Text

Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request to Adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition) License Amendment Request (LAR) 2008-01
	ML093410007
Person / Time
Site:	Oconee
Issue date:	11/30/2009
From:	Baxter D; Duke Energy Carolinas
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	LAR 2008-01
	Download: ML093410007 (81)
	v • d • e

Duke Energ DAVE BAXTER Vice President egy, Oconee Nuclear Station Duke Energy ON01 VP / 7800 Rochester Highway Seneca, SC 29672 864-873-4460 864-873-4208 fax dabaxter@dukeenergy.com November 30, 2009 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC Oconee Nuclear Station, Units 1, 2, and 3 Docket Numbers 50-269, 50-270, and 50-287 Request for Additional Information regarding the License Amendment Request to adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition)

License Amendment Request (LAR) 2008-01 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.90, Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke) proposes to amend Renewed Facility Operating Licenses (FOLs) Nos. DPR-38, DPR-47, and DPR-55. This LAR requests Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) review and approval for adoption of a new fire protection licensing basis which complies with the requirements in 10 CFR 50.48(a), 10 CFR 50.48(c), and the guidance in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.205. The LAR was submitted to the NRC on October 31, 2008 and supplemented in letters dated January 30, 2009, February 9, 2009, February 23, 2009, May 31, 2009, August 3, 2009, and September 29, 2009.

In order to complete review of the LAR, the NRC issued a preliminary request for additional information (RAI). Duke and the NRC met August 19 & 20, 2009, to review the RAIs to ensure that there was a common understanding of the requirements to address the requests. As a result of that meeting, several RAIs were withdrawn and are noted as withdrawn in Enclosure 1. The remaining RAIs were issued formally on November 18, 2009. Enclosure 1 contains the responses to the RAIs.

Duke also provided responses to RAIs 5-15 and 5-16 (RAIs received June 18, 2009) in Enclosure 1. The responses were omitted from the RAI response dated August 3, 2009, due to ongoing discussions between the NFPA-805 Task Force and the NRC concerning FAQ 07-30, Operator Manual Action Transition to Recovery Actions.

Duke and the NRC met on November 12, 2009, to ensure that Duke is incorporating proposed RG 1.205, Revision 1, properly. As discussed during the November 12, 2009 Public Meeting, Duke will take the following actions:

www. duke-energy. com

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 30, 2009 Page 2

Define Primary Control Station.

Establish a Mission Time.

Determine recovery actions required to demonstrate availability of a success path.

Evaluate the risk of recovery actions (Resolution of FAQ 07-0030).

Duke previously committed to supplement the LAR by January 31, 2010, for transition to NFPA 805. However, due to methodology development and continued work required to implement proposed RG 1.205, Revision 1, the anticipated commitment date for the supplement is being delayed. The new date will be communicated to the NRC when a project schedule loaded with the additional activities required to meet the new guidance has been completed. Duke will provide this date by December 17, 2009.

Duke will also post the new project schedule to the shared website for reference. The schedule will be updated to reflect progress as work is completed.

A commitment table supporting this set of RAIs is provided in Attachment 1. Duke will provide a complete listing of NFPA 805 commitments when the LAR supplement is submitted.

If there are any questions regarding this submittal, please contact Reene' Gambrell at (864) 873-3364 or David J. Goforth at (704) 382-2659.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on November 30, 2009.

Sincerely, Dave B er, Vice President Oconee Nuclear Station

Enclosure:

1. Request for Additional Information regarding the License Amendment Request to adopt NFPA 805 Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Generating Plants (2001 Edition)

Attachment:

1. Commitments

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission November 30, 2009 Page 3 cc: w/o enclosures Mr. Luis Reyes, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 Mr. John Stang, Project Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8 G9A Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Paul Lain, NFPA-805 Program Manager Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-10 C15 Washington, D. C. 20555 Mr. Andy Sabisch Senior Resident Inspector Oconee Nuclear Station Ms. Susan Jenkins, Manager Infectious and Radioactive Waste Management Section 2600 Bull Street Columbia, SC 29201

Enclosure I REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO ADOPT NFPA 805 PERFORMANCE-BASED STANDARD FOR FIRE PROTECTION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTOR GENERATING PLANTS (2001 EDITION)

Request For Additional Information November 30, 2009 ENCLOSURE 1 REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST TO ADOPT NFPA 805 PERFORMANCE-BASED STANDARD FOR FIRE PROTECTION FOR LIGHT WATER REACTOR GENERATING PLANTS (2001 EDITION)

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION (RAI) 1-3:

The second sentence in Section 1.1.1 of the Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) Transition Report states:

"... 10 CFR 50.48(c) endorses, with exceptions, the National Fire Protection Association's NFPA 805, Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants - 2001 Edition, as a voluntary alternative for demonstrating compliance with 10 CFR 50.48 Section (b),

Appendix R, and Section (f), Decommissioning."

This sentence is incorrect. The change to 10 CFR 50.48 incorporates the NFPA standard by reference, with exceptions, resulting in the standard actually becoming a part of the regulation.

Similarly, the footnote on page 8 of the ONS Transition Report appears to be in error since the regulations do not "endorse" NFPA 805. The NFPA 805 rule took exception to the Life Safety and Business Interruption goals, objectives and performance criteria and incorporated by reference the remaining sections of NFPA 805.

Revise the Transition Report accordingly.

RAI 1-3 RESPONSE:

Section 1.1.1 and the footnote in the Transition Report will be revised to reflect that NFPA 805 was incorporated by reference and submitted with the License Amendment Request (LAR) supplement.

RAI 1-4:

Section 3.1 of the ONS Transition Report does not include any mention of the need to complete committed modifications.

Is the completion of any required modifications meant to be included in item "(7) complete implementation of the new licensing basis"? If so, this needs to be explicitly included in the discussion since completion of required modifications is required to complete transition.

Provide a summary of proposed modifications, a schedule for implementation of those modifications, and a proposed license condition reflecting the commitment and schedule for installation of the modifications.

RAI 1-4 RESPONSE:

Section 3.1 of the Transition Report and Attachment S of the LAR will be revised to reflect the list of committed modifications in the LAR supplement. Each committed modification will include a summary of the proposed modification scope, a schedule for implementation of the 1

Request For Additional Information November 30, 2009 modification, and a proposed License Condition reflecting the commitment and schedule for installation of the modification. In addition, Attachment C will include an overview of how the modification is to be used in the new NFPA 805 Fire Protection Program at ONS.

RAI 1-5:

Section 4.2.2.3 of the ONS Transition Report includes a bullet for "Open Items." The use of the term "Open Item" implies that further analysis is required. The staff cannot approve a request for transition to a risk-informed, performance-based fire protection program if the analyses required have not been completed.

Title 10 CFR Part 50.48(c)(3)(ii) states:

"The licensee shall complete its implementation of the methodology in Chapter 2 of NFPA 805 (including all required evaluations and analyses) and, upon completion, modify the fire protection plan required by paragraph (a) of this section to reflect the licensee's decision to comply with NFPA 805, before changing its fire protection program or nuclear power plant as permitted by NFPA 805."

The licensee should provide a statement that all required engineering analyses have been completed and that compliance with the requirements has been achieved.

RAI 1-5 RESPONSE:

As described in NEI 04-02 and its associated FAQs, the use of the term open item is an integral part of the process. The term "open item" within Section 4.2.2.3 of the ONS Transition Report was meant to identify a 'variance from the deterministic requirement' that ONS could not self-approve, and therefore implement, under the current licensing basis. This concept was discussed in Section 4.2.2.1, Overview of Evaluation Process. Items included:

" Variances from the current deterministic licensing basis for which change evaluations (now being called fire risk evaluations) were performed (Section 4.5 of the Transition Report)

" Items for which NRC concurrence of prior approval were required (Attachment T of the Transition Report).

" Items for which modifications were committed (Attachment S of the Transition Report).

The necessary analyses for the 'variance from the deterministic requirements' were contained within the change evaluations (now being called fire risk evaluations), scoping of modifications, request for specific NRC approval or in the request for prior approval clarification.

Duke will provide a statement under oath and affirmation as to the state of the required evaluations and analyses that support the transition to a risk-informed, performance-based fire protection program in the LAR supplement.

RAI 1-6:

Attachment P of the ONS Transition Report is based on the approach documented in NFPA 805 Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) 06-0008, Revision 8. Agreement was reached and a closure memo was approved based on Revision 9. To obtain the benefit of the approach documented in 2

Enclosure 1: Request For Additional Information November 30, 2009 Revision 9, the Transition Report must reference the appropriate version. Explain how the LAR, including Attachment P, would change based on Revision 9 of FAQ 06-0008.

RAI 1-6 RESPONSE:

The ONS Transition Report will be revised, as necessary, to incorporate by reference the portions of FAQ 06-0008, Revision 9 (ML0090560170) which were approved within the associated closure memo (ML073380976). Specific to Attachment P, the Oconee LAR will be revised to remove the attachment since it is no longer needed with the approved portions of FAQ 06-0008, Revision 9.

RAI 2-7:

Item (3) of NFPA 805 Section 3.2.3 requires reviews of fire protection program related performance and trends. Describe how compliance to Section 3.2.3 (3) will be achieved.

RAI 2-7 RESPONSE:

NFPA 805 Section 3.2.3(3) requires that procedures be established for reviews of the fire protection program related to performance and trends. NFPA 805, Section 2.6 requires a monitoring program that in part is to establish acceptable performance levels and a method to monitor and assess the performance of the fire protection program. The NFPA 805 requirements for reviews of programs related to performance and trending is provided under the NFPA 805 Monitoring program as described in Transition Report, Section 4.6, Monitoring, and Attachment R, UFSAR Changes. Transition Report, Section 4.6.2 describes the overall Post-Transition NFPA 805 Monitoring Program process. The Monitoring program will be implemented after the LAR approval as part of the fire protection program transition to NFPA 805. The monitoring process will be conducted in four phases.

Phase 1 will determine the scope which includes fire protection systems & features and fire protection program elements.

Phase 2 will establish performance criteria.

" Phase 3 will determine risk significant fire protection program and,"Defense in Depth" elements using criteria established in Phase 2.

" Phase 4 will implement the program after the scope and criteria are established.

Performance and availability monitoring criteria will be applied to the risk significant fire protection classical elements and a tracking program will be used on the "Defense in Depth" elements. A flow chart of this process is provided in the Transition Report as Figure 4-7.

This process will result in development of a program that reviews the fire protection program performance and identifies trends in performance. The reviews will be based on specific performance goals established to measure the effectiveness of the fire protection program.

Monitoring will ensure that assumptions in engineering analysis remain valid. The monitoring program will be documented in an administrative process (i.e. program manual or site directive) instructing how to perform this process and set clear guidelines to consistently measure the performance of the fire protection program.

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Enclosure 1: Request For Additional Information November 30, 2009 RAI 2-8:

NFPA 805, Section 4.1 states: "Once a determination has been made that a fire protection system or feature is required to achieve the performance criteria of Section 1.5, its design and qualification shall meet the applicable requirement of Chapter.3."

The discussion of the fire area-by-fire area review on page 45 of the ONS LAR includes requirements to answer these two questions; "Suppression Required?" and "Detection required?" Provide the following information concerning these systems.

a. When either of these questions is answered "Yes," what requirements apply with respect to the design and qualification of that system?

b. What quality requirements apply to a system that has been designated as required in Attachment C of the LAR?

c. On page 45, under Suppression Required? (Yes/No):, there is a bullet that states that systems required to meet Chapter 4 performance-based compliance (including systems credited for DID) are summarized in change evaluations. This passage implies that systems credited for defense-in-depth in plant change evaluations should be considered.

If a system is required by Chapter 4 its design and qualification would need to meet the applicable requirement of Chapter 3. Is that implication correct? What design, qualification and quality controls apply to fire detection and suppression systems that are credited for defense-in-depth?

RAI 2-8a RESPONSE:

A suppression or detection system that is identified as required in the Fire Area-by-Fire Area review (Transition Report Attachment C) is required to meet the provisions of NFPA 805 Section 3.8 or 3.9 for detection or suppression, respectively. Attachment C, Table B-3 Fire Area Transition, records if suppression and/or detection is required after the Engineering Evaluation summary. The provisions of NFPA 805 Section 3.8 and 3.9 dictate the design and qualification of the system (the system shall meet the requirements of NFPA 13, 15, 72, etc).

Required suppression and detection are addressed in the following proposed revision to the LAR. Note that Table 4-C will identify the Fire Area-by-Fire Area conclusion of required suppression and detection systems. This will be redundant information in a summary table for the ease of reference.

4.2.2.1.1 Fire Protection Systems and Features Required to Achieve the Nuclear Safety Performance Criteria In accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) "Once a determination has been made that a fire protection system or feature is required to achieve the performance criteria of Section 1.5, its design and qualification shall meet the applicable requirement of Chapter 3" Fire protection systems or features are required for NFPA 805 Chapter 4 compliance to achieve the performance criteria of Section 1.5 if the:

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Request For Additional Information November 30, 2009

" Fire Protection Systems and Features are required to meet NFPA 805 Section 4.2.3, Deterministic Approach, or

Fire Protection Systems and Features are required to meet NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4, Performance-Based Approach Methodology To determine if a fire protection system or feature is required to achieve the performance criteria of NFPA 805 Section 1.5 the following process was used:

Deterministic Approach If a fire protection system or feature is required to meet one of the following deterministic compliance strategies, then it is required to meet the nuclear safety performance criteria and therefore its design and qualification shall meet the appropriate sections of NFPA 805 Chapter 3:

1. Fire protection systems and features required for deterministic compliance in accordance with Section 4.2.3 of NFPA 805

a. Outside Containment

" Fire area boundary. One success path of required cables and equipment shall be located in a separate area having boundaries consisting of fire barriers with a minimum fire resistance rating of 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months . Every opening in the fire barriers forming these boundaries shall be protected with passive fire protection features having a fire-resistive rating equivalent to the fire barrier (Section 4.2.3.2).

" 3-hour rated fire barrier or Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System. Separation of required cables and equipment of redundant success paths by a fire barrier having a 3-hour fire resistance rating. Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of a redundant success path in a fire barrier or Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System having a 3-hour fire resistance rating (Section 4.2.3.3(a)).

" Suppression and detection. Separation of required cables and equipment of redundant success paths by a horizontal distance of more than 20 ft with no intervening combustible materials or fire hazards. In addition, automatic fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed throughout the fire area (Section 4.2.3.3(b)).

i-hour 1 rated fire barrier or Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System and suppression and detection. Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant success path in a fire barrier or Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System having a 1-hour fire resistance rating. In addition, automatic fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed throughout the fire area (Section 4.2.3.3(c)).

b. Inside Non-inerted Containment Non-combustible radiant energy shield. Separation of required cables and equipment of redundant success paths by a noncombustible radiant energy shield. These assemblies shall be capable of withstanding a minimum 1/2-hour fire exposure when tested in accordance with NFPA 251, Standard Methods of 5

Request For Additional Information November 30, 2009 Tests of Fire Endurance of Building Construction and Materials (Section 4.2.3.4(b)).

Suppression and detection. Installation of automatic fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system throughout the fire area (Section 4.2.3.4(c)).

2. Required by Existing Engineering Equivalency Evaluation (EEEE)

As allowed by Section 2.2.7 of NFPA 805, "...the user shall be permitted to demonstrate compliance with specific deterministic fire protection design requirements in Chapter 4 for existing configurations with an engineering equivalency evaluation." These existing engineering equivalency evaluations include evaluations previously known as Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations, exemptions, and deviations. Fire Protection systems and features that form the bases for acceptability of these existing compliance strategies are required to meet the nuclear safety performance criteria.

Performance-Based Approach In accordance with NFPA Section 4.2.4.2, the "...use of fire risk evaluation for the performance-based approach shall consist of an integrated assessment of the acceptability of risk, defense-in-depth, and safety margins." If the fire protection system or feature is required to demonstrate the acceptability of risk or defense-in-depth, then it is required by Chapter 4. The following method is used to determine if a fire protection feature or system is required for the acceptability of risk or defense-in-depth.

1. Acceptability of Risk A fire protection feature may be required for the 'acceptability of risk' in one of two ways:

a. It is explicitly credited to reduce risk in the NFPA 805 transition fire risk evaluation, or

b. It is 'of higher significance' to the overall fire risk for the plant. Examples include:

" If the calculated risk (CDF/LERF) of system(s) in an area are above the established threshold.

" If the system is determined to have a risk achievement worth above the established threshold. This is determined during the expert panel review conducted as part of the plant monitoring scoping activities.

2. Defense-in-Depth In accordance with NFPA 805 Section 2.4.4, Plant Change Evaluation, "...The evaluation process shall consist of an integrated assessment of the acceptability of risk, defense-in-depth, and safety margins." NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4.2 refers to the acceptance criteria in this section. Therefore fire protection systems and features required to demonstrate an adequate balance of defense-in-depth are required by NFPA 805 Chapter 4. Criteria for determining what constitutes an adequate balance are provided in Table 4-A.

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Request For Additional Information November 30, 2009 Table 4-A - Considerations for Defense-in-Depth Determination Method of Providing DID Considerations Prevent fires from starting

Combustible Control Combustible and hot work controls are fundamental elements of defense in depth and as such are always in place. The issue to be

Hot Work Control considered during the fire risk evaluations is whether this element needs to be strengthened to offset a weakness in another echelon thereby providing a reasonable balance. Considerations include:

Creating new Transient Free Areas

Modifying an existing Transient Free Area The fire scenarios involved in the fire risk evaluation quantitative calculation should be reviewed to determine if additional controls should be added.

Review the remaining elements of defense in depth to ensure an over-reliance is not placed on programmatic activities for weaknesses on plant design.

Rapidly detect, control and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur thereby limiting fire damage

" Detection system Automatic suppression and detection may or may not exist in the fire area of concern. The issue to be considered during the fire risk

Automatic fire suppression evaluation is whether installed suppression and or detection is

" Portable fire extinguishers provided required for defense in depth or whether suppression/detection for the area needs to be strengthened to offset a weakness in another echelon

Hose stations and hydrants provided thereby providing a reasonable balance. Considerations include:

for the area

If a fire area contains both suppression and detection and

Fire Pre-Fire Plan fire fighting activities would be challenging, both detection and suppression may be required

If a fire area contains both suppression and detection and fire fighting activities would not be challenging, detection and manual fire fighting required (consider enhancing the pre-plans) 0 If a fire area contains detection and a recovery action is required, the detection system may be required.

a If a fire area contains neither suppression nor detection and a recovery action is required, consider adding detection or suppression.

The fire scenarios involved in the fire risk evaluation quantitative calculation should be reviewed to determine the types of fires and reliance on suppression probability should be evaluated in the area to best determine options for this element of defense in depth.

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Request For Additional Information November 30, 2009 Table 4-A - Considerations for Defense-in-Depth Determination Method of Providing DID Considerations Provide adequate level of fire protection for systems and structures so that a fire will not prevent essential safety functions from being performed

" Walls, floors, ceilings and structural If fires occur and they are not rapidly detected and promptly elements are rated or have been extinguished, the third echelon of defense in depth would be relied evaluated as adequate for the upon. The issue to be considered during the fire risk evaluation is hazard. whether existing separation is adequate or whether additional measures (e.g., supplemental barriers, fire rated cable, or recovery

" Penetrations in the fire area barrier actions) are required to offset a weakness in another echelon; are rated or have been evaluated as thereby, providing a reasonable balance. Considerations include:

adequate for the hazard.

If the variance is never affected in the same fire scenario,

- Supplemental barriers (e.g., Electrical internal fire area separation may be adequate and no Raceway Fire Barrier System, cable additional reliance on recovery actions is necessary.

tray covers, combustible liquid dikes/drains, etc.)

If the variance is affected in the same fire scenario, internal fire area separation may not be adequate and reliance on a

" Fire rated cable recovery action may be necessary.

" Reactor coolant pump oil collection

If the CCDP associated with the variances is high regardless system (as applicable) of whether it is in the same scenario, a recovery action and I

" Guidance provided to operations or reliance on supplemental barriers should be considered.

personnel detailing the required

There are known modeling differences between a Fire PRA success path(s) including recovery and nuclear safety capability assessment due to different actions to achieve nuclear safety success criteria, end states, etc. Although a variance may be performance criteria. associated with a function that is not considered a significant contribution to core damage frequency, the variance may be considered important enough to the nuclear safety capability assessment to retain as a recovery action.1 The fire scenarios involved in the fire risk evaluation quantitative calculation should be reviewed to determine the fires evaluated and the CCDP in the area to best determine options for this element of defense in depth.

Summary Table 4-B summarizes the approach to determine the fire protection systems and features required to meet the performance or deterministic approaches of Chapter 4 of NFPA 805.

An example would be components in the nuclear safety capability assessment associated with maintaining natural circulation at a pressurized water reactor that are not modeled explicitly in the Fire PRA since they are not part of a core damage sequence.

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Request For Additional Information November 30, 2009 Table 4-B Determination of NFPA 805 Chapter 4 Required FP Systems and Features Performance Based Deterministic Compliance Loss Category (NFPA 805 § 4.2.3) Compliance Prevention (NFPA 805 § 4.2.4)

Description Required for Required as a Required for Required to Not NFPA 805 basis of the maintain an Required to Chapter 4 acceptability acceptability of adequate meet separation of existing risk balance of § 4.2.3 criteria EEE determination Defense-in- or (evaluations Depth § 4.2.4 previously known as Generic Letter 86-10 evaluations, exemptions, and deviations)

Required Yes Yes Yes Yes No System I 4.8.2.2.1 Results of the Determination of Required Fire Protection Systems and Features In accordance with the methodology outlined in Section 4.2.2.1.1 fire protection systems and features in each fire area in the power block were evaluated to determine if it is:

Required to meet NFPA 805 Section 4.2.3, Deterministic Approach, or

Required to meet NFPA 805 Section 4.2.4, Performance-Based Approach The results of this review are provided in Table 4-C - Fire Protection Systems and Features Required for NFPA 805 Chapter 4 Compliance. Note Table 4-C is empty and provided as an example of what will be included in the LAR supplement.

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Request For Additional Information November 30, 2009 Table 4-C -Fire Protection Systems and Features Required for NFPA 805 Chapter 4 Compliance Fire Area Fire Zone Description Suppression Provided? Suppression Required? Detection Provided? Detection Required? Feature2 Provided? Feature Required?

2 Features other than Suppression or Detection are those fire protection features internal to the Fire Area such as Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems. Fire barrier assemblies are not optional and always required.

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Enclosure 1: Request for Additional Information November 30, 2009 RAI 2-8 b RESPONSE:

Required fire protection systems at ONS are classified in accordance with the Duke Quality Assurance topical report and NSD-307, Quality Standard Manual. NSD-307 defines the quality assurance condition for fire protection as QA Condition 3. QA Condition 3 applies uniquely to fire protection structures, systems, components, and services as defined in the respective station Fire Protection Design Basis Document as needed to protect nuclear safety-related structures, systems, or components.

RAI 2-8c RESPONSE:

Systems credited for defense in depth in plant change evaluations are considered "required-by Chapter 4" and therefore the design, qualification, and quality control of such systems would be the same as any other required system. The response to RAI 2-8a and 2-8b pertain to all required systems, including those credited for defense in depth.

RAI 2-9a:

Some NFPA 805 Chapter 3 elements are complicated or have multiple varied applications throughout the plant (e.g., 3.11.4 Through PenetrationFire Stops). This results in some elements requiring more that one compliance strategy entry to fully capture the licensee's compliance basis.

ONS's B-1 Table currently contains one compliance statement for each NFPA 805 Chapter 3 element or sub-element. Where ONS relies on more than one compliance strategy for a particular element, the B-1 Table must fully capture all of ONS's methods of compliance. Ensure that where necessary, all of ONS's compliance strategies are captured in the B-1 Table. The description of the B-1 Table methodology in the Transition Report (i.e., Section 4.1) should be updated to reflect any changes required by multiple compliance strategies. ONS must also ensure that all aspects of each particular Chapter 3 element or sub-element are addressed by the appropriate compliance statements.

For example, Table B-1 of the LAR fundamental element NFPA 805, Section 3.11.2, identifies two compliance statements; "NRC prior Approval" and "Licensee Evaluation" for fire barriers.

Both of these are described as "fire barriers between the major buildings". This description does not provide any distinction between the two. The NRC staff is unable to identify which barriers fall into which category. Please clarify the distinction. Additionally, these are the only compliance strategies for fire barriers. This would imply that no fire barriers simply meet tested/listed configurations for walls and all fire barriers are covered by only those two compliance strategies. Clarify that this is true.

RAI 2-9a RESPONSE:

Table B-1 will be reviewed to ensure compliance strategies are correctly addressed and captured for all Chapter 3 Sections. The compliance basis where multiple compliance statements are used for one NFPA 805 element or sub-element will be revised as necessary.

These revisions will ensure, in a clear manner, the multiple compliance statements are addressed by the compliance basis. The compliance basis will clearly show which aspects of the basis correspond to the appropriate compliance statements. In addition, the description for the Table B-1 methodology in Section 4.1 of the Transition Report will be reviewed and enhanced as necessary with regards to the use of multiple compliance statements. These 11

Enclosure 1: Request for Additional Information November 30, 2009 revisions will be reflected in the revised Transition Report and Table B-1 which will be submitted with the LAR supplement.

RAI 2-9b:

Evaluations of ONS's compliance with several NFPA standards are referenced in a number of B-1 Table elements. A detailed summary of the results of each of these compliance evaluations should be provided in the, LAR and referenced in the B-1 Table. These summaries may be compiled in a separate attachment to the submittal.

At a minimum, each summary should include:

1. a description of all evaluated conditions determined to be acceptable based on an engineering, or other type of, evaluation, including:

a summary of each condition;

a summary of the evaluation of each condition; and

a summary of the resolution of each condition.

2. a description of all apparent code deviations, including:

a summary of each deviation;

a summary of the evaluation of each deviation; and 0 a summary of the resolution of each deviation.

If ONS wishes to treat these compliance evaluations like existing engineering equivalency evaluations, then this information need not be submitted but available for future review.

Unless specifically limited by the Chapter 3 element, these evaluations should be completed, at

-'a minimum, for all power block areas. (Note that certain standards, such as NFPA 600, apply plant-wide by their nature, and cannot be so limited.)

A partial list of the NFPA standards referenced is:

NFPA 10

NFPA 13

" NFPA 14

NFPA 20

NFPA 24

NFPA 30

NFPA 51B

' NFPA 55

NFPA 600

NFPA 72D

NFPA 80

NFPA 90A RAI 2-9b RESPONSE:

ONS is performing NFPA code compliance evaluations in order to demonstrate compliance with a number of Table B-1 elements. These evaluations are being prepared as engineering 12

Enclosure 1: Request for Additional Information November 30, 2009 evaluations. The RAI 2-6 response (Duke letter dated August 3, 2009) addressed NFPA Code Compliance as follows:

"With respect to evaluations of ONS's compliance with NFPA standards as referenced in Table B-i, ONS will review the NFPA code compliance engineering evaluations against the requirements of FAQ 07-0033 when the evaluations are completed. These evaluations will be referenced in a revised Table B-1 by calculation number and the calculations (code compliance evaluations) will be available for NRC review. Upon ONS review of the calculations, it will then be determined ifthere are evaluations outside of the bounds of FAQ 06-0008 that would require summary in the LAR and require submittal to the NRC for approval."

Since NRC approval is not required for these types of evaluations following transition, it is proposed that these evaluations do not need to be summarized/included in the LAR. The NFPA code compliance evaluations will be available for NRC review.

If there are deviations in the NFPA code compliance evaluations where the deviation/non-compliance does not affect safety of functionality of the system, the non-compliance will be submitted in Attachment L of the Transition Report for NRC approval.

ONS recognizes that unless specifically limited by the Chapter 3 element, NFPA code compliance evaluations should be completed, at a minimum, for all power block areas. The following NFPA codes are applicable plant-wide at ONS: NFPA 20, NFPA 24, NFPA 51B, and NFPA 600.

RAI 2-10:

In 10 CFR 50.48(c), the NRC has specifically not endorsed sections of the NFPA 805 standard.

Generally this text should not be part of ONS's licensing basis. Two examples in the B-1 table are the exceptions to 3.3.5.3 and the exception to 3.6.4. What is the basis for providing none endorsed text of the NFPA 805 standard in the B-1 table?

RAI 2-10 RESPONSE:

The text of the non-endorsed sections of NFPA 805 will be removed. This includes the exception to Section 3.3.5.3 and the exception to Section 3.6.4 not endorsed under 10 CFR 50.48(c), (c.2.v and vi). This will be reflected in revised Table B-1 which will be submitted with the LAR supplement.

RAI 2-11:

B-1 Table: Compliance Strateqy: Complies Via Previous Approval For Chapter 3 elements with a "Complies via Previous Approval" compliance strategy, the following details are required to be provided: (1) appropriate excerpts from submittals regarding the issue for which previous approval is being claimed, followed by (2) appropriate excerpts from the NRC documents that provide the formal approval of the fire protection system/feature.

References for both submittal and approval documents are also required. Additionally, there must be a positive statement with regard to condition(s) in place at the time of approval being still in effect for the NFPA 805 compliance strategy. For example, from Table B-1 section 3.11.3, Fire Barrier Penetrations, fire dampers (page 76 of 80) were to be upgraded as a 13

Request for Additional Information November 30, 2009 condition for approval of the condition (Safety Evaluation (SE) Section 4.9.3). However, no positive statement delineating that all conditions and modifications have been completed or otherwise dispositioned as conditions of acceptance was provided in the Transition Report.

During the review, the NRC staff identified a number of entries where the above requirements were not met. The following matrix details the inadequacies that were identified during the review. ONS should correct these and ensure that there are no others.

Chapter 3 Element Identified Issue 3.3.5.3 Provide submittal and approval excerpts for each deviating detail.

Order the excerpts so that the submittal excerpt is followed by the approving document excerpt.