFW system

- NEEDED TO MAINTAIN SG LEVELS.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 4 of 14 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The RAT supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip due to a fault with the RAT. DG 1A will start, close its output breaker, and begin sequencing UV loads. During the load sequence, the DG will emergency trip on a faulty over speed sensor. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power < 100%, and shift electrical loads to the B train 1 E bus, as well as implementing tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior RNO a.

Perform the following:

UO 1)

Reduce TDAFW pump speed to not less than 1535 rpm.

SS 2)

Go to Step A7.

UO A7.

Verify ACCW pump on unaffected train

- RUNNING.

NOTE: #2 ACCW pump will automatically start on low discharge pressure UO A8.

Verify four CNMT cooling units on unaffected train running in high speed using 13120, CONTAINMENT BUILDING COOLING SYSTEM.

NOTE: Will start Train B CNMT Coolers 3,4,7,8 on high speed UO A9.

Verify CRDM fans on unaffected train

- TWO RUNNING.

Starts CRDM Fan #4 UO AlO.

Verify reactor cavity cooling unit on unaffected train

- ONE RUNNING.

Starts cooling unit #2 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

1 Page 5 of 14 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The RAT supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip due to a fault with the RAT. DG 1A will start, close its output breaker, and begin sequencing UV loads. During the load sequence, the DG will emergency trip on a faulty over speed sensor. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power < 100%, and shift electrical loads to the 8 train 1 E bus, as well as implementing tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO All.

Verify SEP cooling pump on unaffected train running using 13719, SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM IPC Points:

ZD3405 ZD3411 Will dispatch Auxiliary Building Operator to shift Spent Fuel Pool Cooling to Train B.

UO A12.

Verify the following unaffected train Class 1 E 480V load centers ENERGIZED:

Train B BBO6 BBO7 BB16 NB1O UO Al 3.

Verify unaffected MCCs energized by observing

- NO TROUBLE ALARMS.

Train B SS A14.

Open doors that have installed door stops in the following AFFECTED Control Building rooms:

UNIT 1 TR A 852, B55, B76 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: I Page 6 of 14 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The RAT supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip due to a fault with the RAT. DG 1A will start, close its output breaker, and begin sequencing UV loads. During the load sequence, the DG will emergency trip on a faulty over speed sensor. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power < 100%, and shift electrical loads to the B train 1 E bus, as well as implementing tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Al 5.

Initiate the following:

a.

14230, OFFSITE AC CIRCUIT VERIFICATION AND CAPACITY I CAPABILITY EVALUATION.

b.

Verify SAT energized using 13418 C, STANDBY AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER.

OATC A16.

Verify DRPI

- ENERGIZED.

UO

• A1 7.

Check DC bus loads:

a.

Verify 125V DC battery loads

- LESS THAN THE FOLLOWING LIMITS:

AD1 B 300 AMPS expect 200 amps BD1 B 300 AMPS expect 0 amps CD1B 100 AMPS expect 80 amps DD1B 80 AMPS

- expect 0 amps b.

Monitor all 1 E battery bus voltages

- REMAIN GREATER THAN 105V DC.

6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: I Page 7 of 14 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The RAT supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip due to a fault with the RAT. DG IA will start, close its output breaker, and begin sequencing UV loads. During the load sequence, the DG will emergency trip on a faulty over speed sensor. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power < 100%, and shift electrical loads to the B train 1 E bus, as well as implementing tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UOIOATC A18.

Check Reactor Makeup System:

a.

Unaffected boric acid transfer pump

- RUNNING OR SELECTED TO AUTO.

RNO a.

Perform the following:

Manually start unaffected boric acid transfer pump, as necessary.

-OR-Place unaffected pump handswitch in AUTO.

IF boric acid transfer pump is NOT available AND boration is required, THEN open RWST To Charging Pump Suction Valve:

LV-112D

-OR LV-112E 7

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: I Page 8 of 14 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The RAT supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip due to a fault with the RAT. DG 1A will start, close its output breaker, and begin sequencing UV loads. During the load sequence, the DG will emergency trip on a faulty over speed sensor. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power < 100%, and shift electrical loads to the B train 1 E bus, as well as implementing tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior A18 b.

Unaffected reactor makeup water pump

- RUNNING OR S ELECTED TO AUTO.

RNO a.

Perform the following:

Manually start unaffected reactor make-up water pump, as necessary.

-OR-Place unaffected pump handswitch in AUTO.

IF reactor makeup water pump is NOT available, THEN transfer charging pump suction to RWST if VCT level lowers to less than 20%.

UO

• A19 Verify battery charger in service for non-IE batteries:

NDI ND2 ND3A ND3B NOTE: Will direct Control Building Operator to place battery chargers in service for INDI and IND3A using 13406-1, 125V DC Non IE Electrical Distribution System using section 4.1.3 8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 9 of 14 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The RAT supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip due to a fault with the RAT. DG 1A will start, close its output breaker, and begin sequencing UV loads. During the load sequence, the DG will emergency trip on a faulty over speed sensor. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power < 100%, and shift electrical loads to the B train 1 E bus, as well as implementing tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO A20.

Transfer any de-energized NYS, NYRS, and NYR busses to alternate sources by initiating 13432, 1 20V AC NON 1 E INSTRUMENT DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM INYRS and INYR will need to be transferred to alternate power sources NOTE: Main Feed Pump B speed control will be locked due to the loss of power to the control system relay. The UO sill use ARP 17015-1 Window C05 to restore normal speed control after power is restored.

UO ARP 17015-1 WINDOW C05 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE Failure of automatic control signal supplied to the Main Feedwater Pump Turbine (MFPT) Controllers.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE 3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS Check which pump is locked up on Signal Memory Function (SM F) at the MFPT cabinet in the North side of the Control Room.

4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS NOTES MFPT speed will be maintained at the last speed reference signal_received_by_the_SMF_from_the_Process_Control_System 9

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 10 of 14 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The RAT supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip due to a fault with the RAT. DG 1A will start, close its output breaker, and begin sequencing UV loads. During the load sequence, the DG will emergency trip on a faulty over speed sensor. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power < 100%, and shift electrical loads to the B train 1 E bus, as well as implementing tech specs for loss of AC power.

speed reference signal.

If desirable to prevent excessive transients in the Feedwater System, the Manual Control Potentiometer at MFPT A(B) Motor Speed Changer 1 HS 3151(31 52) may be adjusted to obtain zero deviation on the MFPT A(B) AUTO/MAN Transfer Deviation 1 SI 31 53(31 54) prior to switching to manual control.

Counterclockwise raises the deviation indicator and clockwise lowers the indicator.

1.

IF the automatic control signal is lost, perform the following:

a.

Place MFPT A(B) Motor Speed Changer 1 HS 31 51(31 52) in MAN.

b.

Slowly adjust speed to maintain feedwater pressure as required to maintain the Feedwater Control Valve in the controlling band.

2.

IF equipment failure is indicated, initiate maintenance.

3.

WHEN the automatic control signal is restored (indicated by alarm clearing), perform the following:

a.

Return Speed Control to automatic by adjusting 1 SIC 509B(509C) to obtain zero deviation on 1 SI 31 53(31 54).

b.

Place MFPT A(B) Motor Speed Changer 1 HS 31 51 (31 52) in AUTO.

4.

Verify SMF resets for pump previously identified as locked up on SMF.

5.

Operate MFPTs per 13615 1 depending on number of pumps operating.

10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: I Page 11 of 14 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The RAT supply breaker to 1AA02 will trip due to a fault with the RAT. DG 1A will start, close its output breaker, and begin sequencing UV loads. During the load sequence, the DG will emergency trip on a faulty over speed sensor. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class I E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power < 100%, and shift electrical loads to the B train 1 E bus, as well as implementing tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS A21.

Check Control Room Emergency Lighting:

a.

Check bus loss of power expected duration

- GREATER THAN 90 MINUTES.

b.

Transfer emergency lighting to the unaffected unit by placing MAIN CONTROL ROOM LIGHTING LOSP TRANSFER SWITCH on AFFECTED unit to LOSP position:

UNIT 1 (CB-149 LOCKED SWITCHES) 1-TRS-9616A or B in UNIT 1 LOSP POSITION SS A22.

Initiate applicable Technical Specification requirements listed in 11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: I Page 12 of 14 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The RAT supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip due to a fault with the RAT. DG 1A will start, close its output breaker, and begin sequencing UV loads. During the load sequence, the DG will emergency trip on a faulty over speed sensor. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power < 100%, and shift electrical loads to the B train 1 E bus, as well as implementing tech specs for loss of AC power.

ATTACHMENT A Potential Applicable LCOs & TRs Requiring Short Term Response LCOITR Mode Limiting Condition Required Actions 3.1.7 1-2 Lost Rod Pos nd Immediately enter TS 3.0.3 3.4.15 1-4 All RCS leak detection instrumentation Immediately enter TS 3.0.3 mop 3.7.10 All Both CREFS trains in one unit mop Immediately place other unit trains in 3.7.11 emergency mode 3.7.12 3.8.9 1-4 Loss of safety function due to loss of Immediately enter TS 3.0.3 3.8.10 5,6 power Immediately declare supported systems mop, or stop fuel movement/reactivity addition 3.4.6 4

Required RCS loops and/or RHR trains Immediately restore reqd loops/trains to 3.4.7 5

service 3.4.8 5

3.5.3 4

Required ECCS train mop Immediately initiate restoration 3.8.2 5,6 Loss of required AC Source Immediately declare required systems w/o offsite power mop or suspend fuel movement 3.8.5 5,6 Loss of required DC Sources Immediately declare affected features mop or suspend fuel movement activities 3.9.5 6

RHR train requirements are not met for Immediately stop fuel movement and dilutions 3.9.6 refueling and restore required trains and/or water level 13.9.5 All One or both FHB HVAC trains mop Immediately verify remaining train operable or suspend fuel movement activities 13.1.8 3-5 Lost required DRPI Immediately open RTBs 13.1.9 13.1.2 5,6 Required boric acid injection source Immediately suspend fuel movement and/or 13.1.4 and/or pump mop reactivity changes 3.6.3 1-4 Both CNMT pen iso valves are mop 1 hr:

Isolate affected penetrations 3.8.1 1-4 Loss of offsite source I hr:

Complete 14230 Loss of DG I hr:

Verify SAT Operable 4 hr:

Determine redundant safety features operable 3.4.5 3

Required RCS loops mop with RTBs 1 hr:

Restore loop or open RTBs 12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

1 Page 13 of 14 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The RAT supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip due to a fault with the RAT. DG 1A will start, close its output breaker, and begin sequencing UV loads. During the load sequence, the DG will emergency trip on a faulty over speed sensor. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power < 100%, and shift electrical loads to the B train 1 E bus, as well as implementing tech specs for loss of AC power.

closed 3.8.4 1-4 Loss of DC source due to other than mop 2 hrs:

Restore all 4 DC sources to operable battery The above Technical Specifications and the following additional Specifications should be referenced for long term required actions:

3.3.2 1-2 ESFAS instrumentation FU 6d:

Loss of AFWAS from trip of both MFPs 3.3.3 1-3 PAMS instrumentation EU 19:

Loss of CNMT H2 monitor heat tracing.

(Note cross train relationship; Train A heat tracing fed from Train B power.

Train B heat tracing fed from Train A power.

3.3.4 1-3 Remote shutdown system 3.4.9 1-3 Pressurizer 2 heater groups each with 150 kw capacity and capable of being powered from emergency source 3.4.16 All RCS activity Chemistry notified if power changed more than 15% in one hour (SR 3.4.16.2) 3.5.2 1-3 ECCS 3.6.6 1-4 CNMT spray and CNMT clrs 3.7.4 1-3 SG ARVs Also affects 3.3.4 3.7.5 1-3 AFW pumps & disch vlvs 2 or more trains may be mop 3.7.7 1-4 CCW system 3.7.8 1-4 NSCW system 3.7.9 1-4 Ultimate heat sink 3.7.13 1-4 Piping pen units 3.7.14 1-4 ESF chillers 13.1.3 1-4 Boration flow paths 13.1.5 1-4 Charging pumps-operating 13.7.4 All Thermal barriers 3.4.12 4-6 COPS ODCM All RE-i 2444, RE-i 2442, RE-2565, RE-2562 are affected by loss of heat tracing for sample lines.

13

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

1 Page 14 of 14 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The RAT supply breaker to 1AAO2 will trip due to a fault with the RAT. DG 1A will start, close its output breaker, and begin sequencing UV loads. During the load sequence, the DG will emergency trip on a faulty over speed sensor. This will require the crew to complete the actions of AOP 18031-C, Loss of Class 1 E Electrical Systems. Corrective actions include reducing AFW flow to return reactor power < 100%, and shift electrical loads to the B train 1 E bus, as well as implementing tech specs for loss of AC power.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior A23.

Check the fault condition cleared.

RNO A23.

Return to Step Al.

14

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 1 of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

An inadvertent Turbine runback will occur. The operating crew should check to see if the runback is required and determine per their lOAs that the runback is NOT required.

The Unit Operator will then take Standby Control of the main turbine to stabilize load. During the event auto rod motion will not work and the OATC will be required to manually insert rods.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnose Main Turbine Runback in progress:

Alarms:

TAVE I TREE DEVIATION Indications:

Generator MWe lowering.

Tavg rising.

UO 18012-C IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 1.

Check Turbine Runback REQUIRED.

2 of 4 OT DELTA-T runback bistable status lights lit.

- OR 2 of 4 OP DELTA-T runback bistable status lights lit.

UO RNO 1.

Perform the following:

a.

Stabilize Turbine load:

1)

Approximately match CV SIGNAL using STANDBY LOAD SET potentiometer.

2)

Simultaneously depress ON and BYPASS pushbuttons on STANDBY SIGNAL MATCH.

b.

GotoStepl6.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: I Page 2 of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

An inadvertent Turbine runback will occur. The operating crew should check to see if the runback is required and determine per their lOAs that the runback is NOT required.

The Unit Operator will then take Standby Control of the main turbine to stabilize load. During the event auto rod motion will not work and the OATC will be required to manually insert rods.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Enters AOP 18012-C (Crew Update) and verifies completion of immediate actions UO 16.

Check Turbine load STABLE.

OATC/UO 17.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO

• 18.

Control Turbine load using the STANDBY LOAD SET potentiometer.

OATC 19.

Check Tavg

- TRENDING TO TREF.

OATC RNO UO 19.

Match Tavg and Tref by performing the following as necessary:

Use rods.

NOTE: Manual rod control is required due to failure of the rod control system.

Adjust turbine load.

Borate by using 13009, CVCS REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 3 of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

An inadvertent Turbine runback will occur. The operating crew should check to see if the runback is required and determine per their lOAs that the runback is NOT required.

The Unit Operator will then take Standby Control of the main turbine to stabilize load. During the event auto rod motion will not work and the OATC will be required to manually insert rods.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 20.

Check Steam Dump System:

a.

ARMED RNO Go to step 21 b.

RESPONDING TO TAVE/TREF DEVIATION.

OATC

• 21.

Control PRZR level

- IN PROGRAM BAND.

OATC

• 22.

Maintain Seal Injection flow to all RCPs

- 8 TO 13 GPM.

OATC 23.

Check PRZR Pressure

- TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG.

UO 24.

Check SG NR level

- TRENDING TO 65%.

UO RNO 24.

Take manual control of MFP speed and FRVs to restore SG level, as necessary.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 4 of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

An inadvertent Turbine runback will occur. The operating crew should check to see if the runback is required and determine per their lOAs that the runback is NOT required.

The Unit Operator will then take Standby Control of the main turbine to stabilize load. During the event auto rod motion will not work and the OATC will be required to manually insert rods.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

• 25.

Check Steam Dumps:

a.

Check all Steam Dump valves CLOSED.

UO RNO a.

WHEN all Steam Dump valves are closed, THEN reset C-7, if present, by momentarily placing STM DUMP CONTROL MODE SELECT HS-500C in RESET.

UO b.

Reset C-7, if present, by momentarily placing STM DUMP CONTROL MODE SELECT HS-500C in RESET.

UO 26.

Test the Backup and Mechanical Overspeed Trips by initiating 14286, TURBINE TRIP DEVICE OPERABILITY TEST.

OATC 27.

Check reactor power change

- LESS THAN 15%.

RNO Notify Chemistry to sample RCS activity per TS SR 3.4.16.2.

UO 28.

Check cause of runback CORRECTED 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: I Page 5 of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

An inadvertent Turbine runback will occur. The operating crew should check to see if the runback is required and determine per their lOAs that the runback is NOT required.

The Unit Operator will then take Standby Control of the main turbine to stabilize load. During the event auto rod motion will not work and the OATC will be required to manually insert rods.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO RNO 1.

Perform the following:

a.

Restore turbine control to normal using 1 3800, MAIN TURBINE OPERATION when the cause is corrected.

SS b.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

5

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: I Page 1 of 6 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

A phone call will be received by the Shift Manager and report that Hurricane Zeus has changed direction and the track will be over Plant Vogtle. The SM will direct a plant shutdown within one hour per AOP-1 801 3-C, Rapid Power Reduction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Initiating condition:

SS receives call from Shift Manager reporting change in direction of Hurricane Zeus. SM directs crew to shutdown the plant within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> per AOP-1 801 3-C, Rapid Power Reduction.

SS Enters AOP-1 801 3-C, Rapid Power Reduction SS sets an appropriate target to have the plant shutdown within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

SS 18013-C 1.

Perform SHUTDOWN BRIEFING.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 2 of 6 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

A phone call will be received by the Shift Manager and report that Hurricane Zeus has changed direction and the track will be over Plant Vogtle. The SM will direct a plant shutdown within one hour per AOP-1 8013-C, Rapid Power Reduction.

SHUTDOWN BRIEFING METHOD Auto rod control should be used.

Reduce Turbine Load at approximately 3% RTP per minute (approx 36 MWe) up to 5% RTP (approx 60 MWe).

Borate considering the calculations from the reactivity briefing sheet and BEACON.

Maintain AFD within the doghouse.

SS (or SRO designee)

- Maintain supervisory oversight.

AR rod withdrawals will be approved by the SS.

Approval for each reactivity manipulation is not necessary as long as manipulations are made within the boundaries established in this briefing (i.e. turbine load adjustment up to 60 MWe, etc.).

A crew update should be performed at approximately every 100 MWe power change.

If manpower is available, peer checks should be used for all reactivity changes.

OPERATIONAL LIMITS Maintain TAVG within +/-6°F of TREE. If TAVGITREF mismatch >6°F and not trending toward a matched condition or if TAVG 551°F, then trip the reactor.

If load reduction due to a loss of vacuum, every effort should be made to maintain the steam dumps closed (Permissive C-9 24.92 Hg).

INDUSTRY OE Shift supervision must maintain effective oversight and exercise conservative decision making.

Correction of significant RCS TAVG deviations should only be via secondary plant control manipulations and not primary plant control manipulations (i.e., do not withdraw control rods or dilute).

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 3 of 6 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

A phone call will be received by the Shift Manager and report that Hurricane Zeus has changed direction and the track will be over Plant Vogtle. The SM will direct a plant shutdown within one hour per AOP-1 8013-C, Rapid Power Reduction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 2.

Verify rods in AUTO.

NOTE: Auto rod control NOT available UO 3.

Reduce Turbine Load at the desired rate up to 5%/rn in (60 MWE/rnin).

OATC 4.

Borate as necessary by initiating 13009, CVCS REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL SYSTEM.

Expect OATC to select section 4.8 for frequent borations OATC Refer to Event 5 for performing the CVCS Boration per 13009-1 OATC/UO 5.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

CREW

• 6.

Check desired ramp rate - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 5%IMIN.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: I Page 4 of 6 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

A phone call will be received by the Shift Manager and report that Hurricane Zeus has changed direction and the track will be over Plant Vogtle. The SM will direct a plant shutdown within one hour per AOP-18013-C, Rapid Power Reduction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

• 7 Maintain Tavg within 6°F of Tref:

a.

Monitor Tavg/Tref deviation (UT-0495).

b.

Verify rods inserting as required.

RNO b

Manual rod control should be used with insertions of up to 5 steps at a time.

OATC c.

Energize Pressurizer back-up heaters as necessary.

OATC

• 3 Maintain reactor power and turbine power MATCHED.

a.

Balance reactor power with secondary power reduction using boration and control rods.

b.

Check rate of reactor power reduction

- ADEQUATE FOR PLANT CONDITIONS.

c.

Check RCS Tavg

- GREATER THAN 551°F (TS 3.4.2).

d.

Check RCS Tavg

- WITHIN 6°F OF TREF.

OATC

• 9 Maintain PRZR Pressure - AT 2235 PSIG.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 5 of 6 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

A phone call will be received by the Shift Manager and report that Hurricane Zeus has changed direction and the track will be over Plant Vogtle. The SM will direct a plant shutdown within one hour per AOP-1 801 3-C, Rapid Power Reduction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

• 10.

Maintain PRZR Level - AT PROGRAM.

UO

• 11.

Maintain SG Level BETWEEN 60% AND 70%.

SS 12.

Notify the System Operator that a load reduction is in progress.

SS 13.

Notify SM to make the following notifications as appropriate:

Plant Management Notifications using 10000-C, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS.

91001-C, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTATION INSTRUCTIONS.

001 52-C, FEDERAL AND STATE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

Chemistry Technical Specification sampling for load reductions greater than 15% using 35110-C, CHEMISTRY CONTROL OF THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM.

QC to perform a NOPT inspection using 84008, RPV ALLOY 600 MATERIAL INSPECTIONS AND REPORTS for reactor shutdowns.

CREW NOTE Attempts should be made to keep steam dumps closed if power reduction is required for Condenser problem.

5

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 6 of 6 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

A phone call will be received by the Shift Manager and report that Hurricane Zeus has changed direction and the track will be over Plant Vogtle. The SM will direct a plant shutdown within one hour per AOP-1 8013-C, Rapid Power Reduction.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

• 14 Checksteam dumpsCLOSED.

SS 15.

Check Turb/Gen to remain online.

RNO Go to Step 18.

OATC 18.

Check reactor power level

- LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 20%.

RNO Return to Step 3.

PROCEED TO EVENT 6 AFTER -10% POWER REDUCTION 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: I Page 1 of 3 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13009-1, Section 4.8 to borate the RCS as power is reduced to maintain Rods above RIL and AFD on target.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC SOP 13009-1, CVCS Reactor Makeup Control System Section 4.8 NOTES This section can be used during power changes when necessary to frequently borate the RCS for temperature or AFD control. The use of this section shall be authorized by the SS.

Frequent borations can raise VCT level to the point where VCT pressure reaches 40 psig. 1-LIC-0185 may be adjusted to allow divert to the RHT at a lower level to limit VCT pressure increase.

OATC 4.8.1 Determine the amount of boric acid necessary for desired change in boron concentration using PTDB Tab 2.3 and correct the obtained value using PTDB Tab 2.1 or use instructions provided by Reactor Engineering.

gals Boric Acid OATC 4.8.2 Verify the Reactor Makeup System is aligned for automatic operation.

OATC 4.8.3 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in STOP.

OATC 4.8.4 Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A in BOR.

OATC 4.8.5 IF desired, AND with SS concurrence, Boric Acid flow may be adjusted to desired flow using 1-FIC-01 10.

Initial Pot Setting:_______

New Pot Setting:_______

OATC 4.8.6 IF desired, AND with SS concurrence, lower pot setting on 1-LIC-0185, to limit VCT pressure increase.

Initial Pot Setting:_______

New Pot Setting:_______

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 2 of 3 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13009-1, Section 4.8 to borate the RCS as power is reduced to maintain Rods above RIL and AFD on target.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC CAUTION Digital counters and thumbwheel settings on BORIC ACID TO BLENDER Integrator 1 -FQI-01 10 read in tenth-gallon increments.

OATC 4.8.7 Set BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator i-FQI-0i10 for the desired amount of boric acid.

Boric Acid gals OATC 4.8.8 Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in START, and verify flow is indicated on 1-Fl-Oil OA.

OATC 4.8.9 WHEN BORIC ACID TO BLENDER integrator 1-FQI-O1iO reaches its setpoint, verify boration stops and the following valves close:

i-FV-O11OA, BORIC ACID TO BLENDER i-FV-O11OB, BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT OATC 4.8.10 Operate the Pressurizer Back-up Heaters as necessary to equalize Cb between the RCS and the Pressurizer.

OATC 4.8.1 1 Monitor RCS temperature, Control Bank position, or power levels as applicable.

OATC 4.8.12 Repeat Steps 4.8.7 through 4.8.1 1 to borate as necessary to continue power change and/or compensate for Xenon.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: I Page 3 of 3 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13009-1, Section 4.8 to borate the RCS as power is reduced to maintain Rods above RIL and AFD on target.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.8.13 WHEN frequent borations are no longer required, flush approximately 15 gallons of Reactor Makeup Water through

.1-FV-O11OB by performing the following:

a.

Place VCT MAKEUP MODE SELECT 1-HS-40001A to ALT DIL.

b.

Set TOTAL MAKEUP Integrator 1-FQI-01 11 for 13 to 15 gallons.

c.

Place BLENDER OUTLET TO VCT 1-HS-O111B in CLOSE.

d.

Place VCT MAKEUP CONTROL 1-HS-40001B in START.

e.

Verify flow is indicated on 1-Fl-Oil OB.

f.

WHEN TOTAL MAKEUP integrator l-FQI-Olll reaches the desired setpoint, verify the following valves close:

l-FV-O111A, RX MU WTRTO BA BLENDER l-FV-O11OB, BLENDER OUTLET TO CHARGING PUMPS SUCT OATC 4.8.14 ffl Boric Acid flow controller 1-FIC-OllO was adjusted in Step 4.8.5, reset to Initial Pot Setting.

Final Pot Setting:________

OATC 4.8.15 Align RX M/U CONTROL System for automatic makeup per Section 4.1.

OATC 4.8.16 IFVCT level controller l-LIC-0185 pot setting was lowered, restore to initial setting recorded in Step 4.8.6 and record in Unit Control Log.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 1 of 3 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

Main Feed Water Header Pressure (PT-508) will slowly fail high resulting in underfeed to all SGs due MFPs speed decreasing. The UO will immediately take manual control of the MFPT speed controls and MFRVs as necessary to stabilize SG levels. The crew will then use AOP 1816-C Section E to take additional corrective actions.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Alarms:

STEAM GEN 1, 2, 3,4 FLOW MISMATCH alarms.

STEAM GEN 1, 2, 3,4 Hl/LO LVL DEVIATION alarms.

Indications:

Feed water flows lowering on all Steam Generators.

All Steam Generator levels lowering.

Main Feed Pump speeds decreasing.

Main Feed Pump speed deviation meters lowering.

UO 18016-C SECTION E IMMEDIATE ACTIONS El Check steam and feed flows

- MATCHED ON ALL SGs.

RNO Take manual control of the following as necessary to restore NR level between 60% and 70%:

SG feed flow valves MFP(s) speed SS Enters AOP 18016-C Section E (Crew Update)

Verifies immediate actions taken SS 18016-C SECTION E SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS E2.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 2 of 3 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

Main Feed Water Header Pressure (PT-508) will slowly fail high resulting in underfeed to all SGs due MFPs speed decreasing. The UO will immediately take manual control of the MFPT speed controls and MFRVs as necessary to stabilize SG levels. The crew will then use AOP 1816-C Section E to take additional corrective actions.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

• E3.

Maintain SG NR levels - GREATER THAN 40%.

UO E4.

Check SIC-509A, B, and C MFPT SPEED CONTROL

OPERATING PROPERLY:

ALB1 5-C05 MFPT LOSS OF FW SIGNAL

EXTI NC U IS H ED Controller(s) maintaining stable MFPT speed.

Controller(s) maintaining MFP discharge pressure/SG pressure differential

- BETWEEN 100 AND 225 PSI.

RNO E4.

Perform one of the following:

Adjust MFPT speed as necessary to maintain MFP discharge pressure/SC pressure differential between 100 and 225 psi.

- OR Transfer control to the GE Pot by performing the following:

a.

Adjust SC-31 51(31 52) MFPT A(B) SPEED CHANGER to obtain zero deviation on SI 31 53(31 54).

b.

Transfer control by placing MFPT-A(B) MOTOR SPEED CHANGER HS-31 51 (31 52) in MANUAL.

c.

Adjust SC-31 51(31 52) to maintain MFP discharge pressure/SC pressure differential between 100 and 225 psi.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 3 of 3 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

Main Feed Water Header Pressure (PT-508) will slowly fail high resulting in underfeed to all SGs due MFPs speed decreasing. The UO will immediately take manual control of the MFPT speed controls and MFRVs as necessary to stabilize SG levels. The crew will then use AOP 1816-C Section E to take additional corrective actions.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior U0 E5.

Check PT-507

- OPERATING PROPERLY.

SS E6.

Notify l&C to initiate repairs.

NOTE: The operating crew should have discovered that PT-508 is failed and requests I & C support to repair.

UO E7 Return feed flow controls to AUTO as necessary.

SS

• E8 Check repairs and surveillances

- COMPLETE.

RNO E8 Perform the following:

a.

WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform Step E9.

b.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 1 of 14 Event No.: 7-10 Event

Description:

Reactor trip and Safety Injection due to stuck open PORV and de-energized block valve. BIT isolation valve I-IV-8801A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the OATC. A main generator output breaker will fail to open requiring a manual action by the UO.

Crew will transition to 19010-C due to the stuck open PORV and perform actions of 19010-C.

The RCS LOCA will be terminated when 1 E bus 1AAO2 is re-energized from DG-1A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Alarms:

uO SS PV-455A OPEN SIGNAL alarm.

PRZR RELIEF TANK HI PRESS alarm.

PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLOCK alarm.

PRZR RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP alarm.

PRZR CONTROL LO PRESS AND HTRS ON alarm.

Indications:

PRZR pressure rapidly lowering on all indicators.

PRZR PORV 455A red light LIT.

PRZR PORV 455A failure to close with hand switch in close.

OATC 18000-C IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 1.

Verify PRZR Spray Valves

- CLOSED.

OATC 2.

Operate PRZR Heaters as necessary.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: I Page 2 of 14 Event No.: 7-10 Event

Description:

Reactor trip and Safety Injection due to stuck open PORV and de-energized block valve. BIT isolation valve HV-8801A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the OATC. A main generator output breaker will fail to open requiring a manual action by the UO.

Crew will transition to 19010-C due to the stuck open PORV and perform actions of 1901 0-C.

The RCS LOCA will be terminated when 1 E bus 1AAO2 is re-energized from DG-1A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 3.

Verify PRZR PORVs

- CLOSED.

RNO 3.

Perform the following to isolate affected PORV as necessary:

Close affected PORV Block Valve.

Open affected PORV power supply breaker:

AD1 M-04 (PV-455A)

IF PRZR pressure continues to lower, THEN go to 18004-C, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE.

OATC Manually trips the reactor when PRZR pressure approaches 1960 psig.

CREW 19000-C, E-0 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 1.

Verify Reactor Trip Rod Bottom Lights lit Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers

- Open Neutron Flux Lowering 2.

Verify Turbine Trip All Turbine Stop Valves Closed 3.

Check Power to AC Emergency Buses 3a, at least 1 4160 1 E bus energized 3b, all AC Emergency buses energized -4160 and 480V 4.

Check if SI is Actuated Any SI annunciator lit SI BPLP status light lit Go_to_step_6.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 3 of 14 Event No.: 7-10 Event

Description:

Reactor trip and Safety Injection due to stuck open PORV and de-energized block valve.

BIT isolation valve HV-8801A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the OATC. A main generator output breaker will fail to open requiring a manual action by the UO.

Crew will transition to 19010-C due to the stuck open PORV and perform actions of 19010-C.

The RCS LOCA will be terminated when 1 E bus 1AAO2 is re-energized from DG-1A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATCIUO 6.

Initiate Foldout Page NOTE: Expect RCP trip criteria (<1375 psig RCS pressure) to be met 7.

Initiate OATC Initial Actions page and UO Initial Actions Page.

OATC Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

1 Checks both Trains of ECCS aligning per MLBs.

2 Checks Containment Isolation Phase A actuated per MLBs 3

Checks ECCS pumps and NCP status.

a.

CCPs running b.

SI Pumps running c.

RHR pumps running d.

NCP tripped 4

CCW pumps only two running per train 5a NSCW pumps only two running per train 5b NSCW tower return I bypass valves in auto 6a Containment coolers running in LOW speed per MLBs 6b NSCW cooler isolation valves open per MLBs 7

CVI dampers and valves shut per MLBs 8

Containment pressure remained < 21.5 9

Checks ECCS flows:

a.

BIT Flow 0 GPM (Notifies SS of no BIT flow, aligns valves using Attachment B)

0 a)

• a) o a)-

0 _c a) o

.2 (D

> D

.-;=

C) c a).

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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 5 of 14 Event No.: 7-10 Event

Description:

Reactor trip and Safety Injection due to stuck open PORV and de-energized block valve.

BIT isolation valve HV-8801A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the OATC. A main generator output breaker will fail to open requiring a manual action by the UO.

Crew will transition to 19010-C due to the stuck open PORV and perform actions of 19010-C.

The RCS LOCA will be terminated when 1E bus 1AAO2 is re-energized from DG-1A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Initial Operator Actions of E-0 1.

Checks MDAFW pumps running and TDAFW pump, if required.

2.

Checks NR SG levels

- one> 10%, If not ensures at least 570 GPM flow 3.

Checks if SLI is required Any SL Pressure < 585 psig CNMT Pressure> 14.5 psi 9

High rate bistables lit with low pressure Sl/SLI blocked If any above met then verify MSIVs & BSIVs closed 4.

Verifies FWI:

MFRV, BFRV, MFIV, BFIVs all shut 5.

Verifies SGBD isolated places hand switches for SGBD isolation valves to close verifies SGBD sample isolations closed.

6.

Verify Diesel Generators running.

7.

Throttle AFW flow to control SG levels 10 65% NR 8.

Verify both MFPs tripped.

9.

Check Main Generator Output breakers open.

RNO Open Generator Output Breaker on affected Unit:

UNIT 1:

CRITICAL Push and hold 1-PB-161710A and then place 1-HS-161710 in TRIP position.

Push and hold 1-PB-161810A and then place 1-HS-161810 in TRIP position.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: I Page 6 of 14 Event No.: 7-10 Event

Description:

Reactor trip and Safety Injection due to stuck open PORV and de-energized block valve. BIT isolation valve HV-8801A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the OATC. A main generator output breaker will fail to open requiring a manual action by the UO.

Crew will transition to 19010-C due to the stuck open PORV and perform actions of 19010-C.

The RCS LOCA will be terminated when 1 E bus 1AAO2 is re-energized from DG-1A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW 19000-C 8.

Initiate the continuous actions page.

OATC

• 9 Check RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 F:

With RCP(s) running

- RCS AVERAGE TEMPERATURE.

Without RCP(s) running

- RCS WR COLD LEG TEMPERATURES.

UO RNO

• 9 IF temperature is less than 557 F and lowering, THEN perform the following as necessary:

a.

Stop dumping steam.

b.

Perform the following as appropriate:

IF at least one SG NR level greater than 10% [32% ADVERSE], THEN lower total feed flow.

- OR IF all SG NR levels less than 10% [32%

ADVERSE], THEN lower total feed flow to NOT less than 570 gpm.

c.

IF cooldown continues, THEN close MSIVs and BSIVs.

d.

IF temperature greater than 557 F and rising, THEN dump steam.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: I Page 7 of 14 Event No.: 7-10 Event

Description:

Reactor trip and Safety Injection due to stuck open PORV and de-energized block valve.

BIT isolation valve HV-8801A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the OATC. A main generator output breaker will fail to open requiring a manual action by the UO.

Crew will transition to 19010-C due to the stuck open PORV and perform actions of 19010-C.

The RCS LOCA will be terminated when 1E bus 1AAO2 is re-energized from DG-1A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 10.

Check PORVs, Block Valves, & Spray Valves:

a.

PORVs - CLOSED AND IN AUTO RNO a.

IF PRZR pressure less than 2315 psig, THEN verify closed affected PRZR PORV(s).

IF a PRZR PORV can NOT be closed, THEN close its Block Valve.

IF Block Valve can NOT be closed, THEN go to 19010 C, E 1 LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.

SS Enters 19010-C, E-1 Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant.

(Crew Update) 1901 0-C

1. Initiate the following:

OATC/UO Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.

OATC Critical Safety Function Status Trees per 19200-C, F-O CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREE.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 8 of 14 Event No.: 7-10 Event

Description:

Reactor trip and Safety Injection due to stuck open PORV and de-energized block valve.

BIT isolation valve HV-8801A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the OATC. A main generator output breaker will fail to open requiring a manual action by the UO.

Crew will transition to 19010-C due to the stuck open PORV and perform actions of 19010-C.

The RCS LOCA will be terminated when 1 E bus 1AAO2 is re-energized from DG-1A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS

2. Initiate 91001-C, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS.

OATC

• 3 Maintain Seal Injection flow to all RCP5

- 8 TO 13 GPM.

OATC

4. Check if RCPs should be stopped:

a. ECCS Pumps

- AT LEAST ONE RUNNING:

CCP0rSIPump

b. RCS pressure

- LESS THAN 1375 PSIG.

RNO

b. GotoStep5.

OATC

5. Check ACCW Pumps

- AT LEAST ONE RUNNING.

UO

6. Place Containment Hydrogen Monitors in service by initiating 13130, POST -ACCIDENT HYDROGEN CONTROL.

NOTE: Expect request for extra operator to perform this action UO

7. Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a. Identify faulted SG(s):

ANY SG PRESSURE LOWERING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

OR ANY SG COMPLETELY DEPRESSURIZED.

RNO Go to Step 8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: I Page 9 of 14 Event No.: 7-10 Event

Description:

Reactor trip and Safety Injection due to stuck open PORV and de-energized block valve.

BIT isolation valve HV-8801A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the OATC. A main generator output breaker will fail to open requiring a manual action by the UO.

Crew will transition to 19010-C due to the stuck open PORV and perform actions of 19010-C.

The RCS LOCA will be terminated when 1 E bus 1AAO2 is re-energized from DG-1A.

Time Position Applicant 1

s Action or Behavior U0

7. b. Faulted SG(s)

- ISOLATED:

Steamlines MSIVs BSIVs TDAFW supplies SGARVs Feedlines MFIVs BFIVs MFRVs BFRVs AFW valves SG blow down valves SG sample valves UO

• 8. Check intact SG levels:

a. NR level

- AT LEAST ONE GREATER THAN 10% [32%

ADVERSE].

b. Maintain NR levels between 10% [32% ADVERSE] and 65%

c. NR level

- ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

RNO

c. Gotostep9.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: I Page 10 of 14 Event No.: 7-10 Event

Description:

Reactor trip and Safety Injection due to stuck open PORV and de-energized block valve. BIT isolation valve HV-880iA will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the OATC. A main generator output breaker will fail to open requiring a manual action by the UO.

Crew will transition to 19010-C due to the stuck open PORV and perform actions of 19010-C.

The RCS LOCA will be terminated when 1E bus 1AAO2 is re-energized from DG-1A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

9. Check SG Tubes intact:

a. Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.

b. Secondary radiation

- NORMAL:

MAIN STM LINE MONITORS:

RE-i 3120 (SG 1)

RE-i 3121 (SG 2)

RE-i 3122 (SG 3)

RE-i31i9(SG4)

CNDSR AIR EJCTR/STM RAD MONITORS:

RE-i 2839C RE-i2839D (if on scale)

RE-i 2839E (if on scale)

STM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:

RE-00i9 (Sample)

RE-002i (Blowdown)

SG sample radiation.

c.

Check SG levels

- ANY RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER.

RNO c.

GotoStepio.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: I Page 11 of 14 Event No.: 7-10 Event

Description:

Reactor trip and Safety Injection due to stuck open PORV and de-energized block valve.

BIT isolation valve HV-8801A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the OATC. A main generator output breaker will fail to open requiring a manual action by the UO.

Crew will transition to 19010-C due to the stuck open PORV and perform actions of 19010-C.

The RCS LOCA will be terminated when 1 E bus 1AAO2 is re-energized from DG-1A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

• 10. Check PRZR PORVs and Block Valves:

a. Power to PRZR PORV Block Valves

- AVAILABLE.

RNO

a. Restore power to Block Valves.

b. PRZR PORVs

- CLOSED.

RNO b.

IF PRZR pressure less than 2315 psig, THEN verify closed affected PRZR PORV(s).

H any PRZR PORV can NOT be closed, THEN close its Block Valve.

c. PRZR PORV Block Valves

- AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

d. Any RCS WR CL temperature

- LESS THAN 220° F.

RNO

d. WHEN any RCS CL temperature lowers to less than 220°F, THEN arm COPS.

Go to step 11.

OATC

• 11. Check if ECCS flow should be reduced:

a. RCS Subcooling

- GREATER THAN 24°F [38°F ADVERSE].

RNO

a. Gotostepl2.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 12 of 14 Event No.: 7-10 Event

Description:

Reactor trip and Safety Injection due to stuck open PORV and de-energized block valve. BIT isolation valve HV-8801A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the OATC. A main generator output breaker will fail to open requiring a manual action by the UO.

Crew will transition to 19010-C due to the stuck open PORV and perform actions of 19010-C.

The RCS LOCA will be terminated when 1E bus 1AAO2 is re-energized from DG-1A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

• 12 Check if Containment Spray should be stopped:

a. CS Pumps

- RUNNING.

RNO Go to Step 13

b. Containment pressure

- LESS THAN 15 PSIG.

c. Any Containment radiation levels

- INDICATE HIGH DUE TO PRIMARY LOCA:

RE-002 RE-003 RE-005 RE-006

d. Operate CS pumps.

e Minimum of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.

e At least 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> in recirculation mode.

RNO

d. WHEN CS Pumps have operated for at least 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> in the recirculation mode for at least 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />, THEN perform Step 12.c RNO.

OATC CAUTION UO If offsite power is lost after SI reset, action is required to restart the following ESF equipment if plant conditions require their operation:

• RHR Pumps

• SI Pumps

• Post LOCA Cavity Purge Units

• Containment Coolers in low speed (Started in high speed on a UV signal).

• ESF Chilled Water Pumps (If CR1 is reset).

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.:

I Page 13 of 14 Event No.: 7-10 Event

Description:

Reactor trip and Safety Injection due to stuck open PORV and de-energized block valve. BIT isolation valve HV-8801A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the OATC. A main generator output breaker will fail to open requiring a manual action by the UO.

Crew will transition to 19010-C due to the stuck open PORV and perform actions of 19010-C.

The RCS LOCA will be terminated when 1 E bus 1AAO2 is re-energized from DG-1A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 13.

Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped:

a.

RHR Pumps ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST.

b.

RCS pressure:

1) Greater than 300 psig.

2) Stable or rising.

c.

Reset SI.

d.

Stop RHR Pumps.

OATC

• 14.

IF RCS pressure lowers in an uncontrolled manner to less than 300 psig, THEN restart RHR Pumps.

OATC 15.

Check RCS and SG pressures:

Pressure in all SGs STABLE OR RISING.

RCS pressure STABLE OR LOWERING.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

1 Page 14 of 14 Event No.: 7-10 Event

Description:

Reactor trip and Safety Injection due to stuck open PORV and de-energized block valve. BIT isolation valve HV-8801A will fail to auto open requiring manual action by the OATC. A main generator output breaker will fail to open requiring a manual action by the UO.

Crew will transition to 19010-C due to the stuck open PORV and perform actions of 19010-C.

The RCS LOCA will be terminated when 1 E bus 1AAO2 is re-energized from DG-1A.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 16.

Check if DGs should be stopped:

a.

AC Emergency Busses ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER.

RNO a.

Try to restore offsite power to AC Emergency Busses by initiating 13427A1B, 4160V AC AAO2/BAO3 ELECTRICAL DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM.

NOTE: Crew will receive report that faulty over speed sensor on DG-IA has been replaced and that the DG is ready to be started.

SS Directs DG-IA be started NOTE: When DG-IA is started, PORV block valve HV-8000A will re energize and close due to the low RCS pressure. This will stop the LOCA.

END OF THE SCENARIO.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Vogtle Scenario No.:

2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Examiners:

Lea Operators:

NEW Initial Conditions:

100% power, Blender is OOS due to electrical control problems. Manual make up using section 4.6 of 13009-1 will be required when VCT < 30%.

Turnover: Both EDGs have been declared INOP due to water in both FOSTs. Efforts to remove the water have failed. LCOs 3.8.3 Condition G, and 3.8.1 Conditions F & H are applicable. 3.8.1 condition H was entered 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> ago. Be in mode 3 in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> to comply with Technical Specifications.

Event Maif.

Event Event No.

No.

Type*

Description 1

N/A R-ALL Lower power 10% for unit shutdown 2

CVO7 C-OATC NCP trip C-SS TS-SS TR 13.1.5 (Charging pumps) INFO ONLY 3

N/A N-OATC Restore CVCS Charging and Letdown N-SS 4

SGO2F @

l-UO Loop 2 SG controlling NR level channel fails high 100%

l-SS TS-SS LCO 3.3.1 (b-b level trip) LCO 3.3.2 (P-14) 5 PRO2A @

I-OATC PRZR Pressure channel fails high & PORV valve sticks partially open 100%

l-SS PRO5 © TS-SS LCOs 3.3.1 (10 pressure, hi pressure, OThT) & 3.3.2 (10 pressure SI),

20%

P-il (1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> action), LCO 3.4.11 PRZR PORV NOTE: Use Remote Function PRO3 to de-energize PORV Block Valve HV-8000A when Control Building Operator is directed to take this action.

6 TU1 2 C-UO Turbine EHC pump 1 trips with failure of pump 2 to auto start OR:

C-SS HS-6539 PTL ALB2OCO5 OFF Scenario 2 Page 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 7

MSO6A-D M-ALL All SGs faulted due to code safeties lifting following turbine spurious

@ 50%

trip. SG code safeties reseat after crew completes step 13 of 19121-TUO1 C.Failure of Automatic Reactor Trip. Failure of first trip Rx Trip TU12 handswitch.

ESO1 OR HS-40007 to neutral 8

ESO8 l-OATC Automatic SI failure ES16 l-SS 9

AFO5B C-UO MDAFW pump B fails to automatically start on the SI C-SS (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Event 1: Power reduction for Tech Spec Required Shut Down (12004-C)

Verifiable actions:

OATC

- Drive rods to lower Tave, and keep AFD on target, borate RCS UO Lower turbine load on schedule to be in mode 3 in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />.

Consequences:

Unit is not shutdown prior Technical Specification action time limit.

Technical specifications:

N/A Event 2: NCP trip with 120 GPM letdown in service (18007-C Section B)

Verifiable actions:

OATC isolate letdown Consequences:

Flashing will occur in the letdown line with possible mechanical damage to piping and restraints. Longer term consequences include gradual loss of RCS inventory out of the RCP seals.

Technical specifications:

TR 13.1.5 charging pumps INFO ONLY Scenario 2 Page 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 3: Restore CVCS Charging and Letdown (SOP 13006-1 Sections 4.4.2, 4.4.13 and 4.2.4)

Verifiable actions:

OATC Restores normal charging (using COP-lA or B) & letdown to service Consequences:

Flashing in the letdown line if charging flow not controlled properly.

Technical specifications:

N/A Event 4: Controlling SG loop 2 NR level channel fails high (18001-C Section E)

Verifiable actions:

UO Place loop 2 MFRV in manual & match feed flow to steam flow. Unselect failed channel from control circuits, place MFRV back in automatic control Consequences:

Reactor trip on Lo-Lo SG NR level due to incorrect operation of MFRV.

Technical specifications:

LCO 3.3.1 reactor trip on b-b SG level LCO 3.3.2 P-14 on hi-hi SG level Event 5: Controlling PRZR pressure channel fails high & PORV sticks open (18000-C & 18001-C Section C)

Verifiable actions:

OATC immediately close both PRZR spray valves, the affected PORV, and energize PRZR backup heaters. Select an operable pressure channel and restore the pressure control system to automatic operation. Close associated block valve for affected PORV.

Consequences:

Reactor trip and SI on low PRZR pressure if the correct immediate actions not taken promptly Technical specifications:

LCO 3.3.1 (10 pressure, hi pressure, OTtT)

LCO 3.3.2 (10 pressure SI and P-il)

LCO 3.4.11 PRZR PORV condition B Scenario 2 Page 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 6: Turbine EHC pump I trips with failure of pump 2 to auto start (17020-1 Window C06)

Verifiable actions:

UO manually start standby EHC pump to prevent trip of the main turbine on low EHC pressure.

Consequences:

Main Turbine trip due to low EHC pressure at 1100 psig.

Technical specifications:

N/A Event 7: Turbine tripIATWT results in lifting SG code safeties on all 4 loops.

Verifiable actions:

OATC Manually trip reactor due to failure of automatic reactor trip on turbine trip > P-9 power level UO Throttle AFW flow to < 30 gpm/SG to limit cooldown and prevent SG dryout Consequences:

OATC reactor continues to operate at power while exceeding a trip setpoint UO excessive RCS cooldown due to continued feeding of faulted SGs Event 8: Automatic SI actuation failure Verifiable actions:

OATC Manually actuates SI Consequences:

PRZR level goes off scale low and RCS depressurizes to saturation conditions if ECCS flow is not initiated.

Event 9: MDAFW Pump B fails to automatically start on the SI signal Verifiable actions:

UO controls flow from the TDAFW pump to all four SGs. Isolates steam to the TDAFWP in 19121-C, and uses MDAFWPs to feed SGs.

Consequences:

Continues to use TDAFW pump to feed SGs when a MDAFW pump is available causing additional steam removal from SGs 1 & 2.

Scenario 2 Page 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRITICAL STEPS:

1. Transitions to 19121-C when no intact SG identified.

2. Throttles AFW flow to prevent PTS and SG dry out during 19121-C use.

Scenario 2 Page 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

The crew will start with step 4.2.3 of UOP 12004-C, Power Operations to begin a shutdown of the unit. After the crew completes a significant power change then event 2 will occur.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC UOP 12004-C 4.2.3 Control Tavg within 2F of Tref during the power reduction by performing the following.

a.

Place the Rod Control System in MANUAL.

b.

WHILE reducing turbine load, adjust control rods/boron as necessary to maintain AFD within limits per the AFD control strategy and guidelines of Section 4.3.2.

c.

IF it is intended to continue power operation at a reduced power plateau, THEN AFD should be trended and maintained at or near the AFD target value.

SS NOTE Aux. Steam should not be placed in service from the other unit if that units power is below 25%.

UO 4.2.4 IF the auxiliary steam will be required following unit shutdown, initiate the following:

a.

Pressurize the Auxiliary Steam Header from the opposite unit per 13761, Auxiliary Steam System.

b.

Start the second Steam Jet Air Ejector on auxiliary steam per 13620, Condenser Air Ejection System.

c.

Transfer Turbine Steam Seal supply to the Auxiliary Steam Supply per 13825, Turbine Steam Seal System.

SS 4.2.5 Notify System Operator of upcoming power decrease.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

The crew will start with step 4.2.3 of UOP 12004-C, Power Operations to begin a shutdown of the unit. After the crew completes a significant power change then event 2 will occur.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.2.6 Reduce turbine load as desired per 13800, Main Turbine Operation.

a.

Each time reactor power change exceeds 15% in a one hour period, notify Chemistry to perform the following samples:

(1)

RCS iodine sample per TS SR 3.4.16.2.

(Required between 2 and 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> after reactor power changes greater than or equal to 15% in a one hour period)

(2)

Gaseous release path samples per ODCM Table 3-3.

(3)

Record the time of the change and the person contacted in the Control Room Log.

b.

Maintain Tavg within 2°F of Tref.

PROCEED TO EVENT 2 AFTER POWER LOWERED 10%

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 7 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The NCP will trip resulting in a loss of charging flow, RCP seal injection flow, and cooling for the CVCS letdown regenerative heat exchanger. The OATC should immediately isolate CVCS letdown to prevent damage due to flashing. The crew will then take corrective actions using AOP 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section B for a total loss of charging flow.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose NCP trip:

Indications:

NCP breaker trips:

Red OFF Green - ON Amber-ON Charging line flow (Fl-i 21) drops to 0 GPM RCP seal injection flows drop to 0 GPM Alarms:

CHARGING PUMP OVERLOAD TRIP CHARGING LINE HI/LO FLOW RCP SEAL WATER INJ LO FLOW REGEN HX LTDN HI TEMP 4160V SWGR 1NAO5 TROUBLE OATC 18007-C IMMEDIATE ACTIONS Bi.

Isolate letdown:

a. Close letdown orifice isolation valves:

HV8149A HV8149B HV8149C

b. Close letdown isolation valves:

LV459 LV460 SS Enters I 8007-C, Section B (Crew update)

Verifies immediate action Bi with OATC 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario NoW: 2 Page 2 of 7 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The NCP will trip resulting in a loss of charging flow, RCP seal injection flow, and cooling for the CVCS letdown regenerative heat exchanger. The OATC should immediately isolate CVCS letdown to prevent damage due to flashing. The crew will then take corrective actions using AOP 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section B for a total loss of charging flow.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC/UO B2.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

OATC

• B3 Trend RCP Seal Parameters listed in ATTACHMENT A.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 7 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The NCP will trip resulting in a loss of charging flow, RCP seal injection flow, and cooling for the CVCS letdown regenerative heat exchanger. The OATC should immediately isolate CVCS letdown to prevent damage due to flashing. The crew will then take corrective actions using AOP 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section B for a total loss of charging flow.

ATTACHMENT A RCP SEAL PARAMETER INDICATION NOTE The following points are accessible under PC Group 62.

PARAMETER IPC POINT RCP Seal Injection Flow:

RCP1 F0131 RCP2 F0129 RCP3 F0127 RCP4 F0125 RCP Seal Injection Temperature:

T0140 (Measured at VCT Outlet)

Number 1 Seal Leakoff High Flow:

RCP1 F0161 RCP2 F0160 RCP 3 F0159 RCP 4 F0158 Number 1 Seal Inlet Temperature:

RCP 1 T0181 T0417 RCP2 T0182 T0437 RCP3 T0183 T0457 RCP4 T0184 T0477 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of 7 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The NCP will trip resulting in a loss of charging flow, RCP seal injection flow, and cooling for the CVCS letdown regenerative heat exchanger. The OATC should immediately isolate CVCS letdown to prevent damage due to flashing. The crew will then take corrective actions using AOP 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section B for a total loss of charging flow.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC B4.

Check charging pump(s)

- OPERATING NORMALLY:

Discharge flow trend STABLE.

Discharge pressure trend STABLE.

VCT level

- IN NORMAL BAND.

Bus current STABLE.

Suction pressure

- STABLE OATC NOT expected for the crew to perform this RNO RNO B4.

Perform the following:

a.

Stop charging pumps.

b.

Determine and correct cause of charging pump abnormal operations.

c.

IF loss of suction to charging pumps has occurred, THEN do NOT start charging pumps until the cause of the loss of suction is understood and all affected piping and components are vented.

d.

IF gas binding of charging pumps occurred, THEN do NOT start charging pumps until the cause of the gas binding is understood and all affected piping and components are vented.

OATC B5.

Locate and isolate any charging system leakage.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 5 of 7 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The NCP will trip resulting in a loss of charging flow, RCP seal injection flow, and cooling for the CVCS letdown regenerative heat exchanger. The OATC should immediately isolate CVCS letdown to prevent damage due to flashing. The crew will then take corrective actions using AOP 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section B for a total loss of charging flow.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC B6.

Check ACCW system

- IN SERVICE.

OATC B7.

Check normal charging valves

- OPEN:

HV8105 HV8106 HV81460rHV8147 HV 8485A and B FV121 OATC

• B8.

Check normal charging flow ESTABLISHED.

OATC RNO

• B8.

Perform the following:

a)

WHEN normal charging flowpath can be established, THEN place normal charging and letdown in service by initiating 13006, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM.

b)

Goto Step BlO.

5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 6 of 7 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The NCP will trip resulting in a loss of charging flow, RCP seal injection flow, and cooling for the CVCS letdown regenerative heat exchanger. The OATC should immediately isolate CVCS letdown to prevent damage due to flashing. The crew will then take corrective actions using AOP 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section B for a total loss of charging flow.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Refer to Event 3 for placing normal CVCS charging and letdown in service per sop 13006-1.

OATC AOP 18007-C Section B BlO.

Establish Seal Injection flow to all RCPs -8 TO 13 GPM.

OATC Bi 1.

Check RCP seal injection flow ESTABLISHED.

SS NOTE Operation of the excess letdown flowpath will bypass the CVCS demineralizers. This may impact RCS chemistry control.

OATC

• B12 Control PRZR level - IN PROGRAM BAND.

SS B13.

Initiate the following Technical Specifications and/or Technical Requirements as necessary:

LCO 3.5.2 LCO 3.5.3 LCO 3.5.5 TR 13.1.2 TR13.1.3 TR 13.1.4 TR 13.1.5 INFO ONLY 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 7 of 7 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

The NCP will trip resulting in a loss of charging flow, RCP seal injection flow, and cooling for the CVCS letdown regenerative heat exchanger. The OATC should immediately isolate CVCS letdown to prevent damage due to flashing. The crew will then take corrective actions using AOP 18007-C, Chemical and Volume Control System Malfunction, Section B for a total loss of charging flow.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC B14.

Check normal charging flow ESTABLISHED.

SS B15.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 14 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13006-ito restore CVCS charging and letdown to service. After charging and letdown are restored the crew may opt to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM. Section 4.2.4 of SOP 13006-i will be used to complete this task.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Selects section 4.4.2 ofprocedure 13006-1.

OATC 13006-C Section 4.4.2 4.4.2.1 IF a Charging Pump is NOT in service, Go To Section 4.4.13 to start the NCP OR an available Centrifugal Charging Pump, THEN Return To this section.

OATC 13006-C Section 4.4.13 CAUTIONS At BOL, while borating to maintain Tavg, the calculated delta boron concentration between the RCS and the last time the CCP/NCP was placed in service may be incorrect. Experience has shown that high concentrations of borated water tend to collect in the suction piping of the idle pumps, resulting in a higher boron concentration in the CCP/NCP than the RCS. This may cause and unexpected boration and temperature reduction, when the pump is placed in service or tested.

Restart of a charging pump should not be delayed in order to flush the pump prior to start.

OATC 4.4.13.1 PRIOR to starting the pump and based on the conditions described in the first caution above, a slight boration should be anticipated and a briefing on compensatory actions to offset the boration should be conducted.

OATC CAUTION A determination should be made that loss of the Charging Pump was not due to air/gas binding before starting the same or another pump.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 14 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13006-ito restore CVCS charging and letdown to service. After charging and letdown are restored the crew may opt to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM. Section 4.2.4 of SOP 13006-1 will be used to complete this task.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.13.2 Dispatch an Operator to perform pump pre-start checks.

NOTE: Expect system operators dispatched to check on NCP and NCP breaker for cause of trip.

OATC 4.4.13.3 Verify VCT LEVEL iLl-185 indicates between 30 and 80%.

OATC 4.4.13.4 Verify OPEN VCT OUTLET ISOLATION Valves:

1-LV-Oil2B 1-LV-0112C OATC 4.4.13.5 Verify OPEN CCP-A & B COMMON MINIFLOW 1-HV-8i 10.

OATC NOTE CCP-1A is only capable of flows up to 102 gpm at NOPT. It may not be used with 120 gpm letdown. At higher than normal RCS pressure, the flow will be reduced even more.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 14 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13006-1 to restore OVOS charging and letdown to service. After charging and letdown are restored the crew may opt to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM. Section 4.2.4 of SOP 13006-1 will be used to complete this task.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.13.6 IF starting a COP perform the following:

IF starting COP-A:

a.

Open COP-A SUCTION 1-HV-8471A.

b.

Open COP-A MINIFLOW 1-HV-8111A.

c.

Verify OPEN COP-A & B COMMON MINIFLOW 1-HV-81 10.

d.

Close COP-A SAFETY GRADE OHG 1 -HV-01 90A.

e.

Open COP-A DISCHARGE ISOLATION 1 -HV-8485A.

HZ starting COP-B: (Expect this option) a.

Open COP-B SUCTION 1-HV-8471B.

b.

Open COP-B MINIFLOW 1-HV-8111B.

c.

Verify OPEN COP-A & B COMMON MINIFLOW 1-HV-81 10.

d.

Close COP-B SAFETY GRADE CHG 1 -HV-01 90B.

e.

Open COP-B DISCHARGE ISOLATION 1 -HV-8485B.

f.

Open COP DISCHARGE HEADER CROSSCONNECT 1 -HV-8438.

OATC NOTE The desired position of NOP MINIFLOW 1-HV-8109 prior to a pump start is closed. The NCP Miniflow valve will open after a pump start and will remain open until the pump is shut down.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario Nofl: 2 Page 4 of 14 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13006-1 to restore CVCS charging and letdown to service. After charging and letdown are restored the crew may opt to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM. Section 4.2.4 of SOP 13006-1 will be used to complete this task.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.13.7 ffl starting the NCP, verify ACCW flow through the NCP Motor Cooler is established.

OATC 4.4.1 3.8 Set 1 HC-1 82 for Maximum Seal Flow (0% demand).

OATC 4.4.13.9 Verify Charging Flow Control 1FIC-121 in MAN and set to minimum.

OATC NOTE Normal and Alternate charging paths should be alternated over plant life to equalize thermal stress. The transfer should be performed at cold shutdown conditions to avoid thermal transients. Normal charging should be in service during even-numbered fuel cycles. Alternate charging should be in service during odd-numbered fuel cycles.

Swapping nozzles at NOPT should be avoided.

OATC 4.4.13.10 Verify OPEN one of the following:

NORMAL CHARGING TO LOOP 1 1-HV-8146 OR ALTERNATE CHARGING TO LOOP 4 1-HV-8147 OATC 4.4.13.11 Verify OPEN CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION Valves:

1-HV-8105 1-HV-8106 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 5 of 14 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13006-1 to restore OVOS charging and letdown to service. After charging and letdown are restored the crew may opt to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM. Section 4.2.4 of SOP 13006-1 will be used to complete this task.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.13.12 Verify the ALOP of the COP to be started is running as indicated by the QMOB red indicating lamp lit.

OATC 4.4.13.13 Start the desired COP or NOP:

COP-A 1 HS-273A OR COP-B 1 HS-274A OR NOP 1HS-275 OATC 4.4.13.14 H a COP was started, verify the selected COP ALOP red indicating lamp goes off (on QMOB) shortly after the pump is started.

OATC 4.4.13.15 H the NOP was started, verify NOP MINIFLOW 1-HV-8109 opens.

OATO 4.4.13.16 Simultaneously perform the following:

Adjust Seal Flow Control 1 HO-i 82 to obtain between 8 and 13 gpm to each ROP.

Adjust Charging Flow Control 1 FlO-1 21 to obtain the desired charging flow.

OATC 4.4.13.17 Return To Section 4.4.2 to establish Normal Letdown and Charging.

5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 6 of 14 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13006-1 tO restore CVCS charging and letdown to service. After charging and letdown are restored the crew may opt to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM. Section 4.2.4 of SOP 13006-1 will be used to complete this task.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 13006-C Section 4.4.2 NOTES This section also applies to returning normal charging and letdown to service following termination of safety injection.

Letdown is to be established as soon as possible after initiating flow through a Charging Nozzle.

OATC 4.4.2.2 fl NCP is in service, verify NCP MINIFLOW 1-HV-8109 is open.

OATC 4.4.2.3 Perform the following:

a.

Close LETDOWN ORIFICE Isolation Valves:

1-HV-8149A 1-HV-8149B 1-HV-8149C OATC b.

Close LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM Valves:

1-LV-460 1-LV-459 OATC c.

Close PZR AUX SPRAY VALVE 1-HV-8145.

OATC d.

Open CVCS LETDOWN PIPE BREAK PROT ISOLATION 1-HV-15214.

6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 7 of 14 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13006-1 to restore CVCS charging and letdown to service. After charging and letdown are restored the crew may opt to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM. Section 4.2.4 of SOP 13006-1 will be used to complete this task.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC e.

Open RCS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV IRC 1-HV-8160.

OATC f.

Open RCS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV ORC 1-HV-8152.

OATC g.

Place Letdown Pressure Controller IPIC-131 in MAN and adjust output to between 50% and 75%.

OATC h.

Place LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1TIC-130 in MAN and adjust output to the most current position as recorded on the Control Room Rounds Sheets.

OATC i.

Verify PRESSURIZER LEVEL 1 LR-459 greater than 17%.

OATC NOTE If Normal Charging and Letdown are being returned to service as directed from Section 4.4.15, one of the valves in Substep j. and both valves in Step 4.4.2.4 will already be open.

OATC j.

Verify one of the following are OPEN:

NORMAL CHARGING TO LOOP 1 1-HV-8146 (even-numbered fuel cycle)

OR ALTERNATE CHARGING TO LOOP 4 1-HV-8147 (odd-numbered fuel cycle) 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 8 of 14 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13006-1 to restore CVCS charging and letdown to service. After charging and letdown are restored the crew may opt to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM. Section 4.2.4 of SOP 13006-1 will be used to complete this task.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.4 Verify CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION Valves are OPEN:

1-HV-8106 e

1-HV-8105 OATC 4.4.2.5 Simultaneously perform the following:

Adjust 1 HC-1 82 output to maintain between 8 and 13 gpm to each RCP.

Adjust 1FIC-121 to raise CHG FLOW lFl-l2lAto between 80 and 90 gpm.

OATC 4.4.2.6 Open LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV UPSTREAM AND DOW NSTREAM Valves by holding their handswitches in OPEN UNTIL the valves are fully open:

1 -LV-460 1 HS-460 1-LV-459 1HS-459 OATC CAUTION Unless otherwise directed by Operations Management, until the letdown flow orifices are replaced the even/odd fuel cycle rotation of 75 gpm orifices does not apply and only the 75 gpm orifice associated with 1HV-8149C should be placed in service.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 9 of 14 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13006-1 to restore CVCS charging and letdown to service. After charging and letdown are restored the crew may opt to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM. Section 4.2.4 of SOP 13006-1 will be used to complete this task.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.7 Establish Letdown flow:

a.

Simultaneously open a Letdown Orifice and maintain pressure by performing the following:

Open one LETDOWN ORIFICE Isolation Valve by holding its handswitch in the OPEN position until fully open:

1 HS-81 49B (75 gpm

- odd fuel cycles)

OR 1 HS-8149C (75 gpm even fuel cycles)

OR 1 HS-8149A (45 gpm)

Adjust 1PIC-131A to maintain LETDOWN PRESS lPl-131A between 360 and 380 psig.

OATC b.

Record the letdown orifice that was placed in service in the Unit Control Log.

OATC 4.4.2.8 WHEN LETDOWN PRESS 1PI-131A stabilizes between 360 and 380 psig, place 1PIC-131 in AUTO.

OATC 4.4.2.9 Place LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1TIC-130 in AUTO and verify it maintains temperature less than or equal to 1 15°F.

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 10 of 14 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13006-1 to restore CVCS charging and letdown to service. After charging and letdown are restored the crew may opt to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM. Section 4.2.4 of SOP 13006-1 will be used to complete this task.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.4.2.10 Verify LETDOWN REGEN HX OUT lTl-127 indicates less than 380°F.

OATC 4.4.2.11 Monitor 1 LR-459 Pressurizer Level and Pressurizer Level Setpoint.

OATC 4.4.2.12 Maintain Pressurizer Level within 1% of Level Setpoint using 1FIC-121.

OATC 4.4.2.13 Place Pressurizer Level Control in automatic UNLESS it is to remain in Manual under Tagout or Caution tag:

a.

Verify PRZR Level Controller 1LIC-459 in AUTO.

OATC b.

AFTER level has been stable within 1% of setpoint for approximately 3 minutes, place 1FIC-121 in AUTO.

OATC 4.4.2.14 IF this section was performed to restore normal charging and letdown to service following termination of Safety Injection, Return To 19011-C, ES-l.l SI Termination.

10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 11 of 14 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13006-1 to restore CVCS charging and letdown to service. After charging and letdown are restored the crew may opt to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM. Section 4.2.4 of SOP 13006-1 will be used to complete this task.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC NOTE: If the crew opts to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM then these additional steps will apply.

13006-1 Section 4.2.4 NOTE Table 1 may be reviewed for specific charging flow and letdown orifice combinations and conditions.

TABLE I Required Manual Final Charging iTT-i 27 1TI-127 Desired Initial Flow for Temperature ° Final Final Temperature Letdown Charging Transfer:

1 PlC-i 31 Initial Orifice Orifice(s)

Charging 1 PlC-i 31 Flow Flow GPM Pressure PSIG In service In service Flow Pressure PSIG Swap 45 58 gpm 90

- 100

<290° 8149A 8149B 87 gpm 290° AUTO to 75 gpm or 100 to 120 8149C 370 AUTO Raise75 87gpm 120-

<290° 8149B (8149Bor l32gpm 290°AUTO to 120 130 or 8149C) 100 to 120 81 49C and 370 AUTO 8149A Swap 75 87 gpm 90

- 100

<290° 8149B 8149C 87 gpm 290° AUTO to75 or or 100 to 120 8149C 8149B 370 AUTO Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC CAUTIONS CCP-1 B or the NCP must be used for 120 gpm letdown.

CCP-1A is only capable of flows up to 102 gpm at NOPT. It may not be used with 120 gpm letdown. At higher than normal RCS pressure, the flow will be reduced even more.

Letdown temperature and pressure should be continuously monitored during the transfer. The Operator should manually intervene to control these limits during the transfer.

ii

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 12 of 14 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13006-1 to restore CVCS charging and letdown to service. After charging and letdown are restored the crew may opt to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM. Section 4.2.4 of SOP 13006-1 will be used to complete this task.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.4.1 IF CCP-A is in service, swap to the NCP or CCP-B per Section 4.2.1 or 4.2.3 as applicable.

OATC 4.2.4.2 Maintain Seal Injection flows between 8 and 13 gpm per RCP.

OATC 4.2.4.3 IF the NCP is in service, perform the following:

a.

Dispatch an operator to obtain NCP miniflow value as indicated on 1FI-10132 NCP MINIFLOW FLOW INDICATOR b.

Place Charging Flow Control 1FIC-121 in MAN AND adjust charging until the sum of NCP miniflow AND normal charging flow is greater than 120 gpm.

N OTE Reducing seal injection flow before closing miniflow will help keep seal flow from exceeding maximum limit when 1-HV-8109 goes closed.

c.

Adjust SEAL FLOW CONTROL 1 HC-1 82 as necessary to maintain Seal Injection flows approximately 8 gpm.

d.

Close NCP MINIFLOW 1-HV-8109.

OATC 4.2.4.4 WITH Charging Flow Control 1FIC-121 in MAN, simultaneously perform the following:

Adjust 1FIC-121 until charging flow is approximately 120 to 130 gpm.

Adjust SEAL FLOW CONTROL 1HC-182 as necessary to maintain Seal Injection flows between 8 and 13 gpm.

OATC 4.2.4.5 Verify Regenerative Heat Exchanger Outlet 1TI-127 temperature remains less than 290°F.

12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 13 of 14 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13006-1 to restore CVCS charging and letdown to service. After charging and letdown are restored the crew may opt to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM. Section 4.2.4 of SOP 13006-1 will be used to complete this task.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.4.6 Place Letdown Pressure Controller 1PIC-131 pressure controller in MAN AND adjust LETDOWN PRESS lPl-131A pressure to between 100 and 120 psig.

OATC ALBO7-F03 LTDN HX OUT HI FLOW OATC CAUTION Until the letdown flow orifices are replaced the even/odd fuel cycle rotation of 75 gpm orifices does not apply and only the 75 gpm orifice associated with 1HV-8149C should be placed in service, as required by Step 4.2.4.7, unless otherwise directed by Operations Management.

OATC 4.2.4.7 Open the selected LETDOWN ORIFICE isolation valve:

1 HS-81 49A for 45 gpm orifice isolation 1 -HV-81 49A.

OR 1HS-8149B for 75 gpm orifice isolation 1-HV-8149B (odd fuel cycles).

OR 1HS-8149C for 75 gpm orifice isolation 1-HV-8149C (even fuel cycles).

OATC 4.2.4.8 Adjust 1PIC-131 to maintain letdown pressure between 360 and 380 psig.

OATC 4.2.4.9 WHEN LETDOWN PRESS 1PI-131A stabilizes between 360 and 380 psig, place 1PIC-131 in AUTO.

OATC 4.2.4.10 Monitor 1LR-459 Pressurizer Actual Level and Level Setpoint.

13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 14 of 14 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

The OATC will use SOP 13006-1 to restore CVCS charging and letdown to service. After charging and letdown are restored the crew may opt to raise letdown flow to 120 GPM. Section 4.2.4 of SOP 13006-1 will be used to complete this task.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.4.11 Adjust 1FIC-121 to maintain Pressurizer Level within 1% of setpoint.

OATC 4.2.4.12 Place Pressurizer Level Control in automatic UNLESS it is to remain in Manual under Tagout or Caution tag:

a.

Verify PRZR Level Controller 1 LIC-459 in AUTO.

b.

AFTER level has been stable within 1% of setpoint for approximately 3 minutes, place 1FIC-121 in AUTO.

OATC 4.2.4.13 Adjust LETDOWN HEAT EXCH OUTLET 1TIC-130 to maintain LETDOWN HEAT EXCH OUTLET 1TI-130 below 1 15°F, and place in AUTO.

OATC 4.2.4.14 Record the letdown orifice that was placed-in service or removed-from-service in the Unit Control Log.

OATC 4.2.4.15 Notify Chemistry that Letdown Flow has been raised.

OATC 4.2.4.16 Notify Reactor Engineering that Letdown Flow has been changed and to monitor for impacts.

14

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 4 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Controlling SG Level transmitter for Loop # 2 fails HIGH. The MFRV for loop

1. 2 will close requiring the UO to perform lOAs and take manual control of the valve to prevent a reactor trip on Lo-Lo SG level. The crew will then enter AOP-1 8001 Section E, Failure of SG NR Level Instrumentation to complete the corrective actions for this failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnoses the high failure of SG #2 NR level instrument LT-529.

Symptoms / alarms / indications:

STM GEN 2 HI / LO LVL DEVIATION STM GEN 2 HI-HI LEVEL ALERT Steam generator # 2 controlling level channel reading off scale high.

MFRV for loop # 2 SG throttling closed.

MFW flow to SG # 2 decreasing.

Other 3 level channels on SG # 2 lowering.

UO AOP-18001 Section E Immediate Actions El Check steam and feed flows matched on all SGs RNO Take manual control of SG # 2 MFRV to restore SG # 2 level between 60% and 70%.

SS Enters AOP-1 8001-C, section F. (Crew Update)

Verifies Immediate Actions with UO UO AOP-18001 Section E Subsequent Actions E2 Selects an unaffected control channel (LT-552)

UO E3 Returns feed flow control to automatic on MFRV loop # 2.

1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 4 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Controlling SG Level transmitter for Loop # 2 fails HIGH. The MFRV for loop

1. 2 will close requiring the UO to perform lOAs and take manual control of the valve to prevent a reactor trip on Lo-Lo SG level. The crew will then enter AOP-18001 Section E, Failure of SG NR Level Instrumentation to complete the corrective actions for this failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC/UO E4 Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO

• E5 Check SG level control maintains NR level at 65%.

• RNO Control NR level between 60 70%

SS E6 Notify I & C to initiate repairs.

SS will call typically call the SSS to perform the following:

e Notify Operations Duty Manager of the AOP entry e

Write a Condition Report o

Notify l&C SS E7 Bypass the affected instrument channel using 1 3509 C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION, if desired.

NOTE: The SS is not expected to BT1.

SS E8.

Trip affected channel bistable and place associated MASTER TEST switch in TEST position per TABLE El within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

(TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.2)

NOTE: SS expected to leave bistables untripped during allowed out of servIce time to facilitate troubleshooting by l&C.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 4 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Controlling SG Level transmitter for Loop # 2 fails HIGH. The MFRV for ioop

1. 2 will close requiring the UO to perform IQAs and take manual control of the valve to prevent a reactor trip on Lo-Lo SG level. The crew will then enter AOP-1 8001 Section E, Failure of SG NR Level Instrumentation to complete the corrective actions for this failure.

CAUTIONS ALL test switches for the failed level transmitter should be tripped. Only one channel for each steam generator should be tripped.

The bistable input is placed in the tripped state by positioning the Selector Switch on the specified test card to TEST.

The bistable input identified by the switch number should agree with the location specified by CAB, CARD, and B/S before tripping a bistable input.

If a discrepancy exists, CAB-CARD-B/S should be used, not switch number.

Bypassing another channel for Surveillance Testing with a channel inoperable is permitted provided the inoperable channel is in the tripped condition and the channel being tested is not bypassed for more than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

TABLE El FRAME SSPS INPUT CAB

/CARD B/S SWITCH Initial LT-529 Failure (Channel 1)

SG2 Hi-Hi Lvl TT & FWI 1

8/31 1

LS-529A

()

SG2 Lo-Lo Lvl Rx Trip/AFW 1

8/31 2

LS-529B

()

MASTER TEST SWITCH 8/73 1

()

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS E9.

Initiate the applicable actions of:

TS 3.3.1 TS 3.3.2 3.3.1 Reactor Trip Function 13 Condition E

3.3.2 ESFAS

- Function 5c P14 Condition I

Function 6b AFW Condition D 3.3.3 PAMS:

- INFO ONLY 3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of 4 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

Controlling SG Level transmitter for Loop # 2 fails HIGH. The MFRV for loop

1. 2 will close requiring the UO to perform lOAs and take manual control of the valve to prevent a reactor trip on Lo-Lo SG level. The crew will then enter AOP-1 8001 Section E, Failure of SG NR Level Instrumentation to complete the corrective actions for this failure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS

• El0 Check repairs and surveillances

- COMPLETE.

SS RNO

• Elo Perform the following:

a)

WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform Step El 1.

b)

Return to procedure and step in effect.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 9 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

PRZR pressure channel PT-455 will fail high. The associated PORV will stick partially open. The OATC will have to perform immediate actions to prevent a reactor trip and a safety injection. The crew will then use AOP 18001-C, Section C for the failed instrument and AOP 18000-C for the failed PORV.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose the failure of PT-455 high:

Alarms:

PRZR HI PRESS PRZR HI PRESS CHANNEL ALERT PRZR RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP PRZR PRESS LO PORV BLOCK PV-0455A OPEN SIGNAL Indications:

P 1-455 off scale high Other 3 PRZR pressure channels lowering Both normal spray valves fully open PORV-455 open PORV-455 will NOT close with handswitch in close when block valve is open NOTE: This indication will not occur until PRZR pressure is restored above 2185 psig.

OATC AOP 18001-C, Section C IMMEDIATE ACTIONS Cl.

Check RCS pressure

- STABLE OR RISING.

RNO:

Cl.

Perform the following:

Close spray valves.

Close affected PRZR PORV.

Operate PRZR heaters as necessary.

1

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 9 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

PRZR pressure channel PT-455 will fail high. The associated PORV will stick partially open. The OATC will have to perform immediate actions to prevent a reactor trip and a safety injection. The crew will then use AOP 18001-C, Section C for the failed instrument and AOP 18000-C for the failed PORV.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC AOP 18000-C IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 1.

Verify PRZR Spray Valves

- CLOSED.

SS Enters AOP 18000-C (Crew Update)

OATC AOP 18000-C Subsequent Actions 2.

Operate PRZR Heaters as necessary.

OATC 3.

Verify PRZR PORVs

- CLOSED OATC RNO:

3.

Perform the following to isolate affected PORV as necessary:

Close affected PORV Block Valve. (HV-8000A)

Open affected PORV power supply breaker:

AD1 M-04 (PV-455A)

BD1 M-04 (PV-456A)

IF PRZR pressure continues to lower, THEN go to 18004 C, REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LEAKAGE.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 9 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

PRZR pressure channel PT-455 will fail high. The associated PORV will stick partially open. The OATC will have to perform immediate actions to prevent a reactor trip and a safety injection. The crew will then use AOP 18001-C, Section C for the failed instrument and AOP 18000-C for the failed PORV.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.

Check PRZR Safety Valves

- CLOSED OATC 5.

Check PIC-455A Pressurizer Master Pressure Controller -

OPERATING PROPERLY:

Reference FIGURE 1.

RNO 5.

Perform the following:

a.

Operate PRZR heaters and sprays in manual as necessary to restore RCS pressure between 2220 and 2250 psig.

Adjust PIC-455A output AND return sprays and heaters to auto as necessary to restore RCS pressure between 2220 and 2250 psig.

b.

Notify l&C to initiate repairs.

c.

Restore controls to automatic when repairs are complete.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of 9 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

PRZR pressure channel PT-455 will fail high. The associated PORV will stick partially open. The OATC will have to perform immediate actions to prevent a reactor trip and a safety injection. The crew will then use AOP 18001-C, Section C for the failed instrument and AOP 18000-C for the failed PORV.

PSIG ERROR SIGNAL (PSIG)

MASTER CONTROLLER OUTPUT (%)

FIGURE 1 PRESSURIZER PRESSURE CONTROLLER BAND Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 6.

Check associated instrumentation

- OPERATING PROPERLY.

SS RNO:

6.

Initiate 18001-C, PRIMARY SYSTEMS INSTRUMENTATION MALFUNCTION.

BACKUP HEATERS PREF PROPORTiONAL SPRAYS PROPORTIONAL HEATERS 2250 2260 15 25 I

I 10 1

i i

0 9.4 14.4 15.6 25 34.4 40.6 2310 75 71.9 2355 120 100 4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 5 of 9 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

PRZR pressure channel PT-455 will fail high. The associated PORV will stick partially open. The OATC will have to perform immediate actions to prevent a reactor trip and a safety injection. The crew will then use AOP 18001-C, Section C for the failed instrument and AOP 18000-C for the failed PORV.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 7.

Comply with applicable Technical Specifications:

3.4.1 DNB Condition A met when pressure > 2199 psi 9

3.4.10 Safety Valves

- N/A 3.4.1 1 PORVs Condition B Bi. Close block valve in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND B2. Remove power from block valve in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> NOTE: Will dispatch Control Building Operator to locally open breaker for HV-8000A AND B3. Restore PORV in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 3.4.12 COPS INFO ONLY 3.4.13 Operational Leakage Met when block valve closed.

SS 8.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

SS Enters AOP 18001-C, Section C. (Crew Update)

SS AOP 18001-C, Section C Subsequent Actions CAUTION Failure of the controlling channel may saturate the Master Pressure Controller and cause inadvertent operation of the spray valves during recovery.

5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 6 of 9 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

PRZR pressure channel PT-455 will fail high. The associated PORV will stick partially open. The OATC will have to perform immediate actions to prevent a reactor trip and a safety injection. The crew will then use AOP 18001-C, Section C for the failed instrument and AOP 18000-C for the failed PORV.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC C2.

Check controlling channel OPERATING PROPERLY.

RNO:

C2.

Perform the following:

a.

Place HS-455A in close.

b.

Place PRZR spray valve controllers in manual.

OATC/UO C3.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

OATC

• C4.

Control PRZR pressure using heaters and sprays

BETWEEN 2220 AND 2250 PSIG.

C5.

Check PIC-455A Pressurizer Master Pressure Controller IN AUTO WITH OUTPUT SIGNAL APPROXIMATELY 25%.

RNO:

C5.

Place PIC-455A in manual and adjust controller output to approximately 25%.

OATC C6.

Check affected channel selected on PS-455F PRZR PRESS CNTL SELECT.

6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 7 of 9 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

PRZR pressure channel PT-455 will fail high. The associated PORV will stick partially open. The OATC will have to perform immediate actions to prevent a reactor trip and a safety injection. The crew will then use AOP 18001-C, Section C for the failed instrument and AOP 18000-C for the failed PORV.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC C7.

Select unaffected channels on PS-455F:

Failed Channel Select P455 CH457/456 P456 CH455/458 P457 CH455/456 P458 CH455/456 OATC C8.

Perform the following:

a.

Check PRZR pressure STABLE AT APPROXIMATELY 2235 PS 1G.

b.

Place PRZR heaters in AUTO.

c.

Place PRZR spray valve controllers in AUTO.

RNO:

a.

Adjust PRZR pressure to approximately 2235 psig using PRZR heaters and sprays.

C9.

Place PORVs in AUTO and verify proper operation.

NOTE: Unable to complete this step due to PORV being stuck open.

OATC ClO.

Return PRZR pressure Master Controller to AUTO.

OATC Cli.

Select same channel on PS-455G PRZR PRESS REC SEL as selected on PS-455F.

457 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 8 of 9 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

PRZR pressure channel PT-455 will fail high. The associated PORV will stick partially open. The OATC will have to perform immediate actions to prevent a reactor trip and a safety injection. The crew will then use AOP 18001-C, Section C for the failed instrument and AOP 18000-C for the failed PORV.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC C12.

Check P-il status light on BPLB indicates correctly for plant condition within one hour.

OFF SS C13.

Notify l&C to initiate repairs.

SS will call typically call the SSS to perform the following:

Notify Operations Duty Manager of the AOP entry Write a Condition Report Notify l&C SS Ci 4.

Bypass the affected instrument channel using 1 3509 C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION, if desired.

NOTE: SS is NOT expected to bypass failed channel.

SS C15.

Trip the affected channel bistables and place the associated MASTER TEST switches in TEST position per TABLE Cl within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. (TS 3.3.1 & 3.3.2)

NOTE: SS expected to leave bistables untripped during allowed out of service time to facilitate troubleshooting by l&C.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 9 of 9 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

PRZR pressure channel PT-455 will fail high. The associated PORV will stick partially open. The OATC will have to perform immediate actions to prevent a reactor trip and a safety injection. The crew will then use AOP 18001-C, Section C for the failed instrument and AOP 18000-C for the failed PORV.

Time Position ApplicanVs Action or Behavior SS C16.

Initiate the applicable actions of:

TS 3.3.1 Reactor Trip Function Condition 6OTIXT E

Ba Low PRZR pressure M

8b High PRZR pressure E

TS3.3.2ESFAS Function Condition ld SI low PRZR pressure D

8b P-il Interlock L

TS 3.4.1 DNB RCS pressure < 2199 psig B (Momentary)

SS

• c17 Check repairs and surveillances - COMPLETE.

SS RNO:

• c17 Perform the following:

a.

WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform step C18.

b.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

Main Turbine EHC pump trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start on low pressure.

The UO will refer to ARP 17033-1 for correctiveactions. The standby pump will be manually started to prevent a turbine trip on low EHC pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnoses trip of EHC pump:

Alarms:

480V SWGR 1 NBO2 TROUBLE (ALB33 window B07)

After several minutes

- HYD FLUID LO PRESS (ALB2O window D05)

Indications:

EHC pump A (HS-6539):

Red OFF Amber-ON Green ON EHC pressure (P1-6338) <1600 psig and lowering EHC Pump A amps (11-40073) drop to 0 amps UO Refers to ARP 1 7033-1 for Window B07 (480V SWGR 1 NBO2 TROUBLE)

UO 1.0 PROBABLE CAUSE 1.

One of the breakers on Switchgear 1 NBO2 tripped due to a fault.

2.

Bus ground fault.

3.

Potential transformer/fuse failure.

4.

Loss of bus voltage from Switchgear 1 NAO4.

5.

Transformer 1NBO2X winding high temperature.

6.

Loss of 1 25V DC control power from Panel 1 ND21.

7.

Loss of power to transformer temperature monitor.

2.0 AUTOMATIC ACTIONS NONE 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

Main Turbine EHC pump trips and the standby pump fails to automatically start on low pressure.

The UO will refer to ARP 1 7033-1 for corrective actions. The standby pump will be manually started to prevent a turbine trip on low EHC pressure.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior U0 NOTE Loss of 1 25V DC control power results in loss of breaker remote/local remote operating capabilities and associated control circuit trip features.

3.0 INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS NONE 4.0 SUBSEQUENT OPERATOR ACTIONS 1.

Check for associated alarms and indications.

2.

Dispatch an operator to Switchgear 1 NBO2 to check for:

a.

Ground fault indications.

b.

Other abnormal conditions.

3.

IF alarm is due to a breaker tripping on fault or undervoltage:

a.

Determine affected loads.

b.

Start redundant loads, if applicable.

NOTE: Student notices green and amber lights for EHC pump A and then starts EHC pump B.

NOTE: After starting EHC pump B EHC pressure returns to 1600 psig.

UO Will call SSS to:

Write condition report SS Notify Maintenance 2

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 1 of 14 Event No.:

7-9 Event

Description:

SG code safety valves fail open on all four loops following a turbine trip. The crew will enter EOP 19121-C, ECA-2.1 to take corrective actions. The code safety valves will reseat a lower than normal pressure. As soon as the crew realizes a SG is intact they should transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG isolation, based on 19121-C, Foldout page criteria.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC/UO Diagnose turbine trip W/O Reactor Trip:

All Stop Valves shut TURBINE TRIP/P9 REACTOR TRIP Alarm OATC Manually actuates Reactor Trip using both manual trip handswitches:

1 HS-40007 & 1 HS-40002 CREW IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1

- Verifies Reactor Trip Rod Bottom Lights

- LIT Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers

- OPEN Neutron Flux

- LOWERING 2

Verifies Turbine Trip All Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED 3

Checks Power to AC Emergency Buses 3a. at least 1 4160 1 E bus energized

- White lights

- ON 3b. all AC Emergency buses energized

- White lights

- ON (41 60V and 480V) 4

- Checks if SI I Actuated Any SI annunciator

- LIT SI BPLP status light

- LIT RNO

- Check if SI is required:

IF one or more of the following conditions has occurred:

PRZR pressure less than or equal to 1870 psig.

Steam line pressure less than or equal to 585 psig.

Containment pressure greater than or equal to 3.8 psig.

Automatic alignment of ECCS equipment to injection phase.

THEN actuate SI and Go to Step 6.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 2 of 14 Event No.:

7-9 Event

Description:

SG code safety valves fail open on all four loops following a turbine trip. The crew will enter EOP 19121-C, ECA-2.1 to take corrective actions. The code safety valves will reseat a lower than normal pressure. As soon as the crew realizes a SG is intact they should transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG isolation, based on 19121-C, Foldout page criteria.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS Plant page for Reactor Trip / Safety Injection OATC / UO 6.

Initiate Foldout Page 7.

Initiate OATC Initial Actions pages Initiate UO Initial Actions pages.

2

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 3 of 14 Event No.:

7-9 Event

Description:

SG code safety valves fail open on all four loops following a turbine trip. The crew will enter EOP 19121-C, ECA-2.1 to take corrective actions. The code safety valves will reseat a lower than normal pressure. As soon as the crew realizes a SG is intact they should transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG isolation, based on 19121-C, Foldout page criteria.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

I Checks both Trains of ECCS aligning per MLB5.

Manually actuates SI 2

Checks Containment Isolation Phase A actuated per MLBs 3

Checks ECCS pumps and NCP status.

a.

CCP5 running b.

SI Pumps running c.

RHR pumps running d.

NCPtripped 4

CCW pumps only two running per train 5a NSCW pumps only two running per train 5b NSCW tower return / bypass valves in auto 6a Containment coolers running in LOW speed per MLB5 6b NSCW cooler isolation valves open per MLBs 7

CVI dampers and valves shut per MLBs 8

Containment pressure remained <21.5 9

Checks ECCS flows:

a.

BIT Flow On scale b.

RCS pressure < 1625 psig (If NOT go to step 10) c.

Slpumpflow d.

RCS pressure < 300 psig e.

RHR pump flow 10 Checks ECCS valve alignment proper on MLB5 11 Checks at least one ACCW pump running 12 Adjusts seal injection flow to RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 4 of 14 Event No.:

7-9 Event

Description:

SG code safety valves fail open on all four loops following a turbine trip. The crew will enter EOP 19121-C, ECA-2.1 to take corrective actions. The code safety valves will reseat a lower than normal pressure. As soon as the crew realizes a SG is intact they should transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG isolation, based on 19121-C, Foldout page criteria.

UO Initial Operator Actions of E-0 1.

Checks MDAFW pumps running and TDAFW pump, if required.

NOTE: MDAFW Pump B will have to be manually started.

2.

Checks NR SG levels

- one> 10%, If not ensures at least 570 GPM flow 3.

Checks if SLI is reqUired Any SL Pressure < 585 psig CNMT Pressure> 14.5 psig High rate bistables lit with low pressure SI/SLI blocked If any above met then verify MSIVs & BSIVs closed 4.

Verifies FWI:

MFRV, BFRV, MFIV, BFIVs all shut 5.

Verifies SGBD isolated places hand switches for SGBD isolation valves to close verify SGBD sample isolations closed.

6.

Verify Diesel Generators running.

7.

Throttle AFW flow to control SG levels 10 65% NR 8.

Verify both MFPs tripped.

9.

Check Main Generator Output breakers open.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 5 of 14 Event No.:

7-9 Event

Description:

SG code safety valves fail open on all four loops following a turbine trip. The crew will enter EOP 19121-C, ECA-2.1 to take corrective actions. The code safety valves will reseat a lower than normal pressure. As soon as the crew realizes a SG is intact they should transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG isolation, based on 19121-C, Foldout page criteria.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior I 9000-C OATC I UO 8.

Initiate Continuous Actions pages.

OATC

• 9 Checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 degrees F using RCS Tavg.

UO 9 RNO. If necessary, takes actions to control RCS temperature.

Stop dumping steam.

Reduces AFW flow (not < 570 gpm if SG NR levels < 10% NR).

If cooldown continues shuts MSIVs and BSIVs If temperature> 557 F & rising then dump steam OATC 10

- Checks PORVs, Block Valves, & Spray Valves a, PORVs closed and in AUTO (456 ONLY) b, Normal spray valves closed c, Power available to at least one block valve (HV-8000B ONLY)

• d At least one block valve open (NOT)

• d RNO, verify open at least one block valve when RCS pressure > 2185 psig.

OATC 1 1

- Checks if RCPs should be stopped a, CCP or SIP running b, RCS pressure < 1375 psig If yes then stop all RCPs if no then go to step # 12 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 6 of 14 Event No.:

7-9 Event

Description:

SG code safety valves fail open on all four ioops following a turbine trip. The crew will enter EOP 19121-C, ECA-2.1 to take corrective actions. The code safety valves will reseat a lower than normal pressure. As soon as the crew realizes a SG is intact they should transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG isolation, based on 19121-C, Foldout page criteria.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO / SS 12

- Checks for faulted SG and transition to E-2 SG pressures:

Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner, or Completely depressurized Ifyes then go to 19020-C, E-2 lfnothengotostep#13 SS Enters 1 9020-C (Crew Update)

OATC/UO 19020-C, E-2 FAULTED SG ISOLATION 1.

Initiate critical safety function status trees per 19200-C, F-0 CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES.

SS 2.

Initiate 91001-C, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS.

Contacts Shift Manager to implement EPIPs SS CAUTION At least one SG should be maintained available for RCS cooldown 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 7 of 14 Event No.:

7-9 Event

Description:

SG code safety valves fail open on all four loops following a turbine trip. The crew will enter EOP 19121-C, ECA-2.1 to take corrective actions. The code safety valves will reseat a lower than normal pressure. As soon as the crew realizes a SG is intact they should transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG isolation, based on 19121-C, Foldout page criteria.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 3.

Verify Main Steamline Isolation and Bypass Valves

- SHUT UO 4.

Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a. Identify intact SG(s):

SG pressures ANY STABLE OR RISING SS RNO4a:

a.

IF all SG pressures are lowering in an uncontrolled manner, THEN go to 19121-C, ECA-2.1 UNCONTROLLED DEPRESSURIZATION OF ALL STEAM GENERATORS.

SS Enters 19121-C, ECA-2.1 (Crew Update)

CRITICAL OATC/UO 19121-C, ECA-2.1 1.

Initiate the Continuous Actions and Foldout Page.

7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 8 of 14 Event No.:

7-9 Event

Description:

SG code safety valves fail open on all four loops following a turbine trip. The crew will enter EOP 19121-C, ECA-2.1 to take corrective actions. The code safety valves will reseat a lower than normal pressure. As soon as the crew realizes a SG is intact they should transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG isolation, based on 19121-C, Foldout page criteria.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 2.

Check SGs secondary pressure boundaries:

a.

Verify the following valves

- CLOSED:

MSIVs MFIVs BFIVs MFRVs BFRVs b.

Verify BSIVs

- CLOSED.

c.

Verify SG Blowdown and Sampling Isolation Valves CLOSED.

d.

Verify SG ARV5

- CLOSED.

UO 3.

Isolate steam supply to TDAFW Pump by performing the following:

a.

Check at least one MDAFW Pump

- RUNNING AND CAPABLE OF FEEDING SG(s) NEEDED FOR RCS COOLDOWN.

b.

Close TDAFW Pump Steam Supply Valves:

HV-3009, (SG 1) LP-1 MS SPLY TO AUX FW TD PMP 1 HV-3019, (SG 2) LP-2 MS SPLY TO AUX FW TD PMP 1 NOTE: Cross connecting MDAFW pump A discharge per SOP 13610-1, Section 4.4.2 is not expected due to the caution at the beginning of the section.

8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 9 of 14 Event No.:

7-9 Event

Description:

SG code safety valves fail open on all four loops following a turbine trip. The crew will enter EOP 19121-C, ECA-2.1 to take corrective actions. The code safety valves will reseat a lower than normal pressure. As soon as the crew realizes a SG is intact they should transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG isolation, based on 19121-C, Foldout page criteria.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior

• 4 Control feed flow to minimize RCS cooldown:

SS a.

Monitor shutdown margin by initiating 14005, SHUTDOWN MARGIN AND KEFF CALCULATIONS.

SS will contact SSS to initiate 14005.

UO b.

Check cooldown rate in RCS Cold Legs

- LESS THAN 1 00°F/HR.

RNO:

UO b.

Lower feed flow to 30 gpm to each SG.

CRITICAL SS Go to Step 4.d.

NOTE: The heat sink CSFST will turn red when AFW flow is throttled to < 570 GPM if SG NR levels are < 10%.

If the SS transitions to 19231-C, then the following are applicable:

SS 19231-C, FR-H.1, Loss of Secondary Heat Sink 1.

Check total feed flow capability to SG(s):

Greater than 570 gpm available.

-AND Less than 570 gpm due to Operator action.

2.

Do NOT perform this procedure and return to procedure and step in effect.

9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 10 of 14 Event No.:

7-9 Event

Description:

SG code safety valves fail open on all four ioops following a turbine trip. The crew will enter EOP 19121-C, ECA-2.1 to take corrective actions. The code safety valves will reseat a lower than normal pressure. As soon as the crew realizes a SG is intact they should transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG isolation, based on 19121-C, Foldout page criteria.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior 19121-C Actions uQ 4.

Control feed flow to minimize RCS cooldown:

d.

Check NR level in all SGs

- GREATER THAN 10% [32%

UO ADVERSE].

RNO:

d.

Maintain a minimum feed flow of 30 gpm to each SG with less than 10% [32% ADVERSE] NR level.

uo 4.

Control feed flow to minimize RCS cooldown:

e.

Check RCS WR Hot Leg temperatures

- STABLE OR LOWERING.

RNO:

e.

Control feed flow or dump steam to stabilize RCS WR Hot Leg temperatures.

OATC

• 5 Check if RCPs should be stopped:

a.

ECCS Pumps

- AT LEAST ONE RUNNING:

CCP or SI Pump b.

RCS pressure

- LESS THAN 1375 PSIG.

c.

Stop all RCPs.

10

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 11 of 14 Event No.:

7-9 Event

Description:

SG code safety valves fail open on all four loops following a turbine trip. The crew will enter FOP 19121-C, ECA-2.1 to take corrective actions. The code safety valves will reseat a lower than. normal pressure. As soon as the crew realizes a SG is intact they should transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG isolation, based on 19121-C, Foldout page criteria.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

• 6.

Maintain Seal Injection flow to all RCPs - 8 TO 13 GPM OATC

• 7 Check PRZR PORVS and Block Valves:

a.

Power to PRZR PORV Block Valves

- AVAILABLE.

b.

PRZR PORVs

- CLOSED.

c.

PRZR PORV Block Valves

- AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

d.

Any RCS WR CL temperature

- LESS THAN 220F.

OATC

• 7 Check PRZR PORVS and Block Valves:

RNO:

d.

WHEN any RCS CL temperature lowers to less than 220°F, THEN arm COPS.

SS Go to Step 8.

11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 12 of 14 Event No.:

7-9 Event

Description:

SG code safety valves fail open on all four ioops following a turbine trip. The crew will enter EOP 19121-C, ECA-2.1 to take corrective actions. The code safety valves will reseat a lower than normal pressure. As soon as the crew realizes a SG is intact they should transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG isolation, based on 19121-C, Foldout page criteria.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 8.

Check secondary radiation

- NORMAL:

Direct Chemistry to take periodic activity samples of all SGs one at a time.

Secondary radiation

- NORMAL.

MAIN STM LINE MONITORS:

RE-i 3120 (SG 1)

RE-i 31 21 (SG 2)

RE-i 3122 (SG 3)

RE-i 3119 (SG 4)

CNDSR AIR EJCTR/STM RAD MONITORS:

RE-i 2839C RE-i 2839D (if on scale)

RE-i 2839E (if on scale)

STM GEN LIQ PROCESS RAD:

RE-00i9 (Sample)

RE-002i (Blowdown)

SG sample radiation.

SS CAUTIONS If offsite power is lost after SI reset, action is required to restart the following ESF equipment if plant conditions require their operation:

RHR Pumps SI Pumps Post-LOCA Cavity Purge Units Containment Coolers in low speed (Started in high speed on a UV signal).

ESF Chilled Water Pumps (If CR1 is reset).

i2

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 13 of 14 Event No.:

7-9 Event

Description:

SG code safety valves fail open on all four loops following a turbine trip. The crew will enter EOP 19121-C, ECA-2.1 to take corrective actions. The code safety valves will reseat a lower than normal pressure. As soon as the crew realizes a SG is intact they should transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG isolation, based on 19121-C, Foldout page criteria.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

• 9 Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped:

a.

RHR Pumps

- ANY RUNNING WITH SUCTION ALIGNED TO RWST.

b.

RCS pressure:

1)

Greater than 300 psig.

2)

Stable or rising.

c.

Reset SI if necessary.

d.

Stop RHR Pumps.

OATC

• 10 IF RCS pressure lowers in an uncontrolled manner to less than 300 psig, THEN restart RHR Pumps.

OATC

• 1 1.

Check if Containment Spray should be stopped:

a.

CS Pumps

- RUNNING.

RNO:

SS a.

GotoStepl2.

OATC 12.

Check if SI Accumulators should be isolated:

a.

At least two RCS WR Hot Leg temperatures

- LESS THAN 380°F.

RNO:

SS a.

GotoStepl4.

13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 2 Page 14 of 14 Event No.:

7-9 Event

Description:

SG code safety valves fail open on all four loops following a turbine trip. The crew will enter EOP 19121-C, ECA-2.1 to take corrective actions. The code safety valves will reseat a lower than normal pressure. As soon as the crew realizes a SG is intact they should transition to 19020-C, Faulted SG isolation, based on 19121-C, Foldout page criteria.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC/UO

• 14.

Check if ECCS flow should be reduced:

a.

RCS subcooling

- GREATER THAN 24°F [38°F ADVERSE].

b.

RCS pressure

- STABLE OR RISING.

c.

PRZR level

- GREATER THAN 9% [37% ADVERSE].

RNO:

c.

Try to stabilize RCS pressure with Normal PRZR Spray.

SS Return to Step 14.a.

END OF SCENARIO 14

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 DRI c--r Facility: Vogtle Scenario No.:

3 Op-Test No: 2010-301 Examiners:

Lea Operators:

NEW Initial Conditions:

Plant is at 0% power preparing for a mid-cycle critical approach.

Turnover: The previous crew has pulled control rods for the reactor startup. You will continue the start up after turnover. Hurricane Zeus has been down graded to a tropical depression. Highest sustained winds are now 35 mph. Heavy rain and widespread flooding is expected in the area. PT-455 is out of service for repairs, all required Technical Specification actions have been completed.

Event Maif.

Event Event No.

No.

Type*

Description 1

N/A R-ALL Pull control rods to establish critical reactor 2

NSO2A C-UO Train A NSCW Pump #1 trips and standby pump #5 fails to start NSO7E C-SS TS-SS LCO 3.7.8 3

PRO3A © I-OATC Controlling channel Pressurizer Level Transmitter (LT-459) fails high 100%

I-SS Ramp 120 TS-SS LCO 3.3.1 sec 4

N/A N-OATC Restore CVCS Letdown to service N-SS 5

CVO2 © C-OATC Letdown line break inside containment (isolable) 25%

C-SS TS-SS LCO 3.4.13 6

N/A N-OATC Place Excess Letdown in service N-SS 7

MSO3D c l-UO Steam Generator # 4 ARV pressure Transmitter fails high 100%

l-SS TS-SS LCO 3.3.4 & 3.7.4 N/A

- ARV still operable (manual) 8 ALBO8 C-OATC RCP #2 High Vibration E4, and F4 C-SS ON TS-SS LCO 3.4.4 Scenario 3 Page 1

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 9

SGO1 B @

M-ALL Loop 2 Steam Generator Tube Rupture 45%

10 S106B C-OATC SIP-I B fails to automatically start when safety injection is actuated SIO3A C-SS SIP-lA trips on automatic start and cannot be restarted (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (l)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Event 1: Continue Reactor Startup (12003-C)

Verifiable Action:

OATC

- Withdraw control rods to establish critical conditions and raise power to 2E-3%

UO

- Maintain SG NR levels 60-70%.

Consequences:

Enter power range too fast to control or loss of SG level control either resulting in the need for a reactor trip.

Technical Specifications:

N/A Event 2: NSCW pump I trips, pump 5 fails to automatically start (18021-C)

Verifiable Action:

UO

- Start standby NSCW pump.

Consequences:

NSCW pump 3 damage due to run out conditions Technical Specifications:

INFO LCD 3.7.8 Scenario 3 Page 2

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 3: Controlling PRZR level channel fails high (18001-C Section D)

Verifiable Actions:

OATC

- Manual control of pressurizer level and RCP seal injection flow. Select operable channel for control.

Consequences:

Loss of PRZR level control or RCP seal damage if flows are not properly controlled.

Technical Specifications:

LCD 3.3.1 reactor trip on hi PRZR level Event 4: Restore CVCS letdown to service (SOP 13006-1 Section 4.4.2)

Verifiable Actions:

OATC Places normal CVCS letdown in service Consequences:

Flashing/water hammer in letdown line if charging flow not adequate Technical Specifications:

N/A Event 5: Letdown leak inside containment (18004-C)

Verifiable Action:

OATC

- Isolate letdown to stop RCS leak Consequence:

If letdown is not isolated, RCS leak will inside containment will continue.

Technical Specifications:

LCD 3.4.13 Operational Leakage (Unidentified Leakage) not met until letdown isolated Scenario 3 Page 3

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 6: Place Excess Letdown in Service (SOP 13008-1 Section 4.1)

Verifiable Action:

OATC Places Excess letdown in service to the RCP Seal Return Header per 13008-1.

Consequences:

Exceeding Excess letdown HX outlet temperature or RCP seal return pressure limits.

Technical Specifications:

N/A Event 7: Steam Generator 4 ARV pressure transmitter fails high (18008-C)

Verifiable Actions:

UO

- Close SG 4 ARV.

Consequence:

Uncontrolled entry into mode 1.

Technical Specifications:

3.3.4 & 3.7.4 N/A ARV still operable (manual operation)

Event 8: RCP 2 high vibration (17008-1 Windows E04 & F04, 13003-1 Section 4.3.1)

Verifiable Action:

OATC

- Trip RCP 2.

Consequence:

If RCP is running 10 minutes after trip, then a seal failure occurs.

Technical Specifications:

LCO 3.4.4 RCS Loops Modes 1 & 2: Condition A be in mode 3 in 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Event 9: SG 2 SGTR Verifiable Action:

UO Isolate the ruptured SG, complete rapid RCS cool down to target temperature, maintain Tave at target temperature.

OATC Depressurize RCS to stop break flow, secure ECCS pumps, establish normal charging.

Consequences:

Prolonged off site radioactivity release through ruptured SG ARV5 / code safety valves.

Scenario 3 Page 4

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event 10: SIP lB must be manually started & SIP IA trips Verifiable Actions:

OATC -Manual start of SIP-i B Consequences:

RCS inventory is not maintained.

CRITICAL STEPS:

I. Manually start SIP-I B to maintain RCS inventory during SGTR.

2. Isolate SG 2 to allow RCS rapid cool down to target temperature.

3. Maintain RCS Tavg < target temperature.

PT-455 (PRZR Pressure) Out of Service turnover information:

E 3.3.2 SI Low PRZR Pressure D

3.3.2 P11 Interlock L

Scenario 3 Page 5 Trip bistables in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> INFO ONLY [applicable> P7 (10% power)]

Trip bistables in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Trip bistables in 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Verify P11 in correct condition in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> LCD 3.3.1 3.3.1 3.3.1 Function OTAT Low PRZR Pressure High PRZR Pressure Condition Actions M

E

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 5 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

Crew will perform actions necessary to continue the in-progress reactor startup until criticality is achieved using procedure 12,003-C. The OATC will need to withdraw control rods, and both the OATC and SS will need to identify when the reactor is critical.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.20 When Control Bank C reaches 115 steps, VERIFY Control Bank D begins withdrawing. (TS SR 3.1.6.3)

OATC 4.2.21 IF this startup is a dilution to criticality for LPPT, perform the following:

a.

Withdraw Control Bank D to the ARO position in 50 step increments or less as recommended by reactor engineering and approved by the SS.

b.

Commence dilution to criticality at ARO, per LPPT-GAE/GBE-01.

c.

Log Mode 2 entry time and update IPC per Step 4.2.14.

This step is N/A OATC 4.2.22 Verify IR indication comes on scale as source range count rate rises. (SR indication 3 X 102 cps)

OATC 4.2.23 WHEN criticality is reached, Log the reactor is critical in the SS Control Room Log.

SS CAUTION Source Range high flux reactor trip will occur at i0 5 cps.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 5 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

Crew will perform actions necessary to continue the in-progress reactor startup until criticality is achieved using procedure 12,003-C. The OATC will need to withdraw control rods, and both the OATC and SS will need to identify when the reactor is critical.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.2.24 At an IR indication of approximately 2 X 1 0%, perform the following:

a.

Observe the following status lights illuminated:

(1)

IR P6 NC35D (TSLB-4, 3.1), or (2)

IR P6 NC36D (TSLB-4, 3.2)

(3)

SOURCE RANGE BLOCK PERMISSIVE P6 b.

Block the source range hi flux reactor trip by placing both SR BLOCK RESET A/B switches HS-40030/HS-40031 to the BLOCK position, c.

Observe the following BPLP status lights illuminated:

(1)

SR TRAIN A TRIP BLKD (2-1)

(2)

SR TRAIN B TRIP BLKD (2-2)

SS CAUTION If the startup is stopped after blocking the SR Hi flux trip and power level is allowed to decrease, the SR trip may become unblocked. There is no audible indication to alert the operator if this occurs. The SR Hi Flux trip should be verified blocked and, if necessary, the above steps repeated to re-block the trip prior to reaching I E+5 cps.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 3 of 5 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

Crew will perform actions necessary to continue the in-progress reactor startup until criticality is achieved using procedure 12,003-C. The OATC will need to withdraw control rods, and both the OATC and SS will need to identify when the reactor is critical.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC d.

Configure Nuclear Instrumentation for continuing power increase:

(1)

Verify both channels of Intermediate Range NIs indicating properly on recorder NR-45.

(2)

Remove Audible Count Rate monitor from service per 13501, Nuclear Instrumentation System OATC 4.2.25 Raise power to 2 X 10% in the Intermediate Range by adjusting control rods as necessary OATC 4.2.26 Stabilize power at an Intermediate Range indication of approximately 2 X 1 0% and complete:

a.

OSP 14940, Estimated Critical Condition Calculation Data Sheet 1, Actual Critical Data, OR b.

88010-C, Computer Calculation Of Estimated Critical Conditions Data Sheet 3.

c.

Place a copy of the above Data Sheet(s) in the Start-up Log tab of the Reactor Trip Log.

d.

IF this reactor startup IS NOT a dilution to criticality for LPPT, Tavg recording per Data Sheet 2 can be terminated if ALB12AO5 is NOT illuminated.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of 5 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

Crew will perform actions necessary to continue the in-progress reactor startup until criticality is achieved using procedure 12,003-C. The OATC will need to withdraw control rods, and both the OATC and SS will need to identify when the reactor is critical.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS NOTE The Avg/Tref Deviation alarm, ALB12AO5, provides actions to maintain Tavg above 551°F, the minimum temperature for criticality.

OATC 4.2.27 Monitor Tavg/Tref Deviation alarm, ALB12AO5, during the SS remainder of the startup and take corrective action as directed to maintain Tavg at 557°F +/-2°F. (TS SR 3.4.2.1)

UO 4.2.28 Unblock both Source Range channels HFASA circuits per 13501, Nuclear Instrumentation System.

(1)

Source Range Channel N31 (2)

Source Range Channel N32 SS 4.2.29 IF this reactor startup was a dilution to criticality for LPPT, perform LPPT-GAE/GBE-01.

This Step is N/A OATC 4.2.30 Verify Power Range Channels indicating properly on recorder NR-45.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 5 of 5 Event No.:

I Event

Description:

Crew will perform actions necessary to continue the in-progress reactor startup until criticality is achieved using procedure 12,003-C. The OATC will need to withdraw control rods, and both the OATC and SS will need to identify when the reactor is critical.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS NOTE OATC A spike in startup rate (SUR) will occur when intermediate range nuclear instruments (N35 and N36) automatically swap from pulse counting to MSV mode at about 3 X 10-2% power (rising).

SS CAUTION OATC Ensure alternate indications of reactor power level are observed to back up nuclear instrumentation readings.

OATC 4.2.31 Raise power to approximately 1% to 3%.

UO 4.2.32 Verify steam dumps or, if applicable, SG atmospheric relief valves, maintain Tavg at 557°F +/-2°F.

SS 4.2.33 Continue to power operation per 12004-C, Power Operation (Mode 1)

OR Commence reactor shutdown per 12005-C, Reactor Shutdown to Hot Standby.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 4 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Trip of A train NSCW pump #1. The standby NSCW pump #5 will fail to automatically start. The crew will enter AOP 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System to take the corrective actions to restore the train A NSCW system to normal 2 pump operation:

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnose degraded NSCW conditions:

Trip of NSCW pump #1(1HS-1602A)

Green ON Amber-ON Red OFF Alarms:

NSCW TRAIN A LO HDR PRESS NSCW TRAIN A DG CLR LO FLOW NSCW TRAIN A RHR PMP & MTR CLR LO FLOW NSCW TRAIN A CNMT CLR 1 & 2 LO FLOW NSCW TRAIN A CNMT CLR 5 & 6 LO FLOW NSCW TRN A RX CVTY CLG COIL LOW FLOW TRAIN A SYS STATUS MON PNL ALERT 4160V SWGR 1AAO2 TROUBLE Indications:

NSCW HDR PRESS 1 P1-1636 drops to 50 psig NSCW Train A flow:

SUPPLY 1F11640B drops to 12,000 GPM RETURN 1FI164OA drops to 12,000 GPM SS Enters AOP 18021, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System (Crew Update)

UO 1.

Check if catastrophic leakage from NSCW system EXISTS.

SS RNO Go to Step 6.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 4 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Trip of A train NSCW pump #1. The standby NSCW pump #5 will fail to automatically start. The crew will enter AOP 18021-C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System to take the corrective actions to restore the train A NSCW system to normal 2 pump operation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 6.

Verify NSCW pumps in affected train TWO OR MORE OPERATING:

NOTE: UO should start NSCW pump 5 here Supply header pressure greater than 70 psig.

Train A:Pl 1636 Train B:Pl 1637 Supply header flow approximately 1 7,000 gpm.

Train A:FI 1640B Train B:FI 1641B UO 7.

Check the following on the affected train:

NSCW pumpsTHREE RUNNING.

-AND Low header pressure annunciator EXTINGUISHED.

SS RNO Go to Step 9.

UO 9.

Verify the following on the affected NSCW train:

Supply header pressure GREATER THAN 70 PSIG:

Train A:Pl 1636 Train B:Pl 1637 Supply header temperature computer indication LESS THAN 90°F:

Train A:TE 1642 Train B:TE 1643 Supply header flow APPROXIMATELY 17,000 GPM:

Train A:FI 1640B Train B:Fl 1641B

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 3 of 4 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Trip of A train NSCW pump #1. The standby NSCW pump #5 will fail to automatically start. The crew will enter AOP 18021 -C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System to take the corrective actions to restore the train A NSCW system to normal 2 pump operation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 10.

Check NSCW cooling tower basin levels on affected NSCW train GREATER THAN 73%:

Train A:Ll 1606 Train B:Ll 1607 UO 1 1.

Check proper operation of affected NSCW train:

Two pumps running.

Supply header pressure GREATER THAN 70 PSIG:

Train A:Pl 1636 Train B:Pl 1637 Supply header temperature computer indication LESS THAN 90°F:

Train A:TE 1642 Train B:TE 1643 Supply header flow APPROXIMATELY 1 7,000 GPM:

Train A:FI 1640B Train B:Fl 1641B SS 12.

Go to Step 21.

UO 21.

Check NSCW return temperature on affected train LESS THAN 95°F:

Train A:Tl 1676A Train B:TI 1677A

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of 4 Event No.:

2 Event

Description:

Trip of A train NSCW pump #1. The standby NSCW pump #5 will fail to automatically start. The crew will enter AOP 18021 -C, Loss of Nuclear Service Cooling Water System to take the corrective actions to restore the train A NSCW system to normal 2 pump operation.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 22.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

Controlling Pressurizer level channel fails high. The OATC will have to manually control charging & seal injection flow until the failed channel is removed from service.

The OATC may opt to isolate letdown if letdown line starts flashing.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnose controlling Pressurizer level channel failure:

Indications:

LI-459 indication rising Charging line flow lowering (FI-121A & Fl-i 21 C)

Possible erratic letdown flow due to flashing (Fl-i 32C)

Alarms:

PRZR CONTROL HI LEVEL DEV AND HEATERS ON PRZR HI LEVEL CHANNEL ALERT SS Initiates AOP 18001-C, Section D for the failed PRZR level channel.

(Crew Update)

OATC/UO Di.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

OATC

• D2.

Check PRZR level

- TRENDING TO PROGRAM LEVEL.

OATC

• D2 RNO:

IF PRZR level instrument fails high, THEN perform the following as necessary:

Adjust charging to prevent letdown from flashing.

-OR-Isolate letdown.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

Controlling Pressurizer level channel fails high. The OATC will have to manually control charging & seal injection flow until the failed channel is removed from service.

The OATC may opt to isolate letdown if letdown line starts flashing.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

• D3.

Maintain Seal Injection flow to all RCPs - 8 TO 13 GPM.

OATC D4.

Select an unaffected channel on LS-459D PRZR LVL CNTL SELECT.

461/460 selected OATC D5.

Select same channel on LS-459E PRZR LVL REC SEL as selected on LS-459D.

461 selected UO

• D6 Restore letdown flow by initiating 13006, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM, if required.

NO TE: If letdown was isolated, then refer to event 3A for this task.

OATC D7.

Check if PRZR heaters should be restored to service:

PRZR level controlling channel

- FAILED LOW.

SS D7 RNO: Go to Step D9 OATC D9 Return PRZR level control to AUTO.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 3 of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

Controlling Pressurizer level channel fails high. The OATC will have to manually control charging & seal injection flow until the failed channel is removed from service.

The OATC may opt to isolate letdown if letdown line starts flashing.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

• D10 Check PRZR level is maintained at program by auto control.

SS Dl 1.

Notify l&C to initiate repairs.

Contacts SSS to:

Write a Condition Report Contact OPS Duty Manager ofAOP entry o

Contact Maintenance SS D12.

Bypass the affected instrument channel using 13509-C, BYPASS TEST INSTRUMENTATION (BTI) PANEL OPERATION, if desired.

Use of BTI is NOT expected.

SS D13.

Trip affected channel bistable and place associated MASTER TEST switch in TEST position per TABLE Dl 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. (TS 3.3.1)

Expect channels to remain as is to facilitate l&C repair activities.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

Controlling Pressurizer level channel fails high. The OATC will have to manually control charging & seal injection flow until the failed channel is removed from service.

The OATC may opt to isolate letdown if letdown line starts flashing.

Initial

()

()

CAUTIONS Only one channel should be tripped.

The bistable input is placed in the tripped state by positioning the selector switch on the specified test card to TEST.

The bistable input identified by the switch number should agree with the location specified by CAB, CARD, and B/S before tripping a bistable input.

If a discrepancy exists, CAB-CARD-B/S should be used, not switch number.

Bypassing another channel for Surveillance Testing with a channel inoperable is permitted provided the inoperable channel is in the tripped condition and the channel being tested is not bypassed for more than 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

TABLE DI FRAME SSPS INPUT CAB

/CARD B/S SWITCH LT-459 Failure (Channel 1)

High Level Reactor Trip 1

8/47 1

LS-459A MASTER TEST SWITCH 8/73 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 5 of 5 Event No.:

3 Event

Description:

Controlling Pressurizer level channel fails high. The OATC will have to manually control charging & seal injection flow until the failed channel is removed from service.

The OATC may opt to isolate letdown if letdown line starts flashing.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS D14.

Initiate applicable actions of Technical Specification 3.3.1 INFO ONLY LCO 3.3.1 FU 9applicable> P-7 (10% power)

SS

• D1 5.

Check repairs arid surveillances - COMPLETE.

SS

• D1 5 RNO.

Perform the following:

a)

WHEN repairs and surveillances are complete, THEN perform step D16.

b)

Return to procedure and step in effect.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 7 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

If letdown was isolated in response to the PRZR level instrument failure, then it will be returned to service using SOP 13006-1. This task will likely be performed by the UO while the OATC remains in front of the reactor controls.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Selects section 4.4.2 of procedure 1 3006-1.

NOTE: With letdown isolated and charging still in service, an Auto-makeup will occur to ensure VCT level is maintained. The OATC and/or UO should verify proper makeup flow rates per the Reactivity Briefing Sheet.

UO 4.4.2.1 IF a Charging Pump is NOT in service, Go To Section 4.4.13 to start the NCP OR an available Centrifugal Charging Pump, THEN Return To this section.

UO NOTES This section also applies to returning normal charging and letdown to service following termination of safety injection.

Letdown is to be established as soon as possible after initiating flow through a Charging Nozzle.

UP 4.4.2.2 IF NCP is in service, verify NCP MINIFLOW 1-HV-8109 is open.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 7 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

If letdown was isolated in response to the PRZR level instrument failure, then it will be returned to service using SOP 13006-1. This task will likely be performed by the UO while the OATC remains in front of the reactor controls.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.4.2.3 Perform the following:

a.

Close LETDOWN ORIFICE Isolation Valves:

1-HV-8149A 1-HV-8149B 1-HV-8149C UO b.

Close LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM Valves:

1-LV-460 1 -LV-459 UO c.

Close PZR AUX SPRAY VALVE 1-HV-8145.

UO d.

Open CVCS LETDOWN PIPE BREAK PROT ISOLATION 1-HV-15214.

UO e.

Open RCS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV IRC 1-HV-8160.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 3 of 7 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

If letdown was isolated in response to the PRZR level instrument failure, then it will be returned to service using SOP 13006-1. This task will likely be performed by the UO while the OATC remains in front of the reactor controls.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO f.

Open RCS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV ORC 1-HV-8152.

UO g.

Place Letdown Pressure Controller 1 P10-131 in MAN and adjust output to between 50% and 75%.

UO h.

Place LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1TIC-130 in MAN and adjust output to the most current position as recorded on the Control Room Rounds Sheets.

NOTE: UO will use value posted on board at back of control room UO i.

Verify PRESSURIZER LEVEL 1 LR-459 greater than 17%.

UO NOTE If Normal Charging and Letdown are being returned to service as directed from Section 4.4.15, one of the valves in Substep 1. and both valves in Step 4.4.2.4 will already be open.

UO j.

Verify one of the following are OPEN:

NORMAL CHARGING TO LOOP 1 1-HV-8146 (even-numbered fuel cycle)

OR ALTERNATE CHARGING TO LOOP 4 1-HV-8147 (odd-numbered fuel cycle)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of 7 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

If letdown was isolated in response to the PRZR level instrument failure, then it will be returned to service using SOP 13006-1. This task will likely be performed by the UO while the OATC remains in front of the reactor controls.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.4.2.4 Verify CHARGING TO RCS ISOLATION Valves are OPEN:

1-HV-8106 1-HV-8105 UO 4.4.2.5 Simultaneously perform the following:

e Adjust 1 HC-1 82 output to maintain between 8 and 13 gpm to each RCP.

Adjust 1FIC-121 to raise CHG FLOW lFl-l2lAto between 80 and 90 gpm.

UO 4.4.2.6 Open LETDOWN ISOLATION VLV UPSTREAM AND DOWNSTREAM Valves by holding their handswitches in OPEN UNTIL the valves are fully open:

1-LV-460 1HS-460 1 -LV-459 1 HS-459 UO CAUTION Unless otherwise directed by Operations Management, until the letdown flow orifices are replaced the even/odd fuel cycle rotation of 75 gpm orifices does not apply and only the 75 gpm orifice associated with 1HV-8149C should be placed in service.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 5 of 7 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

If letdown was isolated in response to the PRZR level instrument failure, then it will be returned to service using SOP 13006-1. This task will likely be performed by the UO while the OATC remains in front of the reactor controls.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.4.2.7 Establish Letdown flow:

a.

Simultaneously open a Letdown Orifice and maintain pressure by performing the following:

e Open one LETDOWN ORIFICE Isolation Valve by holding its handswitch in the OPEN position until fully open:

1HS-8149B (75 gpm

- odd fuel cycles)

OR 1 HS-81 49C (75 gpm even fuel cycles)

OR 1HS-8149A (45 gpm)

Adjust 1 PlC-I 31 A to maintain LETDOWN PRESS 1PI-131A between 360 and 380 psig.

UO b.

Record the letdown orifice that was placed in service in the Unit Control Log.

UO 4.4.2.8 WHEN LETDOWN PRESS 1PI-131A stabilizes between 360 and 380 psig, place IPIC-131 in AUTO.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 6 of 7 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

If letdown was isolated in response to the PRZR level instrument failure, then it will be returned to service using SOP 13006-1. This task will likely be performed by the UO while the OATC remains in front of the reactor controls.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.4.2.9 Place LETDOWN HX OUTLET TEMP 1TIC-130 in AUTO and verify it maintains temperature less than or equal to 1 1 5°F.

UO 4.4.2.10 Verify LETDOWN REGEN HX OUT lTl-127 indicates less than 380°F.

UO 4.4.2.11 Monitor 1 LR-459 Pressurizer Level and Pressurizer Level Setpoint.

UO 4.4.2.12 Maintain Pressurizer Level within 1% of Level Setpoint using 1FIC-121.

UO 4.4.2.13 Place Pressurizer Level Control in automatic UNLESS it is to remain in Manual under Tagout or Caution tag:

a.

Verify PRZR Level Controller 1 LIC-459 in AUTO.

UO b.

AFTER level has been stable within 1% of setpoint for approximately 3 minutes, place 1FIC-121 in AUTO.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 7 of 7 Event No.:

4 Event

Description:

If letdown was isolated in response to the PRZR level instrument failure, then it will be returned to service using SOP 13006-1. This task will likely be performed by the UO while the OATC remains in front of the reactor controls.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.4.2.14 IF this section was performed to restore normal charging and letdown to service following termination of Safety Injection, Return To 19011-C, ES-l.l SI Termination.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 11 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Letdown line break inside containment will result in loss of RCS inventory and increasing radiation levels inside containment. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, to take corrective actions for the loss of inventory.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Diagnoses loss of RCS/CVCS inventory:

Alarms:

INTMD RADIATION ALARM HIGH RADIATION ALARM Indications:

Charging flow (Fl-i 21 C) increases to 137 GPM PRZR levels 24% & slowly lowering (Ll-459/460/461)

Charging flow controller (FIC-0i21) @ 100% (red up arrow lit)

Safety Related Display Console & IPC:

RE-002 CNMT area low range ALERT (Amber)

RE-003 CNMT area low range ALERT (Amber)

RE-2562C CNMT ATM RADIOGAS HIGH (Red)

SSJUO Refers to Annunciator Response Procedure 171 02-1 guidance for RE-2562, 002, and 003 alarms:

Initial Operator Actions 1.

Initiate evacuation of Containment IF the alarm is due to unexpected or unexplained radiation increases, OR IF appropriate HP controls are NOT in place for the radiological conditions indicated.

2.

IF the alarm is due to expected radiation increases from preplanned evolutions AND appropriate HP controls are in place, THEN request HP and Chemistry to investigate the cause of alarm and sample Containment atmosphere. If required, initiate evacuation of Containment.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 11 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Letdown line break inside containment will result in loss of RCS inventory and increasing radiation levels inside containment. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, to take corrective actions for the loss of inventory.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS/UO Subsequent Operator Actions 1.

If required, verify that the Containment has been evacuated and all personnel are accounted for.

2.

Perform the following:

(1)

IF RCS leakage IS apparent by observable conditions, initiate 18004-C, RCS Leakage.

SS Enters AOP 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage Section A.

(Crew Update)

SS Al.

Check plant conditions:

In Mode 1 or 2.

-OR In Mode 3 with RCS pressure greater than 1000 psig.

OATCIUO A2.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

• A3.

Maintain PRZR level:

a)

Adjust charging flow as necessary to maintain program level.

b)

Check PRZR level STABLE OR RISING.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 3 of 11 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Letdown line break inside containment will result in loss of RCS inventory and increasing radiation levels inside containment. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, to take corrective actions for the loss of inventory.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC

• A3b RNO:

NOTE: Isolating letdown will isolate the leak.

b.

Perform the following:

1)

Isolate letdown by closing:

a)

Letdown Orifice Valves.

b)

Letdown Isolation Valves.

c)

Excess Letdown Valves.

2)

Start an additional Charging Pump as necessary.

3)

IF PRZR level can NOT be maintained greater than 9%, THEN perform the following:

a)

Trip the Reactor.

b)

WHEN Reactor trip verified, THEN actuate SI.

c)

Go to 19000 C, E 0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

SS CAUTION The NCP will NOT have miniflow when the CCP normal miniflow valves are closed.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of 11 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Letdown line break inside containment will result in loss of RCS inventory and increasing radiation levels inside containment. The crew will enter AOP 1 8004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, to take corrective actions for the loss of inventory.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC A4.

Check charging flow less than or equal to 100 gpm.

NOTE: Charging flow is expected to drop below 100 gpm due to isolating letdown OATC RNO (This is not expected to be performed)

A4.

Shift charging suction to the RWST:

a.

Open RWST TO CCP A&B SUCTION valves:

LVO112D LVO112E b.

Close VCT OUTLET ISOLATION valves:

LVO112B LVO112C a.

Place CCP alternate mini flow valves in ENABLE PTL:

HV8508A HV8508B b.

Close CCP normal miniflow valves:

HV 8110 CCP A & B COMMON MINIFLOW HV8111ACCPAMINIFLOW HV8111BCCPBMINIFLOW c.

Trip the reactor.

d.

Initiatel 9000-C, E 0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

OATC

• A5.

Maintain VCT level using automatic or manual makeup control.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 5 of 11 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Letdown line break inside containment will result in loss of RCS inventory and increasing radiation levels inside containment. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, to take corrective actions for the loss of inventory.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS A6.

Initiate 91001-C, EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND IMPLEMENTING INSTRUCTIONS OATC A7.

Verify PRZR PORVs

- CLOSED.

OATC A8.

Check PRZR Safety Valves

- CLOSED.

UO A9.

Stop any load changes in progress.

OATC AlO.

Check PRZR pressure

- TRENDING TO PROGRAM.

OATC/UO

• A1 1 Monitor CNMT pressure:

Less than 3.8 psig.

Stable.

SS A12 Initiate 14905, RCS LEAKAGE CALCULATION (INVENTORY BALANCE) to verify TS 3.4.13 compliance.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 6 of 11 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Letdown line break inside containment will result in loss of RCS inventory and increasing radiation levels inside containment. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, to take corrective actions for the loss of inventory.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS CAUTION Non essential personnel should be evacuated from containment if conditions warrant. However, a containment entry may be necessary to identify the source of the leakage, if conditions permit.

SS/OATC A13 Locate the source of leakage using ATTACHMENT A.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 7 of 11 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Letdown line break inside containment will result in loss of RCS inventory and increasing radiation levels inside containment. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, to take corrective actions for the loss of inventory.

ATTACHMENT A LEAK IDENTIFICATION SYMPTOMS 1.

Leak from pressurizer steam space:

System pressure degraded with pressurizer level normal and relatively stable.

Rising temperature, pressure or level in PRT.

ALB12-E01 PRZR RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP.

ALB12-F01 PRZR SAFETY RELIEF DISCH HI TEMP.

ALB12-E02 PRZR REL TANK HI PRESS.

ALB12-F02 PRZR REL TANK HI/LO LEVEL.

ALB12-E03 PRZR REL TANK HI TEMP.

A pressurizer level/pressure instrument reference leg leak will display the following symptoms:

Affected pressure channel failing low and affected level channel failing high.

Unaffected pressure channels lowering and unaffected level channels normal and relatively stable.

ALB11-COl PRZR CONTROL HI LEVEL DEV AND HEATERS ON.

ALB11-E01 PRZR HI LEVEL ALARM.

ALB11-FOl PRZR HI LEVEL CHANNEL ALERT.

2.

Leak past reactor vessel head flange:

ALBI2-F03 RV FLG LKOF HI TEMP.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 8 of 11 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Letdown line break inside containment will result in loss of RCS inventory and increasing radiation levels inside containment. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, to take corrective actions for the loss of inventory.

3.

Leak into auxiliary component cooling water:

ALB-04-A05 (B05, C05, D05) ACCW RCP 1(2,3, 4) THERM BARRIER HX HI FLOW.

ALBO4-B06 ACCW RCP THRM BARRIER HI PRESS.

ALBO4-A0l ACCW SURGE TK HI/LO LVL.

RE-i 950 Auxiliary component cooling water process monitor rising or alarm.

ACCW outlet from seal water heat exchanger local ti-2075.

ALBO4-C02 ACCW EXCESS LTDN HX LO FLOW extinguished.

Low or no letdown flow indicated on Fl-Oi 32A!C with normal charging temperature indicated on Tl-0i26 (Letdown heat exchanger tube leak).

4.

Reactor coolant pump seal package:

ALBO8-A03(B03,C03,D03) RCP1 (2,3,4) STANDPIPE HI LEVEL.

ALBO8-A05(B05,C05,D05) RCP1 (2,3,4) CONTROLLED LKG HI/LO FLOW.

ALBO8-A04(B04,C04,D04) RCP1 (2,3,4) NO.2 SEAL LKOF HI FLOW.

Abnormally high seal return flow indicated on FI-0160 or Fl-0158..

Low differential pressure across No. i seal for any reactor coolant pump!

5.

Safety injection system accumulators:

ALBO6-A03(B03,C03,D03) ACCUM TANK 1 (2,3,4) Hl!LO LEVEL.

Rising water level indication for any accumulator.

Rising pressure indication for any accumulator.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 9 of 11 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Letdown line break inside containment will result in loss of RCS inventory and increasing radiation levels inside containment. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, to take corrective actions for the loss of inventory.

6.

Chemical and volume control system:

Abnormal temperatures in letdown or charging flow.

Abnormal pressure in letdown or charging flow.

Abnormal flows in letdown or charging flow.

ALB51-B04 (ALB52-B01) CVCS TRAIN A(B) PMP RM HI TEMP.

Pressurizer relief tank level, temperature or pressure rising from CVCS letdown line relief valve PSV-8117.

Seal return line relief valve PSV-8121 lifting.

ALB63-E01 CVCS PIPE BREAK RM PROT ACTUATION.

7.

Excess letdown line:

Rising temperature at Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet Tl-0122.

Rising pressure at Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Outlet P1-0124.

8.

Reactor vessel head vent line:

Rising temperature on Head Vent Line Tl-0400.

Rising flow on Head Vent Line Fl-0406A or Fl-0407A.

Rising level, temperature, or pressure in the pressurizer relief tank.

9.

RHR system:

Lifting of relief valves PSV-8708A or 8708B as indicated by rising PRT level, pressure or temperature.

ALBO2(03)-B05 CCW TRAIN A(B) SURGE TK HI/LO LVL

Appendixb Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 10 of 11 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Letdown line break inside containment will result in loss of RCS inventory and increasing radiation levels inside containment. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, to take corrective actions for the loss of inventory.

CCW process RAD RE-0017A(B) rising or alarm.

10.

Safety injection system, RHR subsystem:

V Lifting of relief valves PSV-8842, 8856A or 8856B as indicated by rising boron recycle holdup tank levels.

11.

Safety injection system, SI pumps:

Lifting of relief valves PSV-8851, 8853A or 8853B as indicated by rising boron recycle holdup tank levels.

12.

Intersystem LOCA:

RWST level rising.

Any abnormal rise in inventory of a system connected to the RCS.

13.

Steam Generator Tube Leakage:

SG sample results indicate greater than minimum detectable activity.

Secondary radiation monitors indicate increasing leakage based on historical data.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 11 of 11 Event No.:

5 Event

Description:

Letdown line break inside containment will result in loss of RCS inventory and increasing radiation levels inside containment. The crew will enter AOP 18004-C, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, to take corrective actions for the loss of inventory.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC A14.

Isolate the leak.

OATC Al 5.

Restore normal charging and letdown, if possible by initiating 13006, CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROL SYSTEM NOTE: The SS may opt to place excess letdown in service to keep PRZR level stable.

Refer to Event 6 for placing Excess Letdown in service.

SS Al6.

Check continued operation allowed per Operations Management.

RNO SS Al6.

Perform a unit shutdown by initiating 12004-C, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1).

SS Al 7.

Return to procedure and step in effect.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 5 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

The UO places Excess letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the RCS leak. The UO will use SOP 13008-1, to place excess letdown in service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Section 4.1 of 13008-1 is selected.

UO NOTE Independent Verifications performed within Section 4.1 are documented on Checklist 1.

UO 4.1.1 Verify that a CVCS Charging Pump is running.

UO 4.1.2 Verify CLOSED RX HEAD VENT TO EXCESS LETDOWN ISOLATION 1-HV-8098.

UO 4.1.3 Verify flow controller EXCESS LETDOWN, 1 HC-123 is set to closed (0% demand).

UO 4.1.4 Verify OPEN RCPs Seal Leakoff Isolation valves:

1-HV-8100 RCPS SEAL LEAKOFF CRC ISOLATION 1-HV-8112 RCPS SEAL LEAKOFF IRC ISOLATION

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 5 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

The UO places Excess letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the RCS leak. The UO will use SOP 13008-1, to place excess letdown in service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.1.5 Verify EXCESS LETDOWN TO VCT, 1HS-8143 is in the OPEN VCT position.

UO 4.1.6 Verify Reactor power is maintained 3622.6 MWT while Excess Letdown is in service and LEFM is in service.

IF LEFM is NOT in service, maintain power 3562 MWT per guidance of 12004-C.

UO 4.1.7 Open EXCESS LETDOWN LINE Isolation Valves:

1-HV-8153 EXCESS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV 1-HV-8154 EXCESS LETDOWN LINE ISO VLV UO 4.1.8 Record the following:

Pressure on indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, IPI-124.

Temperature on indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, 1TI-122.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 3 of 5 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

The UO places Excess letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the RCS leak. The UO will use SOP 13008-1, to place excess letdown in service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.1.9 WHILE establishing excess letdown, perform the following:

Monitor pressure rise on pressure indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, 1PI-124 and verify it remains less than 50 pounds above pressure recorded in Step 4.1.8.

e Monitor temperature rise on temperature indicator EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET, 1TI-122 and verify it remains less than 165 degrees.

UO 4.1.10 Slowly adjust output flow controller EXCESS LETDOWN 1 HC-1 23 to establish maximum allowable flow (estimated to be approximately 30 gpm).

UO 4.1.1 1 Perform the following as required to maintain desired pressurizer level:

Adjust charging using CHARGING LINE CONTROL, 1FIC-121.

Adjust seal injection using SEAL FLOW CONTROL, 1HC-182.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of 5 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

The UO places Excess letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the RCS leak. The UO will use SOP 13008-1, to place excess letdown in service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.1.12 IF normal letdown is isolated, align the outlet of the Seal Water Heat Exchanger to the Volume Control Tank spray nozzle as follows: (IV REQUIRED) (N/A if previously performed) a.

Unlock and open CVCS SEALS SEAL WATER HX OUTLET TO VCT, 1-1208-U6-104 (KEY 1OP2-281).

( RA-26) b.

Close CVCS SEALS SEAL WATER HX OUTLET TO NCP SUCTION, 1-1 208-U6-1 06. (RA-26)

UO 4.1.13 jf directed by SS to transfer excess letdown to the RCDT, perform the following:

a.

Verify RCDT system is aligned to accept Excess Letdown flow per 13002-1 Reactor Drain Tank Operation.

b.

Place EXCESS LETDOWN TO VCT, 1 HS-8143 to the OPEN RCDT position.

c.

Monitor temperature rise on EXCESS LETDOWN HX OUTLET 1TI-122 and verify it remains less than 165 degrees.

d.

Slowly raise output on flow controller EXCESS LETDOWN, 1 HC-1 23 to establish maximum allowable flow.

e.

swap to RCDT is being performed for Chemistry control or level control Step 4.2.7.

f.

Perform the following as required to maintain desired pressurizer level:

Adjust charging using CHARGING LINE CONTROL, 1 FIC-1 21.

Adjust seal injection using SEAL FLOW CONTROL, IHC-182.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 5 of 5 Event No.:

6 Event

Description:

The UO places Excess letdown in service per direction of the SS to maintain PRZR level after letdown is isolated to stop the RCS leak. The UO will use SOP 13008-1, to place excess letdown in service.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 4.1.14 IF the Seal Water Heat Exchanger Outlet was aligned to the Volume Control Tank, restore normal alignment as follows:

(IV REQUIRED) a.

Open CVCS SEALS SEAL WATER HX OUTLET TO NCP SUCTION, 1-1 208-U6-1 06. (RA-26) b.

Close and lock CVCS SEALS SEAL WATER HX OUTLET TO VCT, 1-1 208-U6-1 04 (KEY 1OP2-281).

(RA-26)

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

SG #4 ARV Pressure Transmitter Fails High resulting in a fully opened ARV.

The crew will respond by performing the actions of AOP 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage.

The UO will be able to isolate the leak with manual operation of the ARV controller on the main control board.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Diagnoses opening of SG ARV by the following indications:

MN STM SFTY VLVS LLEAKING TAVG/TREF DEVIATION TAVGLO-LOALERT TERR (TAVG-TREF) LO High ARV tailpipe temperature (back panel indication)

SG 4 ARV position indicating lights Red ON, Green

- OFF Lowering RCS temperature Rising reactor power SG #2 ARV controller indication (RED UP ARROW LIT)

SS Enters AOP 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage (Crew Update) 1.

Perform the following as necessary:

Reduce Turbine load if any of the following indications exceed 100% power:

OATC UQ1 118 (GREATER THAN 100% MWT for the applicable unit)

NIs Ts UO Isolate the leak. (UO closes SG ARV)

IF leakage is such that significant hazard to personnel or equipment exists OR leakage rate is unstable and is worsening, THEN:

1)

Trip the reactor.

2)

WHEN reactor trip is verified, THEN close MSIVs and BSIVs.

3)

Go to 19000-C, E 0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

SG #4 ARV Pressure Transmitter Fails High resulting in a fully opened ARV.

The crew will respond by performing the actions of AOP 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage.

The UO will be able to isolate the leak with manual operation of the ARV controller on the main control board.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC/UO 2.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

uQ

• 3 Monitor steam leakage characteristics:

Small in magnitude such that no significant hazard to personnel or equipment exists.

Leakage rate is relatively stable and is not rapidly worsening.

OATC 4.

Check the following:

a.

Tavg

- MATCHED WITH TREF b.

PRZR level

- IN PROGRAM BAND c.

PRZR pressure

- BETWEEN 2220 AND 2250 PSIG UO d.

SG levels

- IN PROGRAM BAND UO 5.

Check containment conditions

- NORMAL:

Pressure Temperature Moisture Sump level UO 6.

Close SG blowdown isolation valves if the source of leakage is unknown.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 3 of 3 Event No.:

7 Event

Description:

SG #4 ARV Pressure Transmitter Fails High resulting in a fully opened ARV.

The crew will respond by performing the actions of AOP 18008-C, Secondary Coolant Leakage.

The UO will be able to isolate the leak with manual operation of the ARV controller on the main control board.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior uo 7.

Check CSTs level - GREATER THAN 80%.

UO

• 8.

Monitor hotwell makeup rate

- SUFFICIENT TO MAINTAIN LEVEL.

SS 9.

Review applicable Technical Specification requirements.

LCO 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System INFO ONLY LCO 3.7.4 ARVs

- INFO ONLY SS 10.

Perform one of the following:

Continue plant operation.

-OR-Commence a unit shutdown by initiating 12004 C, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1).

Should select unit shutdown due to RCS/CVCS leakage

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 6 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

I-ugh shaft vibration on RCP #2. The crew will dispatch a Systems Operator to obtain local panel readings and to determine which RCP has the high vibrations. The Annunciator Response procedure for the RCP hi shaft vibration will direct the crew the shut down the RCP using procedure 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation.

If RCP #2 is not stopped within 10 minutes of the alarm, RCP seal leakage into CNMT will result.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Alarms:

RCP SHAFT VIBRATION ALERT RCP SHAFT HI VIBRATION Refers to procedure 17008-1, windows E04 and F04.

OATC NOTES Prompt action is required to confirm alarm validity and shut down affected RCP if required.

The Vibration Monitoring Panel displays auctioneered high vibration levels.

OATC INITIAL OPERATOR ACTIONS SS 1.

Attempt to confirm validity of annunciator through related plant parameters.

Possible parameters to look at are:

seal DIP seal injection flow seal leak off flow bearing temperatures lube oil alarms

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 6 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

High shaft vibration on RCP #2. The crew will dispatch a Systems Operator to obtain local panel readings and to determine which RCP has the high vibrations. The Annunciator Response procedure for the RCP hi shaft vibration will direct the crew the shut down the RCP using procedure 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation.

If RCP #2 is not stopped within 10 minutes of the alarm, RCP seal leakage into CNMT will result.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 2.

Dispatch an operator to the Vibration Monitoring Panel 1-1201-P5-VMP to:

a.

Identify the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) causing the alarm.

b.

Check both vibration channels and alarm setpoints for shaft and frame of each RCP (32 points in all) to verify no obvious vibration monitoring equipment problems exist.

c.

Attempt to reset alarm using COMMON RESET toggle switch.

3.

Refer to 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation and shut down the affected RCP.

NOTE: The SO reports that RCP #2 shaft vibration channels are reading 21 mils, and the frame vibration channels are reading 2.5 mils. All other RCP channels indicate 7 mils shaft and I mil frame. The common reset switch has been placed to reset to attempt to clear the alarm.

SS Determines section 4.3.1 of procedure 13003-1, is the correct section to use for RCP shutdown.

SS CAUTIONS If RHR is in the Shutdown Cooling Mode, RCS Pressure shall be less than 365 psig prior to stopping a Reactor Coolant Pump (This is to preclude lifting a RHR Suction Relief).

If RCP #1 or #4 is to be stopped, the associated Spray Valve is placed in manual and closed to prevent spray short cycling.

Determines these cautions are N/A

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 3 of 6 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

High shaft vibration on RCP #2. The crew will dispatch a Systems Operator to obtain local panel readings and to determine which RCP has the high vibrations. The Annunciator Response procedure for the RCP hi shaft vibration will direct the crew the shut down the RCP using procedure 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation.

If RCP #2 is not stopped within 10 minutes of the alarm, RCP seal leakage into CNMT will result.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 4.3.1.1 !j RCP #1 or #4 is to be stopped, place the associated spray valve in MANUAL and close the valve:

RCP 1:

1-PIC-0455C RCP 4:

i-PIC-0455B Determines this step is N/A.

OATC 4.3.1.2 in Modes 1 or 2, perform an RCP shutdown as follows:

a.

Start the RCP Oil Lift Pump for affected RCP, if available.

Red

- ON Green OFF Blue

- ON OATC b.

IF Reactor Power is Greater than 15% Rated Thermal Power:

(1)

Trip the Reactor and initiate 19000-C, E-O Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection.

(2)

WHEN the immediate operator actions of 19000-C are complete, stop the RCP by placing its Non-i E Control Switch in STOP and then placing its 1 E Control Switch in STOP:

RCP Non-i E Control Switch 1 E Control Switch Loop 1 1-HS-0495B 1-HS-0495A Loop 2 1 -HS-0496B 1 -HS-0496A Loop 3 1-HS-0497B 1-HS-0497A Loop 4 1 -HS-0498B I -HS-0498A Determines this step is N/A.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of 6 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

High shaft vibration on RCP #2. The crew will dispatch a Systems Operator to obtain local panel readings and to determine which RCP has the high vibrations. The Annunciator Response procedure for the RCP hi shaft vibration will direct the crew the shut down the RCP using procedure 13003-i, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation.

If RCP #2 is not stopped within 10 minutes of the alarm, RCP seal leakage into CNMT will result.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC c.

IF Reactor Power is less than 15% Rated Thermal Power:

(1)

Stop the RCP by placing its Non-IE Control Switch in STOP and then placing its IE Control Switch in STOP:

RCP Non-IE Control Switch IE Control Switch Loop 2 1-HS-0496B 1-HS-0496A (2)

Initiate 18005-C, Partial Loss Of Flow.

Notifies SS to initiate 18005-C.

OATC 4.3.1.3 IF in Mode 3 or below, perform an RCP shutdown as follows:

a.

Start the RCP Oil Lift Pump for affected RCP, if available.

b.

Stop the RCP by placing its Non-i E Control Switch in STOP and then place its i E Control Switch in STOP:

RCP Non-i E Control Switch 1 E Control Switch Loop 1 i-HS-0495B 1-HS-0495A Loop 2 1-HS-0496B i-HS-0496A Determines this step is N/A.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 5 of 6 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

High shaft vibration on RCP #2. The crew will dispatch a Systems Operator to obtain local panel readings and to determine which RCP has the high vibrations. The Annunciator Response procedure for the RCP hi shaft vibration will direct the crew the shut down the RCP using procedure 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation.

If RCP #2 is not stopped within 10 minutes of the alarm, RCP seal leakage into CNMT will result.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC NOTE When stopping the last RCP, its Oil Lift Pump needs to run for at least 10 minutes after stopping the RCP.

OATC 4.3.1.4 WHEN the RCP has coasted to a stop (as indicated by reverse flow), stop the RCP Oil Lift Pump.

HS-0556 placed in stop SS Initiates AOP 1 8005-C, Partial Loss of Flow (Crew Update).

OATC 18008-C 1.

Check reactor power

- LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 15%

UO 2.

Stop any power changes in progress.

OATC/UO 3.

Initiate the Continuous Actions Page.

UO

• 4*

Check affected loop SG NR Level

- TRENDING TO 65%

RNO:

Control feed flow to maintain affected loop SG NR level between 60% and 70%.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 6 of 6 Event No.: 8 Event

Description:

High shaft vibration on RCP #2. The crew will dispatch a Systems Operator to obtain local panel readings and to determine which RCP has the high vibrations. The Annunciator Response procedure for the RCP hi shaft vibration will direct the crew the shut down the RCP using procedure 13003-1, Reactor Coolant Pump Operation.

If RCP #2 is not stopped within 10 minutes of the alarm, RCP seal leakage into CNMT will result.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATCIUO 5.

Check Tavg

- TRENDING TO PROGRAM OATC 6.

Verify PRZR level

- TRENDING TO PROGRAM OATC 7.

Verify PRZR pressure

- TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG OATC 8.

Check RCP 1 and RCP 4

- RUNNING SS 9.

Initiate shutdown to Mode 3 by initiating 12004-C, POWER OPERATION (MODE 1).

(TS 3.4.4)

SS 10.

Determine and correct the cause of the pump trip.

S5 11.

Check shutdown to Mode 3 COMPLETE RNO:

Return to Step 9.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 1 of 16 EventNo.:

9andlO Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the ioop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Tries to maintain PRZR level: (Continuous action from AOP 18009-C) 2 Maintain PRZR Level a.

Adjust charging flow as necessary to maintain program level.

b.

Check PRZR level STABLE OR RISING.

RNO b. Perform the following:

1)

Isolate letdown by closing:

a)

Letdown Orifice Valves b)

Letdown Isolation Valves c)

Excess Letdown Valves 2)

Start an additional Charging Pump as necessary 3)

IF PRZR level can NOT be maintained greater than 9%,

THEN perform the following:

a)

Trip the Reactor b)

When Reactor trip verified, THEN actuate SI c)

Go to 19000-C, E-0 REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Report to SS unable to maintain PRZR level through the normal charging path.

SS Directs OATC action per AOP 18009-C step 2 RNO actions listed above SS Directs OATC I UO actions using EOP 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 2 of 16 Event No.:

9 and 10 Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the ioop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030 0, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW IMMEDIATE ACTIONS of 19000-C, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection 1

- Verifies Reactor Trip Rod Bottom Lights

- LIT Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers

- OPEN Neutron Flux

- LOWERING 2

Verifies Turbine Trip All Turbine Stop Valves CLOSED 3

Checks Power to AC Emergency Buses 3a. at least 1 4160 1 E bus energized

- White lights

- ON 3b. all AC Emergency buses energized

- White lights

- ON (41 60V and 480V) 4

- Checks if SI I Actuated Any SI annunciator - LIT SI BPLP status light

- LIT SS Plant page for Reactor Trip I Safety Injection OATC I UO 6.

Initiates Foldout Page 7.

Initiate OATC Initial Actions pages Initiate UO Initial Actions pages.

2

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 3 of 16 Event No.:

9andlO Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the ioop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the FOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC Initial Operator Actions of E-0.

1 Checks both Trains of ECCS aligning per MLBs.

2 Checks Containment Isolation Phase A actuated per MLBs 3

Checks ECCS pumps and NCP status.

a.

CCPs running CRITICAL b.

SI Pumps running (manually starts SIP-IB) c.

RHR pumps running d.

NCPtripped 4

CCW pumps only two running per train 5a NSCW pumps only two running per train 5b NSCW tower return I bypass valves in auto 6a Containment coolers running in LOW speed per MLB5 6b NSCW cooler isolation valves open per MLBs 7

CVI dampers and valves shut per MLBs 8

Containment pressure remained < 21.5 OATC 9

Checks ECCS flows:

a.

BIT Flow On scale b.

RCS pressure < 1625 psig (If NOT go to step 10) c.

SI pump flow d.

RCS pressure < 300 psig e.

RHRpumpflow OATC 10 Checks ECCS valve alignment proper on MLB5 1 1 Checks at least one ACCW pump running 12 Adjusts seal injection flow to RCPs 8 to 13 gpm.

3

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 4 of 16 EventNo.:

9andlO Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the ioop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030 0, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO Initial Operator Actions of E-0 1.

Checks MDAFW pumps running and TDAFW pump, if required.

2.

Checks NR SG levels

- one> 10%, If not ensures at least 570 GPM flow 3.

Checks if SLI is required Any SL Pressure < 585 psig CNMT Pressure> 14.5 psig High rate bistables lit with low pressure SI/SLI blocked If any above met then verify MSIVs & BSIVs closed 4.

Verifies FWI:

MFRV, BFRV, MFIV, BFIVs all shut 5.

Verifies SGBD isolated places hand switches for SGBD isolation valves to close verify SGBD sample isolations closed.

6.

Verify Diesel Generators running.

7.

Throttle AFW flow to control SG levels 10 65% NR 8.

Verify both MFPs tripped.

9.

Check Main Generator Output breakers open.

19000-c OATC I UO 8.

Initiate Continuous Actions pages.

OATC 9.

Checks RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557 degrees F using RCS Tavg.

4

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 5 of 16 EventNo.:

9andlO Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the loop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030 0, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 9RNO.

If necessary, takes actions to control RCS temperature.

Stop dumping steam.

Reduces AFW flow (not < 570 gpm if SG NR levels < 10% NR).

If cooldown continues shuts MSIVs and BSIVs If temperature> 557 F & rising then dump steam OATC 10

- Checks PORVs, Block Valves, & Spray Valves a, PORVs closed and in AUTO b, Normal spray valves closed c, Power available to at least one block valve d, At least one block valve open (NOT) d RNO, verify open at least one block valve when RCS pressure>

2185 psig.

OATC 1 1

- Checks if RCPs should be stopped a, COP or SIP running b, RCS pressure < 1375 psig If yes then stop all RCPs if no then go to step # 12 UO / SS 12

- Checks for faulted SG and transition to E-2 SG pressures:

o Any lowering in an uncontrolled manner, or o

Completely depressurized If yes then go to 19020-C, E-2 if no then go to step # 13 5

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 6 of 16 EventNo.:

9andlO Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the loop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS I UO 13

- Checks for SG tubes intact.

a.

Directs chemistry to periodically sample all SG one at a time for activity.

b.

Checks secondary radiation normal:

o Main Steam Line Rad Monitors RE-13120 RE-i3121 RE-i3122 RE-i3iig o

Condenser Air Ejector Rad Monitors RE-i 2839C RE-i 2839D (if on scale)

RE-i 2839E (if on scale) o Steam Generator Liquid Process Rad Monitors RE-00i9 (Sample)

RE-002i (Blowdown) o SG sample radiation c.

Any SG level rising in an uncontrolled manner (EXPECTED) d.

If rad monitors abnormal or SG level rising uncontrollably, then go to 1 9030-C, E-3 EOP 19030-C, Steam Generator Tube Rupture SS Directs actions of OATCI UO using 19030-C.

(Crew Update)

OATCIUO 1.

Initiate the following:

Continuous Actions and Foldout Page Critical Safety Function Status Trees per i 9200-C 6

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 7 of 16 Event No.:

9 and 10 Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the ioop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS 2.

Directs SM to implement EPIPs (91001-C)

OATC

• 3 Maintain RCP seal injection flow 8 to 13 GPM OATC

• 4 Checks if RCPs should be stopped:

At least one CCP or SI pump running RCS pressure < 1375 psig (EXPECT> 1375)

If pressure lowers < 1375 psig prior to initiation of RCS cooldown then stop all RCPs Q

• 5 Identifies Ruptured SG by any of the following:

Unexpected rise in SG # 2 narrow range level, or Report for chemistry High radiation from any SG steamline High radiation from any SG blowdown line UO 6.

Isolate Ruptured SG ARV:

CRITICAL Adjusts SG 2 ARV controller to 1160 psig (7.7.3 pot setting)

Check SG 2 ARV -CLOSED UO 7.

Checks at least one MDAFW pump running & capable of feeding SG(s) needed for RCS cooldown 7

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 8 of 16 Event No.:

9andlO Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the ioop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 8.

Closes SG 2 supply to TDAFW pump HV-3019 CRITICAL UO 9.

Verifies SGBD isolation valves & handswitches in close UO 10.

Closes loop 2 MSIVs & BSIVs to isolate ruptured SG CRITICAL from intact SGs SS CAUTION Procedure should be performed in a timely manner to assure break flow in the ruptured SG is terminated before water enters the SGs main steam piping.

UO ii.

Maintains ruptured SG that is also faulted isolated unless needed for RCS cooldown or SG activity sample UO 12.

Checks SG 2 isolated from intact SGs:

MSIVs & BSIVs on loop 2 shut Steam supply to TDAFW pump (HV-301 9) shut UO

• j3 Controls ruptured SG level:

CRITICAL Maintains feed flow until NR level > 10%, then isolates feed flow UO 14.

Checks ruptured SG pressure> 290 psig 8

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 9 of 16 Event No.:

9 and 10 Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the ioop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC I UO 15.

Checks if low steam line pressure SI / SLI should be blocked:

a. Steam dumps available

b. PRZR pressure < 2000 psig RNOb. Blocks low steamline pressure SI/SLI when RCS pressure < 2000 psig and SG high steam pressure rate alarms are clear.

(HS-40068 & HS 40069)

UO 16.

Checks if automatic steam dump isolation should be bypassed:

a. RCS temperature > 550 F

b. As RCS cooldown initiated hold HS-500A and HS-500B in BYPASS INTERLOCK position until RCS temperature is < 550 F UO 17.

Raises intact SG levels prior to maximum rate cooldown OATC 18.

Checks at least one RCP running 9

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 10 of 16 Event No.:

9andlO Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the ioop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030 0, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior CREW 19.

Determines required core exit temperature for cooldown:

Ruptured SG Core Exit Pressure Temperature (psig)

(°F)

>1200 530 1100to1199 518 1000 to 1099 506 900 to 999 493 800 to 899 479 700 to 799 463 600 to 699 445 500 to 599 424 400 to 499 399 300 to 399 366 290 to 299 350 UO 20.

Initiates RCS cooldown at maximum rate using steam Dumps If in Tave mode:

1) Match demand on SG header pressure controller PlC-507 and SD demand meter U 1-500

2) Transfer steam dumps to STM PRESS mode using HS-5000

3) Open all available steam dumps by slowly raising demand on PIC-507 If in steam pressure mode:

1) Open all available steam dumps by slowly raising demand on P10-507 10

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 11 of 16 Event No.:

9andlO Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the loop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030 0, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-I B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO

• 21.

Checks if RCS Cooldown should be stopped:

a. Core Exit TCs < required temperature

if not, perform 21 b & 21 c when < required temperature otherwise go to step 22

b. Stop RCS cooldown CRITICAL

c. Maintain core exit TCs < required temperature UO

• 22.

Checks intact SG levels:

a. NR level

- at least one> 10%

if not maintain > 570 gpm total feed flow

b. Maintain NR levels between 10% and 65%

c. NR level any rising in an uncontrolled manner:

if yes stop cooldown and return to step 3 If no go to step 23 OATC

• 23.

Checks PRZR PORVs and Block valves

a. Power to PRZR PORV Block Valves

- AVAILABLE.

b. PRZR PORVs

- CLOSED.

c. PRZR PORV Block Valves

- AT LEAST ONE OPEN.

RNO c. IF Block Valve NOT closed to isolate an excessively leaking or open PRZR PORV, AND WHEN PRZR pressure is greater than 2185 psig, THEN verify open at least one PRZR PORV Block Valve.

11

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.:

3 Page 12 of 16 Event No.:

9 and 10 Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the ioop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the FOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior SS CAUTIONS If offsite power is lost after SI reset, action is required to restart the following ESF equipment if plant conditions require their operation:

RHR Pumps SI pumps Post-LOCA Cavity Purge Units Containment Coolers in low speed (Started in high speed on a UV signal).

ESF Chilled Water Pumps (If CR1 is reset).

OATC 24.

Reset SI SS CAUTION Repositioning Phase A Isolation Valves may cause radiation problems throughout plant OATC 25.

Reset Containment Isolation Phase A UO 26.

Establish Instrument Air to Containment:

a. Instrument air pressure> 100 psig

b. Open INSTR AIR CNMT ISO VLV HV-9378 OATC

c. Verify PRZR Spray Valves operating as required 12

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 13 of 16 Event No.:

9andlO Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the loop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicant 1

s Action or Behavior OATC 27.

Check if RHR pumps should be stopped:

a. RHR pumps any running with suction aligned to RWST

b. RCS pressure > 300 psig

c. Stop RHR pumps OATC

• 28.

IF RCS pressure lowers in an uncontrolled manner to less than 300 psig, THEN restart RHR Pumps.

OATC

• 29.

Check if RCS cooldown should be stopped:

a. Core Exit TCs

- LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

RNO a. Do NOT proceed until core exit TCs less than required temperature.

UO

b. Stop RCS cooldown.

UO

c. Maintain Core Exit TCs

- LESS THAN REQUIRED TEMPERATURE.

CAUTION SS Ruptured SG pressure and RCS subcooling should begin to rise as RCS pressure recovers after the cooldown is stopped.

13

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 201 0-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 14 of 16 EventNo.:

9andlO Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the loop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior UO 30.

Check ruptured SG(s) pressure

- STABLE OR RISING.

OATC 31.

Check RCS Subcooling

- GREATER THAN 44°F

[58°F ADVERSE].

OATC 32.

Check if RCS depressurization termination criteria is currently met:

BOTH of the following:

1)

RCS pressure

- LESS THAN RUPTURED SG(s)

PRESSURE.

2)

PRZR level

- GREATER THAN 9%

[37% ADVERSE].

-OR RCS Subcooling

- LESS THAN 24 F [38 F ADVERSE].

-OR PRZR level

- GREATER THAN 75% [52% ADVERSE].

If NOT met go to step 34 (expected action)

OATC 34.

Check Normal PRZR Spray

- AVAILABLE.

14

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 15 of 16 Event No.:

9andlO Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the ioop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 35.

Depressurize RCS using Normal PRZR Spray to refill PRZR:

a. Spray PRZR with maximum available spray.

b. Normal PRZR Spray EFFECTIVE AT REDUCING RCS PRESSURE

c. Go to step 41.

OATC 41.

Check if any of the following conditions are satisfied:

Both of the following:

1) RCS pressure < ruptured SG pressure

2) PRZR level > 9%

--OR-RCS subcooling < 24 F

--OR PRZR level > 75%

RNO Do NOT continue until termination criteria met.

OATC 42.

Terminates RCS depressurization:

a. Verify normal spray valves closed

b. Verify PRZR PORV(s) closed

c. Block COPS

d. Check auxiliary spray in service RNO d. go to step 43 15

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2010-301 Scenario No.: 3 Page 16 of 16 EventNo.:

9andlO Event

Description:

A SGTR suddenly develops in the ioop with the RCP high vibration immediately after the RCP is stopped. The OATC will not be able to maintain PRZR level and will manually actuate Safety Injection. The crew will enter the EOP network and transition to 19030-C, SGTR. The OATC will have to manually start SIP-i B.

Time Position Applicants Action or Behavior OATC 43.

Check RCS pressure rising CAUTION SS ECCS FLOW SHOULD BE TERMINATED when termination criteria are satisfied to prevent overfilling of the ruptured SGs.

OATC I UO 44.

Check if ECCS flow should be terminated:

(SHOULD BE MET)

RCS subcooling > 24 F, and SG NR level in one intact SG > 10%, or

> 570 GPM flow to SGs, and RCS pressure stable or rising, and PRZR level > 9%

OATC 45.

Stops both SI pumps and one CCP END OF SCENARIO 16