ML071760031

Final - Section C Operating Exam (Folder 3)

ML071760031
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	04/19/2007
From:	Division of Reactor Safety I
To:	AmerGen Energy Co
Sykes, Marvin D.
Shared Package
ML060800145	List: IR 05000289/2007301 ML071090575 ML071350626 ML071360136 ML071360144 ML071360151 ML071360155 ML071450423 ML071760022 ML071760030 ML071760031 ML071760138 ML071770540 ML071770553
References
50-289/07-301
Download: ML071760031 (76)

Text

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Facility: Three Mile Island Scenario No.: 1 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

• 100% power, MOC.

• EF-P-2B is OOS for bearing replacement.

• DR-P-1A is running for effluent flow Turnover: Maintain 100% power operations.

Critical Tasks: Initiate HPI Cooling (CT-14)

Initiate HPI (CT-2)

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RW04A CRS Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A trips (TS) 2 CRS NLO Reports an excessive oil leak from Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 (TS).

3 MS01D I CRS Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high slowly I ARO 4 CC04A C CRS Intermediate Closed Cooling Water Pump IC-P-1A trips and IC-P-1B fails to auto start C URO 5 MS19A N CRS Steam Leak in the Turbine Building N ARO R URO 6 FW-15A M CRS Feedwater Pump 1A trip FW-15B M URO Feedwater Pump 1B trip TC07B M ARO Turbine stop valve fails open 7 FW17 C CRS Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 trips on start FW18A C ARO Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A does not start.

(CT-14) 8 MU08B C CRS High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B fails to open C URO B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #1 The crew will take the watch with reactor power at 100% and ICS in Full Automatic. Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pump EF-P2B is OOS for a bearing replacement. Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A is running in preparation for a liquid release.

When the crew has accepted the watch the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the trip of Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A. The Crew should respond in accordance with MAP Alarm B-1-5, 480V ES Motor Trip and B-2-5, 480V ES Motor Overload. The CRS should review Tech Spec 3.3.1.4.d and declare a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> timeclock based on Tech Spec 3.3.2. When the Tech Spec call has been made the scenario can continue.

After the TS call is made the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the NLO report of a large oil leak from EF-P-1 bearing with an empty bearing oil indicator. The CRS should review Tech Spec 3.4.1.1.a.4 and Note 1 and declare that the 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> timeclock on Emergency Feedwater is suspended until a second EFW Pump is operable. The CRS may initiate action to prevent EF-P-1 from starting by manually closing MS-V-13A and MS-V-13B. EF-P-1 will not be returned to operable status during this scenario. The scenario can continue when the Tech Spec timeclock is suspended.

After the Tech Spec call is made and on cue from the Lead Evaluator, the Turbine Header Pressure instrument failure can be initiated. The crew should diagnose the failing pressure and take hand control of the turbine and the SG/Rx Master Integrated Control System station. The CRS should implement OP-TM-301-471, Manual Control of the Main Turbine and OP-TM-621-471, ICS Manual Control. The backup pressure instrument may be selected in accordance with OP-TM-621-451, Selecting Alternate Instrument Inputs to ICS. The backup instrument does not have to be selected for the scenario to continue.

After the plant has been stabilized the Lead Examiner can cue the trip of Intermediate Closed Cooling Water Pump IC-P-1A. The crew should diagnose the loss of IC-P-1A and the failure of IC-P-1B to auto start using MAP alarms AA-1-6, 480V BOP Motor Trip, C-1-2, IC CRD Flow Lo and C-2-2, IC System Flow Lo. The CRS should implement 1202-17, Loss of Intermediate Closed Cooling Water and the URO should manually start IC-P-1B. Letdown flow may be isolated by CRD high temperature closing MU-V-1A and MU-V-1B. If this occurs the CRS should initiate OP-TM-211-950, Restoration of Letdown Flow. Letdown flow does not have to be re-established to continue.

After IC-P-1B has been started the Lead Evaluator can cue initiation of the steam leak in the Turbine Building. The crew should diagnose the steam leak in the Turbine Building and the CRS should implement 1203-24, Steam Leak. An NLO will provide a report of severity enough to begin a plant shutdown. The CRS should order a plant shutdown in accordance with 1102-4, Power Operations.

At the cue of the Lead Examiner or after the first Feedwater Pump (FW-P-1A or FW-P-1B) is secured initiate the trip of the remaining pump to trip the reactor. If the crew trips the reactor due to the steam leak the trip of both Feedwater Pumps will be initiated at <40 % power. One turbine stop valve will fail to close and the contingency steps of OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip will have to be taken for the turbine. The steam leak will be isolated when the turbine trips. The CRS will initiate OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 1 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #1 Continued Following the loss of both Feedwater Pumps, EF-P-1 will trip (if not previously isolated by the CRS) and EF-P-2A fails to start. The crew should diagnose the lack of heat transfer and respond in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-004, Lack of Primary to Secondary Heat Transfer.

Without primary to secondary heat transfer PORV/HPI cooling is the only method to maintain adequate core cooling, which makes this a critical task. PORV/HPI Cooling will be initiated in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-009, HPI Cooling (CT-14). The ARO will initiate OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 16, EFW Failure for the Emergency Feedwater Pump failures.

When HPI is manually initiated HPI Valve MU-V-16B will fail to open and the B Train HPI manual ESAS actuation does not actuate. This will result in inadequate HPI since there will not be one full train of HPI in operation. Without adequate HPI the mitigation strategy is changed for the event, which makes obtaining adequate HPI a critical task. The B Train components will have to be started at the component level in accordance with OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPI/LPI) (CT-2).

The CRS will subsequently transition to OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown from EOP-009.

Optional, transition to Pressurizer Bubble recovery, by allowing restoration of EF-P-2B, optional steps at end of scenario for the start of pressurizer bubble recovery, actual recovery of level on scale could take 30 minutes and will not be evaluated in this scenario.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.

Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 1 Event Description Procedure Support Initial Set-up. EF-P-2B OOS for bearing replacement DR-P-1A Running in preparation for a liquid release 1 DR-P-1A Trips TS 3.3.1.4.d and 3.3.2, ECCS Systems MAP Alarm B-1-5, 480V ES Motor Trip MAP Alarm B-2-5, 480V ES ES Motor Overload 2 EF-P-1 Bearing Oil Leak TS 3.4.1.1.a.4, Decay Heat Removal Capability 3 Turbine Header Pressure OP-TM-MAP-H0302, Sass Mismatch instrument fails high OP-TM-MAP-H0203, Mn Turb Hdr Press Hi/Lo OP-TM-301-471, Manual Control of the Main Turbine OP-TM-621-471, ICS Manual Control OP-TM-621-451, Selecting Alternate Instrument Inputs to ICS 4 Intermediate Closed Cooling 1202-17, Loss of Intermediate Cooling System Water Pump IC-P-1A trips AA-1-6, 480V BOP Motor Trip and IC-P-1B fails to auto start OP-TM-MAP-C0102, IC CRD Flow Lo OP-TM-MAP-C0202, IC System Flow Lo 5 1203-24 Steam Leak Steam Leak in the Turbine 1102-4 Power Operations Building 6 Feedwater Pump 1A (or 1B) OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip trip Turbine stop valve fails to close 7 Emergency Feedwater Pump OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 16, EFW Failure EF-P-1 trips on start OP-TM-EOP-004, Lack of Primary to Secondary Emergency Feedwater Pump Heat Transfer EF-P-2A does not start.

OP-TM-EOP-009, HPI Cooling 8 High Pressure Injection OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPI/LPI).

Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B fails to open B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 1 ACTION COMMENTS / INSTRUCTIONS DESCRIPTION Initialization IC- 100% HFP, ICS Full AUTO 201(TEMP)

Console Left EF-P-2B Tagged OOS Scenario Support EF-P-2B PTL EF-P-2B PTL/EF-P-2B BKR OPEN Remote Function Value: OUT Scenario Support FWR13 When: Immediately Main Console Robust Barriers applied IAW Scenario Support Risk Document Console Center DR-P-1A Running Scenario Support DR-P-1A NAS Malfunction RW04A Value: Insert DR-P-1A Trips When: Event 1 Malfunction MS01D Value: Insert Sev. 100% Turbine Header Pressure When: Event 3 RAMP 300 sec instrument fails high SP10B-PT2 I/O Override IC-P-1B Value: Insert OFF IC-P-1B Fails to Auto Start NAT When: Immediately Malfunction CC04A Value: Insert IC-P-1A trip When: Event 4 Malfunction MS19B Value: Insert Sev. 10% Steam Leak in the Turbine When: Event 5 RAMP 300 sec Building Malfunction FW15A Value: Insert Feedwater Pump 1A trip When: Event 6 ratpw<40 Malfunction FW15B Value: Insert Feedwater Pump 1B trip When: Event 6 ratpw<40 Malfunction TC07B Value: Insert Turbine Stop Valve B Fails When: Immediately Open Malfunction FW17 Value: Insert Emergency Feedwater Pump When: Event 7 fwnefp1>0.1 EF-P-1 trip Malfunction FW18A Value: Insert Emergency Feedwater Pump When: Event 8 ratpw<10 EF-P-2A trip MU08B Value: Insert High Pressure Injection Valve When: Event 9 (HPI) MU-V-16B fails as is muvmuv16b>0.1 03A4S02-ZDIPB1RBB Value: Insert OFF B ESAS 4 psig Manual When: Immediately Actuation Failure 03A4S01-ZDIPB1RCB Value: Insert OFF B ESAS 4 psig 1600 psig When: Immediately Actuation Failure SGTUNEZ(19) Value: 0.5 When: Immediately Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 6 of 76 Event

Description:

Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A Trips (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Initiate Event 1.

Booth Operator Role Play: When requested to investigate DR-P-1A, Pump is hot to touch and thermal overloads are tripped, if requested thermal overloads do not reset.

Indications Available:

Directs Review of Alarm Response B-1-5 (480V ES Motor CRS Trip).

URO Diagnose trip of DR-P-1A.

URO Tripped pump disagreement light (amber/green).

CRS Computer printout and CRT.

Directs review of Alarm Response B-2-5 (480 ES Motor CRS Overload).

URO Motor disagreement lights, amber/red (except on air handlers).

CRS Computer printout and CRT.

Review TS 3.3.1.4.d below and 3.3.2 and declare a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> CRS time clock IAW 3.3.2.

T.S. 3.3.1.4.d Cooling Water Systems - Specification 3.0.1 applies, (however Allowed outage time below applies).

Two decay heat river water pumps must be OPERABLE.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 1 Page 7 of 76 Event

Description:

Decay Heat River Water Pump DR-P-1A Trips (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior T.S. 3.3.2 Maintenance or testing shall be allowed during reactor operation on any components(s) in the makeup and purification, decay heat, RB emergency cooling water, RB spray, BWST level instrumentation, or cooling water systems which will not remove more than one train of each system from service. Components shall not be removed from service so that the affected system train is inoperable for more than 72 consecutive hours. If the system is not restored to meet the requirements of Specification 3.3.1 within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />, the reactor shall be placed in a HOT SHUTDOWN condition within six hours.

NOTE: The crew may elect to swap MU-P-1A cooling to Nuclear Services Closed Cooling using OP-TM-543-439, Swapping MU-P-1A Cooling to NS.

CRS Go to Event 2.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 8 of 76 Event

Description:

NLO Reports an Excessive Oil Leak From Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Reports a large oil leak on Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1s outboard pump bearing. The oil bulb is empty.

Booth Operator Role Play: If asked to prioritize Emergency feedpump work state EF-P-2B will be ready for IST in about 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />..

Indications Available:

Review TS 3.4.1.1.a.4 and Note 1. The CRS should declare the EF-P-2B 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> time clock suspended until a second EFW CRS pump is operable and direct action to restore EF-P-1 and/or EF-P-2B to service.

Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature greater than 250 degrees F.

Three independent Emergency Feedwater (EFW) Pumps and two redundant flowpaths to each Once through Steam Generator (OTSG) shall be OPERABLE** with:

• Two EFW Pumps, each capable of being powered from an OPERABLE emergency bus, and one EFW Pump capable of being powered from two OPERABLE main steam supply paths.

• With more than one EFW Pump or both flowpaths to either OTSG inoperable, initiate action immediately to restore at least two EFW Pumps and one flowpath to each OTSG:

• Specification 3.0.1 and all other actions requiring shutdown or changes in REACTOR OPERATING CONDITIONS are suspended until at least two EFW Pumps and one EFW flowpath to each OTSG are restored to OPERABLE status.

Booth Operator Instructions: If ordered to trip EF-P-1 using the overspeed trip device enter event 7. If ordered to gag MS-V-13A/B use mimic.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 2 Page 9 of 76 Event

Description:

NLO Reports an Excessive Oil Leak From Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Go to Event 3.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 10 of 76 Event

Description:

Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high slowly.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Initiate Event 3.

Indications Available:

Directs initiation of alarm response SASS Mismatch CRS OP-TM-MAP-H0302.

Diagnoses failure of turbine header pressure instrument ARO SP-10A-PT2.

MANUAL ACTIONS REQURIED Directs review of alarm response MN Turb HDR Press HI/LO CRS OP-TM-MAP-H0203.

AUTOMATIC ACTIONS If modified header pressure error >40 psi for >5 seconds then ARO Turbine goes to manual.

MANUAL ACTIONS REQUIRED Directs initiation of OP-TM-301-471, Manual Control of the CRS Main Turbine.

ARO Precautions:

To avoid a reactor trip, slowly adjust ICS Main Turbine Hand ARO control since it can change load at equivalent of 35% Reactor power/minute (28% CV Pos / Min).

Limitations:

IF SG/RX demand is in Auto, then turbine load (Mwe) should ARO be maintained within 10 Mwe of desired load.

IF SG/RX demand is in hand, then turbine header pressure ARO should be maintained between 875 and 895 psig.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 11 of 76 Event

Description:

Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high slowly.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ADJUST Main Turbine demand to maintain Turbine load within ARO limits.

NOTE: Manual control of SG/RX demand may be required to stabilize turbine header pressure.

CRS DIRECTS initiation of OP-TM-621-471, ICS Manual Control.

URO Limitations URO MAINTAIN NI power within 1% of desired reactor power.

WHEN reactor power > 20%, then control feedwater flow to URO OTSGs as follows:

• Maintain Tavg between 578°F and 580°F.

• If Tavg reduced at EOC IAW 1102-4, then maintain Tavg within +/-1°F of desired setpoint.

• Maintain Tc between +2°F to -2°F (TC = TCA-TCB).

URO ENSURE ULD in HAND.

IF SG/REACTOR Station is being placed in HAND to support a URO planned activity, THEN VERIFY reactor power is less than 2558 MWAth (99.6%).

URO PLACE SG/REACTOR DEMAND station in HAND.

URO ENSURE control rod position does NOT change.

URO VERIFY alarm H-2-1 ICS in Track In.

NOTE: ICS load rate of change is NOT in effect with SG/Reactor station in HAND.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 3 Page 12 of 76 Event

Description:

Turbine Header Pressure instrument fails high slowly.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IF necessary to maintain reactor power or control rods within URO limits or if a power change is being conducted IAW 1102-4, then ADJUST SG/RECTOR DEMAND as follows;

• IF maintaining stable reactor power or a slow planned power change, then RAISE or LOWER in discrete steps to keep neutron error between +2% and -2%.

• IF rapid power reduction is required, then LOWER as necessary to achieve desired reactor power level and ENSURE FW flow controlled within limits.

NOTE: Additional ICS related stations may be placed in manual control IAW the following procedures:

EXAMINERS NOTE: The backup instrument does not have to be selected to continue the scenario DIRECTS initiation of OP-TM-621-451, selecting alternate CRS instrument inputs (optional).

COMPARE alternate inputs (using Attachment 7.3 of ARO OP-TM-621-000, Integrated Control System or table in OP-TM-MAP-H0302 as necessary).

ARO VERIFY one of the following:

• Difference between affected and alternate channel(s) is (are) less than SASS Setpoint s listed in OP-TM-MAP-H0302.

ARO SELECT alternate instrument(s) with console PB.

• VERIFY plant stable.

• Selects MS-PT-10B PT1 Go to Event 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 13 of 76 Event

Description:

IC-P-1A Trips and IC-P-1B fails to Auto Start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Initiate Event 4.

Booth Operator Role Play: If requested to investigate IC-P-1A, Pump is hot to touch and thermal overloads are tripped, if requested thermal overloads do not reset.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECT entry into AA-1-6, 480V BOP Motor Trip.

URO OBSERVATIONS

• Tripped pump disagreement lights (green/amber)

MANUAL ACTIONS

• May immediately start IC-P-1B based on action that should URO have occurred.

CRS DIRECT entry into C-1-2, IC CRD CLG FLOW LO.

CRS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS

• MU-V-1A and MU-V-1B will Close if CRD outlet temperature is > 160°F MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED URO

• ENSURE an IC pump is operating.

CRS DIRECT entry into C-2-2, IC SYSTEM FLOW LO.

MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED URO

• ENSURE standby IC pump is Operating.

• If IC flow is < 550 gpm, then INTIATE EP 1202-17, Loss of IC Cooling System.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 14 of 76 Event

Description:

IC-P-1A Trips and IC-P-1B fails to Auto Start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DIRECT entry into 1202-17, Loss of Intermediate Cooling CRS System.

SYMPTOMS CRS

• I.C. Pump Disch Press Lo, Alarm, 70 psig. (C-2-4)

• I.C. System Flow Lo, Alarm, 550 GPM. (C-2-2)

• I.C. CRD Clg Flow Lo, Alarm, 100 GPM. (C-1-2)

CRS AUTOMATIC ACTIONS

• Standby IC Pump starts (ICCW flow less than 550 GPM)

• MU-V-1A/1B closes (CRD Coolant Outlet Hi Temp. greater than 160°F)

MANUAL ACTION REQUIRED URO

• If low flow exists, then PERFORM the following:

• VERIFY OR START the standby IC pump.

• MONITOR Surge Tank Level.

• FILL Surge Tank Level as necessary to maintain a normal indicated level of 18.5 Should order MU-P-1A started, and MU-P-1B shutdown due to CRS operation of IC-P-1B.

Booth Operator Instructions: If the crew orders MU-P-1A transferred to NSCCW use mimic to accomplish.

URO

• Order MU-P-1A cooling transferred to NSCCW

• Starts MU-P-1A (CC)

• Stops MU-P-1B (CR)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 15 of 76 Event

Description:

IC-P-1A Trips and IC-P-1B fails to Auto Start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: If the crew recovers letdown flow use Remote Functions:

MUR90 to bypass the MU-V-3 Hi Temperature Interlock MUR89 to Open MU-V-2A/B MUR01 to operate MU-V-70A ARO RECOVER LETDOWN AS FOLLOWS

• Verifies Prerequisites

• ICCW flow restored

• Containment isolation permission from CRS.

• Closes / verifies closed MU-V-6A/B

• Orders MU-70A open

• Orders MU-V-2A/B high temperature interlock bypassed

• Orders MU-V-3 high temperature interlock bypassed

• Ensures closed MU-V-3, MU-V-4, MU-V-5 (CC)

• Ensures open MU-V-1A/B (CC)

• Opens MU-V-2A/B PCR

• Opens MU-V-5 10% on position controller (CC)

• Presses and holds MU-V-3 open PB (CC) until high temperature alarm clears.

• Gradually throttles MU-V-5 controller to restore at rate of 2.5 gpm/min or less.

• Reopen MU-V-6A

• Order MU-V-70A closed

• Order MU-V-2A/B high temperature interlock to normal

• Order MU-V-3 high temperature interlock to normal

• When flow is approximately 50 gpm then

• Open MU-V-4 (CC)

• Close MU-V-5 (CC)

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 4 Page 16 of 76 Event

Description:

IC-P-1A Trips and IC-P-1B fails to Auto Start.

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE: If letdown flow is lost it does not have to be recovered to continue the scenario.

Go to Event 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 17 of 76 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in the Turbine Building Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Initiate Event 5.

Booth Operator Instructions: After crew has had opportunity to diagnose steam leak, or as requested by lead examiner, report a steam leak in the overhead of the 2nd floor of the Turbine. Appears to be a Steam Lead drain line and is not accessible. No personnel appear to be in danger at this time but there is a large amount of steam and a lot of condensation occurring.

IF further indication is needed report as the Director Operations that while the leak is not catastrophic a plant shutdown should be initiated.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECT entry into AP 1203-24, Steam Leak.

SYMPTOMS CRS

• DECREASING secondary steam pressure.

• Electrical load reducing (mismatch between electrical load and Rx Power).

• Decrease in pressurizer level, R.C. Pressure, and cold leg temperature.

• For a leak outside the Reactor Building; Noise may be heard in Control Room or a report made from personnel outside the Control Room.

Immediate Manual Action

• IF continued operation is not posing a hazard to personnel CRS or equipment required for safe shutdown but is severe enough to require shutdown.

Then reduce load at rate specified by US and go to following CRS steps.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 18 of 76 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in the Turbine Building Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Continue to shutdown and cooldown the unit per OP 1102-10 CRS and 11 respectively.

DETERMINE which OTSG has the steam leak and if possible CRS the location of the leak. If possible, the leak should be isolated.

INITIATES OP 1102-4 Power Operation to Commence CRS Shutdown.

EXAMINERS NOTE: Completion of Enclosure 2A not required for Emergency S/D.

PERFORM Enclosure 2A (for an emergency (forced) power CRS reduction INITIATE Enclosure 2A).

EXAMINERS NOTE: IF ICS is still in hand step 1104-2 3.2.2(c) is the step that will apply for the shutdown.

URO REDUCE reactor power to the desired power as follows:

ARO

• MAINTAIN Generator Reactive Load IAW OP-TM-301-472.

• IF SG/REACTOR DEMAND is in AUTO, then REDUCE URO reactor power as follows:

URO

• ENSURE ULD is in HAND.

• SET ULD LOAD RATE OF CHANGE to 1%/minute URO for PLANNED reductions or at a rate determined by CRS for Forced power reductions.

URO

• SET ULD Target Load Demand to desired setpoint.

• IF SG/REACTOR DEMAND is in HAND, then REDUCE URO reactor power IAW OP-TM-621-471 ICS Manual Operations.

CRS

• PERFORM the actions per Enclosure 2B.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 19 of 76 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in the Turbine Building Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE: If this section is being performed during an emergency plant shutdown, then any action in this table may be deferred except those marked with EP in the sign-off column.

ARO Prior to FW-U-1B speed < 4000 RPM START LO-P-8B.

ARO Prior to FW-U-1A speed < 4000 RPM START LO-P-8A.

Prior to shutdown of MO-P-1B IF MO-V-26 is OPEN, then CRS INITIATE OP-TM-431-152 to remove MO-T-3 from service.

Prior to reactor turbine load < 630 Mwe If any MO-P-1 are CRS operating, then SHUTDOWN all Moisture Separator Pumps IAW OP-TM-431-152.

ARO Prior to reactor power < 75%:

• PLACE FW-P-1A in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-472

• PLACE FW-P-1B in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-473 BOOTH OPERATOR: Use RNI screen to remove powdex vessels from service.

When condensate flow < 6.9 mlb/HR AND prior to any in service powdex vessel flow being reduced to less than 1500 CRS gpm, REDUCE to 4 IN SERVICE POWDEX vessels IAW OP-TM-423-151.

When total heater drain flow (sum of HD-FI-10, 11, & 12 on pumps in service) is less than 3300 GPM AND prior to reducing ARO any Heater Drain pump flow to < 1200 GPM, SHUTDOWN a Heater Drain Pump IAW OP-TM-431-152.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 1 Event # 5 Page 20 of 76 Event

Description:

Steam Leak in the Turbine Building Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior WHEN ULD target load is < 560 MWe and prior to FW-P-1A or B SPEED DEMAND less than 3%, PLACE one Feedwater ARO Pump in STANDBY IAW OP-TM-401-153 (A) or OP-TM-401-154 (B).

GO TO EVENTS 6, 7, & 8

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Booth Operator Instructions: If Reactor is not tripped then initiate Event 6 when directed.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.

URO IMMEDIATE ACTIONS URO PRESS BOTH Reactor Trip AND DSS pushbuttons.

URO VERIFY REACTOR SHUTDOWN.

URO PRESS Turbine Trip PB.

URO VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.

• PLACE EHC-P-1A and EHC-P-1B in Pull-To-Lock.

• OPEN EHC-V-FV1 (TB 305, EHC bypass valve at EHC pump skid).

BOOTH OPERATOR: Use Remote Function TCR01 to OPEN EHC-V-FV1.

ARO PERFORMS a symptom check.

CRS VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFCATION (VSSV)

IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom CRS using the following priority:

• SCM < 25°F GO TO EOP-002

• XHT GO TO EOP-003

• LOHT GO TO EOP-004

• OTSG tube leakage > 1 gpm GO TO EOP-005 NOTE TO EXAMINER: Crew should diagnose lack of primary to secondary heat transfer and transition to EOP-004. SOME EOP-001 steps may be performed prior to diagnosis.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ANNOUNCE Reactor Trip over plant page and radio (include plant conditions sufficient for NLO response per OS-24).

VERIFY control rod groups 1 through 7 are fully inserted.

VERIFY OTSG A and B Operating Range level < 97.5%.

ENSURE FW-V-5A and FW-V-5B are closed.

VERIFY OTSG level > setpoint.

INITIATE RULE 4 - FWC.

VERIFY ICS/NNI HAND or AUTO Power is available.

INITIATES OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 15, EFW Actuation ARO Response.

IAAT EFW is actuation is required, then:

ARO ENSURE EF-P-1, EF-P-2A, and EF-P-2B start.

ARO DISPATCH an Auxiliary Operator (AO) to EF-V-30 area.

IF EFW pump disch. Pressure < OTSG pressure, then ARO INITIATE Guide 16.

ARO INITIATES Guide 16, EFW Failure.

IAAT EFW is required and ALL components are NOT functional, then:

ARO IF EF-P-1 fails, then INITIATE Guide 16.1.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 ARO IF EF-P-2A or EF-P-2B fails, then INITIATE Guide 16.2.

ARO INITIATES Guide 16.1, EFW Failure of EF-P-1 (Page 1 of 2).

ARO ENSURE OPEN MS-V-2A and MS-V-2B.

ARO ENSURE OPEN MS-V-13A and MS-V-13B.

ARO IF MS-PI-204 < 150 psig, then ENSURE MS-V-6 is OPEN.

OBTAIN CRS concurrence and ENSURE EFW actuation ARO enable-defeat switches (8) are in DEFEAT.

ARO CLOSE MS-V-13A and MS-V-13B.

BOOTH OPERATOR: Report EF-P-1 trip mechanism is broken and needs maintenance attention.

ARO INITIATES Guide 16.2 EFW Failure of EF-P-2A or EF-P-2B.

ARO VERIFY voltage available on the associated bus.

VERIFY control power is available as indicated by the green ARO indicator light at the control switch.

ARO OBTAIN CRS concurrence immediately prior to initiating flow.

OBTAIN CRS concurrence and ENSURE EFW actuation ARO enable-defeat switches (8) are in DEFEAT.

ARO START the pump from the Control Room.

ARO IF the pump did NOT start, then at 1D/E 4160V switchgear:

• ENSURE targets are reset on relays located at the switchgear.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

• IF breaker control power light is OFF, then ENSURE the 10 amp closing fuses are properly installed.

• UNLOCK and PLACE the EF-P-2A (B) 69 bypass switch in EMERG

• PRESS CLOSE pushbutton to start EF-P-2A (B).

BOOTH OPERATOR: Report attempting steps Guide 16.2 7.1 - 7.4 and EF-P-2A did NOT start.

DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-004, Lack of Primary to CRS Secondary Heat Transfer.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS URO ENSURE no more than one RCP operating per loop.

ARO ENSURE EFW is actuated and Guide 15 initiated.

ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and ARO radio. (Include plant conditions sufficient for NLO response per OS-24).

VERIFY 1D and 1E 4160V buses are energized from auxiliary URO transformers.

IAAT primary-to-secondary heat transfer has been established, CRS then GO TO Step 3.19.

IAAT RCS Pressure approaches 2450 psig (or 552 psig if URO

< 329°F), then perform the following:

• ENSURE RC-V-2 (PORV block) is Open

• GO TO EOP-009.

CRS IAAT RCS is approaching 25°F SCM, then GO TO EOP-009.

EXAMINERS NOTE: Initiating PORV/HPI Cooling is a CRITICAL TASK.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-009, HPI Cooling.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS CRS IAAT SCM < 25°F, then:

• PERFORM Rule 1.

• CONTINUE with EOP-009.

EXAMINERS NOTE: Initiating HPI is a CRITICAL TASK.

URO ENSURE 4 psig ESAS has been initiated IAW OP-TM-642-902.

EXAMINERS NOTE: URO should diagnose failure of MU-V-16B to open and the B train of HPI to start. B Train of HPI will be started manually.

URO VERIFY ADEQUATE HPI.

EXAMINERS NOTE: May go to Section 4.0 on Inadequate HPI.

URO INTIATE OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPI/LPI).

URO VERIFY 1D or 1E 4160V bus is energized.

VERIFY a valid automatic actuation has occurred or a manual URO actuation of HPI is required.

EXAMINERS NOTE: There are special usage requirements for Section 4.1 and Attachments 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. These actions are memory items (IAW OS 24) and performed from memory when required. The sequence of actuation and verification of ES is not train dependent. Either train may be performed first or trains may be performed in parallel.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 URO Initiation of Injection URO PCR graphic display is equivalent to Attachment 7.1.

IF any of the components on Attachment 7.1 are NOT in the URO required condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.

IF ESAS Train B Load Seq Block 4 lights (PCR) are NOT URO BLUE, then PRESS Manual ES actuation 1600 PSIG RC PRESS (Train B CR).

IF any of the components on Attachment 7.2 are NOT in the URO required condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.

EXAMINERS NOTE: URO may complete this page before going to Section 4.2.

URO Contingency Actions URO ENSURE MU-V-14A or MU-V-14B is Open.

IAAT DC-P-1A or DC-P-1B fails to start or is shut down URO unexpectedly, then perform the following:

URO IF DC-P-1B fails to start, then START DC-P-1B.

IAAT either ES selected MU pump fails to start or is shut down URO unexpectedly, then perform the following:

IF Train B ES selected MU pump is NOT operating, then URO perform the following:

• VERIFY 1E 4160V bus is energized.

• VERIFY ONE of the following (N/A steps NOT performed):

• MU-V-36 and MU-V-37 are Open.

• MU-V-16C is Open.

• MU-V-16D is Open.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

• IF MU-P-1C is ES Selected, then perform the following:

• VERIFY MU-P-2C or MU-P-3C is operating

• START MU-P-1C URO IF any of the following did NOT Open:

• MU-V-16C

• MU-V-16D Then perform the following to ensure flow through ALL four HPI nozzles:

• IF two ES selected MU pumps are operating, then ENSURE ONE of the following pairs of valves are OPEN (N/A steps NOT performed):

• MU-V-16A and MU-V-16B

• MU-V-16A and MU-V-16D

• MU-V-16B and MU-V-16C

• MU-V-16C and MU-V-16D URO IF MU-V-36 and MU-V-37 did NOT CLOSE, then URO ENSURE MU-V-36 or MU-V-37 is Closed.

IF MU-V-18 did NOT CLOSE, then perform ONE of the URO following (N/A step NOT performed):

• ENSURE MU-V-18 is Closed.

• ENSURE MU-V-17 and MU-V-217 are Closed.

IF DR-P-1A is NOT operating or DR-V-1B is Closed, then URO perform the following:

• START DR-P-1A

• ENSURE DR-V-1A is Open

• IAAT DC system A cooler outlet temperature exceeds 105°F, then perform the following:

• PERFORM 4.2.2 actions for an inoperable DC-P-1A

• PLACE DC-P-1A in PTL Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 IF DR-P-1B is NOT operating or DR-V-1B is Closed, then URO perform the following:

• START DR-P-1B

• ENSURE DR-V-1B is Open URO VERIFY SCM < 25°F.

ENSURE the PORV block is OPEN and OPEN the PORV (RC-URO RV-2).

VERIFY there is flow through the PORV (PORV P indicator, URO ALARM G-1-7, A0517).

CRS REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EAL).

URO DE-ENERGIZE ALL Pressurizer heaters.

CRS VERIFY RCS < 25°F superheat.

CRS VERIFY OTSG Tube Leakage < 1 gpm.

CRS GO TO EOP-006.

BOOTH OPERATOR: If requested by chief examiner, EF-P-2B may be restored by radio report, EF-P-2B work is complete and clearance restoration has been written, request permission to rack in EF-P-2B breaker Use FWR13 in to rack breaker in.

Report EF-P-2B is racked in clearance, calls for you to remove info tag on EF-P-2B extension control as last step.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS URO ENSURE HPI and LPI are operated IAW Rule 2.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 EXAMINERS NOTE: Scenario may progress to point of throttling HPI but is not necessary for completion of scenario.

IAAT an ES Actuation setpoint is reached, then ENSURE all URO ESAS components have actuated.

INITIATE contingency actions IAW Section 4.2 of the applicable procedure(s).

• OP-TM-211-901 Emergency Injection (If EFW is available) EOP-006 Step 3.15 will direct if HPI/PORV cooling in effect & SCM > 25°F & at least 1 OTSG is available.

CRS Then perform Guide 8.1 Recovering a pressurizer steam bubble.

Ensure TBVs are controlling OTSG pressure at desired ARO pressure.

URO Throttle HPI to control SCM 50°F to 70°F.

URO Initiate restoration of letdown.

URO Energize pressurizer heaters.

ARO Verify OTSG level is at setpoint per Rule 4 CRS Brief Crew.

ARO Expeditiously lower OTSG pressure 50 psig URO Close PORV URO Throttle HPI to control SCM 50°F to 70°F.

TERMINATE SCENARIO Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Follow-up question highest event entered during scenario?

Answer FA-1 Loss of Fission Product Barrier 2.d HPI-PORV cooling in effect OR 2.b

<25°F SCM.

Facility: Three Mile Island Scenario No.: 2 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

• Reactor Startup is in Progress

• NI-12 is OOS due to a detector failure Turnover: Take the Reactor Critical Critical Tasks:

• Initiate HPI (CT-2)

• Trip all RCPs (CT-1)

• Reduce Steaming/Isolate Affected SGs (CT-22)

• Limit Uncontrolled Radiation Release (CT-21)

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 RM0322 CRS Reactor Building Hi Range Radiation Monitor Failure (TS) 2 N CRS Reactor Startup R URO N ARO 3 NI37A URO Premature Criticality CRS 4 RD03A M CRS Continuous Rod Withdrawal M URO M ARO 5 TH15A CRS OTSG Tube Leak in OTSG A (TS) 6 TH16A C CRS OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG requiring HPI initiation C URO C ARO 7 MU09 C CRS High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Fails to open C URO 8 CC02B C CRS Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation C URO 9 TH17A C CRS OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG resulting in loss of subcooling C URO margin (CT-1, CT-22)

C ARO 10 ES01A I CRS Both Trains of HPI Fail to Actuate at 1600 psig (CT-2)

ES01B I URO Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 11 FW45A C CRS Emergency Feedwater Pump Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13A Fails Open. (CT-21)

C ARO

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #2 The crew will take the watch with reactor startup in progress pulling toward criticality. NI-12 is OOS due to a detector failure. The crew will continue the reactor startup.

As soon as the crew accepts the watch the lead Examiner can cue the failure of RB Hi Range monitor RM-G-22. MAP Alarm C-1-1, Radiation Level High will be received and the crew should diagnose the failure of the instrument. The CRS should review TS 3.5.5.2 and declare a 7 day timeclock based on the failure. As soon as the TS call is made the crew can be directed to continue the startup.

The crew will observe that the reactor will go critical below the lower band of the ECP. Crew should pick this up through 1/M plot. The CRS should terminate the startup and review 1103-8 requirement to insert rods 1 group worth to achieve 1% shutdown margin.

After the CRS ordered rods inserted, the Lead Examiner can cue the initiation of the Control Rod Group 5 continuous withdrawal. If Group 5 reaches its outlimit before the reactor is tripped Group 6 will begin to withdraw. The URO should attempt to gain rod control in accordance with the IMAs of OP-TM-AOP-064, Uncontrolled Rod Motion. The URO should trip the reactor and enter OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip at this point.

When the reactor is tripped the OTSG tube leak will be initiated. The crew should diagnose the tube leak at approximately 12 gpm. The CRS should go to OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage to mitigate the event. The CRS should identify T.S. 3.1.6.3 OTSG tube leakage >1.0 gpm, if not identified due immediate entry into EOPs, follow-up question may be required.

After the EOP-005 is entered and when directed by the Lead Examiner the OTSG Tube Rupture can be initiated. The crew should diagnose the leak size increase and continue in EOP-005.

The High Capacity Makeup Valve will fail to open and the URO may try to use Makeup Valve MU-V-16B to augment makeup flow. The leak will require initiation of HPI using OP-TM-EOP-010 Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control (CT-2). This is a critical task because the leak size is greater than normal makeup capability which would cause Pressurizer level to lower and eventually empty since HPI will not automatically actuate at 1600 psig.

Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump DC-P-1B will trip when ESAS is actuated and the CRO will have to implement OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPI/LPI) Contingency Actions. When Reactor Building Spray Pump BS-P-1B is placed in Pull to Lock the scenario can continue. The transfer of Makeup Pump MU-P-1C cooling to Nuclear Services Closed Cooling Water (NSCCW) does not have to be completed to continue.

When Reactor Building Spray Pump BS-P-1B is placed in Pull to Lock the Lead Examiner can cue the increase in the leak size. The leak size will result in a loss of subcooled margin. HPI will not automatically actuate at 1600 psig RCS pressure and will have to be manually actuated in accordance with OP-TM-642-901, 1600 PSIG ESAS Actuation (CT-2). The CRS should initiate OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of 25°F Subcooled Margin. All four Reactor Coolant Pumps will be tripped within one minute of the loss of subcooled margin (CT-1) in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1, Loss of Subcooling Margin resulting in Emergency Feedwater actuation. This is a critical task since failure to trip the RCPs could result in the core not being adequately covered and raise the potential for fuel clad failure.

Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 2 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #2 Continued The A OTSG will subsequently be isolated in accordance with EOP-005 (CT-21). This OTSG is not required for cooldown and overfill can not be prevented by steaming requiring the OTSG to be isolated reducing the radiological consequences of the event. The crew should diagnose the Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13A failure to close and order it closed locally.

The CRS will continue in EOP-005 and when EF-P-1 is secured the crew will close Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13B to stop the unmonitored release (CT-22). This is a critical task in that failure to isolate EF-P-1 would result in an uncontrolled radiation release from a non-essential load.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.

Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 2 Event Description Procedure Support Initial Set-up. Reactor Startup in progress Source Range NI-12 is OOS 1 Reactor Building Hi Range Tech Spec 3.5.5.2 Accident Monitoring Radiation Monitor Failure Instrumentation (TS) 2 Reactor Startup 1103-8, Approach to Criticality.

3 Premature Criticality 1103-8, Approach to Criticality.

4 Control Rod Group 5 TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip withdraws uncontrollably Control Rod Group 6 OP-TM-AOP-064, Continuous Rod Motion withdraws uncontrollably 5 OTSG Tube Leak in OTSG A OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage 6 OTSG Tube Rupture in A OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage OTSG requiring HPI initiation OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control 7 High Capacity Makeup Flow OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control Valve MU-V-217 Failure to open 8 Decay Heat Closed Cooling OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPI/LPI)

Water Pump Trips on ESAS OP-TM-543-440, Swapping MU-P-1C Cooling to NS Actuation 9 OTSG Tube Rupture in A OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of 25°F Subcooled Margin OTSG Loss of Subcooled OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage Margin 10 Both Trains of HPI Fail to OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection (HPI/LPI)

Actuate at 1600 psig OP-TM-642-901, 1600 PSIG ESAS Actuation 11 Emergency Feedwater Pump OP-TM-EOP-005, OTSG Tube Leakage Steam Supply Valve MS-V-13A Fails Open Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 2 ACTION COMMENTS / INSTRUCTIONS DESCRIPTION Initialization IC-202 Reactor Startup in Progress Console Center Place EDT on NI-12 indication Scenario Support NI-12 Console Center Place EDT on NI-12 SUR indication Scenario Support NI-12 SUR Malfunction RM0322 Value: Insert RM-G-22 Fails High When: Event 1 Malfunction NI36B Value: Insert NI-12 Fission Chamber Power When: Immediately Supply Failure Malfunction NI37B Value: Insert Sev. 0.0% NI-12 Fission Chamber SUR When: Immediately AMP Failure Remote THR02 Value: 1495 RCS Boron 1495 ppmb When: Immediate Malfunction RD03A Value: Insert Control Rod Group 5 When: Event 4 Continuous Withdrawal Malfunction RD03B Value: Insert Control Rod Group 6 When: Event 12 Continuous Withdrawal ZLORDOUTLMTGRP(5)

Malfunction TH15A Value: Insert Sev. 0.05% OTSG A Tube Leak When: Event 5 Malfunction TH16A Value: Insert 2.8% OTSG A Tube Rupture When: Event 6 RAMP 300 sec I/O Override 02A5S15- Value: Insert High Capacity Makeup Valve ZDIPBOMUV217 When: Immediately Fails as is Malfunction ES01A Value: Insert ESAS Failure to Actuate at When: Immediately HPI Setpoint (1600 PSIG)

Train A Malfunction ES01B Value: Insert ESAS Failure to Actuate at When: Immediately HPI Setpoint (1600 PSIG)

Train B Malfunction CC02B Value: Insert Decay Closed Cooling Water When: Event 8 rrvdrv1b>0.1 Pump 1B Trip Malfunction TH17A Value: Insert 20% OTSG A Tube Rupture When: Event 9 RAMP 10 sec Malfunction FW45A Value: Insert MS-V-13A Fails as is (open)

When: Event 11 fwvmsv13a>0.9 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 36 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Building Hi Range Radiation Monitor RM-G-22 Fails High (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: INITIATE Event 1 when directed.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECTS entry into PRF1-2-8, RM-G-22, RM-G-23 Hi Diagnose RM-G-22 failed high due to no other indications of CRS increased radiation levels on other radiation monitors.

CRS Review TS 3.5.5.2 for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation The channels identified for the instruments specified in Table 3.5-3 shall be OPERABLE. With the number of instrumentation CRS channels less than required, restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE in accordance with the action specified in Table 3.5-3.

CRS Table 3.5-3, Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation Required Minimum Instrument Number of Number of ACTION Channels Channels CRS Containment High Range Radiation 2 2 A (RMG-22/RMG-23)

A. With the number of OPERABLE channels less than CRS required by the Minimum Channels OPERABLE requirements:

1. either restore the inoperable channel(s) to OPERABLE status within 7 days of the event, or

2. prepare and submit a special report within 30 days following the event outlining the action taken, the cause of the inoperability and the plans and schedule for restoring the system to OPERABLE status.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 1 Page 37 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Building Hi Range Radiation Monitor RM-G-22 Fails High (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE: Once the TS call is made the crew can be directed to continue the startup.

Go to Event 2 Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 38 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Startup; Premature Criticality Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

Approach to Criticality 1103-8.

URO LIMITS AND PRECAUTIONS

• Do not exceed a stable startup rate of 1 DPM.

• During actual rod motion, do not exceed a transient start-up rate of 1.5 DPM.

During withdrawal of Regulating Groups:

• Verify proper overlap of 25 +/- 5% exists (T.S. 3.5.2.5).

• Closely monitor nuclear instrumentation to ensure correct response to core reactivity changes.

• During startup when the intermediate range (IR) instruments come on scale, the overlap between the IR and the source range (SR) instrumentation shall not be less than 1 decade (T.S. 3.5.1.5).

The estimated critical position (ECP) calculated in accordance with 1103-15B (Reference 1.5) specifies the rod position tolerance band. If criticality occurs outside the specified band:

• Entry into this procedure (1103-8) is a planned evolution.

Entry into 1203-10, Unanticipated Criticality (Ref. 1.10) is not required unless criticality outside the ECP tolerance band is uncontrollable.

• The Nuclear Instrumentation shall be continuously monitored during any reactivity addition.

• To take conservative actions, including a manual reactor trip if necessary, if abnormal or unexpected reactor indications are observed.

While subcritical, a one over M (1/M) plot shall be made during ARO Regulating Group rod withdrawal for every 25% a group is withdrawn.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 2&3 Page 39 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Startup; Premature Criticality Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Withdraw regulating groups and monitor for criticality observing URO the following limits:

NOTE: During rod withdrawal of regulating groups, proper overlap of 25% +/-5% is required (T.S. 3.5.2.5).

NOTE: In the overlap regions, follow one CRG to determine when a 25% withdrawn increment is complete. For example, a pull from 70% to 95% withdrawn on CRG 5 counts as one 25% withdrawn increment, even though CRG 6 should move to ~ 20% withdrawn during the pull.

URO Stop at least every 25% withdrawn to take 1/M data.

If the reactor critical position is outside the ECP limits URO established per 1103-15B (+/- 0.5% k/k No Xenon, +/- 0.8% k/k Transient Xenon):

• Insert rods to achieve at least a 1% k/k subcritical condition using the rod worth data in 1103-15B.

• Entry into 1203-10, Unanticipated Criticality (Ref.

1.10) is not required unless criticality outside the ECP tolerance band is uncontrollable.

Go to Event 4.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 40 of 76 Event

Description:

Continuous Rod Withdrawal Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: INITIATE Event 4 when directed.

Indications Available:

Booth Operator Instructions: INITIATE Event 5 when the reactor is tripped CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-AOP-064, Continuous Rod Motion A control rod group is moving in or out without a demand from URO ICS or the operator.

URO ENSURE Diamond control station is in MANUAL.

URO ENSURE JOG is selected.

URO ENSURE GROUP and SINGLE SELECT switches are OFF.

URO ENSURE SEQ OR is selected.

If out motion continues, then SELECT the affected GROUP URO and INSERT the affected group.

• TRIP the Reactor (Critical Step above steps do NOT stop motion)

• GO TO OP-TM-EOP-001.

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip.

URO PRESS both Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons.

URO VERIFY REACTOR SHUTDOWN.

URO PRESS Turbine Trip PB.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 41 of 76 Event

Description:

Continuous Rod Withdrawal Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.

CRS VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFICATION (vssv)

IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom CRS using the following priority:

• SCM < 25° GO TO EOP-002

• XHT GO TO EOP-003

• LOHT GO TO EOP-004

• OTSG tube leakage > 1 gpm ANNOUNCE Reactor Trip over plant page and radio (include ARO plant conditions sufficient for NLO response per OS-24).

URO VERIFY control rod groups 1 through 7 are fully inserted.

ARO VERIFY OTSG A and B Operating Range level < 97.5%.

VERIFY Main FW Flow to A and B OTSG are each ARO

< 0.5 mlb/hr.

ARO VERIFY OTSG level > setpoint.

ARO VERIFY ICS/NNI HAND or AUTO Power is available.

VERIFY 1D and 1E 4160V buses are energized from auxiliary URO transformers.

URO INTIATE Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 4 Page 42 of 76 Event

Description:

Continuous Rod Withdrawal Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ARO INITIATE Guide 6 OTSG Pressure Control.

URO INITIATE Guide 8, RCS Pressure Control.

WAAT Generator MW zero, or Turbine speed < 1770 RPM, CRS then VERIFY GB1-12 and GB1-02 are OPEN.

WAAT GB1-12 and GB1-02 are OPEN, then ENSURE the CRS Generator Field Breaker is OPEN.

VERIFY primary and secondary Instrument Air pressure ARO

> 80 psig.

INITIATE OP-TM-642-904 Reactor Trip Isolation ESAS URO Actuation.

CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

CRS REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

Go to Event 5.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 5 Page 43 of 76 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Leak in OTSG A (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: INITIATE Event 5 when directed.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-005 OTSG Tube Leakage.

EXAMINERS NOTE: Leak size is 12 gpm.

CRS NOTIFY RAC to begin offsite dose assessment.

URO INTIIATE Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control.

May identify T.S. 3.1.6.3 or may need to be asked after CRS scenario.

If primary-to-secondary leakage through the steam generator tubes exceeds 1 gpm total for both steam generators, the reactor shall be placed in cold shutdown within 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> of detection.

GO TO EVENT 6.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 44 of 76 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: INITIATE Event 6 when directed.

Indications Available:

EXAMINERS NOTE: Crew should diagnose increase in leak size.

CRS NOTIFY SM to evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

CRS IDENTIFY the affected OTSG.

• OTSG A

• OTSG B ARO INITIATE Attachment 2.

NOTE: Aux Steam load are on boiler due to start-up in progress at beginning of scenario..

ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and URO radio.

ARO DISPATCH an Operator to check MSSV status.

CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

EXAMINERS NOTE: URO should diagnose failure of MU-V-217 and use MU-V-16B for supplemental makeup.

URO Guide 9 RCS Inventory Control (Page 1 of 2)

URO If Pressurizer Level is LOW:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 45 of 76 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO VERIFY MU pump is operating.

URO VERIFY MU-V-5 is CLOSED.

URO VERIFY MU24-FI > 20 GPM.

URO ENSURE MU-V-17 is OPEN.

URO VERIFY PZR level is being restored.

THROTTLE MU-V-217.

URO VERIFY MU24-FI 20 GPM.

THROTTLE MU-V-16B or 16D.

URO VERIFY PZR level is being restored.

CLOSE MU-V-3.

URO VERIFY PZR level is being restored.

EXAMINERS NOTE: HPI initiation is a CRITICAL TASK INITIATE HPI IAW OP-TM-211-901, Emergency Injection HPI/LPI.

URO INITIATES OP-TM-211-901 Emergency Injection (HPI/LPI).

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 46 of 76 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO VERIFY 1D or 1E 4160V bus is energized.

VERIFY a valid automatic actuation has occurred or a manual URO actuation of HPI is required.

EXAMINERS NOTE: There are special usage requirements for Section 4.1 and Attachments 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. These actions are memory items (IAW OS 24) and performed from memory when required. The sequence of actuation and verification of ES is not train dependent. Either train may be performed first or trains may be performed in parallel.

URO Initiation of Injection IF ESAS Train A "Load Seq Block 4" lights (PCR) are not URO BLUE, then PRESS "Manual ES Actuation" "1600 PSIG RC PRESS" (Train A CC).

URO PCR graphic display is equivalent to Attachment 7.1 IF ESAS Train B "Load Seq Block 4" lights (PCR) are not URO BLUE, then PRESS "Manual ES Actuation" "1600 PSIG RC PRESS" (Train B CR).

URO PCR graphic display is equivalent to Attachment 7.2.

IF any of the components on Attachment 7.2 are not in the URO required condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.

DIAGNOSES DC-P-1B trips when ESAS is actuated and that URO Section 4.2 applies.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 47 of 76 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO Contingency Actions IAAT DC-P-1A or DC-P-1B fails to start or is shut down URO unexpectedly, then perform the following:

• IF DC-P-1B fails to start, then START DC-P-1B.

• IF DC-P-1B is NOT operating then perform the following:

• PLACE MU-P-1C in PTL.

• PLACE DH-P-1B in PTL.

• PLACE BS-P-1B in PTL.

• INITIATE OP-TM-543-440 Swapping MU-P-1C cooling to NS.

If required to shift MU-P-1C cooling to NS, then PERFORM the URO following:

• NOTIFY Control Room to monitor the following:

• NS-T-1 level (NS-LI-800 / NS-LI-801) (CC).

• DC-T-1B level (DC-LI-110) (CR).

BOOTH OPERATOR: Use remote function to operate 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.

CLOSE the following valves: (Locked Valve entry)

• DC-V-41B

• DC-V-45B BOOTH OPERATOR: Use remote function to operate 4.2.2 and 4.2.3.

OPEN the following valves:

• NS-V-82

• NS-V-83

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 2 Event # 6, 7, & 8 Page 48 of 76 Event

Description:

OTSG Tube Rupture in A OTSG Requiring HPI Initiation, High Capacity Makeup Flow Valve MU-V-217 Breaker Trips, Decay Heat Closed Cooling Water Pump Trips on ESAS Actuation Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior IAAT either ES selected MU pump fails to start or is shut down URO unexpectedly, then perform the following:

If Train B ES selected MU pump is not operating, then perform URO the following:

• VERIFY 1E 4160V bus is energized

• VERIFY one of the following:

(N/A steps not performed)

• MU-V-36 and MU-V-37 are Open.

• MU-V-16C is Open.

• MU-V-16D is Open.

• If MU-P-1C is ES Selected, then perform the following:

• VERIFY MU-P-2C or MU-P-3C is operating

• START MU-P-1C GO TO EVENT 9

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

EXAMINERS NOTE: Crew should diagnose < 25° SCM.

DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-002 Loss of 25°F Subcooled CRS Margin URO IMMEDIATE ACTIONS URO PERFORM Rule 1, SCM.

INITIATES OP-TM-EOP-010 SCM, Rule 1, Loss of Subcooling URO Margin (SCM).

URO VERIFY it has been more than two minutes since RCP start.

EXAMINERS NOTE: Tripping all four RCPs is a CRITICAL TASK.

URO ENSURE all RCPs are shutdown.

EXAMINERS NOTE: 1600 psig will not actuate. If manual ESAS was re-enabled it will have to be re-initiated. If MU-P-1C, and DH-P-1B are still in PTL they will have to be started.

ARO INITIATE OP-TM-642-901 1600 # ESAS ACTUATION.

INITIATE EFW IAW Guide 15 and FEED available OTSGs to ARO 75 to 85% Operating Range Level.

CRS ENSURE announcement of reactor trip and EFW actuation over the plant page and radio.

CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRS REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

CRS IAAT LPI flow >1250 GPM in each line, then GO TO EOP-006.

URO VERIFY PORV is closed (Tailpipe DP indicator, Alarm G-1-7, A0517).

CRS INITIATE Attachment 1 to isolate possible sources of leakage.

URO VERIFY all RC Pumps are shutdown.

CRS VERIFY ONE of the following exists:

• TWO (2) HPI trains in ES operation,

• SM > 25°F,

• Incore temperature stable or reducing.

CRS IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then GO TO EOP-008. N/A CRS IF primary to secondary heat transfer is excessive (XHT), then GO TO EOP-003. N/A CRS VERIFY cooldown rate > 40°F/hr, or primary to secondary heat transfer exists.

CRS VERIFY OTSG tube leakage < 1 gpm.

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-005 OTSG Tube Leakage.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS CRS NOTIFY RAC to begin offsite dose assessment.

URO INITIATE Guide 9, RCS Inventory Control.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 CRS NOTIFY SM to evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

CRS IDENTIFY the affected OTSG.

• OTSG A CRS INITIATE Attachment 2.

ENSURE announcement of reactor trip over the plant page and CRS radio.

CRS DISPATCH an Operator to check MSSV status.

CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

IAAT OTSG pressure is approaching or is greater than 1000 CRS psig, then ENSURE MS-V-2A(B) is OPEN and to OPEN TBVs or ADVs to maintain OTSG pressure < 1000 psig.

If SCM > 30 ºF, then any the following may be used to reduce RCS to 30ºF SCM:

• OPEN the PORV.

• INITIATE a bleed path (IAW OP-TM-211-462) and letdown (IAW OP-TM-211-950).

• OPEN the RCS Vents.

IAAT level is rising due to tube leakage in an available OTSG, ARO then preferentially STEAM to maintain OTSG level < 85%.

IAAT any of the following isolation criteria are satisfied (without ARO contrary TSC guidance):

• OTSG level > 85% Op Rg

• BWST level < 21 ft

• Projected or actual offsite integrated dose approaches 0.5 R whole body or 1.5R thyroid Then perform the following:

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

• When RCS pressure < 1000 psig, then INITIATE ARO Attachment 1A or B to isolate the affected OTSG(s).

• When affected OTSG TBV/ADVs are closed, then

• If both OTSGs are being isolated, then GO TO EOP-009.

• PERFORM Guide 12 RCS Stabilization Following OTSG Isolation.

EXAMINERS NOTE: Isolation of the 1A OTSG when criteria is met is a CRITICAL TASK ARO PERFORMS Attachment 1A OTSG A Isolation Page 1 of 1.

ARO ENSURE CLOSED the following valves (Control Room):

• MS-V-1A

• MS-V-1B

• FW-V-17A

• FW-V-5A

• FW-V-16A

• FW-V-92A

• EF-V-30A

• EF-V-30D

• MS-V-3D

• MS-V-3E

• MS-V-3F

• MS-V-4A

• MS-V-13A EXAMINERS NOTE: ARO should diagnose MS-V-13A failure to CLOSE and have NLO CLOSE locally.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 BOOTH OPERATOR: To close MS-V-13A when requested; Remove Malfunction FW45A, Use Remote Function FWR78 to place MS-V-13A in MANUAL.

Use FWR79 set to zero to close MS-V-13A ENSURE CLOSED the following valves (In-Plant): (Notify ARO NLOs)

• MS-V-13A

• MS-V-10A

• MS-V-89A

• MS-V-34A,

• MS-V-89B

• MS-V-34B,

• MS-V-43A,

• MS-V-92

• FW-V-85A IAAT OTSG isolation criteria may be challenged prior to CRS reducing RCS pressure < 1000 psig, then

• INITIATE RCS cooldown to 500°F at a rate within RCS inventory control capability and < 240°F/HR.

• ENSURE RC-V-2 is OPEN.

• CYCLE the PORV to reduce SCM to approximately 30°F.

URO INITIATE Guide 8 to minimize SCM.

EXAMINERS NOTE: Closing MS-V-13B is a CRITICAL TASK.

ARO IAAT EF-P-2A or EF-P-2B are running, then

• PLACE both trains of each EFW actuation in DEFEAT (eight switches).

• CLOSE MS-V-13A and MS-V-13B.

EXAMINERS NOTE: Scenario can be terminated when the A OTSG is isolated.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 Follow-up question highest event entered during scenario?

Answer FS1 Site Area Emergency, 2 Fission product barriers lost RCS <25°F and OTSG leakage > 1gpm to atmosphere through EF-P-1.

NOTE If EF-P-1 is not running during tube-leak, EAL is FA1, if Superheat is indicated >

25°F and EF-P-1 is running EAL is FG1 2 barriers lost 1 potential loss.

Facility: Three Mile Island Scenario No.: 3 Op Test No.: NRC Examiners: Operators:

Initial Conditions:

• 85% power, MOC

• Power Escalation Following a trip and maintenance outage

• MU-P-1B OOS Turnover: Raise Power to 100%.

Critical Tasks: Trip all RCPs (CT-1)

Establish FW Flow and Feed SGs (CT-10)

Event Malf. Event Event No. No. Type* Description 1 TH08 C CRS Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breaker C URO Trips (TS) 2 RD0216 C CRS Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)

C URO 3 TH13D N CRS Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration R URO N URO 4 C CRS Feedwater Flow Fails to re-ratio after securing RC-P-1D C ARO C URO 5 TH06 M CRS An RCS leak occurs requiring a Reactor Trip M URO M ARO 6 RW010B C CRS Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1B does not Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1 C URO start on ESAS actuation 7 C CRS RC-P-1A does not trip when control switch is rotated to the stop position (CT-1)

C URO 8 I CRS Emergency Feedwater Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A and EF-V-30D do not control in automatic due to a level setpoint failure I ARO (CT-10)

• (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor Scenario Event Description NRC Scenario 3 Three Mile Island NRC Scenario #3 The crew will take the watch with reactor power at 85% and ICS in Automatic, except for ULD in Manual. The plant is in a power escalation following an automatic trip several days ago and a subsequent maintenance period. Makeup Pump MU-P-1B is OOS for maintenance.

When the crew has accepted the watch the Lead Examiner can cue event 1, which will initiate a PORV leak PORV block will trip on attempted closure, PORV Block will be allowed to be restored. The CRS should review TS 3.1.12.4 for PORV Block Valve & PORV Operability and declare a 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> timeclock is in effect to close the PORV..

After the TS call is made the crew will continue the power escalation. As rods are withdrawn a stuck rod occurs in Group 7 requiring the initiation of procedure OP-TM-AOP-062, Inoperable Rod. The CRS should review TS 4.7.1.2 and 3.5.2.2 and declare the rod inoperable. Tech Spec actions for the inoperable rod are included in AOP-062. Within one hour the other rods in the group must be trimmed so the inoperable rod remains within the group average. The rod will be returned when actions of OP-TM0-AOP-062/OP-TM-622-414 are taken.

After the Tech Spec call is made and AOP-062 has been implemented to the examiners satisfaction, with ICS in auto, the Lead Evaluator can cue the initiation of the RC-P-1D high vibration malfunction. The crew should diagnose increasing vibration on RC-P-1D and initiate action to reduce power to <75% to secure RC-P-1D in accordance with Computer Alarm Response L3125, RC-P-1D High Vibration.

When RC-P-1D is secured feedwater flow will not re-ratio and the crew will have to take hand control of the Feedwater Loop masters in accordance with OP-TM-621-471, ICS Manual Control to manually re-ratio feedwater flow. The ICS does not have to be returned to auto to continue.

When the plant has been stabilized with feedwater flow re-ratioed, the Lead Examiner can cue initiation of the RCS leak. The crew should diagnose the leak based on RB pressure rise and RCS inventory change. Reactor Building pressure will rise rapidly and RCS pressure will lower.

The reactor should be tripped by the crew and the CRS should initiate OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip. Reactor Building Emergency Cooling Pump RR-P-1B will not start automatically on the ESAS signal and must be started manually per OS-24, Conduct of Operations during Abnormal and Emergency Conditions.

When subcooling margin is lost RC-P-1A control switch will not trip the breaker and the URO will have to open the breakers for the 1A 7KV bus to trip the pump (CT-1). If the pump is not tripped within one minute the crew will have to keep RC-P-1A running in accordance with OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1 Loss of Subcooling Margin. This is a critical task since failure to trip the RCPs could result in the core not being adequately covered and raise the potential for fuel clad failure. The CRS will initiate OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of Subcooled Margin.

When Emergency Feedwater is actuated EF-V-30A and EF-V-30D will not operate in automatic and will have to be taken to hand to feed the A OTSG (CT-10). This is a critical task in that failure to take manual control would result in the A OTSG going dry and becoming unavailable to maintain or initiate primary to secondary heat transfer.

The Lead Evaluator can terminate the scenario when all high level activities have been completed and the evaluators agree the crew can be properly evaluated.

Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 3 Event Description Procedure Support Initial Set-up. OP 1102-2 Plant Startup. MU-P-1B OOS 1 Power Operated Relief Valve TS 3.1.12.4, PORV Block Valve Operability (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breaker Trips (TS). PORV starts to leak 2 Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS) TS 4.7.1.2, Rod Misalignment TS 3.5.2.2 Operation With Inoperable Rods OP-TM-AOP-062 Inoperable Rod 3 Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P- Computer Alarm L3125, RC-P-1D High Vibration 1D High Vibration OP 1102-4, Power Operation 4 Feedwater Flow Fails to re- OP-TM-MAP-H0204, Reactor Inlet Tc HI ratio after securing RC-P-1D OP-TM-621-471, ICS Manual Control 5 RCS Leak in the RB OP-TM-EOP-001, Reactor Trip OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1, Loss of Subcooling Margin OP-TM-EOP-002, Loss of Subcooled Margin OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown 6 Reactor Building Emergency OP-TM-534-901, RB Emergency Cooling Operations Cooling Pump RR-P-1B does OS-24, Conduct of Operations During Abnormal and not start on ESAS actuation Emergency Events 7 RC-P-1A does not trip when OS-24, Conduct of Operations During Abnormal and control switch is rotated to Emergency Events the stop position OP-TM-EOP-010, Rule 1, Loss of Subcooling Margin 8 Emergency Feedwater OP-TM-EOP-010, Guide 16, EFW Failure Valves to the A OTSG EF-V-30A and EF-V-30D do not control in automatic Scenario Set-up NRC Scenario 3 ACTION COMMENTS / INSTRUCTIONS DESCRIPTION Initialization IC-TEMP 85% Power, ICS Full AUTO Scenario Support 203 Start MU-P-1A Place Control Switch in NAS Scenario Support Remote Function Value: Insert NS Scenario Support CCR12 When: Immediately Stop MU-P-1B Value: Insert PTL Scenario Support When: Immediately Start IC-P-1B Place control switch in NAS Scenario Support MU-P-1B Place EDT on MU-P-1B-1D Control Scenario Support Switch Place EDT on MU-P-1B-1E Control Switch Remote Function Value: Insert OUT RC-V-2 Breaker trips RCR19 When: Event 1 Malfunction TH08 Value: 0.2% Causes PORV weep When: Event 1 10 sec delay Malfunction RD0216 Value: Insert Stuck rod in Group 7 When: Immediately Malfunction TH13D Value: Insert Sev. 50% RC-P-1D High Vibration When: Event 3 RAMP 300 sec Monitor ICK314B Value: Insert 10.0 FW Flow Fails to Re-ratio (normal value 0.0101) When: Immediately Malfunction TH06 Value: Insert Sev. 0.5% RCS Leak at RCP Discharge When: Event 5 RAMP 100 sec Malfunction RW10B Value: Insert RR-P-1B fails to start on When: Immediately ESAS signal I/O Override 02A3S11- Value: ON RC-P-1A Breaker Fails to Trip ZDICSRCP1A(4) NAS When: Immediately I/O Override 02A3S11- Value: OFF RC-P-1A Breaker Fails to Trip ZDICSRCP1A(2) STP When: Immediately I/O Override 02A3S11- Value: OFF RC-P-1A Breaker Fails to Trip ZDICSRCP1A(1) PTL When: Immediately Remote Function Value: Insert Sev. 0% OTSG Operate Level Setpoint ICR02 When: Immediately for EFW Control A Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 59 of 76 Event

Description:

Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breaker Trips (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: Ensure ICK314B is set at 10.0 in Monitor.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECTS 1102-2 Plant Startup.

CRS IAAT Control Rods approach 95% withdrawn, then

• DETERMINE the volume of water required for the desired rod movement at current Boron concentration & EFPD from Figure 1. Current boron concentration may be estimated based on the latest boron sample result and RCS water additions per the Control Room Log.

• REVIEW recent water addition records in the Control Room log.

• VALIDATE the value obtained from Figure 1 by comparison to recent water additions.

• Reduce RCS boron concentration by performing any of the following IAW 1104-29E Feed and Bleed Processes

• ADD demin water from an RCBT

• Feed and Bleed

• PLACE a deborating demin in service

• EVALUATE the effect of the water addition on Control rod position.

CRS IAAT Group 7 Rods reach 97% WITHDRAWN, then

• Stop Power Ascension until rods have inserted to < 94%

WITHDRAWN.

BOOTH OPERATOR: When requested, report as Primary NLO that, RC-V-2 PORV block breaker at 1C ESV unit 5C appears to be tripped.

If requested to close the breaker use Remote RCR19 to close.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 1 Page 60 of 76 Event

Description:

Power Operated Relief Valve (PORV) Block Valve RC-V-2 Breaker Trips (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE: CRS should review T.S. 3.1.12 for PORV block valve and PORV operability and declare a one hour time clock to close the PORV and remove power from it, or restore PORV Block.

May also refer to T.S. 3.1.6 Leakage though PORV should be blocked before leakage can be quantified.

The PORV Block Valve shall be OPERABLE during HOT CRS STANDBY, STARTUP, and POWER OPERATION:

• With the PORV Block Valve inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either:

• Restore the PORV Block Valve to OPERABLE status or

• Close the PORV (verify closed) and remove power from the PORV

• Otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDOWN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

• With the PORV block valve inoperable, restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status prior to startup from the next COLD SHUTDOWN unless the COLD SHUTDOWN occurs within 90 Effective Full Power Days (EFPD) of the end of the fuel cycle. If a COLD SHUTDOWN occurs within this 90 day period, restore the inoperable valve to OPERABLE status prior to startup for the next fuel cycle.

If total leakage exceeds 10 gpm the reactor shall be placed in CRS hot shutdown within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of detection.

GO TO EVENT 2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 61 of 76 Event

Description:

Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions:

Indications Available:

CRS ORDERS power escalation to continue.

EXAMINERS NOTE: When asymmetric rod condition occurs the CRS should review T.S. 4.7.1.2 and T.S. 3.5.2.2 and declare the rod inoperable.

IF a control rod is misaligned with its group average by more than an indicated nine inches, the rod shall be declared inoperable and the limits of Specification 3.5.2.2 shall apply.

The rod with the greatest misalignment shall be evaluated first.

CRS The position of a rod declared inoperable due to misalignment shall not be included in computing the average position of group for determining the operability of rods with lesser misalignments.

CRS Operation with inoperable rods:

• If within one hour of determination of an inoperable rod as defined in Specification 4.7.1, and once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter, it is not determined that a one percent k/k hot shutdown margin exists combining the worth of the inoperable rod with each of the other rods, the reactor shall be brought to the HOT SHUTDOWN condition within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> until this margin is established.

• Following the determination of an inoperable rod as defined in Specification 4.7.1, all rods shall be exercised within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> and exercised weekly until the rod problem is solved.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 62 of 76 Event

Description:

Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

• If a control rod in the regulating or safety rod groups is declared inoperable per 4.7.1.2, and cannot be aligned per 3.5.2.2.f, power shall be reduced to 60% of the thermal power allowable for the reactor coolant pump combination within 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, and the overpower trip setpoint shall be CRS reduced to 70% of the thermal power allowable within 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br />. Verify the potential ejected rod worth (ERW) is within the assumptions of the ERW analysis and verify N

peaking factor (FQ(Z) and ) limits per the COLR have FH not been exceeded within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-AOP-062 Inoperable Rod.

CRS ENTRY CONDITIONS NOTE: Control rod is misaligned with the group by more than 9 inches.

CRS EITHER of the following conditions exist:

• One or more inoperable control rods And the reactor is NOT shutdown > 1% k/k.

CRS RECORD time of discovery of inoperable rod: _______

CRS REQUEST duty reactor engineer to report to the control room.

CRS VERIFY reactor power > 5%.

CRS VERIFY safety group Out Limit (Diamond panel) is LIT.

CRS VERIFY the inoperable rod is fully inserted.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 63 of 76 Event

Description:

Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior If any regulating or safety rods are inoperable, then perform the following within one hour: (TS 3.5.2.2.b,c).

• INITIATE 1103-15A section 3.2, Calculation of shutdown margin with Tave 530°F. (TS 3.5.2.2.c).

If one of the following is true:

• rod does not meet trip insertion time

• rod can not be exercised

• rod can not be located The INITIATE OP-TM-622-201 Control Rod Movement to verify the operability of other rods, and GO TO step 3.11.

(TS 3.5.2.2.b).

NOTE: Depending on when crew catches rod misalignment AOP-062 may direct realignment IAW OP-TM-622-414 OR transfer of all unaffected rods to the Aux power supply IAW OP-TM-622-451, below steps are written to allow observation of transfer.

Verifies indications on Diamond panel, places diamond in URO manual.

URO Ensure Group selected on GRP/AUX switch.

URO Selects SEQ OR on SEQ/SEQ OR switch URO Selects Group 7 on GROUP SELECT Switch URO May select 1 rod at a time on SINGLE SELECT SWITCH URO Selects JOG Speed URO Observes SY lamp lit

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 2 Page 64 of 76 Event

Description:

Stuck Rod in Group 7 (TS)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO Selects Clamp on CLAMP/CLAMP RELEASE switch URO Presses MAN TRANS URO Verifies TR CF light lit, and PI lights indicate on at PI panel.

May select additional rods on group 7 and press MAN TRANS URO if all rods not moved at once.

URO Select CLAMP RELEASE.

URO Select GROUP, verify sync lamp off URO Select RUN BOOTH OPERATOR: When stuck rod in group 7 is selected delete MALF RD0216 URO Aligns rod 7-2 with group average.

URO Reverses above steps to transfer rods back to normal supply EVALUATOR NOTE: Must return to ICS in auto except ULD prior to EVENT 3.

GO TO EVENT 3

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3&4 Page 65 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: When directed insert Event 3.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-PC-L3125 RC-P-1D High Vibration CRS SETPOINTS Pump Instrument RC-VT-79 Pump Setpoints (Alert/Danger) 15 mils / 20 mils Motor Instrument RC-VT-147D Motor Setpoints (Alert/Danger) 3 mils / 7 mils NOTE: Use of the Trip Multiply switch doubles the alarm limits and causes the red bypass light to flash.

MONITOR RC Pump vibration levels (PLF) and ATTEMPT to ARO reset alarm.

CRS IAAT any of the following conditions are met:

• Motor vibration exceeds 7 mils,

• Pump vibration exceeds 20 mils during 4 RCP operations,

• Pump vibration exceeds 30 mils during single pump operation, Then PERFORM OP-TM-226-154 to place RC-P-1D in the Standby mode.

• EVALUATE RCDT level for abnormal or changing trends.

• IF RC-P-1D individual contribution to the RCDT level rise is

> 1 gpm, then PERFORM OP-TM-226-154 to place RC-P-1D in shutdown Mode.

CRS INITIATES entry into OP-TM-226-154 Shutdown RC-P-1D.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3&4 Page 66 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior VERIFY Reactor Power < the following for the final RCP URO Combination:

• 2 / 1 RCP Combination - < 75% NI Power VERIFY Turbine Load < the following for the final RCP Combination:

• 2 / 1 RCP Combination - < 665 MW E EXAMINERS NOTE: The CRS will direct the power reduction using 1102-4, Power Operation prior to securing RC-P-1D.

NOTE: If this section is being performed during an emergency plant shutdown, then any action in this table may be deferred except those marked with EP in the sign-off column.

When the power reduction is complete, then any action is N/A if the action criteria was not satisfied.

ARO Prior to FW-U-1B speed < 4000 RPM START LO-P-8B.

ARO Prior to FW-U-1A speed < 4000 RPM START LO-P-8A.

Prior to shutdown of MO-P-1B If MO-V-26 is OPEN, then ARO INITIATE OP-TM-431-152 to remove MO-T-3 from service.

Prior to reactor power < 85%, RESET FW Flow Correction CRS Factors to 1,000 IAW MAP G-2-6.

Prior to turbine load < 630 Mwe If any MO-P-1 are operating, CRS then SHUTDOWN all Moisture Separator Pumps IAW OP-TM-431-152.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3&4 Page 67 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ARO Prior to reactor power < 75%

• ___ PLACE FW-P-1A in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-472

• ___ PLACE FW-P-1B in HAND IAW OP-TM-401-473 NOTE: Steps with letter designations should be performed in parallel.

PERFORM Enclosure 2A (for an emergency (forced) power CRS reduction INITIATE Enclosure 2A).

CRS REDUCE reactor power to the desired power as follows:

ARO

• MAINTAIN Generator Reactive Load IAW OP-TM-301-472.

• IF SG/REACTOR DEMAND is in AUTO, then REDUCE URO reactor power as follows:

URO

• ENSURE ULD is in HAND

• SET ULD LOAD RATE OF CHANGE to 1 %/minute URO for PLANNED reductions or at a rate determined by CRS for Forced power reductions.

URO

• SET ULD Target Load Demand to desired setpoint.

CRS PERFORM the actions per Enclosure 2B.

EXAMINERS NOTE: The CRS will direct continuation of OP-TM-226-154 to secure RC-P-1D.

NOTE: RCP vibrations are high whenever one pump is operated alone in a loop. Use the following pump combinations. A and B OR C and D.

EVALUATE final RCP Combination for effects of vibration and CRS procedural requirements:

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3&4 Page 68 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

• 1102-11 specifies use of RC-P-1A and RC-P-1B.

• RC-P-1C and RC-P-1D are designated for alternate use and require use of PT Curves in OP-TM-226-000, Reactor Coolant Pumps, Attachments 7.3 and 7.4 vs. 1102-1 /

1102-11 Figures 1 and 1A.

NOTE: A 2 / 1 RCP combination with OTSG levels > LLLs will require a re-ratio (70% / 30%) of Feedwater flow to A /

B OTSG.

If Reactor power is > 20%, then EVALUATE expected FW Flow CRS requirements for new RCP combination, to minimize effects on Delta Tc.

URO PLACE at least one each of the following in Normal-After-Start:

• RC-P-2D-1, Oil Lift Pump AC HP (CC), or RC-P-2D-2, Oil Lift Pump DC HP (CC)

• RC-P-3D-1, Backstop Oil Pump #1 (CC), or RC-P-3D-2, Backstop Oil Pump #2 (CC)

URO PLACE RC-P-1D in Pull-To-Lock.

URO VERIFY the following:

• RC-P-1D not rotating backwards (PPS L2878, RC-P-1D Reverse Rotation not in alarm).

NOTE: Vibration levels at a low value with the absence of change indicates 0 rpm.

Vibration readings (PLF) indicate RC-P-1D has reached 0 rpm.

URO PLACE the following in Pull-To-Lock:

• RC-P-3D-2, Backstop Oil Pump #2

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3&4 Page 69 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

• RC-P-3D-1, Backstop Oil Pump #1 URO PLACE the following in Pull-To-Lock:

• RC-P-2D-2, Oil Lift Pump DC HP

• RC-P-2D-1, Oil Lift Pump AC HP ARO Diagnoses the failure of feedwater flow to re-ratio.

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-MAP-H0204 RX Inlet TC HI.

• IF automatic feedwater control is inadequate, then PLACE ARO feedwater in HAND IAW one or more of the following procedures:

• OP-TM-621-471, ICS Manual Control. (for FW Loop Masters)

URO Maintain NI power within 1% of desired reactor power.

When reactor power > 20%, then control feedwater flow to ARO OTSGs as follows:

• Maintain Tavg between 578°F and 580°F.

• Maintain c between +2°F to -2°F (TC = TCA - TCB).

• If only 3 RC Pumps are operating, then when either OTSG level reaches 25, TC limit does not apply.

URO ENSURE ULD in HAND.

URO Establish manual SG/REACTOR Control as follows:

• PLACE SG/REACTOR DEMAND station in HAND.

• ENSURE control rod position does NOT change.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # 3 Event # 3&4 Page 70 of 76 Event

Description:

Reactor Coolant Pump RC-P-1D High Vibration; Feedwater Flow Fails to Re-Ratio After Securing RC-P-1D Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior

• VERIFY alarm H-2-1 ICS in Track In.

If necessary to maintain reactor power or control rods within URO limits or if a power change is being conducted IAW 1102-4, then ADJUST SG/REACTOR DEMAND as follows:

• If maintaining stable reactor power or a slow planned URO power change, then RAISE or LOWER in discrete steps to keep neutron error between +2% and -2%.

• If rapid power reduction is required, then LOWER as URO necessary to achieve desired reactor power level and ENSURE FW flow controlled within limits.

ARO Establish manual Feedwater Control as follows:

• PLACE SG A/B LOAD RATIO (TC) station in HAND.

NOTE: Either SG A or B FW DEMAND station may be placed in HAND first.

ARO

• PLACE SG A FW DEMAND station in HAND.

• PLACE SG B FW DEMAND station in HAND.

NOTE: Raising SG A FW DEMAND or lowering SG B FW DEMAND will make TC more negative (TC = TC A - TC B).

• ADJUST SG A and/or B FW DEMAND to maintain Tavg ,

ARO TC, and OTSG level within limits.

GO TO EVENT 5

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 71 of 76 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior Booth Operator Instructions: INITIATE Event 5 when directed.

Indications Available:

CRS DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-001 Reactor Trip.

URO Press BOTH Reactor Trip and DSS pushbuttons.

URO VERIFY REACTOR SHUTDOWN.

URO PRESS Turbine Trip PB.

URO VERIFY the turbine stop valves are closed.

EXAMINERS NOTE: ARO should diagnose loss of SCM during symptom check.

CRS VITAL SYSTEM STATUS VERIFICATION (VSSV)

IAAT a symptom exists, then immediately TREAT the symptom CRS using the following priority:

• SCM < 25°F GO TO EOP-002 DIRECTS entry into OP-TM-EOP-002 Loss of 25°F Subcooled CRS Margin.

URO INITIATES Rule 1 Loss of Subcooling Margin (SCM).

URO VERIFY it has been more than two minutes since RCP start.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 72 of 76 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE: Tripping all RCPs within one minute is a CRITICAL TASK URO ENSURE ALL RCPs are shutdown.

If all RCPs were not tripped within one minute, then MAINTAIN RCP(s) still operating until one of the following conditions is satisfied:

• SCM > 25F

• LPI flow > 1250 gpm in each line

• Tclad > 1800°F EXAMINERS NOTE: RC-P-1A breaker fails to trip and the 1A 7K bus supply breakers will have to be opened within 1 minutes of loss of SCM or RC-P-1A will have to be left running.

Trips RCPs at extension controls and/or de-energizes 7kV URO busses at panel PR.

URO INITIATE OP-TM-642-901 1600 # ESAS ACTUATION INITATE EFW IAW Guide 15 and FEED available OTSGs to 75 ARO to 85% Operating Range Level.

EXAMINERS NOTE: EF-V-30 A & D will fail to respond in auto and have to be operated manually to raise OTSG level. This is a CRITICAL TASK.

ARO INITIATES Guide 15 EFW Actuation Response.

IAAT EFW is actuation is required, then:

• ENSURE EF-P-1, EF-P-2A, and EF-P-2B start.

• DISPATCH an Auxiliary Operator (AO) to EF-V-30 area.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 73 of 76 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior ENSURE EF-V-30A/D and EF-V-30B/C control OTSG level at ARO setpoint (Rule 4).

If Shift Management concurrence is obtained, then EFW flow ARO may be controlled using one or both EF-V-30 valves for each OTSG.

ARO INITIATES Rule 4 Feedwater Control.

ARO MAINTAIN OTSG level 75 - 85% OPERATING Range Level.

IAAT OTSG Level < minimum, then MAINTAIN the following ARO MINIMUM required flow: (In this case > 215 gpm/OTSG ENSURE announcement of reactor trip and EFW actuation CRS over the plant page and radio.

CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

CRS REQUEST SM evaluate Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

CRS IAAT LPI flow > 1250 GPM in each line, then GO TO EOP-006.

VERIFY PORV is closed (Tailpipe DP indicator, Alarm G-1-7, URO A0517).

IF PORV was not opened for core cooling, then CLOSE the PORV Block (RC-V-2). (previously closed)

URO INITIATE Attachment 1 to isolate possible sources of leakage.

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 74 of 76 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior URO VERIFY all RC Pumps are shutdown.

GO TO step 4.2 (perform rapid RCS cooldown).

CRS VERIFY ONE of the following exists:

• TWO (2) HPI trains in ES operation GO TO Section 4.0.

CRS IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then GO TO EOP-008.

VERIFY cooldown rate > 40°F/hr, or primary to secondary heat CRS transfer exists.

CRS VERIFY OTSG tube leakage < 1 gpm.

CRS VERIFY pressurizer level is being maintained without HPI.

GO TO EOP-006.

CRS DIRECTS initiation of OP-TM-EOP-006, LOCA Cooldown.

CRS FOLLOW-UP ACTIONS URO ENSURE HPI and LPI are operated IAW Rule 2.

IAAT an ES Actuation setpoint is reached, then ENSURE all CRS ESAS components have actuated.

INITIATE contingency action IAW Section 4.2 of the applicable procedure(s).

• OP-TM-534-901 RB Emergency Cooling

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 75 of 76 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior EXAMINERS NOTE: RR-P-1B fails to start on ESAS actuation and must be manually started.

CRS ENSURE CF-V-1A and CF-V-1B are OPEN. (PCR)

IAAT RM-A-1 high alarm or 4 psig ESAS have actuated, then CRS INITIATE OP-TM-826-901, Control Building Ventilation System Radiological Event Operations.

CRS IAAT RCS > 25°F superheat, then GO TO EOP-008.

CRS INITIATE Guide 20, PRIOR to Transfer to RB Sump.

CRS ENSURE performance of an alarm review.

CRS REQUEST SM evaluates Emergency Action Levels (EALs).

INITIATES OP-TM-534-901 RB Emergency Cooling URO Operations.

VERIFY 1600 psig ES actuation, RB pressure is approaching 2 URO psig or Emergency Director or Shift Manager has authorized use of RBEC.

URO VERIFY 1D or 1E 4160V Bus is energized.

URO Initiation of RB Emergency Cooling

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 1 Scenario # All Event # 6, 7 & 8 Page 76 of 76 Event

Description:

Feedwater Pump 1A Trip, Turbine Stop Valve Fails Open; Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-1 Trips On Start When FW-P-1A Trips, Emergency Feedwater Pump EF-P-2A Does Not Start (CT-14); High Pressure Injection Valve (HPI) MU-V-16B Fails to Open, B ESAS Manual Actuation Failure (CT-2)

Time Position Applicants Actions or Behavior DISPATCH an operator to CLOSE NS-V-85 (IB 295: S of RR URO valve room).

NOTE: The sequence of actuation and verification of ES is not train dependent. Either train may be performed first or trains may be performed in parallel.

If any of the following components are not in the required URO condition, then INITIATE Section 4.2.

IF RR-P-1A or RR-P-1B is not operating, then perform the URO following:

IF RR-P-1B is not operating and 1E 4160V bus is energized, URO then perform the following:

URO

• START RR-P-1B

• IF RR-V-10B and RR-V-1B are CLOSED, then OPEN URO RR-V-1B.

ARO VERIFY G1-02 and G11-02 are CLOSED.

SCENARIO CAN BE TERMINATED AFTER ALL TASKS HAVE BEEN PERFORMED.

Follow-up question highest event entered during scenario?

Answer FA-1 Fission Product Barrier lost. <25°F SCM.

NOTE If >25°F Superheat is indicated the FS1 applies Loss of 1 barrier and potential loss of a second.