ML071930235
| ML071930235 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 04/11/2007 |
| From: | St.Pierre G Florida Power & Light Energy Seabrook |
| To: | Caruso J NRC Region 1 |
| Sykes, Marvin D. | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML062050109 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML071930235 (69) | |
Text
eabrook tion SI M U LATOR EXAM I NATION 2007 LOlT NRC EXAM DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 This material is developed for FPL Energy Seabrook training programs by the Training Group.
Text materials and figures contained in this document are developed for purposes of instructior and should not be used in connection with either plant maintenance or plant operation. This material may not be reproduced without the authorization of the Training Manager.
PREPARED BY:
DATE:
INSTRUCTOR REVIEWED BY:
DATE:
SME (OPTIONAL)
APPROVED BY:
DATE:
TRAINING SUPERVISOR
SCENARIO This scenario begins with a power increase to 100% power.
The crew will experience a Feedwater instrument and feed regulating valve failure requiring manual control of Feedwater for the remainder of the scenario.
A pressurizer pressure instrument will fail high. The subsequent transient will cause an RCS leak to apparently develop in the pressurizer steam space. This will require a reactor trip and safety injection. Failure of the SI Pumps and the B RHR pump to Auto start creates a critical task. Entry in to the E-Plan will be for the RCS leak initially and then for the SI with ECCS required. Eventual transition to ES-1.2, POST LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization will end the scenario.
Page 2 of 17
SIMULATOR SETUP 0
0
- 1.
Reset the simulator to IC31, Middle of Core Life, 75% Power, Xenon building in after an approx. 20%/hr power decrease, Boron Concentration = 1171 ppm, Axial Flux Difference = - 1.I2 %.
mfS1003, SI-P-6A Fails To Auto Start.
mfS1004, SI-P-6B Fails To Auto Start.
These create critical task for US/PSO
~
3 Malfunctions; Residual Heat removal MfRHOO6, RH-P-8B Fails To Auto Start.
O I
Page 3 of 17
SHIFT TURNOVER Continue power increase to 100% power @ a rate of lO%/hr.
75% Power Boron Concentration = 1171 ppm Axial Flux Difference = - 1.12 YO Page 4 of 17
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 SCENARIO OUTLINE EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Shift Turnover Shift turnover information as stated.
Operators should review alarms and indication
Rev. 01 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS EVENT 1 C Feedwater 0
regulating valve fails c]
to 100% output. At the same time the 0
controlling channel c]
for level fails low.
0 0
0 Component Malfunctions; Feedwater Alarms:
Insert malfunctions: ctFWFK530 Select: FAIL OUTPUT (AUTO)
Value: 100%
Ramp: 30 seconds INSERT LtFWLT553 the procedure.
VAS Alarm F4841, SG C Level Lo Lo VAS Alarm D4772, SG C Level Ref Deviation VAS Alarm D4878, SG C Level Low VAS Alarm D4710, SG C Stm Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch U/A Alarm, UA-53, C-3, SG C Level Hi/Lo Crew responds with OS1235.03, SG Level Instrument Failure:
0 BOP operator should take manual control of the C SG Reg.
Valve.This action may be Skill of the Operator prior to entering Select: FAIL LOW Step la.) BOP operator should identify failed channel (Level channel Step 1 b.) BOP operator should place C Feed Reg. Valve in manual.
Step IC.)
BOP operator should manually control level 45-55%.
Step 2) BOP operator should select the Channel 1 level instrument.
Step 3) BOP operator will attempt to return the C Feed reg. Valve to Auto. The operator should realize that the C Feed Reg. Valve controller output signal fails to 100% output. The operator will have to operate the valve in manual for the remainder of the scenario.
553).
NOTE: Crew may contact I&C to help troubleshoot failed Reg.
Valve controller.
NOTE: Crew may consider calling in an additional operator for feed control. An additional operator is not available.
Step 4) The BOP operator should check that NO redundant bistable lights are lit. The only light that should be lit is UL-6, B-I 1, SG C LB-553A Level Lo Lo.
Step 5) The Unit Supervisor should identify the following applicable Tech. Spec. items:
Pane 6 nf 16
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS 0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, Item 13, Action 6, 0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Item 5b, Action 18, Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Item 6a, Action 18, Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Item 7c, Action 18, Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Item 7, NOT APPICABLE, NOT A PAM INSTRUMENT.
Step 6) BOP verifies ATWS Input Status. NO ATWS mitigation channel failed.
Return to procedure and step in effect.
Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure or at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction:
Pane 7 nf I 6
Rev. 01 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A EVENT INSTRUCTION EVENT 2 Controlling 0
Insert malfunction: ptRCPT455, pressurizer pressure Reactor Coolant; Component Malfunctions; 0
FAIL TO SPECIFIED VALUE: 2500 instrument fails high.
This causes the master pressure con t rot le r to malfunction.
0 Ramp: 15 seconds 0
INSERT COMMENTS Alarms:
VAS F7860, PZR Press Hi Channel Trip UL-6, A-6, Pressurizer PB-455A Press Hi UA-52, D-8, Master Press CTLR Output Lo-May come in when taking pressure controller to manual.
Crew responds with OS1 201.06, PZR Instrument Component Fai I ure.
oPSO operator should take manual control of the pressurizer master pressure controller. This action may be Skill of the Operator prior to entering the procedure.
Step 1) Check PORVs closed. YES Step 2) Check Normal PZR Spray Valves-CLOSED. YES Step 3) Check Pressurizer Pressure Channels. Controlling channel is failed. RC-PI-455A is failed high.
Step 4) Realign Pressurizer Pressure Instruments:
a) RO should manually control pressurizer pressure @ program.
b) RO should select alternate control and backup channels: 4571456.
c) RO should select an alternate channel for recorder.
d) RO should select an alternate AT, OT, OP channel for recorder.
Step 5) Align Pressurizer Pressure Control:
a) RO should control pressure such that is trending towards 2235 psig.
b) When pressure approaches 2235 psig the RO should take actions to place the pressure controller in automatic.
Step 6) Verify redundant channel bistables-Not Tripped:
RO should verify that there are no redundant channel bistables lit on UL-I and UL-6.
Pane 8 nf I 6
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Step 7) Verify Tech. Spec. compliance:
The Unit Supervisor should identify the following applicable Tech.
Spec. items:
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, Item 7, Action 6, Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, Item 9, Action 6, Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip Instrumentation, Item IO, Action 6, Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Item Id, Action 18, Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Item loa, Action 18, Required to trip bistables within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Tech. Spec. 3.2.5, DNBR. Tech Requirements, Chapter 6, Item 2.12, DNB Parameters. Unit Supervisor should address this item if RCS pressure drops below 21 85 psig.
0 If desired to test or troubleshoot, Unit supervisor may direct I&C to place bistables to bypass using BTI for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
End of procedure.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure or at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction:
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 0 Insert malfunction: Reactor Coolant, mfRC048C, RCS Hot Leg 3 Leak, 0-Final Value: 30 GPM Event 3 RCS leak 175000 GPM.
develops.
Ramp: 60 seconds INSERT 0
Alarms:
RDMS Alarm: RM65262-1, Contm Recirc Noble Gas Hi.
RDMS Alarm: Containment Gas Backup High.
Conditions:
RO should notice changing Pressurizer level.
Crew should observe above listed RDMS alarms.
Crew responds with OS1 201.02, RCS Leak. Crew should recognize E-Plan call for Unusual Event, RCS Leakage > 10 gpm, Unusual Event, item 15A.
Step 1) Check if pressurizer level can be maintained.
- a. Control charging and letdown flow as necessary.
- b. Check pressurizer level stable or increasing.
RO should be reducing letdown flow and creating a flow balance to support calculating an estimated leak rate.
Step 2) Determine the appropriate procedure step transition.
The Unit Supervisor should transition to Step 3, for suspected RCS leak.
Step 3) Isolate potential RCS leak sources.
- a. Check pressurizer safety and PORV leakage. This includes checking acoustic monitoring alarms. No Leakage
- b. Check reactor head vent isolated. Yes
- c. Check Excess Letdown isolated. Yes
- d. Check RCS sample valves closed. Yes
- e. Check reactor vessel flange leakoff temperature.(RC-TI-401) Normal
- f. Check valve stem leakoff header temperature (D7805 and D7804). No alarms
- g. Check Steam Generator tubes in tact. Yes
- i. Evaluate RCS leakage-Leakage Isolated. No. Go to step 15.
Step 15) Continue efforts to locatehdentify source of leak.
Step 16) Estimate RCS leak rate.
RO should estimate leak rate at approx. 30 gpm.
BOP should backup the estimate with containment sump trend etc.
Pane I n nf I f ?
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Step 17) Evaluate plant conditions.
- a. Unit Supervisor should identify Tech. Spec. 3.4.6.2, Reactor Coolant System Leakage, greater than 1 gpm allowed limit for Unidentified Leakage.
- b. Unit Supervisor should refer to EAL 15A, Unusual Event.
Step 18) Check VCT Makeup Controls. SAT Step 19) Evaluate continued plant operation.
Unit Supervisor should identify the need for a plant shutdown due to RCS leakage greater than Tech. Spec. limits.
Step 20) Commence controlled shutdown.
Unit Supervisor should direct a plant shutdown per OS1 000.06, Power Decrease.
Step 21) Check CST level greater than 390,000 gallons.
BOP should check level and direct NSO to commence makeup as necessary.
The remainder of the procedure may not be performed based on Lead Examiner discretion.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure and/ or perform power decrease, at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction:
Pane 11 nf 16
Rev. 01 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS 0
failure (meant to 0
Event 4 Pressurizer manway represent a pressurizer weld fai I u re).
0 Insert malfunction: Reactor Coolant, mfRC052, PZR Steam Leak (Max:
Manway failure: 11,500 Ibskec.)
Final Value: 250 Ramp: 120 seconds INSERT Alarms:
RDMS Alarm: RM65261-1 Contm Recirc Particulate High VAS D4327, PZR Pressure Low & BK Heaters On Conditions:
RO should notice a substantial increase in the RCS leakrate.
The crew should recognize the need to utilize the RCS Leak abnormal Caution Statement for inability to maintain pressurizer level greater than 7% using the normal charging lineup. The crew should carry out the following actions:
- 1) Trip the reactor.
- 2) When reactor is verified tripped, Then actuate SI.
- 3) GO to E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION After SI is initiated the crew should carry out the immediate actions of E-0:
Step 1) RO should verify reactor tripped. Yes Step 2) BOP should verify turbine tripped. Yes Step 3) BOP should verify power to AC busses. Yes Step 4) RO should check SI actuated. Yes-Both Trains After Step 4 of E-0 the crew should check for any high priority alarms:
Based on E-0 OAS page, the crew may stop RCPs based on inadequate subcooling.
RO may notice the following alarms:
VAS F5459, RHR Pump B Fail To Auto Start VAS F5483, SI Pump A Fail To Auto Start VAS F5490, SI Pump B Fail To Auto Start VAS F7971, RCS Subcooling Margin Low Pan@ 17 nf If3
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS The crew should enter E-I, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
Step I)
Check if RCPs should be stopped. Pumps should have already been stopped.
Step 2) Check if SG pressure boundary is faulted. NO. Go to Step 3 Step 3) Check intact SG levels. BOP should take actions for SG levels based on adverse containment. Check for at least 1 SG Narrow Range level greater than 15%. If NO-Maintain total EFW flow greater than 500 gpm. If YES, open EFW mini-flow valves and control feed to maintain SG levels 1540%.
Step 4) Check secondary radiation (Main Steam Lines, Condenser Air Evac, Steam Generator Blowdown). No SG uncontrolled Narrow Range level increase. All indications normal.
Step 5) Check PORVs and block valves. Power is available, PORVs are closed, and both block valves are open.
Step 6) Check if ECCS flow should be reduced. NO.
RO should identify that subcooling is less than 4OOF.
Go to Step 7 Step 7) Check if Cont. Spray should be stopped. Not running.
Step 8) Check if RHR pumps should be stopped. NO. Pressure not stable or increasing.
Go to Step 9 Step 9) Check RCS and SG pressures. All SG are stable. RCS pressure decreasing.
Pane I 4 nf 16
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario A Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Step I O ) Check if diesels should be stopped. Yes.
BOP should identify that all busses are energized via the UATs.
BOP should stop diesels by depressing the Emergency Stop push buttons.
Step 11) Evaluate plant status.
- a. Crew should verify Cold Leg Recirc. capability. Yes
- c. No CBS pumps running.
- d. Check for containment leakage. No
- e. Consult with TSC
- f. Evaluate ESF equipment per Attachment A.
RO should evaluate equipment as time permits.
Step 12) Check if RCS cooldown and depressurization are required.
Crew should check RCS pressure Greater Than 300 psig.
Transition to ES-1.2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION, Step 1.
Emergency Plan:
Initial: Unusual Event, item 15A, RCS Leakage, Unidentified or Pressure Boundary Leakage >I Ogpm or Identified Leakage
>25gpm.
Upgrade: Alert, item 1% RCS Leakage >50 gpm. No SAE, item 15d, as subcooling recovers and pressurizer level is >7%.
Terminate the exam at the Lead Examiner discretion when crew enters ES-1.2.
Pane 15 nf 16
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAM Scenario A REV.01 CREW CRITICAL TASKS I.
Establish flow from at least one intermediate head ECCS pump (SI-P-6A or SI-P-6B) before transitioning out of E-0.
- 2. 2.Trip all RCPs if subcooling is less than 40°F (not time dependant) such that an orange path on Core Cooling does not occur when forced circulation in RCS stops.
Paae 16 of 16
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P F
n eabrook SI M U LATOR EXAM1 NATION 2005 - 2007 LOlT DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Scenario B Rev. 01
$This material is developed for FPL Energy Seabrook training programs by the Training Group.
- Text materials and figures contained in this document are developed for purposes of instructior and should not be used in connection with either plant maintenance or plant operation. This material may not be reproduced without the authorization of the Training Manager.
4, A
PREPARED BY:
DATE:
c -3 INSTRUCTOR sin*"*
+-?
DATE:
\\,
/--.
I REVIEWED BY:
WE (OPTIONAL) h APPROVED BY:
DATE:
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TRAl N I NG S U PERVlSO R i
c 8
SCENARIO The simulator is reset to IC #31, Middle of Core Life, 75% Power. The Reactor will not trip automatically or manually. The EDG-1 B breaker will not close on demand. The turbine driven EFW pump will trip due to overspeed. A loss of offsite power will occur after the reactor is tripped.
After the reactor is manually tripped, a loss of offsite power occurs and the B Emergency Diesel Generator breaker does not close. No means of emergency boration will exist at this point. The motor driven EFW pump is not available because it is powered from Bus 6 (B EDG). The turbine driven EFW pump trips on overspeed and will not be restored. The Startup Feedwater Pump will be a success path in FR-H.1.
The crew completes FR-S.l and goes to the procedure and step in effect (Normally E-0). The crew should go straight to FR-H.1, due to the H Red Path and E-0 having been already exited.
0 At step 1 of FR-H.1, the crew verifies heat sink required.
0 At step 2 the crew will note that no CCP (charging pump) is available and go directly to step 10 (bleed and feed).
0 The crew will perform steps 10 through 18, and at step 20 begins to look for sources to feed the steam generators.
I 0 The crew will establish the Startup Feedwater Pump as a feed source using step 5 as a guideline and return to step 21 to continue with the procedure.
0 At steps 24 and 25 the crew will close the PORVs and transition to E-I, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, when subcooling is less than required.
0 At step 12 of E-1 the crew goes to ES-1.2, Post LOCA Cooldown and Depressurization.
?Terminate the exam at the Chief Examiners discretion.
Page 2 of 22
8 SIMULATOR SETUP
- 1.
Reset the simulator to IC #31, Middle of Core Life, 75% Power 2 Reactor will not trip automatically or manually.
Insert Malfunctions, Reactor Protection; 0
0 0
mfRPSOOl, Automatic Reactor Trip Failure Train A mfRPSOO 2, Automatic Reactor Trip Failure Train B mfRPS027, Reactor trip Switches Fail to Actuate (Train A) mfRPS028, Reactor trip Switches Fail to Actuate (Train B) 3 EDG-1 B breaker will not close on demand. Insert Malfunctions, Electrical Distribution Component 0
bkEDEGDG, Select Fail Open 4 Align SUFP to Bus 4 for SUFP Breaker testing on Bus 5 5 On Sim Diagram FW3, FW-P-376, Component Malfunction 0
bkFWP37B SELECT: FAIL OPEN 0
INSERT Page 3 of 22
a SHIFT TURNOVER The plant is at 75% power. The crew is preparing to perform ON1432.01, Weekly Testing of the Extraction Steam Non Return Check Valves during the shift. The SUFP is aligned to Bus 4 for Breaker Testing of the BUS 5 SUFP Breaker.
75% Power Boron Concentration = 11 71 ppm, Axial Flux Difference = - 1.I2 %.
Page 4 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 SCENARIO OUTLINE EVENT INSTRUCTION Shift Turnover Shift turnover information as stated.
COMMENTS Operators should review alarms and indication The BOP is preparing to perform ON1432.01, Weekly Testing of the Extraction Steam Non Return Check Valves. At the Chief Examiners discretion continue to the next event. This surveillance does not take long and can be abandoned at any time without consequence to the remainder of the scenario.
Crew continues power increase to 100%
Page 5 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 EVENT EVENT 1 The control I i ng channel of Pressurizer level will fail low.
INSTRUCTION I
c] Insert Malfunction: Reactor Coolant Component Malfunctions 0 ltRCLT459, FAILS LOW.
0 INSERT COMMENTS Alarms:
VAS D4461, PZR LVL Low & HTR Interlock Actuated VAS F4323, PZR Control Heaters Tripped VAS F4324, PZR Group C Backup Heaters Tripped VAS F4325, PZR Group D Backup Heaters Tripped VAS 681 86, PZR STMICHG Line AT Approach Limit Conditions:
oRC-LCV-459 and CS-V-145 will go closed and isolate letdown flow.
0 At 5% pressurizer level deviation, alarm VAS D4436, PZR LVL Deviation High & BU HTRS On will go into alarm state.
The crew responds using OS1201.07, PZR Level Instrument Failure.
Step 1) The RO should identify the controlling level channel as failed.
Step 2) The step calls for manually controlling pressurizer level at program.
.The RO will have to control charging to supply just the RCP seals. The operator should take manual control of CS-FK-121, Charging Flow Control Valve, and adjust CS-HCV-182, Seal Injection flow control to accomplish this task.
.The RO should select alternate channels for Control/Backup. The operator should select the 461/460 combination.
.The RO should select an alternate channel (460 or 641) for the pressurizer level recorder.
Step 3) The RO should "reset" the control group pressurizer heaters.
Step 4) The RO should verify that RC-LCV-459 has closed.
Page 6 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Step 5) a. The RO should verify or establish greater than 50 gpm charging flow by adjusting CS-FCV-121 and/or CS-HCV-182 accordingly.
- b. The RO should verify that pressurizer level is greater than 17%.
Step 6) The RO should reestablish letdown flow per the following process:
Verify PCCW is aligned to the Letdown Heat Exchanger and that TCV-130 is in auto.
Close Letdown Flow Control Valves CS-HCV-189/190.
Open Letdown Line Isolation Valves. Operator should reopen RC-LCV-459 and CS-V-145.
0 Establish letdown flow with CS-HCV-189 or 190. The operator should utilize the backpressure control valve CS-PK-131 to maintain adequate backpressure. The operator may initially utilize CS-PK-131 in manual and then return the valve to automatic when letdown flow is established.
Alarms:
During letdown flow restoration the following alarms may occur:
VAS 87399, RCS Unidentified Leak Rate High VAS 88266, RCS Unidentified Leak Rate Warning The leak rate monitor is accurate during steady state conditions. The variances introduced during this transient will cause these alarms.
NOTE: It takes a period of time to restore pressurizer level back to its setpoint value. The operator should establish a letdown flowrate that is greater than the charging flowrate to return level to programmed value. When level finally returns to setpoint the crew should utilize procedure OS1002.08, Pressurizer Level Control System Operation as additional guidance for returning level control to automatic.
Step 7) When pressurizer level returns to setpoint the RO should verify proper controller setpoint and return RC-LK-459 and/or CS-FK-121 to automatic.
Step 8) The RO should verify that there are no redundant Pressurizer Level Hi bistables lit on UL-6.
Page 7 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Step 9)
- a. The Unit Supervisor should identify the following Tech. Spec. items as applicable:
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Table 3.3-1, Item 11, Action 6 requires the channel bistable to be tripped within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.3.6, Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, Table 3.3-1 0, Item 5, Action A requires that, with one less than the total channels, the affected channel must be restored to operable within 30 days.
0 Tech. Spec. 3.3.3.5, Remote Shutdown System, Table 3.3-9, Item 5. the crew may discuss that the remote safe shutdown instrument comes off of the same instrument tap as level channel 459. The crew may discuss the possibility of investigating whether the RSS channel is affected.
- b. If desired to test or troubleshoot, Unit supervisor may direct I&C to place bistables to bypass using BTI for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure or at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction:
Page 8 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 EVENT Event 2 An over-current trip of Charging Pump, CS-P-2A will occur.
INSTRUCTION COMMENTS 0
Insert Malfunction: Chemical and Alarms:
Volume Control System, mfCSO16, CS-P-2A OC Trip.
UA-52,C-3, RCP Seal Injection Flow Lo VAS D4652, CNTRFGL CHG Pump A BKR Trip & UO VAS D7853, CHG PMP DISCH Combined HDR Low Low VAS D4676 through D4679, RCP Seal Injection Flow Low alarms.
VAS F6958, CVCS Train A hop The crew responds using OS1 202.02, Charging System Failure.
Step 1) RO should state that charging flow is unavailable.
RO should reduce letdown flow and/or isolate letdown flow by closing CS-V-145. This step is prudent to prevent flashing conditions in the regenerative heat exchanger.
Step 2) The crew should be monitoring the affects on RCP seals due to the loss Of seal injection. The crew should use Main Plant Computer Color graphics Reactor Coolant Pump displays and/or Computer A points. Should be monitoring Seal water inkt temperature <23OoF.
Step 3) The RO should state that there are no charging pumps running.
The RO will start the B charging pump utilizing the following sequence:
0 Place the charging flow controller CS-FK-121 in manual and reduce the output signal to 0%.
0 The RO should start the B centrifugal charging pump form the control board. The operator may utilize computer color graphics and the analog ammeter to observe pump conditions.
The RO should slowly establish charging flow and establish desired seal injection flow by operating the charging flow controller, CS-FK-121 in conjunction with the seal injection flow control valve, CS-HCV-182.
Instructor CUE: After charging pump trip the crew may dispatch an NSO to check the pump breaker. If so, then after a time delay have the NSO report back that the breaker has tripped on over-current.
Page 9 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Step 4)
- a. The RO should verify proper seal injection filter AP. The in service filter should be reading approx. 5 psid.
- b. The operator should verify seal injection flow greater than 6 gpm or adjust flow accordingly utilizing CS-HCV-I 82.
Step 5) The crew should verify that the charging system is intact. The operators should look at RDMS displays, building sump levels, and dispatch personnel to walk down the PAB.
The RCS is intact, the crew should go to Step 9.
Step 9) The RO should verify that VCT level is greater than 30%
Step I O ) The crew should check if notmal letdown can be established.
The RO should verify that charging flow is greater than 50 gpm and pressurizer level is greater than 17%.
0 The RO should reestablish letdown flow per the following process:
0 Verify PCCW is aligned to the Letdown Heat Exchanger.
0 Close Letdown Flow Control Valves CS-HCV-189/190.
0 Open Letdown Line Isolation Valves. Operator should reopen RC-LCV-459 and CS-V-145.
0 Establish letdown flow with CS-HCV-189 or 190. The operator should utilize the backpressure control valve CS-PK-131 to maintain adequate backpressure. The operator may initially utilize CS-PK-131 in manual and then return the valve to automatic when letdown flow is established.
The crew should go to Step 12.
Step 12) : It takes a period of time to restore pressurizer level back to its setpoint value. The operator should establish a letdown flowrate that is greater than the charging flowrate to return level to programmed value.
When level finally returns to setpoint the crew should utilize procedure OS1 002.08, Pressurizer Level Control System Operation as additional guidance for returning level control to automatic.
Page 10 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Step 13) The Unit Supervisor should identify the following Tech. Spec. as applicable:
Tech. Spec. 3.5.2, ECCS Subsystems, Action A, requires restoration of the inoperable ECCS subsystem to operable status within 7 days.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure or at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction:
Page 11 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 3 The B Main Feedwater Pump shaft will shear (no pump trip signal).
Malfunctions, Feedwater Component.
Insert Malfunction: FWP32B 0
Shaft Shear.
0 Select: INSERT COMMENTS The B Main Feedwater Pump trip will initiate the major event. Feedwater flow will be drastically reduced. No automatic plant setback will occur because a pump trip signal is not generated. Steam Generator levels decrease rapidly and a SG Lo-Lo level reactor trip demand occurs @ 20% SG Narrow Range level.
Conditions:
0 BOP may report low B Feed Pump suction flow (FW-FI-4065-1) 0 BOP may report mismatch in 1" stage flow and governor valve position for Feed Pump B as compared to Feed Pump A.
Alarms:
VAS D4700, MFP B Suction Header Flow Low VAS D4704, SG D STM Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch VAS D4706, SG A STM Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch VAS D4708, SG B STM Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch VAS D4710, SG C STM Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch Alarms @ 45% level decreasing:
UA35, A3, SG A Level Hi/Lo UA35, 83, SG B Level Hi/Lo UA35, C3, SG C Level Hi/Lo UA35, D3, SG D Level Hi/Lo VAS 04770, SG A LVL Ref Deviation VAS D4771, SG B LVL Ref Deviation VAS D4772, SG C LVL Ref Deviation VAS D4773, SG D LVL Ref Deviation Alarms @ 35% level decreasing:
VAS D4876, SG A Level Low VAS D4877, SG B Level Low VAS D4878, SG C Level Low VAS D4879, SG D Level Low Page 12 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 3 The B Main Feedwater Pump shaft will shear (no pump trip signal).
COMMENTS The B Main Feedwater Pump trip will initiate the major event. Feedwater flow will be drastically reduced. No automatic plant setback will occur because a pump trip signal is not generated. Steam Generator levels decrease rapidly and a SG Lo-Lo level reactor trip demand occurs @ 20% SG Narrow Range level.
Alarms (@ 20% level decreasing:
Primary VAS Red Alarms:
VAS D4865, RX Trip SG A LVL Lo Lo VAS 04866, RX Trip SG B LVL Lo Lo VAS D4867, RX Trip SG C LVL Lo Lo VAS D4868, RX Trip SG D LVL Lo Lo BOP VAS Alarms:
VAS F4756, SG A Level Lo Lo VAS F4840, SG B Level Lo Lo VAS F4841, SG C Level Lo Lo VAS F4850, SG D Level Lo Lo Crew Response:
- This event will lead to the necessity for a reactor trip. The crew may address the VPRO procedures for the steam generator flow mismatch alarms. The VPRO procedure for alarm D4704, SG D STM Flow/Feed Flow Mismatch includes the following actions:
- 1) Check steam and feed flow indications on the main control board.
- 2) Check for proper feed reg valve response, take manual control if necessary.
- 3) Check FW system parameters.
- 4) Check steam generator parameters.
- 5) Check for any possible steam leaks.
- The loss of a main feed pump will degrade feed flow to all 4 steam generators.
Page 13 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 3 The B Main Feedwa ter Pump shaft will shear (no pump trip signal).
COMMENTS The B Main Feedwater Pump trip will initiate the major event. Feedwater flow will be drastically reduced. No automatic plant setback will occur because a pump trip signal is not generated. Steam Generator levels decrease rapidly and a SG Lo-Lo level reactor trip demand occurs @ 20% SG Narrow Range level.
The crew should recognize the loss of steam generator levels and realize that a reactor trip is warranted.
Allow the crew to evaluate and use the abnormal or at Lead Examiners discretion, prior to entering the next malfunction:
Page 14 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Event 4 The reactor does not trip.
0 RF:Manual Adjust On the reactor trip attempt:
[7 Sim Diagram MS7, MS-V-129 SELECT:O for value
[7 INSERT (NOTE: The following malfunction is inserted to assist in level reduction for H Red Path.)
Insert Main Steam Malfunction:
[7 mfMS051, Break on the main steam bottle.
[7 VALUE: 0.05 0
INSERT The crew will respond by performing the immediate actions of E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
Step 1) The RO should recognize that the reactor did not trip.
Step 1-RNO) The RO should attempt to manually trip the reactor using both main control board reactor trip switches. The RO should inform the Unit Supervisor that the reactor did not trip.
The crew should transition to FR-S.1, RESPONSE TO NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION/ATWS.
The RO should perform the immediate actions of FR-S.1.
The BOP Operator should perform immediate actions of FR-S.1.
Step 1) The RO should recognize that the reactor did not trip and should be verifying that control rods are inserting in automatic or the RO should be manually inserting rods.
Step 2) The BOP should recognize that the main turbine has tripped.
NOTE:
0 The motor driven EFW pump breaker will trip.
0 The turbine driven EFW pump trips on overspeed and will not be restored.
The crew should dispatch an operator to reset MS-V-129.
Step 3) The BOP should verify EFW status.
Step 4) The RO should initiate Emergency boration:
0 Verify a charging pump running.
0 Start a boric acid pump/ Open emergency borate valve.
0 Place charging control valve CS-FK-121 open to charge at max rate.
Open CCP suction valves from RWST.
Close CCP suction valves from VCT.
Check pressurizer pressure less than 2385 psig.
Page 15 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Step 5) The RO should verify Containment Ventilation Isolation.
This can be done by looking at UL status lights.
Step 6) The crew should have dispatched an NSO to locally trip the reactor.
Step 7) Once the reactor is tripped locally the RO should verify that the reactor is subcritical.
Return to procedure and step in effect. The crew should transition to procudure FR-H.l, due to the H Red Path and E-0 having already been exited.
After the reactor is manually tripped, a loss of offsite power occurs and the B Emergency Diesel Generator breaker does not close.
instructor CUE:
Manually trip the reactor after Emergency is complete, Wait 2 minutes and perform the following to trip the reactor:
After the reactor is manually tripped, a loss of offsite power occurs and the B Emergency Diesel Generator breaker does not close. No means of emergency boration will exist at this point. The motor driven EFW pump is not available because it is powered from Bus 6 (B EDG). The Startup Feedwater Pump will be a success path in FR-Sl step
-0R-FR-H.1.
0 DMF mfRPSOOl, Automatic Reactor Trip Failure Train A 0
DMF mfRPSOO2, Automatic Reactor Trip Failure Train B 0
DMF mfRPS027, Reactor trip Switches Fail to Actuate (Train A)
DMF mfRPS028, Reactor trip Switches Fail to Actuate (Train B) 0 DMF mfRPSOO 2, Automatic Reactor Trip Failure Train B Page 16 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Event 5 Malfunctions, Electrical Distribution; After the reactor is manually tripped 0
IMF mfED038 (after Em erg ency Boration is started) a LOP occurs
- Once WR steam generator levels are ~60%
reduce mfMSO51 severity to 0 with a ramp of 300 seconds.
Use LOCAL Panels, Feedwater to Shift SUFP as needed to desired Bus to allow feeding SG.
FR-H.l, RESPONSE TO A LOSS OF SECONDARY HEAT SINK:
Step 1) The crew should verify that RCS pressure is greater than non-faulted steam generator pressure and that RCS Hot Leg temperature is greater than 350°F.
Step 2) The RO should verify that no centrifugal charging pump is available.
The crew should go to step I O.
The crew should now be performing the steps to establish RCS bleed and feed.
Step IO) The RO should verify all RCP's stopped.
Step 11) The RO should actuate SI using the manual SI switch.
Step 12) Verification of feed status. The RO should identify that there are no CCP running but there is one SI pump Running.
Step 13) The RO should perform the following to establish a bleed path:
- a. Power to RC-VI24
- b. Verify both PORV block valves open.
- c. Open both PORV's.
Step 14) The RO should verify an adequate bleed path exists.
Page 17 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Step 15) The RO or BOP should perform Attachment D to verify proper SI equipment actuation.
Step 16) The RO should verify ECCS flow and maintain both PORVs open as a continuous action throughout the bleed and feed process.
Step 17) The RO should reset SI using the control board SI reset switches.
Step 18) The RO should reset Phase A and Phase B signals using the control board T and P signal reset switches.
Step 19) The BOP should check the status of instrument air Step 20) The RO should verify that no CBS pumps are running.
Step 21) The crew should continue attempts to establish a secondary heat sink.
The crew should refer to Step 4 to attempt to establish flow from the Startup Feed Pump. The crew will establish flow from the Startup feed pump and then continue with Step 22. If the crew had made efforts to establish feed flow in E-0, then feed flow may be established earlier.
Evaluator CUE: At step 22, Steam Generator levels may not have recovered enough to continue with the procedure. The exam may be stopped here. If steam generator level has recovered, continue to steps 25 and 26 to stop bleed and feed.
Step 22) The BOP should observe SG levels for verification of adequated heat sink. If levels are adequate the crew should go to Step 23. If levels are not adequate the crew must wait until level recovers.
Page 18 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Rev. 01 Step 23) The RO should verify that Core Exit Thermocouple and RCS Hot Leg temperatures are decreasing.
Step 24) The RO should verify that the Reactor Head Vent valves are closed.
Step 25) The RO should report that subcooling is not adequate for SI termination. The crew should go to Step 26.
Step 26) The RO should close one of the PORVs. The crew should return to Step 25.
Step 25) The RO should report that subcooling is not adequate for SI termination. The crew should go to Step 26.
Step 26) The RO should close the remaining open PORVs. The crew should return to Step 25.
Step 25) The RO should report that subcooling is not adequate for SI termination. The crew should go to Step 26.
Step 26) The RO should verify no bleed paths open.
The crew should transition to E-I, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT.
Page 19 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAM1 NATION Rev. 01 E-I, LOSS OF REACTOR OR SECONDARY COOLANT Step 1) RO should verify that all RCPs are stopped.
Step 2) BOP should verify that there are no SG pressure boundaries faulted.
Step 3) BOP should continue to check intact SG levels adequate.
Step 4) BOP should verify that Secondary radiation is normal.
Step 5) RO should verify that the PORVs are closed, and that at least one block valve is powered and open.
Step 6) RO should verify that ECCS flow should not be reduced.
Crew should go to Step 7.
Step 7) RO should verify no CBS pumps running.
Step 8) RO should check if RHR pumps can be secured.
Step 9) Crew should identify that they should go to Step IO.
Step IO) BOP should secure EDGs as necessary.
Step 11) Crew should verify availability to Cold Leg Recirc.
Step 12) Crew should identify the need to transition to ES-1.2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION.
Crew should transition to ES-1.2, POST LOCA COOLDOWN AND DEPRESSURIZATION.
Page 20 of 22
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAM #
REV.00 CREW CRITICAL TASKS
- 1.
INSERT negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods in accordance with FR-S.1.
0 Automatic and/or manual insertion of the RCCAs.
0 Establish Emergency Boration flow to the RCS.
- 2. ISOLATE the main turbine from the SG's before proceeding to step 5 of FR-S.l on an ATWS initiated by a loss of feedwater.
Paae 10 of 22
tion SIMULATOR EXAMINATION 2005 -2007 LOlT DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 This material is developed for FPL Energy Seabrook training programs by the Training Group.
Text materials and figures contained in this document are developed for purposes of instructior and should not be used in connection with either plant maintenance or plant operation. This material may not be reproduced without the authorization of the Training Manager.
PREPARED BY:
DATE:
INSTRUCTOR REVIEWED BY:
DATE:
SME (OPTIONAL)
APPROVED BY:
DATE:
TRAINING SUPERVISOR
SCENARIO 100% Power, On the loss of power and A Emergency Diesel Generator restart the Service Water pumps will fail to auto start, requiring manual actuation.
Page 2 of 18
SIMULATOR SETUP
- 1.
Reset the simulator to IC #30, Middle of Core Life, 2
Insert the following malfunction to fail the Auto Start of A EDG; Electrical Distribution:
0 Insert the following Malfunction to Trip the B EDG on Low Lube Oil Pressure, Electrical Malfunctions:
0 IMF mfED031 I DG-1A Auto Start Failure IMF mfED034, DG-1 B Low Lube Oil Press Trip On Panel Graphic PHF, Override the A EDG Emergency Stop Pushbuttons to SRP 0
3 To set up the ASDV D Closure and Isolation with MS-V49:
On Sim Diagram MSI for MS-V49 Select the Remote Function, rfMSO14, and Set Final value to 0 On MS-PK-3004, place the controller to Manual and Minimum output On Sim Diagram MSI, MS-PV-3004, Component Malfunction SELECT: FAIL CLOSED SELECT: INSERT PLACE MCB jog switch to CLOSED for MS-PV-3004.
0 0
n 0
4 Malfunctions, Reactor Protection INSERT the following malfunction to prevent an Automatic turbine Trip 5 Malfucntions, Service Water, Insert the following malfunctions to prevent Auto Start of SW-P41A, 41 C and P-I 1 OA 0
0 6 Fail open turbine stop valve #2:
mfRPS003, Automatic Turbine Trip Failure IMF mfSWO, SW-P41A Fails to Auto Start IMF mfSWO, SW-P41C Fails to Auto Start Main Steam, Component Malfunction, avMSVSV2 SELECT:FAIL OPEN SELECT: INSERT 0
0 0
7 Activate trigger for FW-P-37A overspeed.
0 LOIT,L30591,Loss of FW-P-37A on Overspeed.
Page 3 of 18
c DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 EVENT Event 1 RCS Tavg will fail high causing inward control rod motion.
INSTRUCTION COMMENTS 0
Insert Malfunction: Reactor Coolant 0
ttRCTT411 0
Select: FAIL HIGH 0
INSERT The crew responds using OS1201.08, Tavg/Delta T Instrument Failure.
Conditions: Control Rods step in based on TavglTref deviation.
The crew should diagnose that rods are stepping in due to an instrument failure. The RO should recommend and/or the Unit Supervisor should direct the RO to place rods in manual.
Alarms:
VAS F5298, OTDT Chan Trip VAS D4422, Average Tavg High VAS D4421, Tavg-Tref Deviation Component.
UL-6, A3, RC LOOP 1, TB-41 I C OTDT OS1201.08, TavglDelta T Instrument Failure:
Step 1) The RO should identify that Loop 1 temperature instrument 41 1 has failed.
Step 2) The Unit Supervisor should direct the RO to place rods in auto. This action may have already taken place prior to the procedure step as a skill of the operator task.
Step 3) The RO should defeat the Loop 1 AT input, Loop 1 Tavg input, and select a non-effected loop for the AT,OT,OP recorder.
Alarm Resets:
The following alarms will reset:
VAS F5298, OTDT Chan Trip VAS D4422, Average Tavg High VAS alarms for loop Tavg-Tref Deviation Alarms:
The following alarms will have occurred and will remain in alarm:
VAS F8115, RC Loop 1 Tavg Deviation VAS F8119, RC Loop 1 Delta T Deviation Step 4) The RO should verify that Tavg is within 1°F of Tref. The Unit Supervisor should direct the RO to place rods back in automatic.
The RO should monitor pressurizer level trending towards programmed level in automatic.
UL-6, A3, RC LOOP 1, TB-411 C OTDT Page 6 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 The BOP should verify that the Steam Dump interlock selector switches are in the NA Reset NA Bypass Interlock position.
Step 5) The RO should verify that there are no redundant bi-stable lights lit for the following:
UL-1, T Avg Lo-Lo Loop Stm Dmp Is0 UL-1 T AVg LO LOOP TO FW ISO UL-6, RCS LOOP OTAT UL-6, RCS LOOP OPAT UL-12, Tavg Lo Loop To FW Is0 Step 6) The Unit Supervisor should identify the following Tech. Spec. items as being applicable:
Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Item 7, Overtemperature AT, Action 6.
Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Item 8, Overpower ATl Action 6.
Each item requires affected bistables to be placed in the trip condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
The Unit Supervisor may coordinate with I&C to place the affected bistables to bypass, using BTI, for up to 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
End of procedure.
Page 7 of 18
Rev. 01 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Event 2 Initiation of a letdown line Filter.
VAS B7399, RCS Unidentified Leak Rate High leak.
0 Value: 0.5 0
Insert Malfunction: MfCS012, Letdown Line Leak At Inlet TO Reactor Coolant The crew responds with OS1201.02, RCS Leak.
Alarms:
VAS B8266, RCS Unidentified Leak Rate Warning RDMS, RM6508-2, Hi Range PAB North El -7 Alarm RO should identify decrease in VCT level.
0 Select: INSERT Conditions:
OS1201.02, RCS Leak The Unit Supervisor should alert the crew to the Caution Statement prior to step 1:
If the plant is in Mode 1,2,or 3 with SI accumulators aligned for injection and pressurizer level can m b e maintained greater than 7% using normal charging lineup, then perform the following:
- 1) Trip reactor
- 2) When the reactor trip is verified, then actuate SI
- 3) GO to E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
Step 1) The RO should control charging and letdown flow as necessary to maintain pressurizer level.
The RO should verify that pressurizer level is stable or increasing.
This is a continuous action statement. The RNO response for this step reflects the information contained in the procedure caution as described above.
Step 2) The crew should identify that a CVCS leak is suspected. The crew should proceed to Step 5.
Step 5) The Unit Supervisor will direct the RO to isolate letdown.
The RO will close the following valves:
.CS-HCV-189
.CS-HCV-I 90
.CS-V-145
.RC-V-8 1 The Unit Supervisor will direct the RO to isolate charging to the loops.
The RO will close the following valves:
.Maintain seal inj. flow 6-1 3 gpm utilizing CS-FCV-121 in manual.
.Close letdown isolation valves.
.CS-HCV-182 Page 8 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01
.CS-V-I 42
.CS-V-143 Alarms:
When charging flow is isolated the following alarms will occur:
VAS B8166, Pzr Stm/Chg Line AT Approach Limit VAS D7853, Chg Pmp Disch Combined Hdr Flow Low When the charging line isolation valves are closed the following alarms will occur:
VAS D7872, Chg Header Contm Is0 VLV-142 Closed VAS D7873, Chg Header Contm Is0 VLV-143 Closed When a VCT auto makeup occurs at 30% level the following alarm will occur VAS D4660, BA Makeup VLV-1 IOB to Chg Pmp Open Step 6) The crew should identify that the leak is isolated by verifying the following parameters:
.Pressurizer level-Increasing at a rate equal to the difference between seal injection and seal return.
.Containment air particulate and gas monitor. Stable or Decreasing
.Containment temperature and pressure. Stable or Decreasing
.Containment sump A and B levels. Normal or Decreasing Step 7) The crew will be checking charging and letdown system integrity based on:
VCT level decrease-Equal to the difference between seal injection and seal return.
PAB radiation levels-Stable or decreasing.
The outcome of these verifications is time dependant. The step RNO directs dispatching HP/NSOs to determine the source of the leak. If the source cannot be identified the step directs entering OS1 202.02, Charging System Failure. The crew could also enter the Area High Radiation abnormal procedure.
Instructor CUE:, Rer completion of Step 6, have the NSO report that the leak appears to be from the inlet to the reactor coolant filter.
Page 9 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 Step 8) The Unit Supervisor should direct the RO to establish excess letdown.
Excess letdown is necessary to remove the inventory being added to the RCS via seal injection flow.
The RO should establish excess letdown as follows:
.Open CC-V-434, Excess Letdown Heat Exchanger Cooling Water
.Check open CS-V-167 and 168, Excess Ltdn Containment Isol.
.Check closed CS-HCV-123
.Open CS-V-175 and 176, Excess Letdown Contaiment Isol.
.Flush Excess Letdown to RCDT, Align CS-V-170 to RCDT, Slowly open CS-HCV-123 and flush for greater than 5 minutes, then close CS-HCV-123.
.Align CS-V-170 to Seal Return Header.
.Establish Excess Letdown flow via CS-HCV-123. The RO should limit flow such that excess letdown heat exchanger outlet temp is 4 75°F and outlet pressure is 4 5 0 psig.
.The RO should remove data point A0620, Letdown Outlet Flow, from the plant calorimetric calculation.
Step 9) The crew should verify that RCS leakage has stopped via the following method:
.The RO should adjust seal inj. and excess letdown such that presurizer level is stable.
.The RO should verify that the VCT level is stable.
.Containment air particulate and gas monitor-stable or decreasing.
.Containment temperature and pressure-stable or decreasing.
.Containment sump A and B-decreasing or normal Step 10)The crew should minimize the effects of loss of letdown:
Goordinate with Chemistry and Health Physics concerning the loss of letdown and options for maintaining RCS hydrogen conc.
.The Unit Supervisor should identify the need to inform Chemistry of the possible Tech. Spec. implications:
Tech. Spec. 3.4.7, Chemistry Tech. Spec. 3.4.8, Specific Activity The crew should go to Step 17 Page 10 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 Step 17)The Unit Supervisor should consider the implications for Tech. Spec.
3.4.6.2, RCS Leakage.
The Unit Supervisor should identify that there is no Emergency Plan classification criteria met at this time.
Step 18)The RO should verify that the VCT makeup controls are in auto and set for current RCS boron concentration.
Step 19)The Unit Supervisor should evaluate plant conditions:
The crew should identify that the leak is isolated.
The crew should be making the necessary phone calls for rescources to locate and repair the leak.
Step 20)This step directs a plant shutdown if Tech. Spec. RCS leakage is exceeded.
Step 21)BOP should verify CST level >390,000 gallons or direct NSO to commence a CST makeup.
Step 22)The crew should verify COP shutdown and cont isolation valves closed:
COP-V-1 and 4, Train A COP-V-2 and 3, Train B Step 23)Step minimizes effects of leak to containment. The crew should have identified the leak as being in the PAB.
Steps 24 and 25)These steps are applicable to a plant shutdown if Tech.
Spec. limits on RCS leakage had been exceeded.
End of procedure.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure or at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction:
Page 11 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Event 3 The plant has a loss of offsite power.
Insert Malfunction: Electrical Evaluator N0TE:The crew will eventually transition to ECA-0.2. Terminate the exam at the Chief Examiner discretion.
Distribution, mfED038, Loss of Offsite Power.
Select: INSERT Instructor CUE:
.NSO will find a large quantity of oil on the B EDG skid. Finds oil line to engine oil pressure switches ruptured.
.NSO finds nothing obviously wrong with A EDG, use DG Local Panels to set LOCAL on the LOCAUREMOTE switch.
.All local starts of A EDG will not work until Step 14 of ECA-0.0.
.As time allows report as HP that steam lines show no change in radiation levels.
ECA-0.0, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER Step 1)The RO should verify that the reactor is tripped:
Checks reactor trip and bypass breakers open.
Checks neutron flux decreasing.
Step 2)The BOP should verify that the turbine is not tripped:
Checks all stop valves closed.NO. BOP should perform RNO an manually trip the turbine.
Checks generator breaker open.
NOTE: The B EDG will trip on Low Lube Oil Pressure.
Step 3)The RO should check the RCS Isolated.
.Pressurizer PORVs closed-yes
.Letdown isolation valves closed:yes cs-v-145 Or RC-LCV-459 Or
.Excess Letdown valves closed-No CS-V-175 and 176 are closed at step 3c.
.RCS Sample Valves-Yes RC-LCV-460 Page 12 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 3 The plant has a loss of offsite power.
Instructor CUE:
When the crew dispatches an NSO to the field to reset the EFW pump, perform the following:
UComponent Remote Funtions USELECT: rmvMSVl29 USELECT: Manual Adjust USELECT: INSERT Summary USELECT: 1.0 COMMENTS Step 4)The BOP should identify that there is no EFW flow and that MS-V-129 is closed.
The crew should utilize Step 4 RNO, and drirect an NSO to locally start the steam driven EFW pump per OS1036.03, RESETTING THE STEAM DRIVEN EFW PUMP TRIP VALVE.
Step 5)The crew should continue efforts to restore power. SEPs is unavailable
- b. BOP should attempt an emergency start of EDG A Neither EDG will be able to function. The RNO for this step is to use the SEPs diesel generator. SEPs is not available.
- c. The crew should identify that the emergency diesels are not running and go to Step 6.
Step 6)The crew should complete step 6 prior to continuing with recovery efforts. The following equipment should be disabled:
.Thermal Barrier Cooling Pumps-Off
.Charging Pumps-Pull-to-Lock oPCCW Pumps-Pull-to-Lock Containment Spray Pumps-Pull-to-Lock oRHR Pumps-Pull-to-Lock
.SI Pumps-Pull-to-Lock
.Motor Driven EFW Pump-Pull-to-Lock Containment Air Compressors-Off
.All UAT/RAT Supply Breakers-Pull-to-Lock Step 7) Unit Supervisor should direct implementation of Attachment C.
oSUFP (BUS ES)-PUII-~O-LOC~
Page 13 of 18
Rev. 01 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 3 The plant has a loss of offsite power.
Instructor CUE:
During Step 14 of ECA-0.0 you will restore A EDG to service.
Instructions for this will appear next to step 14 of this outline.
Instructor CUE:
When directed as an NSO to Close CS-V167, Use Sim Diagram CS4 and Use Manual Adjust to set CS-VI67 to zero.
Use Chemical and Volume Control Remote Functions to close the following valves:
rfcs020 cs-VI 53 rfCSOl9 cs-VI 57 rfCS018 CS-VI 61 rfCSOl7 CS-VI 65 Step 8) The SEPs is not available. The Unit Supervisor should direct the BOP to coordinate with an NSO and perform a local start of EDG A utilizing Attachment F, Local Start of Emergency Diesel Generator.
Step 9) The Unit Supervisor should direct the RO to coordinate isolation of RCP seals:
.Close CS-V-167, RCP Seal Return ISO.
.Close CS-V-153,157,161, 165, Seal Inj. Throttle Valves.
Step IO) The BOP should verify that the CST is isolated from the hotwells:
CO-LV-4014A-Closed CO-V-151 -Closed Step 11) Establish SG Secondary Side Isolation:
.The ROlBOP should place the Train A and Train B MSI switches to actuate and verify isolation.
.Verify MSlV and MSlV Bypass Valves closed.
Check FW Reg. and FW Reg. Bypass valves closed.
.Check Blowdown Isolation Valves closed per Phase A status panel.
Page 14 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 3 The plant has a loss of offsite power.
Instructor CUE:
During Step 14 of ECA-0.0 Restore A
EDG to service:
ODelete the Overrides on the A EDG Emergency Stop Push buttons.
C]On the LOCAL Panel Select Emergency Start.
COMMENTS Step 12) The crew should identify that the SG pressure boundary is not faulted.
The crew should go to Step 13.
Step 13) The crew should identify that the SG u-tubes =intact.
Step 14)
- a. The BOP should verify intact SG levels greater than 65% Wide b.The BOP should open EFW mini-flow recirc valves and control SG level as necessary. Prior to electrical power restoration the BOP will have to direct local mini-flow valve operation and EFW throttling.
Range in at least two SGs.
Evaluator NOTE:
When electrical power is restored the crew should continue with recovery actions by going to step 24.
OWhen engine is running use Breaker LOCAL control to close the A EDG Breaker.
Step 15) The crew should consult with TSC if DC load shedding is necessary.
Step 16) The BOP should monitor CST level greater than 390,000 gallons.
Evaluator NOTE: The timing of the scenario is such that electrical power will be restored prior to step 17. A description of Step 17 is included in the evant that the Lead Examiner wants to see the crew exercise the step.
Page 15 of 18
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 3 The plant has a loss of offsite power.
COMMENTS Based on restoration of power to Bus E5, the crew should go to Step
- 24.
Step 17) The crew should take actions to depressurize the SGs to reduce RCS leakage:
.The BOP should manually control SG pressure at 11 25 psig utilizing the Position Maintained setting on the ASDV switches (below the controller on the MCB)
.The BOP should maintain SG level adequate as necessary.
.The BOP should dump steam at the maximum rate with the ASDV
.The crew should be monitoring RCS Cold Leg Temperature. When temperature is less than 280°F the BOP should maintain SG pressure at 250 psig using Position Maintain.---
switches.
Step 24) The BOP should utilize the ASDV control switches to maintain SG pressures stable.
Step 25) The crew should verify that the listed essential equipment has loaded onto Bus E5.
Step 26) The BOP should check the Train A SW system alignment.
Substep b. has the operator verify one ocean SW pump running. The crew should identify that Train A has no pumps running. The RNO for the step directs manually starting a SW pump. The SW pump must be manually started to provide cooling to the operating Emergency Diesel Generator.
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5 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION C Standby Scenario Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 3 The plant has a loss of offsite power.
COMMENTS Step 27) The crew should check the following parameters to select the applicable recovery guideline:
ORCS subcooling: >4OoF
.Pressurizer level: >7%
oECCS equipment status:SI Pumps-Not Running, RHR Pumps-Not Running.
Terminate examination when the crew transitions ECA-o*1ECA-0.2 or at the Lead Examiner discretion.
If the above criteria are met, then the crew should transition to ECA-0.1, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY WITHOUT SI REQUIRED. If the above criteria are not met then the crew should transition to ECA-0.2, LOSS OF ALL AC POWER RECOVERY WITH SI REQUIRED.
Emergency Plan:
The charging system leak does not qualify as an RCS leak, so no e-plan call.
Initial: Unusual Event, item 14A, Abnormal Trip or Safety Injection.
Upgrade: Site Area Emergency: Busses E5 and E6 cannot be powered from the diesels or an offsite source within 15 minutes.
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c DEMONSTRATIVE EXAM #
REV.00 CREW CRITICAL TASKS (1) Manually trip the Main Turbine or close the Main Steam Isolation Valves before a severe (2) Establish 500 gpm EFW flow per Step 4 RNO of ECA-0.0.
(3) Manually start an ocean Service Water Pump or a Cooling Tower Pump such that the (Orange Path) challenge develops on either the Subcriticality or Integrity Status Trees.
A Emergency Diesel Generator is not damaged due to engine overheating.
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SI M U LATOR EXAM IN AT10 N 2005 - 2007 LOlT DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Standby Scenario D Rev. 01 This material is developed for FPL Energy Seabrook training programs by the Training Group.
Text materials and figures contained in this document are developed for purposes of instructior and should not be used in connection with either plant maintenance or plant operation. This material may not be reproduced without the authorization of the Training Manager.
PREPARED BY:
DATE:
INSTRUCTOR REVIEWED BY:
DATE:
SME (OPTIONAL)
APPROVED BY:
DATE:
TRAINING SUPERVISOR
SCENARIO Crew will begin at 30% power continuing a power decrease due to ASDV D being out of service.
The crew will experience a PT-505 inst. Failure. The crew will experience an RCP D seal failure. There will be a tube rupture on the D steam generator. A safety valve on the D steam generator will stick open.
Page 2 of 17
SIMULATOR SETUP Reset the simulator to IC #34, Middle of Life, 30% Power Place the Jog Switch for the D ASDV to CLOSE and hang a DANGER tag on the switch.
Place the controller, MS-PK-3004 to Manual and output at minimum.
Main Steam Component malfunctions; Select svMS3004, FAILED CLOSED 0
D Main Steam Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve (ASDV) is failed closed, and Danger Tagged. Close MS-V49 to Isolate the D ASDV from the D Main steamline.
0 On Sim Diagram MSI, for MS-V49, Select REMOTE Function, rfMS014 I7 Final Value = 0 0
INSERT 0
Use Scenario MSR MOVs to turn off the MSR GREEN lights On a reactor Trip a trigger from the above Scenario will correctly set the closed MSR MOV indication SHIFT TURNOVER The plant is at 30% power. Decrease plant power at 5%/hr. Main Steam Atmospheric Steam Dump (DIASDV) valve, MS-PV-3004 is Danger Tagged due to excessive seat leakage. MS-V-49 is closed and tagged. Plant Engineering has recommended a plant shutdown to work on both valves safely. Tech. Spec. 3.7.1.6 was entered 4 days ago.
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DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Standby Scenario D Rev. 01 SCENARIO OUTLINE EVENT INSTRUCTION COMMENTS Shift Turnover Shift turnover information as stated.
Power decrease at the discretion of the Chief Examiner.
Operators should review alarms and indication Initial Scenario Alarms:
Primary Side Alarms VAS F5048, PR Hi Flux Lo Setpoint Channel Trip VAS F7511, SR Train A Blocked VAS F7512, SR Train B Blocked VAS F7513, IR Train A Blocked VAS F7514, IR Train B Blocked VAS F7515, PR Train A Low SP Trip Blocked VAS F7516, PR Train B Low SP Trip Blocked VAS F7517, SR 32 High Voltage Lost VAS F7518, SR High Flux At Shutdown Blocked VAS F7519, SR 31 High Voltage Lost BOP Side Alarms VAS D6045, Turb Setback Loss Of One FW Pump VAS D4700, MFP B Suction Header Flow Low VAS D4855, MFP B Electrical Trip VAS D4721, MFP B Turbine Trip Pane 4 nf 17
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Standby Scenario D Rev. 01 EVENT Event I failure. This failure causes a Tavgnref mismatch and control rods will insert.
FW-PT-505 INSTRUCTION 0 Insert Malfunction: Feedwater Component, ptFWPT505.
0 Fail to Specific Value: 0.0 0 Ramp: 120 seconds 0 INSERT COMMENTS The crew responds with OSl235.05, Turbine Impulse Pressure PT-505 or PT-506 Instrument Failure.
Conditions:
.Control rods will start inserting based on Tavgmref deviation.
.FW-PI-505 reading will decrease.
.The crew should notice the instrument failurelrod movement with no associated loss of plant load.
.The Unit Supervisor should have the operators verify load stable and have the RO placed control rods in manual. This process is described in the abnormal procedure but may be carried out prior to procedure entry as a skill of the operator task.
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Rev. 01 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Standby Scenario D OS1 235.05, Turbine Impulse Pressure PT 505 or 506 Instrument Failure.
Instructor Action For ATWS MM-
=From Panel Overview CLICK ON:
n O n SW 12 SELECT:TB IMP CP-519:
(P505).
Step 1) a.The BOP should check that PT-505 has failed.
b.The Unit Supervisor should direct the RO to placed control rods in manual.
- c. The Unit Supervisor should direct the crew to withdraw control rods as appropriate to restore temperature to program. With PT-505 failed the crew should discuss the need to monitor RCS Cold Leg Temperature.
Step 2) a.The BOP should verify that the steam dumps are CLOSED.
b.The RO should transfer steam dumps to the steam pressure mode:
.Verify that the steam dump controller output signal is at 0% and that the manual light is lit.
.Place the steam dump mode selector switch to STM Pressure Mode.
.Adjust the steam dump controller setpoint potentionmeter such that the setpoint is 1092 psig.
.Verify proper setpoint and depress the AUTO pushbutton on the controller.
c.The BOP should verify that the steam dump selector switches are @tJ positioned to NA Reset NA Bypass.
Step 3) The crew should verify that the P-13 status light on UL-6,N-5 status light is de-energized.
Step 4) The Unit Supervisor should verify that the following Tech. Spec. is applicable:
Tech. Spec. 3.3.1, Reactor Trip System Instrumentation, Item 18.f, action 8.
Within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> determine by observation of the associated permissive annunciator windows that the interlock is within its required state.
Step 5) a.The Unit Supervisor should notify I&C to place the failed channel in I-MM-CP-519, ATWS Mitigation System cabinet to Operate Bypass.
b.The BOP should verify on UL-28,B-1, that the C-20 status light is energized.
End of procedure P m e 6 nf 17
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Standby Scenario D EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 2 This failure 0
Insert Malfunction: Reactor Coolant, mfRO16, RCP D # I Seal Failure causes a Reactor Final Value: 0.25 0
Select: INSERT Coolant Pump D #I seal failure.
Rev. 01 COMMENTS The crew responds with OS1201.01, RCP Malfunction. The crew manually raises Steam Generator level and removes the D Reactor Coolant Pump from service.The procedure will be exited after Attachment E is completed.
Initial Alarms:
VAS D4605, RCP D No. 1 Seal Leakoff Flow High VAS D8340, RCP D No. 1 Seal Leakoff Flow Low VAS D4607, RCP D No. 1 Seal Leakoff Flow Low Low VAS B8154, RCP D Number 2 Seal Flow High Alarms When RCP D Is Tripped:
VAS 88209, RCS LP Avg Temp Lo (Var)
VAS F8122, RC Loop 4 Delta T Deviation VAS F8118, RC Loop 4 Tavg Deviation VAS D7877, Tavg Lo-Lo Chan Trip (Stm Dump Blk)
VAS D4327, PZR Pressure Low & BU HTRS On UA-53,D-8, Master Press CTLR Output Low will cycle.
BOP Condition:
SG Level deviation alarms will come into alarm and reset.
OS1 201.Ol, RCP Malfunction Step 1) The crew should determine that RCP seal leakoff is abnormal and go to Step 3.
Step 3) The RO should verify that RCS pressure is within the prescribed band.
Step 4) The RO should utilize the computer color graphics display for the Reactor Coolant Pumps and verify that seal water inlet temperature is below 230°F.
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Rev. 01 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Standby Scenario D Step 5) The RO should determine that RCP D No. 1 seal leakoff flow is not less than 1.O wm. The Crew should go to Step 6.
Step 6) The RO should determine that No. 1 seal leakoff flow is not less than 8.0 wm. The crew should go to Step 7.
Step 7) The RO should determine that the D RCP seal leakoff Total Flow is not less than 8.0 mm. The crew should perform Step 7 RNO.
Step 7-RNO) The Unit Supervisor apply the section of the RNO for reactor power less than P-8:
.The RO should determine that power is less than P-8.
.The Unit Supervisor should determine that the D RCP should be stopped utilizing Attachment E.
Attachment E, RCP Trip Actions Below P-8 Step 1)
.The BOP should place the Steam Generator D Feed Reg. Valve in manual.
.The BOP should raise the D SG narrow range level to 60-70%.
.The RO should defeat the Loop 4 AT and Tavg inputs.
.The RO should stop the D RCP.
.The BOP should manually operate the D SG feed reg valve and establish level at 4555% narrow range.
.The RO should close the D RCP seal leakoff valve after 2 minutes has elapsed since the pump was tripped.
.The RO should identify that the D; RCP does not supply pressurizer sprays and that no spray valves need to be closed.
.The Unit Supervisor should determine that the plant should be shut down to Mode 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> per OS1 000.06, Power Decrease.
.The Unit Supervisor should identify the following Tech. Spec.as Tech. Spec. 3.4.1.1 I Reactor Coolant Loops and Coolant Circulation, Startup and Power Operation.
applicable:
End of procedure.
Allow the crew to complete the abnormal procedure or at Lead Examiners discretion prior to entering the next malfunction:
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DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Standby Scenario D Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 3 This failure causes a Tube Rupture on the D Steam Generator.
COMMENTS Insert Malfunction: Steam Generators, mfSG002D, SG D DBL End Tube Rupture 0
OS1227.02, Steam Generator Tube Leak The Unit Supervisor should be advising the crew regarding the Pressurizer Level Control Criteria delineated on the Operator Action Summary Page. The level criteria differs from that of other conditions, such as an RCS leak. The level criteria includes utilizing 2 charging pumps to maintain level prior to tripping the reactor and actuating SI.
0 Final Value: 300 GPM 0
Insert Ramp: 30 seconds 0
Step 1)The RO should identify that 3 RCPs are running.
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DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Standby Scenario D Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 3 This failure causes a Tube Rupture on the D Steam Generator.
COMMENTS Step 2) The RO should be continuously checking to determine if pressurizer level can be maintained. The RO should determine that pressurizer level cannot be maintained by controlling normal charging and letdown. The Unit Supervisor should transition to the Step 2 RNO.
Step 2-RNO)
.The Unit Supervisor should direct the RO to reduce letdown flow and
.The RO should determine that a second charging pump is necessary.
.The Unit Supervisor should determine that starting a second charging pump requires addressing Classification of Emergencies, EAL 7c, Steam Generator Tube Leakage or Rupture.
increase charging flow and start a second charging pump as necessary.
.The RO should determine that pressurizer level cannot be maintained >7%.
.The Unit Supervisor should identify the need for and direct the following actions:
-Reactor Trip
-Verify Reactor Trip
-Actuate SI
-GO to E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION.
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DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Standby Scenario D Rev. 01 EVENT INSTRUCTION Event 3 This failure causes a Tube Rupture on the D Steam Generator.
COMMENTS E-0, REACTOR TRIP OR SAFETY INJECTION Step 1)The RO should verify that the reactor has tripped.
Step 2)The BOP should verify that the turbine has tripped.
Step 3)The Bop should verify power to all AC Emergency Busses.
Step 4)The RO should verify that both trains of SI have actuated.
Step 5)The RO should perform Attachment A. The ESF status is sat.
Step 6)The crew should verify that RCS temperature is less than 557°F and decreasing.
.Stop dumping steam to condenser and atmosphere.Yes
.Check steam to MSRs isolated.Yes
.BOP should open EFW pump mini-flow valves.
.BOP should throttle EFW flow accordingly to comply with SG level
.If the cooldown continues the crew should close the MSIVs, MSlV criteria.
Bypass valves, and upstream drains.
Step 7)The RO should verify that the RCS is isolated.
Step 8)The RO should determine that subcooling is adequate. The crew Step 9)The BOP should identify that the Steam Generators are not faulted.
Step 10)The BOP should identify that the D Steam Generator u-tubes are not intact.The crew should identify the need to stop feed to the D Steam Generator is level criteria of 6% is met.
The crew should transition to E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.
should go to Step 9.
Allow the crew to evaluate and use the abnormal or at Lead Examiners discretion, prior to entering the next malfunction:
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DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Standby Scenario D Rev. 01 Event 4 Steam generator safety valve fails open when Steam Generator pressure reaches 1185 psig.
INSTRUCTION Instructor CUE: Step 3f of E-3 closes the MSIVs. After MSlV closure or when SG pressure reaches 11 85 psig. Perform the following to initiate conditions for Event 4:
0 Insert Malfunction: Main Steam Component, rvMSAVR50
-0 r-Via MSI:
0 SELECT: Go to Position: 1.O RAMP:10 sec.
SELECT:INSERT COMMENTS The crew transitions to E-2 from E-3 and then back to E-3.
Possible transition to ECA-3.1 at step 6 of E-3.Terminate the exam when the crew reaches ECA-3.1, step 13.
Step l)RO should identify that subcooling is adequate for RCP operation.
Step 2)BOP should identify the D Steam Generator as ruptured.
Step 3)The Unit Supervisor should direct the BOP to isolate the D Steam Generator:
- a. BOP should adjust ASDV controller setpoints to 1 125 psig.
- b. BOP should identify that the D ASDV is closed.
- 47.
- f. The BOP should close the D steam generator MSlV and bypass valves.
At this point a D steam generator safety valve will stick open causing a faulted condition.
E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE When the crew identifies the D Steam Generator as faulted they should transition to E-2, based on guidance from the E-3 Operator Action Summary Page.
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DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Standby Scenario D Rev. 01 E-2, FAULTED STEAM GENERATOR ISOLATION Step 1) BOP should close/verify closed all the MSlV and bypass valves.
Step 2) BOP should verify that A,B and C Steam Generators are intact.
Step 3) BOP should identify the D Steam Generator as faulted.
Step 4) BOP should identify that the D Steam Generator is isolated.
Step 5) BOP should identify that the CST level is >250,000 gallons.
Step 6) BOP should identify that Secondary Radiation is =normal.
The crew should transition to E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.
E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE.
Step l)RO should identify that subcooling is adequate for RCP operation.
Step 2)BOP should identify the D Steam Generator as ruptured.
Step 3)The Unit Supervisor should direct the BOP to isolate the D Steam Generator:
- a. BOP should VERIFY ASDV controller setpoints is at 1125 psig.
- b. BOP should identify that the D ASDV is closed.
- f. BOP should verify the D steam generator MSlV and bypass valves are closed.
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DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Standby Scenario D Rev. 01 Step 4) BOP should stopherify stopped D Steam Generator EFW flow when narrow range level is >6%.
Step 5) BOP should verify that the D MSlV and bypass valves are closed.
Step 6) BOP should identify that ruptured SG pressure is 2350 psig.
Step 7) Crew should initiate RCS cooldown:
a.Crew should determine appropriate core exit thermocouple temperature based on 0 Steam Generator pressure.
b.At this point the MSlV and MSlV Bypass valves were all previouslt closed. The BOP should dump steam at the maximum rate using the intact steam generators. The BOP should not dump steam from the D Steam Generator.
oRO should depressurize the RCS using normal sprays.
.When pressure is 4950 psig, the RO should check P-I 1 Block Bistable light is lit on UL-1 and then depress both Steamline Safety Injection Block switches.
.The RO should maintain RCS pressure 4950 psig using normal sprays.
.The RO should inform the Unit Supervisor of the SI block status.
d.The BOP should monitor Core Exit Thermocouples.
e.When less than the required temperature the BOP should stop the cooldown and maintain temperature.
Step 8)BOP should maintain SG levels.
Step 9)R0 should check that PORVS are closed and that the block valves are open and have power to them.
Step 10)RO should reset SI using the MCB SI Reset Switches (Both Trains).
Step 11)RO should reset T and P signals using MCB reset switches (Both Trains).
Step 12)BOP should verify instrument air conditions are satisfactory.
Step 13)BOP should verify the RHR pumps should be stopped. The pumps should be stopped and placed in standby.
Pame I 4 nf 17
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Standby Scenario D Rev. 01 Step 14)BOP should identify Core Exit Thermocouple tempeature less than required and should maintain temperature less than the required temperature.
Step 15)BOP should identify that Ruptured SG Pressure is not stable or increasing.
Crew should identify the need to transition to ECAS.1,SGTR DESIRED.
WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT-SUBCOOLED RECOVERY Exam can be terminated at transition to ECAS.l or Lead Examiners discretion.
ECA-3.1,SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT-SUBCOOLED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Step l)RO should verify SI Reset.
Step 2)R0 should verify T and P signals reset.
Step 3)BOP should verify Instrument Air Supplies sat.
Step 4)BOP should identify all AC busses energized from UATs or RATS.
Step 5)R0 should de-energize all pressurizer heater banksunit Supervisor should consult with TSC for heater operation.
Step 6)R0 should verify no CBS pumps running. Crew should go to Step 7.
Step 7)BOP should verify stopped or stop EFW flow to the D Steam Generator if narrow range level is >6%.
Step 8)R0 should verify that the RHR pumps are stopped. The crew should go to Step 9.
Step 9)Crew should evaluate plant status:
- RDMS Consult with TSC mESF equipment, Attachment D.
Step 1O)BOP should identify D Steam Generator as faulted.
Step 11)BOP should maintain intact SG levels.
Step 12)BOP should initiate RCS cooldown with ASDVs P a m 15 nf 17
Rev. 01 DEMONSTRATIVE EXAMINATION Standby Scenario D r
Step 13)Crew should determine if subcooled recovery is appropriate:
.RWST Level >310,000 gallons
.Ruptured SG level ~96%
narrow range If SG level is >96% crew should consult with the TSC and consider transition to ECA-3.2, SGTR WITH LOSS OF REACTOR COOLANT-SATURATED RECOVERY DESIRED.
Emergency Plan:
Initial: Alert, Item 7c, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Possible:SAE, item 12d, depending on Offsite Dose Projection System.
Pane 16 nf 17
DEMONSTRATIVE EXAM #
REV.OO CREW CRITICAL TASKS
- 1. E-3. Isolate Feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured steam generator before transition to ECA-3.1 is required.
- 2. ECA-3.1. Cool down the RCS to cold shutdown conditions such that a severe (Orange Path) challenge to the Integrity Critical Safety Function is not encountered. NOTE: Only requires initiation of a cooldown.
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