Text

Draft - Section C Operating Exam (Folder 2)
	ML071450423
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	03/09/2007
From:	; Division of Reactor Safety I
To:	; AmerGen Energy Co
	Sykes, Marvin D.
Shared Package
ML060800145	List: IR 05000289/2007301; ML071090575; ML071350626; ML071360136; ML071360144; ML071360151; ML071360155; ML071450423; ML071760022; ML071760030; ML071760031; ML071760138; ML071770540; ML071770553;
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PA 1-Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Three Mile Island Scenario No.: 1 OpTestNo.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOC.

0 EF-P-2B is 00s for bearing replacement.

0 DR-P-1A is running for effluent flow Turnover: Maintain 100% power operations.

Critical Tasks: 0 Initiate HPI Cooling (CT-14) 0 Initiate HPI (CT-2)

Event Malf. Event Event No. Description 1 RW04A CRS Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A trips (TS) 2 CRS NLO Reports an excessive oil leak from Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 (TS).

3 MSOID ICRS Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high slowly I ARO 4 CC04A CCRS Intermediate Closed Cooling Water Pump IC-P-IA trips and IC-P-1B fails to auto start C URO 5 MS19A NCRS Steam Leak in the Turbine Building N ARO R URO 6 FW-15A MCRS Feedwater Pump 1A trip FW-15B MURO Feedwater Pump 1B trip TC07B MAR0 Turbine stop valve fails open 7 FW17 C CRS Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 trips on start FW18A CAR0 Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A does not start.

(CT-14) 8 MU086 (N)ormal, I CCRS C URO (R)eactivity, High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B fails to open B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

(I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #I The crew will take the watch with reactor power at 100% and ICs in Full Automatic. Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump EF-P2B is 00s for a bearing replacement. Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A is running in preparation for a liquid release.

When the crew has accepted the watch the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the trip of Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A. The Crew should respond in accordance with MAP Alarm 8-14, 480V ES Motor Trip and B-2-5, 480V ES Motor Overload. The CRS should review Tech Spec 3.3.1.4.d and declare a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months timeclock based on Tech Spec 3.3.2. When the Tech Spec call has been made the scenario can continue.

After the TS call is made the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the NLO report of a large oil leak from EF-P-1 bearing with an empty bearing oil indicator. The CRS should review Tech Spec 3.4.1.I .a.4 and Note 1 and declare that the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months timeclock on Emergency Feedwater is suspended until a second EFW Pump is operable. The CRS may initiate action to prevent EF-P-1 from starting by manually closing MS-V-13A and MS-V-I 38. EF-P-I will not be returned to operable status during this scenario. The scenario can continue when the Tech Spec timeclock is suspended.

After the Tech Spec call is made and on cue from the Lead Evaluator, the Turbine Header Pressure instrument failure can be initiated. The crew should diagnose the failing pressure and take hand control of the turbine and the SG/Rx Master Integrated Control System station. The CRS should implement OP-TM-301-471, Manual Control of the Main Turbine and OP-TM-621-471, ICs Manual Control. The backup pressure instrument may be selected in accordance with OP-TM-621-451, Selecting Alternate Instrument Inputs to ICs. The backup instrument does not have to be selected for the scenario to continue.

After the plant has been stabilized the Lead Examiner can cue the trip of Intermediate Closed Cooling Water Pump IC-P-1A. The crew should diagnose the loss of IC-P-?Aand the failure of IC-P-1B to auto start using MAP alarms AA-1-6,480V BOP Motor Trip, C-1-2, IC CRD Flow Lo and C-2-2, IC System Flow Lo. The CRS should implement 1202-17, Loss of Intermediate Closed Cooling Water and the URO should manually start IC-P-1B. Letdown flow may be isolated by CRD high temperature closing MU-V-1A and MU-V-1B. If this occurs the CRS should initiate OP-TM-211-950, Restoration of Letdown Flow. Letdown flow does not have to be re-established to continue.

After IC-P-1B has been started the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of the steam leak in the Turbine Building. The crew should diagnose the steam leak in the Turbine Building and the CRS should implement 1203-24, Steam Leak. An NLO will provide a report of severity enough to begin a plant shutdown. The CRS should order a plant shutdown in accordance with 1102-4, Power Operations.

At the cue of the Lead Examiner or after the first Feedwater Pump (FW-P-1A or FW-P-1B) is secured initiate the trip of the remaining pump to trip the reactor. If the crew trips the reactor due to the steam leak the trip of both Feedwater Pumps will be initiated at e40 % power. One turbine stop valve will fail to close and the contingency steps of OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip will have to be taken for the turbine. The steam leak will be isolated when the turbine trips. The CRS will initiate OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #IContinued Following the loss of both Feedwater Pumps, EF-P-1 will trip (if not previously isolated by the CRS) and EF-P-2A fails to start. The crew should diagnose the lack of heat transfer and respond in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-004, Lack of Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer.

Without primary to secondary heat transfer PORVIHPI cooling is the only method to maintain adequate core cooling which makes this a critical task. PORV/HPI Cooling will be initiated in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-009, HPI Cooling (CT-14). The ARO will initiate OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 16, EFW Failure for the Emergency Feedwater Pump failures.

When HPI is manually initiated HPI Valve MU-V-16B will fail to open and the 6 Train HPI manual ESAS actuation does not actuate. This will result in inadequate HPI since there will not be one full train of HPI in operation. Without adequate HPI the mitigation strategy is changed for the event, which makes obtaining adequate HPI a critical task. The B Train components will have to be started at the component level in accordance with OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPVLPI) (CT-2).

The CRS will subsequently transition to OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown from EOP-009.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.

Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 1 Event Description Procedure SupPO rt Initial Set-up. ZF-P-2B 00s for bearing replacement 3R-P-1A Running in preparation for a liquid release 1 DR-P-1A Trips TS 3.3.1.4.d and 3.3.2, ECCS Systems MAP Alarm 6-1-5,480V ES Motor Trip MAP Alarm 6-2-5, 480V ES ES Motor Overload 2 EF-P-1 Bearing Oil Leak TS 3.4.1.I .a.4, Decay Heat Removal Capability 3 Turbine Header Pressure 3P-TM-MAP-H0302, Sass Mismatch instrument fails high OP-TM-MAP-H0203, Mn Turb Hdr Press Hi/Lo OP-TM-301-471, Manual Control of the Main Turbine OP-TM-621-471, ICs Manual Control OP-TM-621-451, Selecting Alternate Instrument Inputs to ICs 4 Intermediate Closed Cooling 1202-17, Loss of Intermediate Cooling System Water Pump IC-P-IA trips AA-1-6, 480V BOP Motor Trip and IC-P-1B fails to auto start OP-TM-MAP-CO102, IC CRD Flow LO OP-TM-MAP-C0202, IC System Flow Lo 5 1203-24 Steam Leak Steam Leak in the Turbine 1102-4 Power Operations Building 6 Feedwater Pump 1A (or 1B) OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip trip Turbine stop valve fails to close 7 Emergency Feedwater Pump OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 16, EFW Failure EF-P-1 trips on start OP-TM-EOP-004, Lack of Primary to Secondary Emergency Feedwater Pump Heat Transfer EF-P9A does not start.

OP-TM-EOP-009, HPI Cooling High Pressure Injection OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPVLPI).

Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B fails to open B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure 000006 Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 1 Initialization IC- 100% HFP, ICs Full AUTO 201(TEMP)

Console Left EF-P-2B Tagged 00s Scenario Support EF-P-2B PTL EF-P-2B PTL/EF-P-2B BKR OPEN Remote Function Value: OUT Scenario Support FWRl3 When: Immediately Main Console Robust Barriers applied IAW Scenario Support Risk Document Console Center DR-P-1A Running Scenario Support DR-P-1A NAS Malfunction RW04A Value: Insert DR-P-1A Trips When: Event 1 Malfunction MSOI D Value: Insert Sev. 100% Turbine Header Pressure When: Event 3 RAMP 300 sec instrument fails high SPIOB-PT2 I/O Override IC-P-1B Value: Insert OFF IC-P-1B Fails to Auto Start NAT When: Immediately MaIfunction CC04A Value: Insert IC-P-1A trip When: Event 4 Malfunction MSI 9B Value: Insert Sev. 10% Steam Leak in the Turbine When: Event 5 RAMP 300 sec Building Malfunction FW15A Value: Insert Feedwater Pump 1A trip When: Event 6 ratpwc40 Malfunction FW15B Value: Insert Feedwater Pump 1B trip When: Event 6 ratpwc40 Malfunction TC07B Value: Insert Turbine Stop Valve B Fails When: Immediately Open Malfunction FW17 Value: Insert Emergency Feedwater Pump When: Event 7 fwnefpl>O.l EF-P-1 trip Malfunction FW18A Value: Insert Emergency Feedwater Pump When: Event 8 ratpw-40 EF-P-2A trip MU086 Value: Insert High Pressure Injection Valve When: Event 9 (HPI) MU-V-16B fails as is muvmuvl6b~0.1 03A4S02-ZDIPBIRBB Value: Insert OFF B ESAS 4 psig Manual When: Immediately Actuation Failure 03A4SOI-ZDIPBlRCB Value: Insert OFF B ESAS 4 psig 1600 psig When: Immediately Actuation Failure Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event# 1 Event

Description:

Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A Trips (TS)

Page Of Time 1 Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: initiate Event 1.

Indications Available:

I I CRS 1 Directs Review of Alarm Response B-1-5.

1 ALARM I 1 URO 1 Diagnose trip of DR-P-1A.

I I URO 1 Tripped pump disagreement light (amber/green).

CRS Computer printout and CRT.

CRS Directs review of Alarm Response B-2-5.

ALARM 480 ES Motor Overload.

URO Motor disagreement lights, ambedred (except on air handlers).

CRS Computer printout and CRT.

I CRS I Review TS 3.3.1.4.d below and 3.3.2 and declare a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months time clock IAW 3.3.2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event# 1 Event

Description:

Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A Trips (TS)

T.S. 3.3.1.4.d Cooling Water Systems - Specification 3.0.1 applies.

Two decay heat river water pumps must be OPERABLE.

T.S. 3.3.2 Maintenance or testing shall be allowed during reactor operation on any components(s) in the makeup and purification, decay heat, RB emergency cooling water, RB spray, BWST level instrumentation, or cooling water systems which will not remove more than one train of each system from service. Components shall not be removed from service so that the affected system train is inoperable for more than 72 consecutive hours. If the system is not restored to meet the requirements of Specification 3.3.1 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , the reactor shall be placed in a HOT SHUTDOWN condition within six hours.

NOTE: The crew may elect to swap MU-P-1A cooling to Nuclear Services Closed Cooling using OP-TM-543-439, Swapping MU-P-1A Cooling to NS.

CRS Go to Event 2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

NLO Reports an Excessive Oil Leak From Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Booth Operator Instructions: Reports a large oil leak on Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1s outboard pump bearing. The oil bulb is empty.

Review TS 3.4.1.I .a.4 and Note 1. The CRS should declare the EF-P-2B 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months time clock suspended until a second EFW CRS pump is operable and direct action to restore EF-P-1 and/or EF-P-2B to service.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature greater than 250 degrees F.

Three independent Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pumps and two redundant flowpaths to each Once through Steam Generator (OTSG) shall be OPERABLE** with:

Two EFW Pumps, each capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus, and one EFW Pump capable of being powered from two OPERABLE main steam supply paths.

0 With more than one EFW Pump or both flowpaths to either OTSG inoperable, initiate action immediately to restore at least two EFW Pumps and one flowpath to each OTSG:

0 Specification 3.0.1 and all other actions requiring shutdown or changes in REACTOR OPERATING CONDITIONS are suspended until at least two EFW Pumps and one EFW flowpath to each OTSG are restored to OPERABLE status.

Go to Event 3.

008006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario # 1 Event# 3 Booth Operator Instructions: Initiate Event 3.

Indications Available:

Directs initiation of alarm response SASS Mismatch CRS OP-TM-MAP-H0302.

I I ARo I Diagnoses failure of turbine header pressure instrument SP-IOA-PT2.

I MANUAL ACTIONS REQURIED Directs review of alarm response MN Turb HDR Press HVLO CRS OP-TM-MAP-H0203.

I AUTOMATIC ACTIONS ARO I If modified header pressure error >40 psi for >5 seconds then Turbine goes to manual.

I I I MANUAL ACTIONS REQUIRED I CRS I Directs initiation of OP-TM-301-471, Manual Control of the Main Turbine.

ARO Precautions:

To avoid a reactor trip, slowly adjust ICs Main Turbine Hand ARO control since it can change load at equivalent of 35% Reactor power/minute (28% CV Pos / Min).

~ ~ ~~

Limitations:

IF SG/RX demand is in Auto, then turbine load (Mwe) should ARo be maintained within 10 Mwe of desired load.

ARO 1 IF SG/RX demand is in hand, then turbine header pressure should be maintained between 875 and 895 psig.

000006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 II/

Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event# 3 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in the Turbine Building.

I/

I ARO I Prerequisites I ARo I VERIFY Turbine Generator (301) System is in Operating Mode IAW OP-TM-301-000, Main Turbine generator and Auxiliaries.

1 ARO 1 VERlFY Main Generator breakers Closed.

1 ARO 1 ADJUST Main Turbine demand to maintain Turbine load within limits.

NOTE: Manual control of SGlRX demand may be required to stabilize turbine header pressure.

DIRECTS initiation of OP-TM-621-471, ICs Manual Control.

Limitations MAINTAIN NI power within 1% of desired reactor power.

I URO MAINTIAN control rod index above error adjusted rod index limit for number of RCPs operating IAW COLR Figure 1, 2, or 3.

WHEN reactor power > 20%, then control feedwater flow to OTSGs as follows:

0 Maintain Tavg between 578°F and 580°F.

0 If TaYg reduced at EOC IAW 1102-4, then maintain Tavg within *I "F of desired setpoint.

0 Maintain AT, between +2"F to -2°F (ATc = TcA-TcB).

ENSURE ULD in HAND.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event# 3 Page 11 of 30

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IF SGlREACTOR Station is being placed in HAND to support a URO planned activity, THEN VERIFY reactor power is less than 2558 MWAth (99.6%).

URO ESTABLISH manual SGIREACTOR Control as follows:

URO PLACE SGlREACTOR DEMAND station in HAND.

1 URO 1 ENSURE control rod position does NOT change.

I URO 1 VERIFY alarm H-2-1 ICs in Track In.

~

NOTE: ICs load rate of change is NOT in effect with SG/Reactor station in HAND.

IF necessary to maintain reactor power or control rods within URO limits or if a power change is being conducted IAW 1102-4, then ADJUST SGlRECTOR DEMAND as follows; IF maintaining stable reactor power or a slow planned power change, then RAISE or LOWER in discrete steps to keep neutron error between +2% and -2%.

IF rapid power reduction is required, then LOWER as necessary to achieve desired reactor power level and ENSURE FW flow controlled within limits.

NOTE: Additional ICs related stations may be placed in manual control IAW the following procedures:

DIRECTS initiation of OP-TM-621-451, selecting alternate CRS instrument inputs (optional).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 H Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event# 3 COMPARE alternate inputs (using Attachment 7.3 of ARO OP-TM-621-000, Integrated Control System or table in OP-TM-MAP-HO302 as necessary).

ARO VERIFY one of the following:

Difference between affected and alternate channel(s) is (are) less than SASS Setpoint As listed in OP-TM-MAP-H0302.

ARO SELECT alternate instrument(s)with console PB.

0 VERIFY plant stable.

Go to Event 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event# 4 Event

Description:

IC-P-1A Trips and IC-P-1B fails to Auto Start.

Booth Operator Instructions: Initiate Event 4.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECT entry into AA-1-6, 480V BOP Motor Trip.

SETPOINT CRS 0 Intermediate Closed Cooling Water Pump IC-P-1A trip.

OBSERVATIONS 0 Tripped pump disagreement lights (greedamber)

MANUAL ACTIONS Verify standby pump has started.

DIRECT entry into C-1-2, IC CRD CLG FLOW LO.

SETPOINT 0 100 GPM flow - flow switch ICIO-FS CAUSES 0 Loss of IC pumps AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 0 MU-V-1A and MU-V-1B will Close if CRD outlet temperature is > 160°F

' MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED 0 ENSURE an IC pump is operating.

I I CRS DIRECT entry into C-2-2, IC SYSTEM FLOW LO

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

IC-P-1A Trips and IC-P-1B fails to Auto Start.

I I 1 SETPOINT I I CRS I 0 550 GPM-Flow switch IC-5-FS CRS CAUSES 1 IC Pump Failure 1 CRS I AUTOMATIC ACTIONS I Standby IC pump starts on Lo flow of 550 gpm.

1 MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED I URO I ENSURE standby IC pump is Operating.

0 0 If IC flow is < 550 gpm, then INTIATE EP 1202-17, Loss of IC Cooling System.

1 1 CRS 1 DIRECT entry into 1202-17, Loss of IntermediateCooling System.

SYMPTOMS CRS 0 C. Pump Disch Press Lo, Alarm, 70 psig. (C-2-4)

I I.C. System Flow Lo, Alarm, 550 GPM. (C-2-2)

I 0 I.C. CRD Clg Flow Lo, Alarm, 100 GPM. (C-1-2)

CRS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 0 Standby IC Pump starts (ICCW flow less than 550 GPM) 0 MU-V-INI B closes (CRD Coolant Outlet Hi Temp. greater than 160°F)

I I I MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED I URO I If low flow exists, then PERFORM the following:

0

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event# 4 Event

Description:

IC-P-1A Trips and IC-P-1B fails to Auto Start.

0 VERIFY OR START the standby IC pump.

I I 0 MONITOR Surge Tank Level.

0 FILL Surge Tank Level as necessary to maintain a normal indicated level of Booth Operator Instructions: If the crew recovers letdown flow use Remote Functions:

MUR9O to bypass the MU-V-3 Hi Temperature Interlock MUR89 to Open MU-V-2NB EXAMINERS NOTE: If letdown flow is lost it does not have to be recovered to continue the scenario.

~ ~ ~

Go to Event 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 1 Event# 5 Page -

16 of 30 1 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in the Turbine Buildin I Booth Operator Instructions: Initiate Event 5.

Booth Operator Instructions: Report a steam leak in the overhead of the 2"d floor of the Turbine. Appears to be a Steam Lead drain line and is not accessible. No personnel appear to be in danger at this time but there is a large amount of steam and a lot of condensation occurring.

IF further indication is needed report as the Director Operations that while the leak i s not catastrophic a plant shutdown should be initiated.

k Indications Available:

DIRECT entry into AP 1203-24, Steam Leak.

SYMPTOMS DECREASING secondary steam pressure.

Electrical load reducing (mismatch between electrical load and Rx Power).

Decrease in pressurizer level, R.C. Pressure, and cold leg temperature.

0 For a leak outside the Reactor Building; Noise may be heard in Control Room or a report made from personnel outside the Control Room.

Immediate Manual Action 0 IF continued operation is not posing a hazard to personnel or equipment required for safe shutdown but is severe enough to require shutdown.

Then reduce load at rate specified by US and go to following steps.

~

FOLLOW-UP ACTION

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in the Turbine Building I The objective of this procedure is to continue to shutdown and cooldown the unit while monitoring the steam leak.

I CRS Continue to shutdown and cooldown the unit per OP 1102-10 and 11 respectively.

DETERMINE which OTSG has the steam leak and if possible CRS the location of the leak. If possible, the leak should be isolated.

INITIATES OP 1102-4 Power Operation to Commence CRS Shutdown.

EXAMINERS NOTE: Completion of Enclosure 2A not required for Emergency SID.

cps EXAMINERS NOTE:

PERFORM Enclosure 2A (for an emergency (forced) power reduction INITIATE Enclosure 2A).

IF ICs is still in hand step 2.c is the step that will apply for the shutdown.

1 URO I REDUCE reactor power to the desired power as follows:

I ARO I MAINTAIN Generator Reactive Load IAW OP-TM-301-472.

I URo I 0 IF SG/REACTOR DEMAND is in AUTO, then REDUCE reactor power as follows:

ENSURE ULD is in HAND.

0 SET ULD LOAD RATE OF CHANGE to I ?%/minute for PLANNED reductions or at a rate determined by CRS for Forced power reductions.

0 SET ULD Target Load Demand to desired setpoint.

IF SG/REACTOR DEMAND is in HAND, then REDUCE I URo reactor power IAW OP-TM-621-471 ICs Manual Operations.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event# 5 Page -18 of 30 I 1 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in the Turbine Building I CRS 0 PERFORM the actions per Enclosure 28.

EXAM1NERS NOTE: If this section is being performed during an emergency plant shutdown, then any action in this table may be deferred except those marked with EP in the sign-off column.

I ARO I Prior to FW-U-1B speed 4000 RPM START LO-P-8B.

ARO Prior to FW-U-1A speed 4000 RPM START LO-P8A.

Prior to shutdown of MO-P-1B IF MO-V-26 is OPEN, then CRS INITIATE OP-TM-431-152 to remove MO-T-3 from service.

I I

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Prior to reactor power 85%, RESET FW Flow Correction CRS Factors to 1.OOO IAW MAP G-2-6.

Prior to reactor turbine load 630 Mwe If any MO-P-1 are CRS operating, then SHUTDOWN all Moisture Separator Pumps IAW OP-TM-431-152.

ARO Prior to reactor power 75%:

0 PLACE FW-P-1A in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-472 0 PLACE FW-P-1B in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-473 BOOTH OPERATOR: Use RNI screen to remove powdex vessels from service.

~~~

When condensate flow 6.9 mlb/HR AND prior to any in service powdex vessel flow being reduced to less than 1500 CRS gpm, REDUCE to 4 IN SERVICE POWDEX vessels IAW OP-TM-423-151.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: - 1 Scenario # 1 Event# 5 Page 19 of Event

Description:

Steam Leak in the Turbine Building I

1 Position 1 Applicant's Actions or Behavior When total heater drain flow (sum of HD-FI-10, 11, & 12 on pumps in service) is less than 3300 GPM AND prior to reducing any Heater Drain pump flow to 1200 GPM< SHUTDOWN a Heater Drain Pump IAW OP-TM-431-152.

WHEN ULD target load is 560 MWe and prior to FW-P-1A or B SPEED DEMAND less than 3%, PLACE one Feedwater ARo Pump in STANDBY IAW OP-TM-401-153 (A) or OP-TM-401-154 (B).

GO TO EVENTS 6,7, & 8

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: 1 Scenario# All Event# 6, 7 & 8 Page 20 of 30 I I Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

~

Booth Operator Instructions: If Reactor is not tripped then initiate Event 6 when directed.

Indications Available:

I [ CRS 1 DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip. I URO IMMEDIATE ACTIONS URO PRESS BOTH Reactor Trip AND DSS pushbuttons.

1

~~ ~~ ~ ~

URO VERIFY REACTOR SHUTDOWN.

URO PRESS Turbine Trip PB.

I URO VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.

I I I PLACE EHC-P-1A and EHC-P-1B in Pull-To-Lock. I 0 OPEN EHC-V-FV1 (TB 305',EHC bypass valve at EHC pump skid).

BOOTH OPERATOR:

I I CRS VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFCATION (VSSV)

IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom using the following priority:

0 SCM 25°F GO TO EOP-002 XHT GO TO EOP-003

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2 I Op Test No.: 1 Scenario# All Event# 6, 7 & 8 Page 21 of 30 I Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

I LOHT GO TO EOP-004 OTSG tube leakage =. 1 gpm GO TO EOP-005

~~~~~ ~ ~ ~

NOTE TO EXAMINER: Crew should diagnose lack of primary to secondary heat transfer and transition to EOP-004. SOME EOP-001 steps may be performed prior to diagnosis.

ANNOUNCE Reactor Trip over plant page and radio (include plant conditions sufficient for NLO response per OS-24).

~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~ ~ ~

VERIFY control rod groups 1 through 7 are fully inserted.

INITIATE Emergency Boration per RULE 5 - EB.

VERIFY OTSG A and B Operating Range level 97.5%.

TRIP both MFW pumps.

VERIFY Main FW Flow to A and B OTSG are each c 0.5 mlb/hr.

ENSURE FW-V-5A and FW-V-5B are closed.

VERIFY OTSG level > setpoint.

I INITIATE RULE 4 - FWC. I I VERIFY ICS/NNI HAND or AUTO Power is available.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2

/ Op Test No.: 1 Scenario# All Event# 6, 7 & 8 Page 22 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

INITIATES OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 15, EFW Actuation ARo Response.

I I I IAAT EFW is actuation is required, then:

ARO ENSURE EF-P-1, EF-P-2A, and EF-P-26 start.

ARO DISPATCH an Auxiliary Operator (AO) to EF-V-30 area.

IF EFW pump disch. Pressure OTSG pressure, then ARo INITIATE Guide 16.

I I ARO 1 INITIATES Guide 16, EFW Failure.

IAAT EFW is required and ALL components are NOT functional, then:

I I ARO I IF EF-P-1 fails, then INITIATE Guide 16.1.

ARO IF-P-2A or EF-P-2B fails, then INITIATE Guide 16.2.

I ARO I INITIATES Guide 16.1, EFW Failure of EF-P-1 (Page 1 of 2).

I I ARO 1 ENSURE OPEN MS-V-2A and MS-V-26.

ARO ENSURE OPEN MS-V-13A and MS-V-I3B.

ARO IF MS-PI-204 c 150 psig, then ENSURE MS-V-6 is OPEN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# All Event# 6, 7 & 8 Page 23 of 30 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection

~ ~~ ~~ ~ ~

OBTAIN CRS concurrence and ENSURE EFW actuation enable-defeat switches (8) are in DEFEAT.

I 1 ARO CLOSE MS-V-13A and MS-V-13B.

I BOOTH OPERATOR: Report EF-P-1 trip mechanism is broken and needs maintenance attention.

ARo 1 INITIATES Guide 16.2 EFW Failure Failure of EF-P-2A or EF-P-26.

ARO VERIFY voltage available on the associated bus.

VERIFY control power is available as indicated by the green ARo indicator light at the control switch.

ARO OBTAIN CRS concurrence immediately prior to initiating flow.

OBTAIN CRS concurrence and ENSURE EFW actuation ARo enable-defeat switches (8) are in DEFEAT.

F ARO I START the pump from the Control Room.

ARO IF the pump did NOT start, then at 1DIE 4160V switchgear:

0 ENSURE targets are reset on relays located at the switchgear.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 1 Scenario# All Event# 6,7 & 8 Page 24 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2) 0 PRESS CLOSE pushbutton to start EF-P-2A (B).

BOOTH OPERATOR: Report attempting steps 7.1 - 7.4 and EF-P-A did NOT Start.

DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-004, Lack of Primary to CRS Secondary Heat Transfer.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS ENSURE no more than one RCP operating per loop.

I ARO ENSURE EFW is actuated and Guide 15 initiated.

ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and ARO radio. (Include plant conditions sufficient for NLO response per OS-24).

1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

r*I VERIFY 1D and 1E 4160V buses are energized from auxiliary URO transformers.

IAAT primary-to-secondary heat transfer has been established, then GO TO Step 3.19.

IAAT RCS Pressure approaches 2450 psig (or 552 psig if 329"F), then perform the following:

ENSURE RC-V-2 (PORV block) is Open GO TO EOP-009.

IAAT RCS is approaching 25°F SCM, then GO TO EOP-009.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# All Event# 6, 7 & 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-166 Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

EXAMINERS NOTE: Initiating PORVIHPI Cooling is a CRITICAL TASK.

I CRS I DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-009, HPI Cooling.

I I

CRS 1 FOLLOW-UPACTIONS I

1 CRS I IAAT SCM < 25F, then:

I PERFORM Rule 1.

0 I CONTINUE with EOP-009.

0 EXAMINERS NOTE: Initiating HPI is a CRITICAL TASK.

URO ENSURE 4 psig ESAS has been initiated IAW OP-TM-642-902.

I URO I VERIFY ADEQUATE HPI.

EXAMINERS NOTE: May go to Section 4.0 on Inadequate HPI.

I URO I INTIATE OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPVLPI).

URO Prerequisites I

I URO I VERIFY I D or 1E 4160V bus is energized.

I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: - 1 Scenario# All Event# 6, 7 & 8 Page 26 of 30 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-166 Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

I URO VERIFY Make Up system was in ES standby IAW OP-TM-211-000, Make Up and Purification.

URO 1 URO VERIFY Decay Heat system was in ES standby IAW OP-TM-212-000, Decay Heat Removal.

VERIFY a valid automatic actuation has occurred or a manual actuation of HPI is required.

t-- I EXAMINERS NOTE: There are special usage requirements for Section 4.1 and Attachments 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. These actions are memory items (IAW OS 24) and performed from memory when required. The sequence of actuation and verification of ES is not train dependent. Either train may be performed first or trains may be performed in parallel.

Initiation of Injection I URO PCR graphic display is equivalent to Attachment 7.1.

URU IF any of the components on Attachment 7.1 are NOT in the required condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.

IF ESAS Train B Load Seq Block 4 lights (PCR) are NOT I

T BLUE, then PRESS Manual ES actuation 1600 PSlG RC URo PRESS (Train B CR).

~ ~ ~ _ _ _ ~_____

IF any of the components on Attachment 7.2 are NOT in the required condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.

EXAMINERS NOTE: URO may complete this page before going to Section 4.2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: - 1 Scenario # - All Event# 6,7&8 Page 27 of 30 1 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

URO Zontingency Actions URO ENSURE MU-V-14A or MU-V-14B is Open. I IAAT DC-P-?Aor DC-P-IB fails to start or is shut down unexpectedly, then perform the following:

IF DC-P-1B fails to start, then START DC-P-16.

IAAT either ES selected MU pump fails to start or is shut down unexpectedly, then perform the following:

l----t- IF Train B ES selected MU pump is NOT operating, then URO perform the following:

0 VERIFY 1E 4160V bus is energized.

0 VERIFY ONE of the following (N/A steps NOT performed):

0 MU-V-36 and MU-V-37 are Open.

0 MU-V-16C is Open.

0 MU-V-16D is Open.

0 IF MU-P-IC is ES Selected, then perform the following:

0 VERIFY MU-P-2C or MU-P-3C is operating START MU-P-IC

~ ~ ~ _ _ _ _ ~ ____ ~ ~

URO IF any of the following did NOT Open:

MU-V-16C MU-V-16D Then perform the following to ensure flow through ALL four HPI nozzles:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Y Op Test No.: 1 Scenario# All Event# 6, 7 & 8 Page 28 of 30 1 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

IF two ES selected MU pumps are operating, then ENSURE ONE of the following pairs of valves are OPEN (N/A steps NOT performed):

0 MU-V-16A and MU-V-16B 0 MU-V-16A and MU-V-16D MU-V-16B and MU-V-16C MU-V-16C and MU-V-16D URO IF MU-V-36 and MU-V-37 did NOT CLOSE, then ENSURE MU-V-36 or MU-V-37 is Closed.

IF MU-V-18 did NOT CLOSE, then perform ONE of the following (N/A step NOT performed):

ENSURE MU-V-18 is Closed.

0 ENSURE MU-V-17 and MU-V-217 are Closed.

IF DR-P-1A is NOT operating or DR-V-1B is Closed, then perform the following:

START DR-P-1A 0 ENSURE DR-V-1A is Open IAAT DC system A cooler outlet temperature exceeds 105F, then perform the following:

0 PERFORM 4.2.2 actions for an inoperable DC-P-1A 0 PLACE DC-P-1A in PTL IF DR-P-1B is NOT operating or DR-V-16 is Closed, then URO perform the following:

START DR-P-1B ENSURE DR-V-1B is Open

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# All Event# 6, 7& 8 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2) r URO -1 VERIFYSCM 25°F 1 URo 1 ENSURE the PORV block is OPEN and OPEN the PORV (RC-RV-2).

I URo I VERIFY there is flow through the PORV (PORV AP indicator, ALARM G-1-7, A0517).

CRS REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EAL).

I 1 URO I DE-ENERGIZE ALL Pressurizer heaters.

I CRS I VERIFY RCS 25°F superheat.

1 CRS 1 VERIFY OTSG Tube Leakage 1 gpm.

I CRS I GOTOEOP-006.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS URO ENSURE HPI and LPI are operated IAW Rule 2.

I EXAMINER'S NOTE: Scenario may progress to point of throttling HPI but is not necessary for completion of scenario.

I URo I IAAT an ES Actuation setpoint is reached, then ENSURE all ESAS components have actuated.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: -

1 Event

Description:

I Scenario # -All Event# 6,7&8 Page 30 Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency of 30 1 Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

INITIATE contingency actions IAW Section applicable procedure(s).

0 OP-TM-211-901 Emergency Injection I ENSURE CF-V-1A and CF-V-1B are OPEN (PCR). 1 IAAT RM-A-1 high alarm or 4 psig ESAS have actuated, then CRS INITIATE OP-TM-826-901, Control Building Ventilation System Radiological Event Operations.

I CRS IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then 0 TO EOP-008.

INITIATE Guide 20, PRIOR to Transfer to RB Sump.

ARO ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs). I TERMINATE SCENARIO I

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Three Mile Island Scenario No.: 2 OpTestNo.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 0 Reactor Startup is in Progress 0 NI-12 is 00s due to a detector failure Turnover: Take the Reactor Critical Critical Tasks: 0 Initiate HPI (CT-2) 0 Trip all RCPs (CT-I) 0 Reduce Steaming/lsolate Affected SGs (CT-22) 0 Limit Uncontrolled Radiation Release (CT-21)

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RM0322 CRS 3eactor Building Hi Range Radiation Monitor Failure (TS) 2 N CRS 3eactor Startup R URO N ARO 3 NI37A CRS Source Range Instrument NI-I 1 SUR AMP Failure low (TS) 4 RD03A M CRS Sontinuous Rod Withdrawal M URO M ARO 5 TH15A CRS OTSG Tube Leak in OTSG A

~~

6 TH16A C CRS OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG requiring HPI initiation C URO C ARO 7 MU09 C CRS High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Fails to open C URO 8 CCO2B C CRS Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation C URO 9 TH17A C CRS OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG resulting in loss of subcooling C URO margin (CT-1, CT-22)

C ARO 10 ESOIA I CRS Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 psig (CT-2)

ESOlB I URO FW45A C CRS Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13A Fails Open. (CT-21)

C ARO

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #2 The crew will take the watch with reactor startup in progress pulling toward criticality. NI-12 is 00s due to a detector failure. The crew will continue the reactor startup.

As soon as the crew accepts the watch the lead Examiner can cue the failure of RB Hi Range monitor RM-G-22. MAP Alarm C-1-1, Radiation Level High will be received and the crew should diagnose the failure of the instrument. The CRS should review TS 3.5.5.2 and declare a 7 day timeclock based on the failure. As soon as the TS call is made the crew can be directed to continue the startup.

When the crew has progressed in the startup to satisfy the reactivity manipulation the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the Source Range NI-I 1 SUR AMP failure. The CRS should terminate the startup and review TS 3.5.1.1 and Table 3.5-1 and declare a one hour timeclock based on zero Source Range Instrument Channels operable.

After the CRS has made the Tech Spec call the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the Control Rod Group 5 continuous withdrawal. If Group 5 reaches its outlimit before the reactor is tripped Group 6 will begin to withdraw. The URO should attempt to gain rod control in accordance with the IMAs of OP-TM-AOP-064, Uncontrolled Rod Motion. The URO should trip the reactor and enter OP-TM-EOP-001,Reactor Trip at this point.

When the reactor is tripped the OTSG tube leak will be initiated. The crew should diagnose the tube leak at approximately 12 gpm. The CRS should go to OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage to mitigate the event.

After the EOP-005 is entered and when directed by the Lead Examiner the OTSG Tube Rupture can be initiated. The crew should diagnose the leak size increase and continue in EOP-005.

The High Capacity Makeup Valve will fail to open and the URO may try to use Makeup Valve MU-V-166 to augment makeup flow. The leak will require initiation of HPI using OP-TM-EOP-010 Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control (CT-2). This is a critical task because the leak size is greater than normal makeup capability which would cause Pressurizer level to lower and eventually empty since HPI will not automatically actuate at 1600 psig.

Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump DC-P-1B will trip when ESAS is actuated and the CRO will have to implement OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPVLPI) Contingency Actions. When Reactor Building Spray Pump BS-P-1B is placed in Pull to Lock the scenario can continue. The transfer of Makeup Pump MU-P-1C cooling to Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water (NSCCW) does not have to be completed to continue.

When Reactor Building Spray Pump BS-P-1B is placed in Pull to Lock the Lead Examiner can cue the increase in the leak size. The leak size will result in a loss of subcooled margin. HPI will not automatically actuate at 1600 psig RCS pressure and will have to be manually actuated in accordance with OP-TM-642-901, 1600 PSlG ESAS Actuation (CT-2). The CRS should initiate OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of 25°F Subcooled Margin. All four Reactor Coolant Pumps will be tripped within one minute of the loss of subcooled margin (CT-1) in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1, Loss of Subcooling Margin resulting in Emergency Feedwater actuation. This is a critical task since failure to trip the RCPs could result in the core not being adequately covered and raise the potential for fuel clad failure.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #2 Continued The A OTSG will subsequently be isolated in accordance with EOP-005 (CT-21). This OTSG is not required for cooldown and overfill can not be prevented by steaming requiring the OTSG to be isolated reducing the radiological consequences of the event. The crew should diagnose the Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13A failure to close and order it closed locally.

The CRS will continue in EOP-005 and when EF-P-1 is secured the crew will close Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B to stop the unmonitored release (CT-22). This is a critical task in that failure to isolate EF-P-1 would result in an uncontrolled radiation release from a non-essential load.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.

000006; Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 2 Event I

nstrumentation ITS) 2 Reactor Startup I OP 1103-8, Approach to Criticality 3 Source Range Instrument NI- TS 3.5.1. I , Operational Safety Instrumentation 11 Fission Chamber SUR Table 3.5-1 AMP Failure (TS)

Control Rod Group 5 TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip withdraws uncontrollably Control Rod Group 6 0P-TM-AOP-064, Continuous Rod Motion withdraws uncontrollably OTSG Tube Leak in OTSG A OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage 6 OTSG Tube Rupture in A OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage OTSG requiring HPI initiation OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control 7 High Capacity Makeup Flow OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control Valve MU-V-217 Failure to oPen 8 Decay Heat Closed Cooling OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPIILPI)

Water Pump Trips On OP-TM-543-440, Swapping MU-P-1C Cooling to NS Actuation 9 OTSG Tube Rupture in A OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of 25°F Subcooled Margin OTSG Of Subcooled OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage Margin 10 11 Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 psig Emergency Feedwater Pump I OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPVLPI)

OP-TM-642-901, 1600 PSlG ESAS Actuation OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13A Fails Open Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 2 Initialization IC-202 Reactor Startup in Progress Console Center Place EDT on NI-12 indication Scenario Support NI-12 Console Center Place EDT on NI-12 SUR indication Scenario Support NI-12 SUR Malfunction RM0322 Value: Insert RM-G-22 Fails High When: Event 1 MaIfunction NI36B Value: Insert NI-12 Fission Chamber Power When: Immediately Supply Failure Malfunction N137B Value: Insert Sev. 0.0% NI-12 Fission Chamber SUR When: Immediately AMP Failure Malfunction N137A Value: Insert NI-I 1 Fission Chamber SUR When: Event 3 AMP Failure Malfunction RD03A Value: Insert Control Rod Group 5 When: Event 4 Continuous Withdrawal Malfunction RD03B Value: Insert Control Rod Group 6 When: Event 12 Continuous Withdrawal ZLORDOUTLMTGRP(5)

Malfunction THI 5A Value: Insert Sev. 0.05% OTSG A Tube Leak When: Event 5 Malfunction TH16A Value: Insert 2.8% OTSG A Tube Rupture When: Event 6 RAMP 300 sec I/O Override 02A5S15- Value: Insert High Capacity Makeup Valve ZDIPBOMUV217 When: Immediately Fails as is Malfunction ESOIA Value: Insert ESAS Failure to Actuate at When: Immediately HPI Setpoint (1600 PSIG)

Train A Malfunction ESOI B Value: Insert ESAS Failure to Actuate at When: Immediately HPI Setpoint (1600 PSIG)

Train B Malfunction CC02B Value: Insert Decay Closed Cooling Water When: Event 8 rrvdrvl b>O.1 Pump 1B Trip Malfunction THI 7A Value: Insert 20% OTSG A Tube Rupture When: Event 9 RAMP 10 sec Malfunction FW45A Value: Insert MS-V-13A Fails as is (open)

When: Event 11 fwvmsvl3a>0.9 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# 2 Event# 1 Event

Description:

Reactor Building Hi Range Radiation Monitor RM-G-22 Fails High (TS)

I Booth Operator Instructions: INITIATE Event 1 when directed.

I Indications Available:

CRS 31RECTS entry into PRFI-2-8, RM-G-22, RM-G-23 Hi Diagnose RM-G-22 failed high due to no other indications of CRS increased radiation levels on other radiation monitors.

CRS Review TS 3.5.5.2 for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation The channels identified for the instruments specified in Table 3.5-3 shall be OPERABLE. With the number of instrumentation CRS channels less than required, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE in accordance with the action specified in Table 3.5-3.

CRS Table 3.5-3, Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Required Minimum Instrument Number of Number of ACTION Channels Channels CRS Containment High Range Radiation 2 2 A (RMG-22/RMG-23)

A. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than CRS required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements:

1. either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or

2. prepare and submit a special report within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

~ ~~~~

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event# 1 Page 7 of 27 Event

Description:

Reactor Building Hi Range Radiation Monitor RM-G-22 Fails High (TS) 1 EXAMINERS NOTE: Once the TS call is made the crew can be directed to continue the startup.

Go to Event 2 I 000004; Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario# - 2 Event# 2&3 Event

Description:

Reactor Startup; Source Range SUR AMP NI-I 1 Fails Low (TS)

Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

Approach to Criticality 1103-8.

URO LIMITS AND PRECAUTIONS Administrative URO Do not exceed a stable startup rate of 1 DPM.

I---- URo During actual rod motion, do not exceed a transient start-up rate of 1.5 DPM.

While subcritical, a one over M (l/M) plot shall be made during ARO Regulating Group rod withdrawal for every 25% a group is withdrawn.

URO I During withdrawal of Regulating Groups:

Verify proper overlap of 25 f 5% exists (T.S. 3.5.2.5).

Closely monitor nuclear instrumentation to ensure correct response to core reactivity changes.

During startup when the intermediate range (IR) instruments come on scale, the overlap between the IR and the source URo range (SR) instrumentation shall not be less than 1 decade (T.S. 3.5.1.5).

The estimated critical position (ECP) calculated in accordance URO with 1103-15B (Reference 1.5) specifies the rod position tolerance band. If criticality occurs outside the specified band:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event# 2&3 Event

Description:

Reactor Startup; Source Range SUR AMP NI-I 1 Fails Low (TS) 0 Entry into this procedure (1103-8) is a planned evolution Entry into 1203-10, Unanticipated Criticality (Ref. 1.10) is not required unless criticality outside the ECP tolerance band is uncontrollable.

I URo I The Nuclear Instrumentation shall be continuously monitored during any reactivity addition.

To take conservative actions, including a manual reactor trip if URO necessary, if abnormal or unexpected reactor indications are observed.

Withdraw regulating groups and monitor for criticality observing URo the following limits:

URO Stop at least every 25% withdrawn to take 1/M data.

If the reactor critical position is outside the ECP limits URO established per 1103-15B (k 0.5% Auk No Xenon, f 0.8% Auk Transient Xenon):

Insert rods to achieve at least a 1% Auk subcritical condition using the rod worth data in 1103-15B.

Entry into 1203-10, Unanticipated Criticality (Ref.

1.10) is not required unless criticality outside the ECP tolerance band is uncontrollable.

008006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario# 2 Event# 2&3 Page 10 of 27 Event

Description:

Reactor Startup; Source Range SUR AMP NI-I 1 Fails Low (TS)

Time 1 Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR: Initiate Event 3.

1 EXAMINERS NOTE: CRS should declare a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months time clock based on T.S. 3.5.1.I.

The reactor shall not be in a startup mode or in a critical state unless the requirements of Table 3.5-1, Column A and B are CRS met, except as provided in Table 3.5-1, Column C.

Specification 3.0.1 applies.

CRS Table 3.5-1, Instruments Operating Conditions

~~~

Operator Action if Minimum Minimum Conditions of Functional Unit Operable Degree of Column A Channels Redundancy and Cannot CRS be Met Source range instrument 1 0 channels (a) Restore the conditions of Column (A) and Column (B)

CRS within one hour or place the unit in HOT SHUTDOWN within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months .

(c) When 1 of 2 intermediate range instrument channels is greater than 1O-amps or 2 of 4 power range instrument channels are greater than 10 percent full power, source range instrumentation is not required.

Go to Event 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D Scenario# 2 Event# 4 Event

Description:

Continuous Rod Withdrawal Booth Operator Instructions: INITIATE Event 4 when directed.

Indications Available:

Booth Operator Instructions: INITIATE Event 5 when the reactor is tripped u,, I CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-AOP-064, Continuous Rod Motion SYMPTOMS 1 URO A control rod group is moving in or out without a demand from ICs or the operator.

I yI0 I URO ENSURE Diamond control station is in MANUAL.

ENSURE JOG is selected.

~~

ENSURE GROUP and SINGLE SELECT switches are OFF.

URO ENSURE SEQ OR is selected.

If out motion continues, then SELECT the affected GROUP and URO INSERT the affected group.

TRIP the Reactor GO TO OP-TM-EOP-001 1 CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-001,Reactor Trip.

IMMEDIATE ACTIONS I URO PRESS both Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Continuous Rod Withdrawal URO I VERIFY REACTOR SHUTDOWN.

URO PRESS Turbine Trip PB.

URO VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.

CRS 1 VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFICATION (vssv)

IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom CRS using the following priority:

1 SCM 25" GO TO EOP-002 I 0 XHT GO TO EOP-003 LOHT GO TO EOP-004 OTSG tube leakage > Igpm ANNOUNCE Reactor Trip over plant page and radio (include ARo plant conditions sufficient for NLO response per OS-24).

I 1 URO I VERIFY control rod groups 1 through 7 are fully inserted. I ARO VERIFY OTSG A and B Operating Range level 97.5%.

ARO I VERIFY Main FW Flow to A and B OTSG are each 0.5 mlb/hr.

I I ARO I VERIFY OTSG level > setpoint. I I I ARO I VERIFY ICS/NNI HAND or AUTO Power is available. I Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

Continuous Rod Withdrawal I URo I VERIFY 1D and 1E 4160V buses are energized from auxiliary transformers.

URO INTIATE Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control.

I I ARO I INITIATE Guide 6 OTSG Pressure Control. I URO INITIATE Guide 8, RCS Pressure Control.

WAAT Generator MW g e r o , or Turbine speed c 1770 RPM, CRS then VERIFY GBI-12 and GB1-02 are OPEN.

I CRS I WAAT GB1-12 and GBI-02 are OPEN, then ENSURE the Generator Field Breaker is OPEN.

VERIFY primary and secondary Instrument Air pressure ARo

> 80 psig.

INITIATE OP-TM-642-904 Reactor Trip Isolation ESAS URo Actuation.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

I CRS I REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs). I 1 Go to Event 5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 1 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario# 2 Event# 5 Page -

14 of 27 1 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Leak in OTSG A (TS)

Booth Operator Instructions: INITIATE Event 5 when directed.

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-005 OTSG Tube Leakage.

EXAM1NERS NOTE: Leak size is = 12 gpm.

FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS NOTIFY RAC to begin offsite dose assessment.

I URO INTIIATE Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control I CRS VERIFY the reactor is critical.

I GO TO Step 3.7 GO TO EVENT 6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# 2 Event# 6,7,&8 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation Booth Operator Instructions: INITIATE Event 6 when directed.

CRS NOTIFY SM to evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

I CRS 1 IDENTIFY the affected OTSG.

I 1. OTSGA I 10 OTSGB I ARO I INITIATE Attachment 2.

I ARO 1 IAAT Aux. Steam is available, then BOOTH OPERATOR: Use remote functions to accomplish.

0 OPEN AS-V-8 (TB 355 south of 6h stage drain collection tank).

CLOSE GS-V-4.

0 TRANSFER operating FWPs to Aux Steam:

I SLOWLY OPEN AS-V-5A (7 W of FW-P-1A 2 up).

SLOWLY OPEN AS-V-5B (7 W Of FW-P-1B 2 UP).

I CRS I VERIFY the reactor is critical.

1 GO TO Step 3.17.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I/ Op Test No.: 1 Scenario# 2 Event# 6, 7, & 8 Page 16 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation 1 URo 1 ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and radio.

I I ARO I DISPATCH an Operator to check MSSV status. I CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: URO should diagnose failure of MU-V-217 and use MU-V-16B for supplemental makeup.

I URO I Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control (Page 1 of 2) I URO If Pressurizer Level is LOW:

URO VERIFY MU pump is operating.

I I URO I VERIFY MU-V-5 is CLOSED.

I I URO 1 VERIFY MU24-FI > 20 GPM.

URO ENSURE MU-V-17 is OPEN.

URO VERIFY PZR level is being restored.

I THROTTLE MU-V-217. I URO VERIFY MU24-FI 20 GPM.

I THROTTLE MU-V-16B or 16D.

QOQOOf; Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event# 6, 7 , & 8 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation T m i e 1 1 Position 1 Applicants Actions or Behavior URO VERIFY PZR level is being restored.

I CLOSE MU-V-3.

URO VERIFY PZR level is being restored.

INITIATE HPI IAW OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection HPI/LPI.

URO INITIATES OP-TM-211-901 Emergency Injection (HPVLPI).

URO Prerequisites URO VERIFY 1D or 1E 4160V bus is energized.

VERIFY Make Up system was in ES standby IAW URo OP-TM-211-000, Make Up and Purification.

VERIFY Decay Heat system was in ES standby IAW URo OP-TM-212-000, Decay Heat Removal.

VERIFY a valid automatic actuation has occurred or a manual URo actuation of HPI is required.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation I EXAMINER'S NOTE: There are special usage requirements for Section 4.1 and Attachments 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. These actions are memory items (IAW OS 24) and performed from memory when required. The sequence of actuation and verification of ES is not train dependent. Either train may be performed first or trains may be performed in parallel.

Initiation of Injection IF ESAS Train A "Load Seq Block 4" lights (PCR) are not BLUE, then PRESS "Manual ES Actuation" "1600 PSlG RC PRESS" (Train A CC).

PCR graphic display is equivalent to Attachment 7.1 IF ESAS Train B "Load Seq Block 4" lights (PCR) are not BLUE, then PRESS "Manual ES Actuation" "1600 PSlG RC PRESS" (Train B CR).

PCR graphic display is equivalent to Attachment 7.2.

IF any of the components on Attachment 7.2 are not in the required condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.

DIAGNOSES DC-P-1B trips when ESAS is actuated and that Section 4.2 applies.

t I

Contingency Actions IAAT DC-P-1A or DC-P-1B fails to start or is shut down unexpectedly, then perform the following:

IF DC-P-1B fails to start, then START DC-P-1B.

800006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 r

/I OP Test No.:

1 Scenario # -2 Event# 6, 7, & 8 Page 19 of 27 1 II Event

Description:

OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup aker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump I 0 IF DC-P-1B is NOT operating then perform the following:

I PLACE MU-P-IC in PTL.

I PLACE DH-P-IB in PTL.

PLACE BS-P-1B in PTL.

0 INITIATE OP-TM-543-440 Swapping MU-P-1C cooling to NS.

URO MAINBODY URO VERIFY ALL prerequisites have been met.

I URo I If required to shift MU-P-IC cooling to NS, then PERFORM the following:

0 NOTIFY Control Room to monitor the following:

NS-T-1 level (NS-LI-800 / NS-LI-801) (CC).

0 DC-T-1B level (DC-LI-1IO) (CR).

BOOTH OPERATOR: Use remote function to operate 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.

CLOSE the following valves: (Locked Valve entry)

DC-V4lB I DC-V-45B BOOTH OPERATOR: Use remote function to operate 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.

I I OPEN the following valves:

NS-V-82 NS-V-83 I I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 II IAAT either ES selected MU pump fails to start or is shut down URo unexpectedly, then perform the following:

If Train B ES selected MU pump is not operating, then perform URo the following:

I VERIFY 1E 4160V bus is energized 0 VERIFY one of the following:

(N/A steps not performed) 0 MU-V-36 and MU-V-37 are Open.

0 MU-V-16C is Open.

MU-V-16D is Open.

0 If MU-P-IC is ES Selected, then perform the following:

VERIFY MU-P-2C or MU-P-3C is operating I START MU-P-IC I I I GO TO EVENT 9

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 1 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event# 9,10,&11 Page 21 1 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Resulting in Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-22); Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 PSlG (CT-2);Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B Fails OPEN (CT-21)

I Booth Operator Instructions:

I Indications Available:

EXAMINERS NOTE: Crew should diagnose 25 SCM.

1 CRS 1 DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-002 Loss of 25°F Subcooled Margin

~- ~~

URO IMMEDIATE ACTIONS URO PERFORM Rule 1, SCM.

INITIATES OP-TM-EOP-010 SCM, Rule 1, Loss of Subcooling URo Margin (SCM).

URO VERIFY it has been more than two minutes since RCP start.

URO ENSURE all RCPs are shutdown.

EXAMINERS NOTE: 1600 psig will not actuate. If manual ESAS was re-enabled it will have t o be re-initiated. If MU-P-IC, and DH-P-1B are still in PTL they will have t o be started.

I I ARO I INITIATE OP-TM-642-901 1600 # ESAS ACTUATION.

I ARo I INITIATE EFW IAW Guide 15 and FEED available OTSGs to 75 to 85% Operating Range Level.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 2 Event# 9, IO,& 11 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Resulting in Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-22); Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 PSlG (CT-2);Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B Fails OPEN (CT-21)

FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS I CRS ENSURE announcement of reactor trip and EFW actuation Dver the plant page and radio.

ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

I CRS REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

I I CRS IAAT LPI flow >I250 GPM in each line, then GO TO EOP-006.

VERIFY PORV is closed (Tailpipe DP indicator, Alarm G-1-7, A0517).

I CRS INITIATE Attachment 1 to isolate possible sources of leakage.

VERIFY all RC Pumps are shutdown.

1 CRS VERIFY ONE of the following exists:

0 TWO (2) HPI trains in ES operation, SM >25"F, lncore temperature stable or reducing.

IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then GO TO EOP-008.

I I CRS IF primary to secondary heat transfer is excessive (XHT), then GO TO EOP-003.

VERIFY cooldown rate > 40"F/hr, or primary to secondary heat transfer exists.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event# 9, 10, & 11 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Resulting in Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-22); Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 PSlG (CT-2);Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B Fails OPEN (CT-21) 1 CRS I VERIFY OTSG tube leakage e 1 gpm.

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-005 OTSG Tube Leakage.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS I CRS I NOTIFY RAC to begin offsite dose assessment.

I URO I INITIATE Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control.

CRS VERIFY the reactor is critical.

GO TO Step 3.7.

1 CRS I NOTIFY SM to evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

I CRS I IDENTIFY the affected OTSG.

I OTSGB I CRS I INITIATE Attachment 2.

I I CRS I IAAT Aux. Steam is available, then 1 OPEN AS-V-8 (TB 355 south of 6hstage drain collection tank).

CLOSE GS-V-4.

TRANSFER operating FWPs to Aux Steam:

SLOWLY OPEN AS-V-5A (7 W Of FW-P-1A 2 UP).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 cenario # 2 Event# 9 , 1 0 , & 11 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Resulting in Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-22); Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 PSlG (CT-2);Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B Fails OPEN (CT-21)

SLOWLY OPEN AS-V-5B (7 W Of FW-P-1B 2 UP).

JERIFY the reactor is critical.

SO TO Step 3.17.

ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and

.adio.

I 1 CRS DISPATCH an Operator to check MSSV status.

ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

IAAT OTSG pressure is approaching or is greater than 1000 psig, then ENSURE MS-V-2A(B) is OPEN and to OPEN TBVs or ADVs to maintain OTSG pressure < 1000 psig.

If SCM > 30 OF, then any the following may be used to reduce RCS to 3OoFSCM:

0 OPEN the PORV.

0 INITIATE a bleed path (IAW OP-TM-211-462) and letdown (IAW OP-TM-211-950).

0 OPEN the RCS Vents.

IAAT level is rising due to tube leakage in an available OTSG, then preferentially STEAM to maintain OTSG level c 85%.

IAAT any of the following isolation criteria are satisfied (without contrary TSC guidance):

OTSG level > 85% Op Rg 0 BWST level < 21 ft

000006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event# 9,10,&11 Page 25 of 27 1 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Resulting in Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-22); Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 PSlG (CT-2);Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-138 Fails OPEN (CT-21) 0 Projected or actual offsite integrated dose approaches 0.5 R whole body or 1.5R thyroid Then perform the following:

e When RCS pressure < 1000 psig, then INITIATE ARO Attachment 1A or B to isolate the affected OTSG(s).

0 When affected OTSG TBV/ADVs are closed, then I e If both OTSGs are being isolated, then GO TO EOP-009.

PERFORM Guide 12 RCS Stabilization Following OTSG Isolation.

ARO PERFORMS Attachment ? A OTSG A Isolation Page 1 of I .

I ARO I ENSURE CLOSED the following valves (Control Room):

MS-V-1A MS-V-1B FW-V-17A e FW-V-SA I e FW-V-16A e FW-V-92A e EF-V-30A

~ ~~

EF-V-30D MS-V-3D MS-V-3E I MS-V-3F e MS-V-4A MS-V-13A

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 2 Event# 9, 10,&11 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Resulting in Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-22); Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 PSlG (CT-2);Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B Fails OPEN (CT-21)

I I EXAMINER'S NOTE: ARO should diagnose MS-V-13A failure to CLOSE and have NLO CLOSE locally.

I ARo 1 ENSURE CLOSED the following valves (In-Plant): (Notify NLO's)

I I BOOTH OPERATOR: Remove Malfunction FW45A.

Use Remote Function FWR78 to place MS-V-13A in MANUAL.

Use FWR79 set to zero to close MS-V-13A MS-V-13A (close manual hand wheel (IB 295: in EF-P-1 room)

I I 0 MS-V-1OA ensure valve is closed (IB 295: in EF-P-1 room)

I 0 MS-V-89A MS Line A post htg trap isol (IB 2nd floor cubicle A)

MS-V-34A, MS Line A trap outlet isolation (IB 2nd floor cubicle A west wall, 3 ft. above floor)

I 0 MS-V-89B MS Line B post htg trap isol (IB 2nd floor cubicle B) ~~

MS-V-34B, MS Line B trap outlet isolation (IB 2nd floor cubicle B west wall, 3 ft. above floor) 0 MS-V-43A, MS Header A trap outlet isolation (IB BSMT:

EF-P-1 room, south wall, 6' from door, 2' off floor) 0 MS-V-92 common post htg drain isol (TB 322: 12' west of I I FWP I B , 8' up off floor) 0 FW-V-85A FW reg valve bypass (TB 322: At FW-V-17A)

IAAT OTSG isolation criteria may be challenged prior to CRS reducing RCS pressure 1000 psig, then

Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # - 2 Event # 9,10, & 11 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Resulting in Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-22); Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 PSlG (CT-2);Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B Fails OPEN (CT-21) 0 INITIATE RCS cooldown to 500°F at a rate within RCS inventory control capability and c 240F/HR.

I ENSURE RC-V-2 is OPEN.

1 CYCLE the PORV to reduce SCM to approximately 30°F.

I I URO I INITATE Guide 8 to minimize SCM.

ARO IAAT EF-P-2A or EF-P-2B are running, then 0 PLACE both trains of each EFW actuation in DEFEAT (eight switches).

CLOSE MS-V-13A and MS-V-138.

I EXAMINERS NOTE: Scenario can be terminated when the A OTSG is isolated.

~ ~~~~~~

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 1 Facility: Three Mile Island Scenario No.: 3 OpTest No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

1 InitialConditions: 0 85% power, MOC 0 Power EscalationFollowing a trip and maintenanceoutage MU-P-IBOOS Turnover: Raise Power to 100%.

1 Critical Tasks: 0 Trip all RCPs (CT-1) 0 Establish FW Flow and Feed SGs (CT-10)

Event Malf. Event Event No. Type* Description F

C CRS Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breakei Trips (TS) ~ ~~

RD0216 C CRS Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)

C URO 3 TH13D N CRS Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration R URO N URO 4 C CRS Feedwater Flow Fails to re-ratio after securing RC-P-1D C ARO C URO 5 THO6 M CRS An RCS leak occurs requiring a Reactor Trip M URO M ARO ~ ~~ ~~~~~~

6 RWOIOB C CRS Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1B does not C URO start on ESAS actuation 7 C CRS RC-P-1A does not trip when control switch is rotated to the stop position (CT-1)

C URO I Emergency FeedwaterValves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A andEF-

~~~~~~

8 I CRS I ARo I V-30D do not control in automatic due to a level setpoint failure (CT-10)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)ornponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #3 The crew will take the watch with reactor power at 85% and ICs in Full Automatic. The plant is in a power escalation following an automatic trip several days ago and a subsequent maintenance period. Makeup Pump MU-P-1B is 00s for maintenance.

When the crew has accepted the watch the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the Report from the NLO that he was in the area of I C ES Valves MCC and heard a breaker trip. It was the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve breaker. The CRS should review TS 3.I. 12.4 for PORV Block Valve Operability and declare a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months timeclock is in effect to close the PORV.

The PORV Block Valve breaker will not be returned to service and the scenario can continue when the TS call is made.

After the TS call is made the crew will continue the power escalation. As rods are withdrawn a stuck rod occurs in Group 7 requiring the initiation of procedure OP-TM-AOP-062, Inoperable Rod. The CRS should review TS 4.7.1.2 and 3.5.2.2 and declare the rod inoperable. Tech Spec actions for the inoperable rod are included in AOP-062. Within one hour the other rods in the group must be trimmed so the inoperable rod remains within the group average. The rod will not be returned to operable status during the scenario.

After the Tech Spec call is made and AOP-062 has been implemented to the examiners satisfaction, the Lead Evaluator can cue the initiation of the RC-P-1D high vibration malfunction.

The crew should diagnose increasing vibration on RC-P-1D and initiate action to reduce power to ~ 7 5 % to secure RC-P-1D in accordance with Computer Alarm Response L3125, RC-P-1D High Vibration.

When RC-P-1D is secured feedwater flow will not re-ratio and the crew will have to take hand control of the Feedwater Loop masters in accordance with OP-TM-621-471, ICs Manual Control to manually re-ratio feedwater flow. The ICs does not have to be returned to auto to continue.

When the plant has been stabilized with feedwater flow re-ratioed, the Lead Examiner can cue initiation of the RCS leak. The crew should diagnose the leak based on RB pressure rise and RCS inventory change. Reactor Building pressure will rise rapidly and RCS pressure will lower.

The reactor should be tripped by the crew and the CRS should initiate OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip. Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1B will not start automatically on the ESAS signal and must be started manually per OS-24, Conduct of Operations during Abnormal and Emergency Conditions.

When subcooling margin is lost RC-P-1A control switch will not trip the breaker and the URO will have to open the breakers for the 1A 7KV bus to trip the pump (CT-1). If the pump is not tripped within one minute the crew will have to keep RC-P-1A running in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1 Loss of Subcooling Margin. This is a critical task since failure to trip the RCPs could result in the core not being adequately covered and raise the potential for fuel clad failure. The CRS will initiate OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of Subcooled Margin.

When Emergency Feedwater is actuated EF-V-30A and EF-V-30D will not operate in automatic and will have to be taken to hand to feed the A OTSG (CT-IO). This is a critical task in that failure to take manual control would result in the A OTSG going dry and becoming unavailable to maintain or initiate primary to secondary heat transfer.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #3 Continued The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.

Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 3 Description Initial Set-up.

Power Operated Relief Valve TS 3.1.12.4, PORV Block Valve Operability (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breaker Trips (TS).

Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS) TS 4.7.1.2, Rod Misalignment I TS 3.5.2.2 Operation With Inoperable Rods U OP-TM-AOP-062 Inoperable Rod I Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P- Computer Alarm L3125, RC-P-1D High Vibration 1D High Vibration I

OP I102-4, Power Operation I Feedwater Flow Fails to re-ratio after securing RC-P-1D OP-TM-MAP-H0204, Reactor Inlet ATc HI I OP-TM-621-471, ICs Manual Control RCS Leak in the RB OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1 Loss of Subcooling Margin OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of Subcooled Margin U OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown I Reactor Building Emergency OP-TM-534-901, RB Emergency Cooling Operations Cooling Pump RR-P-16 does OS-24, Conduct of Operations During Abnormal and not start on ESAS actuation Emergency Events RC-P-1A does not trip when control switch is rotated to the stop position OS-24, Conduct of Operations During Abnormal and Emergency Events OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1 Loss of Subcooling Margin I1 Emergency Feedwater OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 16, EFW Failure Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A and EF-V30D do not control in automatic Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 3 Initialization IC-TEMP 85% Power, ICs Full AUTO Scenario Support 203 Start MU-P-1A Place Control Switch in NAS Scenario Support Remote Function Value: Insert NS Scenario Support CCRl2 When: Immediately Stop MU-P-1B Value: Insert PTL Scenario Support When: Immediately MU-P-1B Place EDT on MU-P-1B-I D Control Scenario Support Switch Place EDT on MU-P-1B-I E Control Switch Remote Function Value: Insert OUT RC-V-2 Breaker trips RCRl9 When: Event I Malfunction RD0216 Value: Insert Stuck rod in Group 7 When: Immediately Malfunction TH13D Value: Insert Sev. 50% RC-P-1D High Vibration When: Event 3 RAMP 300 sec Monitor ICK314B Value: Insert 10.0 FW Flow Fails to Re-ratio (normal value 0.0101) When: Immediately Malfunction THO6 Value: Insert Sev. 0.5% RCS Leak at RCP Discharge When: Event 5 RAMP 100 sec Malfunction RWIOB Value: Insert RR-P-1B fails to start on When: Immediately ESAS signal I/O Override 02A3S11- Value: ON RC-P-1A Breaker Fails to Trip ZDICSRCPlA(4) NAS When: Immediately I/O Override 02A3S11- Value: OFF RC-P-1A Breaker Fails to Trip ZDlCSRCPlA(2) STP When: Immediately I10 Override 02A3S1 I- Value: OFF RC-P-1A Breaker Fails to Trip ZDICSRCPIA(1) PTL When: Immediately Remote Function Value: Insert Sev. 0% OTSG Operate Level Setpoint ICR02 When: Immediately for EFW Control A Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 1

Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event# I Event

Description:

Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breaker Trips (TS)

Page Of 300th Operator Instructions: Ensure ICK314B is set at 10.0 in Monitor.

ndications Available:

DIRECTS I 102-2 Plant Startup.

I CRS IAAT Control Rods approach 95% withdrawn, then 0 DETERMINE the volume of water required for the desired rod movement at current Boron concentration & EFPD from Figure 1. Current boron concentration may be estimated based on the latest boron sample result and RCS water additions per the Control Room Log.

0 REVIEW recent water addition records in the Control Room log.

0 VALIDATE the value obtained from Figure 1 by comparison to recent water additions.

Reduce RCS boron concentration by performing any of the following IAW 1104-29E Feed and Bleed Processes ADD demin water from an RCBT Feed and Bleed PLACE a deborating demin in service 0 EVALUATE the effect of the water addition on Control rod position.

IAAT Group 7 Rods reach 97% WITHDRAWN, then 0 Stop Power Ascension until rods have inserted to 94%

WITHDRAWN.

I BOOTH OPERATOR: Report as Primary NLO that you were in the area of IC ES valves MCC and heard a breaker trip. It appears to have been the power operated relief valve breaker.

If requested to close the breaker report that it will not close.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# 3 Event# 1 Event

Description:

Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breaker Trips (TS)

EXAMINERS NOTE: CRS should review T.S. 3.1.12.4 for PORV block valve operability and declare a one hour time clock to close the PORV and remove power from it.

The PORV Block Valve shall be OPERABLE during HOT CRS STANDBY, STARTUP, and POWER OPERATION:

With the PORV Block Valve inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either:

0 Restore the PORV Block Valve to OPERABLE status or Close the PORV (verify closed) and remove power from the PORV Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

0 With the PORV block valve inoperable, restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status prior to startup from the next COLD SHUTDOWN unless the COLD SHUTDOWN occurs within 90 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD) of the end of the fuel cycle. If a COLD SHUTDOWN occurs within this 90 day period, restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status prior to startup for the next fuel cycle.

GO TO EVENT 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario# 3 Event# 2 Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

CRS ORDERS power escalation to continue.

EXAMINERS NOTE: When asymmetric rod condition occurs the CRS should review T.S. 4.7.1.2 and T.S. 3.5.2.2 and declare the rod inoperable.

~

IF a control rod is misaligned with its group average by more than an indicated nine inches, the rod shall be declared inoperable and the limits of Specification 3.5.2.2 shall apply.

The rod with the greatest misalignment shall be evaluated first.

CRS The position of a rod declared inoperable due to misalignment shall not be included in computing the average position of group for determining the operability of rods with lesser misalignments.

CRS Operation with inoperable rods:

0 If within one hour of determination of an inoperable rod as defined in Specification 4.7.1, and once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter, it is not determined that a one percent Ak/k hot shutdown margin exists combining the worth of the inoperable rod with each of the other rods, the reactor shall be brought to the HOT SHUTDOWN condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months until this margin is established.

Following the determination of an inoperable rod as defined in Specification 4.7.1, all rods shall be exercised within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and exercised weekly until the rod problem is solved.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: - 1 Scenario # 3 Event# 2 Page 9 of 25 Event

Description:

Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)

. If a control rod in the regulating or safety rod groups is declared inoperable per 4.7.1.2, and cannot be aligned per 3.5.2.2.f, power shall be reduced to I60% of the thermal power allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , and the overpower trip setpoint shall be reduced to I 70% of the thermal power allowable within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months . Verify the potential ejected rod worth (ERW) is within the assumptions of the ERW analysis and verify N . .

peaking factor (Fo(Z) and -) limits per the COLR have FAH I not been exceeded within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

I CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-AOP-062 Inoperable Rod.

ENTRY CONDITIONS NOTE: Control rod is misaligned with the group by more than 9 inches.

I CRS I EITHER of the following conditions exist:

0 One or more inoperable control rods And the reactor is NOT shutdown > 1% AWk.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS I CRS 1 RECORD time of discovery of inoperable rod:

I CRS I REQUEST duty reactor engineer to report to the control room.

I CRS I VERIFY reactor power > 5%

CRS VERIFY safety group Out Limit (Diamond panel) is LIT.

I I I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event# 2 Event

Description:

Stuck Rod in Group 7 US)

CRS 1 VERIFY the inoperable rod is fully inserted.

If any regulating or safety rods are inoperable, then perform the following within one hour: (TS 3.5.2.2.b,c).

I 1 0 INITIATE 1103-15A section 3.2, Calculation of shutdown margin with Tave 1 530°F. (TS 3.5.2.2.c).

I I I If one of the following is true:

0 rod does not meet trip insertion time 0 rod can not be exercised I 0 rod can not be located The INITIATE OP-TM-622-201 Control Rod Movement to verify the operability of other rods, and GO TO step 3.11.

(TS 3.5.2.2.b).

GO TO EVENT 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D Booth Operator Instructions: When directed insert Event 3.

Indications Available:

DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-PC-L3125 RC-P-1D High Vibration SETPOlNTS ARO MANUAL ACTIONS REQUIRED NOTE: Use of the Trip Multiply switch doubles the alarm limits and causes the red bypass light to flash.

1 ARO MONITOR RC Pump vibration levels (PLF) and ATTEMPT to reset alarm.

CRS IAAT any of the following conditions are met:

0 Motor vibration exceeds 7 mils, 0 Pump vibration exceeds 20 mils during 4 RCP operations, Pump vibration exceeds 30 mils during single pump operation, Then PERFORM OP-TM-226-154 to place RC-P-1D in the Standby mode.

I I 0 EVALUATE RCDT level for abnormal or changing trends.

~ ~~

0 IF RC-P-1D individual contribution to the RCDT level rise is

> 1 gpm, then PERFORM OP-TM-226-154 to place RC-P-1D in shutdown Mode.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D CRS INITIATES entry into OP-TM-226-154 Shutdown RC-P-1D.

Precautions To avoid bearing damage from low oil flows or reverse rotation, backstop pumps should be started prior to RC pump shutdown I

and lift pumps should be started prior tot or immediately following RC pump trip/shutdown. Verify auto start or start pump.

Prerequisites VERIFY RC-P-1D (226) is in Operating Mode IAW OP-TM-226-000, Reactor Coolant Pumps.

VERIFY Reactor Power c the following for the final RCP Combination:

0 2 / 1 RCP Combination - 75% NI Power VERIFY Turbine Load the following for the final RCP Combination:

0 2 / 1 RCP Combination - 665 MWE IIItzII EXAMINERS NOTE: The CRS will direct the power reduction using 1102-4, Power Operation prior to securing RC-P-1D.

NOTE: 0 If this section is being performed during an emergency plant shutdown, then any action in this table may be deferred except those marked with EP in the sign-off column.

0 When the power reduction is complete, then any action is NIA if the action criteria was not satisfied.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D ARO Prior to FW-U-1B speed 4000 RPM START LO-P-8B.

ARO Prior to FW-U-1A speed e 4000 RPM START LO-P-8A.

Prior to shutdown of MO-P-1B If MO-V-26 is OPEN, then ARO INITIATE OP-TM-431-152 to remove MO-T-3 from service.

Prior to reactor power 85%, RESET FW Flow Correction CRS Factors to 1,000 IAW MAP G-2-6.

Prior to turbine load 630 Mwe If any MO-P-1 are operating, CRS then SHUTDOWN all Moisture Separator Pumps IAW OP-TM-431-152.

ARO Prior to reactor power 75%

- PLACE FW-P-1A in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-472

-PLACE FW-P-1B in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-473 CRS Prerequisites VERIFY one of the following:

An automatic or emergency (Le. forced) power reduction is in CRS progress.

NOTE: Steps with letter designations should be performed in parallel.

I CRS Procedure Power Reduction

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario # 3 Event# 3&4 Page -14 of 25 I Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D PERFORM Enclosure 2A (for an emergency (forced) power reduction INITIATE Enclosure 2A).

I CRS REDUCE reactor power to the desired power as follows:

I URO 0 MAINTAIN Generator Reactive Load IAW OP-TM-301-472.

I URO 0 IF SG/REACTOR DEMAND is in AUTO, then REDUCE reactor power as follows:

URO ENSURE ULD is in HAND 0 SET ULD LOAD RATE OF CHANGE to I1 %/minute URO for PLANNED reductions or at a rate determined by CRS for Forced power reductions.

URO SET ULD Target Load Demand to desired setpoint.

I CRS PERFORM the actions per Enclosure 2B.

EXAMINERS NOTE: The CRS will direct continuation of OP-TM-226-154 to secure RC-P-1D.

NOTE: RCP vibrations are high whenever one pump is operated alone in a loop. Use the following pump combinations. A and B OR C and D.

EVALUATE final RCP Combination for effects of vibration and procedural requirements:

0 1102-11 specifies use of RC-P-1A and RC-P-1B RC-P-1C and RC-P-1D are designated for alternate use and require use of PT Curves in OP-TM-226-000, Reactor Coolant Pumps, Attachments 7.3 and 7.4 vs. 1102-1 /

1102-11 Figures 1 and I A .

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 1 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event# 3&4 I Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D NOTE: A 2 / 1 RCP combination with OTSG levels > LLLs will require a re-ratio (70% / 30%) of Feedwater flow to A /

B OTSG.

I f Reactor power is > 20%, then EVALUATE expected Fw Flow 1 CRS -equirementsfor new RCP combination, to minimize effects on 3elta Tc.

URO ?LACE at least one each of the following in Normal-After-Start:

B RC-P-2D-1, Oil Lift Pump AC HP (CC), or RC-P-2D-2, Oil Lift Pump DC HP (CC)

B RC-P-3D-1, Backstop Oil Pump # I (CC), or RC-P-3D-2, Backstop Oil Pump #2 (CC)

URO PLACE RC-P-1D in Pull-To-Lock.

URO VERIFY the following:

~ ~~~

0 RC-P-1D not rotating backwards (PPS L2878, RC-P-1D Reverse Rotation not in alarm).

~ ~~~

NOTE: Vibration levels at a low value with the absence of change indicates 0 rpm.

0 Vibration readings (PLF) indicate RC-P-1D has reached 0 rpm.

URO PLACE the following in Pull-To-Lock:

0 RC-P-3D-2, Backstop Oil Pump #2 I 0 RC-P-3D-1, Backstop Oil Pump # I URO PLACE the following in Pull-To-Lock:

0 RC-P-2D-2, Oil Lift Pump DC HP 0 RC-P-2D-1, Oil Lift Pump AC HP

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# 3 Event# 3&4 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D

~ _ _ _

RECORD RC-P-ID (226) is in Standby Mode in the CR L O g . 1 3iagnoses the failure of feedwater flow to re-ratio.

1 CRS 3IRECTS entry into OP-TM-MAP-H0204 RX Inlet ATC HI.

I I ATck5"F from selected Loop A/B NR Tc at RC-5NB MS2.

CAUSES 0 Unequal RCS flow between loops (Ex: RCP trip) 0 Unequal F.W. flow to the Steam Generators MANUAL ACTIONS REQUIRED I 0 VERIFY Automatic Action. I 0 IF automatic feedwater control is inadequate, then PLACE ARO feedwater in HAND IAW one or more of the following procedures:

OP-TM-621-471, ICs Manual Control. (for FW Loop Masters)

Limitations I I URO Maintain NI power within 1% of desired reactor power. I 1 URO Maintain control rod index above error adjusted rod index limit for number of RCPs operating IAW COLR Figure 1, 2 or 3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event# 3&4 Page -

17 of 25 I I Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D I ARo I When reactor power > 20%, then control feedwater flow to OTSGs as follows:

I 0 Maintain Tavgbetween 578°F and 580°F.

I 1 0 Maintain Ac between +2F to -2°F (ATc = T A - TcB).

If only 3 RC Pumps are operating, then when either OTSG ~

level reaches 2 5 , ATc limit does not apply.

URO MAINBODY URO ENSUIRE ULD in HAND.

1 URO 1 Establish manual SG/REACTOR Control as follows:

I PLACE SGIREACTOR DEMAND station in HAND.

0 I 0 ENSURE control rod position does NOT change.

0 VERIFY alarm H-2-1 ICs in Track In.

If necessary to maintain reactor power or control rods within URO limits or if a power change is being conducted IAW 1102-4, then ADJUST SGIREACTOR DEMAND as follows:

0 If maintaining stable reactor power or a slow planned URO power change, then RAISE or LOWER in discrete steps to keep neutron error between +2% and -2%.

0 If rapid power reduction is required, then LOWER as URO necessary to achieve desired reactor power level and ENSURE FW flow controlled within limits.

I ARO I Establish manual Feedwater Control as follows: ~~ ~~

I 0 PLACE SG A/B GAD KTIO(~TC) station in HAND NOTE: Either SG A or B FW DEMAND station may be placed in HAND first.

I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario # 3 Event# 3&4 Event

Description:

ARO 0 PLACE SG A FW DEMAND station in HAND.

0 PLACE SG B FW DEMAND station in HAND.

NOTE: Raising SG A FW DEMAND or lowering SG B FW DEMAND will make ATc more negative (ATc = TCA - TCB).

ADJUST SG A and/or B FW DEMAND to maintain Tavg, ARO ATc, and OTSG level within limits.

GO TO EVENT 5

000006; Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

An RCS Leak Occurs Requiring a Reactor Trip; Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1B Does Not Start on ESAS Actuation; RC-P-1A Does Not Trip When Control Switch is Rotated to the Stop Position (CT-1); Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V30A and EF-V-30D Do Not Control in Automatic Due to a Level Setpoint Failure (CT-10)

I Booth Operator Instructions: INITIATE Event 5 when directed.

1 Indications Available:

I I CRS I DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-001 Reactor Trip. I I URO I IMMEDIATEACTIONS I URO Press BOTH Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons.

URO VERIFY REACTOR SHUTDOWN.

I URO I PRESS Turbine Trip PB.

1 URO I VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.

0 PLACE EHC-P-1A and EHC-P-1B in Pull-To-Lock.

0 OPEN EHC-V-FV1 (TB 305, EHC bypass valve at EHC pump skid).

EXAMINERS NOTE: ARO should diagnose loss of SCM during symptom check.

I CRS I VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFICATION (VSSV) I IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom CRS using the following priority:

SCM C 25°F GO TO EOP-002 I CRS I DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-002 Loss of 25°F Subcooled Margin.

QOOOOG Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario ## 3 Event ## 5 , 6, 7, 8 8 Page - -

20 of 25 Event

Description:

An RCS Leak Occurs Requiring a Reactor Trip; Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1B Does Not Start on ESAS Actuation; RC-P-1A Does Not Trip When Control Switch is Rotated to the Stop Position (CT-1); Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A and EF-V-30D Do Not Control in Automatic Due to a Level Setpoint Failure (CT-10)

CRS IMMEDIATE ACTIONS 1 URO 1 PERFORM Rule 1, SCM.

URO INITIATES Rule 1 Loss of Subcooling Margin (SCM).

URO VERIFY it has been more than two minutes since RCP start.

GO TO Step 3.

I EXAMINERS NOTE: Tripping all RCPs within one minute is a CRITICAL TASK I I URO I ENSURE ALL RCPs are shutdown.

If all RCPs were not tripped within one minute, then MAINTAIN RCP(s) still operating until one of the following conditions is satisfied:

SCM>25F 0 LPI flow > 1250 gpm in each line 0 Tclad > 1800°F EXAMINERS NOTE: RC-P-1A breaker fails to trip and the 1A 7K bus supply breakers will have to be opened within 1 minutes of loss of SCM or RC-P-1A will have to be left running.

URO INITIATE OP-TM-642-901 1600 # ESAS ACTUATION I

I I

ARo I I

INITATE EFW IAW Guide 15 and FEED available OTSGs to 75 to 85% Operating Range Level.

~ ~~~

000006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 u OP Test No.: -

1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 , 6, 7,& 8 An RCS Leak Occurs Requiring a Reactor Trip; Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1B Does Not Start on ESAS Actuation; RC-P-1A Does Not Trip When Control Switch is Rotated to the Stop Position (CT-1); Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A and EF-V-30D Do Not Control in Automatic Due to a Level Setpoint Failure (CT-10)

EXAMINERS NOTE: EF-VSO A & D will fail to respond in auto and have to be operated manually to raise OTSG level. This is a CRITICAL TASK.

I ARO I INTllTES Guide 15 EFW Actuation Response.

I IAAT EFW is actuation is required, then:

I ENSURE EF-P-1, EF-P-2A, and EF-P-2B start.

0 1 DISPATCH an Auxiliary Operator (AO) to EF-V-30 area.

0 I ARo I ENSURE EF-V-30ND and EF-V-30WC control OTSG level at setpoint (Rule 4).

If Shift Management concurrence is obtained, then EFW flow ARO may be controlled using one or both EF-V-30 valves for each OTSG.

ARO INITIATES Rule 4 Feedwater Control.

I ARO I VERIFY SCM > 25°F.

1 MAINTAIN OTSG level 75 - 85% OPERATING Range Level.

I ARo I IAAT OTSG Level c minimum, then MAINTAIN the following MINIMUM required flow:

I 1 ARO 1 VERIFY SCM > 25°F.

If both OTSGs are available and OTSG tube leak < 1 gpm, then FEED with EFW > 215 gpm / OTSG.

Appendix D Operator Action ' Form ES-D-2 1 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5, 6, 7, 8, 8 Page -

22 of 25 1 An RCS Leak Occurs Requiring a Reactor Trip; Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-16 Does Not Start on ESAS Actuation; RC-P-1A Does Not Trip When Control Switch is Rotated to the Stop Position (CT-1); Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A and EF-V30D Do Not Control in Automatic Due to a Level Setpoint Failure (CT-IO)

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS

~ ~~ ~

ENSURE announcement of reactor trip and EFW actuation CRS over the plant page and radio.

CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

1 CRS I REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

1 CRS I IAAT LPI flow > 1250 GPM in each line, then GO TO EOP-006.

VERIFY PORV is closed (Tailpipe DP indicator, Alarm G-1-7, URo A0517).

IF PORV was not opened for core cooling, then CLOSE the PORV Block (RC-V-2).

URO INITATE Attachment 1 to isolate possible sources of leakage.

URO VERIFY all RC Pumps are shutdown.

I I 1 GO TO step 4.2 (perform rapid RCS cooldown).

CRS VERIFY ONE of the following exists:

I TWO (2) HPI trains in ES operation 0

I GO TO Section 4.0.

~ ~~

I IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then GO TO EOP-008.

~ ~ ~ ~~~

I CRS I CRS I VERIFY cooldown rate > 4O"F/hr, or primary to secondary heat transfer exists.

0QOOOd Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event ## 5, 6, 7, 8, 8 Page 23 of 25 Event

Description:

An RCS Leak Occurs Requiring a Reactor Trip; Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1B Does Not Start on ESAS Actuation; RC-P-1A Does Not Trip When Control Switch is Rotated to the Stop Position (CT-1); Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V30A and EF-V30D Do Not Control in Automatic Due to a Level Setpoint Failure (CT-10)

I CRS I VERIFY OTSG tube leakage c 1 gpm.

I CRS I VERIFY pressurizer level is being maintained without HPI.

I GO TO EOP-006.

I CRS 1 DRIECTS initiation of OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS I URO 1 ENSURE HPI and LPI are operated IAW Rule 2.

I CRS I IAAT an ES Actuation setpoint is reached, then ENSURE all ESAS components have actuated.

INITIATE contingency action IAW Section 4.2 of the applicable procedure(s).

OP-TM-534-901 RB Emergency Cooling EXAMINERS NOTE: RR-P-1B fails to start on ESAS actuation and must be manually started.

I CRS I ENSURE CF-V-1A and CF-V-1B are OPEN. (PCR)

IAAT RM-A-1 high alarm or 4 psig ESAS have actuated, then CRS INITIATE OP-TM-826-901, Control Building Ventilation System Radiological Event Operations.

I CRS I IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then GO TO EOP-008. I

~OOCPO~

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario# 3 Event# 5,6,7, & 8 Page 24 of 25 Event

Description:

An RCS Leak Occurs Requiring a Reactor Trip; Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1B Does Not Start on ESAS Actuation; RC-P-1A Does Not Trip When Control Switch is Rotated to the Stop Position (CT-1); Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A and EF-V-30D Do Not Control in Automatic Due to a Level Setpoint Failure (CT-IO) 1 CRS INITIATE Guide 20, PRIOR to Transfer to RB Sump.

~ ~ ~~ ~~

ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

REQUEST SM evaluates Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

~ ~~ ~

I URO INlTlATES OP-TM-534-901 RB Emergency Cooling Operations.

Prerequisites yI0 VERIFY reactor building emergency river water system was in ES standby IAW 1104-38, Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Water System.

VERIFY 1600 psig ES actuation, RB pressure is approaching 2 URO psig or Emergency Director or Shift Manager has authorized use of RBEC.

URO VERIFY 1D or IE 4160V Bus is energized.

I URO Initiation of RB Emergency Cooling

~ ~ _ _ _ ~ ~~

DISPATCH an operator to CLOSE NS-V-85 (IB 295: S of RR valve room).

NOTE: The sequence of actuation and verification of ES is not train dependent. Either train may be performed first or trains may be performed in parallel.

00000~

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I OP Test No.: -

Event

Description:

1 Scenario # 3 Event # 5 , 6, 7,& 8 An RCS Leak Occurs Requiring a Reactor Trip; Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1B Does Not Start on ESAS Actuation; RC-P-1A Does Not Trip When Control Switch is Rotated to the Stop Position (CT-1); Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V30A and EF-V-30D Do Not Control in Automatic Due to a Level Setpoint Failure (CT-10)

I URo I If any of the following components are not in the required condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.

I URO 1 Contingency Actions 1 URo I IF RR-P-1A or RR-P-1B is not operating, then perform the following:

I URo I IF RR-P-1B is not operating and 1E 4160V bus is energized, then perform the following:

I URO I STARTRR-P-1B IF RR-V-1OB and RR-V-1B are CLOSED, then OPEN URO RR-V-I6.

ARO VERIFY G1-02 and G11-02 are CLOSED.

SCENARIO CAN BE TERMINATED AFTER ALL TASKS HAVE BEEN PERFORMED.

Appendix D Scenario OutIine Form ES-D-1 Facility: Three Mile Island Scenario No.: 4 OpTestNo.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions: 100% power, MOC.

0 NS-P-1A 00s for Maintenance l 0 NS-P-1B running on the 1P 480V bus Turnover: Maintain 100% power operations.

Critical Tasks: 0 Control RCS Inventory (CT-30) 0 Establish and Maintain Reactor Shutdown Requirements(CT-23) 0 Isolate Overcooling SGs (CT-17)

I Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type" Description 1 ED03D C CRS kux Transformer B Fault Pressure (TS)

C URO C ARO 2 ES07A C CRS InadvertentESAS Actuation Train A C URO 3 MU23A C CRS Makeup Pump MU-P-1A Fails to Start on ESAS Actuation (TS)

C URO 4 FW35 N CRS Main CondenserVacuum Leak R URO N ARO 5 MS04A M CRS Main Steam Safety Valve fails to reseat. (MS-V-17A) and a steam MS03A leak in the IntermediateBuilding lCRl3 M URO SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at zero psig FWI1A M ARO Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30) 6 RD02010 C CRS Two Control rods fail to fully insert (CT-23)

RD02056 C URO

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Three Mile Island Audit Scenario #4 The crew will take the watch with reactor power at 100% and ICs in Full Automatic. NS-P-1A is 00s for maintenance and will be out for two days. NS-P-1B is running on the 1P 480 Volt ES Bus and is selected for ES.

After the crew has accepted the watch and on cue from the Lead Examiner the Auxiliary Transformer B trip can be initiated. The I C 4160V bus will fast transfer to the A Auxiliary Transformer and the A Diesel Generator will start and load the 1D 4160 V ES bus. The crew should respond in accordance with the electrical MAP alarm responses (6-1-1, B-1-5, AA-1-8),

OP-TM-AOP-013, Loss of 1D 4160V Bus, and EP 1203-20 Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water Failure to restart NS-P-1B on the A Diesel. The CRS should review TS 3.7.2.b and declare a 30 day timeclock due only one Auxiliary Transformer being operable and the diesel generator is already loaded on the bus.

After the plant has been stabilized and the Tech Spec call is made the Lead Evaluator can cue the initiation of the Inadvertent ESAS Actuation. The crew should diagnose the ESAS Train A actuation as inadvertent and use terminate HPI flow in accordance with OP 1105-3, Safeguards Actuation System. The Crew should also diagnose the failure of Makeup Pump MU-P-1A to start and the CRS should review TS 3.3.1. I .b and TS 3.3.2 and declare a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months timeclock.

MU-P-1A will not be returned to service during this scenario. (Note: the CRS may also review the RCS Leakage Tech Spec 3.1.6.8 due to Reactor Building Radiation Monitor RM-A-2 being out of service)

The crew will have to insert control rods to compensate for the boron addition and stabilize reactor power. The crew will also have to re-establish normal letdown and makeup.

After the plant has been stabilized with rods inserted to compensate for the negative reactivity due to the boron injection and letdown and makeup have been restored the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the Main Condenser Vacuum Leak. The crew should diagnose the vacuum leak and insert rods to maintain power less than 100% as plant efficiency is lost. The CRS should initiate MAP Alarm Responses OP-TM-MAP-MO206, Aux Cond Hotwell Level Hi and OP-TM-MAP-NOIO6, Mn Cond VACUUM LO. The crew may elect to manually trip the reactor and turbine as vacuum degrades to the turbine trip setpoint. The CRS should initiate OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip. If the reactor is not tripped before, the turbine will trip if reactor power is reduced below 95%.

When the reactor trips a Main Steam Safety Valve will stick open on the A OTSG and a large steam leak will occur in the Intermediate Building from the A OTSG. The crew should subsequently diagnose the leak as being from the A OTSG and isolate the OTSG in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 3, Excessive Heat Transfer. In addition, the crew should diagnose the failure of the A OTSG Isolation to occur at 600 psig and FW-V-16A failed 100% open causing an overfeed. The CRS will transition to OP-TM-EOP-003, Excessive Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer. The ARO will have to close FW-V-92A to isolate Feedwater flow to the A OTSG due to FW-V-16A being failed open (CT-17). This is a critical task in that continued feeding of an OTSG with a steam break will continue to overcool the RCS, which could result in emptying the Pressurizer and causing a loss of subcooling margin. This would significantly change the mitigation strategy of the event.

When the OTSG is isolated and empty the URO will have to terminate HPI using Rule 2, HPVLPI THROTTLING CRITERIA and OP-TM-211-901, Attachment 7.3, THROTTLING HPI 000006 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #4 Continued (CT-30). This is a critical task in that failure to throttle/terminate HPI flow will result in a rapid rise in Pressurizer level and pressure eventually challenging the PORV setpoint.

The crew should diagnose the failure of two control rods to fully insert and will have to Emergency Borate in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 5, Emergency Boration. The URO will have to initiate letdown if >50gpm of injection is not achieved CT-23). This is a critical task in that adequate shutdown margin may not exist due to the two stuck rods and the RCS cooldown caused by the steam leak.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.

oooooe; Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 4 Event Description Procedure Support ~

Initial Set-up. 100% Power MOC, NS-P-1A OOS, NS-P-1B Running on the 1P 480V Bus and selected for ES 1 Auxiliary Transformer B 'VIAP Alarm 6-1-5, 480 Volt ES Motor Trip Fault Pressure Trip OP-TM-AOP-013, LOSSOf 1D 4160V BUS TS 3.7.2.b Inadvertent ESAS Actuation OP 1105-3, Safeguards Actuation System Train A OP-TM-211-950, Restoration of Letdown Flow Makeup Pump MU-P-IA Fails TS 3.3.1. I .b and TS 3.3.2, ECCS Equipment to Start on ESAS Actuation (TS)

OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip 4 Main Condenser Vacuum OP-TM-MAP-M0206, Aux Cond Hotwell Level Hi Leak OP-TM-MAP-NO106, Mn Cond VACUUM LO Main Steam Safety Valve OP-TM-EOP-003, Excessive Primary to Secondary fails to reseat. (MS-V-17A) Heat Transfer 5

and Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 3, Excessive Heat Transfer SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at zero psig Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100%

Open (CT-17 and CT-30) 6 Two Control rods fail to fully OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 5, Emergency Boration insert 000006 Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 4 Initialization IC-I6 100% HFP, ICs Full AUTO Console Center NS-P-1B Running Scenario Support NS-P-1B NAS NS-P-I 6-1P Bkr CLOSED Remote Function Value: 1P Scenario Support CCRl9 When: Immediately Console Right NS-P-1B-I S PTL Scenario Support NS-P-16 PTL NS-P-1B-I S Bkr OPEN Remote Function Value: NS-PI B Scenario Support CCR21 When: Immediately Console Center NS-P-1A Tagged 00s Scenario Support NS-P-1A PTL NS-P-1A Bkr OPEN Remote Function Value: OUT Scenario Support CCRl8 When: Immediately Main Console Robust Barriers applied IAW Risk Main Console Document Malfunction ED03D Value: Insert Auxiliary Transformer B Fault When: Event 1 Pressure Trip I/O Override 02A4S66- Value: Insert ON Inadvertent ESAS Actuation ZDlPBl RCA When: Event 2 (1600 psig) Train A Malfunction MU23A Value: Insert MU-P-1A ES Start Failure When: Immediately Malfunction FW35 Value: Severity 15% Vacuum Leak RAMP 300 Sec When: Event 4 Malfunction TCOI Value: Insert Turbine Trip When: Event 5 ratpw<95%

Malfunction MS04A Value: Insert Sev. 100% Main Steam Safety Valve When: Event 6 ratpw<5% Leaks/Fails to Reseat (MS-V-17A)

Malfunction MS03A Value: Insert Sev. 100% Main Steam Leak Outside the When: Event 6 ratpw<5% RB Malfunction RD0223 Value: Insert Stuck Rod When: Immediately Malfunction RD0239 Value: Insert Stuck Rod When: Immediately Malfunction FWI 1A Value: Insert Startup Feedwater Valve Fails When: Immediately as is (FW-V-16A)

Remote Function Value: Insert Sev. 0% SG A Lo Press Isolation lCRl3 When: Immediately setpoint 000006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I Op Test No.:

Event

Description:

1 Scenario # 4 Event# 1 Aux Transformer B Fault Pressure (TS)

Page Of I Booth Operator Instructions:

~ ~

INITIATE Event 1 when directed.

I Indications Available:

CRS DIRECTS entry into AA-1-8 Aux XFMR 1B Trip.

CRS AUTOMATIC ACTION:

Substation Bus 4 breakers trip (GBI-02, 1091-12, 1051-02, 1B-12). Tripped breakers cannot be closed until the lockout relays are reset on Panel PR and/or Panel RBB.

Fast transfer occurs for BOP busses powered from 1B Aux. Transformer if enabled (normally 1B 7kV and 1C 4kV).

4kV ES Bus powered from 1B Aux. Transformer (normally 1D 4kV) will trip and its associated emergency diesel will start.

CRS OBSERVATON (CONTROL ROOM)

AA-2-8 if due to fault pressure.

0 NN-2 230kV Bus 4 trip.

Voltmeter for Bus 4 on Panel SSI.

I Amber disagreement light on for each breaker that tripped.

Blue indicating light on the lockout relays that operated E

(RBA panel).

Target on relays that operated (RBA panel).

0 Possible Computer Alarms:

S2055 Fault Pressure Relay Trip (Transformer or Load Tap Changer)

L2059 230kV Bus 4 Trip E 0 L2071 Aux. Transformer 1B Trip

OOOOOG Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# 4 Event# 1 Event

Description:

Aux Transformer B Fault Pressure (TS)

CRS MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED:

INITIATE OP-TM-AOP-013, LOSSof I D 4160V BUS.

0 ENSURE the following breakers are tipped:

1SB-A2 ISB-C2 1SB-E2 ISB-02 1091-12 1051-02 1SB-B2 1SB-D2 ISB-72 GBI-02 18-12 0 NOTIFY the PJM Grid operator, via the FIRST ENERGY TSO,to change the TMI-1 Post Contingency voltage alarm setpoint. (The new alarm setpoint should be 218.9 KV.)

URO INITIATES B-1-5 480V ES Motor Trip.

DIAGNOSES trip of NS-P-1B and failure of NS-P-1B to URo START.

SET POINTS:

Breaker for NS-P-1B tripped AUTOMATIC ACTION Starts standby pump where applicable.

I I I URO I OBSERVATION (CONTROL ROOM):

0 Tripped pump disagreement light (amberlgreen).

Computer printout and CRT.

1 EXAMINERS NOTE: URO will have to re-start NS-P-1B due to no standby pump being available.

1 URO 1 MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED: I 0 Verify auto start on standby pumps where applicable.

000006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# 4 Event# 1 Event

Description:

Aux Transformer B Fault Pressure (TS) 0 Manually start standby if auto start has not occurred. (Will have to start NS-P-1B.)

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-AOP-013 Loss of 1D 4160V Bus.

CRS I ENTRY CONDITIONS I All of the following conditions exist:

0 1D 4160V bus is de-energized or recovered by EG-Y-IA, 0 At least one auxiliary transformer is energized, 0 The OTSGs are being used for RCS heat removal.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS ANNOUNCE entry into OP-TM-AOP-013, "Loss of 1D 4160V CRS Bus" over the "RED" plant page and radio.

1 ARO/URO 1 INITIATE OP-TM-861-901, "Diesel Generator EG-Y-1A Ernergency 0perations".

URO I VERIFY seal injection flow > 22 gpm.

CRS 1 IAAT 1D 4160 V bus is energized, then GO TO Section 4.0 "Return to Normal".

CRS I RETURN TO NORMAL I CRS I If EG-Y-1A is powering the 1D 4160V bus, then PERFORM the following:

0 LOG entry into TS 3.7.2.b. action statement. Reactor operation in this condition is limited to 30 days.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario# 4 Event# 1 Event

Description:

Aux Transformer 6 Fault Pressure (TS)

The reactor shall not remain critical unless all of the following CRS requirements are satisfied:

Both 23014.16 kV unit auxiliary transformers shall be in operation except that within a period not to exceed eight hours in duration from and after the time one Unit 1 auxiliary transformer is made or found inoperable, two diesel generators shall be operable, and one of the operable diesel generator will be started and run continuously until both unit auxiliary transformers are in operation. This mode of operation may continue for a period not exceeding 30 days.

I GO TO EVENT 2

OQ0006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# 4 Event# 2&3 Event

Description:

Inadvertent ESAS Actuation Train A; Makeup Pump MU-P-1A Fails to Start on ESAS Actuation (TS)

Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

CREW DIAGNOSES an Inadvertent ESAS Actuation of the A Train.

CRS DIRECTS entry into 1105-3 Safeguards Actuation System.

CRS Actions for Inadvertent Actuations - Level 2 I CRS I Prerequisites:

0 One or Both Trains of ES INADVERTENTLY Actuate on one or more signals.

CRS Procedure CAUTION: HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION CAN CAUSE AN OVER PRESSURE CONDITION.

VERIFY that no valid E.S. signal is present by observing the URO following:

0 Reactor coolant pressure is normal for the plant condition.

R.B. pressure normal (< 2 psig).

With the Shift Managers/Control Room Supervisors permission, reset, bypass, or defeat the invalid signals. Refer UROIARO to Section 3.2.

Press all three A side Manual ES 1600 psig Defeat pushbuttons and leave in Defeat (Do Not Re-enable)

URO OPEN the Make Up pump recirc valves as follows:

MU-V-36

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 STOP makeup pumps started by the invalid signal(s). Leave URo the previously running pump in-service.

URO CLOSE the HPI Valves as follows:

0 MU-V-16A and MU-V-16B URO VERIFY MU-V-12 open, then CLOSE the following valves:

MU-V-14A I NOTE:

~

Boron injection into the RCS may require a power reduction to regain Tave control.

CAUTION: THE 27/86 UNDERVOLTAGE LOCKOUT RELAYS FOR BUSSES P, R, S, AND T ON PANEL PCR SHOULD NOT BE RESET UNTIL ALL AMBER DISAGREEMENT LIGHTS HAVE BEEN CLEARED AND IT IS DETERMINED THAT THE DIESELS CAN ACCEPT THE ADDED LOAD.

Reset 27/86 lockout if actuated IAW Section 3.2 to allow URo restoration of Locked Out components.

URO GO TO Section 4.1 to restore the remaining E.S. components.

I 1 CRS I INFREQUENTIABNORMALOPERATIONS ~~~~

CRS Restoration of ES Components - Level 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 n

Op Test No.: 1 Scenario# 4 Event# 2&3 Page -

12 of 26 I II I Event

Description:

Inadvertent ESAS Actuation Train A; Makeup Pump MU-P-1A Fails to Start on ESAS Actuation (TS)

I I I CRS 1 Prerequisites: I I ES signals have been cleared bypassed or defeated.

0 NOTE: Attachment 1 should be periodically reviewed until all components have been returned to ES Standby or to their long term configuration.

CRS 1 Procedure I CRS I Review Attachment 1 to determine which components need to be restored depending on plant conditions.

CRS 1 Verify or restore BWST level to normal level within one hour, to comply with T.S. 3.3.1.1.a.

I 1 URO 1 Restore RCS letdown as follows:

I 0 Verify/Close MU-V-3.

Verify/Close MU-V-5.

0 Open MU-V-2NB.

I I 0 Restore letdown flow in accordance with OP-TM-211-950, Makeup and Purification System.

URO 1 Restore RCS Makeup as follows:

1 0 Verify/Close MU-V-217.

I 0 Verify MU-V-17 in manual and closed.

I 0 Open MU-V-18.

I I I

I 0 Open MU-V-17 as necessary to establish makeup flow.

0 Place MU-V-17 in auto to control level at desired setpoint.

I ARo I Restore RB normal cooling and secure RB Emergency Cooling as follows:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario# 4 Event# 2&3 Event

Description:

1 Open RB-V-7.

b Open RB-V-2A.

B Verify AH-E-IA/B/C are running at desired speed.

b Secure RB Emergency Cooling per OP-TM-534-901, RB Emergency Cooling Water System.

URO Secure DH, DC and DR systems as follows:

B Secure DH-P-INB.

CRS Injection Systems The borated water storage tank (BWST) shall contain a minimum of 350,000 gallons of water having a minimum concentration of 2,5000 ppm boron at a temperature not less CRS than 40°F. If the boron concentration of water temperature is not within limits, restore the W S T to OPERABLE within 8 hrs.

If the BWST volume is not within limits, restore the BWST to OPERABLE within one hour. Specification 3.0.1 applies.

Two Makeup and Purification (MU)/High Pressure Injection (HPI) pumps are OPERABLE in the engineered safeguards CRS mode powered from independent essential buses.

Specification 3.0.1 applies.

Maintenance or testing shall be allowed during reactor operation on any components(s), in the makeup and purification, decay heat, RBH emergency cooling water, RB spray, BWST level instrumentation, or cooling water systems which will not remove more than one train of each system from CRS service. Components shall not be removed from service so that the affected system train in operable for more than 72 consecutive hours. If the system is not restored to meet the requirements of Specification 3.3.1 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , the reactor shall be placed in a HOT SHUTDOWN condition within six hours.*

URO INITIATES OP-TM-211-950 Restoration of Letdown Flow.

OOQOOG Scenario# -4 Event# 2&3 Event

Description:

Inadvertent ESAS Actuation Train A; Makeup Pump MU-P-1A Fails to Start on ESAS Actuation (TS)

Limitations

~~ _ _ _ _ _ ~

The rate of change of letdown flow should be limited to 2.5 GPM/Min to minimize the thermal stress on the letdown cooler I I URO Prerequisites VERIFY one ICCW pump is operating and a heat sink to the river is operable.

VERIFY RB area monitors (RM-G-22 / 23) do not indicate excessive RCS activity.

VERIFY the integrity of the letdown line to the MU tank has been assessed.

VERIFY RM-A-6, RM-A-8 or portable radiation monitors are in service to detect any release that may result from opening the containment isolation valves The ED (or SM if Eplan has not been activated) has given permission to re-open containment isolation valves.

ENSURE the cause of the isolation has been corrected or the actuation signal has been BYPASSED in accordance with other procedures.

ENSURE MU-V-3 is CLOSED.

I URO CLOSE MU-V-4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario# - 4 Event# 2&3 Event

Description:

Inadvertent ESAS Actuation Train A; Makeup Pump MU-P-1A Fails to Start on ESAS Actuation (TS)

URO OPEN MU-V-5 to 10% demand.

URO ENSURE OPEN the following:

MU-V-1A MU-V-1B I URO ENSURE OPEN the following:

MU-V-2A MU-V-2B OPEN MU-V-3 (PUSH AND HOLD MU-V-3 open pushbutton URO until high letdown temperature alarm clears if MU-V-3 closed on high temperature).

NOTE: 0 Monitor letdown temperature and ICCW temperature.

Adjust NR-V-15NB to maintain ICCW temperature between 90 and 100°F.

e Maintain letdown temperature e 125°F.

I THROTTLE OPEN MU-V-5 to RAISE letdown flow at 2.5 gpm/min to the desired flow or at a faster rate if required by SM/ED.

I URO When letdown flow > 50 GPM, then OPEN MU-V-4 and THROTTLE MU-V-5 to maintain a stable letdown flow.

When pressurizer level is restored to the desired range, then CLOSE MU-V-5.

I GO TO EVENT 4.

000006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario# 4 Event# 4, 5, & 6 Page 16 of .26 Event

Description:

Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)

Booth Operator Instructions: Insert Event 4 when directed.

Indications Available:

I_ I 3IRECTS entry into OP-TM-MAP-M0206 Aux Cond Hotwell

-eve1 HI.

CAUSES Degraded Main Condenser Vacuum CRS MANUAL ACTIONS REQUIRED OBSERVE the following:

0 L2275, 1AAux. Condenser 0 L2276, 1B Aux. condenser DETERMINE which condenser has the high level condition by observing the sight glass on the auxiliary condenser hotwell (Turbine building elevation 305' on the north end of the condensers).

VERIFY conductivity points CE35 and CE36 on recorder SS-CR-J500C, are not rising (Turbine plant sampling room).

0 VERIFY proper operation of automatic dump valves CO-V-15A and CO-V-I5B, take local manual control as required to establish normal level.

VERIFY main condenser vacuum is not degraded.

START additional Main Vacuum Pumps if necessary.

DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-MAP-NO106 MN Cond Vacuum LO.

1 CRS SETPOINTS

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Scenario# 4 Event# 4, 5, & 6 Event

Description:

Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press 0 Turbine speed > 150 RPM and Turbine exhaust pressure on any Hood is above value on table. Alarm & Trip setpoints vary with turbine load (6th stage pressure).

(EX-PT-1749/1750/1751-A/B/C)

CRS 61 to 79 psi9 (37 to 48%) Varies linearly from 6.O"HgA 79 to 141 psig (48 to 85%) oHgA to oHgA Varies linearly from 141 to 168 psig (85 to 102%) 6.O"HgA 6.O"HgA to 7.O"HgA This Alarm Setpoint, which is variable, depending on 6th Stage CRS Turbine Pressure, is shown on DTCS OWS Screen #13.

CRS CAUSES 0 Abnormal Condenser air in-leakage CRS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS If rising backpressure reaches trip setpoint, 2 out of 3 switches, CRS on any hood then: (DTCS Screen #13).

0 Main Turbine trips.

Reactor trips if Turbine trips and > 45% power.

CRS MANUAL ACTIONS REQUIRED I I

NOTE: Use Absolute Pressure Indicator CO-PI-73 on CL or Computer Point A0033.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 .Scenario# 4 Event# 4,5,&6 Page 18 of 26 I Event

Description:

Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG;Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)

IAAT Condenser Backpressure greater than Alarm Setpoint, then:

B If Generator MWe less than 272% then TRIP the Turbine.

REDUCE load IAW 1102-4.

~~

CRS If high Condenser Offgas Flow (A0436) indicated:

0 FILL Condenser Exhaust Boot expansion seals IAW OP-TM-421-462.

0 VERIFY Condenser Air Removal lineup IAW OP-TM-331-000.

0 CHECK Main Condenser for air in-leakage due to improper valve position, leaking flanges or other off normal conditions.

REFER to OP-TM-PPC-A0436.

1 EXAMINERS NOTE: Control rods will have to be inserted to reduce power as condenser vacuum degrades.

1 EXAMINERS NOTE: Condenser vacuum (turbine back pressure will degrade to the turbine trip setpoint or at C 95% power the turbine will trip).

I CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-001 Reactor Trip.

I URO IMMEDIATE ACT IONS URO PRESS both Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons.

URO VERIFY REACTOR SHUTDOWN.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario# 4 Event# 4,5, & 6 Page -19 of 26 /I Event

Description:

Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)

URO PRESS Turbine Trip PB.

URO VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.

EXAMINERS NOTE: ARO should diagnose excessive primary to secondary heat transfer in the A OTSG and INITIATE Rule 3.

CRS VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFICATION (VSSV)

I CRS 1- ~~ ~~~ ~~ ~

IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom using the following priority:

~~

I I 0 XHT GO TO EOP-003.

DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-003 Excessive Primary to CRS Secondary heat Transfer.

1 CRS I IMMEDIATEACTIONS I ARO I PERFORM Rule 3, XHT I URO I INITIATE Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control.

ARO Rule 3 Excessive Heat Transfer.

~ ~

ARO VERIFY OTSG level 97.5%.

TRIP both Main FW Pumps (if necessary).

I ARO 1 PERFORM Phase 1 Isolation of the affected OTSGs).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario# 4 Event# 4,5, &6 Event

Description:

Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)

EXAMINERS NOTE: Isolating the A OTSG is a CRITICAL TASK.

I ARO ICLOSES:

1 MS-V-1A MS-V-16 FW-V-16A FW-V-17A I FW-V-5A 1 FW-V-92A MS-V-3D MS-V3E 1 MS-V-3F I MS-V4A EXAMINERS NOTE: ARO should diagnose FW-V-92A and FW-V-16A failure to close. Closing FW-V-92A isolates FW flow to the A OTSG.

1 ARO I VERIFY steam leak is not in RB or Intermediate Building.

ARO VERIFY OTSG level and pressure stabilizes.

I I

ARo I I

INITIATE Guide 12, RCS stabilization following OTSG Isolation.

I URO I Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control.

I I MU Tank Level Control:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 1 Scenario# 4 Event# 4, 5 , & 6 Event

Description:

Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)

URO IF Pressurizer Level is LOW:

VERIFY MU pump is operating.

0 VERIFY MU-V-5 is CLOSED>

VERIFY MU24-FI > 20 GPM.

ENSURE MU-V-17 is OPEN.

I VERIFY PZR level is being restored.

I 0 VERIFY MU24-FI > 20 GPM.

I 0 VERIFY PZR level is being restored.

1

~ ~~ ~

INITATE HPI IAW OP-TM-211-901, "Emergency Injection HPI/LPI".

EXAMINER'S NOTE: ESAS 1600 psig actuation should already be actuated.

The URO will have to manually start MU-P-1A.

I URO I IF Pressurizer Level is HIGH:

I VERIFY HPI is throttled IAW Rule 2.

EXAMINER'S NOTE: Throttling HPI when the A OTSG is dry is a CRITICAL TASK.

URO Rule 2 HPI/LPI Throttling URO VERIFY MU Pump flows &I 5 gpm/pump.

URO VERIFY SCM 250°F.

URO VERIFY at least one RCP is operating.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23) aHEN incore temperature is lowering and RCS 25°F URO superheat and either of the following conditions exists:

B SCMB25F Then HPI may be THROTTLED IAW OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection HPVLPI.

URO Attachment 7.3 Throttling HPI VERIFY ESAS in defeat IAW OP-TM-642-901, 1600 psig URO ESAS Actuation.

IAAT three MU pumps are running and CRS concurrence is obtained, then SHUTDOWN the ES selected pump lined up to URO MU & SI and PLACE CS in Normal-After-Stop. (e.9. normally MU-P- 1A)

~~

VERIFY throttling is permitted IAW RULE 2 and OBTAIN CRS URO concurrence.

WAAT HPI throttling is permitted IAW RULE 2 and prior to URO reducing any MU pump flow to less than 115 GPM, then perform the following:

0 If DH-V-7A and DH-V-7B are Closed, then OPEN MU-V-36 and MU-V-37.

WAAT Emergency Boration is not required (Rule 5), then URO INITIATE Guide 9 to close MU-V-14A and MU-V-14B.

P IF CRS directs termination of HPI, then SHUTDOWN the MU pumps which started on ES and PLACE CS in Normal-after-stop.

CLOSE both MU-V-16 valves lined up to MU/SI pump.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event

Description:

Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)

I CLOSE both MU-V-16 valves opposite MU/S.

1 GO TO Step IO.

I URo I WHEN OP-TM-244-901 criteria is satisfied, then OPEN MU-V-18.

I URo I THROTTLE MU-V-16 parallel to MU and SI (i.e. normally MU-V-I66).

CRS EOP-003 FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and ARo radio.

CRS ENSURE RCS temperature reduction has been terminated.

VERIFY primary to secondary heat transfer is being CRS established.

I I CRS 1 VERIFY RCS Tcold > 525°F INITIATE Emergency boration - Rule 5, EB (if necessary).

CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

CRS REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

I 1 CRS 1 VERIFY OTSG B is providing sufficient steam for Gland Steam. I 1 CRS 1 VERIFY OTSG tube leakhupture symptoms do not exist. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 1 Scenario# 4 Event# 4,5,&6 Page -

24 of 26 I Event

Description:

Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)

CRS VERIFY RCS Tcold > 400°F.

CRS VERIFY RB Pressure 2 psig.

I I CRS 1 INITIATE Attachment 1. I CRS GO TO EOP-001, VSSV.

I I CRS I VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFICATION (VSSV) I CRS 1 IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom using the following priority:

1 SCM < 25°F GO TO EOP-002 XHT GO TO EOP-003 LOHT GO TO EOP-004 0 OTSG tube leakage > 1 gpm GO TO EOP-005 ANNOUNCE Reactor Trip over plant page and radio (include CRS plant conditions sufficient for NLO response per OS-24).

URO VERIFY control rod groups 1 through 7 are fully inserted.

~ ~ ~ ~~ ~

ARO VERIFY OTSG A and B Operating Range level 97.5%.

1 ARo 1 VERIFY Main FW Flow to A and B OTSG are each < 0.5 mlb/hr.

I I ARO I VERIFY OTSG level =.setpoint. I

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: - 1 Scenario# 4 Event# 4, 5,& 6 Page 25 of 26 Event

Description:

Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)

I URO I VERIFY ICS/NNI HAND or AUTO Power is available.

EXAMINERS NOTE: Establishing Emergency Boration is a CRITICAL TASK.

I URO I Rule 4 Emergency Boration I URO I WAAT one of the following conditions exist:

0 1% dk/k SHUTDOWN has been achieved for the expected plant condition IAW Figure I of 1103-4, Soluble Poison Concentration Control, or 1103-15A, SDM and Reactivity Balance I I LPI 1250 GPM per line 0 Tavg > 525°F and stable or rising and all rods are inserted and Neutron flux is lowering as expected then emergency boration may be terminated.

URO VERIFY a MU pump is operating.

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

URO PERFORM ONE of the following:

OPEN MU-V-14A I 0 OPEN MU-V-14B I 0 PERFORM Guide 1 Emergency Boration Backup Methods.

URO VERIFY Total Injection (MU, SI & HPI) > 50 GPM.

INITIATE OP-TM-211-950, Restoration of Letdown Flow (if necessary).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario# 4 Event## 4, 5, & 6 Page 26 of 26 Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23) 1 EXAMINER'S NOTE: When Emergency Boration is established the scenario can be terminated.

VERIFY 1D and 1E 4160V buses are energized from auxiliary RS transformers.

I URO I INITIATE Guide 9 "RCS Inventory Control".

I I ARO I INITIATE Guide 6 "OTSG Pressure Control".

URO INITIATE Guide 8, "RCS Pressure Control".

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ ~

WAAT Generator MW Izero, or Turbine speed < 1770 RPM, CRS then VERIFY GBI-12 and GBI-02 are OPEN.

WAAT GBI-12 and GBI-02 are OPEN, then ENSURE the CRS Generator Field Breaker is OPEN.

VERIFY primary and secondary Instrument Air pressure > 80 ARo psig.

I URo 1 INITIATE OP-TM-642-904 "Reactor Trip Isolation ESAS Actuation".

ML071450423

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