Text

05000321/366-2009-301 Final Simulator Scenarios
	ML091730128
Person / Time
Site:	Hatch
Issue date:	06/22/2009
From:	; NRC/RGN-II
To:	;
References
	Download: ML091730128 (101)
	v • d • e

Page 1 of 26 Scenario Summary Final Facility:

E. I Hatch Scenario No.:

4-01 Op-TestNo.:

2009-301 Initiating Conditions:

Unit 2 is at 60% performing a reactor start-up. All equipment is operable.

Turnover Continue increasing reactor power using the reactivity plan.

Summary:

Event 1: ComponentJTS; As the team prepares to raise reactor power, the "2A" Reactor Recirculation pump seals will sequentially develop a failure that results in reactor coolant leaking into the Drywell (DW). Initially, only the Number 1 seal will fail, followed a few minutes later by a Number 2 Seal failure. The ATC operator will trip and isolate the "2A" Reactor Recirc pump. The Shift Supervisor (SS) will address TS for coolant leakage and single Recirc loop operation.

Event 2: ComponentJTS; The Recirc pump seal leak (Event 1) causes DW pressure to increase.

The team will receive a P603 alarm that will direct DW venting to be placed in service. The BOP operator will attempt to start Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT). The SBGT suction dampers will not open for the first SBGT system the operator attempts to start. The opposite SBGT train will then be started and DW venting will be aligned. The SS will address TS for an inoperable train of SBGT.

Event 3: Reactivity; The tripped Recirc pump (Event 1) will result in operation inside the Region of Potential Instabilities of the Power-To-Flow map. The ATC operator will insert control rods to exit the region.

Event 4: Component; SRV "2G" will begin to leak. After the ATC operator has had a chance to investigate the leaking SRV, it will inadvertently open. The ATC operator will attempt to close the SRV IA W the abnormal procedure for a mechanically open SRV. The SRV will go closed after the SRV control switch is cycled (Critical task). If Torus temperature exceeds 95°F, the BOP operator will place RHR in Suppression Pool Cooling.

Event 5: Major/Component; The running RFPT will trip, resulting in Reactor Water Level (RWL) decreasing below +3 inches. The reactor will scram/be scrammed. An ATWS condition will exist, requiring the ATC operator to manually insert control rods (Critical task). RCIC will start, but RPV level will decrease since makeup requirements exceed RCIC capacity. HPCI will NOT auto start.

Event 6: Component; RCIC will trip. If the team has not started a RFPT (Event 5) to control reactor water level, the trip of RCIC will leave the Feedwater system as the only high pressure source of injection. The BOP operator will start and use a RFPT to maintain RWL above -185 inches (Critical Task).

Page 2 of 26 Critical Tasks and ES 304-4 Attributes Final Facility:

E. I Hatch Scenario No.:

4-01 Op-Test No.:

2009-301 Critical Tasks

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Cycle SRV "G" control switch prior to entering the unsafe area of the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature curve (Event 4).

Commence insertion of control rods within 20 minutes and before entering the unsafe region of the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit graph (Event 5).

Maintain RWL above -185 inches. This is the lowest level that corresponds to adequate core cooling with injection (Event 6).

ES 301-4 Attributes Required Actual Items Total Malfunctions 5-8 7

1. Recirc Pump Seal failure (Event 1)

2. SBGT suction dampers (Event 2)

3. Leaking SRV (Event 4)

4. RFPT Trip (Event 5)

5. Control Rods fail to insert (Event 5)

6. HPCI Fails to start (Event 5)

7. RCIC trip (Event 6)

Malfunctions Mter 1-2 2

1. HPCI Fails to start (Event 5)

EOPEntry

2. RCIC Trip (Event 6)

Abnormal Events 2-4 3

1. Recirc Pump Trip (Event 1)

2. Failed Open SRV (Event 4)

Major Transients 1-2 1

1. Reactor scram! A TWS (Event 5)

EOPs entered, 1-2 2

1. RCA EOP Flow Chart (Event 5) requiring substantive

2. RC EOP Flow Chart (Event 6) actions EOPs contingencies 0-2 1

1. CP-3 ATWS Level Control Flow Chart requiring substantive (Event 5) actions Critical Tasks 2-3 3

1. Cycle switch to close SRV (Event 4)

2. Insert Rods during ATWS (Event 5)

3. Maintain RWL >-185 inches (Event 6)

Page 3 of26 AppendixD Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l Final Facility:

E. I Hatch Scenario No.:

4-01 Op-Test No.:

2009-301 Examiners:

Operators:

SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions.: Plant is at 60% power.

Turnover: A plant startup is in progress. Increase reactor power lAW the reactivity plan.

Event Malf. No.

Event Event No.

Type*

Description 1

mfB3L39A C (ATC)

Recirc Pump "A" seal leakage causes DW leakage.

mfB3L45A TS (SRO) Pump is secured and isolated, rt1BL29 mf60213160 2

ET-T46-01 C (BOP)

Vent the Drywell. Suction valves for the first SBGT started will fail ET-T46-02 TS (SRO) to open, examinee must use opposite train to vent the Drywell 3

R (ATC)

Decrease reactor power by inserting control rods to return to the acceptable region of the power to flow map.

4 mfB2L128G C (ATC)

SRV 2B21-F013G begins leaking. The SRV will open mechanically ET B21-01 after actions are taken for a leaking SRV. The SRV will close after the ATC cycles the SRV switch. The SS will initiate a tracking RAS.

5 mfN2L87B M (ALL)

The running RFPT trip, the reactor scrams/is scrammed and all rods mfE4 L 107 mfCl L211 C (BOP) do not insert (ATWS). HPCI fails to start (2E41-FOOI failed closed).

RCIC starts but RWL decreases since makeup requirements exceed RCIC capacity. RPV level will go below -185" if a RFPT is not used to control RPV level.

6 mf2E5LI10 C (BOP)

After RWL band has been lowered to below -60 inches and the MSIVs have been over-ridden, RCIC will trip. RPV level will go below -185" if a RFPT is not used to control RPV level.

(N)ormal, (R )eacti vi ty, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

UNIT 1 STATUS Power:

Activities in progress:

Power:

Shift Turn Over Sheet 100%

None Approximately 60%

The following equipment is None inoperable:

Scheduled evolutions:

Surveillances due this shift:

Active clearances:

Rod Configuration:

Continue increasing reactor power using the reactivity plan.

None None SeeRWM

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

1 Page 5 of 26 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump "A" seal leakage causes DW leakage.

Pump is secured and isolated Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

Simulator Operator With Chief Examiners Permission:

Call control room BOP operator and tell them to stay on the phone until directed to hang up.

Simulator Operator When the candidate pulls 34GO-OPS-005 or begins actions to place the "2A" RFPT in service AND before power is increased; press (RB-1) to activate:

mfB3L39A (60150), Recire A Inner Seal failure ATC

Receives Annunciator "Pump A Seal Staging Flow High/Low,"

(602-122)

Observes and compares 2B31-R603A, Seal A No.1 pressure indicator, AND 2B31-R602A, Seal A No.2 pressure indicator, to determine the Inner (#1) seal has failed (No.1 pressure normal with No.2 pressure> normal).

Notifies SS that the Inner (#1) Seal on Recire A has failed

Directs a System Operator to confirm seal water flow to Pump A is between 1.6 to 2.2 gpm (this indication not available in the Reactor Building 108RAR24)

Assigns an extra operator perform 34SV-SUV-019-2, Surveillance Checks, to determine the magnitude of leakage.

May monitor Drywell pressure Simulator Operator

After the ATC operator has started executing steps in the "Pump A Seal Staging Flow High/Low" ARP, THEN o Tell the BOP operator that the conversation is over and to hang up the phone.

,j

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

1 Page 6 of 26 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump "A" seal leakage causes DW leakage.

Time Pump is secured and isolated Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior All ATC Simulator Operator At the direction of the lead examimer, press (RB-2) to activate:

mfB3L 45A (15120), Recirc A Outer Seal Failure

(**IMPORTANT**)

Ensure the ATC responds to the "Outer Seal A Leak Detection Flow High," (602-116) and performs the next set of actions (Trip and isolate the "2A" Recirc Pump).

Ensure the BOP operator is the person assigned to vent the Drywell.

Receives Annunciators:

"Outer Seal A Leak Detection Flow High," (602-116)

"DrywellfTorus RCDR R627 Temp High" (650-204)

Note: Alarm is from a P650 recorder

"PaneI2HII-P654 System Trouble" (650-214)

Note: Alarm indicates an alarm has been received on 2Hll-P564.

"Panel 2 Hll-P657 System Trouble" (650-224)

Note: Alarm indicates an alarm has been received on 2Hll-P567.

Annunciator "Pump A Seal Staging Flow High/Low," (602-122) clears Observes and compares 2B31-R603A, Seal A No.1 pressure indicator AND 2B31-R602A, Seal A No.2 pressure indicator, to determine the outer seal has now failed (No.1 and No.2 seal pressure decreases).

Notifies SS that the Outer (#2) Seal on "2A" Recirc has also failed Has an extra operator perform 34SV-SUV-019-2, Surveillance Checks, to determine magnitude of leak.

Monitors 2DII-R630, Fission Products Monitor recorder, to determine IF primary system coolant is leaking from seals.

Monitors Drywell pressure 657 Panel Alarm - Multipoint Temperature RCDR 247-R626 Temperature High 657-025 I

A endix D Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

1 Page 7 of 26 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump "A" seal leakage causes DW leakage.

Pump is secured and isolated Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior All

Recei ves Primary Containment Press High alarm (603-115)

SS

Directs Operator to Check DW Leakage

Directs the BOP to vent the DW with SBGT, when DW pressure approaches 0.65 psig. (See Event 2 For SBGT Start)

Simulator Operator As the operator checking DW leakage, report:

DW Equipment drain leakage is stable at 1.7 gpm

Floor drain leakage has increased from 0.8 gpm to 12.1 gpm.

SS

Directs operator to shutdown and isolate Recirc pump A

Enters Tech Specs:

3.4 Reactor Coolant System

3.4.1 Recirculation Loops Operating o Condition: 3.4.1.A, Requirements of the LCO not met.

(i.e single loop operations)

Required Action: Satisfy requirements of the LCO.

Completion time: 24 hrs.

o Condition: 3.4.4.A, Unidentified leakage not within limit OR total leakage not within limit.

Required Action: Reduce leakage to within limits.

Completion time: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

o Condition 3.4.4.B, Unidentified leakage increase not within limit.

Required Action: Reduce leakage increase to within limits.

Completion time: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Notifies STA that new limits apply for APLHGR, MCPR, LHGR, and APRMs Simulated Thermal power -New Setpoints are required within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

1 Page 80f26 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump "A" seal leakage causes DW leakage.

Pump is secured and isolated I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC

Per 34AR-602-116-2 and 34S0-B31-001-2, Recirc System, Performs one of the following to secure the Reactor Recirc Pump:

Either (actions for Immediate Shutdown) 0 Place the ASD "A" control switch in Pull to Lock (P602) 0 Depress the ASD "A" Shutdown pushbutton (P602)

OR (Actions for Shutdown in a Timely Manner) 0 Depress the ASD "A" Shutdown pushbutton (P602) 0 Confirm ASD A speed ramps to ~370 RPM (2B31-R660) or 22% (2B31-R66l) 0 Confirm Recirc Pump A goes to 0 RPM (2B31-R660) or 22%

(2B31-R661) and drive coasts to 0 gpm (2B31-R614 or R617) 0 Confirm ASD A Start pushbutton illuminates 0

Place ASD "A" control switch 2B31-S002A to Pull-To-Lock (P602)

ATC

Receives and Acknowledges the following Annunciators:

0 Recirc loop A Out of Service 602-127, 0

RBM Downscale 603-211 0

Rod Out Block 603-238 0

Heater Trouble Alarm 650-135 (may come in and clear)

Closes 2B31-F031A, Reactor Recirc A Pump Disch Vlv

Closes 2B31-F023A, Reactor Recirc A Pump Suction Vlv

Dispatches SO to close Seal Injection To Pump A Header Isolation Valve,2B31-F008A.

Enters 34AB-B31-00l-2 "Reactor Recirculation Pump(s) TRIP, Recirc Loops Flow mismatch, Or ASD Cell Bypass."

0 Notify Plant Management and Load Dispatcher

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op* Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.:

4*01 Event No.:

1 Page 9 of 26 Event

Description:

Recirc Pump "A" seal leakage causes DW leakage.

Pump is secured and isolated

'I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

Simulator Operator AFTER the suction and discharge valves are closed for the "2A" Recirc pump, an you are requested to close 2B3l-FOOS, THEN:

MODIFY mfB3L 45A (Final: 100 Ramp: 1000), "Recirc A Outer Seal Failure."

AND THEN press (RB*3) to activate:

rfB3L29, Recirc mini purge B31-F016A closure (simulates B31-FOOSA being closed)

mf60213160, "Outer Seal A Leak Detection Flow High - Annunciator Off (602-116)

/

Simulator Operator If another DW leakage check is requested, report:

Drywell floor drain leakage has decreased to 1.S gpm.

Simulator Operator Proceed to Event 4 at the Chief Examiner's direction.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

2 Page 10 of26 Event

Description:

Vent the Drywell / Failure of SBGT train I Time Position SS BOP SS BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior This event will begin when an operator is given direction to begin venting the Drywell due to the Recirc Pump seal leak: in Event 1.

When venting is required; Directs Operator to vent the drywell.

Enters 34S0-T48-002-2, "Containment Atmosphere Dilution System" or uses placard to vent the Drywell.

Enters 34S0-T46-001-2, "Standby Gas Treatment System" procedure or uses placard at the 2Hll-P657 panel to start SBGT 2A or 2B.

Determines that 2T46-F001 (A or B) and 2T46-F003 (A or B) for the selected train will not open Informs SS that SBGT (A or B) cannot be started due to suction valve failure.

Note: Event triggers will insert overrides to keep the first valves that are operated from opening and then remove the event trigger from the opposite SBGT train. The examinee will not be successful with the first SBGT train; however, the second SBGT traill used will be successful.

Addresses Tech Specs:

3.6 Containment Systems 3.6.4.3, Standby Gas Treatment System o

Condition: 3.6.4.3.B, One required Unit 2 SGT subsystem inoperable.

Required Action: 3.6.4.3.B.1, Restore required SGT subsystem to operable status.

Completion time: 7 days AND 30 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO.

Direct that maintenance be contacted to determine problem with failed SBGT suction dampers.

Vents with the opposite train of SBGT per 34S0-T46-00 1-2 SBGT System procedure or uses placard.

Appendix 0 Reauired Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

2 Page 11 of 26 Event

Description:

Vent the Drywell / Failure of SBGT train I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

BOP 0

Opens 2T46-FOOI (A or B) or 2T46-F003(A or B) for the (Placard) subsequent train.

0 Places SBGT Fan (A or B) control switch to "RUN."

0 Receives alarm 2B (or 2A) SBGT Switch Not In Auto (654-076) (or 657 -091) 0 Confirms 2T46-F002 (A or B) OPENS 0

Confirms SBGT Heater red light illuminates.

BOP 0

Opens 2T48-F334A or 2T48-F334B (both valves may be (Placard) opened) 0 Receives alarm DW Vent Exh Bypass Vlv Open (654-002) or (657-008) 0 Receives alarm DRWUTorus N2 M/u 2 Inch Isol Valves Open (654-035) or (657-042)

~,

0 Opens 2T48-F335A or 2T48-F335B(both valves may be opened)

,e_

O Opens 2T48-F336A or 2T48-F336B. (both valves may be opened) 0 Monitors DW pressure

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

3 Page 12 of26 Event

Description:

Insert control rods to return to safe area of Power to flow map I Time Position SS SS Applicant's Actions or Behavior lAW 34GO-OPS-005-2 Power Changes, o Within 15 minutes of entering the Immediate Exit Region of the Power to Flow map, directs operator to exit the region by inserting control rods.

o Has a control rod movement brief per 34GO-OPS-065-0 Simulator Operator If the Team calls for the STA or Reactor Engineering for rod movement recommendations, then recommend:

o "Insert rods in reverse order lAW the reactivity plan guidance."

If asked by the Shift Supervisor about the Problem Control Rod Matrix, THEN SAY:

o The matrix has been checked and there are no problem rods in the step(s) to be moved.

If the ATC operator asks if Continuous In is allowed for control rod movement, the REPLY:

o "I concur with using Continuous In."

Directs the operator to insert the rods to the insert limit after consulting with the ST A.

Determines that IA W 34GO-OPS-005-2, "Power Changes" step 5.2.3 there is a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months time limit to exit the Immediate Exit Region.

I

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

3 Page 13 of 26 Event

Description:

Insert control rods to return to safe area of Power to flow map Time Position ATC Applicant's Actions or Behavior Inserts control rods per 34GO-OPS-065-0, starting with control rod Step 51 (Sequence A2).

During rod insertion, rod steps will be performed in reverse sequential order, starting at the highest numbered step. (** rod steps are not required to be performed sequentially, but must be positioned to their RWM insert limit prior to inserting lower numbered steps).

Selects Rod Places Control Rod movement switch to the IN position Verifies Rod moves using Rod display information and Rx and Generator power decreasing.

ATC Adjust 2Cll-F003 as required to maintain 220 - 280 psid drive water dp for control rod movement.

It is allowable to flag the RBM downscale and Rod Block alarms, if desired.

ATC Note: RBM Downscale 603-211 will alarm during this movement due to the significant rod worth of these rods.

Releases Rod movement switch so that the control rod stops 1 position before the insert limit unless the insert limit is 00.

Initials Rod movement Sheet.

Verifier, if available, Initials Rod movement sheet.

Notifies the SS when they are out of the region of potential instabilities.

If Power is decreased enough, the LPRM Downscale Alarm (603-246) will annunciate.

I

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2

If Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

4 Page 14 of 26 Event

Description:

Leaking SRV, Inadvertent Opening of SRV 2B21-F013G.

Time Position All ATC BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator At the direction of the lead examiner, Press (RB-4) to activate o mfB2L128G, "Main Steam Relief Valve G Leak" (Final: 5 at Ramp Rate: 5)

Receives "Safety Blowdown Valves Leaking," 34AR-603-122-2 alarms.

Respond to "Safety Blowdown Valves Leaking," ARP (603-122).

May enter 34AB-B21-003-2, "Failure of SafetylReliefValves" since the entry conditions are met; however, this procedure does not provide guidance for leaking SRV s.

Confirms the Green Light for the SRV is illuminated (2H 11-P602)

Directs the BOP operator to confirm which SRV is leaking by checking SRV tail pipe temperatures on 2B21-614 recorder (2Hll-P614 panel).

Dispatch SOs to the Torus area and monitor for noise that may be associated with SRV Tailpipe Vacuum Breaker Operation Attempts to determine of the leakage is pilot leakage or main body leakage by monitoring:

o SRV tailpipe temperatures o Main steam flow o RPV pressure o Torus temperature o Drywell pressure Notifies engineering of the SRV leakage and request Engineering support to determine whether the leakage is pilot leakage or main body leakage.

Checks SRV tail pipe temperatures on 2B21-614 recorder (2Hll-P614 panel).

Determines the "G" SRV tailpipe temperature is elevated Reports to the SS and ATC operator that "G" SRV is leaking I

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2

'I Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

4 Page 15 of 26 Event

Description:

Leaking SRV, Inadvertent Opening of SRV 2B21-F013G.

Time Position All SS ATC ATC SS ATC Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator At the direction of the chief examiner:

o MODIFY mfB2L128Cr, "Main Steam Relief Valve G Leak" to Final: 35 at Ramp Rate: 100.

Receives "Safety Blowdown Pressure High," 34AR-602-311-2 and "Safety Blowdown Valves Leaking," 34AR-603-122-2 alarms Directs operator to enter 34AB-B21-003-2, Failure of Safety/Relief valves.

Enters 34AB-B21-003-2, Failure of Safety/Relief Valves Determines that SRV "G" is open Manually cycles SRV "G". This action will cause SRV to close.

May attempt to reset ADS as follows:

o Depresses the ADS Logic A Timer Reset pushbutton o

Depresses the ADS Logic B Timer Reset pushbutton May attempt to reset LLS as follows:

o Depresses the LLS Channel AlC Reset pushbutton.

o Depresses the LLS Channel B/D Reset pushbutton.

Informs SS that the "G" SRV closed after the switch was cycled (Critical Task - Cycles SRV"G" control switch prior to entering the unsafe area of the Boron Injection Initiation Temperature curve)

Directs operators to verify that the "G" SRV is closed, after switch is cycled.

May initiate a TS Tracking RAS and/or may request Engineering Support to determine the operability status of the "2G" SRV.

o TS 3.4.3.A; Reactor Coolant System (RCS), Safety/Relief Valves (Tracking RAS)

Confirms that SRV "G" is closed by monitoring:

o SRV tailpipe temperature decrease o

Torus Level stabilizing o

Torus Temp stabilizing o

Rx and Generator power returns to the pre-event level

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

4 Page 16 of 26 Event

Description:

Leaking SRV, Inadvertent Opening of SRV 2B21-F013G.

Time Position ATC SS ALL ATC Applicant's Actions or Behavior Resets the SRV leak detection by placing the Leak Detection Logic A Reset key lock switch to Reset position and back to Normal position and confirm that the Amber SRV indicating lights have Extinguished.

Informs the SS that SRV "G" is closed.

Informs the crew that operability of the suppression chamber-drywell vacuum breakers must be performed within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months per 34SV -T48-002-2, Suppression Chamber To Drywell Vacuum Breaker System Operability.

Notifies Chemistry and initiates a CR to initiate increased monitoring of vessel moisture content carryover per 64CH-SAM-025-0.

NOTE The remainder of this Event is NOT required if Torus temps remain below 95°F.

The team recognizes torus temperature is above 95°F.

Enters 34AB-T23-003-2, Torus Temperature Above 95°F Confirms the high temperature by OBSERVING the Suppression Pool bulk average temperature on the SPDS primary display Places RHR in Suppression Pool cooling per 34S0-EII-0I0-2, Residual Heat Removal.

NOTE The operator may place torus cooling in service by using the Placard that's available or using the appropriate section of the procedure.

These steps assume the Placard is used.

The A or B loop of RHR rnay be used. The following steps are written assuming "B" loop and "IS" pump is used. If "A" loop is used, substitute "A" for "B" for valves and if "B" pump is not used substitute "A", "C", or "D" for "B" pump.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

4 Page 17 of 26 Event

Description:

Leaking SRV, Inadvertent Opening of SRV 2B21-F013G.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Placard)

BOP (Placard)

Enters 34S0-E11-01O-2, Residual Heat Removal or uses placard on 2Hll-P601.

o Places RHRSW in service o

Prelubes RHRSW pump o Overrides 2Ell-F068B Low Discharge Pressure Interlock o SEC System Auto Initiation Signal Present (650-234 remains alarmed) o Auto Blow Down CS or RHR Press Permissive (602-312 remains alarmed) o RHR Flow Low (601-215 is received and clears) o Positions 2Ell-F068B to 45% OPEN o

Starts RHRSW pump B

- RHR HX B DiffPress Low (601-215) alarms o Places 2EII-F068B Low Discharge Pressure Interlock switch to normal position.

o Positions 2Ell-F068B to obtain < 4400 GPM AND < 450 PSIG

- RHR HX B DiffPress Low (601-215) alarm clears Place RHR loop B in Suppression Pool Cooling o Does NOT position the 2/3 Core Height Permissive switch.

(RWL will NOT be lowered to below 2/3 core height) o Does NOT place the Containment Spray valve Control switch in the manual position. (LOCA signal is not present) o Confirm open 2Ell-F048B, HX Bypass Vlv.

o Close CLOSE 2E11-F047B, Hx Inlet Vlv.

o Start "2B RHR pump

- SEC System Auto Initiation Signal Present (650-234) alarms

- Auto Blow Down CS or RHR Press Permissive (602-312) alarms

- RHR Flow Low (601-215) alarms o Open 2EI1-F028B, Torus Spray or Test Vlv.

o Throttle open 2EII-F024B, Full Flow Test Line Vlv. and establish RHR flow of less than or equal to 7700 gpm (R603B)

- RHR Flow Low (601-215) alarm clears o Open 2Ell-F047 A(B), Hx Inlet Vlv.

o CLOSE 2Ell-F048A(B), Hx Bypass Vlv.

o Reports to SS that RHR has been placed in Suppression Pool Cooling mode

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

5 Page 18 of 26 Event

Description:

RFPT Trip / A TWS Actions / HPCI Failure To Start Time I Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator:

When directed by the Chief Examiner; Press (RB-5) to activate:

Insert mfN21_87B, "B RFPT Trip" All

Diagnose trip of Feedwater pump I Loss of High Pressure Feedwater.

SS

Direct NPO to scram the reactor 0

Enters RC or RC-A EOP Flowchart.

0 Directs CBO to perform RC-l placard.

0 Directs BOP to perform RC-2 and RC-3 placards.

SS Enters RC-A Flowchart (ATWS) and CP3 (ATWS Level Control).

Directs ATC to:

0 Confirm the reactor Mode Switch in Shutdown.

0 Confirm ARI Initiation.

0 Confirm Recirc runback to minimum.

ATC (Placard)

Manually SCRAMs the Reactor using the SCRAM pushbuttons.

Places Rx Mode Switch in SID.

Initiates Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI) by rotating the button collars and depressing both ARI pushbuttons at the same time.

Uses the Full Core Display and Rod Worth Minimizer to determine that all control rods are NOT inserted past position 02.

Informs the SS that all rods are NOT fully inserted (ATWS).

Inserts IRMs and SRMs.

May inject SBLC depending on RWUpower level (if power is above 5%, the ATC is directed to inject SBLC lAW the RC-l placard).

Places SDV Isol Vlv Switch to "ISOL" and verifies closed.

If not tripped, places Recirc to minimum speed.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 II Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

5 Page 19 of 26 Event

Description:

RFPT Trip / ATWS Actions / HPCI Failure To Start Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC

Reports to the SS that:

0 The Reactor Mode Switch is in the Shutdown position.

0 ARI has been initiated (CBO may initiate ARI at this time).

0 Recirc is at minimum speed.

BOP Performs actions of placards RC-2 and RC-3 after Reactor SCRAM.

BOP (Placard)

Confirms proper Level Control response:

Checks ECCS Injection Systems.

0 Observes BPCI failure to start and informs SS.

0 Either starts RCIC or verifies it auto starts when level goes below

-35 inches.

When feed flow is less than the capacity of the S/U level control valve

(;:::; 1.5 mlbm/hr), then:

Opens 2N21-F125.

Places 2C32-R619, FW S/U level control valve controller, in Auto, set at approximately 9 inches.

Closes 2N21-FllO.

BOP

Attempts to manually start BPCI:

(Placard) 0 Open 2E41-F059, Lube Oil Cooling Wtr Valve.

0 Start 2E41-C002-2, Barom Cndsr Vacuum Pump.

0 Attempt to open 2E41-F001, Turb Steam Supply Vlv.

0 Informs SS of 2E41-FOO 1 failure to open SS

Directs BOP operator or SSS to contact maintenance and have BPCI failure investigated.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

5 Page 20 of26 Event

Description:

RFPT Trip / A TWS Actions / HPCI Failure To Start Time Position BOP (Placard)

BOP BOP (Placard)

SS ATC/STA Applicant's Actions or Behavior Manually starts a Reactor Feedwater Pump (P650) o Confirm the trip condition has reset and the Condensate system is available.

o Confirm the RFPT HP stop valve red light is illuminated.

o Confirm the RFPT LP stop valve red light is illuminated.

o Confirm the RFPT trip annunciator is clear 650-325 (or 326).

o Slowly raise RFPT speed using the Speed Setter switch until speed is at 2100 RPM +/- 100 RPM (2N32-R603A on P603) and confirm MIA Station Permissive white light illuminates.

o Place the RFPT TMR Mode Switch to MIA and confirm the MIA station green light illuminates.

o Raise RFPT speed with the MIA station until RFP discharge pressure (R635A/B) greater than reactor pressure (R605A).

Inject to the RPV and control reactor water level in the band assigned by the SS by performing one of the following:

o Throttling 2N21-Fll0 (Bypass Valve) as necessary to raise or lower injection flow rate.

OR o Confirm open or open 2N21-F125 (SULCV isolation valve) and then throttling 2N21-F111 (2C32-R629 S/U LvI Control Valve) as necessary to raise or lower injection flow rate.

Note: Until the SS assigns a reactor water level band, the level band is lAW 34AB-C71-001-2, RC-2 placard.

Monitors RPV pressure.

Confirms proper operation of pressure control system Bypass Valves As time permits notifies SS of pressure control system operation.

Directs CBO or STA to report reactor power or observes reactor power on SPDS.

Reports power level to the SS.

Note: the SS may proceed down the "power" or "level path first.

I

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

5 Page 21 of26 Event

Description:

RFPT Trip / A TWS Actions / HPCI Failure To Start Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

SS

Directs CBO to trip the Recirc Pumps if power is >5%.

Directs CBO to reset ARI and insert control rods per 3lEO-EOP-103-2.

ATC

Trips Recirc pumps, if not already tripped

Enters 3lEO-EOP-l03-2, "EOP Control Rod Insertion Methods."

Directs the SSS to send a SO to place the ARI test switches in test on 2CU-POOI (local panel) per the 103 procedure.

Places the SDV high level trip bypass switch in the "Open" position.

Direct the SSS to override all automatic scram signals per 3 1 EO-EOP-103-2.

Places the Disch Vol Isol Test Switch to NORM (this action may not be done until the SSS reports back that the automatic scrams have been overridden).

NOTE If asked for a rod insertion order, the ST A will recommend to tIte "Use procedure guidance."

ATC

Prepares to manually insert control rods lAW 3lEO-EOP-l03:

(Critical Task - Commence insertion of control rods within 20 minutes and before entering the unsafe region of the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit graph).

Places the Reactor Mode Switch in "Refuel."

Places the RWM Bypass Switch in "Bypass."

Ask STA which rods have the highest worth or inserts rod in a black and white pattern.

Establishes adequate drive water pressure by adjusting 2CU-F003, Drive Pressure Control Valve.

May start a second CRD pump to establish adequate drive water pressure.

Selects a rod.

Drives selected rod to at least the 02 position using the Emergency In Notch Override switch or Rod Movement Switch.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

5 Page 22 of 26 Event

Description:

RFPT Trip / ATWS Actions / HPCI Failure To Start Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SS

Orders BOP to inhibit ADS.

Directs BOP or SSS to have MSIV closure on low RPV level overridden.

Directs BOP to override 2P41-F316 isolation.

SBLC injection is an option for the SS to consider, but is not required for low power ATWS conditions.

BOP

Inhibits ADS by placing both Keylock inhibit switches to "Inhibit."

If directed to do so by the SS, calls the SSS to have MSIV closure override performed.

Places override switches for 2P41-F316 in the override switches to "Override."

SS

As a conservative action, the SS may direct injection of boron using SBLC.

ATC

If directed by the SS to inject SBLC:

0 Places the SBLC switch to either position "A" or "B".

Confirm the following 0

Squib Vlv Ready indicating lights extinguish.

0 SBLC Loss of Continuity to Squib Valve annunciator alarms 0

Selected SBLC pump has started 0

2G31-F004, Rx Water Cleanup Vlv is closed 0

SBLC tank level is decreasing 0

SBLC discharge pressure> reactor pressure 0

Reactor power is decreasing SS

If water level is above -60" and power above 5% when the SS addresses CP-3, he will Direct the BOP to lower water level to below -

60" using 31EO-EOP-113-2.

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

5 Page 23 of 26 Event

Description:

RFPT Trip I ATWS Actions I HPCI Failure To Start Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP

Reduces injection to lower RWL to < -60 inches using 31EO-EOP-100-2:

Recognizes HPCI failure to start, and informs SS.

Lowers Feedwater flow as necessary to achieve a lowering RWL trend.

SS

When RPV level is below -60 inches, Directs the BOP operator to control RPV level within a level band. Any band between -60 inches and -185 inches is acceptable.

(Typically -60" to -100" to maintain RPV level above -101")

If RWL is subsequently allowed to increase to >-60 inches and Rx power is >5%, the override will be re-addressed to once again, lower level to < -60.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

6 Page 24 of 26 Event

Description:

RCIC Trip I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP (Placard)

Simulator operator:

AFTER the MSIV low level closure HAS BEEN BYPASSED:

THEN Press (RB-6) to activate:

Insert mf2E5LIlO, "RCIC Turbine Trip" Use Feedwater system to control RPV water level in the assigned band (Critical Task - Maintain RWL above -185 inches)

Verify/Place RFPT controllers in Manual Raise RFPT speed to increase pressure to above RPV pressure Do one of the following to provide injection to the RPV:

o Verify/Place the Startup Level Control Valve in Manual o Open/Verify open 2N21-F125 o Throttle open 2N21-Flll (SULCV)

OR o Throttle open 2N21-FllO SS IF the following conditions exist:

SS Reactor power >5%.

RWL above TAF.

Torus temperature is in the safe region of the BITT curve.

SRV s are open.

Then Addresses the override located at coordinate C2 on EOP Flowchart CP-3 to Terminate and Prevent injection to the RPV.

Determines that RPV level can be maintained above -185 inches.

Arrives at "Wait Until" (CP-3 at F-7) for Hot Shutdown Boron Weight.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op. Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.:

4*01 Event No.:

6 Page 25 of26 Event

Description:

RCIC Trip I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP

As time allows, and when generator load goes below 80 MW e, the crew performs TC-1 to trip the Main Turbine.

Manually Trip the Turbine.

Confirm TSV's, TCV's, and CN's have properly closed.

Confirm the generator PCBs and exciter field breaker tripped.

Confirm the 4160 VAC station service busses have transferred to their alternate supply.

ConfirmlPlace TGM in auto.

0 Start TG Oil Pump 0

Motor Suction Pump 0

LiftPumps

Close the RSSV's (2N11-F004A and F004B).

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2

'I Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-01 Event No.:

6 Page 26 of26 Event

Description:

RCIC Trip I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior AFTER the following conditions EXIST:

Control Rods are Inserting"

RWL is being maintained in the established level band.

The SCRAM has been r~~set.

The SDV Vent & Drains are open.

THEN, with Chief Examiner's penrnission:

Delete mfC 11-211 AND

Press (RB-7) to activate mf60313289, Scram Discharge Volume High Level Trip alarm OFF, and mf60313307, Scram Discharge Volume Not Drained Alarm OFF ATC SCRAMS Reactor

All rods insert

Notifies SS that all rods are full in.

SS

Transitions to RC - Point B

Orders Operator to slowly increase RWL to 3 to 50 inches.

Simulator Operator With Chief Examiner's permission Scenario will stop here.

Page 1 of 25 Scenario Summary Final Jacility:

E. I Hatch Scenario No.:

4-02 Op-Test No.:

2009-301 Initiating Conditions:

Unit 2 is at 100%.

"2A" Core Spray pump is tagged out.

Turnover The HPCI surveillance is to be perfonned in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months .

RHR "2B" is in Torus Cooling in preparation for the HPCI surveillance.

Summary:

Event 1: Instrument; The cooling water controller for the "2B" RFPT will fail. This results in high temperatures on the RFPT oil system and RFPT bearings. The BOP operator will place the controller in manual and adjust cooling water flow to reduce the temperatures. If manual control is not taken within 3 minutes, RFPT vibrations will occur and continue to increase until either the temperature is reduced or 6 mils is reached. A manual RFPT trip is required at 6 mils.

Event 2: ComponentlTS; The "2B" RHRSW pump trips. The ATC operator will place the "2D" RHRSW in service.

Event 3: Reactivity/Component; A "2A" Recirculation Pump ASD Cell will auto bypass.

This will result in a flow and power reduction. The ASD Cell Bypass and Recirc flow mismatch will be addressed by annunciator response procedures and an abnonnal procedure. The SS will address TS for Recirc flow mismatch. The plant will be operating in the Immediate Exit Region of the Power-to-Flow map. The ATC operator will insert control rods or increase Recirc Pump speed to exit the Immediate Exit Region of the P/F map.

Event 4: ComponentlTS; The RCIC turbine receives a inadvertent trip while in standby due to accidental bumping of the trip lever. The SS addresses TS for RCIC being inoperable. RCIC will be returned to standby by the BOP operator.

Event 5: : Major; A loss of all high pressure injection/reactor scram occurs as a result of the following: "2D" 4160VAC bus trips, "2C" Condensate Booster pump trips, HPCI cannot be started, "B" Feedwater line breaks inside the Drywell (LOCA and a loss of an injection line for RCIC) and both CRD pumps trip.

Event 6: Component; ECCS LOCA logic fails so the BOP operator will manually start ECCS equipment (RHR, CS, EDGs) (Critical Task). The BOP operator will align RHR to spray the Suppression Chamber. Containment sprays will be secured prior to reaching TAP.

Event 7: Major/Component; RWL will decrease to TAF. The SS will direct the ATC operator to open all SRVs to Emergency Depressurize the RPV (Critical Task). Only 3 ADS valves will open. The ATC operator will manually open 4 additional SRVs. The BOP operator must manually open the RHR and CS discharge valves after reactor pressure decreases below the 500 psig pennissive signal (Critical Task). Reactor pressure will decrease to below the shut-off head of the low pressure ECCS pumps and RWL will be restored to above TAF using all available injection systems. Mter RWL is determined to be above TAF, injection valves will be throttled to control injection and raise RWL to the normal EOP RWL band.

Page 20f25 AppendixD Critical Task List Form ES-D-1 Final lacility:

E. I Hatch Scenario No.:

4-02 Op-Test No.:

2009-301 Critical Tasks

1.

'2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Start ECCS pumps prior to opening ADS valves (Event 6)

Open ADS valves before RWL reaches -185 inches (Event 7)

Begin opening ECCS discharge valves after reactor pressure decreases below the 500 psig permissive and before reactor pressure decreases to below ECCS pump shutoff head. (Event 7)

ES 301-4 Attributes Required Actual Items Total Malfunctions 5-8 6

1. RFPT Temp Controller failure. (Event 1)

2. RHRSW pump trip. (Event 2)

3. Recirc ASD Cell Bypass. (Event 3)

4. RCIC trip. (Event 4)

5. LOCA Logic failure. (Event 6)

6. Failure of ADS valves to open. (Event 7)

Malfunctions After 1-2 2

1. LOCA Logic failure. (Event 6)

EOP Entry

2. Failure of ADS valves to open. (Event 7)

Abnormal Events 2-4 2

1. Recirc ASD Cell Bypass. (Event 3)

2. Loss of 4160V Bus (Event 5)

Major Transients 1-2 2

1. Scram, Loss of Hi Press. injection. (Event 5)

2. Emergency Depressurize at TAF. (Event 7)

EOPs entered, 1-2 1

1. RC (Event 5) requiring substantive actions EOPs contingencies 0-2 2

1. CP-l Alternate RPV Level Control (Event 5) requiring substantive

2. CP-l Emergency Depressurization (Event 7) actions Critical Tasks 2-3 3

1. Start ECCS Pumps. (Event 6)

2. Open SRVs to ED. (Event 7)

3. Open ECCS Discharge Valves. (Event 7)

Page 3 of 25 AppendixD Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l

(

Final Facility:

E. I Hatch Scenario No.:

4-02 Op-Test No.:

2009-301 Examiners:

Operators:

SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions.

Unit 2 is operating at 100% power. Core Spray pump "2A" is tagged out for maintenance due to the supply breaker tripping during a Surveillance test.

Turnover: The HPCI surveillance is to be performed in 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months . RHR Loop "2B" is in Torus Cooling in preparation for the HPCI surveillance.

Event Malf. No.

Event Event No.

Type*

Description 1

mfN2L88B I (ATC)

Feedwater pump 2B cooling water controller failure.

TC repair and return to auto.

2 mf60l21104 TS (SRO) "2B" RHRSW pump overload annunciator alarms. If the operator does mfEl L120B C (ATC) not trip the pump within 3 minutes, the pump will be automatically trip, operator either places the "B" RHR loop in standby and places the "A" loop in Suppression Pool Cooling OR places the other "2D" RHRSW Ipump in service.

3 mfB3L135A R (ATC) A "2A" Reactor Recirc ASD cell is auto bypassed.

"2A" Recirc speed decreases resulting in a flow mismatch. Insert control rods or raise Reactor Recirc pump speed to return to safe area of

[power to flow map.

4 mfE5L61 TS (SRO) RCIC Trip & Throttle valve tripped locally, must be reset and re-C (BOP) latched.

5 mfB2L229B M (All) 4160 VAC "D" trips causing a loss of 2 Condensate and Condensate mfCI1A_30A Ibooster pumps, then Feedwater line B breaks, causing a LOCA, HPCI mfCllB_30B trips on start and will not be returned to service.

mfE4L104 mfN2L80C mfR22_181 diCllB-S4A diCIIB-S4B 6

mfEIL202B C (BOP)

ECCS fails to start on LOCA signal.

mfE2L202A 7

mfB2L129A M (ALL) Emergency depressurization is required due to low RWL mfB2L129C C (ATC) During emergency depress ADS valves A, C, E, and H don't operate.

mfB2Ll29E mfB21 129H (I *

(N)ormal, (R )eacti vity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Power:

Activities in progress:

Power:

Activities in progress:

The following equipment is inoperable:

Scheduled evolutions:

Surveillances due this shift:

Active clearances:

Rod Configuration:

100%

None Shift Turnover Sheet 100%

RHR loop "B" is in Torus cooling in preparation for the HPCI pump surveillance Core Spray "2A" has been inoperable for 1 day.

The supply breaker tripped during a pump surveillance.

o Expect it to be returned to service in 2 days.

o A 7 day RAS exist for Core Spray Pump "2A".

The STA is currently out of the Control Room.

o If needed, the ST A will be in the control room 10 minutes from the time he is called.

o The STA may be reached at phone number ext 2730.

HPCI Pump Operability, 34SV-E41-002-2, is scheduled to be performed 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months from now.

o This is the last day to perform this surveillance.

o A HPCI surveillance brief has just started for the operators that will be performing the surveillance.

All other surveillances are current.

Core Spray 2A SeeRWM

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

1 Page 5 of 25 Event

Description:

Feedwater pump 2B cooling water controller failure.

Time I Position J Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator At Chief Examiner's direction:

Press (RB-l) to activate:

0 mtN21_88B, Feedwater Pump Lube Oil Cooling System Failure ALL The following alarms will annunciate:

34AR-650-315-2, "RFPT 2B Brg Oil Temp High"

34AR-650-112-2, "RFP/COND BRG Metal Temp High"

34AR-650-333-2, "RFPT 2B BRG Temp High" ATC Note: the operator may immediately place the controller in manual in

, "'/

accordance with 31GO-OPS-021-0, Manipulation and Control of Equipment, responding to a failed controller.

Addresses the high temp annunciator, pulling the ARP

At panel 2HII-P655, check all temperature indicators on 2N32-R616 to determine actual oil temperatures.

Confirm that RFPT "2B" Oil Temp controller, 2P41-R606, on pane12Hll-P650 is adjusted for 110 to 130°F ATC

Recognizes the automatic function of the controller has failed, closing the cooling water valve.

Places the controller in manual, depresses the open/increase pushbutton, opening the valve. Oil temperatures begin decreasing and the alarm extinguishes.

All

If this condition exists for over 3 minutes alarm 34AR-650-332-2, "RFPT 2B EXCESSNE VIBRATION," will illuminate.

SS

Notifies maintenance of the RFPT temperature controller problem.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

1 Page 6 of2S Event

Description:

Feedwater pump 2B cooling water controller failure.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior ss ATC Simulator Operator After the team has taken manual control of the temperature controller AND has notified Maintenance of the problem:

AND THEN Delete malfunction mfN2L88B Call the control room and report the following:

o "Time compression is being used; the problem with 2P41-R606 was a wiring harness on the temperature sensor. The automatic function of the temperature controller has been repaired and may be returned to service."

Directs the ATC to return 2P41-R606 to automatic operation.

Depresses the automatic pushbutton on controller 2P41-R606.

Verifies the controller responds correctly in automatic.

Notifies the SS the Lube Oil Temperature Controller has been returned to automatic.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

2 Page 7 of2S Event

Description:

"2B" RHRSW pump trips, "2D" RHRSW pump started Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior C (ALL)

Simulator Operator At Chief Examiner's direction:

Call control room BOP operator and tell them to stay on the phone until directed to hang up.

THEN press (RB-2) to activate:

mfE60 1211 04, "RHR Serv "Wtr Pump B Overload (Annunciator ON)"

If the operator does not trip the "2B" RHRSW pump within 3 minutes, THEN press (RB-3) to activate::

mfEl L120B, Trip of "2B" RHRSW pump Simulator Operator After the "2B" RHRSW pump is tripped, THEN IMMEDIATELY DELETE mfE60121104, "RHR Serv Wtr Pump B Overload (Annunciator ON)"

Diagnose loss of "2B" RHRSW

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 II Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

2 Page 8 of2S Event

Description:

"2B" RHRSW pump trips, "2D" RHRSW pump started Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SS (TS)

Direct BOP operator to respond to annunciators.

Refer to TS:

o 3.7 Plant Systems 3.7.1 RHRSW System

Condition: 3.7.1.A, One RHRSW Pump inoperable.

Required Action: 3.7.1.A.1, Restore RHRSW Pump to operable status.

Completion time: 30 days.

o 3.6 Containment Systems 3.6.2.3 RHR Suppression Pool Cooling

Condition: 3.6.2.3.A, One RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem inoperable.

Required Action: 3.6.2.3.A.1, Restore RHR suppression pool cooling subsystem to operable status.

Completion time: 7 days.

o 3.6 Containment Systems NOTE 3.6.2.4 RHR Suppression Pool Spray

Condition: 3.6.2.4.A, One RHR suppression pool spray subsystem inoperable.

Required Action: 3.6.2.4.A.1, Restore RHR suppression pool spray subsystem to operable status.

Completion time: 7 days.

If the SM is called and asked how to proceed with the "2B" Loop of RHR, as the SM direct the team to "shutdo'wn the RHR Suppression Pool Cooling loop and we will reschedule the HPCI surveillance."

NOTE The SS may direct the operator to shutdown the "2B" loop of RHR, if this occurs the operator will place the "2B" loop of RHR in standby lAW, "RHR System Restoration" of 34S0-Ell-01O-2, "RHR System"

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

2 Page 9 of25 Event

Description:

"2B" RHRSW pump trips, "2D" RHRSW pump started Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP C (BOP)

(Placard)

C (BOP)

(Placard)

Respond to the following annunciators:

o "RHRSW Pump B Trip" (601-226).

o "RHR HX B DiffPress Low" (601-215) comes in and clears.

Respond to ARP:

o RHR SRV WTR Pump B Trip If the BOP operator uses the placard to start the "2D" RHRSW pump in the "B" RHRSW loop:

Start "2D" RHRSW pump IA W 34S0-EII-01O-2, "RHR System" 0 placard.

o Depress the RHRSW Lube Valve pushbutton, allow pump prelubing to occur for 1 minute.

o Place the RHRSW pressure interlock switch for 2E II-F068B in the "Override" position.

o Throttle 2Ell-F068B to 45% open.

RHR HX DiffPress Low (601-215) annunciator alarms o Start the "2B" RHRSW pump o Place the RHRSW pressure interlock switch for 2Ell-F068B in the "NORMAL" position.

o Throttle 2Ell-F068A open (max flow 4,400 gpm, maintaining RHRSW pressure <450 psig If the SS directs the operator to secure Suppression Pool Cooling:

The BOP operator refers to 34S0-EII-01O-2, "RHR System" and:

o Closes 2Ell-F048B, Hx Bypass Valve o Close 2Ell-F024B, Full Flow Test Valve o Confirm closed 2Ell-F027B, Torus Spray Valve o Close 2EII-F028B, Torus Spray or Test Valve o Confirm auto initiation signals were NOT present o Stop the "2B" RHR pump by placing its control switch o Confirm 2Ell-SI8B, Cnmt Spray Vlv Cntl2/3 Core Height Permissive Switch is in the OFF position o Confirm "2B" loop of RHRSW is in shutdown (previously done) o Place the "B" RHR loop in standby

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2

~,

Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

2 Page 10 of 25 Event

Description:

"2B" RHRSW pump trips, "2D" RHRSW pump started II Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

Simulator Operator

After the ATe operator has started executing steps for starting the "D" RHRSW pump THEN o Tell the BOP operator that the conversation is over and to hang up the phone.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

3 Page 11 of 25 Event

Description:

Recirc ASD Cell Bypass, Recirc Mismatch, Insert Control Rods.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

Simulator Operator At Chief Examiner's direction, press (RB-4) to activate:

mfB3 L135A, Recirc ASD A Cell Bypass TS (SS)

Direct ATC to respond to "Recirc Loop Out Of Service" (602-127) and "ASD A Trouble" (602-108) Annunciators

Direct maintenance be contacted to determine cause of Recirc speed decrease

Addresses TS o TS 3.4, Reactor Coolant System

.~.

TS 3.4.1, Recirculation Loops Operating

/

Condition: 3.4.1.A; The requirements of the LCO not met.

Required Action: 3.4.1.A.1, Satisfy the requirements of the LCO (3.4.1)

Two Recirc loops with matched flow in operation OR

One Recirc Loop operating with the following limits applied when the associated LCO is applicable oLCO 3.2.1, APLHGR single loop ops (SLO) limits as specified in the COLR o LCO 3.2.2, MCPR SLO limits specified in the COLR o LCO 3.2.3, LHGR SLO limits specified in the COLR oLCO 3.3.1.1 RPS Instrumentation function 2.b APRM value set (Table 3.3.1.1) for SLO.

Completion Time: 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

3 Page 12 of 25 Event

Description:

Recirc ASD Cell Bypass, Recirc Mismatch, Insert Control Rods.

II Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior C (ATC)

Respond to "Recirc Loop Out Of Service" (602-127) and "ASD A R (ATC)

Trouble" (602-108).

Diagnose Recirc pump speed mismatch

Confirm that an ASD cell has failed and is bypassed using SPDS or by having it verified locally at the ASD cabinet.

Enter 34AB-B31-001-2, "Reactor Recirculation Pump(s) Trip, Recirc Loops Mismatch, OR ASD Cell Bypass.

0 Confirm the "SPD HLD RESET" pushbutton is illuminated 0

Enter section III of 34AB-B31-00 1-2

If Recirc speed mismatch >35%, inform SS of 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months limit to balance Recirc Pump flows 0

When directed by SS with STA guidance:

Depress the respective SPD HLD RESET pushbutton indicating lamp

Increase the speed of the "2A" Recirc Pump per 34S0-B31-001-2, Reactor Recirc System" Note to examiners: TS SR 3.4.1.1 requires Recirc flow mismatch be less than 5% if operating at greater than or equal to 70% rated core flow, and mismatch be less than 10% if operating at less than 70% rated core flow.

After 34AB-B31-001-2 has been addressed entered, the operator will depress the Fault Reset pushbutton to reset the "ASD A Trouble" alarm IAW 34AR-602-108-2, "ASD Trouble."

STA

Recommend increasing core flow to exit the immediate exit region and match Recirc Pump flow.

STA If asked, Reactor Engineering guidance for raising power is:

II

"Limit the rate of power change to 10 MWe/minute."

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2

(

'l Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

3 Page 13 of25 Event

Description:

Recirc ASD Cell Bypass, Recirc Mismatch, Insert Control Rods.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

Simulator Operator At Chief Examiner's direction:

Call the Control Room as I8tC with the following message:

0 The "2A" Recirculation Pump ASD has automatically bypassed a cell, conditions at the ASD are normal for this condition.

SS

Within 15 minutes of entering the Immediate Exit Region of the Power to Flow map, directs operator to exit the region by inserting control rods.

Ensures the plant has exited the Immediate Exit Region of the Power to Flow map within one hour.

Has a control rod movement brief per 34GO-OPS-065-0 Simulator Operator If the Team calls for the ST A or Reactor Engineering, for rod movement recommendations:

Respond as follows:

0 "What do you recommend?"

THEN 0

"I agree with your recommendation" ATC

Inserts control rods per 34GO-OPS-065-0, starting with control rod GROUP 54.

During rod insertion, rod steps will be performed in reverse sequential order, starting at the highest numbered step. (** rod steps are not required to be performed sequentially, but must be positioned to their RWM insert limit prior to inserting lower numbered groups).

Selects Rod

Places Control Rod movement switch to the IN position

Verifies Rod moves using Rod display information and Rx and Generator power decreasing.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2

~ I Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

3 Page 14 of25 Event

Description:

Recirc ASD Cell Bypass, Recirc Mismatch, Insert Control Rods.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC

If required, adjust 2C11-F003 to get 220 - 280 psid drive water dp.

ATC Note: RBM Downscale alarm may alarm during this movement due to the significant rod worth of these rods. It is allowed to flag the RBM Downscale and Rod Block alarm.

Releases Rod movement switch so that the control rod stops 1 position before the insert limit unless the insert limit is 00.

Initials Rod movement Sheet.

Verifier, if available, Initials Rod movement sheet.

Notifies the SS when they are out of the region of potential instabilities.

SS

Directs the operator to insert the rods to the insert limit after consulting with the STA.

A endix 0 Form ES-O-2

'I Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

4 Page 15 of 25 Event

Description:

RCIC Turbine Trip and Throttle Valve tripped locally I Time Position ALL BOP SS SS (TS)

II Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator At Chief Examiner's direction, press (RB-5) to activate:

o mfE5L61, RCIC Overspeed Trip Annunciator 34AR-602-301-2, "RCIC TURBINE TRIP" is received.

Confirms RCIC Turbine has tripped per the following indications:-

2E51-F524, Trip & Throttle Valve, indicates closed.

2E51-F013, Pump Discharge Valve, indicates closed.

2E51-F019, Min Flow Valve, indicates closed.

Notifies the SSS to have the RCIC trip investigated.

Addresses TS:

3.5, ECCS and RCIC 3.5.3, RCIC System o Condition: 3.5.3.A, RCIC system inoperable.

o Required Action: 3.5.3.A.l, Verify by administrative means HPCI system operable o Completion Time: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND o Required Action: 3.5.3.A.2, Verify by administrative means HPCI system operable o Completion Time: 14 days Simulator Operator After TS has been addressed:

As a SO in training, call the Control Room and report:

o "While I was in the RCIC room I accidentally bumped a lever on the RCIC pedestal. It changed position along with a long rod attached to the lever."

I

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2

. ~~.

Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

4 Page 16 of 25 Event

Description:

RCIC Turbine Trip and Throttle Valve tripped locally I Time Position SS BOP BOP SS Applicant's Actions or Behavior Notifies the SSS to have the RCIC mechanical overspeed reset.

Directs the operator to return RCIC to standby.

May use generic guidance of 31 GO-OPS-021-0 to open the trip and throttle valve.

Simulator Operator AFTER the operator has identified the problem as a trip AND RCIC is directed to be reset locally:

Delete malfunction mfESl_61 THEN Call the control room and report:

o "The RCIC mechanical over-speed mechanism has been reset."

Enters 34S0-E51-001-2, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC)

System section for resetting the mechanical overspeed.

At panel 2H 11-P602, takes 2E51-F524, Turbine Trip & Throttle Valve control switch to close and holds until valve operator is fully closed.

At panel 2Hll-P602, takes 2E51-F524, Turbine Trip & Throttle Valve (T&T), control switch to open and holds until the valve is operator is fully open, verifying the valve indication reflects the valve is opening along with the valve operator.

Verifies "RCIC Turbine Trip" annunciator clears Notifies the SS that RCIC' sTrip & Throttle valve is open And RCIC has been returned to the standby condition.

May confirm the remainder of the standby lineup but the only required manipulation is to re-Iatch and open the T&T valve.

Determines the TS RASs associated with RCIC no longer exist

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

5 Page 17 of 25 Event

Description:

Loss of Condensate System and Feedwater line Break.

I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Note to Examiners:

-35 inches:

HPCI starts RCIC starts SBGT start ARI Group 5 isolation (RWCU)

Secondary Containment Isolation

-60 inches Recirc Pumps trip

-101 inches LOCA RHR starts CS Starts EDGs start ADS Permissive CRD Pump trip PSW F316 isolation MCREC shifts to Pressurization mode

-155 inches TAF

-185 inches Minimum Steam Cooling RWL (minimum level that provides adequate core cooling with injection)

-200 inches Minimum Zero Injection RWL (minimum level that provides adequate core cooling with injection)

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2

~~

Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

5 Page 18 of 25 Event

Description:

Loss of Condensate System and Feedwater line Break.

I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator With Chief Examiners Permission, PRESS (RB-6) to activate:

mfB2L229B, FW LINE "Po" Break Inside Containment

mfE41 _104, HPCI Turbine Trip Simulator Operator At Chief Examiners direction PRESS (RB-7) to activate:

mfB2L229B, FW LINE "8" BREAK INSIDE CONTAINMENT

mfC1 L30A, CRD A Pump Trip

mfC1 L30B, CRD B Pump Trip

mfN2L80C, Condensate Booster Pump C Trip

mfR22_181, 4KV Bus 2D Fault ALL

An automatic scram due to decreasing reactor water level or high drywell pressure will occur.

Identifies drywell pressure is rapidly increasing.

SS

Assigns the ATC to perform RC-1.

Assigns the BOP operator to perform RC-2 and RC-3.

Enters the RC EOP flow chart 31EO-EOP-010-2

As time allows,

Enters 3 1EO-EOP-0 12-2, PC-1 flow chart.

As time allows:

o Directs an operator to perform TC-1 o Notifies maintenance to repair 4160 VAC D and CBP 2C.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

5 Page 19 of25 Event

Description:

Loss of Condensate System and Feedwater line Break.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC

Performs RC-1 consisting of:

(Placard) 0 Inserts a manual scram.

0 Places the mode switch to shutdown.

0 Confirms all rods are inserted by observing full in lights, SPDS, or the RWM display.

0 Notifies SS of rod position check.

0 Places SDV isolation valve switch to "isolate" & confirms closed.

0 If not tripped, places the Recirc pumps at minimum speed.

0 Inserts SRMs and IRMs.

0 Shifts recorders to read IRMS, when required.

0 Ranges IRMS to bring reading on scale.

0 Notifies the SS when the above actions are complete.

BOP

Performs RC-2 actions consisting of:

(Placard)

Confirms proper Level Control response:

/"

0 Checks ECCS Injection Systems and secure as necessary.

0 Ensures FW Master Controller setpoint reduces to 9 inches and output reduces to 25% of previous value.

0 IF set down does not auto function, then manually reduces FW Master Controller setpoint to approximately 9 inches.

BOP

When feed flow is less than the capacity of the SID level control valve (Placard)

(~ 1.5 mlbmlhr), then:

0 Opens 2N21-F125.

0 Places 2C32-R619, FW SID level control valve controller, in Auto, set at approximately 9 inches.

0 Closes2N21-FllO.

0 Secures one RFPT if necessary.

0 Recognizes "B" Feedwater line break 0

lAW 34AB-T23-002-2, "Small Pipe Break Primary Containment,"

Places 2N21-F006B, Feedwater line isolation valve to close.

0 Notifies SS of Feedwater line break.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

5 Page 20 of 25 Event

Description:

Loss of Condensate System and Feedwater line Break.

I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP

Performs RC-3 consisting of:

(Placard) 0 Monitor RPV pressure.

0 Confirm proper operation of pressure control system (TBV, LLS, etc.).

0 If necessary, allow RPV pressure to exceed 1074 psig then cycle any SRV to initiate LLS.

0 Maintain RPV pressure between 1074 and 800 psig.

0 Notify SS of pressure control system operation.

ALL

Recognizes a loss of "D" 4160 VAC station service electrical bus and a trip of 2C Condensate Booster Pump has occurred resulting in a loss of Condensate and Condensate Booster pumps "2A", "2B", and "2C".

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

6 Page 21 of 25 Event

Description:

ECCS fails to start on LOCA signal.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

BOP

Identifies that the ECCS pumps have not started when RPV water level (Placard) decreased below -101" or with DIW pressure> 1.85 psig.

Places the control switch for RHR "A" to start.

Places the control switch for RHR "C" to start.

If it is determined that the following equipment is required to mitigate the transient, then:

o Starts the "2A", "2C" EDGs (2Hll-P652) and contacts Unit 1 to start the "lB" EDG.

o Dispatches a SO to the EDG building to check proper operation of the EDGs.

o Maintain 2P41-F316A through D (Turbine Building PSW Isolation Valves) in the Open position.

Places the override switches for 2P41-F316A through D to the override position (2Hll-P652)

(Critical task - start ECCS pumps prior to opening ADS valves).

BOP

Places the control switch for RHR "B" to start.

Places the control switch for RHR "D" to start.

Places the control switch for Core Spray "B" to start NOTE If DIW conditions are present for a long enough period of time (dependent on closure of 2N21-F006B) Torus and DIW sprays will be initiated.

SS

Orders initiation of Suppression Pool Sprays

Transition to CP-1, "Alternate Level Control" o Direct an operator to Inhibit ADS o May direct the ATC operator to initiate SBLC (Table 9 systems are allowed to be use, but not required in this condition)

A endix D Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

6 Page 22 of25 Event

Description:

ECCS fails to start on LOCA signal.

I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

ATC

Initiates Suppression Pool Sprays by:

(Placard)

Places Containment Spray Valve Control switch on 2HII-P601 in the Manual position.(required due to the LOCA signal)

Verifies the RHR pumps 2A(B) and 2C(D) are operating.

Opens 2Ell-F028A(B).

Throttles open 2Ell-F027A(B).

Monitors Suppression chamber pressure.

SS NOTE When 2N21-F006B is closed containment parameters will change quickly and the parameters to spray the drywel1 may only exist for a short period of time.

When suppression chamber pressure exceeds 11 psig and if it remains above 11 psig for sufficient time to respond to condition:

Evaluates the drywell spray initiation limit graph, determining whether plant parameters are currently in the safe region.

Directs the Recirc pumps be secured.

Directs the drywell cooling fans be secured.

Once these conditions are checked and actions completed, the SS directs the ATC operator to Spray the drywelL ATC

Initiates drywell sprays in the "A" or "B" loop of RHR by:

(Placard)

Opens 2Ell-F021A(B) on 2Hll-P601 paneL

Throttles open 2E 11-FO 16A(B) to establish at least 5000 gpm to the drywelL SS

Directs that drywell and suppression pool sprays be secured before the respective area decreases below 0 psi OR before RWL decreases to TAP.

ATC

Secure DIW sprays prior to DIW pressure <0 psig or before RWL decreases to TAF.

Secure Torus sprays prior to <Opsig.

Secure Torus cooling and Torus sprays ifRWL decreases to TAP.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

7 Page 23 of 25 Event

Description:

Failure of ADS valves to operate.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP SS ATC ATC SS ATC SS RO/BOP Monitors RPV water level as it trends down.

Informs the SS of water level reaching -155."

PerCP-l o Orders emergency depressurization after RWL level decreases to below -155 inches; but prior to RWL decreasing to below

-185 inches o Orders all available table 8 systems injecting until RWL increases to above -155 inches Opens 7 ADS valves.

(Critical Task-Open ADS valves before RWL reaches -185 inches)

Places switches for the ADS valves to OPEN.

Recognizes valves A, C, E, and H, do not receive an amber light.

Notifies the SS Directs the ATC to open 4 additional SRVs (i.e. the LLS valves).

Informs the team that the Wide Range RWL instruments can NOT be used when pressure decreases below 500 psig (Per Caution 2 of CP-l).

Opens 2B21-F013B, D, F, and G.

If SBLC was started previously, directs that SBLC be secured following the Emergency Depress before SBLC tank level decreases to below 8%.

Verifies I Opens RHR and Core Spray injection valves open once the Reactor Pressure Low 500 psig alarm illuminates. (Critical Task-Begin opening ECCS discharge valves after reactor pressure decreases below the 500 psig permissive and before reactor pressure decreases to below ECCS pump shutoff head.)

Verifies injection from Core Spray and RHR pumps begins as soon as reactor pressure decreases below the shut off head of the pumps.

When water level is restored above Top of Active Fuel throttles flow for CIS and RHR per the SS directions.

If directed by the SS, places the SBLC switch (603) to the off (mid) position.

May use I transfer to the Condensate system for RWL control Monitors and I or throttles the Feedwater Startup Level Control Valve (SULCV) following Emergency Depress I

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

7 Page 24 of 25 Event

Description:

Failure of ADS valves to operate.

Time Position BOP SS Applicant's Actions or Behavior When drywell sprays are secured, drywell temperatures will increase.

Depending on how long DW sprays have been secured and the temperature inside the drywell when emergency depressurization occurs, reactor water level instruments may experience flashing.

Observes fuel zone water level instruments and the normal 0" to 60" water level instruments for flashing.

If flashing occurs notifies the SS.

NOTE The following steps are contingent on whether the water level instruments experience flashing.

With Chief Examiners Permission:

The scenario should be terminated when the crew has Emergency depressurized the reactor AND:

oRe-established adequate core cooling with water level above T AF OR o Reactor pressure more than 50 psid above torus pressure.

If flashing occurs then transitions to CP-2, 31EO-EOP-016-2 point "J" flooding for non-ATWS.

Directs the operator to close:

MSIVs RPV head vents MSL drains RCIC isolation valves HPCI isolation valves.

Directs the operator to raise injection to obtain 50 psid reactor pressure above torus pressure.

I

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-02 Event No.:

7 Page 25 of 25 Event

Description:

Failure of ADS valves to operate.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

ATC

Verifies the following are closed:

MSIVs

RPV head vents

MSLdrains

RCIC isolation valves

HPCI isolation valves.

SS

Sets a pressure band for the operator to achieve, must be greater than 50 psid above torus pressure.

SS Starts the flooding interval time limit.

Facility:

E. I Hatch Initiating Conditions:

Turnover Summary:

Page 1 of 24 Scenario Summary Final Scenario No.:

4-03 Op-Test No.:

2009-301 Unit 2 is at 1 % power, performing a reactor start-up.

Raise pressure set to 400 psig. Withdraw Control Rods to until one Main Turbine Bypass Valve 80% open in preparation for the start of "2A" RFPT.

Event 1: Normal evolution; The ATC will raise RPV pressure to 400 psig using the DEHC system.

Event 2: Component; Following the pressure increase, the ATC will withdraw control rods to open the #1 Main Turbine Bypass Valve to 80% open. While withdrawing control rods control rod 26-23 sticks. It will not move at normal CRD drive water pressure. CRD drive water pressure will be raised lAW the Inability to Move a Control Rod abnormal procedure. After drive water pressure (dp) has been raised twice, the rod will be allowed to move. Rod withdrawal will then continue normally.

Event 3: InstrumentITS; After the CRD drive pressure has been restored and rod movement continues, 2E41-F002 (HPCI Inboard Steam Isolation Valve) will close as the result of an instrument failure (High Steam Flow dp). Time compression will be used to repair the condition and the team will restore HPCI to standby. SS addresses Tech Specs for HPCI operability and HPCI instrumentation.

Event 4: ComponentlTS; "2A" CRD pump will trip. "2B" CRD pump will be started IA W the Loss of CRD abnormal procedure. The pump trip will be investigated. One accumulator trouble light remains illuminated. SS addresses Tech Specs for the inoperable accumulator.

Event 5: The "2B" CRD pump will trip, resulting in a condition requiring a manual reactor scram. When the scram is inserted, several control rods will not fully insert due to the combination of low RPV pressure and both CRD pumps being off. Power is <5%, so control rod insertion will be addressed using the abnormal procedure for control rods insertion. The SS will enter the RC-A EOP flow chart if RWL decreases < 3 inches. The "2A" CRD pump will be repaired and started, causing the remaining control rods to fully insert as charging water pressure increases with the scram inserted. SS addresses TS requirement for loss of CRD.

Event 6: Major/Component; Torus water level will begin increasing at 3 inches/minute due to an outage valving error. The team will attempt to isolate the flow path; however, the Core Spray AOV and MOV suction valves will fail to work. The SS enters the PCC EOP flowchart.

Event 7: The SS uses EOP Contingency Procedure 1 (CP-l) and directs an operator to Emergency Depressurize the RPV. An operator opens 7 ADS valves prior to Torus water level exceeding 193 inches. (Critical Task)

Event 8: Component; The Startup Level Control Valve (SULCV) fails closed requiring operators to control RWL with the SULCV Bypass Valve, or by using Core Spray, or Residual Heat Removal systems. (Critical Task)

Page 20f24 Critical Task List Facility:

E. I Hatch Scenario No.:

4*03 Op*Test No.:

2009-301 Critical Tasks

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Fully insert all control rods by restarting a CRD pump. (Event 6)

Open 7 SRVs prior to Torus Water Level exceeding 193 Inches. (Event 7) o NOTE: The critical task is met when 5 SRVs have been opened. This is the minimum number of SRVs required by the EOPs to Emergency Depressurize the RPV.

Align available systems for vessel injection to maintain RWL greater than -185 inches. (Event 8)

ES 301*4 Attributes Required Actual Items Total Malfunctions 5-8 5

1. Stuck control rod. (Event 2)

2. HPCI isolation. (Event 3)

3. CRD Pump Trip. (Event 4)

4. Torus water level increases. (Event 6)

5. SULCV fails closed. (Event 8)

Malfunctions Mter 1-2 1

1. 2 Main Turbine Bypass Valves fail closed.

EOP Entry (Event 6)

2. SULCV fails closed. (Event 7)

Abnormal Events 2-4 3

1. Inability to move a control rod. (Event 2)

2. Loss of CRD. (Event 4)

3. Control rod insertion. (Event 5)

Major Transients 1-2 1

1. Torus water level increasing. (Event 6)

EOPs entered, 1-2 1

1. PCC EOP Flowchart. (Event 6) requiring substantive actions EOPs contingencies 0-2 1

1. CP-l Emergency Depress. (Event 7) requiring substantive actions Critical Tasks 2-3 2

1. Insert control rods. (Event 5)

2. Open SRV s to Emergency Depress. (Event 7)

3. Maintain RWL > -185 inches. (Event 8)

Page 3 of24 AppendixD Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l Final Facility:

E. I Hatch Scenario No.:

4-3 Op-Test No.:

2009-301 Examiners:

Operators:

SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions. The unit is starting up Rx Pressure at 380 psig. Power is to be increased to the point of starting the first feed pump.

Turnover: Increase pressure set to 400 psig reactor pressure and continue power increase using control rods until approximately one bypass valve is open 80%. At that time place the first reactor feed pump in service. Heat up data is being taken by a third operator.

Event Malf. No.

Event Event No.

Type*

Description 1

N/A

~ (ATC)

Increase Reactor Pressure to 400 psig prior to preparation for RFPT 5RV

'2A' Startup. Pull rods and to achieve one bypass valve 80% open in preparation for RFPT Startup.

2 mfC12_22 k: (ATC)

Control rod 26-23 is stuck, must increase drive water dip to get the roc 26-23 to move from position "00". 3rd attempt after raising drive water Srei) pressure twice will be successfuL 3

mfE41 - 108 I (BOP)

HPCI Instrument malfunction results in an isolation of 2E41-F002, TS (SRO) compressed repair realign.

4 mfCIL30A K= (ATC)

CRD A Trip I Start CRD B. The accumulator light remains mfC 12_27_22-trs (SRO) illuminated for control rod 22-23.

23 5

mfCll - 30B C (ATC)

CRD B tripsl Manual SCRAM TS (SRO) 6 svoT48140 M (ALL)

Torus level begins to increase due to Core Spray CST and Torus svoN37226 suction valves being open at the same time. Valve failures will svoN37227 prevent closing the CS suction valves. Torus level continues to aoPll-R60l increase, challenging EOP limits (Heat Capacity Temperature Limit, diE21-FOI9A Pressure Suppression Pressure and SRV Tail Pipe Level Limit graphs).

7 Emergency depress due to high Torus water level 8

mfN2L99 C (BOP)

SULCV fails closed. RPV level will be controlled either by throttling open 2N21-FllO, or by using a low pressure ECCS pump system.

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Shift Turnover Sheet UNIT 1 STATUS Power:

0%, Refueling, in Mode 5 Activities in progress:

Making preparations to flood the Reactivity Cavity.

I, UNIT 2 STA1~S I' :,1 Power:

Approximately 2%.

The following equipment is

None inoperable:

Plant Status

The Condensate System is in Long Cycle Cleanup

Heat up rate over the past hour = OOPlhr.

An operator has been assigned to perform 34GO-OPS-001-2, "Plant Startup," Attachment 8, "Heatup/Pressurization Check"

Currently on Step 15 on the Control Rod Pull Sheets.

The next control rod to be withdrawn is 26-39.

Scheduled evolutions:

Raise reactor pressure to 400 psig.

Mter reactor pressure has been raised to 400 psig, withdraw Control Rods until one Main Turbine Bypass Valve is 80% open in preparation for the start of "2A" RFPT.

Surveillances due this

None shift:

Active clearances:

4160 VAC Station Service Bus Normal Supply Breakers Rod Configuration:

See RWM

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

1 Page 5 of 24 Event

Description:

Increase Reactor Pressure to 4z6psig using pressure set Time Position SRO ATC (Placard)

Applicant's Actions or Behavior Orders operator to increase reactor pressure to 400 psig Using pressure set increases reactor pressure to 400 psig On EHC HMI selects control, Selects psi-load Selects Ramp Rate verifies desired ramp rate Note Normally the ramp rate is set at approx 5 to 10 psig/minute.

Passing Criteria: The examinee enters a rate which low enough that:

It does not: Result in High RWL trip It does not result in an IRl\\/1[ scram setpoint being exceeded.

Selects Pressure and enters 400 Selects OK pushbutton Monitors and verifies that reactor pressure increases to desired pressure.

Notifies SS that reactor pressure is at 400 psig.

I

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

2 Page 6 of 24 Event

Description:

Stuck Control Rod. Increase drive water dp twice, then the rod will move.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SS ATC Orders control rods withdrawn per the pull sequence.

Withdraws control rods to continue the power increase by:

Selects the first control rod in the currently latched or next group per the pull sheet and RWM.

First rod moved is 26-39 Step 15.

Continuously withdraws the rod to the withdraw limit, releasing the switch one notch before the withdraw limit, unless the withdraw limit is 48.

Continues withdrawing rods per the pull sheet.

Monitors bypass valve position and ensures expected plant response from control withdrawal.

Note: May get "RMCS/RWM ROD BLOCK or SYS TROUBLE" annunciator.

This is not abnormal when selecting rods in a different group.

Simulator Operator AFTER drive water pressure HAS BEEN RAISED TWICE (> 1 00 psi increase) above normal (approx. 50 psi each time it is raised) for rod 26-23 THEN:

o DELETE mfC12_2226-23.

ATC Attempts to withdraw control rod 26-23, rod fails to withdraw.

Notifies the SS of the inability to move 26-23.

Addresses 34AB-CII-003-2, "Inability to Move a Control Rod."

Proceeds through the flow chart within 34AB-CII-003-2, Is the rod at position "OO?" ans. No.

Is drive water dp less than 600 psig? Yes Verifies indications are normal.

Raises drive water dp in 50 psid increments and attempts to move the rod at each increment.

Mter the ATC operator has raised drive water pressure 2 times, the rod moves.

The ATC operator reduces drive water dp to 260 psid and exit 34AB-CII-003-2.

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2

'r Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

2 Page 7 of 24 Event

Description:

Stuck Control Rod. Increase drive water dp twice, then the rod will move.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator If asked for Shift management perrnission to increase drive water dp, THEN say, "I concur with raising drive water dp" If the operator asks for any other input from the SM, THEN ask "What is your opinion?" and then agree with their opinion.

NOTE The control rod has potential to double notch when it moves since drive water dp has been raise to a high value.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 If Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

3 Page 8 of24 Event

Description:

HPCI instrument malfunction, causing an isolation of 2E41-F002 Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

Simulator Operator

At Chief Examiner's direction PRESS (RB-1) to activate:

0 mfE41 _108, HPCI instrument malfunction (2E41-F002 isolates)

BOP Addresses annunciators:

HPCI Steam Line DiffPress High (601-104)

HPCI Turbine Trip Solenoid Energized (601-109)

HPCI Isolation Trip Logic A Initiated (601-115)

HPCI Isolation VLV F002/F003 Not Fully Open (601-217)

BOP Addresses annunciator "HPCI Isolation Trip Logic "A" Initiated.

Confirms 2E41-F002 is closed.

Closes 2E41-F003

Checks for validity of the alarm, monitoring related alarms.

SS Notifies maintenance to investigate

The HPCI Steam Line Diff Press High signaL Simulator Operator

As an I&C Technician, call the Control Room and REPORT:

0 "The cause of the isolation is 2E41-N 657 A.

0 "It has failed upscale."

0 "We are repairing the problem at this time."

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

3 Page 9 of 24 Event

Description:

HPCI instrument malfunction, causing an isolation of 2E41-F002 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SS ALL II ss Addresses Tech Specs 3.3, Instrumentation 3.3.6.1, Primary Containment Instrumentation o Condition: 3.3.6.1.A, One or more required channels inoperable.

o Required Action: TS 3.3.6.1.A.1, Place channel in trip.

o Completion Time: 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

AND (Table 3.3.6.1-1 item I.c Main Steam Line Flow - High)

(2E41-N657A, LFD-2-PCIS-12) 3.5, ECCS and RCIC 3.. 5.1, ECCS Operating o Condition: 3.5.1.C, HPCI System Inoperable.

o Required Action: 3.5.1.C.1, Verify by administrative means RCIC system is operable.

o Completion Time: 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months AND o Required Action: 3.5.1.C.2, Restore HPCI system to operable status.

o Completion Time: 14 days AND o TS 3.0.4.b - Reactor Startup can NOT be continued with HPCI inoperable.

Simulator Operator DELETE mfE4L108, HPCI instrument malfunction.

As an I&C Tech, call the Control Room and REPORT:

o "I am using Time Compression and it has been 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months since we talked. HPCI instrument 2E41-N657 A has been repaired."

HPCI Steam Line Diff Press High (601-104) clears Directs the ATC operator to realign HPCI to standby status.

11l...--..-.-..L1_--'----______

Appendix 0 Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

3 Page 10 of 24 Event

Description:

HPCI instrument malfunction, causing an isolation of2E41-F002 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Using 34S0-E41-001-2, HPCI System Procedure, the operator should Reset the "B" isolation, observing the white light on paneI2H11-P601 extinguishes.

The following annunciators clear:

o HPCI Turbine Trip Solenoid Energized (601-109) o HPCI Isolation Trip Logic A Initiated (601-115)

Pressurize HPCI with the 2E41-F003 lAW 7.1.40.2 Opens 2E41-F003 Opens 2E41-F054 Slowly Opens 2E41-F002 Monitors HPCI Steam line pressure When HPCI Steam line pressure is within 50 psig of Reactor pressure, fully opens 2E41-F002.

o HPCI Isolation VLV F0021F003 Not Fully Open (610-217) clears Closes 2E41-F054, when HPCI Turbine Inlet Drain Pot Level High (601-110) clears Notifies SS HPCI is returned to Standby I

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

4 Page 11 of 24 Event

Description:

CRD A Trip / Start CRD B / Inoperable HCU Accumulator Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator

At Chief Examiner's direction, PRESS (RB-2) to activate:

o mfCI L30A; 2A CRD Pump Trip All

"CRD Pump A Breaker" annunciator will alarm.

ATC

Determines that CRD pump "2A" has tripped.

Reports the trip of "2A" CRD pump to the SS.

Simulator Operator

BEFORE the "2B" CRD pump is started, PRESS (RB-3) to activate:

o mfC12_27 _22-23, "Control Rod 22-23 Accumulator Trouble" SS

Directs the ATC to address the ARP for the tripped CRD pump annunciator (34AR-603-128-2).

Directs the ATC to enter 34AB-CII-001-2, "Loss of CRD System."

ATC

Addresses 34AR-603-128-2, "CRD Pump A Breaker Trip."

Enters 34AB-Cll-001-2, "Loss of CRD System."

Places the CRD Flow Controller in manual.

Lowers the controller output to "0".

Any attempt to re-start the 2A CRD pump will faiL

Starts "2B" CRD pump.

Raises CRD flow to 50 gpm.

If required, send a SO locally to close 2C II-F034, "Charging Water Header Isolation Valve" to establish adequate drive water pressure.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

4 Page 12 of 24 Event

Description:

CRD A Trip I Start CRD B I Inoperable HCD Accumulator Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

SS

As time permits, orders SO and Maintenance to investigate the loss of "2A" CRD Pump.

Addresses TS:

3.1, Reactivity Control Systems

3.1.5, Control Rod Accumulators o Condition: 3.1.5.C, One or more control rod sram accumulators inoperable with reactor stearn dome pressure < 900 psig.

o Required Action: 3.1.5.C.l, Verify all control rods associated with inoperable accumulators are fully inserted.

o Completion Time: Immediately upon discovery of charging water header pressure less than 940 psig.

AND o Required Action: 3.1.5.C.2, Declare the associated control rod inoperable.

0 Completion Time: One hour.

Simulator Operator

If contacted to investigate SPECIFICALLY the accumulator 22-23 trouble alarm, THEN STAI'E:

o "Accumulator 22-23 pressure is 900 psig."

Simulator Operator

If directed to investigate multiple accumulator trouble alarms, THEN 3 minutes AFTER being directed to check the HCD pressures STATE:

o Pressure indication on several HCD pressure is 900 psig.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

5 Page 13 of 24 Event

Description:

CRD B trips! Manual SCRAM I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator

When the "B" CRD is placed in service and stable and the TS call had been made THEN at Chief Examiner's Direction, PRESS (RB-4) to activate:

o mfCI L30B; "2B CRD Pump Trip" All

"CRD Pump B Breaker" annunciator will alarm.

ATC

Determines that CRD pump "2B" has tripped.

Reports the trip of "2B" CRD pump to the SS.

SS

Directs the ATC to address the ARP for the tripped CRD pump annunciator (34AR -603-129-2).

Directs the ATC to enter 34AB-C 11-00 1-2, "Loss of CRD System."

ATC

Addresses 34AR-603-129-2, "CRD Pump B Breaker Trip."

Enters 34AB-Cll-001-2, "Loss ofCRD System."

Places the CRD Flow Controller in manuaL

Lowers the controller output to "0."

Attempt to re-start the 2B CRD pump, but it will not start

Notifies the SS that the 2B CRD Pump will NOT restart.

ATC

Receives CRD Accumulator Press Low or Level High alarm (603-148)

Notifies SS SS

Directs ATC monitor for more accumulator lights on the full core display and to dispatch personnel the CRD HCUs to check pressure.

Simulator Operator

3 minutes AFTER being directed to check HCU pressures, THEN REPORT:

o Pressure indication on several HCUs indicate between 850 psig and

~1 900 psig.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

5 Page 14 of 24 Event

Description:

CRD B trips/ Manual SCRAM Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC

Determines multiple accumulator lights are illuminating

Notifies SS Simulator Operator

LOOK AHEAD at the next Simulator Operator task (time sensitive).

NOTE: The SS may not have time to determine Tech Spec actions prior to scram.

If this happens, have the SS determine the Tech Spec actions after the scenario is terminated.

SS

Determines that a Tech Spec required shutdown exist lAW with Tech Spec 3.l.S.C, 3.l.S.D and 34AB-Cll-001-2, Loss ofCRD Procedure due to reactor pressure less than 900 psig and multiple inoperable accumulators.

3.1, Reactivity Control Systems

3.1.5, Control Rod Accumulators o Condition: 3.1.5.C, One or more control rod sram accumulators inoperable with reactor steam dome pressure < 900 psig.

o Required Action: 3.1.5.C.l, Verify all control rods associated with inoperable accumulators are fully inserted.

o Completion Time: Immediately upon discovery of charging water header pressure less than 940 psig.

AND o Required Action: 3.1.5.C.2, Declare the associated control rod inoperable.

0 Completion Time: One hour.

AND o Condition: 3.1.5.D, Required action and associated completion time of required action B.l or C.l not met.

o Required Action: 3.1.5.D.l, Place the reactor mode switch in the shutdown position.

o Completion Time: Immediately.

Orders the ATC operator to perform RC-l placard and manually Scram the Reactor.

Orders the BOP operator to perform RC-2 and RC-3 placards

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

5 Page 15 of 24 Event

Description:

CRD B trips! Manual SCRAM I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC NOTE: The number of control rods not full in will depend on how long of (Placard) time it is from the loss of CRD to the Scram (could vary from 10 to 70 rods).

Inserts a manual scram and places the Rx Mode switch in Shutdown.

Notifies the SS that all control rods did not insert.

Performs placard RC-l actions SS

Orders the ATC operator to enter 34AB-C71-001, "Scram Procedure" and 34AB-C 11-005-2, "Control Insertion Methods."

If RWL decreases to less than 3 inches, will enter the RC EOP flowchart; however, RWL is not expected to go below 3 inches.

ATC

Enters 34AB-C71-001, "Scram Procedure" o NOTE: Direction to use 34AB-Cll-005-2, "Control Insertion Methods" to insert control rods is found in 34AB-C71-001.

Enters 34AB-CII-005-2, "Control Insertion Methods."

Bypasses the Scram Discharge Volume high level trip

Resets the Scram

Places the Scram Discharge Volume Isolation Test switch to NORMAL

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

5 Page 16 of 24 Event

Description:

CRD B trips/ Manual SCRAM I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior ATC BOP (Placard)

Simulator Operator NOTE: Do this action ONLY AFTER Maintenance assistance has been requested to repair the CRD pump.

If CRD pump repair has been requested, THEN 2 minutes after the scram has been inserted:

o DELETE mfC1 L30A Call the ATC that a Time Compression is being used and it is 10 minutes later, and REPORT:

o "2A CRD pump has been repaired."

Starts 2A CRD Pump and establishes drive water DP.

Places the Reactor Mode Switch to REFUEL.

Places the RWM Bypass switch to BYPASS.

Obtain recommendations from the STA as to which rods have the highest worth. (Typically a black and white pattern, spiraling from the center)

Inserts control rods.

Critical Task: Take actions to fully insert all control rods by restarting a CRDpump.

If asked for control rod insertion recommendations, the ST A will state:

"Follow procedure guidance" Performs actions of RC-2 and RC-3 after Reactor SCRAM.

Confirms proper Level Control response:

Checks ECCS Injection Systems and secures as necessary.

Ensures FW Master Controller setpoint reduces to 9 inches and output reduces to 25% of previous value.

IF set down does not auto function, then manually reduces FW Master Controller setpoint to approximately 9 inches.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

5 Page 17 of 24 Event

Description:

CRD B trips! Manual SCRAM Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP

With feed flow is less than the capacity of the SID level control valve (Placard)

(~ 1.5 mlbmlhr), verifies:

2N21-F125 is open.

Places 2C32-R619, FW SID level control valve controller, in Auto, set at approximately 9 inches.

Ensures 2N21-FllO is closed.

Determines that the SULCV is failed closed.

Opens 2N21-F11O (almost impossible to control RWL with this valve at this power level.)

OR

Starts RCIC for RWL control

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2

(

Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

6 Page 18 of 24 Event

Description:

Core Spray Suction Valves Opened Result In Increasing Torus Water Level Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator

When directed by the Chief Examiner, PRESS (RB-S) to activate:

0 svoT48140; Suppression Pool Water Level 0

aoPll-R601; Condensate Storage Tank Level

Note: The following overrides were entered at the beginning of the scenario:

0 diE21-FOOIA; Core Spray Suction Valve 0

diE21-F019A; Core Spray Torus Suction Valve 0

svoN37226; Turbine Bypass Valve #2 Position 0

svoN37227; Turbine Bypass Valve #3 Position 0

Event trigger E21-01; 2E21-FOOIA lights go out and valve fails open when the green liight illuminates.

All

Recognize Torus water level is increasing.

SS

Direct operator to enter 34AB-T23-004-2, "Torus Water Level"

Direct operators to look for the source of water entering the Suppression Chamber.

May dispatch SO's to the Reactor Building Diagonals to check for valve lineup issues.

Enters Primary Containment Control (PCC) EOP flowchart when Suppression Pool level exceeds 150 inches.

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

6 Page 19 of 24 Event

Description:

Core Spray Suction Valves Opened Result In Increasing Torus Water Level Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

BOP

Enters 34AB-T23-004-2, "Torus Water Level" o Informs SS of the need to address system operability prior to isolating valves.

NOTE: This is a caution in the procedure o Verify that 2E51-F029, 2E51-F031 (RCIC Torus suction valves) and 2E51-FOlO (RCIC CST suction valves) are not open simultaneously.

Note: This condition will exist for a short period of time as the suction transfers from the CST to the Torus o Verify that 2E41-F041, 2E41-F042(HPCI Torus suction valves) and 2E41-F004 (HPCI CST suction valves) are not open simultaneously.

This condition will exist for a short period of time as the suction transfers from the CST to the Torus.

BOP

Monitor panels looking for sources of in-leakage to the Suppression chamber.

Determines Condensate Storage Tank level is decreasing.

Enters the following ARP's.

0 Torus Level High (601-127) 0 Torus Level (RCIC) High (602-230)

Simulator Operator

When torus level reaches 160 inches, call the control room as the Operations Control Center (GCC) supervisor and REPORT:

0 "1 sent a team to align the Unit 1 Core Spray suction to the CST in preparation for Reactor Cavity Flood up."

0 "They went to Unit 2 and began to open 2E21-F002A before they noticed they were on the incorrect unit."

0 "When they attempted to close the valve, the valve hand wheel would not tum and we could not get the valve to close.

Maintenance is on their way to the valve."

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

6 Page 20 of 24 Event

Description:

Core Spray Suction Valves Opened Result In Increasing Torus Water Level Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SS BOP SS BOP Direct the BOP operator to close the "2A" Core Spray suction valves.

IA W 34AB-T23-004-2, "Torus Water Level," places the 2E21-F001A valve switch in the close position.

o Recognizes that the lights for 2E21-F001A de-energize.

o Reports to the SS that the lights for 2E21-F001A de-energized.

Place the 2E21-F019A valve switch in the close position.

o Recognizes that 2E21-F019A did not close.

o Reports to the SS that 2E21-F019A did not close.

Checks Torus level and determines that Torus level is still increasing.

Simulator Operator

If directed to close 2P11-F029, WAIT for 5 minutes and THEN REPORT:

o "The valve hand wheel for 2P11-F029 broke off of the valve stem and we are sending someone to get us a wrench."

Direct operators to maintain Torus Water Level below 193 inches to remain in the safe region of the Heat Capacity Temperature Limit (HCTL) EOP graph and the SRV Tailpipe Level Limit graph using 34S0-E11-010-2 or 34GO-OPS-087-2.

Directs that maintenance investigate the failure of the "2A" Core Spray suction valves to close.

If time allows, use 34S0-E11-010-2 "RHR System" to align RHR for draining the Torus to Radwaste:

o Confirm Radwaste is capable of receiving water o

Open 2E11-F049 o Close 2E11-F003B o Close 2E11-F047B o Confirm Open 2E 11-F048B o Start a "B" loop RHR pump o Confirm discharge water is less than 200F (2T47-R627 pt. 3) o Throttle Open 2E11-F040

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

6 Page 21 of 24 Event

Description:

Core Spray Suction Valves Opened Result In Increasing Torus Water Level Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SS

Directs operators to terminate any external sources of water except for sources necessary to ensure adequate core cooling, boron injection, or CRD.

If the need to Emergency Depressurize is recognized in time, then Anticipates Emergency Depressurization.

0 Assign an operator to fully open all Main Turbine Bypass Valves.

ATC/BOP

On the DEBC panel 0

Select the Control> Bypass Valve screen.

0 Insert a ramp rate of 100, then press OK.

0 Insert a bypass valve position of 100, then press OK.

0 Checks that the Bypass Valve Jack status is active.

0 Recognizes that only 1 Bypass Valve opens.

0 Reports to the SS that only 1 Bypass Valve opens.

II

(

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

7 Page 22 of 24 Event

Description:

Emergency Depressurization of the RPV Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior SS BOP Prior to exceeding 193 inches in the Torus.

o Enters RC-RPV Control (Non ATWS)

Note: This direction is found on the PCC EOP flowchart, high suppression pool level leg

Directs a manual scram

Directs Anticipating Emergency Depressurization Note: Based on the timing of the transition to the RC-RPV Control (Non ATWS), there may not be time to Anticipate Emergency Depress prior to performing Emergency Depressurization o Orders 7 ADS valves open for Emergency Depress.

(Critical Task - Open 7 SRV s prior to Torus Water Level exceeding 193 Inches. Critical task is met when 5 SRVs have been opened.)

Simulator Operator When torus level reaches 205 inches, call the control room as the Operations Control Center (OCC) supervisor and REPORT:

o "Maintenance has closed 2E21-F002A."

Places the switches for 7 ADS valves in the open position.

o If Anticipate Emergency Depressurization was performed, the amber lights for the SRV s will not illuminate if pressure has been reduced to below approximately 300 psig. In this case the operator must use 2Hll-P614 recorderindication to monitor tail pipe temperatures for the SRVs to verify the valves actually opened (Recorder 2B21-R614).

o Depending on Reactor Water Level prior to opening ADS valves, RWL may swell to above 60 inches, requiring the operator to enter 34AB-C32-001-2, Reactor Water Level Above 60 inches.

Operator secures all injection other than CRD

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4*3 Event No.:

8 Page 23 of 24 Event

Description:

SULC Fails Closed, Will Use 2N21-FII0 or Low Pressure ECCS System(s) to Maintain RWL.

I Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Simulator Operator AFTER the ADS valves have been opened, PRESS (RB-6) to activate:

o mtN2L99, SULCV fails closed The BOP recognizes the SULCV has failed closed.

Performs one or more of the following to inject water into the reactor.

o Throttles open 2N21-FllO, and inject water into the reactor.

OR o Starts a CS Pump.

o Confirm discharge pressure >265 psig.

o Confirm 2E21-F031A(B) closes when flow >950 gpm.

o Confirm a CS and RHR room cooler automatically starts.

o When RPV pressure is <425 psig, throttles open 2E21-F005A(B).

OR o

Starts a RHR pump.

o When RPV pressure is <425 psig, throttles open 2Ell-FOI5A(B).

Reports SULCV problem to the SS.

Critical Task - Align available systems for vessel injection to maintain RWL greater than -185 inches.

NOTE: The critical task is met when 5 SRVs have been opened (EOP minimum number of SRVs required to Emergency Depressurize the RPV).

A endix 0 Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-3 Event No.:

8 Page 24 of24 Event

Description:

SULC Fails Closed, Will Use 2N21-FII0 or Low Pressure ECCS System(s) to Maintain RWL.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator With Chief Examiners permission AND vVhen reactor water is being controlled following the emergency depressurization, with reactor pressure below 50 psig, THEN o

Terminate the scenario.

Page 1 of 26 Scenario Summary Facility:

E. I Hatch Scenario No.:

4-04 Op-Test No.:

2009-301 Final Initiating Conditions: I Unit 2 is at 90%.

Turnover I Raise power to 100%

Summary:

Event 1: The "2C" Station Service Air Compressor (SSAC) will trip. The "2B" SSAC will not auto start, and the BOP operator will start the "2A" SSAC.

Event 2: ComponentlTS; A control rod (34-35) will drift out. The ATC operator will insert the control rod with the "Emergency In" switch. The control rod will continue to drift until the rod is disarmed at the HCV. The SS will address TS for an inoperable control rod.

Event 3: ComponentITS; A RWCU line will break outside of Primary Containment. The outboard isolation valve is failed open and cannot be closed. The inboard valve fails to automatically close on an automatic isolation signal and must be manually closed (Critical Task). The SS addresses Tech Specs for inoperable Primary Containment Isolation Valve.

Event 4: ComponentlTS; An inadvertent initiation of ADS logic occurs. The ATC operator inhibits ADS IA W with abnormal procedures. SS addresses TS for inoperable ADS logic (Critical Task).

Event 5: (Major) A loss of all Startup Transformer "2D" will occur. The reactor will scram and MSIVs will close. All control rods fully insert. The only Unit 2 4160V bus that will be energized without operator action is "2P". There is a hard phase-to-phase short on "2E" 4160VAC bus which causes the alternate breaker to trip after it closes in. The "2A" EDG output breaker will not close. "2G" 4160 V AC bus fails to auto transfer and the associated EDG cannot be started. RCIC trips when it attempts to start. HPCI fails to auto start but can be manually started. Drywell pressure will increase to above 1.85 psig. The SS will direct the EOP actions IA W with the RC and PCC EOP flowcharts.

Event 6: Component; "2G" 4160 VAC bus will be energized from SAT "2C.

Event 7: Component; Start HPCI and inject to maintain RWL above top of active fueL (Critical Task)

Page 2 of 26 Critical Task List Facility:

E. I Hatch Scenario No.:

4-04 Op-Test No.:

2009-301 Critical Tasks

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

Manually isolate RWCU before exceeding maximum safe Secondary Containment Control EOP parameters (Temperatures, Radiation levels or SC water levels). (Event 3)

Manually inhibit ADS prior to SRVs automatically opening. (Event 4)

Maintain RWL above -185 inches. This is the lowest level that corresponds to adequate core cooling with injection (Event 7)

ES 301-4 Attributes Required Actual Items Total Malfunctions 5-8 6

1. SSAC trips (Event 1)

2. Rod drifts out (Event 2)

3. RWCU line break (Event 3)

4. Inadvertent ADS Actuation (Event 4)

5. Loss of SAT "2D" (Event 5)

6. HPCI fails to auto start (Event 7)

Malfunctions After 1-2 2

1. HPCI fails to auto start (Event 5)

EOP Entry

2. "2C" EDG cannot be started (Event 6)

Abnormal Events 2-4 3

1. Mispositioned Control Rod (Event 2)

2. RWCU pipe break inside the RB (Event 3)

3. Inadvertent Initiation of ECCS (Event 4)

Major Transients 1-2 1

1. Loss of SAT "2D" (Event 5)

EOPs entered, 1-2 2

1. RC EOP Flowchart (Event 5) requiring substantive

2. PC EOP Flowchart (Event 6) actions EOPs contingencies 0-2 0

requiring substantive actions Critical Tasks 2-3 3

1. Isolate RWCU line break (Event 3)

2. Manually inhibit ADS prior to SRVs opening (Event 4)

3. Maintain RWL above -185 inches. (Event 7)

Page 3 of26 AppendixD Scenario Outline Form ES-D-l Final Facility:

E. I Hatch Scenario No.:

4-04 Op-Test No.:

2009-301 Examiners:

Operators:

SRO RO BOP Initial Conditions. Unit 2 is at 90% RTP following Turbine Control Valve testing.

Turnover: Return to 100% power Event Malf. No.

Event Event No.

Type*

Description 1

mtP5L222C C (BOP)

Loss of "2C" SSAC. "2B" SSAC does not start.

diP51-C001B Manually start "2A" SSAC.

2 mfC12_25_34-C (ATC)

Control Rod 34-35 drifts out.

35 TS (SRO)

Drive the rod full in and de-activate it.

mfC 12_22_34-35

.... 3 mfG3L207A C(ATC)

RWCU line break outside of Secondary Containment. Must be svoG31071, Irs (SRO) manually isolated (Critical Task), with failure of outboard isolation mfG3L52 valve to close.

aoG31-R605B 4

mtB2L131 C (ATC)

Inadvertent ADS initiation. ATC inhibits ADS logic (Critical Task)

TS (SRO)

SS Addresses TS for inoperable ADS logic.

5 mfS1L227B rM (ALL)

Loss of all Startup Transformer "2D".

mfP64_193B "B" DW Chiller fault mfR22-182 Fault on "2E" 4160VAC bus.

mfR43_168A "2A" EDG output breaker will not close.

diR22_135584C "2G" 4160 VAC bus fails to auto transfer.

mfCIL30B "B" CRD pump trips mfR43_167C "2C" EDG cannot be started.

mfN30_122 Main turbine trip mfE5L110 RCIC trips after auto starting.

mfE4L235A HPCI fails to auto start.

mfE4L235B ET E51-01 6

C (ATC) Energize "2G" 4160 VAC bus from SAT "2C.

7 C (BOP)

Start HPCI to control RWL (Critical Task).

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Power:

Activities in progress:

Power:

100%

None Shift Turnover Sheet Approximately 90%.

The following equipment is None inoperable:

Scheduled evolutions:

Surveillances due this shift:

Active clearances:

Rod Configuration:

Return to 100% power None None SeeRWM

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2

(

'\\

Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

1 Page 5 of26 Event

Description:

Trip of "2C" Station Service Air Compressor I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator

Call ATC, have them initially on the phone, have them remain on the line until the BOP operator begins taking actions for the tripped air compressor Simulator Operator

As directed by the Chief Examiner press (RB-l) to activate 0

mtP5L222C, Air Compressor trip.

BOP

Responds to "PANEL 2HII-P700 SYSTEM TROUBLE" annunciator on 2Hll-P650 panel.

Responds to annunciator "AIR CMPSR 2C Tripped! Shutdown."

34AR-700-233-2

Addresses the abnormal procedure 34AB-P51-001-2, "Loss Of Instrument and Service Air System or Water Intrusion Into The Service Air System."

0 Places the control switch for "2A" or "2B" SSAC to start at 2Hll-P650.

0 If the operator attempts to start the "2A" SSAC, recognizes "2A" air compressor DOES start.

Verify that air pressure is restored 2P51-R600 and 2P52-R600 (2Hll-P650) 0 If the operator attempts to start the "2B" SSAC, recognizes "2B" air compressor does NOT start.

0 Contacts Health Physics.

0 Has the SSS send a Systems Operator to locally check Air Compressor 2P51-COO 1 C Microprocessor for cause of Trip.

0 Contacts Maintenance to investigate the cause of 2P51-COO IB failure to run.

0 Notifies the SS of the status of the air system.

SS Notifies maintenance to begin investigating the trip condition on "2C" Air Compressor and failure on the "2B" SSAC.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2

.~

Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

1 Page 6 of 26 Event

Description:

Trip of "2C" Station Service Air Compressor Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

Simulator operator:

If called as Unit One SS or ATC with request to cross-tie air systems report the Unit One is operating on only the "A" compressor and it will not supply both units, therefore; cannot cross-tie.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 II Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

2 Page 7 of 26 Event

Description:

Control Rod 34-35 Drifts Out Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior All SS ATC Simulator Operator At the direction of the Chief Examiner, press (RB-2) to activate:

o mfC12_25_34-35, "Control Rod 34-35 Drift In" NOTE: This malfunction will result in Event Trigger C12-01 initiation.

Event Trigger C12-01 will delete mfC12_25_34-35, "Control Rod 34-35 Drift In" and insert malfunction mfC12_24_34-35, "Control Rod 34-35 Drift Out."

The following annunciators will be received:

o Rod Drift (603-47) o Rod Out Block (603-38) o APRM Upscale (603-19) o RBM Upscale or Inoperative (603-2)

Rod drift alarm on the Full Core Display for control rod 34-35 will illuminate.

If control rod 34-35 is selected, the 4-Rod Display will begin to count up (increasing numbers) indicating that rod 34-35 is drifting out.

Depending on how long the ATC operator takes to addresses 34AB-C 11-004-2, "Mispositioned Control Rods," the control rod may reach position 48 prior to the ATC operator attempting to insert the control rod.

Directs the ATC to respond to the 2H11-P603 annunciators Address 34AR-603-247-2, "Rod Drift" Annunciator Response Procedure.

o Confirm the rod drift light is illuminated for control rod 34-35.

o Inform the SS that rod 34-35 is drifting out o Select control rod 34-45 (if not already selected) and confirm it is not at an even numbered reed switch.

o Refer to 34AB-C11-004-2, "Mispositioned Control Rods"

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

2 Page 8 of 26 Event

Description:

Control Rod 34-35 Drifts Out Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

ATC

Addresses 34AB-C11-004-2, "Mispositioned Control Rods" o Discontinue all normal power changes o Monitor nuclear instrumentation for flux perturbations o Have STA monitor Thermal Limits o Enter section 4.5 of 34AB-C 11-004-2, "Mispositioned Control Rods" o Select control rod 34-35, drives it into position 10 (its correct position)

The ATC operator may request help from the BOP operator to determine the correct position for rod 34-35

The rod may be driven to the full-in position while attempting to ascertain the "correct position" 0

When the ATC operator releases the rod will begin drifting out once again.

o Continuously hold the Emergency In switch in the "In" position to keep the rod from drifting out.

o Direct the Shift Support Supervisor to dispatch a SO to the HCU for rod 34-35 and determine if the FI02 is leaking/suspected to be leaking.

Simulator Operator

When directed to investigate FI02 for rod 34-35, wait 3 minutes THEN, as a System Operator REPORT:

0 I can't tell whether the PI02 valve for 34-35 is leaking, but the solenoid for it is humming as if it is energized.

ATC

Informs the SS of the humming solenoid

Directs the SO to Electrically De-Energize F102 for rod 34-35

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

2 Page 9 of 26 Event

Description:

Control Rod 34-35 Drifts Out II Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator NOTE The next 3 simulator actions are must be done in the order given.

The end result is that the control rod will settled to the "00" position before the "rod stuck" malfunction is inserted.

Simulator Operator

When the control rod has been fully inserted and you have been directed to electrically de-energize F102 for rod 34-35, THEN:

0 DELETE mfC12_24_34-35, "Control Rod 34-35 Drift Out" Simulator Operator

After mfC12_24_34-35, "Control Rod 34-35 Drift Out" has been deleted REPORT:

0 "I am using time compression, FI02 on the HCU for control rod 34-35 has been Electrically Disarmed."

Simulator Operator

AFTER the rod settles to "00" (4 Rod Display indicates "00"), PRESS (RB-3) to ACTIV ATE:

0 mfC12_22_34-35, "Control Rod 34-35 Stuck" ATC

Releases the "Emergency In" switch and determines that control rod 34-35 does not move.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2

,~

Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

2 Page 10 of 26 Event

Description:

Control Rod 34-35 Drifts Out Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SS

Addresses Tech Specs:

TS 3.1, Reactivity Control Systems TS 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability

Condition: 3.1.3.C, One or more control rods inoperable for reasons other than Condition A or B o Required Action: 3.1.3.C.l, Fully insert inoperable control rod.

Completion Time: 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months .

AND o Required Action: 3.1.3.C.2, Disarm the associated CRD.

Completion Time: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months .

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

3 Page 11 of 26 Event

Description:

RWCU line break outside containment. Fail to Auto Isolate. Failure of Outboard Isolation Valve to Close.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator

At Chief Examiner's direction, press (RB-4) to activate:

0 mfG3L207A, G31-FOOI Fails to isolate on Group 5 0

mfG3L52, RWCU System Leak 0

ET E31-01 (aoG31-R609, RWCU Inlet Flow f:280, r:lO)

Note: svoG31071, G31-F004 Valve position was activated at ST=O All

"RWCU System Leak" Alarm, (602-421), is received.

SS

Request SSS to send a RO to Control Room back panel to determine leakage.

Simulator Operator

If asked to determine leakage, then report:

0 2G31-N615, "RWCU differential flow," indicates 78 gpm.

ATC

Enters 34AR-602-421-2, "RWCU Sys Leak"

Enters 34AB-G31-001-2, "RWCU Isolation" 0

Determines that RWCU did NOT isolate.

0 Determines that the "2B" RWCU pump did NOT trip.

0 Trips RWCU Pump "2B" 0

Places the control switches for 2G31-FOOI and 2G31-F004 to the CLOSE position.

0 Determines that the RWCU System 2G31-FOOI DID close.

(Critical Task) 0 Determines that the RWCU System 2G31-F004 DID NOT close.

0 Notifies SS that 2G31-F004 will not close.

I

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

3 Page 12 of26 Event

Description:

RWCU line break outside containment. Fail to Auto Isolate. Failure of Outboard Isolation Valve to Close.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Note Ordinarily the "B" RWCU Demin flow indication would read upscale in this condition. In this case an override is active to cause it to read 280 gpm (i.e. not upscale). This override will be automatically deleted when the RWCU pump is tripped.

ATC

Enters 34AB-T22-001-1, Primary Coolant System Pipe Break Reactor Building.

Contact Chemistry to isolate the autoclave and the Mitigation Monitoring system. (Note the SS may contact Chemistry.)

ATC

Enters 34AB-T22-001-2, "Primary Coolant System Pipe Break Reactor Building."

0 Monitor Reactor Water LeveL 0

Monitor Reactor power.

0 Confirm all Automatic Actions have occurred.

0 Investigate the extent of damage to the RWCU System.

0 Monitor Reactor Chemistry and continue operations, as allowed by TS.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009*301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

3 Page 13 of 26 Event

Description:

RWCU line break outside containment. Fail to Auto Isolate. Failure of Outboard Isolation Valve to Close.

I Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior SS

Dispatches SO to determine RWCU leak location.

Dispatches SOlMaintenance to determine why 2G31-F004 did not close.

Directs maintenance to investigate why the RWCU leak detection isolation signal did not close either RWCU isolation valve.

Addresses TS for 2G31-FOO4.

TS 3.6, Containment Systems TS 3.6.1.3, Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIV's) 0 Condition: 3.6.1.3.A; One or more penetration flow paths with one PCN inoperable except due to leakage not within limit. Required Action: 3.6.1.3.A.1 Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured. Completion time: 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months except for main steam line.

AND 0

Required Action: 3.6.1.3.A.1, Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated. Completion Time: Once per 31 days for isolation devices outside primary containment.

SS

Inform STA that the input to the Heat balance will be affected by the RWCU isolation

Ensure steps are taken to monitor reactor water conductivity as required by TRM T3.4.1, RCS Chemistry o TRM Surveillance TSR 3.4.1.1, Verify conductivity is within limits of Table TRM T3.4.1-1 at a frequency of72 hours AND 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months when continuous conductivity monitor is nonfunctional.

Direct that continuous conductivity monitor is aligned to the Recirc Loop (Recorder 2G31-R601 Select switch verified/positioned in the Read H20 position, 2Hll-P602).

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

3 Page 14 of26 Event

Description:

RWCU line break outside containment. Fail to Auto Isolate. Failure of Outboard Isolation Valve to Close.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator

As the SO sent to investigate the RWCU leak, REPORT:

0 "Viewing with the camera, there appears to have been a leak in the Heat Exchanger room. There is water on the floor, but there is no leakage at this time."

Simulator Operator

DELETE diP5LCOOIB, Sta Serv Air Compressor 2B, THEN call the control room and report:

0 "The problem with the "2B" Station Service Air Compressor has been repaired."

A endix D Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

4 Page 15 of26 Event

Description:

Inadvertent ADS actutation.

II Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator

At the direction of the Chief Examiner, PRESS (RB-5) to ACTIVATE:

0 mfB2L131, "Inadvertent ADS actuation" ALL Auto Blowdown Timers Initiated (602-306) alarm is received.

Auto Blowdown Relays Energized (602-318) alarm is received.

SPDS countdown timer begins to count down (from 101 seconds)

Confirm the initiation of ADS logic is not valid.

0 RWL is normal 0

DW pressure is normal 0

CS and RHR pumps are still in standby SS Direct ATC operator to respond to Auto Blowdown Alarms Direct ATC to enter 34AB-ElO-001-2, "Inadvertent Initiation of ECCS/RCIC."

Direct ATC operator to Inhibit ADS.

May direct operator to depress the ADS Logic Timer pushbuttons (often referred to as the "two minute timer reset pushbuttons")

ATC If directed by the SS, depresses the "ADS Logic Timer" pushbuttons (2Hll-P602, Logic A 2B21-S2A and Logic B 2B21-S2B).

lAW 34AB-EI0-001-2, "Inadvertent Initiation of ECCS/RCIC," places the ADS Auto Logic Inhibit Switches to the "Inhibit" Position (2H 11-P602, Channel AlC 2B21C-S7A and Channel BID 2B21C-S7B).

0 "Auto Blowdown Relays Energized" (602-318) alarm clears 0

"ADS Inhibit Switch(es) in Inhibit Position" (602-335) alarms

Report to the SS that ADS has been inhibited.

Enter 34AB-EI0-001-2, "Inadvertent Initiation of ECCS/RCIC."

NOTE Pressing the ADS Logic Timer pushbuttons resets the ADS 101 second time delay relays. These count down relays begin counting down from 101 seconds immediately after the pushbutton are released.

Critical Task - Manually inhibit ADS prior to SRVs automatically opening.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2

'~

Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

4 Page 16 of 26 Event

Description:

Inadvertent ADS actutation.

Time Position SS Applicant's Actions or Behavior Verifies that no SRV s open when the SPDS ADS countdown timer counts down to zero.

Addresses Tech Specs TS 3.5, ECCS and RCIC TS 3.5.1, ECCS Operating o Condition: Two or more ADS valves inoperable. Required Action: 3.5.1.E.l, Be in Mode 3. Completion time: 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months o AND o Required Action: 3.5.1.E.2, reduce reactor steam dome pressure to less than or equal to 150 psig. Completion time: 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

NOTE If ADS valves open and the plant begins to depressurize, a Group I isolation and a reactor scram will occur at 855 psig if the reactor mode switch is still in the RUN position Simulator Operator As a contingency, in case the ADS valves automatically open, be prepared to activate the next event at Chief Examiner's direction

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

5 Page 17 of 26 Event

Description:

Loss of Startup Transformer "2D".

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator

At Chief Examiner's Direction press (RB-6) to activate:

0 mfCIL30B; Control Rod Drive Pump B Trip 0

mtP64_193B; Drywell Chiller Compressor B FAIL 0

mfR22-182; 4KV Bus 2E Fault 0

mfS1L227B; SAT 2D Failure 0

mfN30_122, Main turbine Trip 0

diR22_135584C; 2E 4160 VAC Alternate Supply Breaker 0

mfR43_168A; Diesel Gen Tie Brk Fails Auto Close 2A 0

ET E51-0 1, RCIC trips when F045 opens Note: mfR43_167C, Diesel Gen Fail to Start 2C was active since the beginning of the scenario.

SS Enters the RC flowchart due to low reactor water level (RWL) and assigns the following tasks Note: the SS may assign one operator to perform Scram procedure placards RC-l, RC-2 and RC-3.

Assigns the CBO to perform RC-l.

Assigns the BOP operator to perform RC-2 and RC-3.

If time allows assigns TC-1 to be performed.

CBO

Performs RC-1 consisting of:

0 Inserts a manual scram.

0 Places the mode switch to shutdown.

0 Confirms all rods are inserted by observing full in lights, SPDS, or the RWM display.

0 Notifies the SS of rod position check.

0 Places SDV isolation valve switch to "isolate" & confirms closed.

0 Inserts SRMs and IRMs.

0 Shifts recorders to read IRMS, when required.

0 Ranges IRMS to bring reading on scale.

0 Notifies the SS when the above actions are complete.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

5 Page 18 of 26 Event

Description:

Loss of Startup Transformer "2D".

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Note: the operator will delay performing some RC-2 actions due to lack of power to the Feedwater system.

BOP BOP Performs RC-2 actions consisting of:

o Confirms proper Level Control response:

o Checks ECCS Injection Systems and secure as necessary.

o Ensures FW Master Controller setpoint reduces to 9 inches and output reduces to 25% of previous value.

o IF set down does not auto function, then manually reduces FW Master Controller setpoint to approximately 9 inches.

When feed flow is less than the capacity of the S/U level control valve

(~ 1.5 mlbmfhr), then:

o Opens 2N21-FI25. No power.

o Places 2C32-R619, FW S/U level control valve controller, in Auto, set at approximately 9 inches.

o Closes 2N21-FllO. No power.

o Identifies that no Condensate or Condensate Booster pumps are operating. No power.

o If time allows, places switches for all the Condensate and Condensate Booster pumps may in the Trip or Pull-to-Lock position.

Recognizes the MSIV s have closed.

Recognizes RCIC trip.

Recognizes that HPCI did not START.

See event 7

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

5 Page 19 of26 Event

Description:

Loss of Startup Transformer "2D".

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

BOP

Performs RC-3 consisting of:

0 Monitor RPV pressure.

0 Confirm proper operation of pressure control system (TBV, LLS, etc.). No power 0

If necessary, allows RPV pressure to exceed 1074 psig then cycles any SRV to initiate LLS.

0 Maintain RPV pressure between 1074 and 800 psig.

0 Notify SS of pressure control system operation.

SS

Directs the CBO to address the plant electrical systems and enter:

0 34AB-R22-003-2, "Station Blackout" 0

34AB-R43-001-2, "Diesel Generator Recovery"

Calls for maintenance support in restoring emergency 4160 V AC buses.

CBO

Confirms Diesel Generator response:

0 "2A" EDG is running, but not tied to "2E" 4160VAC Bus.

0 "1B" EDG is running, but not tied to "2F' 4160VAC Bus.

Standby Service Water Pump is running.

0 "2C" EDG is not running.

CBO

Evaluates the emergency buses:

0 "2E" is de-energized.

0 "2F' is energized from SAT 2C.

0 "2G" is de-energized.

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-O-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

6 Page 20 of 26 Event

Description:

4160 VAC 2G Manually Energized from Startup Transformer "2C".

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBO CBO (Placard)

NOTE Entry conditions for 34AB-R22-003-2, "Station Blackout" are (in addition to various annunciators):

At least two 4160 Emergency Busses are de-energized.

o This procedure will continue to be used as long as only one 4160 VAC Emergency Buses are energized.

o This procedure is exited when two 4160 VAC Emergency Buses are energized.

Enters 34AB-R22-003-2, "Station Blackout."

Enters 34AB-R43-001-2, "Diesel Generator Recovery."

May attempt to close the "2A" EDG output breaker using 34AB-R43-001-2, Diesel Generator Recovery, Attachment 2 (or placard).

Ask is the diesel running unloaded? Yes Confirms the normal and alternate supply breakers are open.

Lowers EDG frequency to 57 hz, then raise to 60 Hz.

Recognizes the EDG breaker closed and tripped open.

Did the Emergency Bus energize? NO Refers to 34AB-R43-001-2.

Calls for Maintenance assistance. Time: ___ _

Simulator Operator After 10 minutes has elapsed from the time of the call for assistance with the "2E" 4160 V AC Bus, call the control room as Electrical Maintenance in the EDG bldg and REPORT:

o "The "2E" bus appears to have a hard short between two main bus bars. Length of time necessary to resolve the problem is unknown at this time."

I

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

6 Page 21 of 26 Event

Description:

4160 VAC 2G Manually Energized from Startup Transformer "2C".

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior Simulator Operator

AFTER the 86 lockout has tripped for the "2G" 4160 VAC bus, THEN:

0 DELETE diR22-135584C; Contr SW ACB 135574 CBO In addressing "G" 4160 VAC bus the operator may use Attachment 2 (Placard)

(or placard) of 34AB-R43-001-2, Diesel Generator Recovery which directs the operator to determine and perform the following steps:

Is the diesel running unloaded? NO

Is the Auto Start System operative light lit: NO

Confirms the normal and alternate supply breakers are open.

Depresses the EDG Shutdown Relay logic push-button (normally auto start occurs in 110 seconds, in this case the EDG will not start)

Did the EDG start? NO

Is the Auto Start System Operative light lit? NO

Direct operator at the EDG building to locally start the "2C" EDG Time:

Simulator Operator

After 4 minutes has elapsed from the call concerning the "2C" EDG, call the control room as the SO in the EDG bldg and REPORT:

0 "The "2C" EDG will cannot be started locally."

SS May confirm with electrical maintenance that 4160 VAC bus is ready to be re-energized. (see the next Simulator Operator direction)

Directs the CBO to reset the LOSP relay for "2G" 4160 VAC bus.

Appendix D Reguired Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

6 Page 22 of26 Event

Description:

4160 VAC 2G Manually Energized from Startup Transformer "2C".

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I

Simulator Operator

If electrical maintenance is called to determine if there is a fault on the "2G" 4160 VAC bus, then REPORT:

o "No faults exists on 4160VAC bus "2G". No relays are tripped to indicate an electrical ground or over-current condition."

If asked whether the bus may be energized, then o "From an electrical safety and equipment damage point of view, the bus is ready to be energized."

CBO

Addresses 34AB-R22-002-2, Loss of Emergency Bus 0

Direction is provided to energize "2G" 4160 bus from SAT "2C" using 34S0-R22-001-2, "4160 VAC System."

Addresses 34S0-R22-001-2, "4160 VAC System" for Restoration of power to 4160 VAC Emergency Bus (2E, 2F, 2G) from Alternate power Supply (2C).

0 Confirms power available to SAT 2C.

0 Confirms requirements are met to reset SAT 2C lockout relay.

(see the next Simulator Operator direction) 0 Direct reset of SAT 2C lockout relay at Bus 2R22-S00S.

0 Confirms requirements are met to reset LOSP lockout relay.

0 Requests permission from the SS to reset the LOSP relay for "2G" 4160 V AC bus 0

Hold 4160 VAC Bus 2G LOSP lockout relay in RESET.

0 Confirm the 4160 VAC bus 2G Alternate Supply breaker closes.

0 Place the Alternate Supply breaker to the close position.

Simulator Operator

If directed to reset the lock out relay for SAT 2C, REPORT:

II 0

"The lockout relay for SAT 2C at 2R22-S00S is reset"

Appendix 0 Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

6 Page 23 of 26 Event

Description:

4160 VAC 2G Manually Energized from Startup Transformer "2C".

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBO

Confirms "2B" PSW Pump starts

Confirms 2P41-F316 Band D automatically close CBO

Addresses 34AB-R23-001-2, Loss Of 600 Volt Emergency Bus, for "c" and "D" 600V AC buses.

Resets the non-essential load lock-outs on 2Hll-P652

Directs the SSS close breakers fed from 600 V AC systems such as:

0 125/250 VDC battery chargers.

0 Reactor Protection System power supply.

0 Station Service Air Compressors.

0 Reactor Building Closed Cooling Water pump.

Simulator Operator

When requested to perform remote actions to send operators out to help in restoration of 600 V AC bus loads, THEN perform the remote functions to restore (ONLY perform the actions for those systems specifically requested):

0 Station Service Battery Chargers 0

Vital AC Battery Charger 0

RPS power restoration 0

Station Service Air Compressor SS

Enters the PC EOP Flowchart due to high Drywell pressure (1.85 psig)

An assigns the following actions:

Directs the operator to restore drywell chillers and coolers per 31EO-EOP-100-2, Miscellaneous Emergency Overrides.

Simulator Operator

AFTER being directed to restore DW chillers AND AFTER DW pressure has exceeded 1.85 psig OR DW Temperature has exceeded 150°F:

0 DELETE mtP64_193B, "Drywell Chiller Compressor B FAIL"

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

6 Page 24 of26 Event

Description:

4160 VAC 2G Manually Energized from Startup Transformer "2C".

II Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior CBO

Restores drywell chillers per 31EO-EOP-I00-2 section 3.7 by:

0 Verifies drywell temperature is below 250 0 Fusing SPDS and/or recognizes there is not a leak in primary containment.

0 Place 2P64-S3, LOCA Override Switch, to BYPASS on panel 2Hll-P700 0

Has the SSS open links:

Upper TB 1-11, 2R22-S007 Fr. 7,2P64-B006B 0

Directs the SSS reset 86 lockout relays on drywell chiller breaker on 4160V bus and "G" (2R22-S007 Fr. 11) 0 May have the SSS to reset the POR relay for each chiller.

0 Monitors for chiller start by observing the red light on 2Hll-P700 or input from the SSS.

Restores the drywell coolers per 31EO-EOP-100-2 section 3.6 by:

0 Verifies drywell temperature is below 250 of on SPDS and/or recognizes there is nota leak in primary containment.

0 Place drywell cooling fans system B key-lock LOCA override switch to BYPASS on 2Hll-P654.

0 Observes the drywell cooler fans start by observing their red lights illuminating on 2Hll-P654.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 II Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

7 Page 25 of 26 Event

Description:

HPCI must be manually started.

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP NOTE The following 2 malfunctions were entered at ST-O:

o mtE4L235A (HPCI Fails To Auto Start On Low Level) o mtE4L235B (HPCI Fails To Auto Start On Hi Drywell Press)

Recognizes that HPCI failed to Auto Start and Starts HPCI (CRTICAL TASK) HPCI is the only high pressure injection system, perform this action prior to emergency depressurization being required due to lowing level.

Recognizes HPCI fails to auto start at -35" or 1.85 psig DW pressure and manually starts per 34S0-E41-001-2, prior to emergency depressurization.

o Opens 2E41-F059, Lube Oil Cooling Wtr Vlv.

o Starts 2E41-C002-2, Barometric Condenser Vacuum Pump.

o Opens 2E41-FOOl, Turbine Steam Supply Vlv o Takes 2E41-C002-3, Aux Oil Pump, control switch to the START position.

o Opens 2E41-F006, Pump Discharge Valve.

Confirm the following valves OPENED:

o Turbine Control Vlv o Turbine Stop Vlv Recognizes that the flow controller has failed low Places flow controller in manual and adjust as required to achieve the following Confirm the turbine comes up to speed Confirms 2E41-F012, Min Flow Vlv, closed.

Adjust flow with 2E41-R612, Flow Control to maintain water leveL When LLS is initiated to control Rx pressure, RWL may go above 52",

if so, the HPCI high water level trip will have to be reset to inject with HPCI prior to -35".

Continues manual control of HPCI to maintain RWL.

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2009-301 Scenario No.:

4-04 Event No.:

7 Page 26 of26 Event

Description:

BPCI must be manually started.

Time I Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior With Chief Examiners permission:

The Scenario will be stopped when:

0 "20" 4160 VAC Emergency Bus is energized AND one of the following:

0 BPCI is being used for RWL control OR 0

The Plant has been emergency depressed and Low pressure ECCS is being used for RWL control

ML091730128

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