ML081010219
| ML081010219 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 03/31/2008 |
| From: | D'Antonio J Operations Branch I |
| To: | |
| Hansell S | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML073040288 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML081010219 (97) | |
Text
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 1 REV. 00 No. of Pages: 25 STEAM LEAK IN DRYWELL/PSP EXCEEDED/CONTAINMENT SPRAY WITH SERVICE WATER PREPARER S. Dennis DATE_11/19/07___
VALIDATED Ops Crew with W. Coppom DATE 11/19/07___
GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING R. Brown DATE 1/23/08 OPERATIONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Initial Power Level: 90%
The scenario begins at 90% power. The BOP will be required to swap from the 2SWP*P1B to the 2SWP*P1F for normal equipment rotation. After completion of the pump swap, one of the running RBCLCW pumps will trip and the standby pump will fail to auto start. The standby pump can be manually started by the operators.
An ADS SRV will then go open but can be closed by pulling the SRV solenoid fuses.
When this occurs, a Drywell vacuum breaker pair will fail open. The crew will enter the SOP for Stuck Open SRV and the SRO will review Technical Specifications (TS) in regard to the vacuum breakers.
Once TS are addressed a trip will occur on one Feedwater Pump and only a partial Recirc Runback will occur. SOPs must be entered to control feedwater level and address the reduction in power. Cram rods will need to be inserted and TS must be addressed due to loop flow mismatch.
When plant conditions stabilize, one control rod will drift out requiring an entry into the SOP for Unplanned Power Changes. The SOP will require that power be lowered and the RO will reduce recirculation flow IAW procedures. After power is lowered, another control rod will drift out requiring a reactor scram.
When the reactor scrams a steam leak will occur inside the drywell. LPCS and RHR A will fail to initiate and RHR B will trip when Drywell pressure exceeds 1.68 psig.
NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
However, both LPCS and RHR A can be started manually. RHR A must then be placed in Suppression Chamber sprays per EOP-PC. When Suppression Chamber pressure exceeds 10 psig, the crew will attempt to spray the Drywell with RHR A, but RHS*MOV15A will not open. Spraying the Drywell must be accomplished with Service Water (Critical Task). Once DW sprays are in service and PSP is evaluated, it will be recognized that RPV Blowdown is required once above the PSP (Critical Task). The crew will blowdown the reactor and continue to control Containment pressure.
The scenario ends with the blowdown complete and containment pressure lowering.
Major Procedures Exercised: EOP-RPV, PC, C2. SOP-8, 34 EAL Classification: Alert 3.1.1 - Primary Containment cannot be maintained below 1.68 psig due to coolant leakage.
Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown is complete and containment pressure lowering Mitigation Strategy Code: PC-4 NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
I. SIMULATOR SET UP A. IC Number: IC-191 or IC-241 w/n08scen1.bat loaded B. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 1. Malfunctions:
- a. RH14A ECCS FAILS TO INITIATE (DIVI) PRESET
- b. CW16C CCP-P1C FAILS TO AUTOSTART PRESET
- c. RH09A RHS*MOV15A JAMMED PRESET
- f. RD05-18-31 CONTROL ROD FAILURE DRIFT OUT TRG 4
- g. RD05-42-39 CONTROL ROD FAILURE DRIFT OUT TRG 6
- h. MS04 STEAM LINE RUPTURE INSIDE PRIMARY TRG 7 CONTAINMENT (1.5% DELAY 3 MINUTES 6 MINUTE RAMP)
- 2. Remotes:
- 3. Overrides:
- 4. Annunciators:
- a. None C. Equipment Out of Service
- 1. None D. Support Documentation None NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
E. Miscellaneous Automatic Event Triggers
NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: N D DATE:
PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA)
- Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
- CRO Log (CRO)
Lit Control Room Annunciators
- Computer Alarm Summary (CRO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
- Reactor Power = 90%
- Loadline = >100%
- None PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Swap Service Water Pumps from the 2SWP*P1B to the 2SWP*P1F for normal pump Rotation.
PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
- Review new Clearances (SM)
- Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
- Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO ATC RO BOP RO NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
Scenario ID#
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?
NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
III. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES A. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Spray the Drywell with Service Water when RHR is unavailable.
CT-2.0 Blowdown the RPV when PSP is exceeded.
B. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Given the plant with direction to swap Service Water Pumps, the crew will remove the 2SWP*P1B pump from service and place the 2SWP*P1F pump in service for equipment rotation IAW N2-OP-11.
PO-2.0 Given the trip of a RBCLCW pump and the failure of the standby pump to auto start, the crew will manually start the standby pump IAW SOP-13.
PO-3.0 Given the plant or plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actions/notifications in accordance with all applicable administrative, emergency, and technical procedures.
PO-4.0 Given a pair of failed open Drywell Vacuum Breakers the crew will diagnose the failure and enter Technical Specifications.
PO-5.0 Given a stuck open SRV the crew will diagnose the failure enter and execute N2-SOP-34 to close the by pulling the SRV solenoid fuses.
PO-6.0 Given a single Feedwater Pump trip, with only a partial Recirc Runback, the crew will enter and execute SOPs 6, 101D, and 29, to control feedwater level, reduce power and maintain NMP 2 in service.
PO-7.0 Given a control rod drift, the crew will execute N2-SOP-8 to fully insert and disarm the control rod.
PO-8.0 Given the plant operating and a steam leak inside the drywell the crew will diagnose the leak NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
PO-9.0 Given a second control rod drift the crew will recognize the requirement to scram the reactor and will perform a reactor scram.
PO-10.0 Given drywell pressure above 1.68, the crew will verify automatic ECCS initiations and recognize the failure of LPCS and RHR A to start.
PO-11.0 Given suppression chamber pressure above 10 psig, the crew will spray the drywell using Service Water through RHR B loop prior to exceeding the Primary Containment Pressure Limit.
PO-12.0 Given suppression chamber pressure above the Pressure Suppression Pressure with drywell sprays in operation, the crew will blowdown the reactor prior to exceeding the Primary Containment Pressure Limit NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO/Crew
- Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
EVENT 1 Swap Service Water Pumps from the 2SWP*P1B to the 2SWP*P1F for normal equipment rotation IAW N2-OP-11.
EVENT 1 -SRO Actions SRO
- Directs the BOP to start Service Water Pump 1F and secure Service Water Pump 1B per N2-OP-11.
- Conducts a pre-evolution brief.
EVENT 1 -BOP Actions BOP PO-1.0
- Reviews N2-OP-11, Section E.2.0 and G.1.0 Role Play: As AO, wait two minutes and report
- Verifies Precautions and that Service Water Pump P1F prestart checks Limitations are met.
are complete.
- Dispatches AO to perform prestart check of P1D.
Cue: If asked report that SWP strainer and
- Starts Service Water Pump, P1F casing venting are complete. and secures Service Water Pump, P1B.
NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 2 CREW PO-2.0 RBCLCW Pump P1B trips. Standby Pump
- Responds to RBCLCW Pump P1B fails to auto-start and must be started manually trip.
- Recognizes the P1A pump fails to SIM Booth: Activate Trigger #1 when cued. start.
CW02B RBCLCW PUMP TRIP P1B TRG 1 EVENT 2 -SRO Actions SRO
- Directs ROs to respond to annunciators and enter SOP-13
- May contact the Work Execution Center (WEC) for maintenance followup.
EVENT 2 -BOP Actions BOP
- Recognizes failure of standby RBCLCW pump to auto start.
- References annunciator response for pump trip.
- Refers to SOP-13 and starts the standby pump.
- Place B Pump in Pull-To-Lock EVENT 2 -RO Actions RO
- Monitors reactor power, pressure and level.
- May announce on plant page entry to SOP-13 NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 -ADS SRV Opens/ Drywell CREW, SRO PO-4.0 and PO-5.0 vacuum breaker fails open SIM Booth: Activate Trigger #2 when cued OVR-13S05DI2011 OPEN ADS VLV PSV 134 PC10B, DW/WW VACUUM BKR PAIR FAILED OPEN(2ISC*RV34 AB) -DELAY 20 SECONDS EVENT 3 SRO Actions SRO PO-3.0
- Directs Power Reduction to DIV I MSS*PSV134 OPEN ADS white light lit approx. 85%
601537 ADS VALVES/SAFETY VALVES
- Declares PSV134 ADS valve LEAKING alarms inoperable.
601548 SAFETY/RELIEF VALVE OPEN
- Refers to Tech Specs 3.5.1. With alarms. one ADS valve inoperable no SRV is open by its A solenoid. MWe lowers actions is required. Currently the and Suppression Pool temperature rises as minimum number of REQUIRED heat is being added. ADS valves is still met with one valve inoperable.
When the Drywell Vacuum breakers stick/fail
- When informed Report that a pair open, the following annunciators actuate: of DW vacuum breakers are open 601556 DRYWELL VACUUM BRKR determines that DW and SC INBOARD DISC OPEN pressures are equal, therefore the 601557 DRYWELL VACUUM BRKR vacuum breakers should not be OUTBOARD DISC OPEN open.
NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Refers to Tech Spec 3.6.1.7.2.C EVENT 3 SRO Actions (Cont.) for SP to DW vacuum breakers (2hours) and recognizes requirement to perform N2-OSP-ISC-M@002 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
- May direct one loop of RHS placed in Suppression Pool Cooling.
- IF RHS is placed in Suppression Pool Cooling, declares RHS inoperable for LPCI mode and enters Tech Spec 3.5.1 CONDITION A REQUIRED ACTION A.1 with 7 day COMPLETION TIME.
- IF Suppression Pool Temperature exceeds 90°F, enters EOP-PC and Tech Spec 3.6.2.1
- Notifies Operations and Plant Management.
- Conducts post event brief.
- Reports one or both of the following:
o P601556 Drywell Vacuum Brkr Inboard Disc Open o P601557 Drywell Vacuum Brkr Outboard Disc Open.
NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 RO actions (Cont.)
- Informs the CRS that 34A and B vacuum breakers indicate open on Panel 2CEC*PNL628
- Reduces power to approximately 85% per N2-SOP-101D.
SRV is expected to be closed prior to the
- IF Average Suppression Pool requirement to initiate a manual scram. temperature is approaching 110°F THEN Scram the reactor per N2-SOP-101C and continue here.
- Monitors parameters to assist in determining SRV position.
- Monitors and control RPV water level in directed band in manual.
- Make page announcement regarding plant status.
- Reports annunciators
- Enters and executes N2-SOP-34
- Identify which SRV is open.
(PSV121)
- Place the keylock switch for PSV21 to the OFF position.
- Did the SRV close? NO (Detail 1)
Use one or more of following NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 BOP actions (CONT) indications to verify SRV status:
-SPDS Computer
-ERF Computer Points
-MSSZC111; MSSZC128
-Reactor Power Change
-Generator Output Change
-Steam Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch
-Acoustic Monitor The SRV does NOT close when the C solenoid
- Proceeds to back panel P628 with fuses are pulled. The SRV DOES close after fuse pullers and protective safety nd the 2 set (A solenoid) fuses are pulled. equipment (PPE). Using Detail 2, remove the fuses for the affected SRV in the following order until the SRV closes:
PSV134 closes after pulling F81, F82 F13A,
- C,A,B Solenoid fuse F14A. At P601 position indicating (red and Did SRV close? YES for A solenoid green) lights for PSV134 are now deenergized. Detail 1
- Use one or more of following indications to verify SRV status:
- SPDS Computer
- ERF Computer Points MSSZC111 MSSZC128
- Reactor Power Change
- Generator Output Change
- Steam Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch
- Acoustic Monitor NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
regard to placing SW rad monitor in service
EVENT 4 - Feedwater Pump Trip, Partial Crew PO-6.0 Recirc Runback
- Recognizes and responds to trip of Sim Booth: Activate Trigger #3 when cued P1A feedwater pump trip.
FW03A Feedwater Pump Trip (P1A)
- Recognizes and responds to partial RR30 HPU B PMP #1 FAILURE Recirc Runback RR31 HPU B PMP #2 FAILURE EVENT 4 SRO Actions When Feedwater Pump trips, RPV water level SRO begins to lower. When level drops below 178
Runback should occur to automatically lower o SOP-6. Feedwater Failures power to about 65%. The B FCV locks up due o SOP-101D, Power Reduction to a trip of both hydraulic subloops due to a o SOP-29, Sudden Reduction in fault. Core Flow.
- Refers to TS 3.4.1.B. for Recirc Reactor power will remain above 65% due to Loop Flow Mismatch (2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />) the failed FCV.
- Recognizes trip of P1A Feedwater Pump.
NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Refers to SOP-6, Feedwater When the Cram Rods are inserted, power Failures lowers and RPV water level restores to the
- Inserts 4 Cram Rods as required normal band. by SOP-6
- Recognizes Partial Recirc Runback
- Refers to SOP-29 Attachment 1 to address Recirc loop Flow Mismatch SIM Booth Operator: Insert the next malfunction (TRG 4) for control rod drift
- Begins recovery actions to reset PRIOR to resetting the runback. runback IAW Att.1.
EVENT 5 - Control Rod Drift Crew PO-7.0 RD05-18-31 CONTROL ROD FAILURE
- Identifies and reports control rod DRIFT OUT TRG 4 drift on 18-31 EVENT 5 SRO Actions SRO
- Recognizes entry and directs entry to SOP-8, Unplanned Power Changes
- Declares control rod 18-31 inoperable per Tech. Spec. 3.1.3 NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS condition C actions C.1 and C.2 (fully insert and disarm) (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> to disarm).
- Recognizes and identifies Control Rod 18-31 drifting out.
- Selects rod for display.
- Refers to SOP-8 and inserts drifting control rod 18-31
- Releases insert pushbutton and observe rod position.
- Recognizes rod continues to drift out
- Drives the rod full-in and holds insert pushbutton until HCU is disarmed.
Sim Booth Operator: When requested to
- When rod 18-31 is full-in, directs valve out the HCU, Insert TRG 5 after field operator to close RDS*V103 approximately 2 minutes. & RDS*V105.
RD08-18-31 HCU ISOLATION FOR
- Dispatch Auxiliary Operator to INSERTED ROD TRG 5 isolate HCU by closing RDS*V103 and V105 in accordance with SOP-08.
NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 6, Second Control Rod Drift Crew PO-9.0
- Identifies and reports second Sim Booth: Activate Trigger #6 when cued control rod drift of control rod 42-RD05-42-39 CONTROL ROD FAILURE 39 DRIFT OUT TRG 6 EVENT 6 SRO Actions SRO
- Direct mode switch be placed in shutdown
- Enters EOP-RPV
- Enters SOP- 101C
- Directs RPV level control 160 -
200 inches
- Directs RPV pressure control 800 -
1000 psig EVENT 6 RO Actions RO
- Places mode switch to shutdown.
- Provides scram report:
o Mode Switch in Shutdown o APRMs downscale o RPV Water Level o RPV Pressure o All Rods In o FW and MSIV status NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Maintains RPV level 160-200 inches
- Monitors RPV pressure 800-1000 psig and lowering.
EVENTS 7 & 8, 9 Steam Leak Inside Drywell. LPCS and RHR A Fail to Automatically Initiate and RHR B Trips, MOV15A DW spray valve fails to open Sim Booth: ConfirmcTrigger #7 and Crew PO-8.0 Trigger #8 activated at following reactor
MS04 STEAM LINE RUPTURE INSIDE PRIMARY CONTAINMENT (1.5% DELAY 3 MINUTES 6 MINUTE RAMP) TRG 7 RH01B RHR PUMP TRIP (P1B) TRG 8 EVENTS 7 & 8, 9 SRO Actions SRO PO-12.0
- Enters EOP-PC
- Directs RHR A placed in Suppression Chamber sprays.
EAL may be addressed at scenario
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Directs the crew to monitor and report when Suppression Chamber pressure exceeds 10 psig.
- When told that Suppression Chamber pressure exceeds 10 psig Directs the following:
o Drywell Unit Coolers tripped.
o Recirc. Pumps tripped
- Verifies within Drywell Spray Initiation Limit Curve
- Determines Suppression Chamber pressure above the Pressure Suppression Pressure curve limit.
- Directs spraying the Drywell using Service Water via RHR B using EOP-6 Att. 5.
CT-1.0
- Verifies that Containment pressure is above PSP with Drywell Sprays EVENT 10 in service.
Note to Evaluator: It is important that the
- Directs RPV Blowdown per EOP-evaluation to blowdown when above PSP be made only after Drywell sprays are initiated or C2, based on being above PSP it is determined that the Drywell cannot be with Drywell Sprays in service.
sprayed. It is incorrect EOP implementation to
- Directs 7 ADS SRVs open (1 continue to RPV Blowdown without having additional SRV needed due to attempted to spray the Drywell. previous ADS SRV failure)
CT-2.0 NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Directs placing RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling.
EVENT 7 & 8, 9 RO Actions RO PO-10.0
- Reports DW pressure above 1.68 psig.
- Recognizes and reports failure of DIV I EDG.
- Recognizes and reports trip of RHR B pump.
- Places RHR A in Suppression Chamber sprays and does not establish Suppression Pool cooling.
SIM Booth: If directed to defeat DW Spray
- Defeats the DW Spray interlocks interlocks for RHS Loop A per EOP-6, Att. 22 per EOP-6, Att. 22 activate TRG 9:
- Recognizes and reports that RH47 2RHS*MOV 15A EOP JMPR RHS*MOV15A cannot be opened.
(RHS*MOV25A 33 CONTACT)
- Lineup and spray containment with RH49 2RHS*MOV 25A EOP JMPR Service Water per EOP-6 (RHS*MOV15A 33 CONTACT) Attachment 5 as follows:
The following steps lineup SWP to RHS Loop
- Verify SWP system is available to inject through RHS loop B.
B (EOP-6 Attachment 5 Section 3.1)
NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Verify the following valves closed:
(2CEC*PNL601)
- RHS*MOV15B, OUTLET TO DRYWELL SPRAY
- RHS*MOV25B, OUTLET TO DRYWELL SPRAY
- RHS*MOV33B, OUTLET TO SUPPR POOL SPRAY
- RHS*FV38B, RETURN TO SUPPR POOL COOLING
- RHS*MOV12B, HEAT EXCHANGER 1B OUTLET VLV
- RHS*MOV40B, SDC B RETURN
- RHS*MOV104, RHR B TO REACTOR HEAD SPRAY
- Place RHS*P1B, PMP 1B, control switch in Pull-To-Lock.
- Verify open RHS*MOV8B, HEAT EXCHANGER 1B INLET BYPASS VLV.
- Verify open RHS*MOV116, SVCE WTR INJECTION TO RHR B.
CT-1.0
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS TALE DRAIN VLV.
- Verify Open RHS*MOV115, SVCE WTR INJECTION TO RHR B.
CT-1.0 The following steps lineup RHS Loop B to
- Verify the following valves closed spray (EOP-6 Attachment 5 Section 3.4) (2CEC*PNL601):
- RHS*MOV33B, OUTLET TO SUPPR POOL SPRAY
- RHS*FV38B, RETURN TO SUPPR POOL COOLING
- RHS*MOV40B, SDC B RETURN
- RHS*MOV104, RHR B TO REACTOR HEAD SPRAY
- Initiate drywell sprays by opening the following valves:
When Drywell Spray is initiated with Service
- RHS*MOV15B, OUTLET TO Water, DW and SC Pressure begin to lower.
DRYWELL SPRAY CT-1.0
- RHS*MOV25B, OUTLET TO DRYWELL SPRAY CT-1.0
- Places RHR A in Suppression Pool Cooling.
NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 7 ,8 & 9 BOP Actions BOP PO-11.0 EVENT 10 - RPV Blowdown
- Reports Suppression Chamber Examiner Note: Applicant must recognize pressure above 10 psig.
previous ADS SRV failure and open an
- Verifies DW unit coolers tripped.
additional SRV to obtain 7 open for the
- Trips Recirc pumps.
blowdown.
- Reports that 7 ADS valves open.
- Verifies that RPV pressure is lowering Termination Criteria: RPV Blowdown is complete and Containment pressure is lowering.
NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
V. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE A. NA, NRC Exam VI. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS A. Reference Events th 1.0 During performance of Surveillance (N2-OSP-ADS-R001), when the 8 SRV was opened Suppression Chamber pressure became great enough to open a pair of vacuum breakers. The vacuum breakers stayed open for almost 30 minutes until DW and SC pressure equalized.
B. Commitments
- 1. None VII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC 2008 Scenario 1 March 2008
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST
- 1. Additional Information about these checks:
For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
- 2. Qualitative Attributes X Realism/Credibility X Event Sequencing X Simulator Modeling X Evaluating Crew Competencies
- 3. Quantitative Attributes 6 Total Malfunctions 1 Malfunctions after EOP Entry 4 Abnormal Events 1 Major Transients 2 EOPs Used 1 EOP Contingency Procedures Used Simulator Run Time EOP Run Time 2 Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
- 4. Developmental Checks:
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 2 REV. 00 No. of Pages: 22 ATWS/LOSS OF HIGH PRESSURE FEED PREPARER S. Dennis DATE 11/19/07 VALIDATED Ops Crew with W. Coppom DATE 11/19/07 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING R. Brown DATE 1/23/08 OPERATIONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Initial Power Level: 100%
The scenario begins at 100% power. The RO will perform the surveillance test for the C RHR Pump, N2-OSP-RHS Q@006. While the pump is running, the breaker will trip for the RHS B/C Water Leg Pump RHS*P2 requiring a TS entry by the SRO (TS 3.5.1.C - 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />). Once TS are addressed, the in service Instrument Air Compressor will trip requiring operator action to manually start the C standby compressor. The B compressor will not start.
Oscillations of the in service EHC pressure regulator will occur and require actions to swap to the alternate regulator and lower reactor pressure. Additionally, the RO will be required to lower reactor power to 85% IAW the SOP-23.
High Pressure Core Spray starts unexpectedly, requiring operator action to terminate the initiation. The SRO will address TS for HPCS inoperability and 2 other ECCS pumps inoperable (3.0.3). After addressing TS, the Feedwater Master Controller will then fail as-is. The crew will enter SOP-6 and control feedwater in manual.
Additionally, a failure of the Recirculation FCV will cause the FCV to open. Operator action will be required to control the FCV and reactor level. Cram rods may be inserted or Recirc flow lowered to lower reactor power to pre-transient levels.
The backup EHC pressure regulator will fail and result in a rapid RPV pressure rise.
The reactor will automatically scrams, however, all control rods will not fully insert and A and B reactor feed pumps will trip. EOPs RPV, EOP-Failure-To-Scram will be entered. The RO must inhibit ADS to prevent injection during the ATWS (CT).
NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
The RCIC turbine can be manually controlled after a controller malfunction. SLC pumps will fail to auto-start and must be manually started prior to exceeding the HCTL (CT). RPV level must be restored with C FW pump, RCIC (or Condensate Booster Pumps with RPV pressure lowered) precluding the need to perform a RPV Blowdown (CT). The RO will implement actions to insert control rods until all rods are inserted (CT).
Major Procedures Exercised: EOP-RPV, PC, C2. SOP-8, 34 EAL Classification: SAE 2.2.2 - Reactor/Reactivity Control-ATWS Termination Criteria: RPV level is being controlled in the required band and control rod insertion is in progress.
Mitigation Strategy Code: AT1 NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
II. SIMULATOR SET UP C. IC Number: IC-192 or IC-17 w/n08scen2.bat loaded.
D. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 2. Malfunctions:
- a. RH20 RHS*P2 TRIP TRG 1
- c. IA02B 2IAS-C3B THERMAL OVERLOAD TRIP PRESET
- d. IA04A IAS COMPRESSOR LAG AUTO-START FAILURE PRESET
- e. IA04B IAS COMPRESSOR B/U AUTO-START FAILURE PRESET
- n. RP02 RPS-FAILURE TO SCRAM-AUTOMATIC TRG 22
- q. RH08 GRP 5 ISOLATION FAILURE- RHS*MOV122/113 TRG 25
- t. RP08A RRCS 98 SEC TIMER FAILURE (DIV 1) PRESET
- u. RP08B RRCS 98 SEC TIMER FAILURE (DIV II) PRESET RD17A PARTIAL INSERTION UNDER SCRAM (L1) 48 PRESET RD17B PARTIAL INSERTION UNDER SCRAM (L2) 12 PRESET RD17C PARTIAL INSERTION UNDER SCRAM (L3) 14 PRESET RD17E PARTIAL INSERTION UNDER SCRAM (L5) 16 PRESET RD17F PARTIAL INSERTION UNDER SCRAM (L6) 24 PRESET RD17G PARTIAL INSERTION UNDER SCRAM (L7) 14 PRESET RD17H PARTIAL INSERTION UNDER SCRAM (L8) 48 PRESET RD17I PARTIAL INSERTION UNDER SCRAM (L9) 48 PRESET NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
RD17J PARTIAL INSERTION UNDER SCRAM (L10) 48 PRESET RD17K PARTIAL INSERTION UNDER SCRAM (L11) 22 PRESET RD17L PARTIAL INSERTION UNDER SCRAM (L12) 48 PRESET RD17M PARTIAL INSERTION UNDER SCRAM (L13) 48 PRESET RD17N PARTIAL INSERTION UNDER SCRAM (L14) 48 PRESET Remotes:
- a. RH52 RHRB FILL AND VENT TRG 24
- b. TC02 PRESSURE REG BIAS A B , Value +9, 3 min. ramp TRG 4
- f. MS06A DEFEAT LVL 1 ISOL OF MSIVS (JMPR K148A) TRG 21
- g. MS06B DEFEAT LVL 1 ISOL OF MSIVS (JMPR K148B) TRG 21
- h. MS06C DEFEAT LVL 1 ISOL OF MSIVS (JMPR K148C) TRG 21
- i. MS06D DEFEAT LVL 1 ISOL OF MSIVS (JMPR K148D) TRG 21
- 4. Overrides:
- a. None
- 5. Annunciators:
- b. an601658 RHR B HIGH POINT VENT LEVEL , OFF PRESET D. Equipment Out of Service
- 2. None F. Support Documentation E. Miscellaneous Automatic Event Triggers
- 1. TRG 8 and 9. When Mode Switch in SHUTDOWN activates FW03A and B after 45 second delay, tripping both running Feedwater Pumps.
- 2. TRG10. When RCIC Flow increases (zarcr606) activates RC07 failing the RCIC flow signal high (turbine speed lowers to prevent injection).
NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: N D DATE:
PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA)
- Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
- CRO Log (CRO)
Lit Control Room Annunciators
- Computer Alarm Summary (CRO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
- Reactor Power = 100%
- Loadline = >100%
- None PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Perform N2-OSP-RHS-Q@006 RHR System Loop C Pump and Valve Operability Test and System Integrity Test PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
- Review new Clearances (SM)
- Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
- Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO ATC RO BOP RO NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
Scenario ID#
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?
NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
IV. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES C. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Inhibit ADS to preclude an automatic blowdown, preventing uncontrolled injection during the ATWS.
CT-2.0 Operate SLC, SRVs, Suppression Pool Cooling and level control systems such that HCTL is not exceeded, precluding the need to perform an RPV Blowdown.
CT-3.0 Restore and maintain RPV water level above MSCWL, precluding the need to perform an RPV Blowdown.
CT-4.0 Insert control rods through combination of manually driving rods using RMCS or performing additional manual scrams per EOP-6 Attachment 14, Alternate Control Rod Insertion D. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Given the plant or plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actions/notifications.
PO-2.0 Given RHS B/C Water Leg Pump breaker tripping, the crew will secure from the surveillance, declare the pump inoperable and restore the valve lineup.
PO-3.0 Given the plant operating at power with an instrument air compressor failure, the operating crew will restore IA header pressure to normal prior to 60 psig IA header pressure.
PO-4.0 Given the plant operating with a malfunction of the EHC pressure regulator the crew will take action in accordance with N2-SOP-23 to reduce power below 85% and place the "B" pressure regulator in service.
PO-5.0 Given the plant with a spurious HPCS initiation, the crew will take actions to terminate the injection.
PO-6.0 Given an operating reactor with a Recirc flow control valve failed open and a FWLC failure the crew will tale the appropriate actions to restore and maintain RPV water level.
NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
PO-7.0 Given the plant operating at power with RPV pressure lowering due to an EHC failure, the crew will verify the MSIVs close and the Reactor SCRAMs in accordance with SOP-101C.
PO-8.0 Given a loss of Normal Feedwater the crew will stabilize RPV level using RCIC in manual.
PO-9.0 Given entry conditions to EOPs RPV, PC and C-5, the crew will execute the following actions to mitigate the event:
- Preventing HPCS Injection
- Inhibiting ADS initiation.
- Terminating and preventing RPV injection in accordance with EOP Basis and as directed by EOP-C5.
- Verifying SLS injection prior to Suppression Pool temperature >
110°F.
- Operating Suppression Pool Cooling to minimize suppression pool heatup.
- Insert Control Rods per EOP-6, Att. 14.
NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Crew
- Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
EVENT 1 RHR Pump Operability Test with RHS B/C Water Leg Pump breaker trip EVENT 1 -SRO Actions SRO PO-1.0
- Perform pre-job brief with RO assigned to performance of surveillance
- Authorizes/directs performance of surveillance N2-OSP-RHS-Q@006 for RHS C loop EVENT 1 -BOP Actions BOP
- Reviews surveillance, and commences.
- Makes plant announcement starting RHS*P1C After pump starts and discharge pressure is
- Positions RHS*P1C control switch sufficient, annunciator 601540 ADS B RHR to start.
B/RHR C PERMISSIVE alarms
- Reports annunciator 601540 alarmed (expected).
Role Play: When directed to open test
- Directs test connection for suction connections, report that the test connections opened.
are open.
- Throttle open RHS*FV38C to 7450 gpm NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Sim Booth OPERATOR
- Observe RHS*MOV4C closed After pump flow is established at 7450 gpm,
- Directs test connection for activate malfunction using TRG 1: discharge opened.
RH20 RHS*P2 TRIP PO-2.0 RHR Keep-Full (Water Leg) Pump trips and Annunciator 601648 RHR B SYS VALVES/WATER LEG PMP MOT OVERLOAD alarms EVENT 1 -BOP Actions BOP
- Diagnoses RHS B/C Water Leg Reference Pump breaker trip
- Notifies SRO SIM BOOTH NOTE: After 2 minutes, Call Control room and report that the pump motor appears to be damaged.
- Determines the Loss of RHS*P2, RHS B/C WTR LEG PMP, will render RHS B AND C inoperable.
- Refers to Technical Specification 3.5.1.C -72 hour completion time.
EVENT 2 Instrument Air Compressor A Trip When directed by lead evaluator activate malfunction TRG 2:
IA02A Inst. Air Compressor A Trip NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Instrument Air header pressure lowers BOP PO-3.0 851228 INSTR AIR CPSR 3A/3B/3C AUTO
- Reports Annunciator TRIP/FAIL TO START
- Enters SOP-19
- Reports Instrument air header pressure lowering
- Recognizes Lag IAS Compressor B fails to start
- Manually starts IAS Compressor C.
- Acknowledges reports
- Ensures SOP 19 entered
- Ensures starting of standby IAS compressors EVENT 3 EHC REGULATOR OSCILLATION Sim Booth: When directed by lead evaluator activate malfunction TRG 3:
TC03A EHC SYS PRESS REG FAILURE-OSCILLATION RPV Pressure and power start to oscillate. Crew PO-4.0 Annunciator 851148 B PRESS REGULATOR
- Reports alarms IN CONTROL intermittently alarms and clears
- Reports pressure / power as pressure cycles and controlling regulator is oscillations NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS changing. This occurs for the next several minutes, until the B Regulator is biased into control.
EVENT 3 -SRO Actions SRO
- Direct entry into SOP-23
- Direct power reduced below 85%
IAW SOP-101D
- Verify thermal limits are acceptable per OP-23 section for operation with 1 pressure regulator out of service EVENT 3 -RO Actions RO
- Enter SOP-23
- Perform power reduction below 85%
- Monitors power, pressure and water level while changing in-service EHC regulators.
EVENT 3 -BOP Actions BOP When requested to adjust EHC bias in Relay
- Direct personnel to relay room to Room activate TRG 4 to bias the B EHC place B EHC regulator in control pressure regulator in control. per SOP-23.
TC02 PRESSURE REG BIAS A B , Value
- Reports when B regulator is in
+9, 3 min. ramp TRG 4 control.
NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- When pressure is stable, exits After regulator bias is adjusted, RPV pressure SOP-23.
and power stabilize. RPV Pressure will be about 10 psig higher (if at full power) than the pre-transient value.
EVENT 4 HPCS spurious start Sim Booth: When directed by Lead Evaluator activate TRG 5:
CS01B HPCS INADVERTENT INITIATION HPCS Pump and Diesel Generator auto starts. BOP HPCS injects into the vessel. Reactor level
FW Flow and level stabilizes.
- As time permits, verifies HPCS Reactor pressure and power lower slightly as injection not required.
HPCS sprays inside the core shroud.
- If directed, places HPCS in pull-to-lock.
- If directed, closes HPCS injection valve.
EVENT 4 - SRO Actions SRO PO-5.0
- Determines HPCS initiation not required.
- May direct HPCS pump be placed in pull-to-lock if still running.
- Directs SOP-06 entry.
- Review Tech Spec 3.5.1 required actions B. and C. and H.
NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 4 SRO Actions (Cont.)
- Enter TS 3.0.3 Immediately
- Review Tech Spec 3.3.5.1, required actions A.1 and B.3.1.
- Review Tech Spec 3.6.1.3 for HPCS injection valve.
- Contacts Work Week Manager.
- Identifies need for notifications per 10CFR50.72 (b) (3) (v) and 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (v).
- May direct HPCS injection valve to be closed.
- Conducts transient brief.
EVENT 4 RO Actions RO Role Play: If called to check the Div 3
- Dispatches operator to verify Switchgear or HPCS pump, report overcurrent proper operation of Div 3 DG.
flags on breaker and HPCS pump appears to
EVENT 5 & 6 RCS FCV Drifts with FWLC Failure Sim Booth: When directed by Lead Evaluator activate remotes and malfunction on TRG 6:
RR10A FCV A DRIFT RR12A FCV A DRIFT POSITION, 100%
DELAY 3 SECONDS CREW PO-6.0 FW15 FW MASTER CTRLR FAILURE-AS IS
- Identifies and reports power rise.
DELAY 2 SECS NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 5 & 6 -SRO Actions SRO RCS FCV A Loop begins to drift open. Loop
- Directs entry to SOP-6, Feedwater Flow and Total Core Flow rise. Reactor power Failures and steam flow slowly rise, as core flow
- Directs entry to SOP -8, position. As steam flow rises, a mismatch is Unplanned power changes created and RPV water level slowly lowers.
- Directs lowering power by insertion of Cram Rods or Lowering Recirc on Loop B.
EVENT 5 & 6 -RO & BOP Actions RO
- Enters SOP-6
- Monitors FW system response and takes manual control as required to maintain normal level band.
- Lowers power with Cram Rods or using B Recirc FCV, as directed
- Reviews power to flow map.
BOP BOP implements SOP-8
- Enters SOP-8 If the Hydraulic Power Unit is shutdown, FCV
- Determines power change is will be locked due to loss of hydraulics and caused by Recirc FCV motion.
valve motion will be stopped.
- Depress HYDRAULIC POWER UNIT SHUTDOWN pushbutton at P602.
NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Reports status of FCV position and flow mismatch.
EVENT 7 - EHC Regulator failure cause Reactor High Pressure, ATWS, Loss of Feedwater Sim Booth: When directed by the Lead Evaluator activate TRG 7:
TC02B EHC PRESS REG FAILURE-LOW (B)
TC02A EHC PRESS REG FAILURE-LOW (A)
EHC MAIN STEAM PRESSURE instruments go downscale. Turbine Control Valves close and Bypass Valves remain closed, since regulator senses pressure lowering.
RPV Pressure rises rapidly as TCVs close Crew PO-7.0, PO-8.0 & PO-9.0 RPV High Pressure Scram setpoint of 1052
- Recognize and report Reactor psig is exceeded. RPV level lowers. RPS trips SCRAM signal and failure to but all control rods fail to fully insert due to SCRAM.
hydraulic SDV lock..
A loss of Feedwater occurs after Feedwater pumps trip.
APRM power should be 20 to 25%
- Directs mode switch placed in shutdown.
- Acknowledges scram report.
when scram is required.
NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Exits RPV Control due to control rods not fully inserted.
- Enters EOP-C5 Failure to Scram from EOP-RPV.
- Directs RRCS initiated.
- Directs an initial RPV water level band.
- With Reactor Power >4% and RPV level >100 inches, directs terminate and prevent injection.
- Initially directs a RPV pressure band of 800 to 1000 psig.
- Subsequently lowers the RPV pressure band to a target of 500 -
600 psig to establish injection with Booster pumps.
- May direct Feed Pump C started.
- Directs a loop of RHR be placed in Suppression Pool Cooling.
- Directs control rods inserted using EOP-6, Attachment 14.
- Acknowledges trip of RCIC turbine.
NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Enter EOP-PC, executes all legs simultaneously.
- Place reactor mode switch in shutdown.
- Provides scram report.
- Initiates RRCS as directed.
- Takes appropriate action to maintain RPV water level within the directed band.
- When directed, terminates and prevents injection by closing LV10 valves.
- Re-injects to maintain RPV level within directed band.
- Using condensate system, restore and maintain RPV level above the MSCWL.
CT-3.0 EVENT 7 BOP Actions BOP
- Places ADS inhibit switches to ON. CT-1.0
- Verifies HPCS in pull to lock.
NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Restoring pneumatics to the Drywell allows
Sim Booth: If requested by control room
- If directed, Installs jumpers to activate TRG 21 to defeat MSIV Level 1 defeat MSIV closure isolation per closure: EOP-6, Attachment 10.
MS06A through MS06D
- If directed, terminate & Prevent DEFEAT LVL 1 ISOL OF MSIVS (JMPR injection at Panel P601.
K148A - D)
- Places RHR A(B) in suppression pool cooling.
- Notifies the SM to declare RHR A(B) LPCI mode inoperable.
EVENT 8 RCIC Controller Failure EVENT 8 BOP Actions BOP TRG10 automatically triggers when RCIC
failure in automatic.
RC07 RCIC FLOW TRANSMITTER
- Take manual control of RCIC FAILURE-HI TRG 10 speed controller and raise turbine When RCIC starts, flow transmitter fails high, speed to inject with RCIC, if providing a false high flow signal to the flow directed.
controller. RCIC turbine speed lowers to minimum and the system will not inject unless manual control is taken.
EVENT 9 - SLC FAILURE TO AUTO START BOP SLC fail to auto start. SLC should be injected
- Identifies Failure of SLC to auto before SPT reaches 110EF start on initiation signal.
NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Manually places SLC in service prior to exceeding the HCTL CT -2.0 EVENT 7 -ADDITIONAL RO ACTIONS RO
- When directed performs Alternate Sim Booth: When requested to install RPS Control Rod Insertion per EOP-6 jumpers and to defeat ARI, activate triggers Attachment 14 22 and 23.
SIM Booth: When scram is reset, clear all
- Confirms RPS PILOT SCRAM RD17 malfunctions to allow rod insertion SOLENOIDS lights are lit on next manual scram. (P603).
- Confirms SDV Vents and Drains open (P603).
- Performs Manual Control Rod Insertion (Section 3.5) while waiting for SDV to drain.
- Verify both RDS Pumps running.
TIME COMPRESSION
LVL annunciator malfunctions (an603109,
- Close RDS-PV101 Drive an603409 RPS A,B DIS VOL HI LVL TRIP) on Pressure Control Valve.
Trigger 26. This will allow rod insertion when
- Drive Control Rods in using RMCS. CT-4.0 NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- WHEN SDV High Level annunciators clear, insert an additional manual scram by When additional manual scram is inserted, all arming and depressing scram rods fully insert. pushbuttons. CT-4.0
- Observe and report control rod motion.
- Provides scram report.
Termination Criteria:
RPV water level being controlled in directed band and control rod insertion in progress.
NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
VIII. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE B. NA, NRC Exam IX. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS C. Reference Events None D. Commitments
- 2. None X. LESSONS LEARNED NRC 2008 Scenario 2 March 2008
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST
- 1. Additional Information about these checks:
For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
- 2. Qualitative Attributes X Realism/Credibility X Event Sequencing X Simulator Modeling X Evaluating Crew Competencies
- 3. Quantitative Attributes 6 Total Malfunctions 2 Malfunctions after EOP Entry 2 Abnormal Events 1 Major Transients 2 EOPs Used 2 EOP Contingency Procedures Used Simulator Run Time EOP Run Time 4 Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
- 4. Developmental Checks:
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 3 REV. 00 No. of Pages: 19 PLANT STARTUP WITH LOSS OF RPV LEVEL INSTRUMENTS RPV FLOODING REQUIRED PREPARER S. Dennis DATE 11/20/07 VALIDATED Ops Crew with W. Coppom DATE 11/20/07 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING R. Brown DATE 1/23/08 OPERATIONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Initial Power Level: 2% Startup with RPV Pressure at 900 psig The scenario begins with a plant startup in progress and reactor pressure at 900 psig.
Control rods will be withdrawn until one bypass valve is open 25%. When that occurs, the operators will transfer the Reboiler Steam Supply to Main Steam. After that occurs, the plant startup will continue with control rod withdrawal.
While increasing power an inop trip will occur on IRM channel A. The operators will bypass the affected IRM and reset the half scram. TS (TS 3.3.1.1) will be referred to by the SRO.
Next, a loss of offsite power to Div I Switchgear occurs when breaker 16-2 fails open, the crew will take action per N2-SOP-03 to stabilize plant parameters and adjust Service Water flow. The SRO will be required to address TS (TS 3.8.1.A - 1 Hr for surveillance - 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> SD LCO).
A seismic event will then occur causing a service water pump trip requiring a restart of a service water pump and entry to TS 3.7.1.E. -72 hours. IRM G also receives an upscale trip requiring a TS entry. N2-SOP-N2-90 will be entered to address the seismic event.
Once conditions are stabilized, a seismic aftershock will occur causing a rupture of an RPV level instrument reference leg. Initially drywell pressure rise slowly and the operators will manually scram the plant. Entry into EOP-RPV and EOP-PC will be NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
required on high Drywell Pressure. After Drywell Cooling is restored a second reference leg ruptures and a small RCS leak develops. The crew will place Suppression Chamber Spray in service. The event is complicated by a failure of Division 2 ECCS to initiate automatically. Operator action will be required to manually initiate Division 2 ECCS.
After Suppression Chamber Spray is initiated the remaining RPV water level instruments fail. The crew must determine that water level indication is no longer valid and enter RPV Flooding EOP-C4. An RPV blowdown must be initiated to allow the RPV to be flooded to the Main Steam Lines. (CT). Only 5 SRVs will initially open requiring operator action to open additional SRVs. The crew must flood the RPV to the elevation of the main steam lines in accordance with RPV flooding EOP-C4 (CT). Once RPV is flooded, containment parameters can be addressed.
Major Procedures Exercised: EOP-RPV, PC, C4 EAL Classification: Alert 8.4.4 - Seismic Event, SAE - 2.1.2 -RPV Flooding Required Termination Criteria: Level recovered to the main steam lines as indicated by acoustic monitors, RPV pressure rising, or tailpipe temperatures lowering.
Mitigation Strategy: RL4 SE5 NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
III. SIMULATOR SET UP E. IC Number: IC-191 or IC-244 w/n08scen3.bat loaded, Ensure RWM is functional when IC is snapped.
F. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 3. Malfunctions:
- a. RH14B ECCS FAILS TO INITIATE (DIV II) PRESET
- f. MT01 SEISMIC ACCELERATION, .085 TRG 3
- i. CW01F SERVICE WATER PUMP TRIP (P1F) TRG 3
- j. RR35A, RX VES NOZZLE N14 340 DEG RUPTURE DW TRG 4 K. RR34A, RX VES NOZZLE N14 20 DEG RUPTURE DW TRG 5
- j. RR20 RR LOOP RUPTURE -DBA LOCA, 0.8% TRG 5 K. RPV LEVEL INSTRUMENTS ALL FAIL UPSCALE TRG 6 Remotes:
- 5. Overrides:
- a. None
- 6. Annunciators:
- c. None E. Equipment Out of Service
- 3. None G. Support Documentation F. Miscellaneous - ENSURE THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES ARE OUT IN THE CONTROL ROOM SIGNED OFF AS INDICATED BELOW N2-OP signed off thru step 3.3.32 N2-OP-101A - step 2.46.3 completed N2-OP-101A - step 2.45 in progress NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: N D DATE:
PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA)
- Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
- CRO Log (CRO)
Lit Control Room Annunciators
- Computer Alarm Summary (CRO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
- Reactor Power = Startup @ 900 psig
- Rod 50-27 is the next rod to move
- BPV #1 is approximately 15% open
- Other operators will be performing SJAE startup at step 2.45 of N2-OP-101A PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Applicable Procedures In Progress N2-OP signed off thru step 3.3.32 N2-OP-101A - step 2.46.3 in progress N2-OP-101A - step 2.45 in progress (to b)e completed by other operators
- Additional Applicable Startup procedures are being monitored and performed by other operators. No actions from any applicable procedure will taken without notifying the control room.
Continue to raise power to get BPV #1 25% open with pressure at 925 psig Transfer the Reboiler Steam Supply to Main Steam IAW N2-OP-25, Section F.5.0.
PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
- Review new Clearances (SM)
- Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
- Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO ATC RO BOP RO NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
Scenario ID#
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?
NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
V. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES E. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given loss of level instruments, the crew will initiate an RPV blowdown by opening seven ADS valves per N2-EOP-C4.
CT-2.0 Given conditions requiring RPV flooding, crew will flood the RPV to the elevation of the main steam lines per EOP-C4.
F. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Given the plant or plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actions/notifications.
PO-2.0 Given the plant with a reactor startup in progress, the crew will identify and take actions for a failed IRM detector in accordance with N2-OP-92.
PO-3.0 Given the reactor plant operating at full power when service water pump trips, the crew will take action to stabilize service water in accordance with N2-SOP-03.
PO-4.0 Given a LOCA inside the primary containment, the crew will manually initiate a scram before high drywell pressure scram setpoint is reached.
PO-5.0 Given N2-SOP-101C and EOP-RPV, monitor and control Reactor Water Level and Reactor Pressure.
PO-6.0 Given the plant shutdown following a LOCA and RPV level indication not usable, the crew will perform RPV flooding in accordance with EOP-C4.
PO-7.0 With RPV level instrumentation unavailable for use the crew will open 7 ADS valves in accordance with EOP-C4.
PO-8.0 With RPV level instrumentation unavailable, 7 ADS valves open, the crew will inject with all systems necessary to flood the RPV to the Main Steam Lines in accordance with EOP-C4.
NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CREW Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
EVENT 1 SRO Continue Startup
- Direct the RO to continue withdrawing control rods until RPV pressure is approximately 925 psig and BPV #1 is 25% open.
- Withdraws control rods IAW sequence.
- Establish a stable positive period greater than 60 seconds using
- control rods as required.
- Maintain Reactor Water Level between 178.3 AND 187.3
NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 2 Transfer Reboiler Steam Supply to Main Steam SRO
- Directs the BOP to change the Reboiler Steam supply to the Main Steam supply provided that Reactor pressure control is established with a Turbine Bypass Valve open 20% or greater.
- Verifies an operator is stationed at the Auxiliary Boilers.
- If required, manually open 2ASS-MOV148, MAIN STM TO AUX STM ISOL VLV (Step not required)
- Close 2ASS-AOV145, AUX BLR STM INLET VLV,
- Place the Reboiler 2ASS-STV112 and 2ESS-STV104 control Role Play: switches in the AUTO When dispatched to IPNL204, report RESET
- Direct the local operator to depress pushbuttons have been depressed for LV8 the RESET PUSHBUTTONS on valves. the 2CES-IPNL204
- Open 2CNA-HV34A(B)
- Monitor for proper reboiler operation
- Reports steam supply transferred.
NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 3 IRM A Inop Trip When directed by lead evaluator activate TRG 1:
NM09A, IRM CHANNEL A FAILURE - INOP SRO PO-1.0
RPS A PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOIDS RO PO-2.0 four white lights are out, indicating RPS trip
- Recognize IRM A failure.
system A is tripped.
- Reports to SRO.
603102 RPS A NMS TRIP alarms
603201 IRM TRIP SYSTEM A
- Resets half scam per N2-OP-97, Sect H.2.0 UPSCALE/INOPERABLE alarms
- At 2CEC*PNL603, reset SCRAM At P603 IRM reading remains consistent with signals by momentarily placing its current value, but IRM A red UPSC TR OR applicable switches to RESET as INOP red light above range switch is lit, follows:
indicating an INOP trip has occurred.
o REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC A o REACTOR SCRAM RESET LOGIC C o Verify PILOT SCRAM VALVE SOLENOID white lights A, C, E AND G are lit.
- Reports IRM bypassed and half scram reset.
NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 4 Loss of power to Div I switchgear.
When directed by lead evaluator activate TRG 2:
ED04F, 4.16 KV NORMAL BUS FAULT (SWG16)
Crew PO-3.0 Loss of power to Div I/III Switchgear.
- Recognize loss of power from Div I and III EDGs start and pick up their SWG016.
respective buses.
- Enter SOP-3 and perform SWP non-essential headers isolate. immediate actions to stabilize SWP*P1A automatically sequences on. SWP and restore pneumatics.
SRO PO-1.0
- Monitor crew actions and implementation of SOP-3.
- Evaluate Tech Specs for the loss of power to SWG016. T.S. 3.8.1 AC Sources Operating.
One required Offsite power source is
- Enters T. S. 3.8.1 Condition A, inoperable. restore in 24 hrs.
Service Water is inoperable with a division of
- Enters T.S. 3.7.1 Condition C, non-essential MOVs overridden open. restore in 72 hrs.
- Perform additional actions of SOP-3 for a loss of power with EDGs on the bus.
- Verify Div I/III EDGs start.
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS isolate.
- Verify Div I SWP pump restarts.
- Restore flow to SWP non-essential headers.
rd
- Start 3 SWP pump in Div II.
- Restore pneumatics.
EVENT 5 Small Seismic Event, Service Water Pump trip, IRM G Upscale trip When directed by lead evaluator activate TRG 3:
MT01 SEISMIC ACCELERATION (.085) Crew PO-2.0, 3.0 CW01F SERVICE WTR PP TRIP (P1F)
- Report alarms NM06G IRM G Fails Upscale (30 sec delay)
- Monitor plant conditions 842121 Seismic Acceleration Exceeded
- Recognize trip of SWP*P1F.
alarms
- Recognize IRM G upscale trip.
Half scram on RPS A which cannot be reset.
- Recognizes half scram on RPS A.
IRM G can not be bypassed due to the
- Responds to Seismic alarm.
previous IRM A inop condition.
- Monitor crew response
- Directs SOP-90 entry for seismic event
- Entry into T.S. 3.7.1, Cond. E, required Act. E.1, restore required pump within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
- Evaluates starting second SWP pump in DIV I.
NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Direct actions for IRM failure enter TS 3.3.1.1. ; trip channel with completion time of 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.
ALERT 8.4.4 is met when seismic acceleration
- Recognize EAL 8.4.4 is met.
exceeds OBE (0.075)
- Refers to ARPs.
- Places SWP*P1F in pull-to-lock.
- Throttles flows on remaining running SWP Pumps to maintain flows 10,000 gpm.
- If directed, starts second Div I SWP pumps as follows:
- Start CSL Pump
- Start RHR A Pumps
- Start either SWP Pump C or E
- Report status to SRO EVENT 6 Seismic Aftershock Event, RPV Instrument Line Rupture When directed by lead evaluator:
Manually place MT01 Seismic Acceleration at new value of 0.25 on TRG 4. THEN activate TRG 4:
MT01 Seismic Accelaration 0.25 RR35A, RX VES NOZZLE N14 340 DEG RUPTURE DW NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Drywell pressure rises and RPV water level Crew PO-4.0 lowers with the following alarms:
- Recognize / report alarms and 601718 HPCS REACTOR WATER LEVEL rising Drywell Pressure.
HIGH
- Initiates a manual scram on rising 602226 RECIRC PMP 1B AUTO TRIP LOW Drywell pressure prior to automatic SPEED TRANSFER scram setpoint 1.68 psig is 603139 REACTOR WATER LEVEL reached.
HIGH/LOW 603141 FD WTR SYSTEM REACTOR WATER LEVEL HIGH NARROW RANGE LEVEL "A" METER (C33-R606A ON P603) fails upscale and FEEDPUMP LEVEL 8 CHANNEL "A" trips.
REACTOR PRESS RECORDER (C33-R609 ON P603), RX PRESS WIDE RANGE METER (C33-R605 ON P603) fail downscale.
Reactor building ventilation system will isolate and standby gas treatment system will start up.
ECCS systems will actuate. EDGs will start and run unloaded.
SRO PO-5.0 Initially after the scram, EOP-RPV entry
- Monitor plant response conditions are not expected to be met since
- Acknowledge scram report initial power level is low.
- Enters SOP-101C for initial response until an EOP entry condition is reached.
NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Enter into EOP-RPV on high DWP
- Directs operators to control water level between the Post Scram low level and 200 inches and to restore RPV level to between 160 and 200 inches.
- Directs Drywell Cooling restored per EOP-6 Attachment 24.
RO With RX LEVEL NR A level transmitter failed
- Places Mode switch to shutdown and provides scram report
- Restores RPV level (as directed).
SRO Preset malfunction RH14B, ECCS FAILS TO
- Recognizes/Responds to crew INITIATE (DIV II) becomes effective. communication that Division II ECCS failed to auto initiate hen expected
- Directs Manual initiation of Division II ECCS
- May direct injection prevented from LP ECCS not needed for Core Cooling (RPV Override) before RPV pressure drops to 400 psig.
NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS BOP
- Takes action to manually initiate Div II ECCS
- As Directed Injects with available FWS/Cond
- Restores Drywell Cooling per EOP-6 Attachment 24 as follows:
o Determines hottest DW temperature is below 250°F o Places Div I and Div II DRYWELL UNIT COOLER WTR LOCA OVERRIDE switches to OVERRIDE o Closes individual Unit Cooler CCP-MOVs o Opens CCP Containment Isolation valves 2CCP*MOV265, 273, 122 and 124 o Re-opens individual Unit Cooler CCP-MOVs o Places GRP 1 and GRP 2 UNIT COOLER FANS LOCA OVERRIDE switches to NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS OVERRIDE o Starts all ten available DW Unit Cooler fans o Reports DW Cooling is restored.
EVENT 7 SRO AFTER DW Cooling is restored, activate
- Directs operator to establish SC TRG 5 sprays before pressure reaches 10 RR34A RR34A, RX VES NOZZLE N14 20 psig EOP-6, Att. 22 DEG RUPTURE DW RR20 RR LOOP RUPTURE DBA 0.8%
BOP REACTOR LEVEL RECORDER (B22-R623A
- Establishes SC sprays before ON P601), REACTOR PRESSURE pressure reaches 10 psig IAW RECORDER (B22-R623A ON P601), and SPDS PRESSURE input fails low. EOP-6, Att. 22 as follows:
- Verify closed RHS*MOV24A RHS*MOV24A Injection Valve receives an OPEN PERMISSIVE. If using RHS Loop A for
- Verify RHS*P1A running SC Spray, Injection valve must be overridden
- Open RHS*MOV33A closed to allow RHS*MOV33A to be opened.
- Verify spray header flow Use of RHS Loop B instead of Loop A is also acceptable, even without LOCA initiation signal
- IF Suppression Pool Cooling is present. also direceted, throttle open Drywell and Suppression Chamber pressure RHS*FV38A rise at a faster rate. Suppression Chamber
- Open SWP valve to RHS Heat pressure slowly rises and SC Spray should be established. Pressure remains below 10 psig Exchanger.
and DW should not be required.
NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 8- Loss of RPV level indication, RPV CREW PO-5.0 - 8.0 Flooding
- Crew recognizes that RPV level is unknown.
SIM BOOTH: AFTER SC Spray is in service, activate TRG 6: SRO RR27, RPV LEVEL INSTRUMENTS ALL
- Directs restoration of pneumatics and RPV blowdown Remaining narrow, wide and upset range level ( 7 ADS valves open) CT-1.0 instruments at P603 fail upscale. Fuel Zone Acknowledge only 5 ADS SRVs recorder and indicator along with the wide open.
range level instruments on P601 PAM
- Directs additional SRVs opened recorders also fail upscale. Shutdown range
- Directs MSIVs shut.
on P851 is failed.
manually realigned to inject, since flooding is
- Directs Main Steam line drains required. isolated.
- Directs Continued Injection until rise. When sufficient pressure is in the RPV, the main steam lines are the P601 SRV indicators may now indicate the flooded as indicated by:
SRVs are open.
o Increasing Reactor pressure.
o SRV Red Light Indication on P601 -acoustic monitor noise.
o Decreasing SRV tailpipe temperature.
CT-2.0 NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Verify ECCS injecting
- Monitor containment response
- Directs crew to monitor for indications of core damage IAW EOP-C4 BOP Preset malfunctions AD08E,ADS VLV N2
- Initiates blowdown by opening 7 SUPPLY SEVERED (MSS*PSV134) and ADS valves AD08G ADS VLV N2 SUPPLY SEVERED (MSS*PSV129) become effective.
- Open additional SRVs At P601, ADS Accumulator Tank pressure drop to 0 psig for the failed SRVs.
- Establishes 7 SRVs open CT- 1.0
- Continues feeding vessel with available systems as directed.
- Monitors for indications of main steam lines flooded.
After flooding to the steam lines the crew may
- Continues Injection until the divert a loop of RHS to SC Spray. If SCP has main steam lines are flooded as exceeded 10 psig, Drywell Spray should be indicated by:
directed. o Increasing Reactor pressure.
o SRV Red Light Indication on P601 -acoustic monitor noise.
o Decreasing SRV tailpipe temperature.
CT-2.0 NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS RO
- Shuts all MSIVs.
- Verifies shut RCIC Steam Isolation valves, 2ICS*MOV121 &
2ICS*MOV128.
- Verify closed Main Steam Lines drain valves.
- Continues feeding vessel with available systems as directed.
- Monitors if main steam lines are flooded as indicated by:
o Increasing Reactor pressure.
o SRV Red Light Indication on P601 -acoustic monitor noise.
o Decreasing SRV tailpipe temperature.
CT-2.0 Termination Criteria:
Indication of Mean Steam Lines Flooded is determined by crew NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
XI. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE C. NA, NRC Exam XII. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS E. Reference Events None F. Commitments
- 3. None 4.
XIII. LESSONS LEARNED NRC 2008 Scenario 3 March 2008
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST
- 1. Additional Information about these checks:
For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
- 2. Qualitative Attributes X Realism/Credibility X Event Sequencing X Simulator Modeling X Evaluating Crew Competencies
- 3. Quantitative Attributes 6 Total Malfunctions 2 Malfunctions after EOP Entry 3 Abnormal Events 1 Major Transients 2 EOPs Used 1 EOP Contingency Procedures Used Simulator Run Time EOP Run Time 2 Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
- 4. Developmental Checks:
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?
NMP SIMULATOR SCENARIO NRC Scenario 4 REV. 00 No. of Pages: 30 STATION BLACKOUT WITH STEAM LEAK IN DRYWELL PREPARER S. Dennis DATE 12/6/07 VALIDATED Ops Crew with W. Coppom DATE 12/9/07 GEN SUPERVISOR OPS TRAINING R. Brown DATE 1/23/08 OPERATIONS MANAGER NA Exam Security DATE CONFIGURATION CONTROL NA Exam Security DATE SCENARIO
SUMMARY
Length: 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> Initial Power Level: 100%
The scenario begins with the crew performing a power maneuver to lower power to 90%
for a rod line adjustment which will take place on the next shift. The crew will perform surveillance N2-OSP-RMC-W@001 Control Rod Movement and Position Verification.
Following the third rod tested, a trip of the running CRD pump will occur due to a clogged suction strainer. Actions must be taken to start the standby pump. Once the standby pump is started, position indication for a control rod will be lost requiring the SRO to address Technical Specifications (TS 3.1.3.C.1 and 2).
One of the Control Room AC units will trip and the standby unit will fail to auto-start.
The SRO will enter TS 3.7.3.A. The running Stator Water Cooling pump then trips and the standby pump fails to start but can be manually started. If a bypass valve opens due to the pump trip and generator runback a power reduction will be required. When conditions stabilize, a loss of 4KV normal NNS-SWG015 will occur which affects RPS and requires operator action to transfer RPS to its alternate supply. Additionally, Switchgear 15 may be re-powered.
Once conditions are stabilized, a small leak will develop in the drywell requiring a manual scram of the reactor. A failure of the mode switch and RPS manual scram pushbuttons will occur requiring the use of RRCS to insert control rods (CT). The SRO will enter EOPs and EOP contingencies.
Once the rods are inserted, a Loss of Offsite Power will occur. Additionally, the EDGs will fail to auto start. The operators will take actions to start the EDGs in the control room IAW SOP-03 but they will fail to start. SOP-Station Blackout must be entered and NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
the EDGS can be started locally to repower the bus or the HPCS EDG can be used to re-power a Divisional bus (CT). The containment leak will get worse. The operators will be expected to control containment pressure with Drywell Spray prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure (CT).
Major Procedures Exercised: EOP-RPV, PC, C6. SOP-1,3,11,30,68 EAL Classification: Alert - 6.1.3 - AC Power loss for >15 minutes on one bus Alert - 3.1.1 - Primary Containment Pressure cannot be maintained <1.68 psig Alert - 2.1.1 - auto scram failed Termination Criteria: Containment pressure is decreasing and RPV level and pressure are being controlled.
Mitigation Strategy: PC3 SE1 NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
IV. SIMULATOR SET UP G. IC Number: IC-194 or IC-17 w/n08scen4.bat loaded H. Presets/Function Key Assignments
- 4. Malfunctions:
- b. RD11 30-59 CONTROL ROD FAILURE RPIS (ANY) TRG 2 (DELAY 5 SECONDS)
- e. RP03 RPS FAILURE TO SCRAM PRESET
- h. DG01A DG #1 FAILURE TO START PRESET
- i. DG01C DG #3 FAILURE TO START PRESET
- j. ED14 UPS FAULT 2VBB-UPS1G TRG 9
- 2. Remotes:
- c. DG01 LOCKOUT RELAY DG1, RESET TRG 11
- d. DG03 LOCKOUT RELAY DG3, RESET TRG 12
- e. SB05 2VBS-PNLA102 BKRS 1,2 TRG 20
- f. SB06 2VBS-PNLB102 BKR 3 (DLY 10 SECS) TRG 20
- g. SB07 2VBS-PNLA104 BKR 3 (DLY 20 SECS) TRG 20
- h. SB08 2VBS-PNLB103 BKR 7 (DLY 30 SECS) TRG 20
- i. SB01 2VBS-PNLA101 BKRS 6,7,9,11,12,13,19,20,36,37 TRG 20 (DLY 1 MIN)
- j. SB02 2VBS-PNLB101 BKR 5,6,7,8,9,12,13,14,15 TRG 20 (DLY 1MIN 10 SECS)
- k. SB03 2VBS-PNLB104 BKR 3 (DLY 1 MIN 20 SECS) TRG 20
- l. SB04 2VBS-PNLA103 BKR 3 (DLY 1 MIN 45 SECS) TRG 20
- m. SB11 2VBS-PNLA101 BKR 35 TRG 21 NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
- n. SB12 2VBS-PNLB101 BKR 23 (DLY 10 SECS) TRG 21
- o. SB09 2VBS-PNL101A BKRS 3,11,13,20 (DLY 20 SECS) TRG 21
- p. SB13 2BYS-PNL201A BKRS 11,18,19,20 (DLY 30 SECS) TRG 21
- q. SB15 2BYS-PNL202A BKRS 1,2,3,4,5,6 (DLY 1 MIN TRG 21
- r. SB14 2BYS-PNL201B BKRS 18,21 (DLY 1 MIN 10 SECS) TRG 21
- s. SB10 2VBS*PNL301B BKRS 12,13,17,20 TRG 21 (DLY 1 MIN 20 SECS)
- t. SB16 2BYS*PNL202B BKRS 1,2,3,4 (DLY 1 MIN 45 SECS) TRG 21
- 6. Overrides:
- b. OVR-04A2S022DI6126 GEN STR COOL PMP 2GMC P1B PRESET
- d. OVR-18A3S095DI1357 STP CONTROL ROOM A/C FAN*ACU1B PRESET OFF (GRN)
- e. OVR-18A3S095DI1358 NAP CONTROL ROOM A/C FAN*ACU1B PRESET OFF (GRN)
- 7. Annunciators:
- 4. None H. Support Documentation
- 1. Provide RMR for Power reduction with Recirc Flow.
- 2. Working copy of N2-OSP-RMC-W@001 for rod excercizing.
G. Miscellaneous
- 1. EVENT TRIGGER 2 rod 30-59 at 46 trgset 2 rdvposb(182)== 736
- 2. EVENT TRIGGER 15 and 16, both for zdpc1hvcb01(2) (ACU1B control switch taken to start). This deletes the preset overrides that are preventing ACU1B from auto-starting (OVR-18A3S095DI1357 and OVR-18A3S095DI1358)
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
II. SHIFT TURNOVER INFORMATION OFF GOING SHIFT: N D DATE:
PART I: To be performed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
PART II: To be reviewed by the oncoming Operator before assuming the shift.
Shift Supervisor Log (SM, CRS, STA)
- Shift Turnover Checklist (ALL)
- CRO Log (CRO)
Lit Control Room Annunciators
- Computer Alarm Summary (CRO)
Evolutions/General Information/Equipment Status:
- Reactor Power = 100%
- Loadline = >100%
- None PART III: Remarks/Planned Evolutions:
Lower Reactor power per RMR to 90% to support rod line adjustment next shift.
Perform N2-OSP-RMC-W@001 Control Rod Movement and Position Verification Test PART IV: To be reviewed/accomplished shortly after assuming the shift:
- Review new Clearances (SM)
- Test Control Annunciators (CRE)
- Shift Crew Composition (SM/CRS)
TITLE NAME TITLE NAME SRO ATC RO BOP RO NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
Scenario ID#
INSTRUCTOR COMMENTS (Strengths, Areas for Improvement, Open Items etc.)
What Happened? What we did? Why? (Goals) Other Options?
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
VI. PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES G. Critical Tasks:
CT-1.0 Given a failure of RPS the crew will use of RRCS to insert control rods.
CT-2.0 Given a Loss of Off-Site Power with a failure of the EDGs the operators will take actions to re-power at least one vital bus (either with a local EDG start or HPCS EDG cross tie) IAW SOP-03.
CT-3.0 Given a leak in the drywell the crew will initiate Drywell Spray prior to exceeding the Pressure Suppression Pressure H. Performance Objectives:
PO-1.0 Given the plant at rated power, the crew will lower power to 90%
using recirc flow control following the guidance of the provided RMR and N2-OP-101D.
PO-2.0 Given the plant at 90% power, the crew will perform surveillance N2-OSP-RMC-W@001 PO-3.0 Given a loss of the a running CRD pump, the crew will start the Standby CRD pump before receiving any accumulator alarms, IAW N2-SOP-30.
PO-4.0 Given the failure of control rod position indication for a control rod Refer to N2-OP-96, Section H and restore RPIS.
PO-5.0 Given the plant or plant system in a condition requiring Technical Specification action, identify the deviation and any required actions/notifications.
PO-6.0 Given a loss of the operating stator water cooling pump and the failure of the standby pump to auto start the operating crew will take action to manually start the standby pump IAW N2-SOP-21, N2-SOP-68 and N2-SOP-101C.
PO-7.0 Given a loss of the Control Room AC Unit and the failure of the standby AC unit to auto start the operating crew will take action to manually start the standby AC unit IAW N2-OP-53A.
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
PO-8.0 With an electrical fault on NNS-SWG015, the crew will electrically isolate NNS-SWG015 and investigate the cause per N2-SOP-03.
PO-9.0 With B RPS de-energized due to loss of NNS-SWG015, the crew will re-energize B RPS from its alternate supply per N2-SOP-97.
PO-10.0 With DW Cooling fans de-energized due to loss of NNS-SWG015, the crew will start DRS-UC3A per N2-OP-60.
PO-11.0 With the plant operating at power the crew will respond to LOCA in the drywell PO-12.0 Given the plant following a scram with a station blackout, the crew will respond to the station blackout in accordance with N2-SOP-1 and N2-SOP-03.
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS CREW
- Crew conducts a pre-brief, walks down the panels, and tests annunciators.
EVENT 1 - Power reduction to 90%
EVENT 1 -SRO Actions SRO PO-1.0
- If not previously performed, conducts Shift and Reactivity Briefs.
- Directs power lowered to 90% per RMR and OP-101D EVENT 1 -RO Actions RO Core Flow lowers, Power lowers
- Lowers power to 90 % by reducing core flow
- Moves RCS*HYV17A&B individually in the close direction, maintaining loop flow differential at a minimal value by alternating between the two valves.
- Monitors NIs and rate of power change.
EVENT 1 -BOP Actions BOP
- Monitors plant parameters to verify proper operations.
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 2 - Perform N2-OSP-RMC-W@001 Control Rod Movement and Position Verification Surveillance Test EVENT 2 -SRO Actions SRO PO-2.0
- Authorizes/directs performance of surveillance N2-OSP-RMC-W@001 EVENT 2 -RO Actions RO
- Commences surveillance
- Exercises first control rod
- Exercises the second rod EVENT 3 CRD P1A suction filter clog When directed by lead evaluator activate malfunction on TRG 1:
RD18, ONLINE CRD SUCTION FLTR CLOG.
RDS-P1A trips on low suction pressure. CREW PO-3.0 AN 603318 CRD Pmp Suct Fltr Diff Press High
- Recognize/Report the loss of RDS-AN 603315 CRD Pmp 1B Suct Press Low P1A AN 603309 CRD Pmp 1A Suct Press Low AN 603308 CRD Pmp 1A/1B Auto Trip RDS-P1A trips AN 603446 CRD PUMP DISCH HEADER PRESSURE LOW EVENT 3 SRO Actions SRO
- Directs RO to halt surveillance test.
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Directs RO to enter and execute SOP-30
- When suction filter has been NOTE: If Required, prompt SRO to swapped directs the continue with surveillance test when CRD resumption of Control Rod suction Filters are swapped Movement surveillance test.
EVENT 3 -RO Actions RO
- Enters and executes SOP-30 o Places RDS Flow Controller to Examiner Note: May receive alarm 603324 MAN for RWCU system. This will require RWCU o Closes RDS Flow Control to be removed from service (due to loss of Valve CRD flow to pump seals) o Directs AO to shift RDS Suction Filters o Throttles closed WCS*MOV200 until F/Ds are in HOLD o Trips WCS Pumps Role Play: As an Operator dispatched to o Acknowledge CRD Suction Swap CRD Suction Filters, wait 3 min. or as Filter Swap.
directed by lead instructor, clear Malfunction o Restart a CRD pump per N2-RD18 and report Suction Filters swapped. SOP-30.
o Report CRD Flow restored.
Examiner Note: The following annunciator CREW may alarm during the CRD suction Filter
- Recognizes/Reports control rod swap. high temperature alarm and takes the actions of ARP.
AN 603316, CONTROL ROD HIGH
- Dispatches Aux Operator to TEMPERATURE alarms. monitor CRD temperatures.
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Role Play: As the Aux Operator dispatched to monitor CRD temperatures, report that highest temperature is on rod 18-43 (report 265°F if alarm is in, report 240°F if alarm is clear).
EVENT 4 - Rod Position Indication Lost CREW PO-4.0 & 5.0
- Resumes N2-OSP-RMC-W@001 NOTE: Trigger 2 automatically activates Control Rod Movement and when rod 30-59 is at position 46, after 5 Position Verification.
second delay.
- Diagnose loss of RPIS for 30-59 EVENT 4 SRO Actions Role Play: As the Reactor Engineer direct a SRO halt to all further rod movement and direct the
- Suspend all attempts to move SRO to determine the control rod movement control rods.
and notify Reactor Engineering if any control
- Direct entry into N2-OP-96, rod movement occurs. Section H.
Role Play: As the I & C Supervisor ask for
- Refer to Technical Specification all the current control room annunciators and 3.1.3 state you will send an I & C Tech to determine
- Determines a control rod whose the cause of the problem. position cannot be determined be declared inoperable and fully inserted within 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> and disarmed within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />.
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Notify the Reactor Engineer AND Contact the I&C Department to troubleshoot AND repair.
- Suspend all attempts to move control rods.
- Refer to N2-OP-96, Section H.
- Record the lit LEDs in 2CEC-PNL615.
- Attempt to determine the position of 30-59 by checking:
The Full-In (or Full-out)
PNL 615 is not simulated. If required provide indication on the R&DD.
cue that I&C will obtain this data.
- Demand an OD-7 printout from the process computer.
- Reposition rod to a known position.
EVENT 5 - Control Room AC unit trips When directed by lead evaluator activate TRG 3:
OVR-20A2S065DI2438 PTL CNTL RM A/C CREW PO-7.0 FAN ACU 1A SW, ON
- Recognizes and diagnoses the AN870326 Control Rm AC Unit 1A Auto Trip, loss of Control Room AC and the CRYWOLF (10 sec delay). standby unit failure to auto-start.
2HVC*ACU1A Control Room ACU trips.
ACU1B should start on low flow, but it fails to automatically start.
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 5 SRO Actions SRO
- Directs manual start of CNTL RM A/C FAN ACU 1B
- Enters procedure N2-OP-53A
- Enters TS 3.7.2.A - 7 days, TS 3.7.3.A - 30 days.
EVENT 5 RO Actions
- Monitors Reactor Power, Pressure
& Level EVENT 5 BOP Actions BOP
- Manually starts CNTL RM A/C FAN ACU 1B.
- Verifies system conditions IAW Enters procedure N2-OP-53A
- Verifies CR HVAC operates correctly EVENT 6 Stator water pump trip, failure of standby to auto start When directed by the lead evaluator activate TRG 4 EG06A MAIN GEN STATOR CLG PMP TRIP (P1A)
GMC-P1A trips on motor electric fault. Crew PO-8.0 AN851135, STTR CLG WTR Pump 1A/1B
- Recognizes/reports loss of GMC-Auto Trip/Fail to Start P1A.
GMC-P1B fails to start automatically
- Recognizes failure of standby EHC Loadset motor begins to runback GMC pump to start automatically.
Turbine bypass valves begin to open.
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 6 SRO Actions SRO
- Enters SOP-68
- If a runback occurs, initiate a power reduction IAW N2-SOP-101D as necessary to maintain the BPV closed EVENT 6 BOP Actions BOP
- Enters SOP-68 Role Play: As the AO sent to Stator Water
- Manually starts GMC-P1B skid that all conditions are normal. If sent to
- Reports start of standby GMC the breaker for GMC-P1A report that the pump breaker front is warm.
- Dispatched personnel to the local Report that the breaker for GMC-P1B appears GMC skid to check for probable normal. causes.
EVENT 7 Loss of NNS-SWG015 When directed by lead evaluator activate override on TRG 5: CREW PO-8.0, 9.0, 10.0 OVR-05A2S101DI7235 STP NORM
Supply breaker to NNS-SWG015 (15-3) trips
- Enter SOP-3 for loss of SWG015.
open. SWG015 and NJS-US6 de-energize
Major alarms include 852545 4KV BUS NNS 015 SUPPLY ACB AUTO TRIP/FTC, 852547 NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS 4KV BUS NNS 015 UNDERVOLTAGE and 852453 LOAD CENTER NJS US6 UNDERVOLTAGE Plant response will include loss of CCS-P1B, RDS-P1B (non-running pump, if A was restarted in Event 3), WCS-P1B, 1/2 of DW Cool Fans and RPM - MG1B causing the RPS B scram pilot solenoids to de-energize (silent half scram).
CUE: After being dispatched by control room, report as Electrical Maintenance that NNS-SWG015 has no problems and it appears a problem occurred with BKR 15-3.
- Ensures SOP-3 is entered for SWG015 loss.
Role Play: After being dispatched by control room, report as Electrical Maintenance that Switchgear 15 has no problems and it appears a problem occurred with BKR 15-3.
Role Play: As AO dispatched for SOP-97, report, as necessary:
- RPM*ACB1B tripped
- RPM*ACB2B tripped
- RPM-MG1B not running
- RPM-MG1B Generator Output switch closed
- NHS-MCC009-4EL breaker closed NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 7 RO Actions RO
- Check control rod positions for drifting control rods
- Monitor Power, Pressure & Level EVENT 7 BOP Actions If RPS Power Source Selector Switch at P610 is incorrectly positioned to ALT A, a reactor scram will occur.
BOP Sim Booth: When asked to reset the EPAs for
- Direct an operator to reset the EPAs.
Role Play: As AO dispatched for SOP-97 to reset the EPAs report:
- EPA relay trip flags reset
- EPA breaker reset After the EPA breakers are reset, the four white lights for P603 RPS B scram pilot solenoid lights will light, indicating power is restored to scram pilot solenoids.
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS EVENT 8 Steam Leak in containment, Failure to Scram When RPS B has been re-energized per SOP-97 and as directed by the lead evaluator, activate malfunction TRG 7: CREW PO-11.0
- Recognizes and responds to MS03 STM LEAK INSIDE PRI CONT, 5% annunciator.
- Identifies and reports changing 603140 Drywell Pressure HIGH/LOW containment parameters.
- Directs mode switch to shutdown.
- Enters RPV Control.
When the Mode switch is placed in
- Directs EOP-RPV on power >4%
SHUTDOWN and manual scram pushbuttons and scram is required.
are depressed, the RPS logic fails to trip. N2-
- Exits EOP-RPV and enters EOP-EOP-RPV is entered and then exited. N2- C5 Failure to SCRAM.
EOP-C5 is entered.
- Directs ADS logic inhibited.
- Directs CSH placed in pull-to-lock.
Inches After RRCS is manually initiated, the ARI
- Directs RRCS initiated. Rods function will bleed down the scram air header Insert and all control rods fully insert. CT-1.0
- Directs a RPV water level band 160-200 inches.
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Directs a RPV pressure band with a target of 800-1000 psig.
- Directs EOP-6, Attachment 13.
- May direct EOP-6 Attachment 10.
- Place reactor mode switch in shutdown and provides scram reports.
- Attempts manual scram using RPS RPS fails to trip. pushbuttons
- Recognizes and Reports all control rods did not insert Control rods insert after the scram air header
CT-1.0
- Takes appropriate action to maintain RPV water level within the directed band of 160 -200 inches.
- Takes appropriate action to maintain RPV pressure within the directed band.
- Inhibits ADS.
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Drywell Cooling can only be restored if AC
- Restores drywell Cooling (EOP-6 power is available, when this step is att 24):
implemented. o Determines drywell temperature <250°F o Overrides drywell unit cooler water LOCA isolation interlocks with keylock switches.
o Verifies closed drywell unit cooler inlet valves
- Restores CCP to drywell by opening containment isolation valves.
o Restores CCP to drywell unit coolers by opening drywell unit cooler inlet valves.
o Overrides drywell unit cooler fan interlocks with keylock switches.
o Restarts drywell Unit cooler Fans (all).
Sim Booth Operator: After exiting EOP-Failure to Scram and re-entering EOP-RPV control AND a level and pressure band has been established activate TRG 8:
EVENT 9 - Loss of Offsite Power with EDG Auto start failures (SBO).
ED02A, LOSS OF OFFSITE 115KV LINE 5 ED02B, LOSS OF OFFSITE 115KV LINE 6 NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS Loss of Line 5 and 6 resulting in NPS- CREW PO-12.0 SWG001 and 003.
- Recognizes and reports Loss of Loss of all Feed Power.
Recirc pumps trip
Circ Water pumps trip and condenser vacuum degrades.
Loss of all AC except Div III Diesel EVENT 9 SRO Actions SRO
- Directs Entry to SOP-3 for Loss of TRG 20 and 21 are only used if load shedding AC is directed during the SBO. It is likely that SBO will be exited prior to initiating load shed.
- Directs start attempt of the EDGs EXAMINER NOTE: from the control room
- Restores power to at least one After the SRO enters the Station Blackout EOP, and requests performance of the step vital bus either with the EDGs or to Bypass the RCIC Room High Cross-Tie of the HPCS EDG to a Temperature Alarms, the EDGs will be made available. bus CT-2.0 The field operator dispatched will report that there are indications of an incomplete
- Enters Station Blackout-SOP and start on both EDGs and they can be started performs all legs concurrently until locally.
EDG(s) are returned to service and At examiners discretion, once operators are vital buses are repowered.
dispatched to the 4KV buses per SOP-3
- Directs level control using RCIC.
Sim Booth:
- Directs pressure control using When requested, as the field operator SRVs report that there are indications of an
- Directs entry into EOP-PC as incomplete start on both EDGs, the problem was found and they can be started appropriate.
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS locally.
- Directs suppression chamber spray be initiated before exceeding After the SRO enters the Station Blackout 10 psig suppression chamber EOP, and requests performance of the step pressure.
to Bypass the RCIC Room High Temperature Alarms, the EDGs will be made available.
When directed by examiner to allow restart of the EDGS; Manually Delete Malfunctions:
DG01A for Div 1 DG DG01C for Div 2 DG AND Insert Remote DG01 -Reset TRG 11 Insert Remote DG03 -Reset TRG 12 EVENT 9 BOP Actions BOP
- Attempts to start the EDGs 1 and III as per SOP-3 Detail A instructions:
Per procedures, if the HPCS Div III DG is the o Checks listed annunciators only DG started, it must be manually shutdown o Reports DGs cannot be started because of lack of cooling water. Cooling from control room die to lit water is supplied from Div I and II service annunciators water. o RECOGIZES AND REPORTS THAT NEITHER EDG can be STARTED.
Sim Booth: Once the Divisional EDGs have
MS04, STM LINE RUPTURE IN PRI CON 1% 1000 psig with 8 minute ramp.
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS
- Places RHR A(B) in suppression chamber sprays as follows.
o Opens SWP*MOV90A(B) -
Drywell and Suppression Chamber Pressure may be delayed until after rise and approach 10 psig (SCP). spray are in service as follows:
o Verifies RHR pump A(B) running.
o Verifies RHS*MOV24A(B) overridden closed.
o Opens RHS*MOV33B to establish SC spray flow.
o Opens RHS*FV38A(B) and establish approximately 7450 gpm-if suppression pool cooling is required.
o Throttles open SWP*MOV33A(B) to establish flow not to exceed 7400 gpm.
May be required to start th 5 Service Water pump (post-LOCA).
o Closes RHS*MOV8A(B) - after 10 minute time delay from ECCS initiation signal.
o Directs RP to place SWP*RE23A(B) in service.
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS SRO DW pressure continues to rise and when SC
- Verifies DW spray conditions are met.
- Directs RCS Pumps tripped.
- Direct DRS Unit Coolers tripped.
CT-3.0 RO/BOP
o Trips DRS Unit Coolers.
Pressure Suppression Pressure (PSP from
- Places RHR in Drywell Spray EOP-PC Curve L) limit is about 17 psig in SC prior to exceeding the Pressure with SPL at 200.5 feet. Suppression pressure limit as follows: CT-3.0 o Verifies an initiation signal present.
o Opens SWP*MOV90A(B) -
May be delayed until after sprays are in service.
After DW Sprays are initiated, DWP and SCP o Verifies RHR pump running.
begin to lower. o Verifies closed RHS*FV38A (B).
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
INSTRUCTOR ACTIONS/
PLANT RESPONSE OPERATOR ACTIONS o Verifies open RHS*MOV4A (B).
o Opens RHS*MOV25A (B).
o Opens RHS*MOV15A (B).
o Verifies RHS*MOV4A (B) closes.
o Verifies approximately 7450 gpm on drywell spray header.
o Closes RHS*MOV8A (B) after 10 minute time delay from receipt of initiation signal.
o Contacts RP to start SWP*RE23A(B).
o Throttles open SWP*MOV33A (B) to establish flow not to exceed 7400 gpm - may be required to start 5th service water pump (post LOCA).
- Monitors for improving containment parameters Termination Cue:
Containment pressure is decreasing and RPV level and pressure are being controlled.
NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
XIV. POST SCENARIO CRITIQUE D. NA, NRC Exam XV. REFERENCE EVENTS AND COMMITMENTS G. Reference Events None H. Commitments
- 5. None XVI. LESSONS LEARNED NRC 2008 Scenario 4 March 2008
EVALUATED SCENARIO CHECKLIST
- 1. Additional Information about these checks:
For continuing training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 604 and Appendix D.
For initial training, can be found in NUREG 1021, ES 301 and Appendix D.
- 2. Qualitative Attributes X Realism/Credibility X Event Sequencing X Simulator Modeling X Evaluating Crew Competencies
- 3. Quantitative Attributes 7 Total Malfunctions 2 Malfunctions after EOP Entry 5 Abnormal Events 1 Major Transients 2 EOPs Used 1 EOP Contingency Procedures Used Simulator Run Time EOP Run Time 2 Crew Critical Tasks (if applicable per Attachment 6.)
- 4. Developmental Checks:
Does every event have either a Critical Task(s) or Performance Objective?
Is Criteria given for sequencing to subsequent events?
Is termination criteria clear and unambiguous?
Does termination criteria allow verification that all CT, PO standards are met?