ML071930259
| ML071930259 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/2007 |
| From: | St.Pierre G, Wright K Florida Power & Light Energy Seabrook |
| To: | Caruso J NRC Region 1 |
| Sykes, Marvin D. | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML062050109 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-443/07-301 | |
| Download: ML071930259 (74) | |
Text
ro io SI M U LATOR EXAM IN AT1 ON 2007 LOlT NRC EXAM DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A (
9 Rev. 01 This material is developed for FPL Energy Seabrook training programs by the Training Group.
Text materials and figures contained in this document are developed for purposes of instructior and should not be used in connection with either plant maintenance or plant operation. This material may not be reproduced without the authorization of the Training Manager.
PREPARED BY:
DATE:
INSTRUCTOR REVIEWED BY:
DATE:
SME (OPTIONAL)
APPROVED BY:
DATE:
TRAINING SUPERVISOR
SCENARIO This scenario begins with a power increase to 100% power.
The crew will experience a Feedwater instrument and feed regulating valve failure requiring manual control of Feedwater for the remainder of the scenario.
A pressurizer pressure instrument will fail high. The subsequent transient will cause an RCS leak to develop in the pressurizer steam space. This will require a reactor trip and safety injection. Failure of the SI Pumps and the B RHR pump to Auto start creates a critical task.
Entry in to the E-Plan will be for the RCS leak initially and then for the SI with ECCS required.
Eventual transition to ES-1.2, POST LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization will end the scenario.
Page 2 of 17
0 0
- 1.
Reset the simulator to IC31, Middle of Core Life, 75% Power, Xenon building in after an approx. 20%/hr power decrease, Boron Concentration = 1171 ppm, Axial Flux Difference = - 1.I2 %.
mfS1003, SI-P-6A Fails To Auto Start.
mfS1004, SI-P-6B Fails To Auto Start.
These create critical task for US/PSO 0
3 Malfunctions; Residual Heat removal MfRHOO6, RH-P-8B Fails To Auto Start.
Page 3 of 17
SHIFT TURNOVER The Crew is at 75% Power. Current Boron concentration is 1171 ppm.
Continue power increase to 100% power @ a rate of IO%/hr.
Axial Flux Difference is on target at - 1.12 YO Page 4 of 17
Rev. 01 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A SCENARIO OUTLINE EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Shift Turnover Event 1 Power Increase Shift turnover information as stated.
Operators should review alarms and indications Unit Supervisor: A brief reactivity review will take place discussing the temperature limits for Tave to be used in the power increase.
The temperature band will normally be 22°F. Control rods will be used for AFD and temperature control.
Turbine Operations: The BOP will increase the turbine Load Pot in 3 to 5 increments, called Flats. This opens the turbine control valves to increase turbineheactor power. He should verify the change with control valve position change, temperature change and power change.
Reactor Power change: The crew will use control rods initially to increase temperature during the turbine load increases. Using ODI-56, a dilution value will be determined to change the boron concentration and increase power/temperature. If control rods are used in manual the operator will verify rod speed, place the Rod Motion Selector switch to the OUT direction and withdraw the rods a maximum of three steps. He will monitor temperature and power as confirmation of his actions.
Using the laminated sheets for the Figure 2: Dilution Check List, the RO will set up the controllers for the required dilution volume and rate.
The high level steps are:
0 Verify the pumps in AUTO e
Verify the makeup valves are in AUTO 0
Activate Non-RCS Make Up Function on plant computer 0
Place Blender Mode Start Switch to STOP 0
Place the Mode Selector Switch to Dilute or Alt. Dilute 0
Set the quantity on CIS-FIQ-111 controller Pane 5 nf 17
Rev. 01 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Set the Mode Start Switch to START 0
Verify the pumps and valves respond 0
Verify Plant Response.
Restore System 0
Deactivate Non-RCS Makeup on plant computer.
Pane 6 nf 17
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS EVENT 2 C Feedwater 0
regulating valve fails 0 to 100% output. At the same time the 0
controlling channel 0
for level fails low.
0 0
Component Malfunctions; Feedwater Alarms:
Insert malfunctions: ctFWFK530 Select: FAIL OUTPUT (AUTO)
Value: 100%
Ramp: 30 seconds INSERT Lt F W LT553 VAS Alarm F4841 SG C Level Lo Lo VAS Alarm D4772, SG C Level Ref Deviation VAS Alarm D4878, SG C Level Low VAS Alarm D4710, SG C Stm Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch U/A Alarm, UA-53, C-3, SG C Level Hi/Lo Crew responds with OS1 235.03, SG Level Instrument Failure:
0 BOP operator should take manual control of the C SG Reg.
Valve. This action may be Skill of the Operator prior to entering the procedure.
0 Select: FAIL LOW Step la.) BOP operator should identify failed channel (Level channel Step 1 b.) BOP operator should place C Feed Reg. Valve in manual.
Step IC.) BOP operator should manually control level 45-55%.
Step 2) BOP operator should select the Channel 1 level instrument.
Step 3) BOP operator will attempt to return the C Feed reg. Valve to Auto. The operator should realize that the C Feed Reg. Valve controller output signal fails to 100% output. The operator will have to operate the valve in manual for the remainder of the scenario.
553).
NOTE: Crew may contact I&C to help troubleshoot failed Reg.
Valve controller.
NOTE: Crew may consider calling in an additional operator for feed control. An additional operator is not available.
Step 4) The BOP operator should check that NO redundant bistable lights are lit. The only light that should be lit is UL-6, B-I 1, SG C LB-553A Level Lo Lo.
Step 5) The Unit Supervisor should identify the following applicable Tech. Spec. items:
Pane 7 nf 17
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, Item 13, Action 6, Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Item 5b, Action 18, required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Tech. Spec. 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Item 6a, Action 18, required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Item 7c, Action 18, required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Item 7, NOT APPICABLE, NOT A PAM INSTRUMENT.
Step 6) BOP verifies ATWS Input Status. NO ATWS mitigation channel failed.
Return to procedure and step in effect.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure or at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction:
Parre 8 nf 17
Rev. 01 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A EVENT EVENT 3 Co nt ro I I i ng pressurizer pressure instrument fails high.
This causes the master pressure control le r to malfunction.
INSTRUCTION Reactor Coolant; Component Malfunctions; Insert malfunction: ptRCPT455, 0
FAIL TO SPECIFIED VALUE: 2500 0
Ramp: 15 seconds 0
INSERT COMMENTS Alarms:
VAS F7860, PZR Press Hi Channel Trip UL-6, A-6, Pressurizer PB-455A Press Hi UA-52, D-8, Master Press CTLR Output Lo-may come in when taking pressure controller to manual.
Crew responds with OS1 201.06, PZR Instrument Component Failure.
oPSO operator should take manual control of the pressurizer master pressure controller. This action may be Skill of the Operator prior to entering the procedure.
Step 1) Check PORVs closed. YES Step 2) Check Normal PZR Spray Valves-CLOSED. YES Step 3) Check Pressurizer Pressure Channels. Controlling channel is failed. RC-PI-455A is failed high.
Step 4) Realign Pressurizer Pressure Instruments:
a) RO should manually control pressurizer pressure @ program.
b) RO should select alternate control and backup channels: 4571456.
c) RO should select an alternate channel for recorder.
d) RO should select an alternate AT, OT, OP channel for recorder.
Step 5) Align Pressurizer Pressure Control:
a) RO should control pressure such that it is trending towards 2235 psig.
b) When pressure approaches 2235 psig the RO should take actions to place the pressure controller in automatic.
Step 6) Verify redundant channel bistables-Not Tripped:
RO should verify that there are no redundant channel bistables lit on UL-1 and UL-6.
Pane !J nf 17
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Step 7) Verify Tech. Spec. compliance:
The Unit Supervisor should identify the following applicable Tech.
Spec. items:
Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, Item 7, Action 6, Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, Item 9, Action 6, Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, Item 10, Action 6, Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Item Id, Action 18, Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Item loa, Action 18, Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.2.5, DNBR. Tech Requirements, Chapter 6, Item 2.12, DNB Parameters. Unit Supervisor should address this item if RCS pressure drops below 2185 psig.
0 If desired to test or troubleshoot, Unit supervisor may direct I&C to place bistables to bypass using BTI for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure or at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction.
Pane I n nf 17
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 Event 4 0
0 RCS leak develops.
0 0
Insert malfunction: Reactor Coolant, Alarms:
mfRC048Cl RCS Hot Leg 3 Leakl 0-175000 GPM.
RDMS Alarm: RM65262-1 Contm Recirc Noble Gas Hi.
RDMS Alarm: Containment Gas Backup High.
Final Value: 30 GPM Ramp: 60 seconds INSERT Conditions:
RO should notice decreasing Pressurizer level.
Crew should observe above listed RDMS alarms.
Crew responds with OS1201.02, RCS Leak. Crew should recognize E-Plan call for Unusual Event, RCS Leakage =- 10 gpm, Unusual Event, item 15A.
Step I ) Check if pressurizer level can be maintained.
- a. Control charging and letdown flow as necessary.
- b. Check pressurizer level stable or increasing.
RO should be reducing letdown flow and creating a flow balance to support calculating an estimated leak rate.
Step 2) Determine the appropriate procedure step transition.
The Unit Supervisor should transition to Step 3, for suspected RCS leak.
Step 3) Isolate potential RCS leak sources.
- a. Check pressurizer safety and PORV leakage. This includes checking acoustic monitoring alarms. No Leakage
- b. Check reactor head vent isolated. Yes
- c. Check Excess Letdown isolated. Yes
- d. Check RCS sample valves closed. Yes
- e. Check reactor vessel flange leakoff temperature.(RC-TI-401) Normal
- f. Check valve stem leakoff header temperature (D7805 and D7804). No alarms
- g. Check Steam Generator tubes intact. Yes
- i. Evaluate RCS leakage-Leakage Isolated. No. Go to step 15.
Step 15) Continue efforts to locatehdentify source of leak.
Step 16) Estimate RCS leak rate.
RO should estimate ieak rate at approx. 30 gpm.
BOP should backup the estimate with containment sump trend etc.
Pane 11 nf 17
Rev. 01 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Instructor CUE: After identifying the leak is greater than TS, if the Crew decides to wait the 4 hOurs for investigation, prompt them that management has decided to begin the Step 17) Evaluate plant conditions.
- a. Unit Supervisor should identify Tech. Spec. 3.4.6.2, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, greater than 1 gpm allowed limit for Unidentified Leakage.
- b. Unit Supervisor should refer to EAL 15A, Unusual Event.
Step 18) Check VCT Makeup Controls. SAT at this Step 19) Evaluate continued plant operation.
Unit Supervisor should identify the need for a plant shutdown due to RCS leakage greater than Tech. Spec. limits.
Step 20) Commence controlled shutdown.
Unit Supervisor should direct a plant shutdown per OS1 000.06, Power Decrease.
Step 21) Check CST level greater than 390,000 gallons.
BOP should check level and direct NSO to commence makeup as necessary.
The remainder of the procedure may not be performed based on Lead Examiner discretion.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure and/ or perform power decrease, at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction.
Pane 17 nf 17
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Event 5 0 Insert malfunction: Reactor Coolant, Pressurizer manway failure (meant to 0 mfRC052, PZR Steam Leak (Max:
represent a pressurizer weld failure).
Manway failure: 11,500 Ibslsec.)
0 Final Value: 170 0 Ramp: 120 seconds INSERT NOTE: IF THE CREW IS SLOW TO REACT THE REACTOR MAY AUTO TRIP ON RCS PRESSURE LO-LO.
Alarms:
RDMS Alarm: RM6526l-1 Contm Recirc Particulate High VAS D4327, PZR Pressure Low & BK Heaters On Conditions:
RO should notice a substantial increase in the RCS leakrate.
The crew should recognize the need to utilize the RCS Leak abnormal Caution Statement for inability to maintain pressurizer level greater than 7% using the normal charging lineup. The crew should carry out the following actions:
- 1) Trip the reactor.
- 2) When reactor is verified tripped, Then actuate SI.
- 3) GO to E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION After SI is initiated the crew should carry out the immediate actions Of E-0:
Step 1) RO should verify reactor tripped. Yes Step 2) BOP should verify turbine tripped. Yes Step 3) BOP should verify power to AC busses. Yes Step 4) RO should check SI actuated. Yes-Both Trains After Step 4 of E-0 the crew should check for any high priority alarms:
Based on E-0 OAS page, the crew may stop RCPs based on inadequate subcooling.
RO may notice the following alarms:
VAS F5459, RHR Pump B Fail To Auto Start VAS F5483, SI Pump A Fail To Auto Start VAS F5490, SI Pump B Fail To Auto Start VAS F7971, RCS Subcooling Margin Low Pane I 3 nf 17
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS RO may notice a low subcooling margin via the following MCB indications:
RCS Subcooling meter, RC-TI-9424-A RCS Subcooling meter, RC-TI-9424-B The Crew should recognize the need to trip the Reactor Coolant Pumps when subcooling goes to less than 40°F.
Step 5) Perform ESF Actuation Verification.
RO should identify the need to align at least one train of equipment.
NOTE: These are not an event as they were set UP to not auto start in the scenario set up.
Both SI pumps and the B RHR pump failed to auto start. The RO should recognize the need to start the pumps per Attachment A, Step 2.
NOTE: For a brief time the RCS Integrity status tree, PI, may toggle to Red andlor Orange. This condition is transient and is expected to reset before exiting E-0.
Step 6) Monitor RCS temperature stable at or trending to 557°F.
Step 6 RNO) Crew should identify RCS temperature less than 557°F and trending downward. Crew should perform RNO actions.
Step 7) Check RCS isolated. Yes Step 8) Check if RCPs should be stopped. Yes. Subcooling is less than 40°F. RCPs may have already been stopped.
Step 9) Check if Steam Generator pressure boundary is faulted. No Step IO) Check if SG u-tubes are intact. Yes Step 11) Check if RCS is intact. NO.
Crew should transition to E-I, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
Pane I 4 nf 17
EVENT INSTRUCTION Step 1) Check if RCPs should be stopped. Pumps should have already been stopped.
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 COMMENTS The crew should enter E-I, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
Step 2) Check if SG pressure boundary is faulted. NO. Go to Step 3 Step 3) Check intact SG levels. BOP should take actions for SG levels based on adverse containment. Check for at least 1 SG Narrow Range level greater than 15%. If NO-Maintain total EFW flow greater than 500 gpm. If YES, open EFW mini-flow valves and control feed to maintain SG levels 1550%.
Step 4) Check secondary radiation (Main Steam Lines, Condenser Air Evac, Steam Generator Blowdown). No SG uncontrolled Narrow Range level increase. All indications normal.
Step 5) Check PORVs and block valves. Power is available, PORVs are closed, and both block valves are open.
Depending on the crew pace, either Subcooling or RCS Pressure may be the reason for going to Step 7 from Step 6.
Step 6) Check if ECCS flow should be reduced. NO.
RO may identify that subcooling is less than 40°F, or the check of RCS Pressure STABLE or INCREASING may be a NO.
Go to Step 7 Step 7) Check if Cont. Spray should be stopped. Not running.
Step 8) Check if RHR pumps should be stopped. NO. Pressure not stable or increasing.
Go to Step 9: Check RCS and SG pressures. All SG pressures are stable. RCS pressure is decreasing.
Pane 15 nf 17
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Step IO) Check if diesels should be stopped. Yes.
BOP should identify that all busses are energized via the UATs.
BOP should stop diesels by depressing the Emergency Stop pushbuttons.
Step 11) Evaluate plant status.
- a. Crew should verify Cold Leg Recirc. capability. Yes
- c. No CBS pumps running.
- d. Check for containment leakage. No
- e. Consult with TSC
- f. Evaluate ESF equipment per Attachment A.
RO should evaluate equipment as time permits.
Step 12) Check if RCS cooldown and depressurization are required.
Crew should check RCS pressure Greater Than 300 psig.
Transition to ES-1.2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, Step 1.
Emergency Plan:
Initial: Unusual Event, item 15A, RCS Leakage, Unidentified or Pressure Boundary Leakage 21 Ogpm or Identified Leakage
>25gpm.
Upgrade: SAE, item 15d, may be selected based on prior conditions during the scenario.
CUE: Administer SRO ADMIN JPM 05, Emergency Plan Classification and notification. The candidate should be told to classify based upon the worst case conditions in the scenario.
Terminate the exam at the Lead Examiner discretion when crew enters ES-1.2.
P a m 16 nf 17
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAM Scenario A REV.01 CREW CRITICAL TASKS
- 1. Establish flow from at least one intermediate head ECCS pump (SI-P-6A or SI-P-68) before transitioning out of E-0.
- 2. Trip all RCP's if subcooling is less than 40°F (not time dependant) such that an orange path on Core Cooling does not occur when forced circulation in RCS stops.
Paae 17 of 17
ro SIMULATOR EXAM IN AT1 0 N 2005 - 2007 LOlT DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario B Rev. 01 This material is developed for FPL Energy Seabrook training programs by the Training Group.
Text materials and figures contained in this document are developed for purposes of instructior and should not be used in connection with either plant maintenance or plant operation. This material may not be reproduced without the authorization of the Training Manager.
PREPARED BY:
DATE:
INSTRUCTOR REVIEWED BY:
DATE:
SME (OPTIONAL)
DATE:
APPROVED BY:
TRAINING SUPERVISOR
SCE NARlO The simulator is reset to IC #31, Middle of Core Life, 75% Power. The Reactor will not trip automatically or manually.
After the reactor is locally tripped, a loss of offsite power occurs and the B Emergency Diesel Generator breaker does not close. No means of emergency boration will exist at this point. The motor driven EFW pump is not available because it is powered from Bus 6 (B EDG). The turbine driven EFW pump trips on overspeed and will be restored in FR-H.1.
The crew completes FR-S.l and goes to the procedure and step in effect (Normally E-0). The crew should go straight to FR-H.1, due to the H Red Path and E-0 having been already exited.
0 At step 1 of FR-H.l, the crew verifies heat sink required.
0 At step 2 the crew will note that no CCP (charging pump) is available and go directly to step 10 (bleed and feed).
0 The crew will perform steps IO through 18, and at step 20 begins to look for sources to feed the steam generators.
0 The crew will establish the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump as a feed source, using step 5 as a guideline and return to step 21 to continue with the procedure.
0 At steps 24 and 25 the crew will close the PORV's and transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, when subcooling is less than required.
0 At step 12 of E-1 the crew goes to ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
Terminate the exam at the Chief Examiners discretion.
Page 2 of 21
SIMULATOR SETUP
- 1.
Reset the simulator to IC #31, Middle of Core Life, 75% Power 2
Reactor will not trip automatically or manually.
Insert Malfunctions, Reactor Protection; 0
0 0
0 mfRPSOOl, Automatic Reactor Trip Failure Train A mfRPSOO 2, Automatic Reactor Trip Failure Train B mfRPS027, Reactor trip Switches Fail to Actuate (Train A) mfRPS028, Reactor trip Switches Fail to Actuate (Train B) 3 EDG-1 B breaker will not close on demand. Insert Malfunctions, Electrical Distribution Component 0
bkEDEGDG, Select Fail Open 4 0 Align SUFP to Bus 4 for SUFP Breaker testing on Bus 5.
0 Place a Danger Tag on SUFP Breaker Control Switch.
5 On Sim Diagram FW3, FW-P-37B, Component Malfunction 0
bkFW P37B 0
SELECT: FAIL OPEN 0
INSERT Page 3 of 21
SHIFT TURNOVER The plant is at 75% power. The current boron concentration is 1171 ppm.
The SUFP is aligned to Bus 4 for Breaker Testing of the BUS 5 SUFP Breaker Axial Flux Difference is on target at - 1.I2 YO.
Continue the power increase at 10% per hour.
Page 4 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 SCENARIO OUTLINE EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Event I Shift Turnover Shift turnover information as stated.
Operators should review alarms and indications.
Crew continues power increase to 100% at 10% per hour.
At the Chief Examiners discretion continue to the next event.
Unit Supervisor: A brief reactivity review will take place discussing the temperature limits for Tave to be used in the power increase. The temperature band will normally be 22°F. Control rods will be used for AFD and temperature control.
Turbine Operations: The BOP will increase the turbine Load Pot in 3 to 5 increments, ca I led " Flats".
This opens the turbine control valves to increase turbineheactor power.
He should verify the change with control valve position change, temperature change and power change.
Page 5 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 EVENT Event I INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Reactor Power change: The crew will use control rods initially to increase temperature during the turbine load increases. Using ODI-56, a dilution value will be determined to change the boron concentration and increase power/temperature. If control rods are used in manual the operator will verify rod speed, place the Rod Motion Selector switch to the OUT direction and withdraw the rods a maximum of three steps. He will monitor temperature and power as confirmation of his actions.
Using the laminated sheets for the Figure 2: Dilution Check List, the RO will set up the controllers for the required dilution volume and rate.
The high level steps are:
0 Verify the pumps in AUTO 0
Verify the makeup valves are in AUTO 0
Activate Non-RCS Make Up Function on plant computer 0
Place Blender Mode Start Switch to STOP 0
Place the Mode Selector Switch to Dilute or Alt. Dilute 0
Set the quantity on CIS-FIQ-111 controller 0
Set the Mode Start Switch to START 0
Verify the pumps and valves respond 0
Verify Plant Response.
0 Restore System Deactivate Non-RCS Makeup on plant computer Page 6 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS EVENT 2 0
The controlling channel of Pressurizer c]
level will fail low.
0 Insert Malfunction: Reactor Coolant Alarms:
Com ponent Malfunctions VAS D4461, PZR LVL Low & HTR Interlock Actuated VAS F4323, PZR Control Heaters Tripped VAS F4324, PZR Group C Backup Heaters Tripped VAS F4325, PZR Group D Backup Heaters Tripped VAS 881 86, PZR STM/CHG Line AT Approach Limit 0RC-LCV-459 and CS-V-145 will go closed and isolate letdown flow.
0 At 5% pressurizer level deviation, alarm VAS D4436, PZR LVL Deviation High & BU HTRS On will go into alarm state and the Pressurizer Backup Heaters will energize.
ltRCLT459, FAILS LOW INSERT Conditions:
The crew responds using OS1201.07, PZR Level Instrument Failure.
Step 1) The RO should identify the controlling level channel has failed low.
Step 2) The step calls for manually controlling pressurizer level at program.
0 0
The RO will have to control charging to supply just the RCP seals.
The operator should take manual control of CS-FK-121, Charging Flow Control Valve, and adjust CS-HCV-182, Seal Injection flow control to accomplish this task.
The RO should select alternate channels for Control/Backup. The operator should select the 461/460 combination.
The RO should select an alternate channel (460 or 461) for the pressurizer level recorder.
0 0
Step 3) The RO should "reset" the control group pressurizer heaters.
Step 4) The RO should verify that RC-LCV-459 has closed.
Page 7 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Step 5) a. The RO should verify or establish greater than 50 gpm charging flow by adjusting CS-FCV-121 and/or CS-HCV-182 accordingly.
- b. The RO should verify that pressurizer level is greater than 17%.
Step 6) The RO should reestablish letdown flow per the following process:
0 Verify PCCW is aligned to the Letdown Heat Exchanger and that TCV-130 is in auto.
0 Close Letdown Flow Control Valves CS-HCV-189/190.
0 Open Letdown Line Isolation Valves. Operator should reopen RC-LCV-459 and CS-V-145.
0 Establish letdown flow with CS-HCV-189 or 190. The operator should utilize the backpressure control valve CS-PK-131 to maintain adequate backpressure. The operator may initially utilize CS-PK-131 in manual and then return the valve to automatic when letdown flow is established.
Alarms:
During letdown flow restoration the following alarms may occur:
VAS 67399, RCS Unidentified Leak Rate High VAS 68266, RCS Unidentified Leak Rate Warning The leak rate monitor is accurate during steady state conditions. The variances introduced during this transient will cause these alarms.
NOTE: It takes a period of time to restore pressurizer level back to its setpoint value. The operator should establish a letdown flowrate that is greater than the charging flowrate to return level to programmed value.
When level finally returns to setpoint the crew should utilize procedure OS1 002.08, Pressurizer Level Control System Operation as additional guidance for returning level control to automatic.
Step 7) When pressurizer level returns to setpoint the RO should verify proper controller setpoint and return RC-LK-459 and/or CS-FK-121 to automatic.
Step 8) The RO should verify that there are no redundant Pressurizer Level Hi bistables lit on UL-6.
Page 8 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAM I NATION Rev. 01 Step 9)
- a. The Unit Supervisor should identify the following Tech. Spec. items as applicable:
Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Table 3.3-1,
Item 11, Action 6 requires the channel bistable to be tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Table 3.3-10, Item 5, Action A requires that, with one less than the total channels, the affected channel must be restored to operable within 30 days.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown System, Table 3.3-9, Item 5.
the crew may discuss that the remote safe shutdown instrument comes off of the same instrument tap as level channel 459. The crew may discuss the possibility of investigating whether the RSS channel is affected.
- b. If desired to test or troubleshoot, Unit supervisor may direct I&C to place bistables to bypass using BTI for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure or at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction.
Page 9 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 EVENT Event 3 An over-current trip of Charging Pump, CS-P-2A will occur.
INSTRUCTION Insert Malfunction: Chemical and Volume Control System, mfCSO16, CS-P-2A OC Trip.
Instructor CUE: After charging pump trip the crew may dispatch an NSO to check the pump breaker. If so, then after a time delay have the NSO report back that the breaker has tripped on over-current.
COMMENTS Alarms:
UA-52,C-3, RCP Seal Injection Flow Lo VAS D4652, CNTRFGL CHG Pump A BKR Trip & L/O VAS D7853, CHG PMP DISCH Combined HDR Low Low VAS D4676 through D4679, RCP Seal Injection Flow Low alarms.
VAS F6958, CVCS Train A hop The crew responds using OS1 202.02, Charging System Failure.
Step 1) RO should state that charging flow is unavailable.
RO should reduce letdown flow and/or isolate letdown flow by closing CS-V-145. This step is prudent to prevent flashing conditions in the regenerative heat exchanger.
Step 2) The crew should be monitoring the affects on RCP seals due to the loss of seal injection. The crew should use Main Plant Computer color graphics Reactor Coolant Pump displays and/or computer A points. Should be monitoring seal water inlet temperature ~230°F.
Step 3) The RO should state that there are no charging pumps running.
The RO will start the B charging pump utilizing the following sequence:
0 Place the charging flow controller CS-FK-121 in manual and reduce the output signal to 0%.
0 The RO should start the B centrifugal charging pump from the control board. The operator may utilize computer color graphics and the analog ammeter to observe pump conditions.
0 The RO should slowly establish charging flow and establish desired seal injection flow by operating the charging flow controller, CS-FK-121 in conjunction with the seal injection flow control valve, CS-HCV-182.
Page 10 of 21
D E M 0 N ST RAT I VE EXAM I N AT I 0 N Rev. 01
_i Step 4)
- a. The RO should verify proper seal injection filter AP. The in service filter should be reading approx. 5 psid.
- b. The operator should verify seal injection flow greater than 6 gpm or adjust flow accordingly utilizing CS-HCV-182.
Step 5) The crew should verify that the charging system is intact. The operators should look at RDMS displays, building sump levels, and dispatch personnel to walk down the PAB.
The RCS is intact, the crew should go to Step 9.
Step 9) The RO should verify that VCT level is greater than 30%
Step I O ) The crew should check if normal letdown can be established.
The RO should verify that charging flow is greater than 50 gpm and pressurizer level is greater than 17%.
The RO should reestablish letdown flow per the following process:
Verify PCCW is aligned to the Letdown Heat Exchanger.
Close Letdown Flow Control Valves CS-HCV-189/190.
Open Letdown Line Isolation Valves. Operator should reopen RC-LCV-459 and CS-V-145.
Establish letdown flow with CS-HCV-189 or 190.
The operator should utilize the backpressure control valve CS-PK-131 to maintain adequate backpressure.
The operator may initially utilize CS-PK-131 in manual and then return the valve to automatic when letdown flow is established.
The crew should go to Step 12.
Page 1 1 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Step 12) : It takes a period of time to restore pressurizer level back to its setpoint value.
The operator should establish a letdown flowrate that is greater than the charging flowrate to return level to programmed value.
When level finally returns to setpoint the crew should utilize procedure OS1 002.08, Pressurizer Level Control System Operation as additional guidance for returning level control to automatic.
Step 13) The Unit Supervisor should identify the following Tech. Spec. as applicable:
Tech. Spec. 3.5.2, ECCS Subsystems, Action A, requires restoration of the inoperable ECCS subsystem to operable status within 7 days.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure or at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction.
Page 12 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION rev^ 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 4 c] Malfunctions, Feedwater The B Main Feedwater Pump shaft will shear (no pump trip signal).
Component.
0 Insert Malfunction: FWP32B Shaft Shear.
c] Select: INSERT COMMENTS The B Main Feedwater Pump Shaft Shear will initiate the major event.
Feedwater flow will be drastically reduced. No automatic plant setback will occur because a pump trip signal is not generated. Steam Generator levels decrease rapidly and a SG Lo-Lo level reactor trip demand occurs @ 20%
SG Narrow Range level.
Conditions:
BOP may report low B Feed Pump suction flow (FW-FI-4065-1)
BOP may report mismatch in 1 stage flow and governor valve position for Feed Pump B as compared to Feed Pump A.
Alarms:
VAS D4700, MFP B Suction Header Flow Low VAS D4704, SG D STM Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch VAS D4706, SG A STM Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch VAS D4708, SG B STM Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch VAS D4710, SG C STM Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch Alarms @ 45% level decreasing:
UA35, A3, SG A Level Hi/Lo UA35, B3, SG B Level Hi/Lo UA35, C3, SG C Level Hi/Lo UA35, 03, SG D Level Hi/Lo VAS D4770, SG A LVL Ref Deviation VAS D4771, SG B LVL Ref Deviation VAS D4772, SG C LVL Ref Deviation VAS 04773, SG D LVL Ref Deviation Alarms @ 35% level decreasing:
VAS D4876, SG A Level Low VAS D4877, SG B Level Low VAS D4878, SG C Level Low VAS D4879, SG D Level Low Page 13 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Alarms @ 20% level decreasing:
Primary VAS Red Alarms:
VAS 04865, RX Trip SG A LVL Lo Lo VAS D4866, RX Trip SG B LVL Lo Lo VAS D4867, RX Trip SG C LVL Lo Lo VAS D4868, RX Trip SG D LVL Lo Lo BOP VAS Alarms:
VAS F4756, SG A Level Lo Lo VAS F4840, SG B Level Lo Lo VAS F4841, SG C Level Lo Lo VAS F4850, SG D Level Lo Lo NOTE: With the B MFP shaft sheared, its recirc valve will open based upon low flow through the pump. The BOP may diagnose this as the recirc valve failing open.
Crew Response:
.This event will lead to the necessity for a reactor trip. The crew may address the VPRO procedures for the steam generator flow mismatch alarms. The VPRO procedure for alarm D4704, SG D STM FlowlFeed Flow Mismatch includes the following actions:
- 1) Check steam and feed flow indications on the main control board.
- 2) Check for proper feed reg valve response, take manual control if necessary.
- 3) Check FW system parameters.
- 4) Check steam generator parameters.
- 5) Check for any possible steam leaks.
.The loss of a main feed pump will degrade feed flow to all 4 steam generators.
The crew should recognize the loss of steam generator levels and realize that a reactor trip is warranted, based upon approaching the Lo-Lo level trip setpoint of 20% Narrow Range level.
Page 14 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAM I NATION Rev. 01 Event 5 The reactor does not trip and Event 6 Loss of EFW-P-37A, SELECT:O for value Turbine Driven EFW Pump 0
INSERT On the reactor trip attempt:
Sim Diagram MS7, MS-V-129 RF:Manual Adjust CUE: -40 seconds after the Rx Trip attempt Fail FW-P-32A via Shaft Shear:
Malfunctions, Feedwater Component.
0 Insert Malfunction: FWP32A Shaft Shear.
0 Select: INSERT The crew will respond by performing the immediate actions of E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
Step 1) The RO should recognize that the reactor did not trip.
Step 1-RNO) The RO should attempt to manually trip the reactor using both main control board reactor trip switches. The RO should inform the Unit Supervisor that the reactor did not trip.
The crew should transition to FR-S.l, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POW E R G E N E RAT1 ONlATWS.
The RO should perform the immediate actions of FR-S.1.
The BOP Operator should perform immediate actions of FR-S. 1.
Step 1) The RO should recognize that the reactor did not trip and should be verifying that control rods are inserting in automatic or the RO should be manually inserting rods.
Step 2) The BOP should recognize that the main turbine has tripped.
NOTE:
0 The motor driven EFW pump breaker will trip.
' ' 3 driven EFW pump trips on overspeed and will not be restored.
ould dispatch an operator to reset MS-V-129.
RO should initiate Emergency boration:
arging pump running.
ic acid pump/ Open emergency borate valve.
Place charging control valve CS-FK-121 open to charge a. rnax rate.
Open CCP suction valves from RWST, CS-LCV-112D and CS-LCV-112E.
Close CCP suction valves from VCT, CS-LCV-112B and CS-LCV-112C Check pressurizer pressure less than 2385 psig.
Page 15 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Step 5) The RO should verify Containment Ventilation Isolation. This can be done by looking at UL status lights.
Step 6) The crew should have dispatched an NSO to locally trip the reactor Step 7) Once the reactor is tripped locally the RO should verify that the reactor is subcritical.
Return to procedure and step in effect. The crew should transition to procudure FR-H.l, due to the H Red Path and E-0 having already been exited.
After the reactor is manually tripped, a loss of offsite power occurs and the B Emergency Diesel Generator breaker does not close.
Instructor CUE:
Manually trip the reactor after Emergency Boration, FR-S.1, step 4 is complete,
-0R-Wait 2 minutes and perform the following to trip the reactor:
0 DMF mfRPSOOl, Automatic Reactor Trip Failure Train A DMF mfRPS002, Automatic Reactor Trip Failure Train B 0
DMF mfRPS027, Reactor trip Switches Fail to Actuate (Train A)
DMF mfRPS028, Reactor trip Switches Fail to Actuate (Train B) 17 DMF mfRPSOO 2, Automatic Reactor Trip Failure Train B After the reactor is manually tripped, a loss of offsite power occurs and the B Emergency Diesel Generator breaker does not close.
No means of emergency boration will exist at this point.
The motor driven EFW pump is not available because it is powered from Bus 6 (B EDG).
The Turbine Driven EFW Pump will be the ultimate success path in FR-H.1.
Page 16 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Event 7 Malfunctions, Electrical After the reactor Distribution; is manually tripped (after 0
IMF mfED038 Em erg en cy Boration is started) a LOP occurs FR-H.l, RESPONSE TO A LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK:
Step 1) The crew should verify that RCS pressure is greater than non-faulted steam generator pressure and that RCS Hot Leg temperature is greater than 350°F.
Step 2) The RO should verify that no centrifugal charging pump is available.
The crew should go to step I O.
The crew should now be performing the steps to establish RCS bleed and feed.
Step IO) The RO should verify all RCP's stopped.
Step 11) The RO should actuate SI using the manual SI switch.
Step 12) Verification of feed status. The RO should identify that there are no CCPs running and that there is one SI pump Running, SI-P-6A.
Step 13) The RO should perform the following to establish a bleed path:
- a. Power to RC-VI24
- b. Verify both PORV block valves open.
- c. Open both PORVs.
Step 14) The RO should verify an adequate bleed path exists.
Page 17 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Restoration Of EFW Flow.
Restore the Turbine Driven EFW Pump, FW-P-37A, in FR-H.l:
Sim Diagram MS7 0
On MS-V129, Select RF: Manual Adjust.
Value = 1.0 0
Ramp = 10 seconds Step 15) The RO or BOP should perform Attachment D to verify proper SI equipment actuation.
Step 16) The RO should verify ECCS flow and maintain both PORV's open as a continuous action throughout the bleed and feed process.
Step 17) The RO should reset SI using the control board SI reset switches.
Step 18) The RO should reset Phase A and Phase B signals using the control board T and P signal reset switches.
Step 19) The BOP should check the status of instrument air.
Step 20) The RO should verify that no CBS pumps are running.
Step 21) The crew should continue attempts to establish a secondary heat sink.
The crew refers to Step 3 to attempt to establish flow from the Turbine Driven EFW Feed Pump, FW-P-37A.
The crew will establish flow from the EFW pump and then continue with Step
- 22.
If the crew had made efforts to establish feed flow in E-0, then feed flow may be established earlier.
NOTE: Due to the RCS Bleed and Feed containment pressure may be elevated to greater than the Adverse Containment Pressure, 4.3 psig. If so, a check of SG levels should be done before restoring feed flow as "Hot Dry" SG conditions may apply. Hot Dry SG is defined as a WR level 4 4 % (30% Adverse Containment)
Page 18 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 If bleed and feed has been established AND RCS temperatures are increasing recovery of a dry SG should be initiated by selecting a single intact SG and SG and feeding at the maximum rate.
If bleed and feed has been established AND RCS temperatures are stable or decreasina recovery of a dry SG should be initiated by selecting a single intact SG and feeding less than or equal to 100 gpm. When WR level is greater than 14% (30% Adverse Containment), Feedwater flow can be adjusted as necessary to restore adequate level.
Step 22) The BOP should observe SG levels for verification of adequate heat sink. If levels are adequate the crew should go to Step 23. If levels are not adequate the crew must wait until level recovers.
Evaluator CUE: At step 22, Steam Generator levels may not have recovered enough to continue with the procedure. The exam may be stopped here. If steam generator level has recovered, continue to steps 25 and 26 to stop bleed and feed.
Step 23) The RO should verify that Core Exit Thermocouple and RCS Hot Leg temperatures are decreasing.
Step 24) The RO should verify that the Reactor Head Vent valves are closed.
Step 25) The RO should report that subcooling is not adequate for SI termination. The crew should go to Step 26.
Step 26) The RO should close one of the PORV's. The crew should return to Step 25.
Step 25) The RO should report that subcooling is not adequate for SI termination. The crew should go to Step 26.
Page 19 of 21
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Step 26) The RO should close the remaining open PORVs. The crew should return to Step 25.
Step 25) The RO should report that subcooling is not adequate for SI termination. The crew should go to Step 26.
Step 26) The RO should verify no bleed paths open.
The crew should transition to E-?,
LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
Terminate the examination when the crew is at the transition to -I, or at Lead Examiners discretion.
CUE: When the simulator is placed in FREEZE the evaluator should administer SRO ADMIN JPMOS, E-Plan Classification and Notification. The candidate should be directed to classify the event based upon the worst conditions experienced during the scenario.
Emergency Plan Classifications:
Initial: Site Area Emergency due to FR H RED.
Page 20 of 21
r DEMONSTRATIVE EXAM #
REV.00 CREW CRITICAL TASKS
- 1.
INSERT negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods in accordance with FR-S.1.
0 Automatic andlor manual insertion of the RCCAs.
0 Establish Emergency Boration flow to the RCS.
- 2. ISOLATE the main turbine from the SG's before proceeding to step 5 of FR-S.l on an ATWS initiated by a loss of feedwater.
Paae 21 of 21
SIMULATOR EXAMINATION 2005 - 2007 LOlT DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario D Rev. 01 This material is developed for FPL Energy Seabrook training programs by the Training Group.
Text materials and figures contained in this document are developed for purposes of instructior and should not be used in connection with either plant maintenance or plant operation. This material may not be reproduced without the authorization of the Training Manager.
DATE:
PREPARED BY:
INSTRUCTOR REVIEWED BY:
DATE:
SME (OPTIONAL)
APPROVED BY:
DATE:
TRAINING SUPERVISOR
SCENARIO Crew will begin at 30% power continuing a power decrease due to ASDV D being out of service.
The crew will experience a PT-505 inst. Failure. The crew will experience an RCP D seal failure. There will be a tube rupture on the D steam generator. A safety valve on the D steam generator will stick open.
Page 2 of 17
SIMULATOR SETUP Reset the simulator to IC #34, Middle of Life, 30% Power Place the Jog Switch for the ID ASDV to CLOSE and hang a DANGER tag on the switch.
Place the controller, MS-PK-3004 to Manual and output at minimum.
Main Steam Component malfunctions; Select svMS3004, FAILED CLOSED 0
D Main Steam Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve (ASDV) is failed closed, and Danger Tagged. Close MS-V49 to Isolate the D ASDV from the D Main steamline.
On Sim Diagram MSI, for MS-V49, Select REMOTE Function, rfMS014 I7 CI Final Value = 0 CI INSERT 0 Use Scenario MSR MOVs to turn off the MSR GREEN lights On a reactor Trip a trigger from the above Scenario will correctly set the closed MSR MOV indication Page 3 of 17
SHIFT TURNOVER The plant is at 30% power. Decrease plant power at 5%/hr. Main Steam Atmospheric Steam Dump (DASDV) valve, MS-PV-3004 is Danger Tagged due to excessive seat leakage. MS-V-49 is closed and tagged. Plant Engineering has recommended a plant shutdown to work on both valves safely. Tech. Spec. 3.7.1.6 was entered 4 days ago.
Page 4 of 17
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario D EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Rev. 01 SCENARIO OUTLINE Event 1 Shift Turnover and Power Decrease Turnover information as stated.
Operators should review alarms and indications.
Unit Supervisor: A brief reactivity review will take place discussing the temperature limits for Tave to be used in the power increase. The temperature band will normally be -2°F to +3F. Control rods will be used for AFD and temperature control.
Turbine Operations: The BOP will decrease the turbine Load Pot in 3 to 5 increments, called Flats to maintain the power decrease and Tave/Tref.
This closes the turbine control valves to decrease turbineheactor power. He should verify the change with control valve position change, temperature change and power change.
Reactor Power change: The crew will use control rods initially to decrease temperature during the turbine load decreases. Using ODI-56, a boration value will be determined to change the boron concentration and decrease power/temperature. If control rods are used in manual the operator will verify rod speed, place the Rod Motion Selector switch to the IN direction and INSERT the rods a maximum of three steps. He will monitor temperature and power as confirmation of his actions.
Using the laminated sheets for the Figure 3: Boration Check List, the RO will set up the controllers for the required boration volume and rate.
The high level steps are:
Verify the pumps in AUTO Verify the makeup valves are in AUTO Place Blender Mode Start Switch to STOP Place the Mode Selector Switch to Borate Set the quantity on CIS-FIQ-111 and CIS-FIQ-110 controllers Set the Mode Start Switch to START Verify the pumps and valves respond 0
Verify Plant Response.
Restore System Pane 5 nf 19
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario D EVENT INSTRUCTION Rev. 01 COMMENTS Initial Scenario Alarms:
Primary Side Alarms VAS F5048, PR Hi Flux Lo Setpoint Channel Trip VAS F7511, SR Train A Blocked VAS F7512, SR Train B Blocked VAS F7513, IR Train A Blocked VAS F7514, IR Train B Blocked VAS F7515, PR Train A Low SP Trip Blocked VAS F7516, PR Train B Low SP Trip Blocked VAS F7517, SR 32 High Voltage Lost VAS F7518, SR High Flux At Shutdown Blocked VAS F7519, SR 31 High Voltage Lost BOP Side Alarms VAS D6045, Turb Setback Loss Of One FW Pump VAS D4700, MFP B Suction Header Flow Low VAS D4855, MFP B Electrical Trip VAS D4721, MFP B Turbine Trip Pane 6 nf IQ
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario D EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Rev. 01 Event 2 FW-PT-505 failure. This failure 0
Insert Malfunction: Feedwater PT-506 Instrument Failure.
causes a Tavgnref Component, ptFWPT505.
Conditions:
The crew responds with OS1235.05, Turbine Impulse Pressure PT-505 or mismatch and control rods will insert.
.Control rods will start inserting based on TavgITref deviation.
oFW-PI-505 reading will decrease.
0 Fail to Specific Value: 0.0 0
Ramp: 120 seconds
.The crew should notice the instrument failurehod movement with no associated loss of plant load.
0 INSERT
.The Unit Supervisor should have the operators verify load stable and have the RO placed control rods in manual. This process is described in the abnormal procedure but may be carried out prior to procedure entry as a skill of the operator task.
Pane 7 nf I Q
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario D EVENT INSTRUCTION NOTE: Crew should evaluate TS 3.1.1.4 and Surveillance 4.1.1.4b for Tavernref Deviation. As temperature should be above 562F, logging of Tave will not be necessary.
Instructor Action For ATWS MM-UFrom Panel Overview CLICK ON:
U O n SW 12 SELECT:TB IMP CP-519:
(P505).
Rev. 01 COMMENTS OS1235.05, Turbine Impulse Pressure PT 505 or 506 Instrument Failure.
Step 1)
- a. The BOP should check that PT-505 has failed.
- b. The Unit Supervisor should direct the RO to placed control rods in manual.
- c. The Unit Supervisor should direct the crew to withdraw control rods as appropriate to restore temperature to program. With PT-505 failed the crew should discuss the need to monitor RCS Cold Leg Temperature.
Step 2)
- a. The BOP should verify that the steam dumps are CLOSED.
- b. The RO should transfer steam dumps to the steam pressure mode:
.Verify that the steam dump controller output signal is at 0% and that the manual light is lit.
.Place the steam dump mode selector switch to STM Pressure Mode.
.Adjust the steam dump controller setpoint potentiometer such that the setpoint is 1092 psig.
.Verify proper setpoint and depress the AUTO pushbutton on the controller.
- c. The BOP should verify that the steam dump selector switches are both positioned to NA Reset NA Bypass.
Step 3) The crew should verify that the P-13 status light on UL-6,N-5 status light is de-energized.
Step 4) The Unit Supervisor should verify that the following Tech. Spec. is applicable:
Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Item 18.f, action 8.
Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator windows that the interlock is within its required state.
Step 5)
- a. The US should notify I&C to place the switch for the failed channel on 1-MM-CP-519, ATWS Mitigation System cabinet to Operate Bypass.
- b. The BOP should verify on UL-28, B-I, that the C-20 status light is energ ized.
D7899, ATWS Mitigation System BYPlTrouble will alarm when 505 is bypassed.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure or at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction.
Pane R nf 19
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario D EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS EVENT Event 3 This failure causes a Reactor Coolant Pump ID # I seal failure.
Rev. 01 INSTRUCTION COMMENTS 0
Insert Malfunction: Reactor Coolant, The crew responds with OS1201.01, RCP Malfunction. The crew manually mfRO16, RCP D # I Seal Failure raises Steam Generator level and removes the D Reactor Coolant Pump from service. The procedure will be exited after Attachment E is completed.
Initial Alarms:
VAS D4605, RCP D No. 1 Seal Leakoff Flow High VAS D8340, RCP D No. 1 Seal Leakoff Flow Low VAS D4607, RCP D No. 1 Seal Leakoff Flow Low Low VAS B8154, RCP D Number 2 Seal Flow High 0
Final Value: 0.25 0
Select: INSERT Alarms When RCP D Is Tripped:
VAS B8209, RCS LP Avg Temp Lo (Var)
VAS F8122, RC Loop 4 Delta T Deviation VAS F8118, RC Loop 4 Tavg Deviation VAS D7877, Tavg Lo-Lo Chan Trip (Stm Dump Blk)
VAS D4327, PZR Pressure Low & BU HTRS On UA-53,D-8, Master Press CTLR Output Low will cycle.
BOP Condition:
SG Level deviation alarms will come into alarm and reset.
OS1201.01, RCP Malfunction Step 1) The crew should determine that RCP seal leakoff is abnormal and go to Step 3.
Step 3) The RO should verify that RCS pressure is within the prescribed band.
Step 4) The RO should utilize the computer color graphics display for the Reactor Coolant Pumps and verify that seal water inlet temperature is below 230°F.
Pane Cl nf I C l
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario D EVENT INSTRUCTION Rev. 01 COMMENTS Step 5) The RO should determine that RCP D No. 1 seal leakoff flow is not less than 1.O wm. The Crew should go to Step 6.
Step 6) The RO should determine that No. 1 seal leakoff flow is not less than 8.0 qpm. The crew should go to Step 7.
Step 7) The RO should determine that the D RCP seal leakoff Total Flow is not less than 8.0 wm. The crew should perform Step 7 RNO.
Step 7-RNO) The Unit Supervisor should apply the section of the RNO for reactor power less than P-8: 48% power.
.The RO should determine that power is less than P-8.
.The Unit Supervisor should determine that the D RCP should be stopped utilizing Attachment E.
Attachment E, RCP Trip Actions Below P-8 Step 1)
.The BOP should place the Steam Generator D Feed Reg. Valve in manual.
.The BOP should raise the D SG narrow range level to 60-70%.
.The RO should defeat the Loop 4 AT and Tavg inputs.
.The RO should stop the D RCP.
.The BOP should manually operate the D SG feed reg valve and establish level at 4545% narrow range.
.The RO should close the D RCP seal leakoff valve after 2 minutes has elapsed since the pump was tripped.
.The RO should identify that the D RCP does not supply pressurizer sprays and that no spray valves need to be closed.
.The Unit Supervisor should determine that the plant should be shut down to Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> per OS1 000.06, Power Decrease.
.The Unit Supervisor should identify the following Tech. Spec. as Tech. Spec. 3.4.1.1, Reactor Coolant Loops and Coolant Circulation, Startup and Power Operation.
applicable:
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure or at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction.
Pane I n nf 19
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario D EVENT INSTRUCTION E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Step 1) The RO should verify that the reactor has tripped.
Step 2) The BOP should verify that the turbine has tripped.
Rev. 01 Step 3) The Bop should verify power to all AC Emergency Busses.
Step 4) The RO should verify that both trains of SI have actuated.
Step 5) The RO should perform Attachment A. The ESF status is sat.
Step 6) The crew should verify that RCS temperature is less than 557°F and decreasing.
.Stop dumping steam to condenser and atmosphere.Yes Check steam to MSRs isolated.Yes
.BOP should open EFW pump mini-flow valves.
.BOP should throttle EFW flow accordingly to comply with SG level
.If the cooldown continues the crew should close the MSIVs, MSlV criteria.
Bypass valves, and upstream drains.
Step 7) The RO should verify that the RCS is isolated.
Step 8) The RO should determine that subcooling is adequate. The crew should go to Step 9.
Step 9) The BOP should identify that the Steam Generators are not faulted.
Step I O ) The BOP should identify that the D Steam Generator u-tubes are not intact. The crew should identify the need to stop feed to the D Steam Generator as the narrow range level criteria of 6% are met.
The crew should transition to E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.
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DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario D EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Rev. 01 Event 5 Instructor CUE: Step 3f of E-3 E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE closes the MSIVs. After MSlV closure or when SG pressure reaches 1185 psig. Perform the following to initiate conditions for Event 5:
0 Insert Malfunction: Main Generator:
Step 1) RO should identify that subcooling is adequate for RCP operation.
Step 2) BOP should identify the D Steam Generator as ruptured.
Step 3) The Unit Supervisor should direct the BOP to isolate the D Steam
- a. BOP should adjust ASDV controller setpoints to 1125 psig.
- b. BOP should identify that the D ASDV is closed.
- c. The BOP should identify that the D SG does not supply steam to the Steam generator safety valve fails Open when Generator pressure reaches 1185 psig.
Steam Component, rvMSAVR50
-or-Via MSI :
SELECT: Go to Position:l.O RAMP: 10 sec.
SELECT: INSERT EFW pump.
- f. The BOP should close the D steam generator MSlV and bypass valves.
At this point a D steam generator safety valve will stick open causing a faulted condition.
When the crew identifies the D Steam Generator as faulted they should transition to E-2, based on guidance from the E-3 Operator Action Summary Page.
The crew transitions to E-2 from E-3 and then back to E-3.
Possible transition to ECA-3.1 at step 6 of E-3,Terminate the exam when the crew reaches ECA-3.1, step 13.
Pane 13 nf 1 Q
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario D EVENT INSTRUCTION Rev. 01 COMMENTS E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION Step 1) BOP should close/verify closed all the MSlV and bypass valves.
Step 2) BOP should verify that A,B, and C Steam Generators are intact.
Step 3) BOP should identify the D Steam Generator as faulted.
Step 4) BOP should identify that the D Steam Generator is isolated.
Step 5) BOP should identify that the CST level is >250,000 gallons.
Step 6) BOP should identify that Secondary Radiation is notnormal.
The crew should transition to E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.
E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.
Step 1) RO should identify that subcooling is adequate for RCP operation.
Step 2) BOP should identify the D Steam Generator as ruptured.
Step 3) The Unit Supervisor should direct the BOP to isolate the D Steam Generator:
- a. BOP should VERIFY ASDV controller setpoints is at 1125 psig.
- b. BOP should identify that the D ASDV is closed.
- f. BOP should verify the D steam generator MSlV and bypass valves are closed.
Pane 14 nf 1 Q
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario D EVENT INSTRUCTION Rev. 01 COMMENTS Step 4) BOP should stopherify stopped D Steam Generator EFW flow when narrow range level is >6%.
Step 5) BOP should verify that the D MSlV and bypass valves are closed.
Step 6) BOP should identify that ruptured SG pressure is >350 psig.
Step 7) Crew should initiate RCS cooldown:
- a. Crew should determine appropriate core exit thermocouple temperature based on D Steam Generator pressure.
- b. At this point the MSlV and MSlV Bypass valves were all previously closed. The BOP should dump steam at the maximum rate using the intact steam generators using the ASDVs. The BOP should not dumD steam from the D Steam Generator.
0 0
RO should depressurize the RCS using normal sprays.
When pressure is e1950 psig, the RO should check P-1 1 Block Bistable light is lit on UL-1 and then depress both Steamline Safety Injection Block switches.
The RO should maintain RCS pressure 4950 psig using normal sprays.
The RO should inform the Unit Supervisor of the SI block status.
0 0
- d. The BOP should monitor Core Exit Thermocouples.
- e. When less than the required temperature the BOP should stop the cooldown and maintain temperature.
Step 8)BOP should maintain SG levels.
Pane 15 nf IQ
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario D EVENT INSTRUCTION Rev. 01 COMMENTS Step 9) RO should check that PORVs are closed and that the block valves are open and have power to them.
Step IO) RO should reset SI using the MCB SI Reset Switches (Both Trains).
Step 11) RO should reset T and P signals using MCB reset switches (Both Trains).
Step 12) BOP should verify instrument air conditions are satisfactory.
Verifies all PCCW Containment Isolation valves open (4 per loop).
Step 13) BOP should verify the RHR pumps should be stopped. The pumps should be stopped and placed in standby.
Step 14) BOP should identify Core Exit Thermocouple temperature less than required and should maintain temperature less than the required temperature.
Step 15) BOP should identify that Ruptured SG Pressure is &stable or increasing.
Crew should re-verify isolation of SG D prior to transition to ECA-3.1 Crew should identify the need to transition to ECAS.l, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT-SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Pane 16 nf 19
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario D EVENT INSTRUCTION Transition to ECA-3.1 Rev. 01 COMMENTS ECA3.1,SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT-SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Step 1) RO should verify SI Reset.
Step 2) RO should verify T and P signals reset.
Step 3) BOP should verify Instrument Air Supplies sat.
Step 4) BOP should identify all AC busses energized from UATs or RATS.
Step 5) RO should de-energize all pressurizer heater banksunit Supervisor should consult with TSC for heater operation.
Step 6) RO should verify no CBS pumps running. Crew should go to Step 7.
Step 7) BOP should verify stopped or stop EFW flow to the D Steam Generator if narrow range level is >6%.
Step 8) RO should verify that the RHR pumps are stopped. The crew should go to Step 9.
Step 9) Crew should evaluate plant status:
RDMS Consult with TSC ESF equipment, Attachment D.
Step 10) BOP should identify D Steam Generator as faulted.
Step 11) BOP should maintain intact SG levels.
Step 12) BOP should initiate RCS cooldown with ASDVs Pane 17 nf IQ
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario D EVENT INSTRUCTION Rev. 01 COMMENTS Step 13) Crew should determine if subcooled recovery is appropriate:
RWST Level >310,000 gallons Ruptured SG level ~96%
narrow range If SG level is >96% crew should consult with the TSC and consider transition to ECA-3.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT-SATURATED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Exam can be terminated at transition to ECAS.l or Lead Examiners discretion.
CUE: When the simulator is placed in FREEZE the evaluator should administer SRO ADMIN JPMOS, E-Plan Classification and Notification. The candidate should be directed to classify the event based upon the worst conditions experienced during the scenario.
Emergency Plan:
Initial: Alert, Item 7c, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Pane 18 nf 1 Q
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAM #
REV.00 CREW CRITICAL TASKS
- 1. E-3. Isolate Feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured steam generator before transition to ECA-3.1 is required.
- 2. ECA-3.1. Cool down the RCS to cold shutdown conditions such that a severe (Orange Path) challenge to the Integrity Critical Safety Function is not encountered. NOTE: Only requires initiation of a cooldown.
Paae 19 of 19
io SIMULATOR EXAM I NATION 2005 -2007 LOlT DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario (&
- .c/
Rev. 01 This material is developed for FPL Energy Seabrook training programs by the Training Group.
Text materials and figures contained in this document are developed for purposes of instructior and should not be used in connection with either plant maintenance or plant operation. This material may not be reproduced without the authorization of the Training Manager.
PREPARED BY:
DATE:
INSTRUCTOR REVIEWED BY:
DATE:
SME (OPTIONAL)
APPROVED BY:
DATE:
TRAINING SUPERVISOR
SCENARIO The plant is at 100% Power, beginning a downpower at 5% per hour due to MS-PV-3004 seat leakage. It was tagged out and the TS 3.7.1.6 was entered 4 days ago. The ASDV isolation valve MS-V49 is also closed.
During the downpower the Loop 1 Tave instrument (TE-411) will fail high. The crew responds with OS1201.08, Tave/Delta T Instrument Failure. Shortly after a leak in the letdown line at the inlet to the Reactor Coolant Filter will be initiated. Whatever letdown flow is, 50% will be lost causing VCT level to decrease. The crew responds with OS1201.02 RCS Leak.
A Loss of Offsite Power will occur. The B EDG will fail due to a lube oil leak. A local start of the A EDG will be allowed and the crew will recover power to Bus E5. Upon power restoration it will be found that the SW pump on the A Train did not Auto restart and action must be taken to restore SW flow to the A EDG. If SW flow is not restored within 17 minutes the engine will trip on high lube oil temperature. The crew will enter E-0 and ECA-0.0 for these events.
Also in the LOP, the turbine driven EFW Pump, FW-P-37A will trip on Overspeed, requiring the reset of the trip throttle valve and the restoration of EFW flow to the SGs.
Page 2 of 18
SIMULATOR SETUP
- 1.
Reset the simulator to IC #30, Middle of Core Life, 2 Insert the following malfunction to fail the Auto Start of A EDG; Electrical Distribution:
Insert the following Malfunction to Trip the B EDG on Low Lube Oil Pressure, Electrical Malfunctions:
0 IMF mfEDO31, DG-1A Auto Start Failure IMF mfED034, DG-1B Low Lube Oil Press Trip On Panel Graphic PHFOS, Override the A EDG Emergency Stop Pushbuttons to STOP 3 To set up the ASDV D Closure and Isolation with MS-V49:
On Sim Diagram MSI for MS-V49 Select the Remote Function, rfMS014, and Set Final value to 0 On MS-PK-3004, place the controller to Manual and Minimum On Sim Diagram MSI, MS-PV-3004, Component Malfunction SELECT: FAIL CLOSED SELECT: INSERT PLACE MCB jog switch to CLOSED for MS-PV-3004.
output 0
0 4 Malfunctions, Reactor Protection INSERT the following malfunction to prevent an Automatic turbine Trip 0
mfRPS003, Automatic Turbine Trip Failure 5
Malfunctions, Service Water, Insert the following malfunctions to prevent Auto Start of SW-P-41A, 41C and P-11OA 0
IMF mfSWO12, SW-P-41A Fails to Auto Start IMF mfSW014, SW-P-41C Fails to Auto Start 6 Fail open turbine stop valve #2:
0 Main Steam, Component Malfunction, avMSVSV2 SELECT:FAIL OPEN SELECT: INSERT 0
0 7 Activate trigger for FW-P-37A Overspeed.
LOIT,L30591,Loss of FW-P-37A on Overspeed.
8 On Sim Diagram SEPS, rackout SEPS to Bus 6, A7A, and place Danger Tags on Bus 5 &6 SEPS MCB Breakers Page 3 of 18
SHIFT TURNOVER The plant is at 100% power. Decrease plant power at 5%/hr. Main Steam Atmospheric Steam Dump ("DI'ASDV) valve, MS-PV-3004 is Danger Tagged due to excessive seat leakage. MS-V-49 is closed and tagged. Plant Engineering has recommended a plant shutdown to work on both valves safely. Tech. Spec. 3.7.1.6 was entered 4 days ago.
AFD= -1.49 on Target SEP's is out of service for controller software upgrades.
Page 4 of 18
Rev. 01 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario SCENARIO OUTLINE EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Shift Turnover Event 1 Decrease plant power @
5%/hr.
Shift turnover information as stated.
Operators should review alarms and indications The crew should prepare for and initiate a plant shutdown at 5%/hr.
Unit Supervisor: A brief reactivity review will take place discussing the temperature limits for Tave to be used in the power decrease. The temperature band will normally be -2°F to +3F. Control rods will be used for AFD and temperature control.
Turbine Operations: The BOP will decrease the turbine Load Pot in 3 to 5 increments, called Flats to maintain the power decrease and Tavernref. This closes the turbine control valves to decrease turbineheactor power. He should verify the change with control valve position change, temperature change and power change.
Reactor Power change: The crew will use control rods initially to decrease temperature during the turbine load decreases. Using ODI-56, a boration value will be determined to change the boron concentration and decrease power/temperature. If control rods are used in manual the operator will verify rod speed, place the Rod Motion Selector switch to the IN direction and INSERT the rods a maximum of three steps. He will monitor temperature and power as confirmation of his actions.
Using the laminated sheets for the Figure 3: Boration Check List, the RO will set up the controllers for the required boration volume and rate.
The high level steps are:
Verify the pumps in AUTO 0
Verify the makeup valves are in AUTO 0
Place Blender Mode Start Switch to STOP 0
Place the Mode Selector Switch to Borate 0
Set the quantity on CIS-FIQ-111 and CIS-FIQ-110 controllers 0
Set the Mode Start Switch to START 0
Verify the pumps and valves respond 0
Verify Plant Response.
Restore System Page 5 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 2 RCS Tavg Component.
will fail high causing 0
ttRCTT411 inward control rod motion.
0 Insert Malfunction: Reactor Coolant 0
Select: FAIL HIGH 0
INSERT Rev. 01 COMMENTS The crew responds using OS1201.08, TavgIDelta T Instrument Failure.
Conditions: Control Rods step in based on Tavg/Tref deviation.
The crew should diagnose that rods are stepping in due to an instrument failure. The RO should recommend and/or the Unit Supervisor should direct the RO to place rods in manual.
Alarms:
VAS F5298, OTDT Chan Trip VAS D4422, Average Tavg High VAS D4421, Tavg-Tref Deviation UL-6, A3, RC LOOP 1, TB-41 I C OTDT OS1 201.08, TavglDelta T Instrument Failure:
Step 1) The RO should identify that Loop 1 Tave instrument has failed.
Step 2) The Unit Supervisor should direct the RO to place rods in MANUAL.
This action may have already taken place prior to the procedure step as a "skill of the operator" task.
Step 3) The RO should defeat the Loop 1 AT input, Loop 1 Tavg input, and select a non-effected loop for the AT,OT,OP recorder.
Alarm Resets:
The following alarms will reset:
VAS F5298, OTDT Chan Trip VAS D4422, Average Tavg High VAS alarms for loop Tavg-Tref Deviation Alarms:
The following alarms will have occurred and will remain in alarm:
VAS F8115, RC Loop 1 Tavg Deviation VAS F8119, RC Loop 1 Delta T Deviation Step 4) The RO should verify that Tavg is within 1°F of Tref. The Unit Supervisor should direct the RO to place rods back in automatic.
The RO should monitor pressurizer level trending towards programmed level in automatic.
UL-6, A3, RC LOOP 1, TB-411 C OTDT Page 6 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 The BOP should verify that the Steam Dump interlock selector switches are in the NA Reset NA Bypass Interlock position.
Step 5) The RO should verify that there are no redundant bi-stable lights lit for the following:
UL-1, T Avg Lo-Lo Loop Stm Dmp Is0 UL-1, T AVg LO LOOP TO FW ISO UL-6, RCS LOOP OTAT UL-6, RCS LOOP OPAT UL-12, Tavg Lo Loop To FW Is0 Step 6) The Unit Supervisor should identify the following Tech. Spec. items as being applicable:
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Item 7, Overtemperature AT, Action 6.
Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System instrumentation, item 8, Overpower AT, Action 6.
Each item requires affected bistabies to be placed in the trip condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
The Unit Supervisor may coordinate with I&C to place the affected bistables to bypass, using BTI, for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure or at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction.
Page 7 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 Event 3 Initiation of a Control:
letdown line leak.
Malfunctions; Chemical and Volume 0
Insert Malfunction: MfCS012, Letdown Line Leak At Inlet To Reactor Coolant Filter.
0 Value: 0.5 Select: INSERT The crew responds with OS1201.02, RCS Leak.
Alarms:
VAS 87399, RCS Unidentified Leak Rate High VAS 88266, RCS Unidentified Leak Rate Warning RDMS, RM6508-2, Hi Range PAB North El -7 Alarm Conditions:
RO should identify decrease in VCT level.
OS1 201.02, RCS Leak The Unit Supervisor should alert the crew to the Caution Statement prior to step 1:
If the plant is in Mode 1,2,or 3 with SI accumulators aligned for injection pressurizer level can m b e maintained greater than 7% using normal charging lineup, then perform the following:
- 1) Trip reactor
- 2) When the reactor trip is verified, then actuate SI
- 3) GO to E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
Step 1) The RO should control charging and letdown flow as necessary to maintain pressurizer level.
The RO should verify that pressurizer level is stable or increasing.
This is a continuous action statement. The RNO response for this step reflects the information contained in the procedure caution as described above.
Step 2) The crew should identify that a CVCS leak is suspected. The crew should proceed to Step 5.
Step 5) The Unit Supervisor will direct the RO to isolate letdown.
The RO will close the following valves:
.CS-HCV-189
&S-HCV-I 90
.CS-V-145
- RC-V-8 1 The Unit Supervisor will direct the RO to isolate charging to the loops.
The RO will close the following valves:
- Maintain seal inj. flow 6-13 gpm utilizing CS-FCV-121 in manual.
Close letdown isolation valves.
mCS-HCV-182 Page 8 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01
.CS-V-142
.CS-V-143 Alarms:
When charging flow is isolated the following alarms will occur:
VAS 88166, Pzr Stm/Chg Line AT Approach Limit VAS D7853, Chg Pmp Disch Combined Hdr Flow Low When the charging line isolation valves are closed the following alarms will occur:
VAS D7872, Chg Header Contm Is0 VLV-142 Closed VAS D7873, Chg Header Contm Is0 VLV-143 Closed When a VCT auto makeup occurs at 30% level the following alarm will occur VAS D4660, BA Makeup VLV-1106 to Chg Pmp Open Instructor CUE: After completion of Step 6, have the NSO report that the leak appears to be from the inlet to the reactor coolant filter.
Step 6) The crew should identify that the leak is isolated by verifying the following parameters:
.Pressurizer level-Increasing at a rate equal to the difference between seal injection and seal return.
.Containment air particulate and gas monitor. Stable or Decreasing
.Containment temperature and pressure. Stable or Decreasing
.Containment sump A and B levels. Normal or Decreasing Step 7) The crew will be checking charging and letdown system integrity based on:
VCT level decrease-Equal to the difference between seal injection and seal return.
PAB radiation levels-Stable or decreasing.
The outcome of these verifications is time dependant. The RNO step directs dispatching HP/NSOs to determine the source of the leak. If the source cannot be identified the step directs entering OS1202.02, Charging System Failure. The crew could also enter the Area High Radiation abnormal procedure.
Page 9 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 Step 8) The Unit Supervisor should direct the RO to establish excess letdown.
Excess letdown is necessary to remove the inventory being added to the RCS via seal injection flow.
The RO should establish excess letdown as follows:
.Open CC-V-434, Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Cooling Water
.Check open CS-V-167 and 168, Excess Ltdn Containment Isolation valves
.Check closed CS-HCV-123
.Open CS-V-175 and 176, Excess Letdown Containment Isolation valves.
.Flush Excess Letdown to RCDT, Align CS-V-170 to RCDT, Slowly open CS-HCV-123 and flush for greater than 5 minutes, then close CS-HCV-123.
.Align CS-V-170 to Seal Return Header.
.Establish Excess Letdown flow via CS-HCV-123. The RO should limit flow such that excess letdown heat exchanger outlet temp is 4 75°F and outlet pressure is 4 5 0 psig.
.The RO should remove data point A0620, Letdown Outlet Flow, from the plant calorimetric calculation.
Step 9) The crew should verify that RCS leakage has stopped via the following method:
.The RO should adjust seal inj. and excess letdown such that presurizer level is stable.
.The RO should verify that the VCT level is stable.
.Containment air particulate and gas monitor-stable or decreasing.
.Containment temperature and pressure-stable or decreasing.
.Containment sump A and B-decreasing or normal Step I O ) The crew should minimize the effects of loss of letdown:
.Coordinate with Chemistry and Health Physics concerning the loss of letdown and options for maintaining RCS hydrogen conc.
.The Unit Supervisor should identify the need to inform Chemistry of the possible Tech. Spec. implications:
Tech. Spec. 3.4.7, Chemistry Tech. Spec. 3.4.8, Specific Activity The crew should go to Step 17.
Page 10 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 Step 17) The Unit Supervisor should consider the implications for Tech. Spec.
3.4.6.2, RCS Leakage.
The Unit Supervisor should identify that there is no Emergency Plan classification criteria met at this time.
Step 18) The RO should verify that the VCT makeup controls are in auto and set for current RCS boron concentration.
Step 19) The Unit Supervisor should evaluate plant conditions:
The crew should identify that the leak is isolated.
The crew should be making the necessary phone calls for rescources to locate and repair the leak.
Step 20) This step directs a plant shutdown if Tech. Spec. RCS leakage is exceeded. (The leakage was previously isolated.)
Step 21) BOP should verify CST level >390,000 gallons or direct NSO to commence a CST makeup.
Step 22) The crew should verify COP shutdown and cont isolation valves closed:
COP-V-1 and 4, Train A COP-V-2 and 3, Train B Step 23) Step minimizes effects of leak to containment. The crew should have identified the leak as being in the PAB.
Steps 24 and 25) These steps are applicable to a plant shutdown if Tech.
Spec. limits on RCS leakage had been exceeded.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure or at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction.
Page 11 of 18
Rev. 01 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 4 The plant has a loss of offsite power.
c]
Insert Malfunction: Electrical Distribution, mfED038, Loss of Offsite Power.
Select: INSERT Instructor CUE:
.NSO will find a large quantity 0, oil on the B EDG skid. Finds oil line to engine oil pressure switches ruptured.
.NSO finds nothing obviously wrong with A EDG, use DG Local Panels to set LOCAL on the LOCAL/REMOTE switch.
.All local starts of A EDG will not work until Step 14 of ECA-0.0.
COMMENTS The Crew enters E-0 and performs the Immediate Actions steps and exits at step 3 to ECA-0.0.
ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER Step 1) The RO should verify that the reactor is tripped:
Checks reactor trip and bypass breakers open.
Checks neutron flux decreasing.
Step 2) The BOP should verify that the turbine is not tripped:
Checks all stop valves closed. NO. BOP should perform RNO step and manually trip the turbine.
Checks generator breaker open, NOTE: The B EDG will trip on Low Lube Oil Pressure.
Step 3) The RO should check the RCS Isolated.
.Pressurizer PORVs closed-yes
.Letdown isolation valves closed: yes cs-v-145 Or RC-LCV-459 Or
.Excess Letdown valves closed-No CS-V-175 and 176 are closed at step 3c.
.RCS Sample Valves-Yes RC-LCV-460
.As time allows report as HP that steam lines show no change in radiation levels.
Page 12 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 Instructor CUE:
When the crew dispatches an NSO to the field to reset the EFW pump, perform the following:
UComponent Remote Funtions USELECT: rmvMSVl29 USELECT: Manual Adjust USELECT: INSERT Summary USELECT: 1.0 Instructor CUE:
During Step 14 of ECA-0.0 you will restore A EDG to service.
Instructions for this will appear next to step 14 of this outline.
Step 4) The BOP should identify that there is no EFW flow and that MS-V-129 is closed.
The crew should utilize Step 4 RNO, and direct an NSO to locally start the steam driven EFW pump per OS1 036.03, RESETTING THE STEAM DRIVEN EFW PUMP TRIP VALVE.
Step 5) The crew should continue efforts to restore power. SEPs is unavailable
- b. BOP should attempt an emergency start of EDG A Neither EDG will be able to function. The RNO for this step is to use the SEPs diesel generator. SEPs is not available.
- c. The crew should identify that the emergency diesels are not running and go to Step 6.
Step 6) The crew should complete step 6 prior to continuing with recovery efforts. The following equipment should be disabled:
.Thermal Barrier Cooling Pumps-Off
.Charging Pumps-Pull-to-Lock oPCCW Pumps-Pull-to-Lock
.Containment Spray Pumps-Pull-to-Lock oRHR Pumps-Pull-to-Lock
.SI Pumps-Pull-to-Lock
.Motor Driven EFW Pump-Pull-to-Lock
.Containment Air Compressors-Off
- All UAT/RAT Supply Breakers-Pull-to-Lock Step 7) Unit Supervisor should direct implementation of Attachment C.
GUFP (BUS E5)-Pull-to-L0ck Step 8) The SEPs is not available. The Unit Supervisor should direct the BOP to coordinate with an NSO and perform a local start of EDG A utilizing Attachment F, Local Start of Emergency Diesel Generator.
Page 13 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 Step 9) The Unit Supervisor should direct the RO to coordinate isolation of RCP seals:
.Close CS-V-167, RCP Seal Return ISO.
Close CS-V-153,157,161,165, RCP Seal Injection Throttle Valves.
Instructor CUE:
When directed as an NSO to Close CS-V167, Use Sim Diagram CS4 and Use Manual Adjust to set CS-VI67 to zero.
Use Chemical and Volume Control Remote Functions to close the following valves:
rfcs020 cs-VI 53 rfcso19 cs-VI 57 rfCSOl8 CS-VI 61 rfCS01 7 CS-VI 65 Step I O ) The BOP should verify that the CST is isolated from the hotwells:
CO-LV-4014A-Closed CO-V-151 -Closed Step 11) Establish SG Secondary Side Isolation:
.The RO/BOP should place the Train A and Train B MSI switches to actuate and verify isolation.
.Verify MSlV and MSlV Bypass Valves closed.
.Check FW Reg. and FW Reg. Bypass valves closed.
Check Blowdown Isolation Valves closed per Phase A status panel.
Step 12) The crew should identify that the SG pressure boundary is @
faulted.
The crew should go to Step 13.
Step 13) The crew should identify that the SG U-tubes =intact.
Page 14 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 Instructor CUE:
During Step 14 of ECA-0.0 Restore A
EDG to service:
ODelete the Overrides on the A EDG Emergency Stop Pushbuttons.
OOn the LOCAL Panel Select Emergency Start.
Step 14)
- b. The BOP should open EFW mini-flow recirc valves and control SG level as necessary. Prior to electrical power restoration the BOP will have to direct local mini-flow valve operation and EFW throttling.
Range in at least two SGs.
Evaluator NOTE:
When electrical power is restored the crew should continue with recovery actions by going to step 24.
OWhen engine is running use Breaker LOCAL control to close the A EDG Breaker.
Step 15) The crew should consult with TSC if DC load shedding is necessary.
Step 16) The BOP should monitor CST level greater than 390,000 gallons.
Evaluator NOTE: The timing of the scenario is such that electrical power will be restored prior to step 17. A description of Step 17 is included in the event that the Lead Examiner wants to see the crew exercise the step.
Based on restoration of power to Bus E5, the crew should go to Step
- 24.
Step 24) The BOP should utilize the ASDV control switches to maintain SG pressures stable.
Step 25) The crew should verify that the listed essential equipment has loaded onto Bus E5.
Page 15 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 Event 5 restoration of sw Step 26) The BOP should check the Train A SW system alignment.
Substep b. has the operator verify one ocean SW pump running. The crew should identify that Train A has no pumps running. The RNO for the step directs manually starting a SW pump. The SW pump must be manually started to provide cooling to the operating Emergency Diesel Generator. The RMO relay needs to be reset to restart the SW pump.
Step 27) The crew should check the following parameters to select the applicable recovery guideline:
.RCS subcooling: >40°F
.Pressurizer level: >7%
If the above criteria are met, then the crew should transition to ECA-0.1, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY WITHOUT SI REQUIRED. If the above criteria are not met then the crew should transition to ECA-0.2, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY WITH SI REQUIRED.
Evaluator NOTE: The crew will eventually transition to ECA-0.2. Terminate the exam at the Chief Examiner discretion.
Terminate examination when the crew transitions o ECA-O.I/ECA-0.2 or at the Lead Examiner discretion.
Instructor NOTE: restore A-Point A0620, Letdown Outlet Flow, to scan at the end of the scenario.
CUE: When the simulator is placed in FREEZE the evaluator should administer SRO ADMIN JPMO5, E-Plan Classification and Notification. The candidate should be directed to classify the event based upon the worst conditions experienced during the scenario.
Page 16 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 Emergency Plan:
The charging system leak does not qualify as an RCS leak, so no e-plan call is made based on this event.
Initial: Unusual Event, item 14A, Abnormal Trip or Safety Injection.
Upgrade: Site Area Emergency: Busses E5 and E6 cannot be powered from the diesels or an offsite source within 15 minutes.
Page 17 of 18
\\ 1 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAM #
REV.00 CREW CRITICAL TASKS
- 1. Manually trip the Main Turbine or close the Main Steam Isolation Valves before a severe (Orange Path) challenge develops on either the Su bcriticality or Integrity Status Tree's.
- 2. Establish 500 gpm EFW flow per Step 4 RNO of ECA-0.0.
- 3. Manually start an ocean Service Water Pump or a Cooling Tower Pump such that the " A Emergency Diesel Generator is not damaged due to engine overheating.
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