ML071450423
| ML071450423 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Crane  |
| Issue date: | 03/09/2007 |
| From: | Division of Reactor Safety I |
| To: | AmerGen Energy Co |
| Sykes, Marvin D. | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML060800145 | List: |
| References | |
| Download: ML071450423 (108) | |
Text
PA 1-RW04A MSOID CC04A Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRS CRS ICRS I ARO CCRS C URO Facility:
Three Mile Island Scenario No.:
1 OpTestNo.:
NRC Examiners:
Operators:
MS19A Initial Conditions:
100% power, MOC.
NCRS N ARO R URO 0
0 EF-P-2B is 00s for bearing replacement.
DR-P-1A is running for effluent flow FW-15A FW-15B TC07B Turnover:
Maintain 100% power operations.
MCRS MURO MAR0 Critical Tasks:
0 Initiate HPI Cooling (CT-14)
FW17 FW18A 0
Initiate HPI (CT-2)
C CRS C A R 0 Event No.
1 2
3 4
5 6
7 8
Malf.
Event MU086 CCRS I C URO Event Description Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A trips (TS)
NLO Reports an excessive oil leak from Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 (TS).
Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high slowly Intermediate Closed Cooling Water Pump IC-P-I A trips and IC-P-1 B fails to auto start Steam Leak in the Turbine Building Feedwater Pump 1A trip Feedwater Pump 1 B trip Turbine stop valve fails open Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 trips on start Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A does not start.
(CT-14)
High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B fails to open B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #I The crew will take the watch with reactor power at 100% and ICs in Full Automatic. Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump EF-P2B is 00s for a bearing replacement. Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A is running in preparation for a liquid release.
When the crew has accepted the watch the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the trip of Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A. The Crew should respond in accordance with MAP Alarm 8-14, 480V ES Motor Trip and B-2-5, 480V ES Motor Overload. The CRS should review Tech Spec 3.3.1.4.d and declare a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> timeclock based on Tech Spec 3.3.2. When the Tech Spec call has been made the scenario can continue.
After the TS call is made the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the NLO report of a large oil leak from EF-P-1 bearing with an empty bearing oil indicator. The CRS should review Tech Spec 3.4.1.I
.a.4 and Note 1 and declare that the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> timeclock on Emergency Feedwater is suspended until a second EFW Pump is operable. The CRS may initiate action to prevent EF-P-1 from starting by manually closing MS-V-13A and MS-V-I 38. EF-P-I will not be returned to operable status during this scenario. The scenario can continue when the Tech Spec timeclock is suspended.
After the Tech Spec call is made and on cue from the Lead Evaluator, the Turbine Header Pressure instrument failure can be initiated. The crew should diagnose the failing pressure and take hand control of the turbine and the SG/Rx Master Integrated Control System station. The CRS should implement OP-TM-301-471, Manual Control of the Main Turbine and OP-TM-621-471, ICs Manual Control. The backup pressure instrument may be selected in accordance with OP-TM-621-451, Selecting Alternate Instrument Inputs to ICs. The backup instrument does not have to be selected for the scenario to continue.
After the plant has been stabilized the Lead Examiner can cue the trip of Intermediate Closed Cooling Water Pump IC-P-1A. The crew should diagnose the loss of IC-P-?A and the failure of IC-P-1 B to auto start using MAP alarms AA-1-6,480V BOP Motor Trip, C-1-2, IC CRD Flow Lo and C-2-2, IC System Flow Lo. The CRS should implement 1202-17, Loss of Intermediate Closed Cooling Water and the URO should manually start IC-P-1 B. Letdown flow may be isolated by CRD high temperature closing MU-V-1A and MU-V-1 B. If this occurs the CRS should initiate OP-TM-211-950, Restoration of Letdown Flow. Letdown flow does not have to be re-established to continue.
After IC-P-1 B has been started the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of the steam leak in the Turbine Building. The crew should diagnose the steam leak in the Turbine Building and the CRS should implement 1203-24, Steam Leak. An NLO will provide a report of severity enough to begin a plant shutdown. The CRS should order a plant shutdown in accordance with 1102-4, Power Operations.
At the cue of the Lead Examiner or after the first Feedwater Pump (FW-P-1A or FW-P-1B) is secured initiate the trip of the remaining pump to trip the reactor. If the crew trips the reactor due to the steam leak the trip of both Feedwater Pumps will be initiated at e40 % power. One turbine stop valve will fail to close and the contingency steps of OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip will have to be taken for the turbine. The steam leak will be isolated when the turbine trips. The CRS will initiate OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #I Continued Following the loss of both Feedwater Pumps, EF-P-1 will trip (if not previously isolated by the CRS) and EF-P-2A fails to start. The crew should diagnose the lack of heat transfer and respond in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-004, Lack of Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer.
Without primary to secondary heat transfer PORVIHPI cooling is the only method to maintain adequate core cooling which makes this a critical task. PORV/HPI Cooling will be initiated in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-009, HPI Cooling (CT-14). The ARO will initiate OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 16, EFW Failure for the Emergency Feedwater Pump failures.
When HPI is manually initiated HPI Valve MU-V-16B will fail to open and the 6 Train HPI manual ESAS actuation does not actuate. This will result in inadequate HPI since there will not be one full train of HPI in operation. Without adequate HPI the mitigation strategy is changed for the event, which makes obtaining adequate HPI a critical task. The B Train components will have to be started at the component level in accordance with OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPVLPI) (CT-2).
The CRS will subsequently transition to OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown from EOP-009.
The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.
Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 1 Event Description Procedure Sup PO rt Initial Set-up.
ZF-P-2B 00s for bearing replacement 3R-P-1A Running in preparation for a liquid release 1
DR-P-1 A Trips TS 3.3.1.4.d and 3.3.2, ECCS Systems MAP Alarm 6-1-5,480V ES Motor Trip MAP Alarm 6-2-5, 480V ES ES Motor Overload 2
.a.4, Decay Heat Removal Capability EF-P-1 Bearing Oil Leak 3
Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high 3P-TM-MAP-H0302, Sass Mismatch OP-TM-MAP-H0203, Mn Turb Hdr Press Hi/Lo OP-TM-301-471, Manual Control of the Main Turbine OP-TM-621-471, ICs Manual Control OP-TM-621-451, Selecting Alternate Instrument Inputs to ICs 4
In termed iate Closed Cooling Water Pump IC-P-IA trips and IC-P-1B fails to auto start 1202-1 7, Loss of Intermediate Cooling System AA-1-6, 480V BOP Motor Trip OP-TM-MAP-CO102, IC CRD Flow LO OP-TM-MAP-C0202, IC System Flow Lo 1203-24 Steam Leak 1 102-4 Power Operations 5
Steam Leak in the Turbine Building 6
OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip Feedwater Pump 1A (or 1B) trip Turbine stop valve fails to close Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 trips on start Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P9A does not start.
7 OP-TM-EOP-01 0, Guide 16, EFW Failure OP-TM-EOP-004, Lack of Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer OP-TM-EOP-009, HPI Cooling OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPVLPI).
High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B fails to open B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure
000006 Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 1 Initialization IC-201 (TEMP)
Console Left Remote Function FWRl3 Main Console EF-P-2B PTL Console Center Malfunction RW04A DR-P-1A NAS Malfunction MSOI D I/O Override IC-P-1 B NAT Ma If unct ion CC04A Malfunction MSI 9B Malfunction FW15A Malfunction FW 15B Malfunction TC07B Malfunction FW17 Malfunction FW18A MU086 03A4S02-ZDIPBI RBB 03A4SOI-ZDIPBl RCB 100% HFP, ICs Full AUTO EF-P-2B Tagged 00s Value:
OUT When:
Immediately Robust Barriers applied IAW Risk Document DR-P-1 A Running EF-P-2B PTL/EF-P-2B BKR OPEN Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
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When:
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Value:
When:
Insert Event 1 Insert Sev. 100%
Event 3 RAMP 300 sec Insert OFF Immediately Insert Event 4 Insert Sev. 10%
Event 5 RAMP 300 sec Insert Event 6 ratpwc40 Insert Event 6 ratpwc40 Insert Immediately Insert Event 7 fwnefpl>O.l Insert Event 8 ratpw-40 Insert Event 9 muvmuvl6b~0.1 Insert OFF Immediately Insert OFF Immediately Scenario Support Scenario Support Scenario Support Scenario Support DR-P-1 A Trips Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high SPIOB-PT2 IC-P-1 B Fails to Auto Start IC-P-1A trip Steam Leak in the Turbine Building Feedwater Pump 1A trip Feedwater Pump 1 B trip Turbine Stop Valve B Fails Open Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 trip Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A trip High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B fails as is B ESAS 4 psig Manual Actuation Failure B ESAS 4 psig 1600 psig Actuation Failure
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS CRS URO Page Of Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
1 Event#
1 Event
Description:
Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1 A Trips (TS)
Computer printout and CRT.
Directs review of Alarm Response B-2-5.
ALARM 480 ES Motor Overload.
Motor disagreement lights, ambedred (except on air handlers).
Time 11 Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior CRS Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
initiate Event 1.
Computer printout and CRT.
I I
CRS 1 Directs Review of Alarm Response B-1-5.
1 ALARM I
1 URO 1 Diagnose trip of DR-P-1A.
I I
URO 1 Tripped pump disagreement light (amber/green).
Review TS 3.3.1.4.d below and 3.3.2 and declare a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> I
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
1 Event#
1 Event
Description:
Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A Trips (TS)
Go to Event 2.
NOTE:
T.S. 3.3.1.4.d Cooling Water Systems - Specification 3.0.1 applies.
Two decay heat river water pumps must be OPERABLE.
T.S. 3.3.2 Maintenance or testing shall be allowed during reactor operation on any components(s) in the makeup and purification, decay heat, RB emergency cooling water, RB spray, BWST level instrumentation, or cooling water systems which will not remove more than one train of each system from service. Components shall not be removed from service so that the affected system train is inoperable for more than 72 consecutive hours. If the system is not restored to meet the requirements of Specification 3.3.1 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the reactor shall be placed in a HOT SHUTDOWN condition within six hours.
The crew may elect to swap MU-P-1A cooling to Nuclear Services Closed Cooling using OP-TM-543-439, Swapping MU-P-1A Cooling to NS.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Event
Description:
NLO Reports an Excessive Oil Leak From Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Review TS 3.4.1.I
.a.4 and Note 1. The CRS should declare the EF-P-2B 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> time clock suspended until a second EFW pump is operable and direct action to restore EF-P-1 and/or EF-P-2B to service.
Booth Operator Instructions:
Reports a large oil leak on Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 s outboard pump bearing. The oil bulb is empty.
Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature greater than 250 degrees F.
Three independent Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pumps and two redundant flowpaths to each Once through Steam Generator (OTSG) shall be OPERABLE** with:
Two EFW Pumps, each capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus, and one EFW Pump capable of being powered from two OPERABLE main steam supply paths.
0 With more than one EFW Pump or both flowpaths to either OTSG inoperable, initiate action immediately to restore at least two EFW Pumps and one flowpath to each OTSG:
0 Specification 3.0.1 and all other actions requiring shutdown or changes in REACTOR OPERATING CONDITIONS are suspended until at least two EFW Pumps and one EFW flowpath to each OTSG are restored to OPERABLE status.
Go to Event 3.
008006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Scenario #
1 Event#
3 Directs initiation of alarm response SASS Mismatch OP-TM-MAP-H0302.
Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
Initiate Event 3.
CRS Directs review of alarm response MN Turb HDR Press HVLO OP-TM-MAP-H0203.
Diagnoses failure of turbine header pressure instrument I
I ARo I SP-IOA-PT2.
ARO ARO I MANUAL ACTIONS REQURIED Precautions:
To avoid a reactor trip, slowly adjust ICs Main Turbine Hand control since it can change load at equivalent of 35% Reactor power/minute (28% CV Pos / Min).
ARo I AUTOMATIC ACTIONS
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Limitations:
IF SG/RX demand is in Auto, then turbine load (Mwe) should be maintained within 10 Mwe of desired load.
If modified header pressure error >40 psi for >5 seconds then Turbine goes to manual.
ARO I
I I
I MANUAL ACTIONS REQUIRED Directs initiation of OP-TM-301-471, Manual Control of the I
CRS I Main Turbine.
IF SG/RX demand is in hand, then turbine header pressure should be maintained between 875 and 895 psig.
ARO 1
000006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
1 Event#
3 I
I/
I/ Event
Description:
Steam Leak in the Turbine Building.
I ARO I Prerequisites VERIFY Turbine Generator (301) System is in Operating Mode I
ARo I IAW OP-TM-301-000, Main Turbine generator and Auxiliaries.
1 ARO 1 VERlFY Main Generator breakers Closed.
ADJUST Main Turbine demand to maintain Turbine load within 1
ARO 1 limits.
NOTE:
Manual control of SGlRX demand may be required to stabilize turbine header pressure.
I URO DIRECTS initiation of OP-TM-621-471, ICs Manual Control.
Limitations MAINTAIN NI power within 1% of desired reactor power.
MAINTIAN control rod index above error adjusted rod index limit for number of RCPs operating IAW COLR Figure 1, 2, or 3.
WHEN reactor power > 20%, then control feedwater flow to OTSGs as follows:
0 Maintain Tavg between 578°F and 580°F.
0 If TaYg reduced at EOC IAW 1102-4, then maintain Tavg within *I "F of desired setpoint.
0 Maintain AT, between +2"F to -2°F (ATc = TcA-TcB).
ENSURE ULD in HAND.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URO Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
1 Event#
3 Page 11 of 30
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IF SGlREACTOR Station is being placed in HAND to support a planned activity, THEN VERIFY reactor power is less than 2558 MWAth (99.6%).
URO URO ESTABLISH manual SGIREACTOR Control as follows:
PLACE SGlREACTOR DEMAND station in HAND.
1 URO 1 ENSURE control rod position does NOT change.
URO I
URO 1 VERIFY alarm H-2-1 ICs in Track In.
IF necessary to maintain reactor power or control rods within limits or if a power change is being conducted IAW 1102-4, then ADJUST SGlRECTOR DEMAND as follows;
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NOTE:
ICs load rate of change is NOT in effect with SG/Reactor station in HAND.
CRS DIRECTS initiation of OP-TM-621-451, selecting alternate instrument inputs (optional).
IF maintaining stable reactor power or a slow planned power change, then RAISE or LOWER in discrete steps to keep neutron error between +2% and -2%.
IF rapid power reduction is required, then LOWER as necessary to achieve desired reactor power level and ENSURE FW flow controlled within limits.
NOTE:
Additional ICs related stations may be placed in manual control IAW the following procedures:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 ARO Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
1 Event#
3 H
COMPARE alternate inputs (using Attachment 7.3 of OP-TM-621-000, Integrated Control System or table in OP-TM-MAP-HO302 as necessary).
ARO VERIFY one of the following:
Difference between affected and alternate channel(s) is (are) less than SASS Setpoint As listed in OP-TM-MAP-H0302.
ARO Go to Event 4.
SELECT alternate instrument(s) with console PB.
0 VERIFY plant stable.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
1 Event#
4 Event
Description:
IC-P-1A Trips and IC-P-1 B fails to Auto Start.
Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
Initiate Event 4.
CRS CRS I
I CRS DIRECT entry into AA-1-6, 480V BOP Motor Trip.
SETPOINT 0
Intermediate Closed Cooling Water Pump IC-P-1A trip.
OBSERVATIONS 0
Tripped pump disagreement lights (greedamber)
MANUAL ACTIONS Verify standby pump has started.
DIRECT entry into C-1-2, IC CRD CLG FLOW LO.
SETPOINT 0
100 GPM flow - flow switch ICIO-FS CAUSES 0
Loss of IC pumps AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 0
MU-V-1A and MU-V-1 B will Close if CRD outlet temperature is > 160°F MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED 0
ENSURE an IC pump is operating.
DIRECT entry into C-2-2, IC SYSTEM FLOW LO
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event
Description:
IC-P-1A Trips and IC-P-1 B fails to Auto Start.
CRS I
I 1 SETPOINT CAUSES I
I CRS I 0 550 GPM-Flow switch IC-5-FS CRS SYMPTOMS 0
C. Pump Disch Press Lo, Alarm, 70 psig. (C-2-4) 1 IC Pump Failure CRS 1
CRS I AUTOMATIC ACTIONS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS 0
0 Standby IC Pump starts (ICCW flow less than 550 GPM)
MU-V-INI B closes (CRD Coolant Outlet Hi Temp. greater than 160°F)
I Standby IC pump starts on Lo flow of 550 gpm.
1 MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED I
URO I 0 ENSURE standby IC pump is Operating.
0 If IC flow is < 550 gpm, then INTIATE EP 1202-17, Loss of IC Cooling System.
DIRECT entry into 1202-1 7, Loss of Intermediate Cooling 1
1 CRS 1 System.
I I.C. System Flow Lo, Alarm, 550 GPM. (C-2-2)
I 0 I.C. CRD Clg Flow Lo, Alarm, 100 GPM. (C-1-2)
I I
I MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED I
URO I 0 If low flow exists, then PERFORM the following:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
1 Event#
4 Event
Description:
IC-P-1A Trips and IC-P-1 B fails to Auto Start.
0 VERIFY OR START the standby IC pump.
I I
0 MONITOR Surge Tank Level.
0 FILL Surge Tank Level as necessary to maintain a normal indicated level of Booth Operator Instructions:
If the crew recovers letdown flow use Remote Functions:
MUR9O to bypass the MU-V-3 Hi Temperature Interlock MUR89 to Open MU-V-2NB EXAMINERS NOTE:
If letdown flow is lost it does not have to be recovered to continue the scenario.
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Go to Event 5
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
Scenario #
1 Event#
5 Page -
16 of 30 11 Event
Description:
Steam Leak in the Turbine Buildin I Booth Operator Instructions:
Initiate Event 5.
Booth Operator Instructions:
Report a steam leak in the overhead of the 2"d floor of the Turbine. Appears to be a Steam Lead drain line and is not accessible. No personnel appear to be in danger at this time but there is a large amount of steam and a lot of condensation occurring.
IF further indication is needed report as the Director Operations that while the leak is not catastrophic a plant shutdown should be initiated.
Indications Available:
k DIRECT entry into AP 1203-24, Steam Leak.
SYMPTOMS DECREASING secondary steam pressure.
Electrical load reducing (mismatch between electrical load and Rx Power).
Decrease in pressurizer level, R.C. Pressure, and cold leg temperature.
0 For a leak outside the Reactor Building; Noise may be heard in Control Room or a report made from personnel outside the Control Room.
Immediate Manual Action 0
IF continued operation is not posing a hazard to personnel or equipment required for safe shutdown but is severe enough to require shutdown.
Then reduce load at rate specified by US and go to following steps.
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FOLLOW-UP ACTION
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event
Description:
Steam Leak in the Turbine Building I
I CRS CRS CRS EXAM IN ERS NOTE:
The objective of this procedure is to continue to shutdown and cooldown the unit while monitoring the steam leak.
Continue to shutdown and cooldown the unit per OP 1102-10 and 11 respectively.
DETERMINE which OTSG has the steam leak and if possible the location of the leak. If possible, the leak should be isolated.
INITIATES OP 1102-4 Power Operation to Commence Shutdown.
Completion of Enclosure 2A not required for Emergency SID.
cps PERFORM Enclosure 2A (for an emergency (forced) power reduction INITIATE Enclosure 2A).
EXAM IN ERS NOTE:
IF ICs is still in hand step 2.c is the step that will apply for the shutdown.
1 URO I REDUCE reactor power to the desired power as follows:
I ARO I
MAINTAIN Generator Reactive Load IAW OP-TM-301-472.
IF SG/REACTOR DEMAND is in AUTO, then REDUCE reactor power as follows:
I URo I
I URo 0
ENSURE ULD is in HAND.
0 SET ULD LOAD RATE OF CHANGE to I ?%/minute for PLANNED reductions or at a rate determined by CRS for Forced power reductions.
0 SET ULD Target Load Demand to desired setpoint.
IF SG/REACTOR DEMAND is in HAND, then REDUCE reactor power IAW OP-TM-621-471 ICs Manual Operations.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
1 Event#
5 Page -
18 of 30 I 0
PERFORM the actions per Enclosure 28.
II 11 Event
Description:
Steam Leak in the Turbine Building ARO CRS Prior to FW-U-1A speed 4000 RPM START LO-P8A.
Prior to shutdown of MO-P-1 B IF MO-V-26 is OPEN, then INITIATE OP-TM-431-152 to remove MO-T-3 from service.
EXAM1 N ERS NOTE:
If this section is being performed during an emergency plant shutdown, then any action in this table may be deferred except those marked with EP in the sign-off column.
CRS I
ARO I Prior to FW-U-1 B speed 4000 RPM START LO-P-8B.
Prior to reactor turbine load operating, then SHUTDOWN all Moisture Separator Pumps 630 Mwe If any MO-P-1 are IAW OP-TM-431-152.
ARO
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Prior to reactor power 85%, RESET FW Flow Correction I
CRS I Factors to 1.OOO IAW MAP G-2-6.
Prior to reactor power 75%:
0 PLACE FW-P-1A in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-472 CRS
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When condensate flow 6.9 mlb/HR AND prior to any in service powdex vessel flow being reduced to less than 1500 gpm, REDUCE to 4 IN SERVICE POWDEX vessels IAW OP-TM-423-151.
0 PLACE FW-P-1 B in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-473 BOOTH OPERATOR:
Use RNI screen to remove powdex vessels from service.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 ARo 1
Scenario #
1 Event#
5 Page 19 of Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
Steam Leak in the Turbine Building WHEN ULD target load is 560 MWe and prior to FW-P-1A or B SPEED DEMAND less than 3%, PLACE one Feedwater Pump in STANDBY IAW OP-TM-401-153 (A) or OP-TM-401-154 (B).
GO TO EVENTS 6,7, & 8 I
1 Position 1 Applicant's Actions or Behavior When total heater drain flow (sum of HD-FI-10, 11, & 12 on pumps in service) is less than 3300 GPM AND prior to reducing any Heater Drain pump flow to Heater Drain Pump IAW OP-TM-431-152.
1200 GPM< SHUTDOWN a
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URO URO Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
All Event#
6, 7 & 8 Page 20 of 30 I I
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS PRESS BOTH Reactor Trip AND DSS pushbuttons.
Event
Description:
I URO Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)
PRESS Turbine Trip PB.
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Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
If Reactor is not tripped then initiate Event 6 when directed.
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CRS 1 DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.
I 1
URO
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VERIFY REACTOR SHUTDOWN.
I URO VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.
I I
I PLACE EHC-P-1A and EHC-P-1 B in Pull-To-Lock.
I 0
OPEN EHC-V-FV1 (TB 305', EHC bypass valve at EHC pump skid).
BOOTH OPERATOR:
I I
CRS -"
VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFCATION (VSSV)
IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom using the following priority:
SCM 25°F GO TO EOP-002 0
XHT GO TO EOP-003
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-0-2
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Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
All Event#
6, 7 & 8 Page 21 of 30 I I
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VERIFY control rod groups 1 through 7 are fully inserted.
INITIATE Emergency Boration per RULE 5 - EB.
VERIFY OTSG A and B Operating Range level 97.5%.
TRIP both MFW pumps.
Event
Description:
Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)
I LOHT GO TO EOP-004 OTSG tube leakage =. 1 gpm GO TO EOP-005
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NOTE TO EXAMINER:
Crew should diagnose lack of primary to secondary heat transfer and transition to EOP-004. SOME EOP-001 steps may be performed prior to diagnosis.
ANNOUNCE Reactor Trip over plant page and radio (include plant conditions sufficient for NLO response per OS-24).
VERIFY Main FW Flow to A and B OTSG are each c 0.5 mlb/hr.
ENSURE FW-V-5A and FW-V-5B are closed.
VERIFY OTSG level > setpoint.
I INITIATE RULE 4 - FWC.
I I VERIFY ICS/NNI HAND or AUTO Power is available.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 ARo
// Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
All Event#
6, 7 & 8 Page 22 INITIATES OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 15, EFW Actuation Response.
Event
Description:
Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)
ARO ARO ARo ENSURE EF-P-1, EF-P-2A, and EF-P-26 start.
DISPATCH an Auxiliary Operator (AO) to EF-V-30 area.
IF EFW pump disch. Pressure INITIATE Guide 16.
OTSG pressure, then I
I I IAAT EFW is actuation is required, then:
ARO IF-P-2A or EF-P-2B fails, then INITIATE Guide 16.2.
I I
ARO 1 INITIATES Guide 16, EFW Failure.
ARO ARO IAAT EFW is required and ALL components are NOT functional, then:
ENSURE OPEN MS-V-13A and MS-V-I 3B.
IF MS-PI-204 c 150 psig, then ENSURE MS-V-6 is OPEN.
I I
ARO I IF EF-P-1 fails, then INITIATE Guide 16.1.
I ARO I INITIATES Guide 16.1, EFW Failure of EF-P-1 (Page 1 of 2).
I I
ARO 1 ENSURE OPEN MS-V-2A and MS-V-26.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 ARO ARo Op Test No.:
Scenario#
All Event#
6, 7 & 8 Page 23 of 30 VERIFY voltage available on the associated bus.
VERIFY control power is available as indicated by the green indicator light at the control switch.
Event
Description:
Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection ARO ARo I
1 ARO OBTAIN CRS concurrence immediately prior to initiating flow.
OBTAIN CRS concurrence and ENSURE EFW actuation enable-defeat switches (8) are in DEFEAT.
I BOOTH OPERATOR:
ARO F
IF the pump did NOT start, then at 1 DIE 4160V switchgear:
0 ENSURE targets are reset on relays located at the switchgear.
~
~~
~~
~
~
OBTAIN CRS concurrence and ENSURE EFW actuation enable-defeat switches (8) are in DEFEAT.
CLOSE MS-V-13A and MS-V-13B.
Report EF-P-1 trip mechanism is broken and needs maintenance attention.
INITIATES Guide 16.2 EFW Failure Failure of EF-P-2A or EF-ARo 1 P-26.
ARO I START the pump from the Control Room.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 1
Scenario#
All Event#
6, 7 & 8 Page 24 Event
Description:
Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2) 0 PRESS CLOSE pushbutton to start EF-P-2A (B).
BOOTH OPERATOR:
CRS CRS I
ARO ARO 1
URO r*I Report attempting steps 7.1 - 7.4 and EF-P-A did NOT Start.
DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-004, Lack of Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer.
FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS ENSURE no more than one RCP operating per loop.
ENSURE EFW is actuated and Guide 15 initiated.
ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and radio. (Include plant conditions sufficient for NLO response per OS-24).
~
~
~
~
~
~
~
VERIFY 1 D and 1 E 41 60V buses are energized from auxiliary transformers.
IAAT primary-to-secondary heat transfer has been established, then GO TO Step 3.19.
IAAT RCS Pressure approaches 2450 psig (or 552 psig if 329"F), then perform the following:
ENSURE RC-V-2 (PORV block) is Open GO TO EOP-009.
IAAT RCS is approaching 25°F SCM, then GO TO EOP-009.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URO Op Test No.:
Scenario#
All Event#
6, 7 & 8 Event
Description:
Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-166 Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)
ENSURE 4 psig ESAS has been initiated IAW OP-TM-642-902.
EXAMINERS NOTE:
Initiating PORVIHPI Cooling is a CRITICAL TASK.
URO I
CRS I DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-009, HPI Cooling.
Prerequisites I
CRS 1 FOLLOW-UPACTIONS I
I 1
CRS I IAAT SCM < 25F, then:
I 0 PERFORM Rule 1.
I 0 CONTINUE with EOP-009.
EXAMINERS NOTE:
Initiating HPI is a CRITICAL TASK.
I URO I VERIFY ADEQUATE HPI.
EXAM IN ERS NOTE:
May go to Section 4.0 on Inadequate HPI.
I URO I INTIATE OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPVLPI).
I URO I VERIFY I D or 1E 4160V bus is energized.
I I
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 1
Scenario#
All Event#
6, 7 & 8 Page 26 of 30 Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-166 Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)
I URO URO 1
URO
t--
I EXAMINERS NOTE:
I URO URU I
URo T
EXAMINERS NOTE:
VERIFY Make Up system was in ES standby IAW OP-TM-211-000, Make Up and Purification.
VERIFY Decay Heat system was in ES standby IAW OP-TM-21 2-000, Decay Heat Removal.
VERIFY a valid automatic actuation has occurred or a manual actuation of HPI is required.
There are special usage requirements for Section 4.1 and Attachments 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. These actions are memory items (IAW OS 24) and performed from memory when required. The sequence of actuation and verification of ES is not train dependent. Either train may be performed first or trains may be performed in parallel.
Initiation of Injection PCR graphic display is equivalent to Attachment 7.1.
IF any of the components on Attachment 7.1 are NOT in the required condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.
IF ESAS Train B Load Seq Block 4 lights (PCR) are NOT BLUE, then PRESS Manual ES actuation 1600 PSlG RC PRESS (Train B CR).
~
~ ~ _ _ _
~ _ _ _ _ _
IF any of the components on Attachment 7.2 are NOT in the required condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.
URO may complete this page before going to Section 4.2.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
I 1
Scenario #
All Event#
6,7&8 Page 27 of 30 1 Event
Description:
Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)
URO URO l----t-URO URO Zontingency Actions ENSURE MU-V-14A or MU-V-14B is Open.
I IAAT DC-P-?A or DC-P-I B fails to start or is shut down unexpectedly, then perform the following:
IF DC-P-1 B fails to start, then START DC-P-16.
IAAT either ES selected MU pump fails to start or is shut down unexpectedly, then perform the following:
IF Train B ES selected MU pump is NOT operating, then perform the following:
0 VERIFY 1 E 4160V bus is energized.
0 VERIFY ONE of the following (N/A steps NOT performed):
0 0
MU-V-16C is Open.
MU-V-36 and MU-V-37 are Open.
0 MU-V-16D is Open.
IF MU-P-IC is ES Selected, then perform the following:
0 0
VERIFY MU-P-2C or MU-P-3C is operating START MU-P-IC
~
~ ~ _ _ _ _
~
~
~
IF any of the following did NOT Open:
MU-V-16C MU-V-16D Then perform the following to ensure flow through ALL four HPI nozzles:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
All Event#
6, 7 & 8 Page 28 of 30 1 Y
Event
Description:
Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)
URO URO IF two ES selected MU pumps are operating, then ENSURE ONE of the following pairs of valves are OPEN (N/A steps NOT performed):
0 MU-V-16A and MU-V-16B 0
MU-V-16A and MU-V-16D MU-V-16B and MU-V-16C MU-V-16C and MU-V-16D IF MU-V-36 and MU-V-37 did NOT CLOSE, then ENSURE MU-V-36 or MU-V-37 is Closed.
IF MU-V-18 did NOT CLOSE, then perform ONE of the following (N/A step NOT performed):
ENSURE MU-V-18 is Closed.
0 ENSURE MU-V-17 and MU-V-217 are Closed.
IF DR-P-1A is NOT operating or DR-V-1 B is Closed, then perform the following:
START DR-P-1A 0
ENSURE DR-V-1A is Open IAAT DC system A cooler outlet temperature exceeds 105F, then perform the following:
0 PERFORM 4.2.2 actions for an inoperable DC-P-1A 0 PLACE DC-P-1A in PTL IF DR-P-1 B is NOT operating or DR-V-16 is Closed, then perform the following:
START DR-P-1 B ENSURE DR-V-1B is Open
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Op Test No.:
Scenario#
All Event#
6, 7& 8 Event
Description:
Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)
REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EAL).
r URO -1 VERIFYSCM 25°F CRS URO ENSURE the PORV block is OPEN and OPEN the PORV (RC-1 URo 1 RV-2).
FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS ENSURE HPI and LPI are operated IAW Rule 2.
VERIFY there is flow through the PORV (PORV AP indicator, I
URo I ALARM G-1-7, A0517).
I 1
URO I DE-ENERGIZE ALL Pressurizer heaters.
I CRS I VERIFY RCS 25°F superheat.
1 CRS 1 VERIFY OTSG Tube Leakage 1 gpm.
I CRS I GOTOEOP-006.
I EXAMINER'S NOTE:
Scenario may progress to point of throttling HPI but is not necessary for completion of scenario.
IAAT an ES Actuation setpoint is reached, then ENSURE all I
URo I ESAS components have actuated.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
I 1 Event
Description:
I Scenario #
All Event#
6,7&8 Page 30 of 30 1 Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)
INITIATE contingency actions IAW Section applicable procedure(s).
CRS I
CRS ARO 0
OP-TM-211-901 Emergency Injection I
ENSURE CF-V-1A and CF-V-1B are OPEN (PCR).
1 IAAT RM-A-1 high alarm or 4 psig ESAS have actuated, then INITIATE OP-TM-826-901, Control Building Ventilation System Radiological Event Operations.
IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then 0 TO EOP-008.
INITIATE Guide 20, PRIOR to Transfer to RB Sump.
ENSURE performance of an alarm review.
REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
I TERMINATE SCENARIO I
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:
Three Mile Island Scenario No.:
2 OpTestNo.:
NRC Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
0 Reactor Startup is in Progress 0
NI-12 is 00s due to a detector failure Turnover:
Take the Reactor Critical Critical Tasks:
0 Initiate HPI (CT-2) 0 Trip all RCPs (CT-I) 0 Reduce Steaming/lsolate Affected SGs (CT-22)
Event No.
Limit Uncontrolled Radiation Release (CT-21) 0 Malf.
No.
RM0322 Event Description 3eactor Building Hi Range Radiation Monitor Failure (TS) 3eactor Startup Event CRS N CRS R URO N ARO Type*
1 2
Source Range Instrument NI-I 1 SUR AMP Failure low (TS)
Sontinuous Rod Withdrawal CRS M CRS M URO M ARO 3
4 N I37A RD03A CRS OTSG Tube Leak in OTSG A TH15A TH 16A 5
6 C CRS C URO C ARO
~~
OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG requiring HPI initiation 7
MU09 C CRS High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Fails to open C URO C CRS 8
Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation CCO2B C URO C CRS C URO C ARO OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG resulting in loss of subcooling margin (CT-1, CT-22)
TH17A 9
10 ESOIA ESOl B I CRS I URO Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 psig (CT-2)
FW45A C CRS C ARO Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13A Fails Open. (CT-21)
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #2 The crew will take the watch with reactor startup in progress pulling toward criticality. NI-12 is 00s due to a detector failure. The crew will continue the reactor startup.
As soon as the crew accepts the watch the lead Examiner can cue the failure of RB Hi Range monitor RM-G-22. MAP Alarm C-1-1, Radiation Level High will be received and the crew should diagnose the failure of the instrument. The CRS should review TS 3.5.5.2 and declare a 7 day timeclock based on the failure. As soon as the TS call is made the crew can be directed to continue the startup.
When the crew has progressed in the startup to satisfy the reactivity manipulation the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the Source Range NI-I 1 SUR AMP failure. The CRS should terminate the startup and review TS 3.5.1.1 and Table 3.5-1 and declare a one hour timeclock based on zero Source Range Instrument Channels operable.
After the CRS has made the Tech Spec call the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the Control Rod Group 5 continuous withdrawal. If Group 5 reaches its outlimit before the reactor is tripped Group 6 will begin to withdraw. The URO should attempt to gain rod control in accordance with the IMAs of OP-TM-AOP-064, Uncontrolled Rod Motion. The URO should trip the reactor and enter OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip at this point.
When the reactor is tripped the OTSG tube leak will be initiated. The crew should diagnose the tube leak at approximately 12 gpm. The CRS should go to OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage to mitigate the event.
After the EOP-005 is entered and when directed by the Lead Examiner the OTSG Tube Rupture can be initiated. The crew should diagnose the leak size increase and continue in EOP-005.
The High Capacity Makeup Valve will fail to open and the URO may try to use Makeup Valve MU-V-166 to augment makeup flow. The leak will require initiation of HPI using OP-TM-EOP-010 Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control (CT-2). This is a critical task because the leak size is greater than normal makeup capability which would cause Pressurizer level to lower and eventually empty since HPI will not automatically actuate at 1600 psig.
Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump DC-P-1B will trip when ESAS is actuated and the CRO will have to implement OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPVLPI) Contingency Actions. When Reactor Building Spray Pump BS-P-1 B is placed in Pull to Lock the scenario can continue. The transfer of Makeup Pump MU-P-1 C cooling to Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water (NSCCW) does not have to be completed to continue.
When Reactor Building Spray Pump BS-P-1 B is placed in Pull to Lock the Lead Examiner can cue the increase in the leak size. The leak size will result in a loss of subcooled margin. HPI will not automatically actuate at 1600 psig RCS pressure and will have to be manually actuated in accordance with OP-TM-642-901, 1600 PSlG ESAS Actuation (CT-2). The CRS should initiate OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of 25°F Subcooled Margin. All four Reactor Coolant Pumps will be tripped within one minute of the loss of subcooled margin (CT-1) in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1, Loss of Subcooling Margin resulting in Emergency Feedwater actuation. This is a critical task since failure to trip the RCPs could result in the core not being adequately covered and raise the potential for fuel clad failure.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #2 Continued The A OTSG will subsequently be isolated in accordance with EOP-005 (CT-21). This OTSG is not required for cooldown and overfill can not be prevented by steaming requiring the OTSG to be isolated reducing the radiological consequences of the event. The crew should diagnose the Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13A failure to close and order it closed locally.
The CRS will continue in EOP-005 and when EF-P-1 is secured the crew will close Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B to stop the unmonitored release (CT-22). This is a critical task in that failure to isolate EF-P-1 would result in an uncontrolled radiation release from a non-essential load.
The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.
000006; Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips On Actuation Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 2 OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPIILPI)
OP-TM-543-440, Swapping MU-P-1 C Cooling to NS Event OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Of Subcooled Margin I
OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of 25°F Subcooled Margin OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage 2
Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-3 OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage 6
7 8
9 10 11 nstrumentation ITS)
Reactor Startup I OP 1103-8, Approach to Criticality Source Range Instrument NI-TS 3.5.1.I, Operational Safety Instrumentation Table 3.5-1 11 Fission Chamber SUR AMP Failure (TS)
Control Rod Group 5 TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip withdraws uncontrollably Control Rod Group 6 0 P-TM-AOP-064, Continuous Rod Motion withdraws uncontrollably OTSG Tube Leak in OTSG A OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG requiring HPI initiation High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Failure to oPen OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPVLPI)
I OP-TM-642-901, 1600 PSlG ESAS Actuation Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 psig 13A Fails Open
Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 2 Initialization IC-202 Console Center Console Center Malfunction RM0322 NI-12 NI-12 SUR Ma Ifu n ct ion N I36 B Malfunction N137B Malfunction N137A Malfunction RD03A Malfunction RD03B Malfunction THI 5A Malfunction TH16A Reactor Startup in Progress Place EDT on NI-12 indication Place EDT on NI-12 SUR indication Value:
Insert When:
Event 1 Value:
Insert When:
Immediately Value:
Insert Sev. 0.0%
When:
Immediately Value:
Insert When:
Event 3 Value:
Insert When:
Event 4 Value:
Insert When:
Event 12 ZLORDOUTLMTGRP(5)
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
I/O Override 02A5S15-Value:
ZDIPBOMUV217 When:
Malfunction ESOIA Value:
When:
Malfunction ESOI B Value:
When:
Malfunction CC02B Value:
When:
Malfunction THI 7A Value:
When:
Malfunction FW45A Value:
When:
Insert Sev. 0.05%
Event 5 Insert 2.8%
Event 6 RAMP 300 sec Insert Immediately Insert Immediately Insert Immediately Insert Event 8 rrvdrvl b>O. 1 Insert 20%
Event 9 RAMP 10 sec Insert Event 11 fwvmsvl3a>0.9 Scenario Support Scenario Support RM-G-22 Fails High NI-12 Fission Chamber Power Supply Failure NI-12 Fission Chamber SUR AMP Failure NI-I 1 Fission Chamber SUR AMP Failure Control Rod Group 5 Continuous Withdrawal Control Rod Group 6 Continuous Withdrawal OTSG A Tube Leak OTSG A Tube Rupture High Capacity Makeup Valve Fails as is ESAS Failure to Actuate at HPI Setpoint (1600 PSIG)
Train A ESAS Failure to Actuate at HPI Setpoint (1600 PSIG)
Train B Decay Closed Cooling Water Pump 1B Trip OTSG A Tube Rupture MS-V-13A Fails as is (open)
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
Scenario#
2 Event#
1 Event
Description:
Reactor Building Hi Range Radiation Monitor RM-G-22 Fails High (TS)
I Booth Operator Instructions:
INITIATE Event 1 when directed.
I Indications Available:
CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS CRS 31RECTS entry into PRFI-2-8, RM-G-22, RM-G-23 Hi Diagnose RM-G-22 failed high due to no other indications of increased radiation levels on other radiation monitors.
Review TS 3.5.5.2 for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation The channels identified for the instruments specified in Table 3.5-3 shall be OPERABLE. With the number of instrumentation channels less than required, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE in accordance with the action specified in Table 3.5-3.
Table 3.5-3, Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Required Minimum Channels Channels Instrument Number of Number of ACTION Containment High Range Radiation 2
2 A
(RMG-22/RMG-
- 23)
A. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements:
- 1.
- 2.
either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or prepare and submit a special report within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.
~
~~~~
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
Scenario #
2 Event#
1 Page 7 of 27 Event
Description:
Reactor Building Hi Range Radiation Monitor RM-G-22 Fails High (TS) 1 EXAMINERS NOTE:
Once the TS call is made the crew can be directed to continue the startup.
Go to Event 2 I
000004; Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URO Scenario#
2 Event#
2 & 3 Reactor Startup; Source Range SUR AMP NI-I 1 Fails Low (TS)
Event
Description:
Approach to Criticality 1 103-8.
LIMITS AND PRECAUTIONS Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
URO I----
Do not exceed a stable startup rate of 1 DPM.
URo ARO During actual rod motion, do not exceed a transient start-up rate of 1.5 DPM.
While subcritical, a one over M (l/M) plot shall be made during Regulating Group rod withdrawal for every 25% a group is withdrawn.
Administrative URo URO Verify proper overlap of 25 f 5% exists (T.S. 3.5.2.5).
Closely monitor nuclear instrumentation to ensure correct response to core reactivity changes.
During startup when the intermediate range (IR) instruments come on scale, the overlap between the IR and the source range (SR) instrumentation shall not be less than 1 decade (T.S. 3.5.1.5).
The estimated critical position (ECP) calculated in accordance with 11 03-15B (Reference 1.5) specifies the rod position tolerance band. If criticality occurs outside the specified band:
URO I During withdrawal of Regulating Groups:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
2 Event#
2 & 3 Event
Description:
Reactor Startup; Source Range SUR AMP NI-I 1 Fails Low (TS)
URO 0
Entry into this procedure (1 103-8) is a planned evolution Entry into 1203-1 0, Unanticipated Criticality (Ref. 1.10) is not required unless criticality outside the ECP tolerance band is uncontrollable.
To take conservative actions, including a manual reactor trip if necessary, if abnormal or unexpected reactor indications are observed.
The Nuclear Instrumentation shall be continuously monitored I
URo I during any reactivity addition.
URo Withdraw regulating groups and monitor for criticality observing the following limits:
URO Stop at least every 25% withdrawn to take 1/M data.
URO Insert rods to achieve at least a 1% Auk subcritical condition using the rod worth data in 1103-15B.
If the reactor critical position is outside the ECP limits established per 1103-15B (k 0.5% Auk No Xenon, f 0.8% Auk Transient Xenon):
Entry into 1203-1 0, Unanticipated Criticality (Ref.
1.10) is not required unless criticality outside the ECP tolerance band is uncontrollable.
008006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
2 Event#
2 & 3 Page 10 of 27 Event
Description:
Reactor Startup; Source Range SUR AMP NI-I 1 Fails Low (TS)
Time 11 Position 11 Applicants Actions or Behavior BOOTH OPERATOR:
Initiate Event 3.
1 EXAMINERS NOTE:
CRS should declare a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> time clock based on T.S. 3.5.1.I.
CRS CRS CRS CRS The reactor shall not be in a startup mode or in a critical state unless the requirements of Table 3.5-1, Column A and B are met, except as provided in Table 3.5-1, Column C.
Specification 3.0.1 applies.
Table 3.5-1, Instruments Operating Conditions
~~~
Operator Action if Conditions of Minimum Minimum Functional Unit Operable Degree of Column A Channels Redundancy and Cannot be Met Source range instrument channels 1
0 (a) Restore the conditions of Column (A) and Column (B) within one hour or place the unit in HOT SHUTDOWN within an additional 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.
(c) When 1 of 2 intermediate range instrument channels is greater than 1 O-amps or 2 of 4 power range instrument channels are greater than 10 percent full power, source range instrumentation is not required.
Go to Event 4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D Scenario#
2 Event#
4 Event
Description:
Continuous Rod Withdrawal Booth Operator Instructions:
INITIATE Event 4 when directed.
Indications Available:
Booth Operator Instructions:
INITIATE Event 5 when the reactor is tripped I
CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-AOP-064, Continuous Rod Motion u,,
SYMPTOMS 1
URO A control rod group is moving in or out without a demand from ICs or the operator.
I yI0 ENSURE Diamond control station is in MANUAL.
ENSURE JOG is selected.
I URO
~~
ENSURE GROUP and SINGLE SELECT switches are OFF.
ENSURE SEQ OR is selected.
URO URO If out motion continues, then SELECT the affected GROUP and INSERT the affected group.
TRIP the Reactor GO TO OP-TM-EOP-001 1
CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS I
URO PRESS both Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URO URO Continuous Rod Withdrawal PRESS Turbine Trip PB.
VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.
URO I VERIFY REACTOR SHUTDOWN.
CRS IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom using the following priority:
CRS 1 VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFICATION (vssv)
ARo ANNOUNCE Reactor Trip over plant page and radio (include plant conditions sufficient for NLO response per OS-24).
1 SCM 25" GO TO EOP-002 ARO I 0 XHT GO TO EOP-003 VERIFY OTSG A and B Operating Range level 97.5%.
LOHT GO TO EOP-004 OTSG tube leakage > I gpm I
I ARO I VERIFY OTSG level > setpoint.
I I
1 URO I VERIFY control rod groups 1 through 7 are fully inserted.
I VERIFY Main FW Flow to A and B OTSG are each 0.5 mlb/hr.
ARO I
I I
ARO I VERIFY ICS/NNI HAND or AUTO Power is available.
I
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URO Event
Description:
Continuous Rod Withdrawal INTIATE Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control.
VERIFY 1 D and 1 E 41 60V buses are energized from auxiliary I
URo I transformers.
URO CRS INITIATE Guide 8, RCS Pressure Control.
WAAT Generator MW gero, or Turbine speed c 1770 RPM, then VERIFY GBI-12 and GB1-02 are OPEN.
I I
ARO I INITIATE Guide 6 OTSG Pressure Control.
I ARo VERIFY primary and secondary Instrument Air pressure
> 80 psig.
WAAT GB1-12 and GBI-02 are OPEN, then ENSURE the I
CRS I Generator Field Breaker is OPEN.
URo CRS INITIATE OP-TM-642-904 Reactor Trip Isolation ESAS Actuation.
FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.
I CRS I REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
I 1 Go to Event 5.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS 11 Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
2 Event#
5 Page -
14 of 27 11 DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-005 OTSG Tube Leakage.
Event
Description:
Booth Operator Instructions:
INITIATE Event 5 when directed.
EXAM1 N ERS NOTE: :::
I URO I
CRS I
Leak size is = 12 gpm.
FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS NOTIFY RAC to begin offsite dose assessment.
INTIIATE Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control VERIFY the reactor is critical.
GO TO Step 3.7 GO TO EVENT 6.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Op Test No.:
Scenario#
2 Event#
6, 7, & 8 NOTIFY SM to evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
Event
Description:
OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation Booth Operator Instructions:
INITIATE Event 6 when directed.
I CRS 1 IDENTIFY the affected OTSG.
I
- 1.
OTSGA I
1 0 OTSGB I
ARO I INITIATE Attachment 2.
I ARO 1 IAAT Aux. Steam is available, then BOOTH OPERATOR:
Use remote functions to accomplish.
0 OPEN AS-V-8 (TB 355 south of 6h stage drain collection tank).
CLOSE GS-V-4.
0 TRANSFER operating FWPs to Aux Steam:
I SLOWLY OPEN AS-V-5A (7 W of FW-P-1A 2 up).
SLOWLY OPEN AS-V-5B (7 W Of FW-P-1 B 2 UP).
I CRS I VERIFY the reactor is critical.
1 GO TO Step 3.17.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS I/ Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
2 Event#
6, 7, & 8 Page 16 ENSURE performance of an alarm review.
Event
Description:
URO URO OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation If Pressurizer Level is LOW:
VERIFY MU pump is operating.
ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and 1
URo 1 radio.
URO I
I ARO I DISPATCH an Operator to check MSSV status.
I ENSURE MU-V-17 is OPEN.
URO EXAMINER'S NOTE:
URO should diagnose failure of MU-V-217 and use MU-V-16B for supplemental makeup.
VERIFY PZR level is being restored.
I URO I Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control (Page 1 of 2)
I URO VERIFY MU24-FI 20 GPM.
I I
URO I VERIFY MU-V-5 is CLOSED.
I I
URO 1 VERIFY MU24-FI > 20 GPM.
I THROTTLE MU-V-217.
I I THROTTLE MU-V-16B or 16D.
QOQOOf; Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URO Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
2 Event#
6, 7, & 8 VERIFY PZR level is being restored.
Event
Description:
OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation Time11 Position 11 Applicants Actions or Behavior URO VERIFY PZR level is being restored.
I CLOSE MU-V-3.
URO URO URO INITIATE HPI IAW OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection H P I/LP I.
INITIATES OP-TM-211-901 Emergency Injection (HPVLPI).
Prerequisites VERIFY 1 D or 1 E 4160V bus is energized.
URo URo VERIFY Make Up system was in ES standby IAW OP-TM-211-000, Make Up and Purification.
VERIFY Decay Heat system was in ES standby IAW OP-TM-212-000, Decay Heat Removal.
URo VERIFY a valid automatic actuation has occurred or a manual actuation of HPI is required.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event
Description:
OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation I EXAMINER'S NOTE:
t I
There are special usage requirements for Section 4.1 and Attachments 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. These actions are memory items (IAW OS 24) and performed from memory when required. The sequence of actuation and verification of ES is not train dependent. Either train may be performed first or trains may be performed in parallel.
Initiation of Injection IF ESAS Train A "Load Seq Block 4" lights (PCR) are not BLUE, then PRESS "Manual ES Actuation" "1600 PSlG RC PRESS" (Train A CC).
PCR graphic display is equivalent to Attachment 7.1 IF ESAS Train B "Load Seq Block 4" lights (PCR) are not BLUE, then PRESS "Manual ES Actuation" "1 600 PSlG RC PRESS" (Train B CR).
PCR graphic display is equivalent to Attachment 7.2.
IF any of the components on Attachment 7.2 are not in the required condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.
DIAGNOSES DC-P-1 B trips when ESAS is actuated and that Section 4.2 applies.
Contingency Actions IAAT DC-P-1A or DC-P-1 B fails to start or is shut down unexpectedly, then perform the following:
IF DC-P-1 B fails to start, then START DC-P-1 B.
800006 URO URO Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 PLACE BS-P-1B in PTL.
0 INITIATE OP-TM-543-440 Swapping MU-P-1 C cooling to NS.
MAINBODY VERIFY ALL prerequisites have been met.
r II
/I OP Test No.:
1 Scenario #
2 Event#
6, 7, & 8 Page 19 of 27 11 Event
Description:
OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup aker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump I 0 IF DC-P-1B is NOT operating then perform the following:
I PLACE MU-P-IC in PTL.
I PLACE DH-P-IB in PTL.
If required to shift MU-P-IC cooling to NS, then PERFORM the I
URo I following:
0 NOTIFY Control Room to monitor the following:
NS-T-1 level (NS-LI-800 / NS-LI-801) (CC).
0 DC-T-1 B level (DC-LI-1 IO) (CR).
BOOTH OPERATOR:
Use remote function to operate 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.
CLOSE the following valves: (Locked Valve entry)
DC-V4lB I
DC-V-45B BOOTH OPERATOR:
Use remote function to operate 4.2.2 and 4.2.3. I OPEN the following valves:
NS-V-82 I
I NS-V-83 I
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 II URo IAAT either ES selected MU pump fails to start or is shut down unexpectedly, then perform the following:
URo I
VERIFY 1E 4160V bus is energized If Train B ES selected MU pump is not operating, then perform the following:
0 VERIFY one of the following:
(N/A steps not performed) 0 0
MU-V-16C is Open.
MU-V-16D is Open.
MU-V-36 and MU-V-37 are Open.
0 If MU-P-IC is ES Selected, then perform the following:
VERIFY MU-P-2C or MU-P-3C is operating I
START MU-P-IC I
I I GO TO EVENT 9
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2
~-
~~
URO URO URo 11 Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
2 Event#
9,10,&11 Page 21 IMMEDIATE ACTIONS PERFORM Rule 1, SCM.
INITIATES OP-TM-EOP-010 SCM, Rule 1, Loss of Subcooling Margin (SCM).
1 Event
Description:
URO OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Resulting in Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-22); Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 PSlG (CT-2);Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B Fails OPEN (CT-21)
VERIFY it has been more than two minutes since RCP start.
I Booth Operator Instructions:
URO I Indications Available:
ENSURE all RCPs are shutdown.
EXAMINERS NOTE:
Crew should diagnose 25 SCM.
DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-002 Loss of 25°F Subcooled 1
CRS 1 Margin EXAMINERS NOTE:
1600 psig will not actuate. If manual ESAS was re-enabled it will have to be re-initiated. If MU-P-IC, and DH-P-1 B are still in PTL they will have to be started.
I I
ARO I INITIATE OP-TM-642-901 1600 # ESAS ACTUATION.
INITIATE EFW IAW Guide 15 and FEED available OTSGs to I
ARo I 75 to 85% Operating Range Level.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 2
Event#
9, IO,& 11 Event
Description:
OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Resulting in Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-22); Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 PSlG (CT-2);Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B Fails OPEN (CT-21)
I CRS I
CRS I
I CRS I
CRS 1
CRS I
I CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS ENSURE announcement of reactor trip and EFW actuation Dver the plant page and radio.
ENSURE performance of an alarm review.
REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
IAAT LPI flow >I250 GPM in each line, then GO TO EOP-006.
VERIFY PORV is closed (Tailpipe DP indicator, Alarm G-1-7, A051 7).
INITIATE Attachment 1 to isolate possible sources of leakage.
VERIFY all RC Pumps are shutdown.
VERIFY ONE of the following exists:
0 TWO (2) HPI trains in ES operation, SM >25"F, lncore temperature stable or reducing.
IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then GO TO EOP-008.
IF primary to secondary heat transfer is excessive (XHT), then GO TO EOP-003.
VERIFY cooldown rate > 40"F/hr, or primary to secondary heat transfer exists.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS CRS Op Test No.:
Scenario #
2 Event#
9, 10, & 11 Event
Description:
OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Resulting in Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-22); Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 PSlG (CT-2);Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B Fails OPEN (CT-21)
DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-005 OTSG Tube Leakage.
FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS 1
CRS I VERIFY OTSG tube leakage e 1 gpm.
CRS VERIFY the reactor is critical.
GO TO Step 3.7.
I CRS I NOTIFY RAC to begin offsite dose assessment.
I URO I INITIATE Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control.
1 CRS I NOTIFY SM to evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
I CRS I IDENTIFY the affected OTSG.
I OTSGB I
CRS I INITIATE Attachment 2.
I I
CRS I IAAT Aux. Steam is available, then 1
OPEN AS-V-8 (TB 355 south of 6h stage drain collection tank).
CLOSE GS-V-4.
TRANSFER operating FWPs to Aux Steam:
SLOWLY OPEN AS-V-5A (7 W Of FW-P-1A 2 UP).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 cenario #
2 Event#
9,10,& 11 Event
Description:
OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Resulting in Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-22); Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 PSlG (CT-2);Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B Fails OPEN (CT-21)
I 1
CRS,,
SLOWLY OPEN AS-V-5B (7 W Of FW-P-1 B 2 UP).
JERIFY the reactor is critical.
SO TO Step 3.17.
ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and
.adio.
DISPATCH an Operator to check MSSV status.
ENSURE performance of an alarm review.
IAAT OTSG pressure is approaching or is greater than 1000 psig, then ENSURE MS-V-2A(B) is OPEN and to OPEN TBVs or ADVs to maintain OTSG pressure < 1000 psig.
If SCM > 30 OF, then any the following may be used to reduce RCS to 3OoF SCM:
0 OPEN the PORV.
0 INITIATE a bleed path (IAW OP-TM-211-462) and letdown (IAW OP-TM-211-950).
0 OPEN the RCS Vents.
IAAT level is rising due to tube leakage in an available OTSG, then preferentially STEAM to maintain OTSG level c 85%.
IAAT any of the following isolation criteria are satisfied (without contrary TSC guidance):
OTSG level > 85% Op Rg 0
BWST level < 21 ft
000006 ARO Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 PERFORMS Attachment ?A OTSG A Isolation Page 1 of I.
Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
2 Event#
9,10,&11 Page 25 of 27 11 I
~
Event
Description:
OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Resulting in Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-22); Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 PSlG (CT-2);Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-138 Fails OPEN (CT-21)
~~
EF-V-30D MS-V-3D MS-V-3E 0
Then perform the following:
e Projected or actual offsite integrated dose approaches 0.5 R whole body or 1.5R thyroid When RCS pressure < 1000 psig, then INITIATE A or B to isolate the affected OTSG(s).
When affected OTSG TBV/ADVs are closed, then ARO 0
I If both OTSGs are being isolated, then GO TO EOP-009.
e PERFORM Guide 12 RCS Stabilization Following OTSG Isolation.
I ARO I ENSURE CLOSED the following valves (Control Room):
MS-V-1A MS-V-1B FW-V-17A e
FW-V-SA I e FW-V-16A e
FW-V-92A e
EF-V-30A I
MS-V-3F e
MS-V-4A MS-V-13A
Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Appendix D CRS Op Test No.:
Scenario #
2 Event#
9, 10,&11 Event
Description:
OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Resulting in Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-22); Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 PSlG (CT-2);Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B Fails OPEN (CT-21)
IAAT OTSG isolation criteria may be challenged prior to reducing RCS pressure 1000 psig, then I
I EXAMINER'S NOTE:
ARO should diagnose MS-V-13A failure to CLOSE and have NLO CLOSE locally.
ENSURE CLOSED the following valves (In-Plant): (Notify I
ARo 1 NLO's)
I I
BOOTH OPERATOR:
Remove Malfunction FW45A.
Use Remote Function FWR78 to place MS-V-13A in MANUAL.
Use FWR79 set to zero to close MS-V-13A MS-V-13A (close manual hand wheel (IB 295: in EF-P-1 room)
I I 0 MS-V-1OA ensure valve is closed (IB 295: in EF-P-1 room)
MS-V-89A MS Line A post htg trap isol (IB 2nd floor cubicle I
A) 0 MS-V-34A, MS Line A trap outlet isolation (IB 2nd floor cubicle A west wall, 3 ft. above floor)
MS-V-89B MS Line B post htg trap isol (IB 2nd floor cubicle I
B)
~~
0 MS-V-34B, MS Line B trap outlet isolation (IB 2nd floor cubicle B west wall, 3 ft. above floor)
MS-V-43A, MS Header A trap outlet isolation (IB BSMT:
EF-P-1 room, south wall, 6' from door, 2' off floor)
MS-V-92 common post htg drain isol (TB 322: 12' west of FWP IB, 8' up off floor) 0 0
I I
0 FW-V-85A FW reg valve bypass (TB 322: At FW-V-17A)
Appendix 0 Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario #
2 Event #
9,10, & 11 OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Resulting in Loss of Subcooling Margin (CT-22); Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 PSlG (CT-2);Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B Fails OPEN (CT-21)
Op Test No.:
Event
Description:
ARO 0
INITIATE RCS cooldown to 500°F at a rate within RCS inventory control capability and c 240F/HR.
IAAT EF-P-2A or EF-P-2B are running, then 0
CLOSE MS-V-13A and MS-V-138.
PLACE both trains of each EFW actuation in DEFEAT (eight switches).
I ENSURE RC-V-2 is OPEN.
1 CYCLE the PORV to reduce SCM to approximately 30°F.
I I
URO I INITATE Guide 8 to minimize SCM.
I EXAMINERS NOTE:
Scenario can be terminated when the A OTSG is isolated.
~
~~~~~~
Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 C CRS C URO 11 Facility:
Three Mile Island Scenario No.:
3 OpTest No.:
NRC
~
~~
Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)
Examiners:
Operators:
N CRS R URO N URO 11 Initial Conditions:
0 85% power, MOC Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1 D High Vibration 0
Power Escalation Following a trip and maintenance outage MU-P-IBOOS C CRS C ARO C URO Turnover:
Raise Power to 100%.
Feedwater Flow Fails to re-ratio after securing RC-P-1 D 11 Critical Tasks:
0 Trip all RCPs (CT-1)
M CRS M URO M ARO Event F
An RCS leak occurs requiring a Reactor Trip 3
C CRS C URO 4
RC-P-1A does not trip when control switch is rotated to the stop position (CT-1) 5 6
7 8
0 Establish FW Flow and Feed SGs (CT-10)
Malf.
No.
RD0216 TH13D THO6 RWOIOB Event Type*
Event Description C CRS Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breakei Trips (TS)
C CRS C URO
~
~~
~~~~~~
Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1 B does not start on ESAS actuation
~~~~~~
I CRS I Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A andEF-V-30D do not control in automatic due to a level setpoint failure I ARo I (CT-10)
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)ornponent, (M)ajor
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #3 The crew will take the watch with reactor power at 85% and ICs in Full Automatic. The plant is in a power escalation following an automatic trip several days ago and a subsequent maintenance period. Makeup Pump MU-P-1 B is 00s for maintenance.
When the crew has accepted the watch the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the Report from the NLO that he was in the area of I C ES Valves MCC and heard a breaker trip. It was the Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve breaker. The CRS should review TS 3. I.
12.4 for PORV Block Valve Operability and declare a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> timeclock is in effect to close the PORV.
The PORV Block Valve breaker will not be returned to service and the scenario can continue when the TS call is made.
After the TS call is made the crew will continue the power escalation. As rods are withdrawn a stuck rod occurs in Group 7 requiring the initiation of procedure OP-TM-AOP-062, Inoperable Rod. The CRS should review TS 4.7.1.2 and 3.5.2.2 and declare the rod inoperable. Tech Spec actions for the inoperable rod are included in AOP-062. Within one hour the other rods in the group must be trimmed so the inoperable rod remains within the group average. The rod will not be returned to operable status during the scenario.
After the Tech Spec call is made and AOP-062 has been implemented to the examiners satisfaction, the Lead Evaluator can cue the initiation of the RC-P-1 D high vibration malfunction.
The crew should diagnose increasing vibration on RC-P-1 D and initiate action to reduce power to ~ 7 5 %
to secure RC-P-1 D in accordance with Computer Alarm Response L3125, RC-P-1 D High Vibration.
When RC-P-1 D is secured feedwater flow will not re-ratio and the crew will have to take hand control of the Feedwater Loop masters in accordance with OP-TM-621-471, ICs Manual Control to manually re-ratio feedwater flow. The ICs does not have to be returned to auto to continue.
When the plant has been stabilized with feedwater flow re-ratioed, the Lead Examiner can cue initiation of the RCS leak. The crew should diagnose the leak based on RB pressure rise and RCS inventory change. Reactor Building pressure will rise rapidly and RCS pressure will lower.
The reactor should be tripped by the crew and the CRS should initiate OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip. Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1 B will not start automatically on the ESAS signal and must be started manually per OS-24, Conduct of Operations during Abnormal and Emergency Conditions.
When subcooling margin is lost RC-P-1A control switch will not trip the breaker and the URO will have to open the breakers for the 1A 7KV bus to trip the pump (CT-1). If the pump is not tripped within one minute the crew will have to keep RC-P-1A running in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1 Loss of Subcooling Margin. This is a critical task since failure to trip the RCPs could result in the core not being adequately covered and raise the potential for fuel clad failure. The CRS will initiate OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of Subcooled Margin.
When Emergency Feedwater is actuated EF-V-30A and EF-V-30D will not operate in automatic and will have to be taken to hand to feed the A OTSG (CT-IO). This is a critical task in that failure to take manual control would result in the A OTSG going dry and becoming unavailable to maintain or initiate primary to secondary heat transfer.
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #3 Continued The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.
Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 3 Description Initial Set-up.
Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breaker Trips (TS).
Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)
Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1 D High Vibration Feedwater Flow Fails to re-ratio after securing RC-P-1 D RCS Leak in the RB Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-16 does not start on ESAS actuation RC-P-1A does not trip when control switch is rotated to the stop position Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A and EF-V30D do not control in automatic TS 3.1.12.4, PORV Block Valve Operability TS 4.7.1.2, Rod Misalignment I
TS 3.5.2.2 Operation With Inoperable Rods U
OP-TM-AOP-062 Inoperable Rod II Computer Alarm L3125, RC-P-1 D High Vibration I
OP I 102-4, Power Operation I
OP-TM-MAP-H0204, Reactor Inlet ATc HI II OP-TM-621-471, ICs Manual Control OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1 Loss of Subcooling Margin OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of Subcooled Margin U
OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown II OP-TM-534-901, RB Emergency Cooling Operations OS-24, Conduct of Operations During Abnormal and Em erg ency Events I
OS-24, Conduct of Operations During Abnormal and Emergency Events OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1 Loss of Subcooling Margin 1 OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 16, EFW Failure
Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 3 Initialization IC-TEMP 203 Start MU-P-1A Remote Function CCRl2 Stop MU-P-1 B MU-P-1 B Remote Function RCRl9 Malfunction RD0216 Malfunction TH13D Monitor ICK314B (normal value 0.0101)
Malfunction THO6 Malfunction RWIOB I/O Override 02A3S11-ZDICSRCPlA(4) NAS I/O Override 02A3S11-ZDlCSRCPlA(2) STP I10 Override 02A3S1 I ZDICSRCPIA(1) PTL Remote Function ICR02 85% Power, ICs Full AUTO Place Control Switch in NAS Value:
Insert NS When:
Immediately Value:
Insert PTL When:
Immediately Place EDT on MU-P-1 B-I D Control Switch Place EDT on MU-P-1 B-I E Control Switch Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Insert OUT Event I Insert Immediately Insert Sev. 50%
Event 3 RAMP 300 sec Insert 10.0 Immediately Insert Sev. 0.5%
Event 5 RAMP 100 sec Insert Immediately ON Immediately OFF Immediately OFF Immediately Insert Sev. 0%
Immediately Scenario Support Scenario Support Scenario Support Scenario Support Scenario Support RC-V-2 Breaker trips Stuck rod in Group 7 RC-P-1 D High Vibration FW Flow Fails to Re-ratio RCS Leak at RCP Discharge RR-P-1 B fails to start on ESAS signal RC-P-1A Breaker Fails to Trip RC-P-1A Breaker Fails to Trip RC-P-1A Breaker Fails to Trip OTSG Operate Level Setpoint for EFW Control A
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Page Of 1 Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
3 Event#
I Event
Description:
Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breaker Trips (TS) 300th Operator Instructions: Ensure ICK314B is set at 10.0 in Monitor.
ndications Available:
I CRS I
DIRECTS I 1 02-2 Plant Startup.
IAAT Control Rods approach 95% withdrawn, then 0
DETERMINE the volume of water required for the desired rod movement at current Boron concentration & EFPD from Figure 1. Current boron concentration may be estimated based on the latest boron sample result and RCS water additions per the Control Room Log.
REVIEW recent water addition records in the Control Room log.
0 0
VALIDATE the value obtained from Figure 1 by comparison to recent water additions.
Reduce RCS boron concentration by performing any of the following IAW 1 104-29E Feed and Bleed Processes ADD demin water from an RCBT Feed and Bleed PLACE a deborating demin in service 0
EVALUATE the effect of the water addition on Control rod position.
IAAT Group 7 Rods reach 97% WITHDRAWN, then 0
Stop Power Ascension until rods have inserted to 94%
WITHDRAWN.
BOOTH OPERATOR:
Report as Primary NLO that you were in the area of IC ES valves MCC and heard a breaker trip. It appears to have been the power operated relief valve breaker.
If requested to close the breaker report that it will not close.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
Scenario#
3 Event#
1 Event
Description:
Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breaker Trips (TS)
EXAMINERS NOTE:
CRS should review T.S. 3.1.12.4 for PORV block valve operability and declare a one hour time clock to close the PORV and remove power from it.
CRS The PORV Block Valve shall be OPERABLE during HOT STANDBY, STARTUP, and POWER OPERATION:
With the PORV Block Valve inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either:
0 Restore the PORV Block Valve to OPERABLE status or Close the PORV (verify closed) and remove power from the PORV Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.
0 With the PORV block valve inoperable, restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status prior to startup from the next COLD SHUTDOWN unless the COLD SHUTDOWN occurs within 90 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD) of the end of the fuel cycle. If a COLD SHUTDOWN occurs within this 90 day period, restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status prior to startup for the next fuel cycle.
GO TO EVENT 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Scenario#
3 Event#
2 Booth Operator Instructions:
Indications Available:
ORDERS power escalation to continue.
EXAMINERS NOTE:
When asymmetric rod condition occurs the CRS should review T.S. 4.7.1.2 and T.S. 3.5.2.2 and declare the rod inoperable.
CRS CRS
~
IF a control rod is misaligned with its group average by more than an indicated nine inches, the rod shall be declared inoperable and the limits of Specification 3.5.2.2 shall apply.
The rod with the greatest misalignment shall be evaluated first.
The position of a rod declared inoperable due to misalignment shall not be included in computing the average position of group for determining the operability of rods with lesser misalignments.
Operation with inoperable rods:
0 If within one hour of determination of an inoperable rod as defined in Specification 4.7.1, and once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter, it is not determined that a one percent Ak/k hot shutdown margin exists combining the worth of the inoperable rod with each of the other rods, the reactor shall be brought to the HOT SHUTDOWN condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> until this margin is established.
Following the determination of an inoperable rod as defined in Specification 4.7.1, all rods shall be exercised within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and exercised weekly until the rod problem is solved.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
1 Scenario #
3 Event#
2 Page 9 of 25 Op Test No.:
CRS Event
Description:
Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS) 0 One or more inoperable control rods And the reactor is NOT shutdown > 1% AWk.
FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS CRS I
CRS VERIFY safety group Out Limit (Diamond panel) is LIT.
. If a control rod in the regulating or safety rod groups is declared inoperable per 4.7.1.2, and cannot be aligned per 3.5.2.2.f, power shall be reduced to I 60% of the thermal power allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and the overpower trip setpoint shall be reduced to I 70% of the thermal power allowable within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Verify the potential ejected rod worth (ERW) is within the assumptions of the ERW analysis and verify N
peaking factor (Fo(Z) and -)
limits per the COLR have FAH not been exceeded within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.
DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-AOP-062 Inoperable Rod.
ENTRY CONDITIONS NOTE:
Control rod is misaligned with the group by more than 9 inches.
I CRS I EITHER of the following conditions exist:
I CRS 1 RECORD time of discovery of inoperable rod:
I CRS I REQUEST duty reactor engineer to report to the control room.
I CRS I VERIFY reactor power > 5%
I I
I
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
Scenario #
3 Event#
2 Event
Description:
Stuck Rod in Group 7 US)
CRS 1 VERIFY the inoperable rod is fully inserted.
If any regulating or safety rods are inoperable, then perform the following within one hour: (TS 3.5.2.2.b,c).
I 1
0 INITIATE 11 03-1 5A section 3.2, Calculation of shutdown margin with Tave 1 530°F. (TS 3.5.2.2.c).
I I
I If one of the following is true:
0 0
rod does not meet trip insertion time rod can not be exercised I 0 rod can not be located The INITIATE OP-TM-622-201 Control Rod Movement to verify the operability of other rods, and GO TO step 3.1 1.
(TS 3.5.2.2.b).
GO TO EVENT 3
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Event
Description:
Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1 D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1 D IAAT any of the following conditions are met:
0 Motor vibration exceeds 7 mils, Booth Operator Instructions: When directed insert Event 3.
Indications Available:
ARO NOTE:
DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-PC-L3125 RC-P-1 D High Vibration SETPOl NTS MANUAL ACTIONS REQUIRED Use of the Trip Multiply switch doubles the alarm limits and causes the red bypass light to flash.
1 ARO MONITOR RC Pump vibration levels (PLF) and ATTEMPT to reset alarm.
0 Pump vibration exceeds 20 mils during 4 RCP operations, Pump vibration exceeds 30 mils during single pump operation, Then PERFORM OP-TM-226-154 to place RC-P-1 D in the Standby mode.
I I 0 EVALUATE RCDT level for abnormal or changing trends.
~
~~
0 IF RC-P-1 D individual contribution to the RCDT level rise is
> 1 gpm, then PERFORM OP-TM-226-154 to place RC-P-1D in shutdown Mode.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event
Description:
Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1 D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1 D CRS I
IIItzII EXAM IN ERS NOTE:
INITIATES entry into OP-TM-226-154 Shutdown RC-P-1 D.
Precautions To avoid bearing damage from low oil flows or reverse rotation, backstop pumps should be started prior to RC pump shutdown and lift pumps should be started prior tot or immediately following RC pump trip/shutdown. Verify auto start or start pump.
Prerequisites VERIFY RC-P-1 D (226) is in Operating Mode IAW OP-TM-226-000, Reactor Coolant Pumps.
VERIFY Reactor Power c the following for the final RCP Combination:
0 2 / 1 RCP Combination - 75% NI Power VERIFY Turbine Load the following for the final RCP Combination:
0 2 / 1 RCP Combination - 665 MWE The CRS will direct the power reduction using 11 02-4, Power Operation prior to securing RC-P-1 D.
NOTE:
0 If this section is being performed during an emergency plant shutdown, then any action in this table may be deferred except those marked with EP in the sign-off column.
0 When the power reduction is complete, then any action is NIA if the action criteria was not satisfied.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event
Description:
Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1 D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1 D NOTE:
ARO ARO ARO CRS CRS ARO CRS CRS Prior to FW-U-1 B speed 4000 RPM START LO-P-8B.
Prior to FW-U-1A speed e 4000 RPM START LO-P-8A.
Prior to shutdown of MO-P-1 B If MO-V-26 is OPEN, then INITIATE OP-TM-431-152 to remove MO-T-3 from service.
Prior to reactor power 85%, RESET FW Flow Correction Factors to 1,000 IAW MAP G-2-6.
Prior to turbine load then SHUTDOWN all Moisture Separator Pumps IAW 630 Mwe If any MO-P-1 are operating, OP-TM-431-152.
Prior to reactor power 75%
PLACE FW-P-1A in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-472 PLACE FW-P-1 B in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-473 Prerequisites VERIFY one of the following:
An automatic or emergency (Le. forced) power reduction is in progress.
Steps with letter designations should be performed in parallel.
I CRS Procedure Power Reduction
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URO URO URO Op Test No.:
Scenario #
3 Event#
3 & 4 Page -
14 of 25 I Event
Description:
Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1 D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1 D 0
ENSURE ULD is in HAND SET ULD LOAD RATE OF CHANGE to I 1 %/minute for PLANNED reductions or at a rate determined by CRS for Forced power reductions.
SET ULD Target Load Demand to desired setpoint.
PERFORM Enclosure 2A (for an emergency (forced) power reduction INITIATE Enclosure 2A).
I CRS REDUCE reactor power to the desired power as follows:
I URO 0
MAINTAIN Generator Reactive Load IAW OP-TM-301-472.
I URO 0
IF SG/REACTOR DEMAND is in AUTO, then REDUCE reactor power as follows:
I CRS PERFORM the actions per Enclosure 2B.
EXAMINERS NOTE:
The CRS will direct continuation of OP-TM-226-154 to secure RC-P-1 D.
NOTE:
RCP vibrations are high whenever one pump is operated alone in a loop. Use the following pump combinations. A and B OR C and D.
EVALUATE final RCP Combination for effects of vibration and procedural requirements:
0 11 02-1 1 specifies use of RC-P-1A and RC-P-1 B RC-P-1 C and RC-P-1 D are designated for alternate use and require use of PT Curves in OP-TM-226-000, Reactor Coolant Pumps, Attachments 7.3 and 7.4 vs. 1102-1 /
1102-1 1 Figures 1 and IA.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
f Reactor power is > 20%, then EVALUATE expected Fw Flow 1
-equirements for new RCP combination, to minimize effects on 3elta Tc.
11 Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
3 Event#
3 & 4 URO Event
Description:
I PLACE the following in Pull-To-Lock:
0 RC-P-3D-2, Backstop Oil Pump #2 Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1 D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1 D URO NOTE:
PLACE the following in Pull-To-Lock:
0 RC-P-2D-2, Oil Lift Pump DC HP A 2 / 1 RCP combination with OTSG levels > LLLs will require a re-ratio (70% / 30%) of Feedwater flow to A /
B OTSG.
CRS URO URO URO NOTE:
?LACE at least one each of the following in Normal-After-Start:
B RC-P-2D-1, Oil Lift Pump AC HP (CC), or RC-P-2D-2, Oil Lift Pump DC HP (CC)
B RC-P-3D-1, Backstop Oil Pump # I (CC), or RC-P-3D-2, Backstop Oil Pump #2 (CC)
PLACE RC-P-1 D in Pull-To-Lock.
VERIFY the following:
~
~~~
0 RC-P-1 D not rotating backwards (PPS L2878, RC-P-1 D Reverse Rotation not in alarm).
~
~~~
Vibration levels at a low value with the absence of change indicates 0 rpm.
0 Vibration readings (PLF) indicate RC-P-1 D has reached 0 rpm.
I 0 RC-P-3D-1, Backstop Oil Pump # I 0
RC-P-2D-1, Oil Lift Pump AC HP
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
Scenario#
3 Event#
3 & 4 Event
Description:
Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1 D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1 D 1
CRS I
I ARO I
URO 1
URO
~ _ _ _
RECORD RC-P-ID (226) is in Standby Mode in the CR L O g. 1 3iagnoses the failure of feedwater flow to re-ratio.
3IRECTS entry into OP-TM-MAP-H0204 RX Inlet ATC HI.
ATck5"F from selected Loop A/B NR Tc at RC-5NB MS2.
CAUSES 0
0 Unequal RCS flow between loops (Ex: RCP trip)
Unequal F.W. flow to the Steam Generators MANUAL ACTIONS REQUIRED I
0 VERIFY Automatic Action.
I 0
IF automatic feedwater control is inadequate, then PLACE feedwater in HAND IAW one or more of the following procedures:
OP-TM-621-471, ICs Manual Control. (for FW Loop Masters)
Limitations I
Maintain NI power within 1 % of desired reactor power.
I Maintain control rod index above error adjusted rod index limit for number of RCPs operating IAW COLR Figure 1, 2 or 3.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 I
Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
3 Event#
3 & 4 Page -
17 of 25 I I
If only 3 RC Pumps are operating, then when either OTSG
~
level reaches 25, ATc limit does not apply.
Event
Description:
I URO URO Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1 D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1 D MAINBODY ENSUIRE ULD in HAND.
When reactor power > 20%, then control feedwater flow to I
ARo I OTSGs as follows:
URO I 0 Maintain Tavg between 578°F and 580°F.
0 VERIFY alarm H-2-1 ICs in Track In.
If necessary to maintain reactor power or control rods within limits or if a power change is being conducted IAW 1102-4, then ADJUST SGIREACTOR DEMAND as follows:
1 0 Maintain Ac between +2F to -2°F (ATc = T A - TcB).
URO 0
If maintaining stable reactor power or a slow planned power change, then RAISE or LOWER in discrete steps to keep neutron error between +2% and -2%.
URO 0
If rapid power reduction is required, then LOWER as necessary to achieve desired reactor power level and ENSURE FW flow controlled within limits.
1 URO 1 Establish manual SG/REACTOR Control as follows:
I 0 PLACE SGIREACTOR DEMAND station in HAND.
I 0 ENSURE control rod position does NOT change.
I ARO I Establish manual Feedwater Control as follows:
~~
~~
I 0 PLACE SG A/B GAD KTIO(~TC) station in HAND NOTE:
Either SG A or B FW DEMAND station may be placed in HAND first.
I
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 ARO Scenario #
3 Event#
3 & 4 Event
Description:
0 0
PLACE SG A FW DEMAND station in HAND.
PLACE SG B FW DEMAND station in HAND.
NOTE:
Raising SG A FW DEMAND or lowering SG B FW DEMAND will make ATc more negative (ATc = TC A - TC B).
ADJUST SG A and/or B FW DEMAND to maintain Tavg,
ATc, and OTSG level within limits.
ARO GO TO EVENT 5
000006; URO URO Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Press BOTH Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons.
VERIFY REACTOR SHUTDOWN.
Event
Description:
CRS An RCS Leak Occurs Requiring a Reactor Trip; Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1 B Does Not Start on ESAS Actuation; RC-P-1A Does Not Trip When Control Switch is Rotated to the Stop Position (CT-1); Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V30A and EF-V-30D Do Not Control in Automatic Due to a Level Setpoint Failure (CT-10)
IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom using the following priority:
SCM C 25°F GO TO EOP-002 I Booth Operator Instructions:
INITIATE Event 5 when directed.
1 Indications Available:
I I
CRS I DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-001 Reactor Trip.
I I
URO I IMMEDIATEACTIONS I
I URO I PRESS Turbine Trip PB.
1 URO I VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.
0 0
PLACE EHC-P-1A and EHC-P-1 B in Pull-To-Lock.
OPEN EHC-V-FV1 (TB 305, EHC bypass valve at EHC pump skid).
EXAMINERS NOTE:
ARO should diagnose loss of SCM during symptom check.
I CRS I VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFICATION (VSSV)
I DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-002 Loss of 25°F Subcooled I
CRS I Margin.
QOOOOG Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Page 20 of 25 Op Test No.:
Scenario ##
3 Event ##
5, 6, 7, 8 8 Event
Description:
An RCS Leak Occurs Requiring a Reactor Trip; Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1B Does Not Start on ESAS Actuation; RC-P-1A Does Not Trip When Control Switch is Rotated to the Stop Position (CT-1); Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A and EF-V-30D Do Not Control in Automatic Due to a Level Setpoint Failure (CT-10)
IMMEDIATE ACTIONS URO URO 1
URO 1 PERFORM Rule 1, SCM.
INITIATES Rule 1 Loss of Subcooling Margin (SCM).
VERIFY it has been more than two minutes since RCP start.
URO GO TO Step 3.
INITIATE OP-TM-642-901 1 600 # ESAS ACTUATION I EXAMINERS NOTE:
Tripping all RCPs within one minute is a CRITICAL TASK I
I URO I ENSURE ALL RCPs are shutdown.
If all RCPs were not tripped within one minute, then MAINTAIN RCP(s) still operating until one of the following conditions is satisfied:
SCM>25F 0
LPI flow > 1250 gpm in each line 0
Tclad > 1800°F EXAMINERS NOTE:
RC-P-1A breaker fails to trip and the 1A 7K bus supply breakers will have to be opened within 1 minutes of loss of SCM or RC-P-1A will have to be left running.
INITATE EFW IAW Guide 15 and FEED available OTSGs to 75 I
ARo I to 85% Operating Range Level.
I I
I
000006 ARO
~
~~~
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 If Shift Management concurrence is obtained, then EFW flow may be controlled using one or both EF-V-30 valves for each OTSG.
1 Scenario #
3 Event #
5, 6, 7, & 8 An RCS Leak Occurs Requiring a Reactor Trip; Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1 B Does Not Start on ESAS Actuation; RC-P-1A Does Not Trip When Control Switch is Rotated to the Stop Position (CT-1); Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A and EF-V-30D Do Not Control in Automatic Due to a Level Setpoint Failure (CT-10) u OP Test No.: -
ARO EXAMINERS NOTE:
INITIATES Rule 4 Feedwater Control.
EF-VSO A & D will fail to respond in auto and have to be operated manually to raise OTSG level. This is a CRITICAL TASK.
I ARO I INTllTES Guide 15 EFW Actuation Response.
I IAAT EFW is actuation is required, then:
I 0 ENSURE EF-P-1, EF-P-2A, and EF-P-2B start.
1 0 DISPATCH an Auxiliary Operator (AO) to EF-V-30 area.
ENSURE EF-V-30ND and EF-V-30WC control OTSG level at I
ARo I setpoint (Rule 4).
I ARO I VERIFY SCM > 25°F.
1 MAINTAIN OTSG level 75 - 85% OPERATING Range Level.
IAAT OTSG Level c minimum, then MAINTAIN the following I
ARo I MINIMUM required flow:
I 1
ARO 1 VERIFY SCM > 25°F.
If both OTSGs are available and OTSG tube leak < 1 gpm, then FEED with EFW > 215 gpm / OTSG.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Page 22 of 25 11 1 Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
3 Event #
5, 6, 7, 8, 8 FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS An RCS Leak Occurs Requiring a Reactor Trip; Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-16 Does Not Start on ESAS Actuation; RC-P-1A Does Not Trip When Control Switch is Rotated to the Stop Position (CT-1); Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A and EF-V30D Do Not Control in Automatic Due to a Level Setpoint Failure (CT-IO)
~
~~
~
ENSURE announcement of reactor trip and EFW actuation over the plant page and radio.
CRS CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.
URo URO URO 1
CRS I REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
VERIFY PORV is closed (Tailpipe DP indicator, Alarm G-1-7, A0517).
IF PORV was not opened for core cooling, then CLOSE the PORV Block (RC-V-2).
INITATE Attachment 1 to isolate possible sources of leakage.
VERIFY all RC Pumps are shutdown.
1 CRS I IAAT LPI flow > 1250 GPM in each line, then GO TO EOP-006.
CRS VERIFY ONE of the following exists:
I I
1 GO TO step 4.2 (perform rapid RCS cooldown).
I 0 TWO (2) HPI trains in ES operation
~
~~
I GO TO Section 4.0.
~
~
~
~~~
I CRS I IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then GO TO EOP-008.
VERIFY cooldown rate > 4O"F/hr, or primary to secondary heat I
CRS I transfer exists.
0QOOOd Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Op Test No.:
1 Scenario #
3 Event ##
5, 6, 7, 8, 8 Page 23 of 25 Event
Description:
An RCS Leak Occurs Requiring a Reactor Trip; Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1 B Does Not Start on ESAS Actuation; RC-P-1A Does Not Trip When Control Switch is Rotated to the Stop Position (CT-1); Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V30A and EF-V30D Do Not Control in Automatic Due to a Level Setpoint Failure (CT-10)
FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS I
CRS I VERIFY OTSG tube leakage c 1 gpm.
CRS I
CRS I VERIFY pressurizer level is being maintained without HPI.
IAAT RM-A-1 high alarm or 4 psig ESAS have actuated, then INITIATE OP-TM-826-901, Control Building Ventilation System Radiological Event Operations.
I GO TO EOP-006.
I CRS 1 DRIECTS initiation of OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown.
I URO 1 ENSURE HPI and LPI are operated IAW Rule 2.
IAAT an ES Actuation setpoint is reached, then ENSURE all I
CRS I ESAS components have actuated.
INITIATE contingency action IAW Section 4.2 of the applicable procedure(s).
OP-TM-534-901 RB Emergency Cooling EXAM IN ERS NOTE:
RR-P-1 B fails to start on ESAS actuation and must be manually started.
I CRS I ENSURE CF-V-1A and CF-V-1 B are OPEN. (PCR)
I CRS I IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then GO TO EOP-008.
I
~ O O C P O ~
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 INITIATE Guide 20, PRIOR to Transfer to RB Sump.
Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
3 Event#
5,6, 7, & 8 Page 24 of 25 Event
Description:
An RCS Leak Occurs Requiring a Reactor Trip; Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1 B Does Not Start on ESAS Actuation; RC-P-1A Does Not Trip When Control Switch is Rotated to the Stop Position (CT-1); Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A and EF-V-30D Do Not Control in Automatic Due to a Level Setpoint Failure (CT-IO) 1 CRS I
URO yI0 URO URO I
URO
~
~
~~
~~
ENSURE performance of an alarm review.
REQUEST SM evaluates Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
~
~~
~
I NlTlATES OP-TM-534-901 RB Emergency Cooling Operations.
Prerequisites VERIFY reactor building emergency river water system was in ES standby IAW 1104-38, Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Water System.
VERIFY 1600 psig ES actuation, RB pressure is approaching 2 psig or Emergency Director or Shift Manager has authorized use of RBEC.
VERIFY 1 D or I E 41 60V Bus is energized.
Initiation of RB Emergency Cooling
~
~ _ _ _ ~
~~
DISPATCH an operator to CLOSE NS-V-85 (IB 295: S of RR valve room).
NOTE:
The sequence of actuation and verification of ES is not train dependent. Either train may be performed first or trains may be performed in parallel.
00000~
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URO ARO 1
Scenario #
3 Event #
5, 6, 7, & 8 I OP Test No.: -
IF RR-V-1 OB and RR-V-1 B are CLOSED, then OPEN RR-V-I 6.
VERIFY G1-02 and G11-02 are CLOSED.
Event
Description:
An RCS Leak Occurs Requiring a Reactor Trip; Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1 B Does Not Start on ESAS Actuation; RC-P-1A Does Not Trip When Control Switch is Rotated to the Stop Position (CT-1); Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V30A and EF-V-30D Do Not Control in Automatic Due to a Level Setpoint Failure (CT-10)
If any of the following components are not in the required I
URo I condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.
I URO 1 Contingency Actions IF RR-P-1A or RR-P-1 B is not operating, then perform the 1
URo I following:
IF RR-P-1B is not operating and 1E 4160V bus is energized, I
URo I then perform the following:
I URO I
STARTRR-P-1B SCENARIO CAN BE TERMINATED AFTER ALL TASKS HAVE BEEN PERFORMED.
Appendix D Scenario Out I i ne Form ES-D-1 I
Event No.
1 2
3 4
5 6
(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Facility:
Three Mile Island Scenario No.:
4 OpTestNo.:
NRC Examiners:
Operators:
Initial Conditions:
100% power, MOC.
0 NS-P-1A 00s for Maintenance ll 0
NS-P-1B running on the 1P 480V bus Turnover:
Maintain 100% power operations.
Critical Tasks:
0 Control RCS Inventory (CT-30) 0 0
Isolate Overcooling SGs (CT-17)
Establish and Maintain Reactor Shutdown Requirements (CT-23)
Malf.
No.
ED03D ES07A MU23A FW35 MS04A MS03A lCRl3 FWI 1A RD02010 RD02056 Event Type" C CRS C URO C ARO C CRS C URO C CRS C URO N CRS R URO N ARO M CRS M URO M ARO C CRS C URO Event Description kux Transformer B Fault Pressure (TS)
Inadvertent ESAS Actuation Train A Makeup Pump MU-P-1A Fails to Start on ESAS Actuation (TS)
Main Condenser Vacuum Leak Main Steam Safety Valve fails to reseat. (MS-V-17A) and a steam leak in the Intermediate Building SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at zero psig Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30)
Two Control rods fail to fully insert (CT-23)
Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Three Mile Island Audit Scenario #4 The crew will take the watch with reactor power at 100% and ICs in Full Automatic. NS-P-1A is 00s for maintenance and will be out for two days. NS-P-1 B is running on the 1 P 480 Volt ES Bus and is selected for ES.
After the crew has accepted the watch and on cue from the Lead Examiner the Auxiliary Transformer B trip can be initiated. The I C 4160V bus will fast transfer to the A Auxiliary Transformer and the A Diesel Generator will start and load the 1 D 4160 V ES bus. The crew should respond in accordance with the electrical MAP alarm responses (6-1-1, B-1-5, AA-1-8),
OP-TM-AOP-013, Loss of 1 D 41 60V Bus, and EP 1203-20 Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water Failure to restart NS-P-1 B on the A Diesel. The CRS should review TS 3.7.2.b and declare a 30 day timeclock due only one Auxiliary Transformer being operable and the diesel generator is already loaded on the bus.
After the plant has been stabilized and the Tech Spec call is made the Lead Evaluator can cue the initiation of the Inadvertent ESAS Actuation. The crew should diagnose the ESAS Train A actuation as inadvertent and use terminate HPI flow in accordance with OP 1105-3, Safeguards Actuation System. The Crew should also diagnose the failure of Makeup Pump MU-P-1A to start and the CRS should review TS 3.3.1. I.b and TS 3.3.2 and declare a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> timeclock.
MU-P-1A will not be returned to service during this scenario. (Note: the CRS may also review the RCS Leakage Tech Spec 3.1.6.8 due to Reactor Building Radiation Monitor RM-A-2 being out of service)
The crew will have to insert control rods to compensate for the boron addition and stabilize reactor power. The crew will also have to re-establish normal letdown and makeup.
After the plant has been stabilized with rods inserted to compensate for the negative reactivity due to the boron injection and letdown and makeup have been restored the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the Main Condenser Vacuum Leak. The crew should diagnose the vacuum leak and insert rods to maintain power less than 100% as plant efficiency is lost. The CRS should initiate MAP Alarm Responses OP-TM-MAP-MO206, Aux Cond Hotwell Level Hi and OP-TM-MAP-NOIO6, Mn Cond VACUUM LO. The crew may elect to manually trip the reactor and turbine as vacuum degrades to the turbine trip setpoint. The CRS should initiate OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip. If the reactor is not tripped before, the turbine will trip if reactor power is reduced below 95%.
When the reactor trips a Main Steam Safety Valve will stick open on the A OTSG and a large steam leak will occur in the Intermediate Building from the A OTSG. The crew should subsequently diagnose the leak as being from the A OTSG and isolate the OTSG in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 3, Excessive Heat Transfer. In addition, the crew should diagnose the failure of the A OTSG Isolation to occur at 600 psig and FW-V-16A failed 100% open causing an overfeed. The CRS will transition to OP-TM-EOP-003, Excessive Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer. The ARO will have to close FW-V-92A to isolate Feedwater flow to the A OTSG due to FW-V-16A being failed open (CT-17). This is a critical task in that continued feeding of an OTSG with a steam break will continue to overcool the RCS, which could result in emptying the Pressurizer and causing a loss of subcooling margin. This would significantly change the mitigation strategy of the event.
When the OTSG is isolated and empty the URO will have to terminate HPI using Rule 2, HPVLPI THROTTLING CRITERIA and OP-TM-211-901, Attachment 7.3, THROTTLING HPI
000006 Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 4 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #4 Continued (CT-30). This is a critical task in that failure to throttle/terminate HPI flow will result in a rapid rise in Pressurizer level and pressure eventually challenging the PORV setpoint.
The crew should diagnose the failure of two control rods to fully insert and will have to Emergency Borate in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 5, Emergency Boration. The URO will have to initiate letdown if >50 gpm of injection is not achieved CT-23). This is a critical task in that adequate shutdown margin may not exist due to the two stuck rods and the RCS cooldown caused by the steam leak.
The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.
oooooe; Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 4 Event 1
4 5
6 Description Initial Set-up.
Auxiliary Transformer B Fault Pressure Trip Inadvertent ESAS Actuation Train A Makeup Pump MU-P-IA Fails to Start on ESAS Actuation (TS)
Main Condenser Vacuum Leak Main Steam Safety Valve fails to reseat. (MS-V-17A) and Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at zero psig Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100%
Open (CT-17 and CT-30)
Two Control rods fail to fully insert Procedure Support
~
100% Power MOC, NS-P-1A OOS, NS-P-1 B Running on the 1 P 480V Bus and selected for ES
'VIAP Alarm 6-1-5, 480 Volt ES Motor Trip OP-TM-AOP-013, LOSS Of 1 D 41 60V BUS TS 3.7.2.b OP 1 105-3, Safeguards Actuation System OP-TM-211-950, Restoration of Letdown Flow TS 3.3.1. I.b and TS 3.3.2, ECCS Equipment OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip OP-TM-MAP-M0206, Aux Cond Hotwell Level Hi OP-TM-MAP-NO106, Mn Cond VACUUM LO OP-TM-EOP-003, Excessive Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 3, Excessive Heat Transfer OP-TM-EOP-01 0, Rule 5, Emergency Boration
000006 Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 4 Initialization IC-I 6 Console Center Remote Function CCRl9 Console Right Remote Function CCR21 Console Center Remote Function CCRl8 Main Console NS-P-1 B NAS NS-P-16 PTL NS-P-1A PTL Malfunction ED03D I/O Override 02A4S66-ZDlPBl RCA Malfunction MU23A Malfunction FW35 Malfunction TCOI Malfunction MS04A Malfunction MS03A Malfunction RD0223 Malfunction RD0239 Malfunction FWI 1A Remote Function lCRl3 100% HFP, ICs Full AUTO NS-P-1 B Running NS-P-I 6-1 P Bkr CLOSED Value:
1P When:
Immediately NS-P-1 B-I S PTL NS-P-1 B-I S Bkr OPEN When:
Immediately NS-P-1A Tagged 00s NS-P-1A Bkr OPEN Value:
OUT When:
Immediately Robust Barriers applied IAW Risk Value:
NS-PI B Document Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Value:
When:
Insert Event 1 Insert ON Event 2 Insert Immediately Severity 15%
RAMP 300 Sec Event 4 Insert Event 5 ratpw<95%
Insert Sev. 100%
Event 6 ratpw<5%
Insert Sev. 100%
Event 6 ratpw<5%
Insert Immediately Insert Immediately Insert Immediately Insert Sev. 0%
Immediately Scenario Support Scenario Support Scenario Support Scenario Support Scenario Support Scenario Support Main Console Auxiliary Transformer B Fault Pressure Trip Inadvertent ESAS Actuation (1 600 psig) Train A MU-P-1A ES Start Failure Vacuum Leak Turbine Trip Main Steam Safety Valve Leaks/Fails to Reseat (MS-V-17A)
Main Steam Leak Outside the RB Stuck Rod Stuck Rod Startup Feedwater Valve Fails as is (FW-V-16A)
SG A Lo Press Isolation setpoint
000006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
I 1
Scenario #
4 Event#
1 Page Of Event
Description:
Aux Transformer B Fault Pressure (TS)
~
~
I Booth Operator Instructions:
INITIATE Event 1 when directed.
I Indications Available:
I E
E CRS CRS CRS DIRECTS entry into AA-1-8 Aux XFMR 1 B Trip.
AUTOMATIC ACTION:
Substation Bus 4 breakers trip (GBI-02, 1091-12, 1051 -02, 1 B-12). Tripped breakers cannot be closed until the lockout relays are reset on Panel PR and/or Panel RBB.
Fast transfer occurs for BOP busses powered from 1 B Aux. Transformer if enabled (normally 1 B 7kV and 1 C 4kV).
4kV ES Bus powered from 1 B Aux. Transformer (normally 1 D 4kV) will trip and its associated emergency diesel will start.
OBSERVATON (CONTROL ROOM)
AA-2-8 if due to fault pressure.
0 NN-2 230kV Bus 4 trip.
Voltmeter for Bus 4 on Panel SSI.
Amber disagreement light on for each breaker that tripped.
Blue indicating light on the lockout relays that operated (RBA panel).
Target on relays that operated (RBA panel).
0 Possible Computer Alarms:
S2055 Fault Pressure Relay Trip (Transformer or Load Tap Changer)
L2059 230kV Bus 4 Trip 0
L2071 Aux. Transformer 1B Trip
OOOOOG Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Op Test No.:
Scenario#
4 Event#
1 Event
Description:
Aux Transformer B Fault Pressure (TS)
MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED:
INITIATE OP-TM-AOP-013, LOSS of I D 4160V BUS.
0 ENSURE the following breakers are tipped:
1SB-A2 ISB-C2 1SB-E2 ISB-02 1091-12 1051-02 URO URo 1 SB-B2 1 SB-D2 ISB-72 GBI-02 18-12 INITIATES B-1-5 480V ES Motor Trip.
DIAGNOSES trip of NS-P-1 B and failure of NS-P-1 B to START.
SET POINTS:
Breaker for NS-P-1 B tripped 0
NOTIFY the PJM Grid operator, via the FIRST ENERGY
- TSO, to change the TMI-1 Post Contingency voltage alarm setpoint. (The new alarm setpoint should be 218.9 KV.)
AUTOMATIC ACTION Starts standby pump where applicable.
I I
URO I OBSERVATION (CONTROL ROOM):
I 0
Computer printout and CRT.
Tripped pump disagreement light (amberlgreen).
1 EXAMINERS NOTE:
URO will have to re-start NS-P-1 B due to no standby pump being available.
1 URO 1 MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED:
I 0
Verify auto start on standby pumps where applicable.
000006 CRS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-AOP-013 Loss of 1 D 4160V Bus.
Op Test No.:
Scenario#
4 Event#
1 Event
Description:
Aux Transformer B Fault Pressure (TS)
CRS CRS 0
Manually start standby if auto start has not occurred. (Will have to start NS-P-1 B.)
0 The OTSGs are being used for RCS heat removal.
FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS ANNOUNCE entry into OP-TM-AOP-013, "Loss of 1 D 4160V Bus" over the "RED" plant page and radio.
CRS I ENTRY CONDITIONS I All of the following conditions exist:
0 0
1 D 4160V bus is de-energized or recovered by EG-Y-IA, At least one auxiliary transformer is energized, INITIATE OP-TM-861-901, "Diesel Generator EG-Y-1A Erne rg ency 0 pe rat io ns".
1 ARO/URO 1 URO I VERIFY seal injection flow > 22 gpm.
IAAT 1 D 4160 V bus is energized, then GO TO Section 4.0 "Return to Normal".
CRS 1
CRS I RETURN TO NORMAL If EG-Y-1A is powering the 1 D 4160V bus, then PERFORM the I
CRS I following:
0 LOG entry into TS 3.7.2.b. action statement. Reactor operation in this condition is limited to 30 days.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
4 Event#
1 Event
Description:
Aux Transformer 6 Fault Pressure (TS)
CRS The reactor shall not remain critical unless all of the following requirements are satisfied:
Both 23014.16 kV unit auxiliary transformers shall be in operation except that within a period not to exceed eight hours in duration from and after the time one Unit 1 auxiliary transformer is made or found inoperable, two diesel generators shall be operable, and one of the operable diesel generator will be started and run continuously until both unit auxiliary transformers are in operation. This mode of operation may continue for a period not exceeding 30 days.
I GO TO EVENT 2
OQ0006 CREW CRS Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 DIAGNOSES an Inadvertent ESAS Actuation of the A Train.
DIRECTS entry into 1105-3 Safeguards Actuation System.
Op Test No.:
Scenario#
4 Event#
2 & 3 Event
Description:
Inadvertent ESAS Actuation Train A; Makeup Pump MU-P-1A Fails to Start on ESAS Actuation (TS)
CRS Booth Operator Instructions:
Actions for Inadvertent Actuations - Level 2 Indications Available:
CRS Procedure I
CRS I Prerequisites:
0 One or Both Trains of ES INADVERTENTLY Actuate on one or more signals.
CAUTION:
URO UROIARO URO HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION CAN CAUSE AN OVER PRESSURE CONDITION.
VERIFY that no valid E.S. signal is present by observing the following:
0 Reactor coolant pressure is normal for the plant condition.
R.B. pressure normal (< 2 psig).
With the Shift Managers/Control Room Supervisors permission, reset, bypass, or defeat the invalid signals. Refer to Section 3.2.
Press all three A side Manual ES 1600 psig Defeat pushbuttons and leave in Defeat (Do Not Re-enable)
OPEN the Make Up pump recirc valves as follows:
MU-V-36
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URo STOP makeup pumps started by the invalid signal(s). Leave the previously running pump in-service.
I NOTE:
URO URO
~
Boron injection into the RCS may require a power CLOSE the HPI Valves as follows:
0 MU-V-16A and MU-V-16B VERIFY MU-V-12 open, then CLOSE the following valves:
MU-V-14A reduction to regain Tave control.
URo CAUTION:
Reset 27/86 lockout if actuated IAW Section 3.2 to allow restoration of Locked Out components.
THE 27/86 UNDERVOLTAGE LOCKOUT RELAYS FOR BUSSES P, R, S, AND T ON PANEL PCR SHOULD NOT BE RESET UNTIL ALL AMBER DISAGREEMENT LIGHTS HAVE BEEN CLEARED AND IT IS DETERMINED THAT THE DIESELS CAN ACCEPT THE ADDED LOAD.
URO GO TO Section 4.1 to restore the remaining E.S. components.
CRS I
1 CRS I INFREQUENTIABNORMAL OPERATIONS
~~~~
Restoration of ES Components - Level 2
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS 1 Procedure I
n II Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
4 Event#
2 & 3 Page -
12 of 26 I Event
Description:
I I
Inadvertent ESAS Actuation Train A; Makeup Pump MU-P-1A Fails to Start on ESAS Actuation (TS)
I I
CRS 1 Prerequisites:
I I 0 ES signals have been cleared bypassed or defeated.
NOTE: should be periodically reviewed until all components have been returned to ES Standby or to their long term configuration.
Review Attachment 1 to determine which components need to be restored depending on plant conditions.
CRS I
Verify or restore BWST level to normal level within one hour, to comply with T.S. 3.3.1.1.a.
CRS 1
I 1
URO 1 Restore RCS letdown as follows:
I 0 Verify/Close MU-V-3.
Verify/Close MU-V-5.
0 Open MU-V-2NB.
0 Restore letdown flow in accordance with OP-TM-211-950, I
I Makeup and Purification System.
URO 1 Restore RCS Makeup as follows:
1 0 Verify/Close MU-V-217.
I 0 Verify MU-V-17 in manual and closed.
I 0 Open MU-V-18.
I 0 Open MU-V-17 as necessary to establish makeup flow.
I I
I 0
Place MU-V-17 in auto to control level at desired setpoint.
Restore RB normal cooling and secure RB Emergency Cooling I
ARo I as follows:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Scenario#
4 Event#
2 & 3 Event
Description:
Open RB-V-7.
b Open RB-V-2A.
B b
Verify AH-E-IA/B/C are running at desired speed.
Secure RB Emergency Cooling per OP-TM-534-901, RB Emergency Cooling Water System.
Secure DH, DC and DR systems as follows:
B Secure DH-P-INB.
Injection Systems The borated water storage tank (BWST) shall contain a minimum of 350,000 gallons of water having a minimum concentration of 2,5000 ppm boron at a temperature not less than 40°F. If the boron concentration of water temperature is not within limits, restore the W S T to OPERABLE within 8 hrs.
If the BWST volume is not within limits, restore the BWST to OPERABLE within one hour. Specification 3.0.1 applies.
Two Makeup and Purification (MU)/High Pressure Injection (HPI) pumps are OPERABLE in the engineered safeguards mode powered from independent essential buses.
Specification 3.0.1 applies.
Maintenance or testing shall be allowed during reactor operation on any components(s), in the makeup and purification, decay heat, RBH emergency cooling water, RB spray, BWST level instrumentation, or cooling water systems which will not remove more than one train of each system from service. Components shall not be removed from service so that the affected system train in operable for more than 72 consecutive hours. If the system is not restored to meet the requirements of Specification 3.3.1 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the reactor shall be placed in a HOT SHUTDOWN condition within six hours.*
INITIATES OP-TM-211-950 Restoration of Letdown Flow.
OOQOOG Scenario#
4 Event#
2 & 3 Inadvertent ESAS Actuation Train A; Makeup Pump MU-P-1A Fails to Start on ESAS Actuation (TS) -
Event
Description:
I I
URO I
URO Limitations
~~
_ _ _ _ _ ~
The rate of change of letdown flow should be limited to 2.5 GPM/Min to minimize the thermal stress on the letdown cooler Prerequisites VERIFY one ICCW pump is operating and a heat sink to the river is operable.
VERIFY RB area monitors (RM-G-22 / 23) do not indicate excessive RCS activity.
VERIFY the integrity of the letdown line to the MU tank has been assessed.
VERIFY RM-A-6, RM-A-8 or portable radiation monitors are in service to detect any release that may result from opening the containment isolation valves The ED (or SM if Eplan has not been activated) has given permission to re-open containment isolation valves.
ENSURE the cause of the isolation has been corrected or the actuation signal has been BYPASSED in accordance with other procedures.
ENSURE MU-V-3 is CLOSED.
CLOSE MU-V-4.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URO Scenario#
4 Event#
2 & 3 Inadvertent ESAS Actuation Train A; Makeup Pump MU-P-1A Fails to Start on ESAS Actuation (TS) -
Op Test No.:
1 Event
Description:
OPEN MU-V-5 to 10% demand.
URO ENSURE OPEN the following:
MU-V-1A MU-V-1B I
I URO ENSURE OPEN the following:
MU-V-2A MU-V-2B URO OPEN MU-V-3 (PUSH AND HOLD MU-V-3 open pushbutton until high letdown temperature alarm clears if MU-V-3 closed on high temperature).
NOTE:
0 e
I I
URO Monitor letdown temperature and ICCW temperature.
Adjust NR-V-15NB to maintain ICCW temperature between 90 and 100°F.
Maintain letdown temperature e 125°F.
THROTTLE OPEN MU-V-5 to RAISE letdown flow at 2.5 gpm/min to the desired flow or at a faster rate if required by SM/ED.
When letdown flow > 50 GPM, then OPEN MU-V-4 and THROTTLE MU-V-5 to maintain a stable letdown flow.
When pressurizer level is restored to the desired range, then CLOSE MU-V-5.
GO TO EVENT 4.
000006 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
4 Event#
4, 5, & 6 Page 16 of. 2 6 Event
Description:
Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)
Booth Operator Instructions: Insert Event 4 when directed.
Indications Available:
I_
I CRS 1
CRS 3IRECTS entry into OP-TM-MAP-M0206 Aux Cond Hotwell
-eve1 HI.
CAUSES Degraded Main Condenser Vacuum MANUAL ACTIONS REQUIRED OBSERVE the following:
0 L2275, 1AAux. Condenser 0
L2276, 1 B Aux. condenser DETERMINE which condenser has the high level condition by observing the sight glass on the auxiliary condenser hotwell (Turbine building elevation 305' on the north end of the condensers).
VERIFY conductivity points CE35 and CE36 on recorder SS-CR-J500C, are not rising (Turbine plant sampling room).
0 VERIFY proper operation of automatic dump valves CO-V-15A and CO-V-I5B, take local manual control as required to establish normal level.
VERIFY main condenser vacuum is not degraded.
START additional Main Vacuum Pumps if necessary.
DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-MAP-NO106 MN Cond Vacuum LO.
SETPOINTS
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
Scenario#
4 Event#
4, 5, &6 Event
Description:
Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press NOTE:
Turbine speed > 150 RPM and Turbine exhaust pressure on any Hood is above value on table. Alarm & Trip setpoints vary with turbine load (6th stage pressure).
(EX-PT-1749/1750/1751-A/B/C) 61 to 79 psi9 (37 to 48%)
79 to 141 psig (48 to 85%)
oHgA to oHgA 6.O"HgA Varies linearly from 6.O"HgA to 7.O"HgA Varies linearly from 141 to 168 psig (85 to 102%)
6.O"HgA This Alarm Setpoint, which is variable, depending on 6th Stage Turbine Pressure, is shown on DTCS OWS Screen #13.
CAUSES 0
Abnormal Condenser air in-leakage AUTOMATIC ACTIONS If rising backpressure reaches trip setpoint, 2 out of 3 switches, on any hood then: (DTCS Screen #13).
0 Main Turbine trips.
Reactor trips if Turbine trips and > 45% power.
MANUAL ACTIONS REQUIRED I
I Use Absolute Pressure Indicator CO-PI-73 on CL or Computer Point A0033.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:
1
.Scenario#
4 Event#
4, 5, & 6 Page 18 of 26 Event
Description:
I Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)
CRS IAAT Condenser Backpressure greater than Alarm Setpoint, then:
B If Generator MWe less than 272% then TRIP the Turbine.
REDUCE load IAW 1102-4.
~~
If high Condenser Offgas Flow (A0436) indicated:
0 FILL Condenser Exhaust Boot expansion seals IAW OP-TM-421-462.
0 VERIFY Condenser Air Removal lineup IAW OP-TM-331-000.
0 CHECK Main Condenser for air in-leakage due to improper valve position, leaking flanges or other off normal conditions.
REFER to OP-TM-PPC-A0436.
1 EXAMINERS NOTE:
Control rods will have to be inserted to reduce power as condenser vacuum degrades.
1 EXAMINERS NOTE:
Condenser vacuum (turbine back pressure will I
CRS I
URO URO URO degrade to the turbine trip setpoint or at C 95% power the turbine will trip).
DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-001 Reactor Trip.
I M M E D I ATE ACT IONS PRESS both Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons.
VERIFY REACTOR SHUTDOWN.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URO URO Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
4 Event#
4,5, & 6 Page -
19 of 26
/I PRESS Turbine Trip PB.
VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.
Event
Description:
CRS Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)
VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFICATION (VSSV)
CRS EXAMINERS NOTE:
ARO should diagnose excessive primary to secondary heat transfer in the A OTSG and INITIATE Rule 3.
DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-003 Excessive Primary to Secondary heat Transfer.
ARO
~~
~~~
~~
~~
~
IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom using the following priority:
I CRS 1 -
Rule 3 Excessive Heat Transfer.
I I 0 XHT GO TO EOP-003.
ARO
~
~
VERIFY OTSG level 97.5%.
TRIP both Main FW Pumps (if necessary).
1 CRS I IMMEDIATE ACTIONS I
ARO I PERFORM Rule 3, XHT I
URO I INITIATE Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control.
I ARO 1 PERFORM Phase 1 Isolation of the affected OTSGs).
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 ARO Op Test No.:
1 Scenario#
4 Event#
4,5, &6 VERIFY OTSG level and pressure stabilizes.
Event
Description:
Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)
EXAM IN ERS NOTE:
Isolating the A OTSG is a CRITICAL TASK.
I ARO ICLOSES:
1 MS-V-1A MS-V-16 FW-V-16A FW-V-17A I
FW-V-5A 1
FW-V-92A MS-V-3D MS-V3E 1
MS-V-3F I
MS-V4A EXAMINERS NOTE:
ARO should diagnose FW-V-92A and FW-V-16A failure to close. Closing FW-V-92A isolates FW flow to the A OTSG.
1 ARO I VERIFY steam leak is not in RB or Intermediate Building.
INITIATE Guide 12, RCS stabilization following OTSG I
ARo I Isolation.
I I
I URO I Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control.
I I MU Tank Level Control:
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URO 1
Scenario#
4 Event#
4, 5, & 6 IF Pressurizer Level is LOW:
Event
Description:
URO URO URO Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)
VERIFY MU Pump flows &I 5 gpm/pump.
VERIFY SCM 250°F.
VERIFY at least one RCP is operating.
0 VERIFY MU-V-5 is CLOSED>
VERIFY MU pump is operating.
VERIFY MU24-FI > 20 GPM.
ENSURE MU-V-17 is OPEN.
I VERIFY PZR level is being restored.
I 0 VERIFY MU24-FI > 20 GPM.
I 0 VERIFY PZR level is being restored.
~
~~
~
INITATE HPI IAW OP-TM-211-901, "Emergency Injection 1
HPI/LPI".
EXAMINER'S NOTE:
ESAS 1600 psig actuation should already be actuated.
The URO will have to manually start MU-P-1A.
I URO I IF Pressurizer Level is HIGH:
I VERIFY HPI is throttled IAW Rule 2.
EXAMINER'S NOTE:
Throttling HPI when the A OTSG is dry is a CRITICAL TASK.
URO Rule 2 HPI/LPI Throttling
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event
Description:
Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)
URO URO URO URO
~~
URO URO URO P
aHEN incore temperature is lowering and RCS 25°F superheat and either of the following conditions exists:
B SCMB25F Then HPI may be THROTTLED IAW OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection HPVLPI..3 Throttling HPI VERIFY ESAS in defeat IAW OP-TM-642-901, 1600 psig ESAS Actuation.
IAAT three MU pumps are running and CRS concurrence is obtained, then SHUTDOWN the ES selected pump lined up to MU & SI and PLACE CS in Normal-After-Stop. (e.9. normally MU -P-1 A)
VERIFY throttling is permitted IAW RULE 2 and OBTAIN CRS concurrence.
WAAT HPI throttling is permitted IAW RULE 2 and prior to reducing any MU pump flow to less than 115 GPM, then perform the following:
0 If DH-V-7A and DH-V-7B are Closed, then OPEN MU-V-36 and MU-V-37.
WAAT Emergency Boration is not required (Rule 5), then INITIATE Guide 9 to close MU-V-14A and MU-V-14B.
IF CRS directs termination of HPI, then SHUTDOWN the MU pumps which started on ES and PLACE CS in Normal-after-stop.
CLOSE both MU-V-16 valves lined up to MU/SI pump.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Event
Description:
Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)
CRS I
CLOSE both MU-V-16 valves opposite MU/S.
EOP-003 FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS 1
GO TO Step IO.
ARo WHEN OP-TM-244-901 criteria is satisfied, then OPEN I
URo I MU-V-18.
ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and radio.
THROTTLE MU-V-16 parallel to MU and SI (i.e. normally I
URo I M U-V-I 66).
CRS CRS ENSURE RCS temperature reduction has been terminated.
VERIFY primary to secondary heat transfer is being established.
CRS INITIATE Emergency boration - Rule 5, EB (if necessary).
ENSURE performance of an alarm review.
I I
CRS 1 VERIFY RCS Tcold > 525°F CRS REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
I 1
CRS 1 VERIFY OTSG B is providing sufficient steam for Gland Steam. I 1
CRS 1 VERIFY OTSG tube leakhupture symptoms do not exist.
I
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 CRS Page 24 of 26 I 1
Scenario#
4 Event#
4, 5, & 6 VERIFY RCS Tcold > 400°F.
Event
Description:
CRS Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)
VERIFY RB Pressure 2 psig.
I I
CRS 1 INITIATE Attachment 1.
I CRS URO 0
OTSG tube leakage > 1 gpm GO TO EOP-005 ANNOUNCE Reactor Trip over plant page and radio (include plant conditions sufficient for NLO response per OS-24).
VERIFY control rod groups 1 through 7 are fully inserted.
I I
CRS I VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFICATION (VSSV)
I ARO IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom using the following priority:
CRS 1
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VERIFY OTSG A and B Operating Range level 97.5%.
1 SCM < 25°F GO TO EOP-002 XHT GO TO EOP-003 LOHT GO TO EOP-004 VERIFY Main FW Flow to A and B OTSG are each < 0.5 1
ARo 1 mlb/hr.
I I
ARO I VERIFY OTSG level =. setpoint.
I
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 URO Op Test No.: -
1 Scenario#
4 Event#
4, 5, & 6 Page 25 of 26 then emergency boration may be terminated.
VERIFY a MU pump is operating.
Event
Description:
Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)
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URO I
URO I VERIFY ICS/NNI HAND or AUTO Power is available.
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PERFORM ONE of the following:
OPEN MU-V-14A EXAMINERS NOTE:
Establishing Emergency Boration is a CRITICAL TASK.
URO I
URO I Rule 4 Emergency Boration VERIFY Total Injection (MU, SI & HPI) > 50 GPM.
INITIATE OP-TM-211-950, Restoration of Letdown Flow (if necessary).
I URO I WAAT one of the following conditions exist:
0 1% dk/k SHUTDOWN has been achieved for the expected plant condition IAW Figure I of 1103-4, Soluble Poison Concentration Control, or 1 103-1 5A, SDM and Reactivity Balance I
I LPI 1250 GPM per line 0
Tavg > 525°F and stable or rising and all rods are inserted and Neutron flux is lowering as expected I 0 OPEN MU-V-14B I
0 PERFORM Guide 1 Emergency Boration Backup Methods.
Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 RS Scenario#
4 Event##
4, 5, & 6 Page 26 of 26 Main Condenser Vacuum Leak; Main Steam Safety Valve Fails to Reseat; (MS-V-17A) and A Steam Leak in the Intermediate Building; SG A Lo Press Isolation Setpoint is at Zero PSIG; Startup Feedwater Valve FW-V-16A Fails at 100% Open (CT-17 and CT-30); Two Control Rods Fail to Fully Insert (CT-23)
VERIFY 1 D and 1 E 4160V buses are energized from auxiliary transformers.
1 EXAMINER'S NOTE:
URO When Emergency Boration is established the scenario can be terminated.
INITIATE Guide 8, "RCS Pressure Control".
CRS I
URO I INITIATE Guide 9 "RCS Inventory Control".
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WAAT Generator MW I zero, or Turbine speed < 1770 RPM, then VERIFY GBI-12 and GBI-02 are OPEN.
I I
ARO I INITIATE Guide 6 "OTSG Pressure Control".
CRS ARo WAAT GBI-12 and GBI-02 are OPEN, then ENSURE the Generator Field Breaker is OPEN.
VERIFY primary and secondary Instrument Air pressure > 80 psig.
INITIATE OP-TM-642-904 "Reactor Trip Isolation ESAS I
URo 1 Actuation".