Text

Final - Section C Operating Exam (Folder 3)
	ML071760031
Person / Time
Site:	Crane
Issue date:	04/19/2007
From:	; Division of Reactor Safety I
To:	; AmerGen Energy Co
	Sykes, Marvin D.
Shared Package
ML060800145	List: IR 05000289/2007301; ML071090575; ML071350626; ML071360136; ML071360144; ML071360151; ML071360155; ML071450423; ML071760022; ML071760030; ML071760031; ML071760138; ML071770540; ML071770553;
References
	50-289/07-301
	Download: ML071760031 (76)
	v • d • e

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility:

Three Mile Island Scenario No.:

1 Op Test No.:

NRC Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

100% power, MOC.

EF-P-2B is OOS for bearing replacement.

DR-P-1A is running for effluent flow Turnover:

Maintain 100% power operations.

Critical Tasks:

Initiate HPI Cooling (CT-14)

Initiate HPI (CT-2)

Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

RW04A CRS Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A trips (TS) 2 CRS NLO Reports an excessive oil leak from Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 (TS).

I CRS 3

MS01D I ARO Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high slowly C CRS 4

CC04A C URO Intermediate Closed Cooling Water Pump IC-P-1A trips and IC-P-1B fails to auto start N CRS N ARO 5

MS19A R URO Steam Leak in the Turbine Building FW-15A M CRS Feedwater Pump 1A trip FW-15B M URO Feedwater Pump 1B trip 6

TC07B M ARO Turbine stop valve fails open FW17 C CRS Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 trips on start 7

FW18A C ARO Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A does not start.

(CT-14)

C CRS High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B fails to open 8

MU08B C URO B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #1 The crew will take the watch with reactor power at 100% and ICS in Full Automatic. Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump EF-P2B is OOS for a bearing replacement. Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A is running in preparation for a liquid release.

When the crew has accepted the watch the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the trip of Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A. The Crew should respond in accordance with MAP Alarm B-1-5, 480V ES Motor Trip and B-2-5, 480V ES Motor Overload. The CRS should review Tech Spec 3.3.1.4.d and declare a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months timeclock based on Tech Spec 3.3.2. When the Tech Spec call has been made the scenario can continue.

After the TS call is made the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the NLO report of a large oil leak from EF-P-1 bearing with an empty bearing oil indicator. The CRS should review Tech Spec 3.4.1.1.a.4 and Note 1 and declare that the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months timeclock on Emergency Feedwater is suspended until a second EFW Pump is operable. The CRS may initiate action to prevent EF-P-1 from starting by manually closing MS-V-13A and MS-V-13B. EF-P-1 will not be returned to operable status during this scenario. The scenario can continue when the Tech Spec timeclock is suspended.

After the Tech Spec call is made and on cue from the Lead Evaluator, the Turbine Header Pressure instrument failure can be initiated. The crew should diagnose the failing pressure and take hand control of the turbine and the SG/Rx Master Integrated Control System station. The CRS should implement OP-TM-301-471, Manual Control of the Main Turbine and OP-TM-621-471, ICS Manual Control. The backup pressure instrument may be selected in accordance with OP-TM-621-451, Selecting Alternate Instrument Inputs to ICS. The backup instrument does not have to be selected for the scenario to continue.

After the plant has been stabilized the Lead Examiner can cue the trip of Intermediate Closed Cooling Water Pump IC-P-1A. The crew should diagnose the loss of IC-P-1A and the failure of IC-P-1B to auto start using MAP alarms AA-1-6, 480V BOP Motor Trip, C-1-2, IC CRD Flow Lo and C-2-2, IC System Flow Lo. The CRS should implement 1202-17, Loss of Intermediate Closed Cooling Water and the URO should manually start IC-P-1B. Letdown flow may be isolated by CRD high temperature closing MU-V-1A and MU-V-1B. If this occurs the CRS should initiate OP-TM-211-950, Restoration of Letdown Flow. Letdown flow does not have to be re-established to continue.

After IC-P-1B has been started the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of the steam leak in the Turbine Building. The crew should diagnose the steam leak in the Turbine Building and the CRS should implement 1203-24, Steam Leak. An NLO will provide a report of severity enough to begin a plant shutdown. The CRS should order a plant shutdown in accordance with 1102-4, Power Operations.

At the cue of the Lead Examiner or after the first Feedwater Pump (FW-P-1A or FW-P-1B) is secured initiate the trip of the remaining pump to trip the reactor. If the crew trips the reactor due to the steam leak the trip of both Feedwater Pumps will be initiated at <40 % power. One turbine stop valve will fail to close and the contingency steps of OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip will have to be taken for the turbine. The steam leak will be isolated when the turbine trips. The CRS will initiate OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #1 Continued Following the loss of both Feedwater Pumps, EF-P-1 will trip (if not previously isolated by the CRS) and EF-P-2A fails to start. The crew should diagnose the lack of heat transfer and respond in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-004, Lack of Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer.

Without primary to secondary heat transfer PORV/HPI cooling is the only method to maintain adequate core cooling, which makes this a critical task. PORV/HPI Cooling will be initiated in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-009, HPI Cooling (CT-14). The ARO will initiate OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 16, EFW Failure for the Emergency Feedwater Pump failures.

When HPI is manually initiated HPI Valve MU-V-16B will fail to open and the B Train HPI manual ESAS actuation does not actuate. This will result in inadequate HPI since there will not be one full train of HPI in operation. Without adequate HPI the mitigation strategy is changed for the event, which makes obtaining adequate HPI a critical task. The B Train components will have to be started at the component level in accordance with OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPI/LPI) (CT-2).

The CRS will subsequently transition to OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown from EOP-009.

Optional, transition to Pressurizer Bubble recovery, by allowing restoration of EF-P-2B, optional steps at end of scenario for the start of pressurizer bubble recovery, actual recovery of level on scale could take 30 minutes and will not be evaluated in this scenario.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.

Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 1 Event Description Procedure Support Initial Set-up.

EF-P-2B OOS for bearing replacement DR-P-1A Running in preparation for a liquid release TS 3.3.1.4.d and 3.3.2, ECCS Systems MAP Alarm B-1-5, 480V ES Motor Trip 1

DR-P-1A Trips MAP Alarm B-2-5, 480V ES ES Motor Overload 2

EF-P-1 Bearing Oil Leak TS 3.4.1.1.a.4, Decay Heat Removal Capability OP-TM-MAP-H0302, Sass Mismatch OP-TM-MAP-H0203, Mn Turb Hdr Press Hi/Lo OP-TM-301-471, Manual Control of the Main Turbine OP-TM-621-471, ICS Manual Control 3

Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high OP-TM-621-451, Selecting Alternate Instrument Inputs to ICS 1202-17, Loss of Intermediate Cooling System AA-1-6, 480V BOP Motor Trip OP-TM-MAP-C0102, IC CRD Flow Lo 4

Intermediate Closed Cooling Water Pump IC-P-1A trips and IC-P-1B fails to auto start OP-TM-MAP-C0202, IC System Flow Lo 1203-24 Steam Leak 5

Steam Leak in the Turbine Building 1102-4 Power Operations 6

Feedwater Pump 1A (or 1B) trip Turbine stop valve fails to close OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 16, EFW Failure OP-TM-EOP-004, Lack of Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer 7

Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 trips on start Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A does not start.

OP-TM-EOP-009, HPI Cooling 8

High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B fails to open B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPI/LPI).

Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 1 ACTION COMMENTS / INSTRUCTIONS DESCRIPTION Initialization IC-201(TEMP) 100% HFP, ICS Full AUTO Console Left EF-P-2B PTL EF-P-2B Tagged OOS EF-P-2B PTL/EF-P-2B BKR OPEN Scenario Support Remote Function FWR13 Value:

OUT When:

Immediately Scenario Support Main Console Robust Barriers applied IAW Risk Document Scenario Support Console Center DR-P-1A NAS DR-P-1A Running Scenario Support Malfunction RW04A Value:

Insert When:

Event 1 DR-P-1A Trips Malfunction MS01D Value:

Insert Sev. 100%

When:

Event 3 RAMP 300 sec Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high SP10B-PT2 I/O Override IC-P-1B NAT Value:

Insert OFF When:

Immediately IC-P-1B Fails to Auto Start Malfunction CC04A Value:

Insert When:

Event 4 IC-P-1A trip Malfunction MS19B Value:

Insert Sev. 10%

When:

Event 5 RAMP 300 sec Steam Leak in the Turbine Building Malfunction FW15A Value:

Insert When:

Event 6 ratpw<40 Feedwater Pump 1A trip Malfunction FW15B Value:

Insert When:

Event 6 ratpw<40 Feedwater Pump 1B trip Malfunction TC07B Value:

Insert When:

Immediately Turbine Stop Valve B Fails Open Malfunction FW17 Value:

Insert When:

Event 7 fwnefp1>0.1 Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 trip Malfunction FW18A Value:

Insert When:

Event 8 ratpw<10 Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A trip MU08B Value:

Insert When:

Event 9 muvmuv16b>0.1 High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B fails as is 03A4S02-ZDIPB1RBB Value:

Insert OFF When:

Immediately B ESAS 4 psig Manual Actuation Failure 03A4S01-ZDIPB1RCB Value:

Insert OFF When:

Immediately B ESAS 4 psig 1600 psig Actuation Failure SGTUNEZ(19)

Value:

0.5 When:

Immediately

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

1 Page 6

of 76 Event

Description:

Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A Trips (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Initiate Event 1.

Booth Operator Role Play: When requested to investigate DR-P-1A, Pump is hot to touch and thermal overloads are tripped, if requested thermal overloads do not reset.

Indications Available:

CRS Directs Review of Alarm Response B-1-5 (480V ES Motor Trip).

URO Diagnose trip of DR-P-1A.

URO Tripped pump disagreement light (amber/green).

CRS Computer printout and CRT.

CRS Directs review of Alarm Response B-2-5 (480 ES Motor Overload).

URO Motor disagreement lights, amber/red (except on air handlers).

CRS Computer printout and CRT.

CRS Review TS 3.3.1.4.d below and 3.3.2 and declare a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months time clock IAW 3.3.2.

T.S. 3.3.1.4.d Cooling Water Systems - Specification 3.0.1 applies, (however Allowed outage time below applies).

Two decay heat river water pumps must be OPERABLE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

1 Page 7

of 76 Event

Description:

Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A Trips (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T.S. 3.3.2 Maintenance or testing shall be allowed during reactor operation on any components(s) in the makeup and purification, decay heat, RB emergency cooling water, RB spray, BWST level instrumentation, or cooling water systems which will not remove more than one train of each system from service. Components shall not be removed from service so that the affected system train is inoperable for more than 72 consecutive hours. If the system is not restored to meet the requirements of Specification 3.3.1 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , the reactor shall be placed in a HOT SHUTDOWN condition within six hours.

NOTE:

The crew may elect to swap MU-P-1A cooling to Nuclear Services Closed Cooling using OP-TM-543-439, Swapping MU-P-1A Cooling to NS.

CRS Go to Event 2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 8

of 76 Event

Description:

NLO Reports an Excessive Oil Leak From Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Reports a large oil leak on Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1s outboard pump bearing. The oil bulb is empty.

Booth Operator Role Play: If asked to prioritize Emergency feedpump work state EF-P-2B will be ready for IST in about 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months ..

Indications Available:

CRS Review TS 3.4.1.1.a.4 and Note 1. The CRS should declare the EF-P-2B 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months time clock suspended until a second EFW pump is operable and direct action to restore EF-P-1 and/or EF-P-2B to service.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature greater than 250 degrees F.

Three independent Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pumps and two redundant flowpaths to each Once through Steam Generator (OTSG) shall be OPERABLE** with:

Two EFW Pumps, each capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus, and one EFW Pump capable of being powered from two OPERABLE main steam supply paths.

With more than one EFW Pump or both flowpaths to either OTSG inoperable, initiate action immediately to restore at least two EFW Pumps and one flowpath to each OTSG:

Specification 3.0.1 and all other actions requiring shutdown or changes in REACTOR OPERATING CONDITIONS are suspended until at least two EFW Pumps and one EFW flowpath to each OTSG are restored to OPERABLE status.

Booth Operator Instructions:

If ordered to trip EF-P-1 using the overspeed trip device enter event 7. If ordered to gag MS-V-13A/B use mimic.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

2 Page 9

of 76 Event

Description:

NLO Reports an Excessive Oil Leak From Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Go to Event 3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

3 Page 10 of 76 Event

Description:

Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high slowly.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Initiate Event 3.

Indications Available:

CRS Directs initiation of alarm response SASS Mismatch OP-TM-MAP-H0302.

ARO Diagnoses failure of turbine header pressure instrument SP-10A-PT2.

MANUAL ACTIONS REQURIED CRS Directs review of alarm response MN Turb HDR Press HI/LO OP-TM-MAP-H0203.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS ARO If modified header pressure error >40 psi for >5 seconds then Turbine goes to manual.

MANUAL ACTIONS REQUIRED CRS Directs initiation of OP-TM-301-471, Manual Control of the Main Turbine.

ARO Precautions:

ARO To avoid a reactor trip, slowly adjust ICS Main Turbine Hand control since it can change load at equivalent of 35% Reactor power/minute (28% CV Pos / Min).

Limitations:

ARO IF SG/RX demand is in Auto, then turbine load (Mwe) should be maintained within 10 Mwe of desired load.

ARO IF SG/RX demand is in hand, then turbine header pressure should be maintained between 875 and 895 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

3 Page 11 of 76 Event

Description:

Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high slowly.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ARO ADJUST Main Turbine demand to maintain Turbine load within limits.

NOTE:

Manual control of SG/RX demand may be required to stabilize turbine header pressure.

CRS DIRECTS initiation of OP-TM-621-471, ICS Manual Control.

URO Limitations URO MAINTAIN NI power within 1% of desired reactor power.

URO WHEN reactor power > 20%, then control feedwater flow to OTSGs as follows:

Maintain Tavg between 578°F and 580°F.

If Tavg reduced at EOC IAW 1102-4, then maintain Tavg within +/-1°F of desired setpoint.

Maintain Tc between +2°F to -2°F (TC = TCA-TCB).

URO ENSURE ULD in HAND.

URO IF SG/REACTOR Station is being placed in HAND to support a planned activity, THEN VERIFY reactor power is less than 2558 MWAth (99.6%).

URO PLACE SG/REACTOR DEMAND station in HAND.

URO ENSURE control rod position does NOT change.

URO VERIFY alarm H-2-1 ICS in Track In.

NOTE:

ICS load rate of change is NOT in effect with SG/Reactor station in HAND.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

3 Page 12 of 76 Event

Description:

Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high slowly.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO IF necessary to maintain reactor power or control rods within limits or if a power change is being conducted IAW 1102-4, then ADJUST SG/RECTOR DEMAND as follows; IF maintaining stable reactor power or a slow planned power change, then RAISE or LOWER in discrete steps to keep neutron error between +2% and -2%.

IF rapid power reduction is required, then LOWER as necessary to achieve desired reactor power level and ENSURE FW flow controlled within limits.

NOTE:

Additional ICS related stations may be placed in manual control IAW the following procedures:

EXAMINERS NOTE:

The backup instrument does not have to be selected to continue the scenario CRS DIRECTS initiation of OP-TM-621-451, selecting alternate instrument inputs (optional).

ARO COMPARE alternate inputs (using Attachment 7.3 of OP-TM-621-000, Integrated Control System or table in OP-TM-MAP-H0302 as necessary).

ARO VERIFY one of the following:

Difference between affected and alternate channel(s) is (are) less than SASS Setpoint s listed in OP-TM-MAP-H0302.

ARO SELECT alternate instrument(s) with console PB.

VERIFY plant stable.

Selects MS-PT-10B PT1 Go to Event 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 13 of 76 Event

Description:

IC-P-1A Trips and IC-P-1B fails to Auto Start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Initiate Event 4.

Booth Operator Role Play: If requested to investigate IC-P-1A, Pump is hot to touch and thermal overloads are tripped, if requested thermal overloads do not reset.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECT entry into AA-1-6, 480V BOP Motor Trip.

URO OBSERVATIONS Tripped pump disagreement lights (green/amber)

MANUAL ACTIONS URO May immediately start IC-P-1B based on action that should have occurred.

CRS DIRECT entry into C-1-2, IC CRD CLG FLOW LO.

CRS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS MU-V-1A and MU-V-1B will Close if CRD outlet temperature is > 160°F MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED URO ENSURE an IC pump is operating.

CRS DIRECT entry into C-2-2, IC SYSTEM FLOW LO.

MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED URO ENSURE standby IC pump is Operating.

If IC flow is < 550 gpm, then INTIATE EP 1202-17, Loss of IC Cooling System.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 14 of 76 Event

Description:

IC-P-1A Trips and IC-P-1B fails to Auto Start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS DIRECT entry into 1202-17, Loss of Intermediate Cooling System.

SYMPTOMS CRS I.C. Pump Disch Press Lo, Alarm, 70 psig. (C-2-4)

I.C. System Flow Lo, Alarm, 550 GPM. (C-2-2)

I.C. CRD Clg Flow Lo, Alarm, 100 GPM. (C-1-2)

CRS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS Standby IC Pump starts (ICCW flow less than 550 GPM)

MU-V-1A/1B closes (CRD Coolant Outlet Hi Temp. greater than 160°F)

MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED URO If low flow exists, then PERFORM the following:

VERIFY OR START the standby IC pump.

MONITOR Surge Tank Level.

FILL Surge Tank Level as necessary to maintain a normal indicated level of 18.5 CRS Should order MU-P-1A started, and MU-P-1B shutdown due to operation of IC-P-1B.

Booth Operator Instructions:

If the crew orders MU-P-1A transferred to NSCCW use mimic to accomplish.

URO Order MU-P-1A cooling transferred to NSCCW Starts MU-P-1A (CC)

Stops MU-P-1B (CR)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 15 of 76 Event

Description:

IC-P-1A Trips and IC-P-1B fails to Auto Start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

If the crew recovers letdown flow use Remote Functions:

MUR90 to bypass the MU-V-3 Hi Temperature Interlock MUR89 to Open MU-V-2A/B MUR01 to operate MU-V-70A ARO RECOVER LETDOWN AS FOLLOWS Verifies Prerequisites ICCW flow restored Containment isolation permission from CRS.

Closes / verifies closed MU-V-6A/B Orders MU-70A open Orders MU-V-2A/B high temperature interlock bypassed Orders MU-V-3 high temperature interlock bypassed Ensures closed MU-V-3, MU-V-4, MU-V-5 (CC)

Ensures open MU-V-1A/B (CC)

Opens MU-V-2A/B PCR Opens MU-V-5 10% on position controller (CC)

Presses and holds MU-V-3 open PB (CC) until high temperature alarm clears.

Gradually throttles MU-V-5 controller to restore at rate of 2.5 gpm/min or less.

Reopen MU-V-6A Order MU-V-70A closed Order MU-V-2A/B high temperature interlock to normal Order MU-V-3 high temperature interlock to normal When flow is approximately 50 gpm then Open MU-V-4 (CC)

Close MU-V-5 (CC)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

4 Page 16 of 76 Event

Description:

IC-P-1A Trips and IC-P-1B fails to Auto Start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE:

If letdown flow is lost it does not have to be recovered to continue the scenario.

Go to Event 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page 17 of 76 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in the Turbine Building Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Initiate Event 5.

Booth Operator Instructions:

After crew has had opportunity to diagnose steam leak, or as requested by lead examiner, report a steam leak in the overhead of the 2nd floor of the Turbine. Appears to be a Steam Lead drain line and is not accessible. No personnel appear to be in danger at this time but there is a large amount of steam and a lot of condensation occurring.

IF further indication is needed report as the Director Operations that while the leak is not catastrophic a plant shutdown should be initiated.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECT entry into AP 1203-24, Steam Leak.

SYMPTOMS CRS DECREASING secondary steam pressure.

Electrical load reducing (mismatch between electrical load and Rx Power).

Decrease in pressurizer level, R.C. Pressure, and cold leg temperature.

For a leak outside the Reactor Building; Noise may be heard in Control Room or a report made from personnel outside the Control Room.

Immediate Manual Action CRS IF continued operation is not posing a hazard to personnel or equipment required for safe shutdown but is severe enough to require shutdown.

CRS Then reduce load at rate specified by US and go to following steps.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page 18 of 76 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in the Turbine Building Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS Continue to shutdown and cooldown the unit per OP 1102-10 and 11 respectively.

CRS DETERMINE which OTSG has the steam leak and if possible the location of the leak. If possible, the leak should be isolated.

CRS INITIATES OP 1102-4 Power Operation to Commence Shutdown.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Completion of Enclosure 2A not required for Emergency S/D.

CRS PERFORM Enclosure 2A (for an emergency (forced) power reduction INITIATE Enclosure 2A).

EXAMINERS NOTE:

IF ICS is still in hand step 1104-2 3.2.2(c) is the step that will apply for the shutdown.

URO REDUCE reactor power to the desired power as follows:

ARO MAINTAIN Generator Reactive Load IAW OP-TM-301-472.

URO IF SG/REACTOR DEMAND is in AUTO, then REDUCE reactor power as follows:

URO ENSURE ULD is in HAND.

URO SET ULD LOAD RATE OF CHANGE to 1%/minute for PLANNED reductions or at a rate determined by CRS for Forced power reductions.

URO SET ULD Target Load Demand to desired setpoint.

URO IF SG/REACTOR DEMAND is in HAND, then REDUCE reactor power IAW OP-TM-621-471 ICS Manual Operations.

CRS PERFORM the actions per Enclosure 2B.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page 19 of 76 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in the Turbine Building Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE:

If this section is being performed during an emergency plant shutdown, then any action in this table may be deferred except those marked with EP in the sign-off column.

ARO Prior to FW-U-1B speed < 4000 RPM START LO-P-8B.

ARO Prior to FW-U-1A speed < 4000 RPM START LO-P-8A.

CRS Prior to shutdown of MO-P-1B IF MO-V-26 is OPEN, then INITIATE OP-TM-431-152 to remove MO-T-3 from service.

CRS Prior to reactor turbine load < 630 Mwe If any MO-P-1 are operating, then SHUTDOWN all Moisture Separator Pumps IAW OP-TM-431-152.

ARO Prior to reactor power < 75%:

PLACE FW-P-1A in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-472 PLACE FW-P-1B in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-473 BOOTH OPERATOR:

Use RNI screen to remove powdex vessels from service.

CRS When condensate flow < 6.9 mlb/HR AND prior to any in service powdex vessel flow being reduced to less than 1500 gpm, REDUCE to 4 IN SERVICE POWDEX vessels IAW OP-TM-423-151.

ARO When total heater drain flow (sum of HD-FI-10, 11, & 12 on pumps in service) is less than 3300 GPM AND prior to reducing any Heater Drain pump flow to < 1200 GPM, SHUTDOWN a Heater Drain Pump IAW OP-TM-431-152.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

1 Event #

5 Page 20 of 76 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in the Turbine Building Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ARO WHEN ULD target load is < 560 MWe and prior to FW-P-1A or B SPEED DEMAND less than 3%, PLACE one Feedwater Pump in STANDBY IAW OP-TM-401-153 (A) or OP-TM-401-154 (B).

GO TO EVENTS 6, 7, & 8

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Booth Operator Instructions:

If Reactor is not tripped then initiate Event 6 when directed.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.

URO IMMEDIATE ACTIONS URO PRESS BOTH Reactor Trip AND DSS pushbuttons.

URO VERIFY REACTOR SHUTDOWN.

URO PRESS Turbine Trip PB.

URO VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.

PLACE EHC-P-1A and EHC-P-1B in Pull-To-Lock.

OPEN EHC-V-FV1 (TB 305, EHC bypass valve at EHC pump skid).

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Use Remote Function TCR01 to OPEN EHC-V-FV1.

ARO PERFORMS a symptom check.

CRS VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFCATION (VSSV)

CRS IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom using the following priority:

SCM < 25°F GO TO EOP-002 XHT GO TO EOP-003 LOHT GO TO EOP-004 OTSG tube leakage > 1 gpm GO TO EOP-005 NOTE TO EXAMINER:

Crew should diagnose lack of primary to secondary heat transfer and transition to EOP-004. SOME EOP-001 steps may be performed prior to diagnosis.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ANNOUNCE Reactor Trip over plant page and radio (include plant conditions sufficient for NLO response per OS-24).

VERIFY control rod groups 1 through 7 are fully inserted.

VERIFY OTSG A and B Operating Range level < 97.5%.

ENSURE FW-V-5A and FW-V-5B are closed.

VERIFY OTSG level > setpoint.

INITIATE RULE 4 - FWC.

VERIFY ICS/NNI HAND or AUTO Power is available.

ARO INITIATES OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 15, EFW Actuation Response.

IAAT EFW is actuation is required, then:

ARO ENSURE EF-P-1, EF-P-2A, and EF-P-2B start.

ARO DISPATCH an Auxiliary Operator (AO) to EF-V-30 area.

ARO IF EFW pump disch. Pressure < OTSG pressure, then INITIATE Guide 16.

ARO INITIATES Guide 16, EFW Failure.

IAAT EFW is required and ALL components are NOT functional, then:

ARO IF EF-P-1 fails, then INITIATE Guide 16.1.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ARO IF EF-P-2A or EF-P-2B fails, then INITIATE Guide 16.2.

ARO INITIATES Guide 16.1, EFW Failure of EF-P-1 (Page 1 of 2).

ARO ENSURE OPEN MS-V-2A and MS-V-2B.

ARO ENSURE OPEN MS-V-13A and MS-V-13B.

ARO IF MS-PI-204 < 150 psig, then ENSURE MS-V-6 is OPEN.

ARO OBTAIN CRS concurrence and ENSURE EFW actuation enable-defeat switches (8) are in DEFEAT.

ARO CLOSE MS-V-13A and MS-V-13B.

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Report EF-P-1 trip mechanism is broken and needs maintenance attention.

ARO INITIATES Guide 16.2 EFW Failure of EF-P-2A or EF-P-2B.

ARO VERIFY voltage available on the associated bus.

ARO VERIFY control power is available as indicated by the green indicator light at the control switch.

ARO OBTAIN CRS concurrence immediately prior to initiating flow.

ARO OBTAIN CRS concurrence and ENSURE EFW actuation enable-defeat switches (8) are in DEFEAT.

ARO START the pump from the Control Room.

ARO IF the pump did NOT start, then at 1D/E 4160V switchgear:

ENSURE targets are reset on relays located at the switchgear.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 IF breaker control power light is OFF, then ENSURE the 10 amp closing fuses are properly installed.

UNLOCK and PLACE the EF-P-2A (B) 69 bypass switch in EMERG PRESS CLOSE pushbutton to start EF-P-2A (B).

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Report attempting steps Guide 16.2 7.1 - 7.4 and EF-P-2A did NOT start.

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-004, Lack of Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS URO ENSURE no more than one RCP operating per loop.

ARO ENSURE EFW is actuated and Guide 15 initiated.

ARO ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and radio. (Include plant conditions sufficient for NLO response per OS-24).

URO VERIFY 1D and 1E 4160V buses are energized from auxiliary transformers.

CRS IAAT primary-to-secondary heat transfer has been established, then GO TO Step 3.19.

URO IAAT RCS Pressure approaches 2450 psig (or 552 psig if

< 329°F), then perform the following:

ENSURE RC-V-2 (PORV block) is Open GO TO EOP-009.

CRS IAAT RCS is approaching 25°F SCM, then GO TO EOP-009.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Initiating PORV/HPI Cooling is a CRITICAL TASK.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-009, HPI Cooling.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS CRS IAAT SCM < 25°F, then:

PERFORM Rule 1.

CONTINUE with EOP-009.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Initiating HPI is a CRITICAL TASK.

URO ENSURE 4 psig ESAS has been initiated IAW OP-TM-642-902.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

URO should diagnose failure of MU-V-16B to open and the B train of HPI to start. B Train of HPI will be started manually.

URO VERIFY ADEQUATE HPI.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

May go to Section 4.0 on Inadequate HPI.

URO INTIATE OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPI/LPI).

URO VERIFY 1D or 1E 4160V bus is energized.

URO VERIFY a valid automatic actuation has occurred or a manual actuation of HPI is required.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

There are special usage requirements for Section 4.1 and Attachments 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. These actions are memory items (IAW OS 24) and performed from memory when required. The sequence of actuation and verification of ES is not train dependent. Either train may be performed first or trains may be performed in parallel.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 URO Initiation of Injection URO PCR graphic display is equivalent to Attachment 7.1.

URO IF any of the components on Attachment 7.1 are NOT in the required condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.

URO IF ESAS Train B Load Seq Block 4 lights (PCR) are NOT BLUE, then PRESS Manual ES actuation 1600 PSIG RC PRESS (Train B CR).

URO IF any of the components on Attachment 7.2 are NOT in the required condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

URO may complete this page before going to Section 4.2.

URO Contingency Actions URO ENSURE MU-V-14A or MU-V-14B is Open.

URO IAAT DC-P-1A or DC-P-1B fails to start or is shut down unexpectedly, then perform the following:

URO IF DC-P-1B fails to start, then START DC-P-1B.

URO IAAT either ES selected MU pump fails to start or is shut down unexpectedly, then perform the following:

URO IF Train B ES selected MU pump is NOT operating, then perform the following:

VERIFY 1E 4160V bus is energized.

VERIFY ONE of the following (N/A steps NOT performed):

MU-V-36 and MU-V-37 are Open.

MU-V-16C is Open.

MU-V-16D is Open.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 IF MU-P-1C is ES Selected, then perform the following:

VERIFY MU-P-2C or MU-P-3C is operating START MU-P-1C URO IF any of the following did NOT Open:

MU-V-16C MU-V-16D Then perform the following to ensure flow through ALL four HPI nozzles:

IF two ES selected MU pumps are operating, then ENSURE ONE of the following pairs of valves are OPEN (N/A steps NOT performed):

MU-V-16A and MU-V-16B MU-V-16A and MU-V-16D MU-V-16B and MU-V-16C MU-V-16C and MU-V-16D URO IF MU-V-36 and MU-V-37 did NOT CLOSE, then URO ENSURE MU-V-36 or MU-V-37 is Closed.

URO IF MU-V-18 did NOT CLOSE, then perform ONE of the following (N/A step NOT performed):

ENSURE MU-V-18 is Closed.

ENSURE MU-V-17 and MU-V-217 are Closed.

URO IF DR-P-1A is NOT operating or DR-V-1B is Closed, then perform the following:

START DR-P-1A ENSURE DR-V-1A is Open IAAT DC system A cooler outlet temperature exceeds 105°F, then perform the following:

PERFORM 4.2.2 actions for an inoperable DC-P-1A

PLACE DC-P-1A in PTL

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 URO IF DR-P-1B is NOT operating or DR-V-1B is Closed, then perform the following:

START DR-P-1B ENSURE DR-V-1B is Open URO VERIFY SCM < 25°F.

URO ENSURE the PORV block is OPEN and OPEN the PORV (RC-RV-2).

URO VERIFY there is flow through the PORV (PORV P indicator, ALARM G-1-7, A0517).

CRS REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EAL).

URO DE-ENERGIZE ALL Pressurizer heaters.

CRS VERIFY RCS < 25°F superheat.

CRS VERIFY OTSG Tube Leakage < 1 gpm.

CRS GO TO EOP-006.

BOOTH OPERATOR:

If requested by chief examiner, EF-P-2B may be restored by radio report, EF-P-2B work is complete and clearance restoration has been written, request permission to rack in EF-P-2B breaker Use FWR13 in to rack breaker in.

Report EF-P-2B is racked in clearance, calls for you to remove info tag on EF-P-2B extension control as last step.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS URO ENSURE HPI and LPI are operated IAW Rule 2.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 EXAMINERS NOTE:

Scenario may progress to point of throttling HPI but is not necessary for completion of scenario.

URO IAAT an ES Actuation setpoint is reached, then ENSURE all ESAS components have actuated.

INITIATE contingency actions IAW Section 4.2 of the applicable procedure(s).

OP-TM-211-901 Emergency Injection CRS (If EFW is available) EOP-006 Step 3.15 will direct if HPI/PORV cooling in effect & SCM > 25°F & at least 1 OTSG is available.

Then perform Guide 8.1 Recovering a pressurizer steam bubble.

ARO Ensure TBVs are controlling OTSG pressure at desired pressure.

URO Throttle HPI to control SCM 50°F to 70°F.

URO Initiate restoration of letdown.

URO Energize pressurizer heaters.

ARO Verify OTSG level is at setpoint per Rule 4 CRS Brief Crew.

ARO Expeditiously lower OTSG pressure 50 psig URO Close PORV URO Throttle HPI to control SCM 50°F to 70°F.

TERMINATE SCENARIO

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Follow-up question highest event entered during scenario?

Answer FA-1 Loss of Fission Product Barrier 2.d HPI-PORV cooling in effect OR 2.b

<25°F SCM.

Facility:

Three Mile Island Scenario No.:

2 Op Test No.:

NRC Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

Reactor Startup is in Progress NI-12 is OOS due to a detector failure Turnover:

Take the Reactor Critical Critical Tasks:

Initiate HPI (CT-2)

Trip all RCPs (CT-1)

Reduce Steaming/Isolate Affected SGs (CT-22)

Limit Uncontrolled Radiation Release (CT-21)

Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

RM0322 CRS Reactor Building Hi Range Radiation Monitor Failure (TS)

N CRS R URO 2

N ARO Reactor Startup 3

NI37A URO CRS Premature Criticality M CRS M URO 4

RD03A M ARO Continuous Rod Withdrawal 5

TH15A CRS OTSG Tube Leak in OTSG A (TS)

C CRS C URO 6

TH16A C ARO OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG requiring HPI initiation C CRS 7

MU09 C URO High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Fails to open C CRS 8

CC02B C URO Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation C CRS C URO 9

TH17A C ARO OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG resulting in loss of subcooling margin (CT-1, CT-22)

I CRS 10 ES01A ES01B I URO Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 psig (CT-2)

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 C CRS 11 FW45A C ARO Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13A Fails Open. (CT-21)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #2 The crew will take the watch with reactor startup in progress pulling toward criticality. NI-12 is OOS due to a detector failure. The crew will continue the reactor startup.

As soon as the crew accepts the watch the lead Examiner can cue the failure of RB Hi Range monitor RM-G-22. MAP Alarm C-1-1, Radiation Level High will be received and the crew should diagnose the failure of the instrument. The CRS should review TS 3.5.5.2 and declare a 7 day timeclock based on the failure. As soon as the TS call is made the crew can be directed to continue the startup.

The crew will observe that the reactor will go critical below the lower band of the ECP. Crew should pick this up through 1/M plot. The CRS should terminate the startup and review 1103-8 requirement to insert rods 1 group worth to achieve 1% shutdown margin.

After the CRS ordered rods inserted, the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the Control Rod Group 5 continuous withdrawal. If Group 5 reaches its outlimit before the reactor is tripped Group 6 will begin to withdraw. The URO should attempt to gain rod control in accordance with the IMAs of OP-TM-AOP-064, Uncontrolled Rod Motion. The URO should trip the reactor and enter OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip at this point.

When the reactor is tripped the OTSG tube leak will be initiated. The crew should diagnose the tube leak at approximately 12 gpm. The CRS should go to OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage to mitigate the event. The CRS should identify T.S. 3.1.6.3 OTSG tube leakage >1.0 gpm, if not identified due immediate entry into EOPs, follow-up question may be required.

After the EOP-005 is entered and when directed by the Lead Examiner the OTSG Tube Rupture can be initiated. The crew should diagnose the leak size increase and continue in EOP-005.

The High Capacity Makeup Valve will fail to open and the URO may try to use Makeup Valve MU-V-16B to augment makeup flow. The leak will require initiation of HPI using OP-TM-EOP-010 Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control (CT-2). This is a critical task because the leak size is greater than normal makeup capability which would cause Pressurizer level to lower and eventually empty since HPI will not automatically actuate at 1600 psig.

Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump DC-P-1B will trip when ESAS is actuated and the CRO will have to implement OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPI/LPI) Contingency Actions. When Reactor Building Spray Pump BS-P-1B is placed in Pull to Lock the scenario can continue. The transfer of Makeup Pump MU-P-1C cooling to Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water (NSCCW) does not have to be completed to continue.

When Reactor Building Spray Pump BS-P-1B is placed in Pull to Lock the Lead Examiner can cue the increase in the leak size. The leak size will result in a loss of subcooled margin. HPI will not automatically actuate at 1600 psig RCS pressure and will have to be manually actuated in accordance with OP-TM-642-901, 1600 PSIG ESAS Actuation (CT-2). The CRS should initiate OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of 25°F Subcooled Margin. All four Reactor Coolant Pumps will be tripped within one minute of the loss of subcooled margin (CT-1) in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1, Loss of Subcooling Margin resulting in Emergency Feedwater actuation. This is a critical task since failure to trip the RCPs could result in the core not being adequately covered and raise the potential for fuel clad failure.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #2 Continued The A OTSG will subsequently be isolated in accordance with EOP-005 (CT-21). This OTSG is not required for cooldown and overfill can not be prevented by steaming requiring the OTSG to be isolated reducing the radiological consequences of the event. The crew should diagnose the Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13A failure to close and order it closed locally.

The CRS will continue in EOP-005 and when EF-P-1 is secured the crew will close Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B to stop the unmonitored release (CT-22). This is a critical task in that failure to isolate EF-P-1 would result in an uncontrolled radiation release from a non-essential load.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.

Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 2 Event Description Procedure Support Initial Set-up.

Reactor Startup in progress Source Range NI-12 is OOS 1

Reactor Building Hi Range Radiation Monitor Failure (TS)

Tech Spec 3.5.5.2 Accident Monitoring Instrumentation 2

Reactor Startup 1103-8, Approach to Criticality.

3 Premature Criticality 1103-8, Approach to Criticality.

TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip 4

Control Rod Group 5 withdraws uncontrollably Control Rod Group 6 withdraws uncontrollably OP-TM-AOP-064, Continuous Rod Motion 5

OTSG Tube Leak in OTSG A OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage 6

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG requiring HPI initiation OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control 7

High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Failure to open OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control 8

Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPI/LPI)

OP-TM-543-440, Swapping MU-P-1C Cooling to NS OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of 25°F Subcooled Margin 9

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Loss of Subcooled Margin OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage 10 Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 psig OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPI/LPI)

OP-TM-642-901, 1600 PSIG ESAS Actuation 11 Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13A Fails Open OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage

Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 2 ACTION COMMENTS / INSTRUCTIONS DESCRIPTION Initialization IC-202 Reactor Startup in Progress Console Center NI-12 Place EDT on NI-12 indication Scenario Support Console Center NI-12 SUR Place EDT on NI-12 SUR indication Scenario Support Malfunction RM0322 Value:

Insert When:

Event 1 RM-G-22 Fails High Malfunction NI36B Value:

Insert When:

Immediately NI-12 Fission Chamber Power Supply Failure Malfunction NI37B Value:

Insert Sev. 0.0%

When:

Immediately NI-12 Fission Chamber SUR AMP Failure Remote THR02 Value:

1495 When:

Immediate RCS Boron 1495 ppmb Malfunction RD03A Value:

Insert When:

Event 4 Control Rod Group 5 Continuous Withdrawal Malfunction RD03B Value:

Insert When:

Event 12 ZLORDOUTLMTGRP(5)

Control Rod Group 6 Continuous Withdrawal Malfunction TH15A Value:

Insert Sev. 0.05%

When:

Event 5 OTSG A Tube Leak Malfunction TH16A Value:

Insert 2.8%

When:

Event 6 RAMP 300 sec OTSG A Tube Rupture I/O Override 02A5S15-ZDIPBOMUV217 Value:

Insert When:

Immediately High Capacity Makeup Valve Fails as is Malfunction ES01A Value:

Insert When:

Immediately ESAS Failure to Actuate at HPI Setpoint (1600 PSIG)

Train A Malfunction ES01B Value:

Insert When:

Immediately ESAS Failure to Actuate at HPI Setpoint (1600 PSIG)

Train B Malfunction CC02B Value:

Insert When:

Event 8 rrvdrv1b>0.1 Decay Closed Cooling Water Pump 1B Trip Malfunction TH17A Value:

Insert 20%

When:

Event 9 RAMP 10 sec OTSG A Tube Rupture Malfunction FW45A Value:

Insert When:

Event 11 fwvmsv13a>0.9 MS-V-13A Fails as is (open)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

1 Page 36 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Building Hi Range Radiation Monitor RM-G-22 Fails High (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

INITIATE Event 1 when directed.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECTS entry into PRF1-2-8, RM-G-22, RM-G-23 Hi CRS Diagnose RM-G-22 failed high due to no other indications of increased radiation levels on other radiation monitors.

CRS Review TS 3.5.5.2 for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation CRS The channels identified for the instruments specified in Table 3.5-3 shall be OPERABLE. With the number of instrumentation channels less than required, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE in accordance with the action specified in Table 3.5-3.

CRS Table 3.5-3, Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Instrument Required Number of Channels Minimum Number of Channels ACTION CRS Containment High Range Radiation (RMG-22/RMG-

23) 2 2

A CRS A. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements:

1.

either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or

2.

prepare and submit a special report within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

1 Page 37 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Building Hi Range Radiation Monitor RM-G-22 Fails High (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE:

Once the TS call is made the crew can be directed to continue the startup.

Go to Event 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

2 & 3 Page 38 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Startup; Premature Criticality Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

Approach to Criticality 1103-8.

URO LIMITS AND PRECAUTIONS Do not exceed a stable startup rate of 1 DPM.

During actual rod motion, do not exceed a transient start-up rate of 1.5 DPM.

During withdrawal of Regulating Groups:

Verify proper overlap of 25 +/- 5% exists (T.S. 3.5.2.5).

Closely monitor nuclear instrumentation to ensure correct response to core reactivity changes.

During startup when the intermediate range (IR) instruments come on scale, the overlap between the IR and the source range (SR) instrumentation shall not be less than 1 decade (T.S. 3.5.1.5).

The estimated critical position (ECP) calculated in accordance with 1103-15B (Reference 1.5) specifies the rod position tolerance band. If criticality occurs outside the specified band:

Entry into this procedure (1103-8) is a planned evolution.

Entry into 1203-10, Unanticipated Criticality (Ref. 1.10) is not required unless criticality outside the ECP tolerance band is uncontrollable.

The Nuclear Instrumentation shall be continuously monitored during any reactivity addition.

To take conservative actions, including a manual reactor trip if necessary, if abnormal or unexpected reactor indications are observed.

ARO While subcritical, a one over M (1/M) plot shall be made during Regulating Group rod withdrawal for every 25% a group is withdrawn.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

2 & 3 Page 39 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Startup; Premature Criticality Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO Withdraw regulating groups and monitor for criticality observing the following limits:

NOTE:

During rod withdrawal of regulating groups, proper overlap of 25% +/-5% is required (T.S. 3.5.2.5).

NOTE:

In the overlap regions, follow one CRG to determine when a 25% withdrawn increment is complete. For example, a pull from 70% to 95% withdrawn on CRG 5 counts as one 25% withdrawn increment, even though CRG 6 should move to ~ 20% withdrawn during the pull.

URO Stop at least every 25% withdrawn to take 1/M data.

URO If the reactor critical position is outside the ECP limits established per 1103-15B (+/- 0.5% k/k No Xenon, +/- 0.8% k/k Transient Xenon):

Insert rods to achieve at least a 1% k/k subcritical condition using the rod worth data in 1103-15B.

Entry into 1203-10, Unanticipated Criticality (Ref.

1.10) is not required unless criticality outside the ECP tolerance band is uncontrollable.

Go to Event 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 40 of 76 Event

Description:

Continuous Rod Withdrawal Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

INITIATE Event 4 when directed.

Indications Available:

Booth Operator Instructions:

INITIATE Event 5 when the reactor is tripped CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-AOP-064, Continuous Rod Motion URO A control rod group is moving in or out without a demand from ICS or the operator.

URO ENSURE Diamond control station is in MANUAL.

URO ENSURE JOG is selected.

URO ENSURE GROUP and SINGLE SELECT switches are OFF.

URO ENSURE SEQ OR is selected.

URO If out motion continues, then SELECT the affected GROUP and INSERT the affected group.

TRIP the Reactor (Critical Step above steps do NOT stop motion)

GO TO OP-TM-EOP-001.

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.

URO PRESS both Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons.

URO VERIFY REACTOR SHUTDOWN.

URO PRESS Turbine Trip PB.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 41 of 76 Event

Description:

Continuous Rod Withdrawal Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.

CRS VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFICATION (vssv)

CRS IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom using the following priority:

SCM < 25° GO TO EOP-002 XHT GO TO EOP-003 LOHT GO TO EOP-004 OTSG tube leakage > 1 gpm ARO ANNOUNCE Reactor Trip over plant page and radio (include plant conditions sufficient for NLO response per OS-24).

URO VERIFY control rod groups 1 through 7 are fully inserted.

ARO VERIFY OTSG A and B Operating Range level < 97.5%.

ARO VERIFY Main FW Flow to A and B OTSG are each

< 0.5 mlb/hr.

ARO VERIFY OTSG level > setpoint.

ARO VERIFY ICS/NNI HAND or AUTO Power is available.

URO VERIFY 1D and 1E 4160V buses are energized from auxiliary transformers.

URO INTIATE Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

4 Page 42 of 76 Event

Description:

Continuous Rod Withdrawal Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ARO INITIATE Guide 6 OTSG Pressure Control.

URO INITIATE Guide 8, RCS Pressure Control.

CRS WAAT Generator MW zero, or Turbine speed < 1770 RPM, then VERIFY GB1-12 and GB1-02 are OPEN.

CRS WAAT GB1-12 and GB1-02 are OPEN, then ENSURE the Generator Field Breaker is OPEN.

ARO VERIFY primary and secondary Instrument Air pressure

> 80 psig.

URO INITIATE OP-TM-642-904 Reactor Trip Isolation ESAS Actuation.

CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

CRS REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

Go to Event 5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

5 Page 43 of 76 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Leak in OTSG A (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

INITIATE Event 5 when directed.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-005 OTSG Tube Leakage.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Leak size is 12 gpm.

CRS NOTIFY RAC to begin offsite dose assessment.

URO INTIIATE Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control.

CRS May identify T.S. 3.1.6.3 or may need to be asked after scenario.

If primary-to-secondary leakage through the steam generator tubes exceeds 1 gpm total for both steam generators, the reactor shall be placed in cold shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months of detection.

GO TO EVENT 6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7, & 8 Page 44 of 76 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

INITIATE Event 6 when directed.

Indications Available:

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Crew should diagnose increase in leak size.

CRS NOTIFY SM to evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

CRS IDENTIFY the affected OTSG.

OTSG A OTSG B ARO INITIATE Attachment 2.

NOTE:

Aux Steam load are on boiler due to start-up in progress at beginning of scenario..

URO ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and radio.

ARO DISPATCH an Operator to check MSSV status.

CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

URO should diagnose failure of MU-V-217 and use MU-V-16B for supplemental makeup.

URO Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control (Page 1 of 2)

URO If Pressurizer Level is LOW:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7, & 8 Page 45 of 76 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO VERIFY MU pump is operating.

URO VERIFY MU-V-5 is CLOSED.

URO VERIFY MU24-FI > 20 GPM.

URO ENSURE MU-V-17 is OPEN.

URO VERIFY PZR level is being restored.

THROTTLE MU-V-217.

URO VERIFY MU24-FI 20 GPM.

THROTTLE MU-V-16B or 16D.

URO VERIFY PZR level is being restored.

CLOSE MU-V-3.

URO VERIFY PZR level is being restored.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

HPI initiation is a CRITICAL TASK INITIATE HPI IAW OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection HPI/LPI.

URO INITIATES OP-TM-211-901 Emergency Injection (HPI/LPI).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7, & 8 Page 46 of 76 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO VERIFY 1D or 1E 4160V bus is energized.

URO VERIFY a valid automatic actuation has occurred or a manual actuation of HPI is required.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

There are special usage requirements for Section 4.1 and Attachments 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. These actions are memory items (IAW OS 24) and performed from memory when required. The sequence of actuation and verification of ES is not train dependent. Either train may be performed first or trains may be performed in parallel.

URO Initiation of Injection URO IF ESAS Train A "Load Seq Block 4" lights (PCR) are not BLUE, then PRESS "Manual ES Actuation" "1600 PSIG RC PRESS" (Train A CC).

URO PCR graphic display is equivalent to Attachment 7.1 URO IF ESAS Train B "Load Seq Block 4" lights (PCR) are not BLUE, then PRESS "Manual ES Actuation" "1600 PSIG RC PRESS" (Train B CR).

URO PCR graphic display is equivalent to Attachment 7.2.

URO IF any of the components on Attachment 7.2 are not in the required condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.

URO DIAGNOSES DC-P-1B trips when ESAS is actuated and that Section 4.2 applies.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7, & 8 Page 47 of 76 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO Contingency Actions URO IAAT DC-P-1A or DC-P-1B fails to start or is shut down unexpectedly, then perform the following:

IF DC-P-1B fails to start, then START DC-P-1B.

IF DC-P-1B is NOT operating then perform the following:

PLACE MU-P-1C in PTL.

PLACE DH-P-1B in PTL.

PLACE BS-P-1B in PTL.

INITIATE OP-TM-543-440 Swapping MU-P-1C cooling to NS.

URO If required to shift MU-P-1C cooling to NS, then PERFORM the following:

NOTIFY Control Room to monitor the following:

NS-T-1 level (NS-LI-800 / NS-LI-801) (CC).

DC-T-1B level (DC-LI-110) (CR).

BOOTH OPERATOR:

Use remote function to operate 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.

CLOSE the following valves: (Locked Valve entry)

DC-V-41B DC-V-45B BOOTH OPERATOR:

Use remote function to operate 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.

OPEN the following valves:

NS-V-82 NS-V-83

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

2 Event #

6, 7, & 8 Page 48 of 76 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO IAAT either ES selected MU pump fails to start or is shut down unexpectedly, then perform the following:

URO If Train B ES selected MU pump is not operating, then perform the following:

VERIFY 1E 4160V bus is energized VERIFY one of the following:

(N/A steps not performed)

MU-V-36 and MU-V-37 are Open.

MU-V-16C is Open.

MU-V-16D is Open.

If MU-P-1C is ES Selected, then perform the following:

VERIFY MU-P-2C or MU-P-3C is operating START MU-P-1C GO TO EVENT 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Crew should diagnose < 25° SCM.

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-002 Loss of 25°F Subcooled Margin URO IMMEDIATE ACTIONS URO PERFORM Rule 1, SCM.

URO INITIATES OP-TM-EOP-010 SCM, Rule 1, Loss of Subcooling Margin (SCM).

URO VERIFY it has been more than two minutes since RCP start.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Tripping all four RCPs is a CRITICAL TASK.

URO ENSURE all RCPs are shutdown.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

1600 psig will not actuate. If manual ESAS was re-enabled it will have to be re-initiated. If MU-P-1C, and DH-P-1B are still in PTL they will have to be started.

ARO INITIATE OP-TM-642-901 1600 # ESAS ACTUATION.

ARO INITIATE EFW IAW Guide 15 and FEED available OTSGs to 75 to 85% Operating Range Level.

CRS ENSURE announcement of reactor trip and EFW actuation over the plant page and radio.

CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRS REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

CRS IAAT LPI flow >1250 GPM in each line, then GO TO EOP-006.

URO VERIFY PORV is closed (Tailpipe DP indicator, Alarm G-1-7, A0517).

CRS INITIATE Attachment 1 to isolate possible sources of leakage.

URO VERIFY all RC Pumps are shutdown.

CRS VERIFY ONE of the following exists:

TWO (2) HPI trains in ES operation, SM > 25°F, Incore temperature stable or reducing.

CRS IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then GO TO EOP-008. N/A CRS IF primary to secondary heat transfer is excessive (XHT), then GO TO EOP-003. N/A CRS VERIFY cooldown rate > 40°F/hr, or primary to secondary heat transfer exists.

CRS VERIFY OTSG tube leakage < 1 gpm.

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-005 OTSG Tube Leakage.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS CRS NOTIFY RAC to begin offsite dose assessment.

URO INITIATE Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRS NOTIFY SM to evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

CRS IDENTIFY the affected OTSG.

OTSG A CRS INITIATE Attachment 2.

CRS ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and radio.

CRS DISPATCH an Operator to check MSSV status.

CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

CRS IAAT OTSG pressure is approaching or is greater than 1000 psig, then ENSURE MS-V-2A(B) is OPEN and to OPEN TBVs or ADVs to maintain OTSG pressure < 1000 psig.

If SCM > 30 ºF, then any the following may be used to reduce RCS to 30ºF SCM:

OPEN the PORV.

INITIATE a bleed path (IAW OP-TM-211-462) and letdown (IAW OP-TM-211-950).

OPEN the RCS Vents.

ARO IAAT level is rising due to tube leakage in an available OTSG, then preferentially STEAM to maintain OTSG level < 85%.

ARO IAAT any of the following isolation criteria are satisfied (without contrary TSC guidance):

OTSG level > 85% Op Rg BWST level < 21 ft Projected or actual offsite integrated dose approaches 0.5 R whole body or 1.5R thyroid Then perform the following:

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ARO When RCS pressure < 1000 psig, then INITIATE A or B to isolate the affected OTSG(s).

When affected OTSG TBV/ADVs are closed, then If both OTSGs are being isolated, then GO TO EOP-009.

PERFORM Guide 12 RCS Stabilization Following OTSG Isolation.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Isolation of the 1A OTSG when criteria is met is a CRITICAL TASK ARO PERFORMS Attachment 1A OTSG A Isolation Page 1 of 1.

ARO ENSURE CLOSED the following valves (Control Room):

MS-V-1A MS-V-1B FW-V-17A FW-V-5A FW-V-16A FW-V-92A EF-V-30A EF-V-30D MS-V-3D MS-V-3E MS-V-3F MS-V-4A MS-V-13A EXAMINERS NOTE:

ARO should diagnose MS-V-13A failure to CLOSE and have NLO CLOSE locally.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 BOOTH OPERATOR:

To close MS-V-13A when requested; Remove Malfunction FW45A, Use Remote Function FWR78 to place MS-V-13A in MANUAL.

Use FWR79 set to zero to close MS-V-13A ARO ENSURE CLOSED the following valves (In-Plant): (Notify NLOs)

MS-V-13A MS-V-10A MS-V-89A MS-V-34A, MS-V-89B MS-V-34B, MS-V-43A, MS-V-92 FW-V-85A CRS IAAT OTSG isolation criteria may be challenged prior to reducing RCS pressure < 1000 psig, then INITIATE RCS cooldown to 500°F at a rate within RCS inventory control capability and < 240°F/HR.

ENSURE RC-V-2 is OPEN.

CYCLE the PORV to reduce SCM to approximately 30°F.

URO INITIATE Guide 8 to minimize SCM.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Closing MS-V-13B is a CRITICAL TASK.

ARO IAAT EF-P-2A or EF-P-2B are running, then PLACE both trains of each EFW actuation in DEFEAT (eight switches).

CLOSE MS-V-13A and MS-V-13B.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

Scenario can be terminated when the A OTSG is isolated.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Follow-up question highest event entered during scenario?

Answer FS1 Site Area Emergency, 2 Fission product barriers lost RCS <25°F and OTSG leakage > 1gpm to atmosphere through EF-P-1.

NOTE If EF-P-1 is not running during tube-leak, EAL is FA1, if Superheat is indicated >

25°F and EF-P-1 is running EAL is FG1 2 barriers lost 1 potential loss.

Facility:

Three Mile Island Scenario No.:

3 Op Test No.:

NRC Examiners:

Operators:

Initial Conditions:

85% power, MOC Power Escalation Following a trip and maintenance outage MU-P-1B OOS Turnover:

Raise Power to 100%.

Critical Tasks:

Trip all RCPs (CT-1)

Establish FW Flow and Feed SGs (CT-10)

Event No.

Malf.

No.

Event Type*

Event Description 1

TH08 C CRS C URO Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breaker Trips (TS)

C CRS 2

RD0216 C URO Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)

N CRS R URO 3

TH13D N URO Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration C CRS C ARO 4

C URO Feedwater Flow Fails to re-ratio after securing RC-P-1D M CRS M URO 5

TH06 M ARO An RCS leak occurs requiring a Reactor Trip 6

RW010B C CRS Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1B does not

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 C URO start on ESAS actuation C CRS 7

C URO RC-P-1A does not trip when control switch is rotated to the stop position (CT-1)

I CRS 8

I ARO Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A and EF-V-30D do not control in automatic due to a level setpoint failure (CT-10)

(N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #3 The crew will take the watch with reactor power at 85% and ICS in Automatic, except for ULD in Manual. The plant is in a power escalation following an automatic trip several days ago and a subsequent maintenance period. Makeup Pump MU-P-1B is OOS for maintenance.

When the crew has accepted the watch the Lead Examiner can cue event 1, which will initiate a PORV leak PORV block will trip on attempted closure, PORV Block will be allowed to be restored. The CRS should review TS 3.1.12.4 for PORV Block Valve & PORV Operability and declare a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months timeclock is in effect to close the PORV..

After the TS call is made the crew will continue the power escalation. As rods are withdrawn a stuck rod occurs in Group 7 requiring the initiation of procedure OP-TM-AOP-062, Inoperable Rod. The CRS should review TS 4.7.1.2 and 3.5.2.2 and declare the rod inoperable. Tech Spec actions for the inoperable rod are included in AOP-062. Within one hour the other rods in the group must be trimmed so the inoperable rod remains within the group average. The rod will be returned when actions of OP-TM0-AOP-062/OP-TM-622-414 are taken.

After the Tech Spec call is made and AOP-062 has been implemented to the examiners satisfaction, with ICS in auto, the Lead Evaluator can cue the initiation of the RC-P-1D high vibration malfunction. The crew should diagnose increasing vibration on RC-P-1D and initiate action to reduce power to <75% to secure RC-P-1D in accordance with Computer Alarm Response L3125, RC-P-1D High Vibration.

When RC-P-1D is secured feedwater flow will not re-ratio and the crew will have to take hand control of the Feedwater Loop masters in accordance with OP-TM-621-471, ICS Manual Control to manually re-ratio feedwater flow. The ICS does not have to be returned to auto to continue.

When the plant has been stabilized with feedwater flow re-ratioed, the Lead Examiner can cue initiation of the RCS leak. The crew should diagnose the leak based on RB pressure rise and RCS inventory change. Reactor Building pressure will rise rapidly and RCS pressure will lower.

The reactor should be tripped by the crew and the CRS should initiate OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip. Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1B will not start automatically on the ESAS signal and must be started manually per OS-24, Conduct of Operations during Abnormal and Emergency Conditions.

When subcooling margin is lost RC-P-1A control switch will not trip the breaker and the URO will have to open the breakers for the 1A 7KV bus to trip the pump (CT-1). If the pump is not tripped within one minute the crew will have to keep RC-P-1A running in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1 Loss of Subcooling Margin. This is a critical task since failure to trip the RCPs could result in the core not being adequately covered and raise the potential for fuel clad failure. The CRS will initiate OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of Subcooled Margin.

When Emergency Feedwater is actuated EF-V-30A and EF-V-30D will not operate in automatic and will have to be taken to hand to feed the A OTSG (CT-10). This is a critical task in that failure to take manual control would result in the A OTSG going dry and becoming unavailable to maintain or initiate primary to secondary heat transfer.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.

Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 3 Event Description Procedure Support Initial Set-up.

OP 1102-2 Plant Startup. MU-P-1B OOS 1

Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breaker Trips (TS). PORV starts to leak TS 3.1.12.4, PORV Block Valve Operability TS 4.7.1.2, Rod Misalignment TS 3.5.2.2 Operation With Inoperable Rods 2

Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)

OP-TM-AOP-062 Inoperable Rod Computer Alarm L3125, RC-P-1D High Vibration 3

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration OP 1102-4, Power Operation OP-TM-MAP-H0204, Reactor Inlet Tc HI 4

Feedwater Flow Fails to re-ratio after securing RC-P-1D OP-TM-621-471, ICS Manual Control OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1, Loss of Subcooling Margin OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of Subcooled Margin 5

RCS Leak in the RB OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown OP-TM-534-901, RB Emergency Cooling Operations 6

Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1B does not start on ESAS actuation OS-24, Conduct of Operations During Abnormal and Emergency Events OS-24, Conduct of Operations During Abnormal and Emergency Events 7

RC-P-1A does not trip when control switch is rotated to the stop position OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1, Loss of Subcooling Margin 8

Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A and EF-V-30D do not control in automatic OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 16, EFW Failure

Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 3 ACTION COMMENTS / INSTRUCTIONS DESCRIPTION Initialization IC-TEMP 203 85% Power, ICS Full AUTO Scenario Support Start MU-P-1A Place Control Switch in NAS Scenario Support Remote Function CCR12 Value:

Insert NS When:

Immediately Scenario Support Stop MU-P-1B Value:

Insert PTL When:

Immediately Scenario Support Start IC-P-1B Place control switch in NAS Scenario Support MU-P-1B Place EDT on MU-P-1B-1D Control Switch Place EDT on MU-P-1B-1E Control Switch Scenario Support Remote Function RCR19 Value:

Insert OUT When:

Event 1 RC-V-2 Breaker trips Malfunction TH08 Value:

0.2%

When:

Event 1 10 sec delay Causes PORV weep Malfunction RD0216 Value:

Insert When:

Immediately Stuck rod in Group 7 Malfunction TH13D Value:

Insert Sev. 50%

When:

Event 3 RAMP 300 sec RC-P-1D High Vibration Monitor ICK314B (normal value 0.0101)

Value:

Insert 10.0 When:

Immediately FW Flow Fails to Re-ratio Malfunction TH06 Value:

Insert Sev. 0.5%

When:

Event 5 RAMP 100 sec RCS Leak at RCP Discharge Malfunction RW10B Value:

Insert When:

Immediately RR-P-1B fails to start on ESAS signal I/O Override 02A3S11-ZDICSRCP1A(4) NAS Value:

ON When:

Immediately RC-P-1A Breaker Fails to Trip I/O Override 02A3S11-ZDICSRCP1A(2) STP Value:

OFF When:

Immediately RC-P-1A Breaker Fails to Trip I/O Override 02A3S11-ZDICSRCP1A(1) PTL Value:

OFF When:

Immediately RC-P-1A Breaker Fails to Trip Remote Function ICR02 Value:

Insert Sev. 0%

When:

Immediately OTSG Operate Level Setpoint for EFW Control A

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event #

1 Page 59 of 76 Event

Description:

Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breaker Trips (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Ensure ICK314B is set at 10.0 in Monitor.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECTS 1102-2 Plant Startup.

CRS IAAT Control Rods approach 95% withdrawn, then DETERMINE the volume of water required for the desired rod movement at current Boron concentration & EFPD from Figure 1. Current boron concentration may be estimated based on the latest boron sample result and RCS water additions per the Control Room Log.

REVIEW recent water addition records in the Control Room log.

VALIDATE the value obtained from Figure 1 by comparison to recent water additions.

Reduce RCS boron concentration by performing any of the following IAW 1104-29E Feed and Bleed Processes ADD demin water from an RCBT Feed and Bleed PLACE a deborating demin in service EVALUATE the effect of the water addition on Control rod position.

CRS IAAT Group 7 Rods reach 97% WITHDRAWN, then Stop Power Ascension until rods have inserted to < 94%

WITHDRAWN.

BOOTH OPERATOR:

When requested, report as Primary NLO that, RC-V-2 PORV block breaker at 1C ESV unit 5C appears to be tripped.

If requested to close the breaker use Remote RCR19 to close.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event #

1 Page 60 of 76 Event

Description:

Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breaker Trips (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE:

CRS should review T.S. 3.1.12 for PORV block valve and PORV operability and declare a one hour time clock to close the PORV and remove power from it, or restore PORV Block.

May also refer to T.S. 3.1.6 Leakage though PORV should be blocked before leakage can be quantified.

CRS The PORV Block Valve shall be OPERABLE during HOT STANDBY, STARTUP, and POWER OPERATION:

With the PORV Block Valve inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months either:

Restore the PORV Block Valve to OPERABLE status or Close the PORV (verify closed) and remove power from the PORV Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days 0.00833 hours 4.960317e-5 weeks 1.1415e-5 months .

With the PORV block valve inoperable, restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status prior to startup from the next COLD SHUTDOWN unless the COLD SHUTDOWN occurs within 90 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD) of the end of the fuel cycle. If a COLD SHUTDOWN occurs within this 90 day period, restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status prior to startup for the next fuel cycle.

CRS If total leakage exceeds 10 gpm the reactor shall be placed in hot shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of detection.

GO TO EVENT 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event #

2 Page 61 of 76 Event

Description:

Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

CRS ORDERS power escalation to continue.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

When asymmetric rod condition occurs the CRS should review T.S. 4.7.1.2 and T.S. 3.5.2.2 and declare the rod inoperable.

CRS IF a control rod is misaligned with its group average by more than an indicated nine inches, the rod shall be declared inoperable and the limits of Specification 3.5.2.2 shall apply.

The rod with the greatest misalignment shall be evaluated first.

The position of a rod declared inoperable due to misalignment shall not be included in computing the average position of group for determining the operability of rods with lesser misalignments.

CRS Operation with inoperable rods:

If within one hour of determination of an inoperable rod as defined in Specification 4.7.1, and once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter, it is not determined that a one percent k/k hot shutdown margin exists combining the worth of the inoperable rod with each of the other rods, the reactor shall be brought to the HOT SHUTDOWN condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months until this margin is established.

Following the determination of an inoperable rod as defined in Specification 4.7.1, all rods shall be exercised within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months and exercised weekly until the rod problem is solved.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event #

2 Page 62 of 76 Event

Description:

Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior CRS If a control rod in the regulating or safety rod groups is declared inoperable per 4.7.1.2, and cannot be aligned per 3.5.2.2.f, power shall be reduced to 60% of the thermal power allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months , and the overpower trip setpoint shall be reduced to 70% of the thermal power allowable within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months . Verify the potential ejected rod worth (ERW) is within the assumptions of the ERW analysis and verify peaking factor (FQ(Z) and H

N F

) limits per the COLR have not been exceeded within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-AOP-062 Inoperable Rod.

CRS ENTRY CONDITIONS NOTE:

Control rod is misaligned with the group by more than 9 inches.

CRS EITHER of the following conditions exist:

One or more inoperable control rods And the reactor is NOT shutdown > 1% k/k.

CRS RECORD time of discovery of inoperable rod: _______

CRS REQUEST duty reactor engineer to report to the control room.

CRS VERIFY reactor power > 5%.

CRS VERIFY safety group Out Limit (Diamond panel) is LIT.

CRS VERIFY the inoperable rod is fully inserted.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event #

2 Page 63 of 76 Event

Description:

Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If any regulating or safety rods are inoperable, then perform the following within one hour: (TS 3.5.2.2.b,c).

INITIATE 1103-15A section 3.2, Calculation of shutdown margin with Tave 530°F. (TS 3.5.2.2.c).

If one of the following is true:

rod does not meet trip insertion time rod can not be exercised rod can not be located The INITIATE OP-TM-622-201 Control Rod Movement to verify the operability of other rods, and GO TO step 3.11.

(TS 3.5.2.2.b).

NOTE:

Depending on when crew catches rod misalignment AOP-062 may direct realignment IAW OP-TM-622-414 OR transfer of all unaffected rods to the Aux power supply IAW OP-TM-622-451, below steps are written to allow observation of transfer.

URO Verifies indications on Diamond panel, places diamond in manual.

URO Ensure Group selected on GRP/AUX switch.

URO Selects SEQ OR on SEQ/SEQ OR switch URO Selects Group 7 on GROUP SELECT Switch URO May select 1 rod at a time on SINGLE SELECT SWITCH URO Selects JOG Speed URO Observes SY lamp lit

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event #

2 Page 64 of 76 Event

Description:

Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO Selects Clamp on CLAMP/CLAMP RELEASE switch URO Presses MAN TRANS URO Verifies TR CF light lit, and PI lights indicate on at PI panel.

URO May select additional rods on group 7 and press MAN TRANS if all rods not moved at once.

URO Select CLAMP RELEASE.

URO Select GROUP, verify sync lamp off URO Select RUN BOOTH OPERATOR:

When stuck rod in group 7 is selected delete MALF RD0216 URO Aligns rod 7-2 with group average.

URO Reverses above steps to transfer rods back to normal supply EVALUATOR NOTE:

Must return to ICS in auto except ULD prior to EVENT

3.

GO TO EVENT 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 & 4 Page 65 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed insert Event 3.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-PC-L3125 RC-P-1D High Vibration CRS SETPOINTS Pump Instrument RC-VT-79 Pump Setpoints (Alert/Danger) 15 mils / 20 mils Motor Instrument RC-VT-147D Motor Setpoints (Alert/Danger) 3 mils / 7 mils NOTE:

Use of the Trip Multiply switch doubles the alarm limits and causes the red bypass light to flash.

ARO MONITOR RC Pump vibration levels (PLF) and ATTEMPT to reset alarm.

CRS IAAT any of the following conditions are met:

Motor vibration exceeds 7 mils, Pump vibration exceeds 20 mils during 4 RCP operations, Pump vibration exceeds 30 mils during single pump operation, Then PERFORM OP-TM-226-154 to place RC-P-1D in the Standby mode.

EVALUATE RCDT level for abnormal or changing trends.

IF RC-P-1D individual contribution to the RCDT level rise is

> 1 gpm, then PERFORM OP-TM-226-154 to place RC-P-1D in shutdown Mode.

CRS INITIATES entry into OP-TM-226-154 Shutdown RC-P-1D.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 & 4 Page 66 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO VERIFY Reactor Power < the following for the final RCP Combination:

2 / 1 RCP Combination - < 75% NI Power VERIFY Turbine Load < the following for the final RCP Combination:

2 / 1 RCP Combination - < 665 MWE EXAMINERS NOTE:

The CRS will direct the power reduction using 1102-4, Power Operation prior to securing RC-P-1D.

NOTE:

If this section is being performed during an emergency plant shutdown, then any action in this table may be deferred except those marked with EP in the sign-off column.

When the power reduction is complete, then any action is N/A if the action criteria was not satisfied.

ARO Prior to FW-U-1B speed < 4000 RPM START LO-P-8B.

ARO Prior to FW-U-1A speed < 4000 RPM START LO-P-8A.

ARO Prior to shutdown of MO-P-1B If MO-V-26 is OPEN, then INITIATE OP-TM-431-152 to remove MO-T-3 from service.

CRS Prior to reactor power < 85%, RESET FW Flow Correction Factors to 1,000 IAW MAP G-2-6.

CRS Prior to turbine load < 630 Mwe If any MO-P-1 are operating, then SHUTDOWN all Moisture Separator Pumps IAW OP-TM-431-152.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 & 4 Page 67 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ARO Prior to reactor power < 75%

___ PLACE FW-P-1A in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-472

___ PLACE FW-P-1B in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-473 NOTE:

Steps with letter designations should be performed in parallel.

CRS PERFORM Enclosure 2A (for an emergency (forced) power reduction INITIATE Enclosure 2A).

CRS REDUCE reactor power to the desired power as follows:

ARO MAINTAIN Generator Reactive Load IAW OP-TM-301-472.

URO IF SG/REACTOR DEMAND is in AUTO, then REDUCE reactor power as follows:

URO ENSURE ULD is in HAND URO SET ULD LOAD RATE OF CHANGE to 1 %/minute for PLANNED reductions or at a rate determined by CRS for Forced power reductions.

URO SET ULD Target Load Demand to desired setpoint.

CRS PERFORM the actions per Enclosure 2B.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

The CRS will direct continuation of OP-TM-226-154 to secure RC-P-1D.

NOTE:

RCP vibrations are high whenever one pump is operated alone in a loop. Use the following pump combinations. A and B OR C and D.

CRS EVALUATE final RCP Combination for effects of vibration and procedural requirements:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 & 4 Page 68 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior 1102-11 specifies use of RC-P-1A and RC-P-1B.

RC-P-1C and RC-P-1D are designated for alternate use and require use of PT Curves in OP-TM-226-000, Reactor Coolant Pumps, Attachments 7.3 and 7.4 vs. 1102-1 /

1102-11 Figures 1 and 1A.

NOTE:

A 2 / 1 RCP combination with OTSG levels > LLLs will require a re-ratio (70% / 30%) of Feedwater flow to A /

B OTSG.

CRS If Reactor power is > 20%, then EVALUATE expected FW Flow requirements for new RCP combination, to minimize effects on Delta Tc.

URO PLACE at least one each of the following in Normal-After-Start:

RC-P-2D-1, Oil Lift Pump AC HP (CC), or RC-P-2D-2, Oil Lift Pump DC HP (CC)

RC-P-3D-1, Backstop Oil Pump #1 (CC), or RC-P-3D-2, Backstop Oil Pump #2 (CC)

URO PLACE RC-P-1D in Pull-To-Lock.

URO VERIFY the following:

RC-P-1D not rotating backwards (PPS L2878, RC-P-1D Reverse Rotation not in alarm).

NOTE:

Vibration levels at a low value with the absence of change indicates 0 rpm.

Vibration readings (PLF) indicate RC-P-1D has reached 0 rpm.

URO PLACE the following in Pull-To-Lock:

RC-P-3D-2, Backstop Oil Pump #2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 & 4 Page 69 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior RC-P-3D-1, Backstop Oil Pump #1 URO PLACE the following in Pull-To-Lock:

RC-P-2D-2, Oil Lift Pump DC HP RC-P-2D-1, Oil Lift Pump AC HP ARO Diagnoses the failure of feedwater flow to re-ratio.

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-MAP-H0204 RX Inlet TC HI.

ARO IF automatic feedwater control is inadequate, then PLACE feedwater in HAND IAW one or more of the following procedures:

OP-TM-621-471, ICS Manual Control. (for FW Loop Masters)

URO Maintain NI power within 1% of desired reactor power.

ARO When reactor power > 20%, then control feedwater flow to OTSGs as follows:

Maintain Tavg between 578°F and 580°F.

Maintain c between +2°F to -2°F (TC = TCA - TCB).

If only 3 RC Pumps are operating, then when either OTSG level reaches 25, TC limit does not apply.

URO ENSURE ULD in HAND.

URO Establish manual SG/REACTOR Control as follows:

PLACE SG/REACTOR DEMAND station in HAND.

ENSURE control rod position does NOT change.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

3 Event #

3 & 4 Page 70 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY alarm H-2-1 ICS in Track In.

URO If necessary to maintain reactor power or control rods within limits or if a power change is being conducted IAW 1102-4, then ADJUST SG/REACTOR DEMAND as follows:

URO If maintaining stable reactor power or a slow planned power change, then RAISE or LOWER in discrete steps to keep neutron error between +2% and -2%.

URO If rapid power reduction is required, then LOWER as necessary to achieve desired reactor power level and ENSURE FW flow controlled within limits.

ARO Establish manual Feedwater Control as follows:

PLACE SG A/B LOAD RATIO (TC) station in HAND.

NOTE:

Either SG A or B FW DEMAND station may be placed in HAND first.

ARO PLACE SG A FW DEMAND station in HAND.

PLACE SG B FW DEMAND station in HAND.

NOTE:

Raising SG A FW DEMAND or lowering SG B FW DEMAND will make TC more negative (TC = TC A - TC B).

ARO ADJUST SG A and/or B FW DEMAND to maintain Tavg,

TC, and OTSG level within limits.

GO TO EVENT 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

All Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 71 of 76 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

INITIATE Event 5 when directed.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-001 Reactor Trip.

URO Press BOTH Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons.

URO VERIFY REACTOR SHUTDOWN.

URO PRESS Turbine Trip PB.

URO VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

ARO should diagnose loss of SCM during symptom check.

CRS VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFICATION (VSSV)

CRS IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom using the following priority:

SCM < 25°F GO TO EOP-002 CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-002 Loss of 25°F Subcooled Margin.

URO INITIATES Rule 1 Loss of Subcooling Margin (SCM).

URO VERIFY it has been more than two minutes since RCP start.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

All Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 72 of 76 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE:

Tripping all RCPs within one minute is a CRITICAL TASK URO ENSURE ALL RCPs are shutdown.

If all RCPs were not tripped within one minute, then MAINTAIN RCP(s) still operating until one of the following conditions is satisfied:

SCM > 25F LPI flow > 1250 gpm in each line Tclad > 1800°F EXAMINERS NOTE:

RC-P-1A breaker fails to trip and the 1A 7K bus supply breakers will have to be opened within 1 minutes of loss of SCM or RC-P-1A will have to be left running.

URO Trips RCPs at extension controls and/or de-energizes 7kV busses at panel PR.

URO INITIATE OP-TM-642-901 1600 # ESAS ACTUATION ARO INITATE EFW IAW Guide 15 and FEED available OTSGs to 75 to 85% Operating Range Level.

EXAMINERS NOTE:

EF-V-30 A & D will fail to respond in auto and have to be operated manually to raise OTSG level. This is a CRITICAL TASK.

ARO INITIATES Guide 15 EFW Actuation Response.

IAAT EFW is actuation is required, then:

ENSURE EF-P-1, EF-P-2A, and EF-P-2B start.

DISPATCH an Auxiliary Operator (AO) to EF-V-30 area.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

All Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 73 of 76 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ARO ENSURE EF-V-30A/D and EF-V-30B/C control OTSG level at setpoint (Rule 4).

ARO If Shift Management concurrence is obtained, then EFW flow may be controlled using one or both EF-V-30 valves for each OTSG.

ARO INITIATES Rule 4 Feedwater Control.

ARO MAINTAIN OTSG level 75 - 85% OPERATING Range Level.

ARO IAAT OTSG Level < minimum, then MAINTAIN the following MINIMUM required flow: (In this case > 215 gpm/OTSG CRS ENSURE announcement of reactor trip and EFW actuation over the plant page and radio.

CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

CRS REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

CRS IAAT LPI flow > 1250 GPM in each line, then GO TO EOP-006.

URO VERIFY PORV is closed (Tailpipe DP indicator, Alarm G-1-7, A0517).

IF PORV was not opened for core cooling, then CLOSE the PORV Block (RC-V-2). (previously closed)

URO INITIATE Attachment 1 to isolate possible sources of leakage.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

All Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 74 of 76 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO VERIFY all RC Pumps are shutdown.

GO TO step 4.2 (perform rapid RCS cooldown).

CRS VERIFY ONE of the following exists:

TWO (2) HPI trains in ES operation GO TO Section 4.0.

CRS IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then GO TO EOP-008.

CRS VERIFY cooldown rate > 40°F/hr, or primary to secondary heat transfer exists.

CRS VERIFY OTSG tube leakage < 1 gpm.

CRS VERIFY pressurizer level is being maintained without HPI.

GO TO EOP-006.

CRS DIRECTS initiation of OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS URO ENSURE HPI and LPI are operated IAW Rule 2.

CRS IAAT an ES Actuation setpoint is reached, then ENSURE all ESAS components have actuated.

INITIATE contingency action IAW Section 4.2 of the applicable procedure(s).

OP-TM-534-901 RB Emergency Cooling

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

All Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 75 of 76 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE:

RR-P-1B fails to start on ESAS actuation and must be manually started.

CRS ENSURE CF-V-1A and CF-V-1B are OPEN. (PCR)

CRS IAAT RM-A-1 high alarm or 4 psig ESAS have actuated, then INITIATE OP-TM-826-901, Control Building Ventilation System Radiological Event Operations.

CRS IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then GO TO EOP-008.

CRS INITIATE Guide 20, PRIOR to Transfer to RB Sump.

CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

CRS REQUEST SM evaluates Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

URO INITIATES OP-TM-534-901 RB Emergency Cooling Operations.

URO VERIFY 1600 psig ES actuation, RB pressure is approaching 2 psig or Emergency Director or Shift Manager has authorized use of RBEC.

URO VERIFY 1D or 1E 4160V Bus is energized.

URO Initiation of RB Emergency Cooling

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.:

1 Scenario #

All Event #

6, 7 & 8 Page 76 of 76 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO DISPATCH an operator to CLOSE NS-V-85 (IB 295: S of RR valve room).

NOTE:

The sequence of actuation and verification of ES is not train dependent. Either train may be performed first or trains may be performed in parallel.

URO If any of the following components are not in the required condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.

URO IF RR-P-1A or RR-P-1B is not operating, then perform the following:

URO IF RR-P-1B is not operating and 1E 4160V bus is energized, then perform the following:

URO START RR-P-1B URO IF RR-V-10B and RR-V-1B are CLOSED, then OPEN RR-V-1B.

ARO VERIFY G1-02 and G11-02 are CLOSED.

SCENARIO CAN BE TERMINATED AFTER ALL TASKS HAVE BEEN PERFORMED.

Follow-up question highest event entered during scenario?

Answer FA-1 Fission Product Barrier lost. <25°F SCM.

NOTE If >25°F Superheat is indicated the FS1 applies Loss of 1 barrier and potential loss of a second.

ML071760031

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