ML071770553

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Final Outlines (Folder 3)
ML071770553
Person / Time
Site: Crane Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/19/2007
From:
AmerGen Energy Co
To: D'Antonio J
Operations Branch I
Sykes, Marvin D.
Shared Package
ML060800145 List:
References
50-289/07-301, ES-401, ES-401-2, NUREG-1021 50-289/07-301
Download: ML071770553 (29)
v • d • e


Text

ES-401 PWR Examination Outline Form ES-401-2

2.

Plant Systems 1.

2.
3.
4.

1 3

1 3

0 0

5 2

3 4

2 5

28 2

3 5

2 0

1 1

2 2

0 0

1 1

2 0

10 0 1 1 2

3 Tier 3

2 4

2 2

5 2

4 5

4 5

38 3

5 8

Totals

3. Generic Knowledge and Abilities Categories
5.
6.

7.*

1 2

3 4

7 10 1

2 3

2 2

3 3

2 2

2 1

8.
9.

Ensure that at least two topics from every applicable KIA category are sampled within each tier of the RO and SRO-only outlines (Le., except for one category in Tier 3 of the SRO-only outline, the Tier Totals in each KIA category shall not be less than two).

The point total for each group and tier in the proposed outline must match that specified in the table. The final point total for each group and tier may deviate by +I from that specified in the table based on NRC revisions. The final RO exam must total 75 points and the SRO-only exam must total 25 points.

Systemslevolutions within each group are identified on the associated outline; systems or evolutions that do not apply at the facility should be deleted and justified; operationally important, site-specific systems that are not included on the outline should be added. Refer to ES-401, Attachment 2, for guidance regarding elimination of inappropriate KIA statements.

Select topics from as many systems and evolutions as possible; sample every system or evolution in the group before selecting a second topic for any system or evolution.

Absent a plant specific priority, only those KAs having an importance rating (IR) of 2.5 or higher shall be selected. Use the RO and SRO ratings for the RO and SRO-only portions, respectively.

Select SRO topics for Tiers 1 and 2 from the shaded systems and KIA categories.

The generic (G) WAS in Tiers 1 and 2 shall be selected from Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, but the topics must be relevant to the applicable evolution or system.

On the following pages, enter the KIA numbers, a brief description of each topic, the topics importance ratings (IR) for the applicable license level, and the point totals (#) for each system and category. Enter the group and tier totals for each category in the table above. Use duplicate pages for RO and SRO-only exams.

For Tier 3, select topics from Section 2 of the KIA Catalog, and enter the KIA numbers, descriptions, IRs, and point totals (#) on Form ES-401-3. Limit SRO selections to WAS that are linked to 10CFR55.43 NUREG-1021

Form ES-401-2 TMI Unit 1 NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1 ES-401 01 5 I Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions/ 4 027 I Pressurizer Pressure Control System Malfunction I 3 029 /Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) I 1 X

038 I Steam Generator Tube Rupture / 3 054 I Loss of Main Feedwater I 4 065 I Loss of Instrument Air i 8 X

007 I Reactor Trip I 1 008 I Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident I 3 015 I Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions/ 4

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X I

I 1 x 1 I

009 I Small Break LOCA I 3

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X X I AA2.01 022 I Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup 12 325 I Loss of Residual Heat Removal System 14 126 I Loss of Component Cooling Water I8 2.1.32 t-X X

I 2.4.50 I

EA2.15 X I AA2.06 2 1.32 EK2.02 AA2.17 2.1.2 AK2.07 E x 1 AA2.02 AA1.01 AK3.03 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): Cause of RCP failure Conduct of Operations. Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.

~

Emergency Procedures / Plan Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual Ability to determine or interpret the followmg as they apply to a SGTR Pressure at which to maintain RCS during SIG cooldown Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW) AFW adjustments needed to maintain proper T-ave and SIG level

~

Conduct of Operations Ability to explain and apply all svstem limits and mecautions Knowledge of the interrelations between a reactor trip and the following: Breakers, relays and disconnects Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: Steam dumD valve controller (Dosition)

Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation Knowledge of the interrelations between the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow) and the following: RCP seals Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: Charging pump problems Ability to operate andlor monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Residual Heat Removal System:

RCSIRHRS cooldown rate Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water:

Guidance actions contained in EOP for Loss of CCWINuclear Service Water 4.4 I 79 2.5 I 40 3.2 I 43 4

VUREG-1021 2

I ES-401 TMI Unit 1 Form ES-401-2 I NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1

1)

E/APE # / Name Safety Function 1 G I K1 I K2 ] K3 I AI I A2 ] Number I WA Topic@)

1 029 I Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS) I 1 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the ATWS: Reactor nucleonics and thermo-hydraulics behavior EK1.01 2.8 46 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as the apply to the SGTR: Automatic actions associated with high radioactivity in SIG sample lines Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW):

Manual control of AFW flow control valves 47 -

48 038 I Steam Generator Tube Rupture I 3 054 I Loss of Main Feedwater I 4 EK3.03 AK3.03 3.6 3.8 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the Station Blackout: Natural Circulation Cooling EKI.02 4.1 49 055 I Station Blackout I 6 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Offsite Power: Definition of saturation conditions, implication for the systems Emergency Procedures I Plan: Ability to recognize abnormal indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for emergency and abnormal operating procedures.

Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of DC Power:

Battery charger equipment and instrumentation 50 056 I Loss of Off-site Power I 6 057 I Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument Bus 16 AK1.04 2.4.4 AK1.01 3.1 4.0 2.8 51 -

52 058 I Loss of DC Power I 6

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: The automatic actions (alignments) within the nuclear service water resulting from the actuation of the ESFAS AK3.02 3.6 53 062 I Loss of Nuclear Service Water I 4 Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Inadequate Heat Transfer) and the following: Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

I E04 I Inadequate Heat Transfer 14 EK2.2 54 4.2 3.5 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Excessive Heat Transfer): Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Excessive Heat Transfer).

EK3.2 55 E05 I Excessive Heat Transfer I 4 NUREG-I021 3

I ES-401 TMI Unit 1 Form ES-401-2 1 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Post-Trip Stabilization): RO or SRO function within the control room team as appropriate to the assigned position, in such a way that procedures are adhered to and the limitations in the facilities license and amendments are not violated.

4.0 NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 1 56 E/APE # / Name Safety Function r(/A Category Point Totals:

E10 / Post-Trip Stabilization I 1 213 4

3 6

1 213 Group Point 1816 Total:

X EK3.4 NUREG-I 021 4

ES-401 TMI Unit 1 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier 1 Group 2 2.4.30 Emergency Procedures i Plan: Knowledge of which events related to system operationsistatus should be reported to outside agencies.

Equipment Control: Knowledge of bases in technical specifications for limiting conditions for operations and safety limits.

Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Cooldown):

Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak:

Comparison of makeup flow and letdown flow for various modes of operation Ability to operate andlor monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Condenser Vacuum: Rod position 3.7 4.0 3.1 2,5 AA1.2 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the (Plant Runback): Operating behavior characteristics of the facility.

037 I Steam Generator Tube Leak / 3 82 83 84 85 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 3.6 Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Accidental Gaseous Radwaste: The effects on the power plant of isolating a given radioactive gas leak 060 I Accidental Gaseous RadWaste Release I 9 X

EA2.04 3.4 067 I Plant Fire On-site / 8 2.2.25 E09 I Natural Circulation Operations / 4 EA2.2 037 I Steam Generator Tube Leak I3 AK3.02 051 I Loss of Condenser Vacuum I4 AA1.04 Ability to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction:

Selection of an alternate PZR level channel if one has failed.

028 I Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction I 2 AA1.08 3.7

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068 I Control Room Evacuation I 8 I

3.3 Knowledge of the interrelations between the Control Room Evacuation and the following: EDIG AK2.07 1

A01 I Plant Runback I 1 3.2

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A03 I LOSS Of NNI-Y I7 Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Loss of NNI-Y): Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (LOSS Of NNI-Y).

AK3.2 3.0 AK2.2

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~~

~

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Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Turbine Trip) and the following: Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

A04 I Turbine Trip I 4 3.3 NUREG-I 021 5

ES-40 1 TMI Unit 1 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Emergency and Abnormal Plant Evolutions - Tier I Group 2 I

EK2.2 EK3.3

~~

11 E X P E # / Name Safety Function I G I K1 I K2 I K3 I A I I A2 I Number 1 K/A Topic(s)

Knowledge of the interrelations between the (Inadequate Subcooling Margin) and the following:

Facility's heat removal systems, including primary coolant, emergency coolant, the decay heat removal systems, and relations between the proper operation of these systems to the operation of the facility.

Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the (Natural Circulation Cooldown):

Manipulation of controls required to obtain desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.

4.3 3.8 1

E03 I hadequate Subcooling Margin I 4 EO9 I Natural Circulation Operations I 4 WA Category Point Total:

I 012 NUREG-I021 6

ES-401 TMI Unit 1 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 01 0 Pressurizer Pressure Control l------

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR PCS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations Spray valve failures 3.9 86 A2.02 2.1.33 2.1.32 A2.12 2.1.27 K6.04 K1.05 K6.03 X

A4.05 K3.01 2.1.2 A2.03 X

X xx X

X Conduct of Operations: Ability to recognize system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for technical specifications.

1 4.0 1 87 1 012 Reactor Protection 026 Containment Spray Conduct of Operations Ability to explain and apply all svstem limits and mecautions Ahlhty tG (a) predict the impacts Of the following malfunctions or operations on the AC distribution system and (h) based on those predictions use procedures to correct, control or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations Restoration of power to a system with a fault on it Conduct of Operations Knowledge of system purpose and or function 3 6 89 2 9 90 1

062 AC Electrical Distribution 103 Containment 003 Reactor Coolant Pump 004 Chemical and Volume Control 005 Residual Heat Removal Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RCPS: Containment isolation valves affecting RCP operation Knowledge of the physical connections and/or 2.8 1 -

cause-effect relationships between the CVCS and the following systems: CRDS operation in automatic X

mode control Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following will have on the RHRS: RHR heat exchanger Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the control room: Transfer of ECCS flow paths prior to recirculation 3.9 I 4 006 Emergency Core Cooling 007 Pressurizer RelieflQuench Tank 008 Component Cooling Water

-~

~ _ _

~~~

Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRTS will have on the following: Containment X

r 3.0 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.

Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PZR PCS; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: PORV failures 4.1 010 Pressurizer Pressure Control NUREG-I 021 7

ES-401 TMI Unit 1 Form ES-401-2 NRC Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the PZR PCS: Pressure detection systems Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: Permissive circuits Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

ESFASkafeguards equipment control Conduct of Operations: Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.

Abity to monitor automatic operation of the CCS, including: Initiation of safeguards mode of operation I 4,1 1 12 1 I

2.8 I 13 1 Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of system purpose and or function.

~~~

1 4.5 I

14 I Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the control room: CSS controls Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the CSS will have on the following: CCS Ability to predict andlor monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the MRSS controls including: Main steam pressure Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Tripping of MFW pump turbine Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MFW will have on the following: AFW system 3,9 15 3.0 16 3.0 17 3.6 18 Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the AFW components:

Pumps 1

2.6 1 19 1

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Ability to monitor automatic operation of the AC distribution system, including: Vital AC bus amperage Ability to monitor automatic operation of the DC electrical system, including: Meters, annunciators, dials, recorders, and indicating lights ':::I

ES-401 TMI Unit 1 NRC Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 1 Form ES-401-2 I

I A I.03 A2.02 K1.05 2.1.2 Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the ED/G system controls including: Operating voltages, currents, and temperatures Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the PRM system; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: Detector failure Knowledge of the physical connections andlor cause-effect relationships between the ECCS system and the following systems: RCP seal injection and return Conduct of Operations: Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation.

K1.04 2.1.33 Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the IAS and the following systems: Cooling water to compressor Conduct of Operations: Ability to recognize indications for system operating parameters which are entry-level conditions for technical specifications.

A3.01 Ability to monitor automatic operation of the containment system, including: Containment isolation Group Point Total:

[

3.2 2.7 2.8 3.0 2.6 3.4 3.9 22 -

23

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24 -

25 26 -

27 28 -

2815 NUREG-1021 9

TMI Unit 1 NRC Written Examination Outline Plant Systems - Tier 2 Group 2

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2.1.32 A2.05 2.1.23 Form ES-401-2 I Conduct of Operations Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Waste Gas Disposal System and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations Power failure to the ARM and PRM systems Conduct of Operations Ability to perform specific modes of DIant ooeratton system and integrated plant procedures during all ES-401 9,

2 6 92 4 0 93 I

I I

Imp. I Q# I I System #/Name KIA Topics 01 1 Pressurizer Level Control X -

X 071 Waste Gas Disposal 086 Fire Protection Knowledge of the following operational implications as they apply to the CRDS: Xenon production and removal process 001 Control Rod Drive K5.33 3.2 29 Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the PZR LCS:

Criteria and purpose of PZR level program Knowledge of ITM system design feature(s) andlor interlock(s) which provide for the following: Input to subcooling monitors 2.7 30 -

31 01 1 Pressurizer Level Control K5.12 K4.01 01 7 In-core Temperature Monitor 3.4 K2.01 Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following:

ICs, normal and alternate power supply Knowledge of design feature(s) andlor interlock(s) which provide for the following: Negative pressure in containment 041 Steam Dump System and Turbine Bypass Control 329 Containment Purge K4.02 Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System; and (b) based those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations:

Abnormal Spent Fuel Pool water level or loss of water level.

Ability to manually operate andlor monitor in the control room: Turbine valve indicators (throttle, governor, control, stop, intercept), alarms, and annunciators.

Ability to monitor automatic operation of the Waste Gas Disposal System including: Pressure-regulating system for the waste gas vent header.

333 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling 3.1 34 A2.03 A4.01 A3.02 145 Main Turbine Generator 3.1 35 2.8 -

36 171 Waste Gas Disposal NUREG-I 021 10

System #/Name G

072 Area Radiation Monitoring 086 Fire Protection K/A Category Point Totals 012 NUREG-I021 KIA Topics Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of handling operations Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room Halon system K1 K2 K3 K4 K5 K6 AI A2 A3 A4 Number X

K3 02 the ARM system will have on the following Fuel 3 1 37 3 2 38 A4 o6 1013 0

1 1

2 2

0 0

111 1

2 Group Point Total 11

~ 2Equipment Control Facility:

TMI Unit 1 I

DateofExam:

I 2'2.28 2.2.33 2.2.34 2.2.26 Category 3.5 96 Knowledge of new and spent fuel movement procedures.

Knowledge of the process for determining the internal and external effects on core 2.8 68 reactivity.

Knowledge of refueling administrative requirements.

Knowledge of control rod programming.

2.9 97 2.5 69

1.

Conduct of Operations 4/22/2007 SRO-Only I+

Topic KIA #

2'1.32 2'1 3,5 66 2.1.3 Knowledge of shift turnover practices.

3.0 67 3.9 94 3.8 95 Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license.

Ability to explain and apply all system limits and precautions.

Ability to make accurate, clear and concise verbal reports.

Subtotal I

2.3.2 2.3.1 2.3.4 2.3.10 2.3.1 1 Knowledge of facility ALARA program.

I I

I 2.9 I 98 3.0 Knowledge of 10 CFR: 20 and related facility radiation control requirements Knowledge of radiation exposure limits and contamination control, including permissible 2.5 70 levels in excess of those authorized.

Ability to perform procedures to reduce excessive levels of radiation and guard 2.9 71 against personnel exposure.

Ability to control radiation releases.

2.7 72 99 Subtotal I

1 3

1 I

2 4.1 100 Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications.

Knowledge of general guidelines for EOP flowchart use.

Knowledge of the RO's responsibilities in emergency plan implementation.

Knowledge of crew roles and responsibilities during EOP flowchart use.

2.4'41 2'4'14 3,0 73 2.4.39 3.3 74 3.3 75 2.4'1 Procedures / Plan Subtotal 7

r n I

1 10 I 1

7 NUREG-I 021 12

211 211 212 212 212 2 12 Reason for Rejection Tier I Randomly Group Selected KIA I

I Facility does not perform function for the selected topic. Randomly selected Excessive overlap with Audit Examination. Impossible to develop significantly different question. Randomly selected EK2.02 for same topic Facility does not have air ejectors, and Off-Gas monitors do not have a reset function. Randomly selected AK3.03 No pneumatic valves in DHR system at facility. Randomly selected K1.05 for Facility does not have Containment Spray Reset switches. Randomly selected Waste Gas system has no rupture discs at facility. Randomly selected A2.08 for the same topic.

No procedural support for Inadequate SDM in SFP. Randomly selected A2.03 for the same topic.

Facility design is such that there is no overlap between WGDS and HRPS.

Randomly selected A3.02 for the same topic.

Meteorological changes are not referenced in facility procedures for the system. Randomly selected an A2 (A2.05) that has facility application and is not RMS-related.

AA2.1

~ ~ 2. 0 1 for same topic.

055 EK1 037 AK3'02 Oo4 K1. O topic area 026 A4.05 A4.01 07' A2.03 033 A2.01 07' A3'01 071 A2.08 1

2 I I I 025 (32.1.27 I System does not exist at TMI. Reselected system 012.

I Many RMS-related questions on this examination. Randomly selected a K1 in a svstem not selected twice in T2/G1: 006 K1.05.

1 211 I 073K1.01 I 212 211 KIA yields very similar question to Question 23. Selected the only other 072 Facility has no normal IA alignment to the containment. Randomly selected 072 K3.01 K3 (K3.02).

078 K1.03 K,.04.

027 K2'01 060 AA1 '02 2'1'27 2'1.30 212 3

211 A valid question could not be developed for the facility equivalent fan.

Randomly selected K2 >2.5 from a system not covered in T2G2 (041 K2.01).

KIA ties in to other RMS-related questions. Chief Examiner suggested a KIA change. Randomly selected 028 AA1.08.

Chief Examiner suggested a KIA change due to over-sampling. Randomly selected a 2.1 KIA from those not used on the examination (2.1.3).

A valid SRO-level question could not be developed for this KIA. Chief Examiner suggested a KIA change. Randomly selected 2.1.33.

NU REG-I 02 1 13

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 Facility:

TMI Unit 1 Date of Examination:

April 2007 Examination Level (circle one):

I SRO Operating Test Number:

NRC Administrative Topic (see Note)

Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Equipment Control Radiation Control Emergency Plan Type Code*

N N, s N

Describe activity to be performed Perform a batch calculation in accordance with OP CONTROL, Enclosure 1.

2.1.25 (2.8): Ability to obtain and interpret station reference materials such as graphs, monographs, and tables which contain performance data.

Perform a transient RCS leak rate calculation in accordance with OS-24, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS DURING ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY EVENTS, ATTACHMENT F.

2.1.1 9 (3.0): Ability to use plant computer to obtain and evaluate parametric information on system or comDonent status.

11 03-4, SOLUBLE BORON CONCENTRATION Perform Shiftly Checks of Decay Heat Removal Capability in accordance with Surveillance Procedure 1301 -1, SHIFT AND DAILY CHECKS, Data Sheet 3 -

Section C.2.

2.2.1 2 (3.0): Knowledge of surveillance procedures.

Given a set of conditions, determine and apply the facility dose limits.

2.3.1 (2.6): Knowledge of 10 CFR: 20 and related facility radiation control requirements.

N/A - not selected for RO NOTE:

All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (I 3 for ROs; I for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (I 1 ; randomly selected)

(S) i m u lator NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-301 Admi Sst rat ive Topics Out1 i ne Form ES-301-1 THREE MILE ISLAND 2007 NRC RO EXAMINATION CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (Al-1): Perform a batch calculation in accordance with OP 1 103-4, SOLUBLE BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL, Enclosure 1. Given a situation and conditions, determine the applicable section of 1 103-4, Enclosure 1 and utilize the referenced figures and tables to perform a batch calculation. New JPM. RO/SRO Common.

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (Al-2): Perform a transient RCS leak rate calculation in accordance with OS-24, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS DURING ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY EVENTS, ATTACHMENT F. Given a frozen simulator with an RCS leak in progress, use the plant computer to extract the necessary data and then calculate the leak rate.

The calculation is RO/SRO Common. Modify Bank JPM 1 1205057 by changing the initial conditions and requiring the applicant to retrieve the data from the plant computer on a frozen simulator.

EQUIPMENT CONTROL (A2): Perform Shiftly Checks of Decay Heat (DH) Removal Capability in accordance with Surveillance Procedure 1301-1, SHIFT AND DAILY CHECKS, Data Sheet 3 - Section C.2. Evaluate DH Pump performance, system alignment and the adequacy of support instrumentation with the simulator in cold shutdown on DH cooling; identifying all (two, or more) errors. RO only. New JPM RADIATION CONTROL (A3): Given an emergency situation and survey maps, determine the area dose rate near a specified plant component and apply the applicable facility limits to determine the stay time for the situation. RO/SRO Common. New JPM.

NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-301 Control Roodln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 Faci I i ty:

TMI Unit 1 Date of Examination:

April 2007 Exam Level (circle one):

RO / SRO(I) / SRO (U)

Operating Test No.:

NRC Control Room Systems@ (8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U, including 1 ESF)

System / JPM Title Type Code*

Safety Function M, E, L 1

a.

Take corrective action for a Control Rod Drive Sequence Fault in accordance with (IAW) OP-TM-MAP-GO202.

System: 001

b.

Take corrective action for a low pressure injection failure during a large break LOCA IAW OP-TM-211-901.

System: 006 3

c.

Respond to an RCS narrow range pressure instrument failure IAW alarm response procedure MAP G-1-6.

System: 01 0 Respond to an RCP Seal problem IAW AOP-040.

System: 003

d.

4P D

4s

e.

Cross-connect Secondary River Water to Nuclear River Water IAW System: 076 EP 1202-38. (RO Only) 5

f.

Return RB Emergency Cooling to standby following a manual actuation IAW OP-TM-534-901.

System: 022 6

g.

Energize a Vital AC Bus during a loss of off-site power using the SBO Diesel IAW AOP-020.

System: 062

h.

Respond to an alarm on Control Room RMS Channel RM-A1 IAW System: 073 MAP C, C-1-1.

M 7

Implant Systems@ (3 for RO; 3 for SRO-I; 3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i.

Reset the steam-driven EFW Pump overspeed trip IAW EOP-10, GUIDE 16.1.

P, E 4s System: 061 NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-301 Control Roodln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2

j.

Initiate emergency boration IAW EOP-020.

System: APE 068 M, R, E 8

k.

Manually operate RR-V-6, Reactor Building Emergency Cooler Pressure Control Valve, IAW OP-1104-38.

System: 022 D

Q All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

  • Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I I SRO-U (D)irect from bank

< 9 / < 8 / < 4 2 1 I 2 1 I 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 12 1 2 2 1 2 2 l r 1 5 3 I I 3 15 2 (randomly selected) 2 1 I 2 1 I 2 1 (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1 (A)

(P)revious 2 exams THREE MILE ISLAND 301-2 JPM

SUMMARY

STATEMENTS

a. Take corrective action for a Control Rod Drive Sequence Fault in accordance with (IAW)

OP-TM-MAP-G0202. Group 7 rods withdraw out-of-sequence when power is being raised from < 5% in preparation for synchronizing the main turbine generator. The applicant will respond IAW OP-TM-G0202, CRD SEQUENCE FAULT, and correct the overlap problem IAW OP-TM-622-412, RECOVERING FROM A SEQUENCE INHIBIT CAUSED BY EXCESSIVE OVERLAP. Modify Bank JPM 1 1.2.05.1 59 by changing the initial conditions and therefore the procedure path. To be performed by: RO, SROI, SROU. Failure to properly perform the task will result in a violation of technical specifications and operation outside of accident analysis assumptions.

b. Take corrective action for a low pressure injection failure IAW OP-TM-EOP-006.

Applicant will assume the watch with directions to perform EOP-006, LOCA COOLDOWN. DH-P-1 B has failed to start, requiring alternative actions. The alternate path is via OP-TM-211-901, EMERGENCY INJECTION. Bank JPM 11.2.05.195. To be performed by: RO, SROI, SROU. Failure to properly perform the task will result in the possibility that all LPI flow is out the break.

NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-301 Control Room/ln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 C.

d.
e.
f.
9.
h.

Respond to an RCS narrow range pressure instrument failure IAW alarm response procedure MAP G-1-6. Shortly after assuming the watch, an RCS narrow range pressure instrument fails HI and SASS fails to block the signal. The applicant will respond IAW the alarm response procedure to place equipment in the proper alignmenVposition. Modified Bank JPM TQ-TM-104-220-JOO1 to prevent the PZR Spray Valve from closing in MANUAL. The alternate path is to close the PZR Spray Valve isolation valve. To be performed by: RO, SROI. Failure to properly perform the task will result in unnecessarily creating saturated conditions in the RCS.

Respond to an RCP Seal problem IAW AOP-040. Shortly after assuming the watch, an RCP #1 Seal problem will develop, requiring entry into AOP-040, RCP #1 SEAL FAILURE. The alternate path is a requirement to initiate a reactor trip, stop the affected pump and close the return isolation valve. This JPM is identified as NEW because the JPM was removed from the facility bank prior to 2005 and was not based on AOP-040.

To be performed by: RO, SROI, SROU. Failure to properly perform the task could result in a LOCA caused by catastrophic seal failure.

Cross-connect Secondary River (SR) Water to Nuclear River (NR) Water IAW EP 1202-

38. The only available NR Pump will trip shortly after the applicant assumes the watch with the unit shutdown. SR is then cross-connected to NR IAW EP 1202-38, NUCLEAR SERVICES RIVER WATER FAILURE. Bank JPM 11.2.05.1 50. To be performed by:

RO Only. Failure to properly perform the task will result in loss of cooling water to emergency safeguards equipment.

Return RB Emergency Cooling to standby IAW OP-TM-534-901, RB EMERGENCY COOLING OPERATIONS, following a manual actuation. The applicant assumes the watch with RB Emergency Cooling in service due to a small steam leak that has been isolated and is directed to restore it to ES Standby alignment. Randomly selected repeat from the 2003 NRC Exam (B.l.f). To be performed by: RO, SROI. Failure to properly perform the task could result in inadequate flow to Reactor Building coolers and possible operation outside of accident analysis assumptions.

Energize a Vital AC Bus during a loss of off-site power using the SBO Diesel IAW AOP-020. The applicant assumes the watch after a loss of off-site power and AOP-020, LOSS OF STATION POWER, just entered. The alternate path is to energize ID or 1 E Vital Bus IAW OP-TM-864-901, SBO DIESEL GENERATOR (EG-Y-4) OPERATIONS.

Randomly selected repeat from the 2005 NRC Exam (JPM F). The JPM will be modified in that it will begin in AOP-020 vice OP-TM-864-901 and a different bus will be re-energized. To be performed by: RO, SROI. Failure to properly perform the task will result in loss of DC power to the respective bus or a station blackout if power is lost to the available bus.

Respond to an alarm for RMS Channel RM-A1, Control Room Monitor, IAW MAP C, C-1-1. Shortly after the applicant assumes the watch, alarm C-1-1 (HI ALARM) will actuate. Failure of the interlock will require alignment of components IAW OP-TM-826-901, CONTROL BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM RADIOLOGICAL RESPONSE OPERATIONS. The task is similar to Bank JPM TQ-TM-104-826-J001 but will be modified to start from an alarm condition; with failed interlock actuations. To be performed by: RO, SROI. Failure to properly perform the task will result in possible radiation intrusion into the control room environment.

NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-301 Control Roodln-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2

i.

Reset the steam-driven EFW Pump overspeed trip IAW OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 16.1, EFW FAILURE. Randomly selected repeat from the 2003 NRC Exam (B.2.c). To be performed by: RO, SROI. Failure to properly perform the task will result in loss of all feedwater flow when the operating pump fails.

j.

Initiate emergency boration IAW EOP-020, COOLDOWN FROM OUTSIDE OF CONTROL ROOM, Step 3.1.1 9. Perform the steps necessary to initiate boration from outside the control room. Modify Bank JPM TQ-TM-105-211 -JOO1 to have the applicant perform all sub-steps rather than opening just one manual valve (MU-V-51). To be performed by: RO, SROI, SROU. Failure to properly perform the task will result in inadequate SDM during the cooldown.

k. Manually operate RR-V-6, Reactor Building Emergency Cooler Pressure Control Valve, IAW OP-1104-38. Applicant is directed to raise Reactor Building Emergency Cooling coil pressure with a LOCA in progress. Bank JPM TQ-TM-105-534-J001. To be performed by: RO, SROI, SROU. Failure to properly perform the task could result in an uncontrolled leakage path from the Reactor Building atmosphere to the cooling system to the local environment.

NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-301 Ad minist rative Topics Out line Form ES-301-1 Facility:

TMI Unit 1 Date of Examination:

April 2007 Examination Level (circle one):

RO / ml Operating Test Number:

NRC Administrative Topic (see Note)

Conduct of Operations Conduct of Operations Equipment Control Radiation Control Emergency Plan Type Code*

N N

N P/M Describe activity to be performed Perform a batch calculation in accordance with CONTROL, Enclosure 1.

2.1.25 (2.8/3.1): Ability to obtain and interpret station reference materials such as graphs, monographs, and tables which contain performance data.

OP 1103-4, SOLUBLE BORON CONCENTRATION Perform a transient RCS leak rate calculation in accordance with OS-24, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS DURING ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY EVENTS, ATTACHMENT F, and apply the Technical Specification/procedural requirements to the calculation.

2.1.12 (4.0): Ability to apply technical specifications for a system.

Evaluate a proposed temporary procedure change.

2.2.6 (3.3): Knowledge of the process for making changes in procedures as described in the safety analysis report.

Given a set of conditions, determine and apply the facility dose limits.

2.3.1 (2.6/3.0): Knowledge of 10 CFR: 20 and related facility radiation control requirements.

Given a set of conditions, determine the Emergency Action Level (EAL) and make a Protective Action Recommendation (PAR).

2.4.44 (4.0): Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations.

NOTE: All items (5 total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only 4 items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics, when 5 are required.

  • Type Codes & Criteria:

(C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (I 3 for ROs; I for SROs & RO retakes)

(N)ew or (M)odified from bank (> 1)

(P)revious 2 exams (I 1 ; randomly selected)

(S) i m u lator NUREG-1021, Revision 9

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 THREE MILE ISLAND 2007 NRC SRO EXAMINATION CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (Al-1): Perform a batch calculation in accordance with 1 103-4, SOLUBLE BORON CONCENTRATION CONTROL, Enclosure 1. Given a situation and conditions, determine the applicable section of OP 1 103-4, Enclosure 1 and utilize the referenced figures and tables to perform a batch calculation. New JPM. RO/SRO Common.

CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS (Al-2): Perform a transient RCS leak rate calculation in accordance with OS-24, CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS DURING ABNORMAL AND EMERGENCY EVENTS, ATTACHMENT F, and apply the Technical Specification/proceduraI requirements to the calculation. Given a frozen simulator with an RCS leak in progress, use the plant computer to extract the necessary data and then calculate the leak rate. The calculation is RO/SRO Common. The SRO applicants will apply the Technical Specification/procedural requirements based on their calculations. Modify Bank JPM 1 1205057 by changing the initial conditions, requiring the applicant to retrieve the data from the plant computer on a frozen simulator and having the SRO applicant determine and apply the facility requirements.

EQUIPMENT CONTROL (A2): Evaluate a proposed temporary procedure change. Apply facility requirements to the review of a temporary procedure change containing two (or more) administrative and/or technical errors. New JPM. SRO only.

RADIATION CONTROL (A3): Given an emergency situation and survey maps, determine the area dose rate near a specified plant component and apply the applicable facility limits to determine the stay time for the situation. RO/SRO Common. New JPM.

EMERGENCY PLAN (A4): Given a set of conditions, determine the Emergency Action Level (EAL) and make a Protective Action Recommendation (PAR). Randomly selected task from one of the previous two NRC examinations. Modify by changing the conditions. SRO only.

NUREG-1021, Revision 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 7

8 11 Facility:

Three Mile Island Scenario No.:

1 OpTestNo.:

NRC FW17 C CRS Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 trips on start FW18A CAR0 Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A does not start.

MU08B CCRS C URO (CT-1 4)

High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B fails to open B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

100% power, MOC.

0 EF-P-2B is 00s for bearing replacement.

I 0

DR-P-1A is running for effluent flow Turnover:

Maintain 100% power operations.

Critical Tasks:

0 Initiate HPI Cooling (CT-14)

II 0

Initiate HPI (CT-2)

Event Malf.

Event 11 No.

1 No. I Type*

I Event Description 11 1

I RW04A I

CRS I Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A trips (TS) 2 3

4 5

6 MSO1 D CC04A MSl9A FW-15A FW-15B TC07B CRS I CRS I ARO C CRS C URO N CRS N ARO R URO M CRS M URO M ARO NLO Reports an excessive oil leak from Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 (TS).

Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high slowly Intermediate Closed Cooling Water Pump IC-P-1 A trips and IC-P-1 B fails to auto start Steam Leak in the Turbine Building Feedwater Pump 1 A trip Feedwater Pump 1 B trip Turbine stop valve fails open

~ Initial Conditions:

Reactor Startup is in Progress NI-12 is 00s due to a detector failure 1 Turnover:

Take the Reactor Critical CRS N CRS R URO N ARO Reactor Building Hi Range Radiation Monitor Failure (TS)

Reactor Startup C URO C CRS C URO C ARO OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG resulting in loss of subcooling margin (CT-1, CT-22)

ESOlA I I CRS ESOlB I I URO Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 psig (CT-2) 11 NV45A CCRS Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13A Fails Open. (CT-21)

C ARO Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 11 Facility:

Three Mile Island Scenario No.:

2 OpTest No.:

NRC Examiners:

Operators:

Critical Tasks:

Initiate HPI (CT-2) 0 Trip all RCPs (CT-1)

II Reduce Steaming/lsolate Affected SGs (CT-22)

II Limit Uncontrolled Radiation Release (CT-21)

/j Malf.

No.

Event Description Event Type*

RM0322 1

2 3

N137A URO Premature Criticality CRS M CRS 4

RDO3A Continuous Rod Withdrawal M URO M ARO CRS 5

TH15A OTSG Tube Leak in OTSG A (TSI 6

THl6A OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG requiring HPI initiation C CRS C URO C ARO C CRS C URO 7

MU09 High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Fails to open 11 8

I CC02B I C CRS I Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation TH17A ll lo 11 (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

- 1 -

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

TH13D NCRS R URO N URO THO6 M CRS M URO M ARO Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Three Mile Island Scenario No.:

3 OpTestNo.:

NRC Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

0 85% power, MOC 0

Power Escalation Following a trip and maintenance outage MU-P-IBOOS Turnover:

Raise Power to 100%.

Critical Tasks:

0 Trip all RCPs (CT-I) 0 Establish FW Flow and Feed SGs (CT-IO)

Event No.

Event Description 1

C CRS 1 CURO Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-VP Breaker Trips (TS) 2 RD0216 I Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS) 3 Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1 D High Vibration 4

Feedwater Flow Fails to re-ratio after securing RC-P-1 D C CRS C ARO C URO 5

An RCS leak occurs requiring a Reactor Trip 6

RW010B CCRS I CURO Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1 B does not start on ESAS actuation 7

RC-P-1 A does not trip when control switch is rotated to the stop position (CT-1) 8 Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V30A and EF-V-30D do not control in automatic due to a level setpoint failure (CT-10)

I CRS I ARO (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

- 1 -

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 TMI Date of Exam:

A~ril2007 ODeratina Test No.:

NRC Rx NOR IIC MAJ TS RX NOR IIC MAJ TS Rx NOR IIC Instructions:

t-MAJ TS -

1 CREW POSITION Scenarios 2

3 4

CREW CREW CREW POSITION POSITION POSITION T

M 0

I T

N A

I L

M U

M(*)

R I

U 1

1 1

0 1

1 1

1 4

4 2

7 2

2 2

1 0

2 2

1 1

0 1

1 1

1 Circle the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must service in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must do one scenario, including at least two instrument or component (I/C) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a l-for-I basis.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5 TMI Date of Exam:

April 2007 Operating Test No.:

NRC E

v E

N T

T Y

P E

Scenarios 4

I I

CREW CREW CREW CREW POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION SR016 NOR 1

IIC MAJ TS -

11 2

2 RX 1

1 0

1 1

1 4

4 2

2 2

1 0

2 2

1 1

0 1

1 1

1 1

NOR IIC -

4 2

MAJ TS -

RX 1

NOR 1

IIC 9

  • 2 2

SROll MAJ 2

2 -

TS -

1.

Circle the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must service in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must do one scenario, including at least two instrument or component (IIC) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1 -for-I basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

SRO Instant and Upgrade candidates TOTALS reflect the ATC and SRO positions only.

4.

NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-30 1-5 TM I Date of Exam:

April 2007 Operating Test No.:

NRC E

v E

N T

T Y

P E

Rx NOR I/C MAJ TS Rx ns:

NOR I/C MAJ TS Rx NOR I/C MAJ TS

=_e Scenarios 4

CREW CREW CREW CREW POSITION POSITION POSITION POSITION 2

2 2

1 0

2 2

1 1

1 0

1 1

1 1

4 4

2 9

2 2

2 1

2 0

2 2

Circle the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must service in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must do one scenario, including at least two instrument or component (IC) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a 1 -for-I basis.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ES-301 Transient and Event Checklist Form ES-301-5

=acility:

A P

P L

I C

A N

T SR014 SR013 TMI Date of Exam:

April 2007 ODeratina Test No.:

NRC POSITION POSITION I

I I

I I

I 3

CREW POSITION Scenarios 4

CREW POSITION Instructions:

1.

Circle the applicant level and enter the operating test number and Form ES-D-1 event numbers for each event type; TS are not applicable for RO applicants. ROs must service in both the at-the-controls (ATC) and balance-of-plant (BOP) positions; Instant SROs must do one scenario, including at least two instrument or component (VC) malfunctions and one major transient, in the ATC position.

2.

Reactivity manipulations may be conducted under normal or controlled abnormal conditions (refer to Section D.5.d) but must be significant per Section C.2.a of Appendix D. (*) Reactivity and normal evolutions may be replaced with additional instrument or component malfunctions on a I-for-I basis.

3.

Whenever practical, both instrument and component malfunctions should be included; only those that require verifiable actions that provide insight to the applicants competence count toward the minimum requirements specified for the applicants license level in the right-hand columns.

4.

SRO Instant and Upgrade candidates TOTALS reflect the ATC and SRO positions only.

NUREG 1021 Revision 9

ES-301 Competencies Checklist Form ES-30 1 -6 Facility: TMI Date of Examination:

2007 Operating Test No.:

NRC APPLICANTS SRO I Competencies -

1 6,7, Interpret/Diagnose 3,5, Conditions Events and 8

ALL 4RIO 3

4 12, 12, 3,5, 5,6 7,

23, 12, 5,

4 3 N/A NIA ALL ALL ALL ALL 1,2 1,3 RO (ATC) 1 BOP SCEP I

1 1 2 1,3 2,3

,4,

,4, 6,8 6,7 8,

9 1,3 1,3

,4,

,6, 8

7,8

$9 3,4 1,3 95,

,5, 6,7 6,7

,8 8, 1,3 1,2

>4*

,3, 5,6 4,5

,7,,6, 8

7,8

,9 NI N/

A A

9 NI NI A

A Notes:

(1)

(2)

Optional for an SRO-U.

(3)

Only applicable to SROs.

Includes Technical Specification compliance for an RO.

Instructions:

Circle the applicants' license type and enter one or more event numbers that will allow the examiners to evaluate every applicable competency for every applicant.

Author:

NRC Reviewer:

NUREG-1021, Revision 9

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