ML083181220
| ML083181220 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Limerick  |
| Issue date: | 09/15/2008 |
| From: | Caruso J Operations Branch I |
| To: | Hunter J Exelon Generation Co |
| Hansell S | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML081060533 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC U01745 | |
| Download: ML083181220 (78) | |
Text
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Event No.
1 2
3 Facility: Limerick 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 1 Malf. No.
Event Event Type*
Description NIA N-BOP Perform Loaded Run-In on D12 Diesel Generator NIA R-RO 100 MWe Load Reduction For Minimum Generation Emergency MHP450 TS-SRO C-BoP1 HPCl Inadvertent Startup 11 Examiners:
Operators:
MCN078C MRR507A Initial Conditions:
100% power, EOL, Unit 2 in refueling, OPCON 5 Turnover:
Standard turnover, number of components 00s for all scenarios, D12 Diesel Generator running unloaded at rated speed for run-in following cylinder liner replacement. Synchronize and load D12 Diesel Generator per RT-6-092-312-1, D12 Diesel Generator Run-In, beginning at Step 4.5.28.
Condensate Pump C Trips, RRP A Fails to Runback TS-SRO MPR020B MRDOI 6F 5
I-Ro TSOSRO APRM Channel 2 Fails to 96%
1 2 Control Rods Scram, ATWS, 1A SLC Pump Spurious Stop, B &
C SLC Squib Valves Fail to Open, RDCS Failure - Inability to Drive Rods MRP029B MRP407C MSLI 96C MRD024 1 MSL196B 1 1
MRC457B RCIC Flow Controller Fails Low in Automatic with Subsequent I MRC458 I I-Bop I RClC Turbine Trip M
I Main Turbine Trip, Transfer Failure of Unit Aux Buses 11 and 12 I MEHl04B I OR Bkrs II I
I I
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NRC Scenario # I - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 1 of 21
Scenario Summarv and Administration Instructions SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The BOP will synchronize and load Diesel D12 to 700kW following a cylinder liner replacement IAW RT-6-092-312-1, D12 Diesel Generator Run-In, beginning at Step 4.5.28.
After D12 load is stable at 700 kw, the Power System Director will call to request a main generator load decrease of 100 MWe due to a Minimum Generation Emergency. The crew will lower power IAW GP-5, Steady State Operations, Attachment 1, Section 1 and OP-AB-300-1003, BWR Reactivity Maneuver Guidance.
HPCl will inadvertently start up after the plant is stable at the new lower power level. Power will rise but not to an automatic trip setpoint. Digital feedwater control system will reduce main feedwater flow to maintain RPV level. The crew will recognize the initiation signal is not valid and will isolate HPCl per S55.2.A, HPCl Shutdown From Automatic or Manual Initiation, Step 4.4. The SRO will determine HPCl is INOPERABLE and enter TS LCO 3.5.l.c.l Action c.1 (14 days). HPCl Steam Line Outboard Isolation HV-55-1 F003 will fail as-is (closed) after isolation, such that HPCl cannot be unisolated by the crew later in the scenario.
Condensate Pump C RFP will trip on motor overcurrent relay actuation, initiating a recirc pump runback to 42% speed on < 3 condensate pumps running with feed flow > 80.3%. RRP A will fail to runback. The RO will recognize the failure to runback and manually reduce RRP A speed. The SRO will identify operation outside of TS LCO 3.4.1.3.b and direct manual reduction of RRP A flow per TS LCO 3.4.1.3.b Action a to restore recirc loop flow mismatch to within limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
APRM Channel 2 will fail upscale from current value to 96% over approximately 2 minutes. The crew will respond IAW alarm response procedures, determine the channel is failed and bypass the channel. The SRO will reference TS 3.3.11 and 3.3.6.
Two control rods will spuriously scram. The crew will respond per ON-104, Control Rod Problems, Section 2.3 and initiate a manual scram. A failure of RPS and ARI will prevent the scram. The crew will respond per T-101 and 'T-117 to lower reactor power. RO will insert rods.
After some motion, rods will stop inserting due to a rod control system failure. The crew will lower reactor power by lowering RPV level to between minus (-)50 and minus (-) 186 inches (TAF is - 161 inches).
When power is reduced by lowered RPV level, the main turbine will trip and both Unit Aux Buses 11 and 12 will fail to transfer to alternate power. Overrides on Unit Aux Bus alternate power breaker handswitches will prevent manually re-energizing these buses. The BOP will attempt to start RClC and determine the RClC speed controller has failed low in automatic, requiring flow control in manual. After establishing flow with RCIC, the RClC turbine trips.
Crew will determine unable to be restore and maintain level > -186" and transition to T-I 12 to perform an emergency blowdown.
The scenario will be terminated when RPV pressure is < 75 psig and RPV level is controlled IAW T-I 17.
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Scenario Summary and Administration Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
Reset simulator to 100% power EOL. Align equipment per turnover sheet.
Event 2:
100 MWe Load Reduction For Minimum Generation Emergency No malfunctions required Event 3:
HPCl Inadvertent Startup Insert MHP450 on Manual Trigger 3 Event 4:
Condensate Pump C Trips, RRP A Fails to Runback Insert MCN078C and MRR507A on Manual Trigger 4 Event 5:
APRM Channel 2 Fails to 96%
Insert MPR020B at 96% on Manual Trigger 5 Event 6:
2 Control Rods Scram, ATWS, 1A SLC Pump Spurious Stop, B & C SLC Squib Valves Fail to Open, RDCS Failure - Inability to Drive Rods Insert MRDOl6F, MRP0298, MRP407C, NlSLl96B, MSLl96C and MRD024 on Manual Trigger 6 Event 7:
Main Turbine Trip, Transfer Failure of Unit Aux Buses 11 and 12 Override breaker handswitches to prevent auto transfer. Insert MEHl04B on Manual Trigger 7.
Event 8:
RClC Flow Controller Fails Low in Automatic with Subsequent RClC Turbine Trip Insert MRC457B on Manual Trigger 7. Booth operator to insert MRC458 after applicant has established RCIC flow with controller in MANUAL.
CRITICAL TASKS
- 1. T-117.1 Standard :
- 2. T-117.1 Standard :
- 3. T-117.3
.S t a nd a rd :
Inhibit automatic ADS.
Prevent automatic initiation of ADS.
Terminate and prevent injection into the RPV.
RPV level lowered below -50 by Terminating and Preventing injection into the RPV per T-270.
Perform emergency blowdown per T-I 12.
When RPV level cannot be maintained above -1 86 inches and injection into the RPV (except from boron injection systems, CRD, and RCIC) has been terminated and prevented, 5 SRVs are opened.
NRC Scenario #I - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 3 of 21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Op-Test No.: 1 Position Event
Description:
I BOP I BOP Scenario No.: I Event No.: 1 Perform Loaded Run-In on D12 Diesel Generator Applicant's Actions or Behavior Direct BOP to continue with diesel aenerator run-in Drocedure.
Obtains copy of RT-6-092-312-1, D12 Diesel Generator Run PLACE 125-1 1607/SS, DIESEL GEN 12, SYNC, to "ON," using Sync Switch handle.
VERIFY Synchroscope is rotating with both lights fully bright at 180" AND off at 0".
NOTE Next two steps verify controls operating properly. Change in D/G frequency can be observed by change in Synchroscope (SYSTEM) speed. Change in D/G voltage can be observed by change in Synchronizing Incoming Voltmeter (INCOMING). (Ref 6.5)
OBSERVE change in D/G frequency by placing 165 BGSOI/CS, SPEED GOVERNOR, to "RAISE" AND to "LOWER."
OBSERVE change in D/G voltage by placing 170 BG502/CS, VOLTAGE REGULATOR, to "RAISE" AND to "LOWER."
I NOTE Next step adjusts D/G frequency slightly faster than D12 Safeguard Bus frequency.
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior ADJUST 165-BG501/CS, SPEED GOVERNOR, so Synchroscope is rotating slowly in FAST (CW) direction.
BOP ADJUST 170-BG502/CS, VOLTAGE REGULATOR, SO INCOMING Voltage is slightly higher than RUNNING Voltage.
BOP WARN1 NG WHEN synchronizing, THEN extreme care is needed since excessive voltage/phase difference will cause equipment damage OR personnel injury.
WHEN Synchroscope is within 3 O before 12 o'clock position rotating slowly in FAST (CW) direction, THEN CLOSE 152-1 1607, CAUTION KVAR's are to be maintained less than 75% KW to prevent generator exceeding 0.8 rated power factor.
II I
I Immediately RAISE load to 200 - 300 KW by placing 165-BG501/CS, SPEED GOVERNOR, to "RAISE."
BOP RAISE reactive load to 100 - 150 KVAR by placing 170-BG502/CS, VOLTAGE REGULATOR, to "RAISE."
BOP I
U S
DIESEL GEN 12, SYNC, to "OFF."
~~
IF performing other plant testing AND Safeguard Bus needs to be transferred, THEN PERFORM transfer of Safeguard Bus per S92.6.A, Transfer Of A 4kv Safeguard Bus From 101 Safeguard Feed To 201 Safeguard Feed And Vice Versa. [APPLICANT SHOULD NOT NRC Scenario # I - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 5 of 21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DA Time 11 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: I Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Event No.: 1 BOP Gradually RAISE load at a rate of less than or equal to 350 KW/minute to 650 - 750 KW (25% of Full Load) by adjusting 165-BG501/CS, SPEED GOVERNOR AND MAINTAIN reactive load (KVAR) less than or equal to 75% of KW, using 170-BG502/CS, VOLTAGE REGULATOR at panel 1 BC661.
Rapid loading during testing will subject diesel generator to BOP WHEN 650 - 750 KW is obtained, THEN START stopwatch.
CAUTION Hot water is present at vents. Appropriate personal protective equipment AND Tygon tubing must be used.
1 BOP OPEN AND CLOSE 11-1390B, JACKET WATER HEAT EXCHANGER SHELL VENT, AND 92-1607B, AIR COOLER VENT, to ensure any trapped air is vented from the Jacket Water/Air Cooler Coolant Svstems. [DlRECTS EO ACT/OM BOP IF Jacket Water Expansion Tank Level is low, THEN OPEN 20-1 132B, Jacket Water Expansion Tank Manual Fill Valve, to fill tank to within 2 inches of top AND THEN CLOSE 20-1 132B. [DIRECTS 0 ACTlOv -
II Examiner Note Proceed to the next event when diesel load is stable at the target load value between 650 and 750 KW.
NRC Scenario #I - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 6 of 21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-C)
1 Event No.: 2 100 MWe Load Reduction For Minimum Generation Emergency Applicants Actions or Behavior Refer to GP-5, Steady State Operations, Attachment 1, Planned I Intentional Rx Power Maneuvers Between 90% and 100%
Informs crew of PSD request and directs a power reduction of 100MWi IAW GP-5. Attachment 1 NOTES
- 1.
Power System Director should be notified of all Rx power changes. IF possible, THEN notification should be made prior to the change in Rx power.
A rapid reduction in Rx power may cause level swell in the Steam Seal Evaporator causing HV-07-*57, S.S.E. Cond MIU Shutoff VI\\
(SUP), to close. This valve will not reopen automatically.
Rx power reductions should be conducted in accordance with one of the following, imless directed otherwise by Reactor Engineering:
Reactor Maneuvering Shutdown Instructions 0
Reactor Maneuvering Special Instructions 2
3 OP-AB-300-1003, BWR Reactivity Maneuver Guidance CAUTION A Reactor Engineer must be present to monitor core performance during control rod manipulations, except during the following activities 0
Reactor Maneuvering Shutdown Instructions 0
II ST-6-107-760-*, Control Rod Exercise (CM-3)
As allowed by OP-AB-300-1003, BWR Reactivity Maneuver Guidance DETERMINE targeted Rx power level for intended drop in Rx power.
[Determines reactor power must be reduced approximately 70%.]
NOTIFY Power Team of power reduction and obtain E-DART Ticket number 803-6530 (61 0-765-6530)
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior
~
SRO REDUCE Rx power, as required, in accordance with one of the following, unless directed otherwise by Reactor Engineering Otherwise, MARK this step N/A.
Reactor Maneuvering Shutdown Instructions 0
0 Reactor Maneuvering Special Instructions OP-AB-300-1003, BWR Reactivity Maneuver Guidance
[Directs RO to reduce power using B WR Reactivity Maneuver Lowers Rx Recirc flow by reducing output of both RRP speed On a continuing basis during Rx power reduction, OBSERVE the following:
0 APRMs - lowering 0
Recirc flow - lowering 0
Steam flow - lowering 0
RPV level - normal FW flow - lowering EF&
1 MONITOR BOP [balance ofplanf] during drop in Rx power.
1 ENSURE EH; Load Set is maintained greater than 100% as indicated on PMS com uter point E*651.
REQUEST a new P-I edit.
5 NRC Scenario #1 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 8 of 21
Form ES-D Appendix D Required Operator Actions Op-Test No.: 2 Event
Description:
Scenario No.:
1 Event No.: 2 100 MWe Load Reduction For Minimum Generation Emergency Op-Test No.: 2 Event
Description:
Time Position SRO SRO SRO Proceed to the next event Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY (APRM-%CTP) listed on the P-I edit are between -2.0 to 2.C.
IF any (APRM-%CTP) are not within these limits, THEN CHECK (APRM-%CTP) with either a new P-I OR an NSS03, Core Power And Flow Log.
IF (APRM-%CTP) still outside prescribed limits, THEN PERFORM ST-6-1 07-887-*, APRM Gain Determination And Auto Adjustment OR ST-6-1 07-888-*, Manual APRM Gain Adjustment.
[Confirms APRM-%UP between limits.]
VERIFY scram margin is > 9.0%. IF scram margin is NOTIFY Reactor Engineering for rod pattern adjustment. [Confirms scram maruin >9%1 9.0%, THEN Inform Power System Director of completion of power maneuver.
Examiner Note I
Proceed to the next event NRC Scenario #I
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Form E S - D l -
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
HPCI Inadvertent Startup Applicants Actions or Behavior The crew will observe annunciators :
(1 13 8-5) CORE SPRAY LINE INTERNAL BREAK (1 07 H-2) REACTOR HI / LO LEVEL Refer to alarm response procedures.
~
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PER ARC-MCR-107-t-12, REACTOR HVLO LEVEL :
- 1. IF Reactor water level is low and unexpected or unexplained, THEN enter OT-100, Reactor Low Level.
- 2. IF Reactor water level is high and unexpected or unexplained, THEN enter OT-I I O, Reactor High Level.
[SRO will enter OT-170.1
- 3. Refer to LGS Emergency Plan Annex, Table 3-1.
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
HPCI Inadvertent Startup Position SRO BOP BOP RO Applicants Actions or Behavior PER ARC-MCR-113-835, CORE SPRAY LINE INTERNAL BREAK NOTE Alarm designed to indicate failure of one of the core spray loop piping between the vessel penetration AND the core shroud penetration.
Normal rated power shroud/annulus dP is 7.5 psid. A valid value of greater than + I.3 or less than -3.8 psid indicates a failure of the core spray piping outside the shroud. A value of greater than +7.5 psid or less than -1 0.0 psid indicates a failure of the core spray piping outside the vessel. A failure between the vessel AND containment would be measured by the containment leakage detection systems. This instrument loop is very noisy due to the condensation of steam inside the core spray piping AND also sensing pressures inside the shroud.
Spurious alarms that immediately clear should NOT be considered
- 1. Inform Shift Supervision.
- 2. IF signal is valid AND dP is greater than + I.3 psid, THEN declare A Core Spray loop INOPERABLE due to a pipe break AND consider a normal plant shutdown per GP-3.
- 3. IF signal is valid AND dP is less than -3.8 psid, THEN declare B Core Spray loop INOPERABLE due to a pipe break AND consider a normal plant shutdown per GP-3.
- 4. IF containment parameters indicate a LOCA, THEN perform a rapic plant shutdown per GP-4.
- 5. Refer to Tech Spec 3.5.1.
- 6. Request I&C verify proper functioning of PDT-052-1 N056.
[BOP should inform SRO of alarm and refer to alarm response.
BOP and SRO will determine the alarm is due to HPCl pump running and NOT indicative of a pipe break.]
~
Recognize HPCl pump is running and injecting with no valid initiation signal.
Should observe a small Dower rise.
NRC Scenario #I
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Appendix D BOP Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 COLLECT Turbine (*O-S211) reservoir oil sample per MAG CG-502-2, Lubrication Program Guide, after components come to rest, AND REQUEST Chemistry perform moisture analysis of oil sample. CM-1 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
HPCl Inadvertent Startup Time Position I Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
[ OT-I IO, Steps 3. I thru 3.7 are not applicable to the situation.
SRO will utilize Step 3.8, shown below, to stop HPCl injection.]
PREVENT injection from other systems not required to assure SRO adequate core cooling.
Order HPCl isolation per S55.2.A, HPCl Shutdown From Automatic or
[Procedure S55.2.A Actions :I IF HPCl hitiation Signal is present as indicated by white SEAL IN light THEN GO TO step 4.4.
DEPRESS AND RELEEASE HPCl Manual Isolation (ISOLATION)
VERIFY HV-55-*F003, "HPCI Steam Line Outboard Isolation" VERIFY HPCl turbine comes to rest as indicated by SI 56 *61, "HPCI Turbine Speed" (S).
BOP Booth Operator Note Insert Malfunction MHP446B to fail HPCl Steam Line Outboard Isolation HV-55-1 F003 as-is (closed) after isolation, such that HPCl cannot be unisolated by the crew later in the scenario.
[BOP will direct field activity to collect oil sample for Chemistry NRC Scenario #I
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
HPCl Inadvertent Startup Position BOP BOP SRO SRO Applicant's Actions or Behavior ENSURE *OP216, "Barometric Condenser Vacuum Pump" (VACUUM PUMP), operating.
ENSURE *OP213, "Auxiliary Oil Pump" (AUX OIL PUMP), operating.
[No further steps can be performed in S55.2.A because initiation signal is not reset.]
Contact maintenance department to beain troubleshootina and repair.
Refers to Tech Specs. Announces HPCl INOPERABLE. Enters TS LCO 3.5.l.c.l Action <:.I (14 days).
Examiner Note Proceed to the next event NRC Scenario #I
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-U-2 Posit ion Crew BOP RO SRO RO SRO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Respond to numerous annunciators:
104 G I 104 G2 104 D4 107 D5 FWLCS TROUBLE 112 C4 CONDENSATE PUMP MOTOR OVERLOAD CONDENSATE PUMP BREAKER TRIP CONDENSATE PUMPS DISCHARGE HEADER LO PRESS 1 B RECIRC FLOW LIMIT Note to examiners: 11 1 C4, 1A RECIRC FLOW LIMIT should actuate on condensate pump trip but will not actuate because of concurrent failure of 1A auto runback.
Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
I Event No.: 4 Event
Description:
Condensate Pump C Trips, RRP A Fails to Runback L
Proceed to the next event SRO Report trip of IC' Condensate Pump Rersort 1A Recirc Punm is not runnina back.
Place 1A Recirc Pump Speed Controller in MANUAL. Lower speed to 42%.
ber OP-LG-108-101-1001, "Simple Quick Acts / Transient Acts",
Transient Act 3.2.3 and 3.2. IO and per TS LCO 3.4. I. 3. b, Action b] -
Enters TS LCO 3.4.1.3.b Action b for restoring recirc loop flow mismatch to within limits within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />.
Inform manaaement and PSD of tiant status.
Examiner Note:
NRC Scenario #I - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 14 of 21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-0-2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
APRM Channel 2 Fails to 96%
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Acknowledge numerous annunciators.
Refer to alarm response procedures.
1, Determine in which channel APRM/OPRM Trouble condition is present.
- 2. Before bypassing APRM channel, verify compliance with TS 3.3.1, pertaining to Reactor Protection System Instrumentation AND TS 3.3.6, pertaining to Control Rod Block Instrumentation.
- 4. IF all other APRM/OPRM channels are reading normal, THEN contact I&C to determine fault in APRMIOPRM channel AND reDair.
NRC Scenario #I - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 15 of 21
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
APRM Channel 2 Fails to 96%
=
Applicant's Actions or Behavior Refer to alarm response procedures.
108 B-3 APRM UPSCALE TRIP I INOP 1
At APRM Operator Display Assemblies (ODAs) on Panel 1OC603 determine APRM channel(s) causing Upscale Trip/lNOP condition as follows:
0 Message "TRIP" (inverse video) appears in display header of each ODA whose associated channel has an active APRM HI-HVINOP OR OPRM Upscale Trip condition Message "INOP-CALI' OR "INOP-SET"(inverse video) appears in display header of each ODA whose associated chassis Key Lock Mode Switch is in "INOP" position "TRIP STATUS" screens display status of active trip outputs from associated channel (an "*" indicates trip signal present) 0 0
NOTE:
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
Timely performance of Step 2 will reduce the likelihood of a full scram by eliminating a single point vulnerability exposure.
IF one APRM channel has Upscale Trip/lNOP condition, THEN place APRM channel in "BYPASS" with SSV permission.
IF all other APRM channels are reading normal, THEN contact I&C to determine fault with APRM channel AND repair.
IF Rx Power is rising, THEN refer to OT-104, Unexpected/
Unexplained Positive Or Negative Reactivity Insertion.
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
1 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
APRM Channel 2 Fails to 96%
Time Posit ion RO BOP RO BOP SRO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Refer to alarm response procedures.
108 B-4 APRM UPSCALE
- 1. At APRM Operator Display Assemblies (ODAs) on Panel 1 OC603 determine APRM channel(s) causing Upscale Alarm condition as follows:.
Message "ALARM" (inverse video) appears in display header of each ODA whose associated channel has an active APRM HI OR OPRM Pre-Trip Alarm condition "TRIP STATUS" screens display status of active alarm outputs from associated channel (an 'I* indicates alarm signal present)
Timely performance of Step 2 will reduce the likelihood of a full scram by eliminating a single point vulnerability exposure.
IF one APRM channel has Upscale Alarm condition, THEN place upscale APRM channel in "BYPASS" with SSV permission.
IF all other APRM channels are reading normal, THEN contact I&C to determine fault with APRM channel AND repair.
IF Rx Power is rising, THEN refer to OT-104, Unexpected/
Unexplained Positive Or Negative Reactivity Insertion.
0 NOTE:
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
Refer to alarm response procedures.
108 F-3 ROD OUT BLOCK
- 1. IF cause of Rod Block is RDCS INOP, THEN reset Rod Drive control cabinet per S73.0.F, Resetting the Rod Drive Control System.
- 2. Refer to S73.O.B, identifying rod block inputs to the Reactor Manual Control System.
I Reference TS 3.3.1 arid 3.3.6.
Examiner Note:
Proceed to the next event NRC Scenario #1 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 17 of 21
Form ES-D Appendix D Required Operator Actions Time Op-Test No.: 2 Event
Description:
Event No.: 6 2 Control Rods Scram, ATWS, 1A SLC Pump Spurious Stop, B & C SLC Squib Valves Fail to Open, RDCS Failure - Inability to Drive Rods Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Ii I
I RO Inserts SRMs AND IRMs (RC-6)
I I
It RO I Ro Manually initiates RRCS and ARI (RC/Q-5).
Observes 108 F-4 ROD DRIFT alarm. Notes 2 control rods scrammed.
Informs SRO.
BOP RO Enters ON-I 04, Control Rod Problems, Section 2.3.
Ensures recirc runback to minimum (RC/Q-8).
Insert rods manually with the RWM bypassed (RC/Q-12)
Booth operator: Insert MRD024 to stop rod motion AFTER RO has inserted rods a few notches.
SRO IF more than one control rod inadvertently scrams, THEN manually SCRAM the reactor AND PLACE Mode Switch in "SHUTDOWN" OR T-101, as applicable.
AND ENTER T-I 00, Orders a reactor scram.
Depresses scram pushbuttons. Takes Mode Switch to Shutdown.
Reports reactor not scrammed.
RO Enters T-I 01, RPV Control, on "SCRAM condition with power above 4% or unknown". Directs 'T' procedure activities.
NRC Scenario #1 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 18 of 21
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-U-2 Time Position Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
Event No.: 6 Event
Description:
2 Control Rods Scram, ATWS, 1A SLC Pump Spurious Stop, B & C SLC Squib Valves Fail to Open, RDCS Failure - Inability to Drive Rods Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Calls out procedures for electrical ATWS - T-215, T-216 (RCIQ-13). I SRO Attempts SLC injection. Determines SLC will not inject (RC/Q-16).
Inhibits auto ADS (RC/Q-19 or LQ-3).
RO I
I SRO directs T-212 (R.C/Q-20).
Enters T-117, Level / Power Control (RC/L-2).
I I
Terminate and prevent per T-270, except Boron, RClC and CRD BOP: Ensures HPCl isolated, ensures LP ECCS is off, calls Field Supervisor to prevent auto start of ECCS.
RO: Terminates and prevents feedwater injection.
(LQ-5).
BOP/RO CRITICAL TASK (T-117.7)
Lower level and control - 60 to -100 inches (LQ-5).
BOP/RO BOP
~
~-
Lower level and control > - 186 inches (LQ-17).
[In T-1 011:
Control RPV pressure 990 - 1096 with EHC (RC/P-4).
SRO I
PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT WHEN LEVEL HAS REDUCED POWER.
Directs T-221 to ensure MSlVs open (RC/P-9).
NRC Scenario #I - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 19 of 21
Form ES-D Appendix D Required Operator Actions Time
~-
Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.: I Event No.: 7 Event
Description:
Main Turbine Trip, Transfer Failure of Unit Aux Buses 11 and 12 Position Applicants Actions or Behavior SRO Determine turbine has tripped and condenser is unavailable. Not feed with RClC (see next event).
Direct T-270 (EB-6).
Recognize unable to restore and maintain level > - 186 inches. Enters T-I 12, Emergency Blowdown (T-I 17, LQ-19).
SRO Exit T-101, RC/P le only (EB-4).
1 Open all 5 ADS valves.
(/CT I BOP TERMINATE THE SCENARIO WHEN ALL THE FOLLOWING ARE MET:
RPV PRESSURE IS 75 PSlG LEVEL IS CONTROLLED IAW T-I 17 NRC Scenario #I
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Form E S - I S -
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Time Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
Event No.:
Event
Description:
RClC Flow Controller Fails Low in Automatic with Subsequent RClC Turbine Trip Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior BOP Observes RClC PUMP LO FLOW alarm (1 16 83) and RClC turbine not running at normal speed. Identifies flow controller output at minimum n auto.
BOP Places RClC flow controller in manual and raises flow.
Refers to ARC-MCR-116-AI:
- 1.
Check RCilC status board for cause of annunciator BOP
- 2.
- 3.
Refer to Tech. Spec. 3/4.7.3 IF trip units caused alarm, THEN reset trip.
BOP Determines RClC turbine has tripped.
- 4.
- 5.
Dispatch Operator to investigate problem.
IF further investigation is required, THEN contact I&C.
BOP Dispatches EO to investigate, BOP TERMINATE THE SCENARIO WHEN ALL THE FOLLOWING ARE MET:
RPV PRESSURE IS 75 PSlG Informs SRO.
NRC Scenario #I
- 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 21 of 21
Appendix D Scenario Out1 i ne Form ES-C)-'J Event No.
1 2
Facility: Limerick 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 2 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners:
Operators:
Malf. No.
Event Event TY Pe*
Description NIA R-RO Perform Rod Pattern Adjustment MRDo16B TS-SRO C-Ro Control Rod XX-W Drifts Out 3
MCUl95B C-RO MRP027B C-BOP RPS Channel B Breaker Trip, RWCU Fails to Isolate TS-SRO RRP 1 B Lower Seal Failure, Followed By Upper Seal Failure, RRP Suction Valve Fails As-Is MRR433B OR F023B 1
4 I MRR434B I 1
5 6
MRR441 M
Steam Leak in Drywell MED263C MHP449 Manual Start MED261 MED263A M
Loss of Offsite Power, D11 and D13 Lockouts MHP447A C-BOP HPCl Aux Oil Pump Auto Start Failure and Turbine Trip Following (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 1 of 24
Scenario Summary and Administration Instructions SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The crew will assume the watch and perform a rod pattern adjustment.
Control Rod XX-W will continue to drift out after rod pull. The crew will respond IAW ON-104, Control Rod Problems, Section 2.2 and will fully insert the drifting rod. Reactor engineering will direct insertion of the adjacent 3 control rods to maintain symmetry. The CRS will address Tech Specs.
RPS Channel B will lose power due to the trip of Breaker # I 3 on 120VAC Distribution Panel 1 BY160. A half-scram and a half-NSSSS isolation will occur. The following valves will close '
0 0
Loop B DW Chill Waterlsolations RRP Seal Cooling Valves HV13-I 08 &HV13-I 1 1 Division II and IV CASS Valves PClG Compressor Suction Valve HV59-102 RWCU Isolation Valve HV44-1 F004 should close, however it will remain open due to failing as-is. The crew should respond per alarm response procedure. The crew will identify the failure of RWCU to isolate and will isolate RWCU by closing the other isolation valve, HV44-1 FOOI. GP-8 and GP-8.5 will be utilized to clear the isolation signals and restore instrument gas and drywell cooling. The CRS will determine affected TS LCOs (isolation actuation instrumentation, and PClV TS 3.6.3). Power will be restored when electricians replace the power supply breaker at 1 BY160 Distribution Panel. Following power restoration, systems (RWCU, RRP Seal Cooling) will be restored to normal.
RRP B lower seal will fail. The crew will respond IAW ARC-MCR-112-A1, identify the problem, determine the leak rate and refer to Leakage TS 3.4.3.2. After 5 minutes, the upper seal will fail, resulting in approximately 60 gpm leakrate and increasing DW pressure and temperature (OT101 for high drywell pressure). The crew will commence a GP-4 shutdown and, if necessary, scram the reactor before reaching 1.68 psig in the drywell. The RRP should be stopped and isolated IAW S43.2.A, Shutdown of a Recirculation Pump. The RRP Suction Valve will fail as-is partially stroked closed. Drywell pressure and temperature will continue to increase. The crew will scram the reactor per OT-101, High Drywell Pressure.
Crew will enter T-101 on low RPV level. They will subsequently re-enter T-I 01 and enter T-I 02 on high drywell pressure at > 1.68 psig.
A loss of offsite power (E-1020) occurs following RClC start and water level control. It results in lockouts on D11 and D13 Buses. RClC and CRD can be started for injection. Division 2 RHR and Core Spray will be available on Diesel Generators. The crew will initiate suppression pool spray for pressure and temperature control. The leak will increase beyond RClC and CRD capacity. HPCl will fail to auto start and the turbine will trip shortly following manual startup. It cannot be recovered. A rapid depressurization will be required on PSP curve to inject with low pressure ECCS systems.
The scenario will be terminated when the reactor is depressurized and level is restored to between + I 2 5 and +54 inches and actions of T-102 have been performed to address containment control.
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 2 of 24
Scenario Summary and Administration Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP 1, Reset simulator to 70% power. Align equipment per turnover sheet.
- 2. Event 2:
Control Rod XX-YY Drifts Out Insert MRDOl6B for Rod XX-W
- 3. Event 3:
RPS Channel B Breaker Trip, RWCU Fails to Isolate Insert MCUl95B - no TD, MRP027B - 1 sec TD, both on Manual Trigger 3
- 4. Event 4:
RRP 1B Lower Seal Failure, Followed By Upper Seal Failure, RRP Suction Valve Fails As-Is Insert MRR433B - no TD, MRR434B - 5 rnin TD, Override HV43-1 F023 handswitch to PTS
-triggered on TD off of handswitch being taken to CLOSE (such that valve fails in position partially closed - to prevent leak from being isolated Insert MRR441 on Manual Trigger 5 Insert MED261, MED263A and MED263C, on Manual Trigger 6 Insert MHP447A on Manual Trigger 5, MHP449 - 10 sec TD - on trigger of HV55-1 Fool green position light out
- 5. Event 5:
Steam Leak in Drywell
- 6. Event 6:
- 7. Event 7:
Loss of Offsite Power, D11 and D13 Lockouts HPCl Aux Oil Pump Auto Start Failure and Turbine Trip Following Manual Start CRITICAL TASKS
- 1. ON-I 04.2 Drifting control rod is fully inserted.
Standard:
After it is determined that a control rod has drifted out from its original position, a continuous insert signal is applied until the control rod is at or beyond position.
- 2. T-102.2 Perform emergency blowdown per T-I 12.
Standard:
When Suppression Pool Pressure cannot be maintained below the Pressure Suppression Pressure (PUP-3) curve and before Drywell pressure exceeds 55 psig, open 5 SRVs.
- 3. T-I 12.2 Restore RPV level above -161 inches.
Standard:
When Reactor pressure permits, inject with all available low pressure ECCS, to restore RPV level above -161.
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 3 of 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-Ds Position SRO RO RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs RO to perform rod pattern adjustment.
Commences rod pattern adjustment per RE guidance. Performs moves in accordance with IAW S73.1.A, Normal Operation of the Reactor Manual Control System, Section 4.2 4.2.1 REVIEW Attachment 1 AND VERIFY the control rod to be withdrawn is not channel bow susceptible.
4.2.2 SELECT the control rod to be withdrawn at *O-C603, "Reactor Control Conso le.I' 4.2.3 VERIFY correct rod position is indicated on Four Rod Display.
4.2.4 ENSURE drive water pressure is 255 to 265 psid, as indicated on PDI-46-*R602, "Drive Water Differential Pressure Indicator."
4.2.5 PRESS WITHDRAW pushbutton at *O-C603.
NOTE WHEN WITHDRAW pushbutton is depressed,THEN the proper light sequence is:
- 1. INSERT light Lit A,ND THEN extinguishes after approximately 0.6 seconds.
- 2. WITHDRAW light Lit AND THEN extinguishes after approximately 1.5 seconds.
- 3. SETTLE light Lit AND THEN extinguishes after approximately 6.1 seconds.
~~
4.2.6 VERIFY proper RDCS light sequence.
4.2.7 IF control rod fails to reposition, THEN GO TO Section 4.4.
4.2.8 VERIFY CR has been withdrawn one notch position at Four Rod Display.
4.2.9 IF control rod is positioned to notch position 48, THEN PERFORM an over travel check per ST-6-107-730-*, Control Rod Coudina Check.
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 4 of 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-Dd Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 5 of 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-C)-2 Position RO RO SRO SRO Applicants Actions or Behavior Acknowledge ROD DRIFT alarm. Informs SRO.
Refers to ARC-MCR-108-F4, ROD DRIFT:
Refer to ON-I 04, Control Rod Problems, OT-I 04, Unexpected/Unexplained Positive or Negative Reactivity Insertion, AND to Tech Spec 3.1.3.6 pertaining to control rod drive coupling for actions/limitations due to rod drift.
Enters OT-I 04.
2.0 IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 2.1 REDUCE Rx power in accordance with GP-5 Appendix 2, Planned Rx Maneuvering Without Shutdown, Section 3.1, Reducing Rx Power AND Reactor Maneuvering Shutdown Instructions, to maintain Rx power at OR below initial pre-transient level.
JSRO orders insertion of control rod.]
3.0 FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS Conditional IF... THEN steps that are not applicable AND steps to be skipped per direction of the IF... THEN step shall be marked N/A AND initialed.
3.1 IF all four Oscillation Power Range Monitor (OPRM) channels are inoperable due to common mode failure per TS Table 3.3.1-1 ACTION 10.a, THEN PERFORM the following. Otherwise, MARK this step N/A.
JSRO marks this step M A ]
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 6 of 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-W-2 Position SRO SRO RO SRO SRO Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTES Conditional IF... THEN steps that are not applicable AND steps to be skipped per direction of the IF... THEN step shall be marked N/A AND initialed.
3.2 DETERMINE correct Power/Flow Map for given plant conditions.
0 ATTACHMENT 2 (All Feedwater Heaters In Service) 0 ATTACHMENT 3 (Any Feedwater Heater Out Of Service)
[SRO chooses Attachment 21 3.3 DETERMINE Core Flow.
Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 2 Event
Description:
Control Rod XX-W Drifts Out 3.4 VERIFY plant is operating in an authorized region of PowerlFlow Map.
CAUTION Restarting a Recirc Pump is not an acceptable means of raising flow.
3.5 3.6 IF RESTRICTED REGION... is entered...
IF operating in SLO...
3.7 IF SLC injects into RPV...
3.8 IF MSL Monitor High alarm annunciates...
[Steps are MA]
3.9 DETERMINE cause of positive OR negative reactivity insertion:
[SRO selects "Control Rod Position"J NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 7 of 24
Form ES-D-2 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Position SRO Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 2 Event
Description:
Control Rod XX-W Drifts Out SRO SRO RO Applicants Actions or Behavior 3.12 3.12.1 PERFORM the following for an indication of positive reactivity insertion:
DEMAND a Control Rod Position Report AND REVIEW data for unexpected change in control rod position(s).
- 1. IF reactivity insertion was caused by control rod problems, THEN ENTER ON-I 04, Control Rod Problems AND EXECUTE concurrently.
3.12.9 DEMAND a P-I edit AND DETERMINE whether a Thermal Limit violation exists.
3.12.10 IF any Thermal Limit violations exist...
[SRO declares ON-104 entry and demands P-I edi, no thermal violations exist]
Enters ON-I 04, Control Rod Problems 2.2 CONTROL ROD(S) DRIFT OUT 2.2.1 NOTIFY Shift Supervision.
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 8 of 24
Form ES-D Appendix D Required Operator Actions Position RO SRO RO BOP Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 2 Event
Description:
Control Rod XX-YY Drifts Out CT SRO BOP Applicants Actions or Behavior 2.2.2 2.2.3
- 1.
STOP all control rod motion demands.
APPLY continuous control rod insert signal to drifting rod until fully inserted.
IF control rod drifts out after fully inserted,THEN REAPPLY continuous control rod insert signal as necessary to maintain control rod fully inserted.
CRITICAL TASK (ON-104.2) 2.2.4 IF more than one control rod drifts out...
[Step is N/A]
2.2.5 GO TO Flowchart on Attachment 2 AND CONSULT Tech Spec 3.1.3.1.
2.2.6 Reactor power > RWM low power setpt? [Answers YES]
2.2.12 Control rod going in [Answers YES]
2.2.19 Maintain continuous control rod insert signal to drifting rod as necessary to maintain rod full in. Isolate affected rod from its HCU as follows:
(A)
(B)
(C)
Release insert pushbutton. If affected rod begins to drift Close affected CRDs 47-*-01 valve Close affected CRDs 47-*-02 valve out while isolated then continue at step 2.2.14
[Maintains continuous insert signal and directs fiele to close valves, then releases insert pushbutton. J 2.2.20 Demand P-I edit.
2.2.21 Any thermal limit > 1.O [Answers NO]
2.2.22 Return to ON-104, Step 2.2.25 NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 9 of 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 2 Event
Description:
Control Rod XX-YY Drifts' Out Position SRO RO BOP END OF EVENT 2. PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT.
Applicant's Actions or Behavior 2.2.25 ISOLATION/MANUAL SCRAM OF ROD DRIFTING OUT
- 1.
ISOLATE the effected CRD from its HCU as follows after CR fully inserted:
- a.
CLOSE affected CRD's 47-*-01 valve.
- b.
CLOSE affected CRD's 47-*-02 valve AND RELEASE INSERT pushbutton.
IF control rod begins to drift while isolated, THEN quickly ENSURE control rod unisolated as follows...
IF not, GO TO step 2.2.25.9.
- 9.
DECLARE control rod inoperable, AND PERFORM actions required by Tech Spec 3.1.3.1.
- 11.
CONTACT Engineering Duty Manager.
- 2.
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 10 of 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
RPS Channel B Breaker 'Trip, RWCU Fails to Isolate Time Posit ion CREW SRO RO BOP SRO BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior The crew will observe multiple annunciators on 107, 112 and 114 alarm boards.
PER ARC-MCR-112-F:4, RWCU SYSTEM ISOLATED
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
Verify RWCU system isolation.
[RO/BOP will determine required isolation did NOT occur and will manually close HV44-1 FOO4.1 IF isolation is unexpected, verify no SLC pump is operating.
IF SBLC is running THEN enter OT-I 04. [N/A]
IF CRD purge flow to 1A RWCU pump is aligned, THEN ENSURE a flowpath to the reactor (HV-44-1 F042) exists to relieve CRD system pressure. [N/A]
Refer to S44.0.A AND GP-8 for isolation signals. [Refers to GP-81 IF performing Rx Heat up/Cooldown ST re-evaluate temp data co I lect io n. [ N/A]
Notify Chemistry to perform ST-5-041-810-1 as necessary to ensure Tech Spec compliance.
[Notifies chemsiSn/.l PER ARC-MCR-114-G2(3), 1A (B) DRYWELL INSTR GAS TROUBLE :
- 1. Check adequate pressure (>96 psi) from IA(B) lnst Gas Compressor using PI-59-123A( B).
[RO/BOP will determine PClG Compressor Suction Valve H V59-102 has closed.]
- 2. Dispatch Operator to check local control panel 1A(B)C217 to determine cause of compressor trip AND dryer overload.
- 3. IF low receiver pressure, THEN place HSS-059-11 IA(B) to ON to increase pressure OR locate/isolate leakage. [N/A]
- 4. IF compressor capacity is in doubt, THEN perform RT-6-059-310-1.
[N/AI NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 11 of 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 SRO Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Enters GP-8 and GP-8.5 to address inadvertent isolations.
SRO GP-8, Primary And Secondary Containment Isolation Verification And Reset 3.1 WHEN an isolation signal is received, THEN ENSURE associated automatic equipment operation is verified as appropriate OR not appropriate.
SRO Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
RPS Channel B Breaker Trip, RWCU Fails to Isolate SRO 3.2 3.2.1 Automatic Actuations by Isolation Siqnal IF the isolatiori signal is known, THEN USE GP-8.1 to identify the following:
- 1.
Equipment that automatically isolates
- 2.
I nstrument channels
- 3.
Appropriate reset
- 4.
Applicable bypass 3.5 Isolation Bypass 3.5.1 WHEN Isolation Bypass is required, THEN REFER TO GP-8.4 for outlines of bypass procedures as identified in GP-8.1 AND GP-8.4 can be used to determine valves affected by each bypass.
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 12 of 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-DS Position SRO SRO SRO Applicant's Actions or Behavior 3.6 Isolation Bypass of Crucial Systems 3.6.1 WHEN Isolation Bypass of crucial systems is required THEN REFER TO GP-8.5 for outline of bypass procedure for systems crucial to plan1 operation.
NOTE GP-8.5 includes the following systems AND components:
0 Instrument Gas 0
Drywell Chilled Water 0
Reactor Enclosure Cooling Water 0
0 H2/02 AnalyzersAND Post-LOCA Recombiners Bypass Barrier Block and Vent Valves Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No :
2 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
RPS Channel B Breaker 'Trip, RWCU Fails to Isolate 3.7 IF only the isolation group is known, THEN REFER TO for a mechanism to determine the cause of isolation AND how to reset.
GP-8.5, Isolation Bypass of Crucial Systems 3.0 PROCEDURE NOTE:
IF one OR more of the following conditions are met THEN bypassing of containment isolation interlocks may be performed:
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
as directed by TRIP procedures To protect the health and safety of the public per 1 OCFR50.54(x).
Per OM-L-3.2 AND OM-L-3.3, in the event of an emergency not covered by approved procedures, actions shall be taken to minimize personnel injury AND damage to the facility, and to protect the health and safety of the public.
IF an inadvertent isolation signal exists, THEN in accordance with Tech. Spec. 3.6.3 action statement, the automatic valve isolation capability is inoperable.
- 4.
[Determines bypassing may be performed.]
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 13 of 24
Form ES-LP Appendix D Required Operator Actions Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
RPS Channel B Breaker Trip, RWCU Fails to Isolate Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 3.1 3.2.
3.2.
3.1.3
- 1.
- 2.
Instrument Gas Bypass (Group VllA - Isol. Signals C, H, S)
Once bypass logic is completed, valve handswitches used to make up logic may be repositioned.
IF an Inboard lsolation has occurred...
[No inboard isolation]
IF an Outboard Isolation has occurred THEN perform the next step to bypass the isolation signals for:
. HV-59-102 PClG Compressor Suction (OUTBOARD)
. HV-59-1298 PClG B Header Supply (DRYWELL B)
Position switches as listed:
HSS-57-191 B BYPASS HV-59-102 CLOSE HV-59-129B CLOSE
[Positions switches]
The following valves have also had their isolation signals bypassed :
0 HV-57-105 S/P Exhaust to REECE Filter (SUPP POOL EXH BYPASS (INBD))
0 HV-57-111 DNV Exhaust to REECE Filter (DRYWELL EXH BYPASS (INBD))
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 14 of 24
Form ES-D-2 Appendix D Required Operator Actions Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
RPS Channel B Breaker Trip, RWCU Fails to Isolate Time Position SRO BOP Crew SRO Applicant's Actions or Behavior 3.2 3.2.1 3.2.2 3.2.3 Drywell Chilled Water Bypass (Group VlllA.. Isol. Signals C, H)
IF DWCW Head Tank HVLO Alarm (PMS Point G532) is "NORMAL" OK DWCW Pump suction pressure is greater than 35 psig as read on PI-087-109A(B) (local PI at pumps)
THEN performi the following:
Otherwise do not bypass the isolation..
IF an Inboard Isolation has occurred THEN perform the next step to bypass the isolation signals for:
0 HV-87-128 A DNV Chilled Water Supply (LOOP A) 0 HV-87-129 A DNV Chilled Water Return (LOOP A) 0 HV-87-122 B DNV Chilled Water Supply (LOOP B) 0 HV-87-123 B D/W Chilled Water Return (LOOP B)
[No inboard isolation]
- 1.
Position HS-87-115 in BYPASS.
- 2.
IF an Outboard Isolation has occurred THEN perform the next step to bypass the isolation signals for 0
HV-87-120A A DNV Chilled Water Supply (LOOP A) 0 HV-87-1.21A A DNV Chilled Water Return (LOOP A) 0 HV-87-120B B DNV Chilled Water Supply (LOOP B) 0 HV-87-1:21B B DNV Chilled Water Return (LOOP B)
No other valves have had their isolation signals bypassed.
- 1.
Position HS-87-116 in BYPASS.
- 2.
[Positions switch]
No other valves have had their isolation signals bvoassed.
Contacts maintenance to troubleshoot.
Refers to TS LCOs for isolation actuation instrumentation and PClVs (3.6.3)
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 15 of 24
Appendix D Required 0 perator Act ions Form ES-D-2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
I II END OF EVENT 3. PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT.
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 16 of 24
Form ES-IPA Appendix D Required 0 perator Act ions Suction Valve Fails As-Is Position SRO BOP RO SRO RO BOP SRO SRO Applicants Actions or Behavior Refers to ARC-MCR-112-AII 1 B RECIRC PUMP SEAL STAGE HI/LOW FLOW:
- 1.
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
Refers to ARC-MCR-112-A2, 1 B RECIRC PUMP SEAL LEAKAGE HI FLOW:
1,
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
Check # I AND #2 seal cavity pressure.
Check both # I and #2 seal cavity temperatures.
Monitor seal pressure and temperatures on an increased frequency.
Monitor drywell pressure AND temperature.
Monitor Rx coolant leak detection instrumentation to quantify leakage.
Refer to T.S. 3.4.3.2 Rx Coolant system leakage.
Check #I AND #2 seal cavity pressure.
Check # I and #2 seal cavity temperatures on an increased frequency AND refer to S43.0.D (Section 4.5).
Monitor seal pressure AND temperature.
Monitor drywell pressure AND temperature.
Monitor Rx coosant leak detection instrumentation to quantify leakage.
Refer to T.S. 3.4.3.2 Rx Coolant system leakage.
Check flow at FISH-43-101B, located on El. 253, Area 16, Rm 402.
Enters OT-101, High Drywell Pressure 2.0 IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 2.1 MAXIMIZE Drywell cooling.
TERMINATE Containment inerting. [MA]
IF scram conditiori occurs, THEN ENTER T-101 AND T-I 02 AND EXECUTE concurrently.
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 17 of 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Position SRO Op-Test No.:
Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 4 Applicants Actions or Behavior 3.0 FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS 3.1 IF source of high Drywell pressure can not be eliminated through this procedure AND Drywell pressure is rising toward 1.68 psig, THEN PERFORM rapid plant shutdown per GP-4.
Event
Description:
RRP 1 B Lower Seal Failure, Followed By Upper Seal Failure, RRP Suction Valve Fails As-1.s SRO Time 3.1
[Directs BOP to transfer house loads.]
TRANSFER house loads to startup buses in accordance with S91.6.B, Transferring House Loads To S/U Buses.
SRO I Enters GP-4.
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 18 of 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 4 Event
Description:
RRP 1 B Lower Seal Failure, Followed By Upper Seal Failure, RRP Suction Valve Fails As-Is Time Position SRO BOP RO BOP SRO RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[PER S91.6.Bl:
IF transferring 1 l(12) AUX BUS to the lO(20) S/U BUS, THEN PERFORM the following:
- 1.
- 2.
NOTE:
- 3.
- 4.
NOTE:
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
PLACE 225-1 01 02(06)/SS, "Sync Switch," to "ON."
VERIFY INCOMING AND RUNNING voltmeter read approximately 1 1 OV.
10 Startup Bus Voltage may be adjusted per S35.0.J, No. 10 Transformer Tap Changer Control (Remote) AND 20 Startup Bus Voltage may be adjusted per S35.O.H, #20 Regulating Transformer Tap Change Control (Remote-Hand).
IF INCOMING/RUNNING voltages differ by greater than 8 volts, THEN ADJUST Startup Bus Voltage to obtain less than 8 volts difference.
FEED.
CLOSE AND HOLD 252-1 01 02(06)/CS, 10/1 l(20112)
With the Offsite Source Breaker closed and its handswitch in the "Normal After Close" position, the Aux Feed Breaker will au to-o pen.
WHEN 252-1 01 02(06)/CS, 10/11(20/12) FEED, indicates closed, THEN RELEASE 252-1 01 02/CS.
VERIFY 252-1 01 13(213)/CS, AUX FEED, open.
PLACE 225-1 01 02(06)/SS, "Sync Switch," to "OFF."
ENSURE 252-1 01 13(213)/CS, AUX FEED, in "NORMAL AFTER TRIP."
[GP-41 3.2 REDUCE Rx Recirculation Svstem flow to minimum 3.2.1 WHEN core flow reduces to nominal 60%, THEN immediately manually SCRAM Rx AND ENTER T-I 00, Scram/Scram Recovery OR T-I 01, RPV Control, as applicable.
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 19 of 24
Form ES-D Appendix D Required Operator Actions Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 4 Event
Description:
RRP 1 B Lower Seal Failure, Followed By Upper Seal Failure, RRP Suction Valve Fails As-Is Time Posit ion RO SRO SRO RO BOP SRO RO BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior 3.3 ENSURE Reactor Mode Switch is locked in "SHUTDOWN" within one hour following Rx scram AND key is in possession of Shift Supervision (SSV).
3.6 NOTIFY Chernistry to perform the following Surveillance Tests (STs) as required:
[OT-I 011 3.2 VERIFY automatic conditions [for 7.68 psig DWpressure]:
Scram 0
HPCI Initiation 0
Various NSSSS Isolation (PCIG, DWCW, RE HVAC, SGTS, RERS Isolation) 0 Cntmt Leak Detector
[OT-I 011 3.5 THEN:
IF both seals on a Recirc. Pump have failed, 3.5.1 TRIP applicable pump. [Trips 7 8 RRP) 3.5.2 CLOSE pump discharge valve HV-43-*F031A(B),
DISCHARGE A(B).CLOSE seal purge valve HV
- 15A(E3), SEAL PURGE. [Closes 775B seal purge]
3.5.3 CLOSE pump suction valve HV-43-*F023A( B),
SUCTION A(B). [Closes F023B suction valve]
3.5.4 ENTER OT-I 12. [Enters OT-774 END OF EVENT 4. PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT.
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 20 of 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Enters T-I 01 on "low RPV level below + I 2.5" or unknown" following manual reactor scram on GP-4 shutdown. Directs IT' procedure activities.
SRO Enters T-101 on "DW press above 1.68 psig".
RO BOP RO Depressurize RPV within 1 OO"F/hr using ST-6-1 07-640-* bypassing PClG lsol logic per GP-8 as necessary (RC/P-16).
BOP Inserts SRMs AND IRMs (RC-6)
Ensure turbine trip and gen lockout (RC/Q-2).
Restore AND maintain RPV level between +12.5" AND +54" (RC/L-4).
SRO Enters T-I 02 on "DW press above 1.68 psig".
BOP Spray Supp Pool per T-225 (PC/P-5).
PROCEED 'TO NEXT EVENT.
SRO NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Re-enter T-I 02 on "DW temp above 145°F".
Page 21 of 24 BOP Maximize DW cooling bypassing isol per GP-8 as necessary (DWTT-5).
~~
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CT Open all 5 ADS valves.
BOP CRITICAL TASK (T-117.3)
Crew 2.1 VERIFY Diesel Generators running AND Safeguard Switchgear eneraized.
BOP Recognizes loss of offsite power.
2.4 IF either Unit's condenser is not available, THEN CLOSE MSIV's
[Closes MSlVs]
for appropriate UNIT.
1 BOP I
SRO Starts RClC T-I 01, RC/L-4)
Enters E-I 020, Loss of Offsite Power.
WHEN safe side of Curve PUP-3 CANNOT be maintained, THEN Enters T-I 12 from T-'I 02. PUP-1 2. --
Enter T-I 12 and execute concurrently (PUP-1 1/12).
SRO SRO BOP Exit T-101, RC/P leg only (EB-4).
IF low press ECCS auto starts, THEN prevent injection from those Core Spray AND LPCl pumps NOT required for core cooling.
Open all 5 ADS valves.
NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 22 of 24
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2 Event
Description:
Event No.: 6 Loss of Offsite Power, D11 and D13 Lockouts I Position I Applicants Actions or Behavior I Time I
I Restores RPV level above -161 inches.
Controls LPCl injection flow to maintain level between +12.5 and +54 inches.
BOP Examiner Note: Level may momentarily exceed +54 inches on the blowdown and injection, but applicant is expected to control flow to mevent severe overfill.
TERMINATE THE SCENARIO WHEN ALL THE FOLLOWING ARE MET:
0 RPV IS DEPRESSURIZED 0
LEVEL IS RESTORED TO BETWEEN +12.5 AND +54 INCHES T-102 CONTAINMENT CONTROL ACTIONS COMPLETE NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 23 of 24
Form ES-D Appendix D Required Operator Actions Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
2 Event No.: 7 Event
Description:
HPCl Aux Oil Pump Auto Start Failure and Turbine Trip Following Manual BOP Observes HPCl does not auto start on demand.
BOP BOP Starts HPCl Aux Oil Pump Observes HPCl turbine startup BOP Examiner Note: HPCl turbine will trip shortly after aux oil pump is started. It cannot be recovered. I Reports turbine tripped TERMINATE THE SCENARIO WHEN ALL THE FOLLOWING ARE MET:
0 RPV IS DEPRESSURIZED 0
LEVEL IS RESTORED TO BETWEEN +12.5 AND +54 INCHES T-102 CONTAINMENT CONTROL ACTIONS COMPLETE NRC Scenario #2 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 24 of 24
Appendix D Scenario Out1 i ne Form ES-D-1 Malf. No.
NIA Facility: Limerick 1 & 2 Scenario No.: 3 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners:
Operators:
Event Event TY Pe*
Description N-BOP Start C Reactor Feed Pump Initial Conditions:
Unit 1 at 50% power, EOL. Unit 2 is at 100% power.
I NIA MRDol 6D Turnover:
Standard turnover, number of components 00s for all scenarios. Shift orders are to place the C RFP in service and then continue with rod withdrawal to raise power to 75%.
R-RO Raise Power to 75%
I TS-SRO C-Ro Stuck Control Rod XX-W Event L-MED282C IP-TS-SRO Loss of Div Ill DC 6
MRP029B 7
An SRV Fails Open, Manual Reactor Scram Requires ARI C-RO 8
MV1231 D OR 112lE5 MMS067 MPC257 M
M Instrument Line Break in Drywell RHR Pump Suppression Pool Suction Line Rupture MSW488B I C-BOP I Service Water Pump B Trip I
I (N)orrnal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 1 of 29
~~
Scenario Summary and Administration Instructions SCENARIO
SUMMARY
The crew has orders to start the third RFP and then continue rod withdrawal to raise power to 75%. The BOP will start up the C RFP IAW S06.1.C, Placing a Standby RFP in Service.
After the feed pump is in service, the RO will commence raising power by withdrawing control rods.
When power change has been observed, a control rod sticks. The crew will respond per the alarm response procedures and S.73.1.A, Normal Operation Of The Reactor Manual Control System. The rod will be able to move after CRD pressure is raised. The SRO will refer to Tech Specs.
A loss of Division I l l DC will occur, impacting operability of RHR C, CS C, CR Chiller OA, DW Chiller A, CRD A and Div Ill Breakers.' Crew will respond by swapping CRD pumps and CR Chillers IAW E-I FC. The CRS will address Tech Specs 3.5.1.a, 3.5.1.b, 3.8.2.1, and 3.8.3.1 (limiting 8 hr LCO).
The B Service Water Pump trips on motor overload. Crew will respond per S I 0.7.A, Abnormal Service System Operation. The BOP will start the standby service water pump per S10.6.A.
SRV 'J' fails open on mechanical drift of lift setpoint and then valve sticks open. The crew will respond IAW OT-I 14, Inadvertent Opening of a Relief Valve. The BOP will reduce pressure set to 900 psig to attempt SRV reseat. Actions will not reseat SRV. The crew will initiate suppression pool cooling and perform a GP-4 shutdown. Manual scram pushbuttons and mode switch will not shutdown reactor. Scram will be initiated per T-I 01 using ARI.
Immediately following the scram, an instrument line will break. Drywell pressure and temperature will increase. The crew will enter T-101 and T-102 and initiate a cooldown The 1 B RHR Pump suction line will rupture, resulting in pump room flooding from the suppression pool and lowering suppression pool level. The crew will stop RHR Pumps B and D and isolate the leak by closing RHR Pump 1 B Suction Valve F004B. Suppression pool spray will be initiated with the A loop of RHR per T-102.
The scenario will be terminated after the RHR suction line leak has been isolated and suppression pool sprays are in service from the other loop.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 2 of 29
Scenario Summary and Administration Instructions SIMULATOR SETUP
- 1. Reset simulator to 50% power. Align equipment per turnover sheet.
- 2. Events 1 & 2:
Start C Reactor Feed Pump, Raise Power to 75%
No malfunctions required
- 3. Event 3:
Stuck Control Rod XX-YY Insert MRDOl6D
- 4. Event 4:
Loss of Div Ill DC Insert MED282C on Manual Trigger 4
- 5. Event 5:
Service Water Pump B Trip Insert MSW488B on Manual Trigger 5
- 6. Event 6:
Insert MAD145E and MRP029B on Manual Trigger 6
- 7. Event 7:
Instrument Line Break in Drywell Insert MV1231 D, MMS067 and overrride 112 E5 OFF, all on Manual Trigger 5
- 8. Event 8:
RHR Pump Suppression Pool Suction Line Rupture Insert MPC257 at 30,000 gpm severity on Manual Trigger 8 An SRV Fails Open, Manual Reactor Scram Requires ARI CRITICAL TASKS
- 1. T-101.7 Manually scram the reactor.
When any T-101 entry condition has been exceeded, the reactor is manually scrammed.
Standard:
- 2. T-103.4 Isolate systems discharging into area.
Standard:
After it is determined that Secondary Containment temperature, radiation, or water levels cannot be restored and maintained below MNO value of Table SCC-1, systems known to be discharging into the area are isolated before MSO value of Table SCC-2 is exceeded.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 3 of 29
Form ES-D Appendix D Required Operator Actions Position SRO BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs BOP to place standby RFP I C in service IAW S06.1.C, Section 4.2.3, Placing Second,'Third RFP in Service [using FWLCS semi automatic sequences]
NOTE IF third RFP is being placed IN SERVICE, THEN a Reactor Operator must be stationed at panel 10C602, Recirc Pump Controls, in the event a Rx power reduction in accordance with OT-I 00, Reactor Low Level, is required.
CAUTION 7
Operating below 25% power with more than one RFP IN SERVICE may cause severe RFP suction header piping movement.
I
- 1.
ENSURE the following:
NOTE RFPT is adequately warmed when either of the following conditions exist:
0 0
RFPT has been IN STANDBY for greater than 60 minutes AND lube oil cooler outlet temperature between 110 to 120 OF Following tripkhutdown, RFPT has been on Turning Gear for less than two hours with steam seals applied AND lube oil cooler outlet temperature between 110 to 120 O F Oncoming RFPT has been adequately warmed.
HV-006-108A(B,C), "IA(B,C) RFP Disch Vlv" (FEED DISCH A(B,C)), is closed for oncoming RFP.
HIC-006-106A(B,C), "A(B,C) RFP Min Flow Control" (FLOW), ii-
"AUTO" for oncoming RFP.
0 0
0 NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 4 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Position BOP BOP BOP BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 2.
IF third RFP is being placed IN SERVICE, THEN PERFORM the following:
- a.
REFER 'TO current P-I edit AND VERIFY FLLLP value is < 0.92.
- b.
ACCESS screen FWLC-01, Process Overview, at FWLCS Operator Station.
SELECT blue bordered box next to "Reset" in FLLLP <
0.92 Dialog Box until it is outlined in white AND then release.
SELECT' "Activate" (D4) Dialog Key (at bottom of screen)
AND VERIFY box next to "Reset" in FLLLP < 0.92 Dialog Box turns solid blue with a white circle in center.
C.
- d.
- 3.
PLACE FIC-MI-1 RGOIA(B,C), "A(B,C) RFPT Speed Controller" (FEED PUMP A(B, C), S), in "AUTO" for oncoming RFP.
- 4.
ENSURE LIC-0106-138 "A FEEDWTR STARTUP LVL" (START UP BYPASS) in "AUTO".
NOTE Steps 4.2.3.5 through 4.2.3.8 initiate "Start A(B,C) RFP" sequence
- 5.
ACCESS screen FWLC-07, Automatic Sequences, at FWLCS Operator Station.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 5 of 29
Form ES-P Appendix D Required Operator Actions C>p-Test No.:
Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 1 Event
Description:
Start C Reactor Feed Pump Time Position BOP BOP BOP BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior NOTE
- 1. Prerequisite conditions for "Start A(B,C) RFP" sequence are located in the uppermost text box of ATTACHMENT 1(2,3).
- 2. All prerequisite conditions must be met for "READY" box to be solid green. SSV notification is required if prerequisite conditions can not be met.
- 6.
ENSURE "READY" box to left of "Start A(B,C) RFP" sequence is solid green.
- 7.
SELECT blue bordered box next to "Start A(B,C) RFP" sequence until it is outlined in white AND then release.
- 8.
SELECT "Start'n (D4) Dialog Key (at bottom of screen).
- 9.
VERIFY the following on screen FWLC-07, Automatic Sequences, at FWLCS Operator Station:
0 0
Box next to "Start A(B,C) RFP" sequence turns solid blue.
Step Number AND Title appears next to blue box of "Start A(B,C) RFP" sequence.
NOTE
- 1. Placing a RFP IN SERVICE may initiate a minor Rx power change due to rise in core inlet subcooling caused by lack of initial FW heating. (Ref. 5. I O )
- 2. Indicated RFP flow rate less than 0.6 x I O 6 Ibm/hr is considered to be instrument noise AND is ignored by PMS in the calculation of CTP. Actual RFP flow to RPV must be maintained greater than 0.6 x IO6 Ibm/hr to ensure a valid CTP calculation.
- 3. Placing a Standby RFP IN SERVICE will result in individual RFP flows that are unmatched. Subsequent steps in this procedure section to equalize flow will match individual RFP flows and may result in minimum flow valve automatic position changes.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 6 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Position BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP BOP Acmlicant's Actions or Behavior IO.
VERIFY the following automatic actions:
- a.
HV-006-108A(B,C), "IA (B,C) RFP Disch Vlv" (DISCH A (B,C)), for oncoming RFP opens.
- b.
Oncoming RFPT speed rises until oncoming RFP discharge pressure is nominal 10 psig below RPV pressure.
WHEN oncoming RFP discharge pressure nominal 10 psig below RPV pressure, THEN oncorning RFPT speed slowly rises until oncoming RFP begins feeding RPV.
C.
- 11.
VERIFY oncoming AND running RFP(s) are maintaining RPV level.
- 12.
ENSURE oncoming AND running RFP flows are within 0.5 Mlb/hr of each other using the Flow Equalizer in accordance with S06.0.E U/1, Feedwater Level Control And Reactor Feed Pump Control Svstem Maniwlation.
- 13.
IF Flow Equalizer was activated in Step 4.2.3.12, THEN DEACTIVATE Flow Equalizer in accordance with S06.0.E U/1, Feedwater Level Control And Reactor Feed Pump Control Svstem Man i Du la t ion.
- 14.
WHEN oncoming RFP flow is greater than 0.6 x 1 O6 Ibm/hr as indicated on FI-006-1 R604A( B,C), "A( B,C) RFP Discharge" (FEED, A(B,C), FL), THEN ENSURE PMS Computer Point KO00 (k001, k002)indicates oncoming RFP flow is greater than 0.6 x I O 6 Ibm/hr.
- 15.
IF PMS Computer Point KOOONSS (KO01 NSS, K002NSS) was supplied a substitute value in accordance with RT-6-038-800-1, Critical Sensor Point Substitution, when oncoming RFP was shutdown, THEN RESTORE PMS Computer Point KOOONSS (KO01 NSS, K002NSS) in accordance with RT-6-038-800-1, Critical Sensor Point Substitution for oncoming RFP.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 7 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Position BOP BOP BOP BOP Applicants Actions or Behavior
- 16.
IF low pressure (LP) FW heating is in service AND 6th FW Htr is to be placed in service, THEN PLACE 6th FW Htr in service in accordance with S02.1.A, Placing Of Feedwater Heaters In Service (Steam Side).
- 17.
ENSURE LIC-006-138 is in AUTO.
- 18.
IF Rx power is greater than 35%,
THEN REFER TO S06.8.H, Startup, Shutdown, And Operation Of The Hydrogen Water Chemistry System, for guidance in aligning Hydrogen Water Chemistry System.
- 19.
PLACE Seal Injection System for oncoming RFP in AUTOMATIC in accordance with S06.7.A, Reactor Feed Pump Seal Injection System Operating Modes.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 8 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-U-2 I
NOTE Position SRO RO RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior Directs RO to commence rod withdrawal to raise power to 75%
Op-Test No.: 1 Event
Description:
Event No.: 2 Raise Power to 75%
Commences rod withdrawal IAW S73.1.A, Normal Operation of the Reactor Manual Control System, Section 4.2 4.2.1 REVIEW Attachment 1 AND VERIFY the control rod to be withdrawn is not channel bow susceptible.
4.2.2 SELECT the control rod to be withdrawn at *O-C603, "Reactor Con t ro I Cons o I e.
4.2.3 VERIFY correct rod position is indicated on Four Rod Display.
4.2.4 ENSURE drive water pressure is 255 to 265 psid, as indicated on PDI-46-*R602, "Drive Water Differential Pressure Indicator."
4.2.5 PRESS WITHDRAW pushbutton at *O-C603.
WHEN WITHDRAW pushbutton is depressed,THEN the proper light sequence is:
- 1. INSERT light Lit A.ND THEN extinguishes after approximately 0.6 seconds.
- 2. WITHDRAW light Lit AND THEN extinguishes after approximately 1.5 seconds.
- 3. SETTLE light Lit AND THEN extinguishes after approximately 6.1 seconds.
4.2.6 VERIFY proper RDCS light sequence.
4.2.7 IF control rod fails to reposition, THEN GO TO Section 4.4.
4.2.8 VERIFY control rod has been withdrawn one notch position at Four Rod Display.
4.2.9 IF control rod is positioned to notch position 48, THEN PERFORM an over travel check per ST-6-107-730-*, Control Rod Coupling Check.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 9 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2
=
Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
Stuck Control Rod XX-W Time Position RO SRO SRO RO RO Applicants Actions or Behavior Identifies CR will not move. Informs SRO.
Directs RO to attempt to move rod IAW S.73.1.A, Normal Operation Of The Reactor Manual Control System, Section 4.4, Failure of a Control Rod to Withdrawn (Non Channel Bow Rod)
Refers to TS 3.1.3.1 for inoperable immovable rod.
Refers to S.73.1.A.
4.4.1 4.4.2 VERIFY no rold blocks exist.
NOTIFY Shift Supervision that control rod failed to move on a withdraw command.
NOTE The purpose of step 4..4.3 is to purge airOR crud from the control rod d rive m ec ha n ism.
4.4.3 IF control rod is at notch position 00, THENDEPRESS AND HOLD the INSERT pushbutton for approximately 2 minutes OR until the insert flow stabilizes at the normal value.
ATTEMPT a single notch withdraw using WITHDRAW pushbutton.
4.4.4 NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 10 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 I
NOTE The evaluation performed by Reactor Engineering must verify the triple notch will not violate any of the following:
0 Banked position withdraw sequence 0
Conservative approach to criticality Thermal limits.Rated core thermal power OR the maintenance of a satisfactory reactor period Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 3 Event
Description:
Stuck Control Rod XX-YY Time Position RO END OF EVENT 3. PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 11 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 4 Event
Description:
Loss of Div Ill DC Time Position Crew SRO BOP BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
A loss of Division Ill DC will occur, impacting operability of RHR C, CS C, CR Chiller OA, DW Chiller A, CRD A and Div Ill Breakers. Crew will respond by swapping CRD pumps and CR Chillers IAW E-I FC. The CRS will address Tech Specs 3.5.l.a, 3.5.l.b, 3.8.2.1, and 3.8.3.1 (limiting 8 hr LCO).
Acknowledge numerous Div Ill DC related alarms. Identify loss of CRD pump, DW Chiller A, and CR Chiller OA. Identify cause as loss of Div Ill DC.
MED282C Enters E-I FC, Loss Of Division Ill Safeguard 125 VDC Bus 1 FC.
CAUTION
- 1. HV-87-102A, "1.4 Drywell Chilled Water Discharge Valve," fails closed on loss of 1 OY201.
- 2. IF IAKI 11, "IA Drywell Chiller," (CHILLER A) OR OAK1 12, "Cont. End. Chiller" (CHILLER A) is running,THEN they will not trip AND tripping locally may be required to prevent damage from occurring.
IF required, THEN locally TRIP IAKI 11, "IA Drywell Chiller" (CHILLER A) by manually tripping D13 BUS-08 Bkr.
IF required, THEN locally TRIP OAK1 12, "Cont. Encl. Chiller" (CHILLER A) by manually tripping D13 BUS-I 0 Bkr.
IF required, THEN START 1 BK111, "1 B Drywell Chiller," (CHILLER B) in accordance with S87.1.A, Startup Of Drywell Chilled Water System.
ENSURE OBKI 12, "Cont. Encl. Chiller" (CHILLER B) AND Control Enclosure HVAC System Loop B Fans are running.
[Orders 7A Chiller tripped locally, starts 18 DW Chiller]
2.5 Manually INITIATE Main Control Room Chlorine Isolation in accordance with S78.8.A, Manual Initiations Of Control Room Radition Or Chlorine/Toxic Chemical Isolation.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 12 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Position SRO BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior 2.6 REFER TO GP-8, Primary and Secondary Containment Isolation Verification and Reset (Green Reset AND RESET MSlV Isolation Logic, as required.
FOLLOW UP ACTIONS REFER TO LGS Emergency Plan Annex, Table 3-1.
11 NOTE The following can not be startedOR tripped from MCR:
0 OA MCR Chiller 0
1A DNV Chiller IACRD 0
ICRHR 0
I C Core Spray Pp DIV 3 ADS (Aux Equip Room and MCR panel 10C626) can not be activated.
Loss of BUS 1 FC results in a loss of instrument panel 10Y201.
1,
- 2.
- 3.
NOTIFY appropriate personnel to troubleshoot problem prior to restoring power as required.
NOTE Loss of 10Y201 trips AAND C Aux BoilersAND 1A RWCU Pump due to loss of control power.
CHECK 1 CD103, "Division Ill Safeguard 125V DC Battery Ch.arger," for proper operation in accordance with S95.9.A, Routine Inspection Of Station 5atteries And Chargers."
NOTE A North StackAND 'IA South Stack Rad Monitors are disabled due to loss of 1 OY201.
REFER TO RMMS for loss of a North Stack AND 1A South Stack Rad Monitors.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 13 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Position Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 4 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Event
Description:
Loss of Div Ill DC Time USE Load Analysis to identify affected BUS 1 FC AND 1 OY201 REFER TO Unit 1 Tech. Spec. 3.8.2, DC Source, AND determine REFER TO Unit 2 Tech. Spec. 3.8.3, Onsite Power Distribution Loads AND TAKE appropriate LCO actions as follows:
appropriate actions.
Systems, AND determine appropriate action.
SRO IF Unit 1 RWCU system is out of service due to 1A RWCU Pump trip, THEN REFER TO Unit 1 Tech Spec 3.4.4 AND NOTIFY Chemistry for alternate reactor coolant conductivity sampling.
CLEAR all faults AND Trips in memory of TIS-25-1 01 C, "NUMAC Refer to Tech Specs 3.5.1.a, 3.5.1.b, 3.8.2.1, and 3.8.3.1. Identify 3.8.3.1 as the limiting 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> LCO.
SRO END OF EVENT 4. PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 14 of 29
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Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
Service Water Pump B Trip Posit ion Crew BOP SRO SRO SRO BOP BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior The B Service Water Pump trips on motor overload. Crew will respond per S10.7.A, Abnormal Service System Operation. The BOP will start Acknowledge and respond to alarms, Identify Service Water Pump 1 B the standby service water pump.
MSW488B tripped.
ARC-MCR-118-EII 1 El SERVICE WATER PUMP BREAKER TRIP:
- 1. Dispatch Operator to 122 Plant Services Switchgear to investigate breaker trip condition AND reset relay targets on breaker.
Enters S I 0.7.A, Abnormal Service System Operation, Section 4.2, System Flow Reduction to Support One Pump Operation.
Directs BOP to start the standby SW pump IAW S I 0.6.A, Swapping Operating Service Water Pumps.
[Per Sl0.7.Al:
4.2.1 MONITOR both running SW pump dP via local indication.
[Field reports 93 psid pump differentia4 4.2.2 SELECT loads marked (x) for the appropriate Circ Water Temp from ATTACHMENT 1 initially, unless otherwise directed by SSVN, to achieve the expected required system flow reduction OR until nominally 11 7 -1 19 psid is achieved on each pump.
[CW temp 82"F, uses middle column on Aft I]
4.2.3 CHECK with SSV AND ADJUST additional loads as required to maintain Unit.
[SRO is expected to concur on adjusting cooling to loads as selected on Aft. I ]
to valve out spare RECW Heat Exchanger.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 15 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D2 Position BOP BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 3. THROTTLE 10-*0'77A(B), "RECW Htx SW Inlet," for in-service RECW heat exchanger AND MONITOR RECW heat exchanger outlet temo to ensure temoerature does not exceed 100°F.
Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 5 Event
Description:
Service Water Pump B Trip NOTE I
- 1. TECW Train unavailability limits can be obtained from TECW System Manager.
- 2. Actions making systems unavailable should be entered into
- 4. IF TECW train unavailability limits will not be exceeded, THEN CLOSE 10-*033A(B), "TECW Htx SW Outlet Valve," to valve out spare TECW Heat Exchanger Otherwise, MARK this step N/A.
[ TECW System Manager reports unavailability limits WILL be exceeded. SRO marks the sferD WA.1 NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 16 of 29
~~
Form ES-D Appendix D Required Operator Actions Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
3 Event
Description:
Service Water Pump B Trip Time Position SRO BOP BOP RO Event No.: 5 Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[Per SIO.7.Al:
- 6. SECURE Fuel Pool SW Booster pumps per S10.8.A, Fuel Pool Service Water Booster Pump Startup, Normal Operation, And Shutdown, AND MONITOR fuel pool temperature to ensure temperature does not exceed 135°F.
[Per S10.8.Al:
4.6.1 4.6.2 4.6.3 4.6.4 4.6.5 4.6.6 IF the pump being shutdown is desired to windmill, THEN 10-*145A(B,C), "Fuel Pool SW Booster PP Discharge,"
will remain open.
Otherwise, CLOSE 10-*145A(B,C), "Fuel Pool SW Booster PP Discharge, I 1 for the desired pump.
STOP *A(B,C)P212, "Fuel Pool SW Booster Pump" (PUMP).
ENSURE IO-*I 37A( B,C), "Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger SW Outlet Valve," open far each heat exchanger to be placed in service.
CLOSE IO-*I 37A(B,C), "Fuel Pool SW Heat Exchanger Outlet Valve," for the heat exchanger to be removed from service.
THROTTLE 10-*I 36A(B,C), "Fuel Pool Heat Exchanger SW Inlet Valve," to maintain the following:
FPCC Heat Exchanger inlet temperature from 70 EF to 125 EF using TE-53-*I0 "Fuel Pool Htx Inlet" on XI-36-*01(2) at panel
- OC614.
Pump delta pressure between 21 to 30 psid.
IF required, THEN REPEAT this section to secure remaining Fuel Pool SW Booster pumps.
[Per S10.7.Al:
- 7. CLOSE TV-C-O10-*51 B(A), "Drywell Chiller Service Water Supply,"
OR IO-*I 1 OA(B), "SW Inlet to Drywell Chiller Valve," to secure flow to the non-operating Drywell Chiller.
- 8. PERFORM the following on operating chiller:
- a.
THROTTLE TV-C-O10-*51A(B), "Drywell Chiller Service Water Supply," OR IO-*I 1 OA( B), "SW Inlet to Drywell Chi I le r. 'I MAINTAIN condenser pressure below 180 psi.
- b.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 17 of 29
~~
~
Form ES-D Appendix D Required Operator Actions Position BOP BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior
- 9. SECURE condenser area AND condensate pump room unit coolers as required (1 00 gpm per unit cooler) AND MONITOR temperatures.
IO. THROTTLE IO-*022, "Recombiner After Cond SW Inlet," AND MAINTAIN offgas outlet temperature below 200°F on BOP DAS Monitor XR-036-*01(2) point TE-10-*15.
[Per SIO.G.A]:
4.3 PERFORM the following checks at idle *A(B,C)P502, "Service Water Pump," to be started:
[Communicates with EO]
CLOSE idle 10-*040A( B,C), "SW Pump Discharge."
PERFORM the following sequence to open idle 10-*045A(B,C),
"SW Pump Discharge Check Valve":
[Coordinates with 0 to vent pump locally]
4.4 4.5 CAUTION
- 1.
IF SW Pump discharge valve is not opened within three minutes after pump start,THEN pump overheating resulting in pump case distortion may occur.
IF SW pump discharge valve is not fully opened (Le. is left throttled), THEN damage to valve may occur.
- 2.
4.6 4.6 4.7 START idle *A(B,C)P502, "SW Pump" (PUMP), at *OC655.
Fully OPEN 10-*040A(B,C), "SW Pump Discharge."
[Field operator opens discharge valve]
CLOSE 10-*310 (*309, *308), after discharge check valve opens.
VERIFY motor current for started pump less than 300 amps.
4.8 NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 18 of 29
Form ES-D Appendix D Required Operator Actions Position CREW SRO BOP RO SRO BOP RO E
Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 6 Event
Description:
An SRV Fails Open, Manual Reactor Scram Requires ARI SRO SRO BOP Applicants Actions or Behavior SRV J fails open on mechanical drift of lift setpoint and then valve sticks open. The crew will respond IAW OT-I 14, Inadvertent Opening of a Relief Valve. The BOP will reduce pressure set to 900 psig to attempt SRV reseat. Actions will not reseat SRV. The crew will initiate suppression pool cooling and perform a GP-4 shutdown. Manual scram pushbuttons and mode switch will not shutdown reactor. Scram will be initiated per T-101 using ARI.
MAD1 45E Respond to alarms.
ARC-MCR-1 10-B1, SRV / HEAD VENT VALVE LEAKING:
- 2. IF an SRV is leaking, THEN refer to OT-I 14, Inadvertent Opening of a Relief Valve.
- 3. IF head vent line caused alarm, THEN verify head vent valves HV-41-1 FOOI, 2 are closed.
- 4. Refer to RT-6-041-490-1, Attachment 2: SRV Leakage Determination, Monitoring Process.
ARC-MCR-110-82, SAFETY RELIEF VALVE OPEN:
- 2. IF the SRV opening was inadvertent, THEN refer to OT-I 14, Inadvertent Opening of a Relief Valve.
- 3. Check for loss of power to 1AY185 ckt 2.
Enters OT-I 14, Inadvertent Opening of a Relief Valve.
2.0 IMMEDIATE OPERATOR ACTIONS 2.1 PLACE both loops of Suppression Pool cooling in service.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 19 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 CAUTION 7
- 1. IF (*A) HV-51-,*F068A(B) is allowed to go full open during one pump per loop operationTHEN runout of RHRSW Pump may occur.
- 2. Starting a punlp more than twice in one hour may damage DumD motor.
Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 6 Event
Description:
An SRV Fails Open, Manual Reactor Scram Requires ARI Time Position SRO BOP 4.2.1 4.2.2 4.2.3 START OA(B,C,D)V543, Spray Pond Room Fan as follows:
- 1.
IF A Loop pump (OA(C)-P506) is to be placed in service, THEN ENSURE OA-V543 OR OC-V543, Spray Pond Pump Room Fans, in RUN at OOC681.
IF B Loop pump (OB(D)-P506) is to be placed in service, THEN ENSURE OB-V543 OR OD-V543, Spray Pond Fump Room Fans, in RUN at OOC681.
- 2.
START OA(B,C,D)P506, PUMP.
IF not directed by SE-10 to operate RHRSW, THEN THROTTLE HV-51 -*F068A( B) to the maximum obtainable position without exceeding 11,000 gpm on FI-51-*R602A(B) while maintaining pump disch pressure (PI-I 2-001A-1 (B))
between 75 psig to 85 psig.
4.1.12 Verify [amps 4.2.1 3 Notify chemistry 92, disch press > 75 but 120 psig.]
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 20 of 29
Appendix D Required 0 perator Act ions Form ES-D-2 Position BOP Op-Test No.: 2 Event
Description:
Event No.: 6 An SRV Fails Open, Manual Reactor Scram Requires ARI Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[Per S51.8.Al ENSURE HV-51 -*I=006A( B), "Shutdown Cooling Suction" (SUCTION), closed.
ENSURE HV-51 -*IZ006A(B), "Shutdown Cooling Suction" (SUCTION), closed ENSURE alignment of the following valves as indicated:
HV-51 -*F047A(B)
"RHR Heat Exchanger Shell Side Inlet"(lNLET) - OPEN 0
HV-51 -*F003A(B)
"RHR Heat Exchanger Shell Side Outlet"(0UTLET) - OPEN 0
HV-51 -*F004A(B)
"Suppression Pool Suction"(SUCTI0N) - OPEN DISPATCH Equipment Operator to inspect breaker for Trips OR Flags prior to pump start unless a plant transient requires a start of pump.
[Mark step as MA]
START *A(B)P202!, RHR Pump (PUMP).
OPEN HV-51-*F024A(B), "RHR Pump Full Flow Test Return" (SUPP POOL CLG), AND PERFORM the following:
NOTE
- 1. Flow rate is throttled to less than 8500 gpm to prevent condensate transfer from entering Suppression Pool.
- 2. Throttling flow rates to less than 8000 gpm may induce cavitation OR damaae to HV-51-*F024A(Bk
- 1.
- 2.
MAINTAIN flow indicated on FI-51-*R603A(B), "RHR Loop Flow," between 8000 to 8500 gpm.
IF greater than 8500 gpm required to maximize cooling, THEN MINIMIZE amount of time to reduce amount of water added to Suppression Pool.
CLOSE HV-C-51 -"F048A(B), HEAT EXCH BYPASS.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 21 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Position BOP SRO BOP RO Applicant's Actions or Behavior MONITOR Suppression Pool temperature on SPOTMOS OR TE-51-*04A(B,C,C>) "RHR Pump A(B,C,D) Suction" on XI-36-*01(2) at panel *OC6'14 AND PERFORM the following:
- 1.
MAINTAIN temperature below 90°F.
- 2.
IF Suppression Pool temperature is below 65"F, THEN CONSIDER securing system.
- 3.
IF RHRSW inlet temperature is above 56" F, AND Suppression pool temperature is lowered to within 3" F of RHRSW inlet temperature, THEN SECURE suppression pool cooling.
IF Suppression Pool temperature cannot be maintained below 9O0F, THEN PLACE another RHR loop in service to provide additional cooling as directed by SSVN.
- 4.
[Per OT-I 141:
2.2 IF Suppression Pool temperature reaches 110 OF, THEN immediately PERFORM a rapid plant shutdown per GP-4 (Rapid Plant Shutdown to Hot Shutdown) AND PERFORM the following:
2.2.1 PLACE Mode Switch in "SHUTDOWN" AND ENTER T-100 OR T-I 01, as applicable AND T-I 02 AND EXECUTE concurrently.
3.0 FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS 3.1 CONFIRM SRV is stuck open by observing:
Generator load reduction OR bypass valve closure.
RELIEF VALVE OPEN (*10-B-2) alarm.
0 SRV/HEAD VEINT VALVE LEAKING (*IO-B-I) OR SAFETY 0
Relief valve position lights.
0 Steam flow/Feed flow mismatch.
0 Rising Suppression Pool temperature.
0 Rising tailpipe temperature on XI-036-*01, "Primary Monitor BOP DAS" OR Xl-036-*02, "Backup Monitor BOP DAS" under the SRV mimic on *OC614.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 22 of 29
Form ES-D Appendix D Required Operator Actions Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 6 Event
Description:
An SRV Fails Open, Manual Reactor Scram Requires ARI Time Position BOP SRO SRO Applicants Actions or Behavior REDUCE turbine inlet pressure to 900 psig.
3.2 3.2.1 DEPRESS the PRESSURE SETPOINT SELECTOR DECREASE pushbutton at panel *OC653.
3.2.2 MONITOR PI-01-*03 MN STM for 900 psig.
3.3 IF Suppression Pool temperature is greater than or equal to 95F, THEN PERFORM ST-6-060-390-*, Suppression Pool Temperature Check per Tech Spec. 4.6.2.1.
IF SRV remairis open after turbine inlet pressure reaches 900 psig, THEN PERFORM rapid plant shutdown per GP-4, Rapid Plant Shutdown to Hot Shutdown.
3.5 NOTE During rapid power reductions, a Main Steam Line Rad Monitor Hi alarm may annunciate due to elevated hydrogen concentrations.
(CM-1) 3.6 IF Main Steam Line Rad Monitor Hi alarm annunciates, THEN ENTER T-I 03 AND ON-I 02 AND EXECUTE concurrently.
(CM-11 NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 23 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-I32 Position SRO BOP Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 6 Event
Description:
An SRV Fails Open, Manual Reactor Scram Requires ARI SRO Applicants Actions or Behavior NOTE
~ IF SRV will not close during shutdown,THEN condensate injection
, condensate discharge pressure to avoid flooding the vessel. This must be controlled prior to reactor pressure decreasing below 1 could result in SRV downcomer damage due to two-phase discharge.
3.7 IF SRV will not close, THEN PERFORM the following during shutdown:
TRANSFER steam users to aux. steam as soon as possible.
MINIMIZE unnecessary reactor feed pump operation.
ENSURE condensate injection is controlled prior to depressurizing below condensate discharge pressure (nominal 600 psig) by closing the following valves as necessary:
0 HV-O6-*08A( B,C), RFP Discharge (DISCH).
HV-O6-*38A, *A RFP Dis Shutoff Vlv Bypass.
CONSIDER MSlV closure prior to exceeding cool down rate.
ATTEMPT SRV closure by pulling fuses for the appropriate SRV using Attachment 1 for Unit 1, AND Attachment 2 for Unit 2.
3.8 Within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> of discharge of steam to the Suppression Chamber from any relief valve, PERFORM ST-6-060-760-* to cycle each downcomer vacuum breaker through at least one complete cvcle of full travel.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 24 of 29
Form ES-D Appendix D Required Operator Actions Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 6 Event
Description:
An SRV Fails Open, Manual Reactor Scram Requires ARI Time Position SRO BOP RO BOP Applicant's Actions or Behavior
[Enters GP-4]
3.1 PER S91.6.B IF transferring 1 l(12) AUX BUS to the lO(20) S/U BUS, THEN PERFORM the following:
TRANSFER house loads to startup buses in accordance with S91.6.B, Transferring House Loads To S/U Buses.
- 1.
- 2.
NOTE:
- 3.
- 4.
NOTE:
- 5.
- 6.
- 7.
- 8.
PLACE 22!5-10102(06)/SS, "Sync Switch," to "ON."
VERIFY INCOMING AND RUNNING voltmeter read approximately 1 1 OV.
10 Startup Bus Voltage may be adjusted per S35.0.J, No. 10 Transformer Tap Changer Control (Remote) AND 20 Startup Bus Voltage may be adjusted per S35.O.H, #20 Regulating Transformer Tap Change Control (Remote-Hand).
IF INCOMING/RUNNING voltages differ by greater than 8 volts, THEN ADJUST Startup Bus Voltage to obtain less than 8 volts difference.
FEED.
CLOSE AND HOLD 252-1 01 02(06)/CS, 10/11(20/12)
With the Offsite Source Breaker closed and its handswitch in the "Normal After Close" position, the Aux Feed Breaker will auto-open.
WHEN 252-1 01 02(06)/CS, 1011 l(20112) FEED, indicates closed, THEN RELEASE 252-101 02/CS.
VERIFY 252-1 01 13(213)/CS, AUX FEED, open.
PLACE 225-1 01 02(06)/SS, "Sync Switch," to "OFF."
ENSURE 252-1 01 13(213)/CS, AUX FEED, in "NORMAL AFTER TRIP."
[GP-41 3.2 REDUCE Rx Recirculation System flow to minimum.
NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 25 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-Ds Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 6 Event
Description:
An SRV Fails Open, Manual Reactor Scram Requires ARI Applicant's Actions or Behavior 3.2.1 WHEN core flow reduces to nominal 60%, THEN immediately manually SCRAM Rx AND ENTER T-I 00, Scram/Scram Recovery OR T-I 01, RPV Control, as applicable.
3.3 ENSURE Reactor Mode Switch is locked in "SHUTDOWN" within one hour following Rx scram AND key is in possession of Shift Supervision (SSV).
Enters T-I 01, RPV Control, on "SCRAM condition with power above 4% or unknown". Directs 'T' procedure activities.
Manually initiate RRCS AND ensure ARI initiation (T-214 as necessary)
(RC/Q-5)
CRITICAL TASK IT-101.71 Ensure turbine trip AND gen lockout. Continue at step RC/Q-12 (RWQ-4).
Exits RC/Q leg.
Restore AND maintain RPV level between +12.5" AND +54" (RC/L-4). -
Depressurize RPV within 100"Flhr using ST-6-107-640-* bypassing PCIG lsol logic per GP-8 as necessary (RC/P-16).
PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 26 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior I
SRO Enters T-I 02 on "DW press above 1.68 psig".
SRO Enters OT-101, High Drywell Pressure (PCIP-1).
K
~
K ioop iur oryweii sprays.
BOP NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Maximize DW cooling bypassing isol per GP-8 as necessary (DWTT-5).
Page 27 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Op-Test No.: 2 Scenario No.:
3 Event No.: 7 Event
Description:
Instrument Line Break in Drywell Time Position BOP Applicants Actions or Behavior
[OT-I 01 Actions]:
3.1 1 3.11.1 3.1 1.2 3.1 1.3 3.1 1.4 IF high Drywell pressure persists, THEN ISOLATE the following:
ENSURE the following Main Steam Line sample valves closed:
0 HV-41.**F085, DRAIN SAMPLE OUTBOARD HV-41 -*F084, DRAIN SAMPLE INBOARD ENSURE the following Recirc. sample valves closed:
HV-43-*F019, INBOARD HV-43-*F020, OUTBOARD STOP RWCU System AND ENSURE the following valves closed:
0 HV-C-44-*F033 using HC-44-*R606, FL HV-44-*F00II INBOARD 0
HV-44-*F004, OUTBOARD HV-44-*F100, BOTTOM HEAD DRAIN 0
HV-44-*F105, INLET FLOW ENSURE Main Steam Line drains closed:
0 HV-41-*F016, STEAM DRAINS INBOARD 0
HV-41 -*FO19, STEAM DRAINS OUTBOARD 3.1 1.5 WHEN time permits, THEN PERFORM S44.2.A.
PROCEED TO THE NEXT EVENT NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 28 of 29
Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 Time Position 11 Op-Test No.: 1 Scenario No.:
3 Applicant's Actions or Behavior Event No.: 8 CT BOP
~~
~
Enter T-I 03, Secondary Containment Control, on "Room flooding alarrn condition for areas in Table SCC-1".
SRO Booth Operator:
to inform Control Room of location of visuallv observed floodinn.
Isolate all systems discharging into area per T-250 unless required to suppress fire OR required to be operated by the TRIP procedure Stops RHR Pumps B and D.
Closes RHR Pump B and D Suction Valves F004B, F004D (SCC/L-4).
CRITICAL TASK (T-103.4)
Spray Supp Pool per T-225 (PUP-5).
Aligns RHR Loop A for suppression pool spray.
TERMINATE THE SCENARIO WHEN ALL THE FOLLOWING ARE MET:
0 RHR B SUPPRESSION POOL SUCTION VALVE F004B IS CLOSED 0
RHR A LOOP IS IN SERVICE PROVIDING SUPPRESSION POOL SPRAY NRC Scenario #3 - 2008 Limerick Operating Test Page 29 of 29