ML061770039
| ML061770039 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Vermont Yankee  |
| Issue date: | 06/14/2006 |
| From: | Shadis R New England Coalition |
| To: | Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel |
| Byrdsong A T | |
| References | |
| 50-271-OLA, ASLBP 04-832-02-OLA, RAS 11853 | |
| Download: ML061770039 (34) | |
Text
DOCKETED USNRC UNITED STATES OF AMERICA June 22, 2006 (11:35am)
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF SECRETARY Before the RULEMAKINGS AND ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ADJUDICATIONS STAFF In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC June 14, 2006 and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) (Technical Specification Docket No. 50-271-OLA Proposed Change No. 362) ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S RESPONSE TO THE STATEMENTS OF POSITION OF ENTERGY AND NRC STAFF New England Coalition responds herein to the Statements of Position of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc (herein, "Entergy or ENVY") and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff (herein, "NRC Staff') in accordance with 10 C.F.R. § 2.1207(a)(1), and the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's
("Board") "Revised Scheduling Order" of April 13, 2006.
New England Coalition is also filing, simultaneously herewith, the Declaration of Dr. Joram A. Hopenfeld in support of New England Coalition's Response regarding New England Coalition Contention 3 (full transient testing).
At the request of New England Coalition, Dr. Hopenfeld performed a technical assessment of the May 17, 2006 Statements of Position of ENVY and NRC Staff. Dr.
Hopenfeld provides a critical discussion of the technical aspects of the proposed exemption from full-transient testing.
For the reasons set forth herein, New England Coalition submits that its Contentions 3 (full transient testing) and 4 (seismic qualification of the Alternate Cooling empkle=s,5cY y s6c/- op-1
2 System) remain valid issues involving considerations of public health and safety; and therefore Contentions 3 and 4 should be fully investigated by the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board through a full hearing.
New England Coalition respectfully submits that a careful evaluation of NRC Staff and ENVY's Statements of Position in the light of New England Coalition cumulative testimony demonstrates that contentions 3 and 4 should be resolved in favor of denial the extended power uprate ("EPU") license amendment requested by Entergy or attachment of conditions thereto restoring reasonable assurance of the protection of public health and safety.
- 1. INTRODUCTION This proceeding concerns application for an amendment to the Vermont Yankee operating license, initially filed by Entergy on September 3, 2003. The amendment would permit increase of the original licensed thermal power by approximately 20%.
On August 30, 2004, New England Coalition filed a request for a hearing and for leave to intervene containing seven proposed contentions.
On November 22, 2004, the Licensing Board admitted two contentions, now termed, New England Coalition Contentions 3 and 4.
A. Contention 3 - Full Transient Testing The Licensing Board restated contention 3, as follows:
The license amendment should not be approved unless Large Transient Testing is a condition of the Extended Power Uprate." Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-04-28, 60 NRC 548, 580 (2004).
The Board has ruled that the scope of NEC Contention 3 is limited to two large transient tests: the main steam isolation valve ("MSIV") closure test and the turbine
3 generator load rejection test. Memorandum and Order, "Clarifying the Scope of NEC Contention 3," April 17, 2006, slip op. at 2.
On December 13, 2005, Entergy moved for summary disposition of Contention 3; introducing testimony regarding alternatives to full transient testing, including computer modeling, industry experience, and individual component testing..
On December 23, 2005, New England Coalition responded to Entergy's Motion for Summary Disposition. Through an attached, Declaration of Dr. Joram Hopenfeld New England Coalition questioned whether the transient analysis code relied upon by Entergy in its application was properly benchmarked for Vermont Yankee and EPU conditions.
On January 31, 2006, the Board denied Entergy's motion and affirned that Contention 3 Was based on sound technical argument and that a credible material dispute with the licensee was evident.
During the April 20, 2006 teleconference, Administrative Judge Baratta requested testimony regarding qualification of the "ODYN" code and mechanical stress calculations with respect to transients experienced during EPU operations. [Tr. at 899-904.]
On May 17, 2006, New England Coalition filed its Statement of Position including excerpts of an Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards transcript wherein the question of integrating individual component testing for comparison to full transient testing was raised.
4 On May 23, 2006, during a teleconference, Administrative Judge Rubenstein asked Entergy to provide information on the integration of individual component testing as follows:
This is Judge Rubenstein. One of the areas I would be particularly interested in is the methodology you use to integrate the separate test to justify that the large transient tests - is that necessary, and how you took the components of the individual test, like an MSIV test and other things and integrated these into a decision process which said, This is acceptable. We don't have to do the large test, because we have these components, and experience has shown that other reactors-that get codes when using the information from these components have defined the experience perhaps in a transient plant." Is that clear?
MR. SILBERG: Mr. Diaz is shaking his head affirmatively (tr. 973-974).
B. Contention 4 - Alternate Cooling System (cell)
Contention 4, as admitted and restated by the Licensing Board, follows:
The license amendment should not be approved because Entergy cannot assure seismic and structural integrity of the cooling towers under uprate conditions, in particular the Alternate Cooling System cell. At present the minimum appropriate structural analyses have apparently not been done.
In admitting the contention, the Licensing Board stated, The gist of this contention is that a new seismic and structural analysis should be performed to qualify the Vermont Entergy cooling towers for the additional loads that will result from increasing the maximum power by 20%. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, L.L.C., and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station), LBP-04-28, 60 NRC 548, 580 (2004).
On July 13, 2005, Entergy filed a motion to dismiss NEC Contention 4 as moot, or in the alternative, for summary disposition of the contention, based on an analysis that Entergy had provided in disclosure on May 25, 2006; Calculation No. 1356711 -C-001, "Cooling Tower Seismic Evaluation," dated April 5, 2005, and prepared by ABS Consulting ("ABS')
On September 1, 2005, the Licensing Board granted the Applicant's motion to dismiss the contention as moot, finding that the Applicant's submittal of its seismic
5 analysis satisfied the contention's assertion that such an analysis had not been submitted.
However, the Board, recognizing that the contention as originally submitted was not entirely a contention of omission but also included qualifications, ruled that New England Coalition could file a new contention challenging the adequacy of the ABS report, ruling that "[t]o the extent that NEC has specific complaints regarding Entergy's new seismic and structural analysis that are within the scope of the EPU application," NEC may file new or amended contentions. [Order at 433.]
New England Coalition timely filed its request for leave to file a new contention together with a supporting declaration by Dr. Ross B. Landsman, on September 21, 2005.
On December 2, 2005, the Board admitted (new) Contention 4 and restated it as follows:
The Entergy Vermont Yankee [ENVY] license application (including all supplements) for an extended power uprate of 20% over rated capacity is not in conformance with the plant specific original licensing basis and/or 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix S, paragraph I(a), and/or 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A, because it does not provide analyses that are adequate, accurate, and complete in all material respects to demonstrate that the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station Alternate Cooling System [ACS] in its entirety, in its actual physical condition (or in the actual physical condition ENVY will effectuate prior to commencing operation at EPU), will be able to withstand the effects of an earthquake and other natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform its safety functions in service at the requested increased plant power level.
Following complaints by Entergy, the Board ordered Briefs on the both the material and legal scope of Contention 4.
On April 24, 2006, the Board ruled that it now rejected the definition of Alternate Cooling System contained in New England Coalition's Request For Leave to File New Contention' and, setting aside the definition of the "entire ASC system" in DR.
I 'The ACS system includes, but is not limited to, towers, fill, structural members and bracing, shear pins and/or tie rods, basins, piping, pumps, valves and controls, fan motors, fan decks and fan gearing,
6 Ross Landsman's expert declaration-, also ruled that the material scope of Contention 4 was limited to the alternate cooling tower cell and impinging structures. Further, the Board ruled that only those issues itemized by Dr. Landsman in a numbered list regarding deficiencies in the ABS Report could be considered, again redrafting Contention 4:
The Entergy Vermont Yankee license application (including all supplements) for an extended power uprate of 20% over rated capacity is not in conformance with the plant's current licensing basis because, with respect to the Alternative Cooling System (ACS) cooling tower cells CT2-l and CT2-2, it does not provide analyses that are adequate, accurate, and complete in the following respects: the ABS Report (1) does not include a physical examination of the alternate cooling tower cell; (2) lacks adequate documentation of the breaking strength of the tie rods, (3) does not use added conservatism in accounting for the effects of aging mechanisms and/or moisture and/or cooling system chemicals; (4) in its structural analysis, fails to assign a negative value to the replacement rate for degraded members; (5) fails to account for changes after the report was completed; (6) relies on incorrect and non-conservative assumptions concerning the condition of the concrete in the cooling tower cells and fails to take into account the unanalyzed effects of recent modifications including steel splices; and (7) does not provide a reasonable assurance of the seismic qualification of the ACS cooling tower cells CT2-1 and C72-2.
Therefore, the license application fails to demonstrate that the ACS cooling tower cells CT2-1 and CT2-2, in their actual physical condition (or in the actual physical condition Entergy will effectuate prior to commencing operation at EPU), will be able to withstand the effects of an earthquake and other natural phenomena without loss of capability to perform their safety functions in service at the requested increased plant power level.
emergency electrical supply, and all components vital to design basis objectives and licensing basis requirements intended to assure operability when the system is called upon in an emergency.
2 Landsman Declaration at 20. Upon review of the foregoing referenced documents it ismy professional assessment that Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee has not demonstrated seismic resilience of the entire alternate cooling system. By the entire ACS system, I mean to include, but not be limited to, towers, fill material, structural members and bracing of all kinds, shear pins and/or tie rods, basins, piping, pumps, valves and controls, fan motors, fan decks and fan gearing, emergency electrical supply, and all components vital to design basis objectives and licensing basis requirements intended to assure operability when the system is called upon inan emergency. This lack is distressing because extended power uprate operating conditions will require the alternat.-cooling system, when needed, to remove a greater heat load than that for which itwas originally designed. In my professional opinion, this remains a serious issue that is included in New England Coalition's new or revised alternate cooling system contention and that the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board should examine in this case.
7 During the conference call on May 23, 2006, New England Coalition explained to the Board that due to illness in Dr. Landsman's household, he had been unable to prepare additional written prefiled testimony in support of Contention 4. New England Coalition then requested permission to incorporate by reference, as testimony at this point in the proceedings, Dr. Landsman's September 21, 2005 declaration. The Board assented. [Tr.
987-989]
II. DISCUSSION On May 17, 2006, ENVY and NRC Staff both timely filed, Statements of Position; both challenging New England Coalition's Contentions 3 and 4 and both heavily weighting their challenges to assertions that material conditions or omissions described in New England Coalition's Contentions 3 and 4 have been satisfied. New England Coalition takes strong exception to this; respectfully suggesting that a critical reading of both ENVY and NRC Statements of Position and accompanying testimony will show, as New England Coalition intends to show below and through the testimony (declaration) of its expert witness, Dr. Joram Hopenfeld, that both ENVY and NRC Statements of Position shot through with statements that are misleading, incomplete, immaterial, quoted in apposite, or so vague as to be technically irreducible. Taken as whole, as New England Coalition intends to show, that ENVY and NRC Statements of Position as often appear to bolster as to undermine New England Coalition's position.
A. Contention 3 - Full Transient Testing New England Coalition here relies on the professional assessment and expert testimony of Dr. Joram Hopenfeld (Attached &s Exhibit One).
8 Dr. Hopenfeld relies on (and quotes from) documentation provided by ENVY and NRC Staff for evidence that verifiable demonstration has yet to be made that computer codes, relied on the displace full transient testing (most notably, ODYN), have been properly benchmarked.
Further, ENVY and NRC Staff offer little evidence of how individual component tests are integrated with or without computer modeling to a virtual full transient.
Citations to industry experience do not offer the detailed physical, operational characteristics, and transient event histories comparisons necessary to credibly draw predictions about Vermont Yankee behavior during full transients under uprated conditions. ENVY chooses to include in their Vermont Yankee modeling group the KKL (Liebstadt) plant in Switzerland, but are silent as to the plant's differences in structure, operational history, transient testing sequences, flow-induced vibration issues and so on.
ENVY does not appear to take into account the Liebstadt plants uprate history (as discussed in the following ACRS Sub-Committee on Thermal-Hydraulic Phenomena Transcript excerpt-06/12/01); neither stating if an earlier "pressure-increase" uprate changed inputs and considerations or not3 .
Some of the plants on this column even might have uprated or had increased pressure during part of their uprate, but not all of it. Like this plant in Switzerland, the Liebstadt plant, when they did their first 5 percent uprate, they did the uprate and pressure as well, and it was 20 pounds or something. It was some amount. But then when they went to the big uprate that followed, they 3 As a parenthetical, New England Coalition finds it interesting, and submits that any reviewer should find it interesting, that experience at other plants is only selectively invoked. For example, the KKL (Liebstadt) reactor uprate experience is invoked to support full transient analysis but apparently shunned for accident consequence or source term analysis where, as discussed in the 478h meeting of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (12/6/2000) it was found that a 14.7% power increase resulted in a projected 30%
fission product release I just want to touch a little bit on the analysis that was done by HSK. As you know, they have looked at a 14.7 percent increase for the Liebstadt reactor, and they found there is an increase of about 30 percent in the fission product release, namely due to the increase in inventory.
[www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/acrs/tr/fullcommittee/2000/ac001206.htmJI
9 adopted our constant pressure thing just for practical reasons of their own. So they have gone the last 15 percent or 14 percent without raising pressure.
But they did some analysis with the pressure increase, and they looked back and said, hey, I would rather try to do it without all those set point changes, and all the other changes that are needed, and they also have gone a long ways without it for the second half of their uprate
[www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doccollections/acrsltr/subcommitteel200/1thO 1612.html]
In any case, ENVY has offered a very small sample of nuclear power stations that have undergone transients at various. power levels. Further, those nuclear power stations are, if one relies on ENVY's submittals, of undetermined configurations, maintenance and operation histories, and varied transient event sequences that can only be asymmetrically referenced to Vermont Yankee. Simple correlations are not the same as a demonstration of predictive capability. ENVY has yet to show that collective analyzed industry experience is a sufficient base from which to draw reliable predictions.
NRC Staff's Statement of Position offers little more that a seconding of ENVY's Statement. As implicit in Dr. Hopenfeld's Declaration (pp.14-15), the NRC Staff has offer no technically defensible explanations for failure to properly benchmark the ODYN code, or several other key inputs to Entergy's bid for exemption from full transient testing.. It does little validate ENVY's assumptions or conclusions with either data or explanation. As the Board stated in its Order of January 31, 2006, The fact that the Staff may agree with Entergy's factual or technical positions, either informally or in a formal document such as an SER, does not "resolve" the dispute or mean that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute.
B. Alternate Cooling System Cell With respect to New England Coalition's itemized ABS Report defects:
(1) does not include a physical examination of the alternate cooling tower cell ENVY admits that the ABS relied primarily upon licensee representations regarding the physical condition of cooling tower cells CT2-1 and CT2-2. ENVY then
10 proceeds to list, without much information on the form, depth, quality or scope other examinations of the dedicated cooling tower cells that have taken place periodically or since the ABS report. No cogent analysis is provided for the whole.
(2) lacks adequate documentation of the breaking strength of the tie rods, ENVY explains that what where termed "tie-rods" in ENVY documents provided with New England Coalition's initial proposed contention are really not tie "rods" at all but rather a small dimension board splice held in place with 6d nails that have very little holding power and thus cannot transmit significant loads from tower (cell) to Tower (cell). According to ENVY, these ties cover open joints sawn through substantial horizontal connecting members. (ENVY Statement of Position (ESOP) Page 11) This provides small comfort because these breakaway ties solve only the problem of tension between failing non-seismic towers and the dedicated cells. They do not address the issue of compressive impingement raised by New England Coalition. Rhetorically, what is to guarantee that collapsing towers would fall away from and not toward the dedicated cells; pulling instead of pushing? One must also wonder: If these ties are so flimsy, what was their designed purpose? I In this same vein, ENVY explains that New England Coalition's concern that each of the two banks of cooling tower cells is connected by a sixty-inch diameter, heavy walled (1/2 inch thickness) header pipe is misplaced because the pipe is actually made up of segments joined by globe and ball joints that would be easily pulled apart in case adjoining tower cells collapse.(ESOP Page 20) Although ENVY once again missed the push-pull distinction, there appears to be an even more startling revelation. That is, with an open header pipe, what is to guarantee delivery of cooling water to the top of the
11 cooling tower fill. Unless there is something unseen here, ENVY is saying that a seismic resistance design feature of the alternate cooling system is loss of operability.
(3) does not use added conservatism in accounting for the effects of aging mechanisms and/or moisture and/or cooling system chemicals; ENVY makes no claim of accounting for aging effects other than to discount the necessity of going beyond simple visual scans of the wood surfaces, such scans included in walkdowns of unknown detail by personnel of unknown qualifications. ENVY claims that more intensive examination is riot required under industry standards. Hence, examination was limited to eyeballing wet wood surfaces: no probing, no sampling, and no boring, and no testing. Although, admittedly, visual screening is of first importance, there are few or none of the confirmatory qualitative physical assays that one might expect of a competent home inspector or boat surveyor, ENVY claims that the wood, steel and concrete is not subjected to chemical or biotic degradation because of the absence of such elements, but then includes in its exhibits a NPDES permit (ESOP Exhibit 18, Pages 8-9) that lists eight different chemical compounds that are routinely added to service water, including biocides and algaecides, in addition to chlorine and bromine compounds. Typical of periodic maintenance for the towers is removal of silt and sludge from the cooling tower basins and surfaces. ENVY claims, "...there has been no physical evidence of biotic attack on the cooling towers."
(ESOP, Page 21) It strains credulity to think this is sterile or that the waters of the service water system must be routinely poisoned because of the "absence" of biota. ENVY's 1995 Spring Inspection Report (Exhibit 14), Page 3, Item 3, reads, "White and Brown Mold appearing in the distribution basin again, Spraying should be considered". ENVY's 1995 Fall Inspection Report (Exhibit 15), Page 3, Item 2, reads, "White Mold appearing
12 in the distribution basin again, Spraying should be considered". ENVY's 1996 Spring Inspection Report (Exhibit 16), Page 2, Item i, reads, "White and brown molds appearing in the Distribution Basin area again. Spraying should be considered..." In any case, ENVY provides no sampling records, no maintenance records, and no analyses.
(4) in its structural analysis, fails to assign a negative value to the replacement rate for degraded members; ENVY claims that such a negative value need not be assigned. Dr. Landsman, a PhD Civil Engineer with a long career of inspecting and assessing construction and maintenance nuclear power stations for the NRC disagrees (see, Landsman Declaration).
(5) fails to account for changes after the report was completed; ENVY reports on examinations, walkdowns, and repairs that have been made since the ABS Report, but fails to frily explain how the resulting findings and repairs have been integrated and/or reconciled with the ABS Report so as to provide coherent, adequate assurance of the seismic integrity of the dedicated cooling tower cells. ENVY claims that "Starting in 1996, the structural examinations have been performed twice a year, once in the spring and once in the fall" (ESOP Page 16) But ENVY provides reports of only three of these examinations and no details of the regimen. The 2006 Spring Report (ESOP Exhibit 16) finds dozens of structural defects of category 2 (Degradation could result in a structural failure- Replace as schedule permits) and category 3 (Degradation and/or progressing degradation which could result a structural failure within three years).
ENVY cites an examination of the cooling towers conducted in the Spring of 2005 wherein findings or defects, not found in the ABS Report, were found and listed in
13 five different categories. No schedule for corrections and repairs has been found among the documents that ENVY offered.
(6) relies on incorrect and non-conservative assumptions concerning the condition of the concrete in the cooling tower cells and fails to take into account the unanalyzed effects of recent modifications including steel splices; ENVY claims that the structural concrete (below water level) is fine and that the flawed concrete report in the NRC Inspection report was non-structural, located above the water line, a result of a construction flaw, and now patched.
At the same time ENVY claims to numerous periodic inspections of the cooling tower basin, but does not explain why its own people did not find the degraded concrete or did not think it to be reportable or did not repair it until it appeared in an NRC report.
ENVY also claims that there is no degradation of the rebar because there are no flaws in the concrete through which moisture can flow. This claim is entirely inconsistent with ENVY's admission of at least one previously unknown construction flaw leading to spalling or cracking of concrete. Thtat is, if ENVY did not know of this flaw, how can ENVY be certain, especially given that this flaw is above the water line, that there are not other flaws in less accessible areas? New England Coalition believes that without a thorough physical examination properly designed to detect such flaws, they cannot.
ENVY claims that no steel splices have been added; that New England Coalition was badly informed due to an error in an NRC report; that the new splices are actually wood members. (ESOP Page 25) Nonetheless, ENVY does not provide the structural analysis for the added wood braces. Thus wood or steel, placing rigid spots in a structure that gains resiliency from a certain amount of flex, requires analysis or assurance of seismic resistance cannot be verified.
14 and (7) does not provide a reasonable assurance of the seismic qualification of the ACS cooling tower cells CT2-1 and CT2-2.
With respect to the cooling tower fill, corrugated plastic over which cooling water must tumble, New England Coalition witness, Arnold Gundersen, argued that additional loading of the fill due to uprate must be considered in seismic analysis of the Alternate Cooling System (cell). In its Statement of Position, ENVY counters this is not so because the fill is designed to breakaway; thus sparing the cooling tower cell. (ESOP Page 11) New England Coalition is at a loss then as to how, in a severe seismic event, with fill collapsed, and possibly the header pipe disconnected; the dedicated cell is to retain its operability.
Finally, ENVY questions whether Dr. Landsman's credentials and experience qualify him to render expeit opinion on the questions raised in New England Coalition Contention 4. DR. Landsman's education as a Phd. Civil Engineer clearly qualifies him to speak with authority about construction, design strength and durability of materials as well as seismicity as it applies to structures. He has three decades of experience with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ascertaining compliance of commercial nuclear power plant structures with the regulations and standards of the agency and of the nuclear industry as well as commercial codes.
Dr. Landsman is amply qualified as an expert to testify on the subjects at hand.
IV. CONCLUSION New England Coalition eagerly awaits oral argument on its Contentions.
15 Dr. Hopenfeld and Dr. Landsman are fully prepared to engage in a professional discussion of the subjects raised in Contentions 3 and 4 and have confirmed willingness to address written questions from the Board and their availability for the September-October dates of the projected hearings.
New England Coalition is fully confident in the Board's ability to weigh these issues.
If the Board finds this pleading is lacking in any respect, New England Coalition respectfully requests that the Board allow the Coalition an opportunity to cure its defects.
Raymond Shadis Pro se Representative New England Coalition Post Office Box 98 Edgecomb, Maine 04556 207-882-7801 shadis(@prexar.com
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC June 14, 2006 and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) (Technical Specification Docket No. 50-271-OLA Proposed Change No. 362) ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA DECLARATION OF DR. JORAM HOPENFELD IN SUPPORT OF NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S RESPONSE TO THE STATEMENTS OF POSITION OF ENTERGY AND NRC STAFF Dr. Joram Hopenfeld submits the following declaration in support of New England Coalition's Response to the Statements of Position of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc (herein, "Entergy or ENVY") and U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff (herein, "NRC Staff').
At the request of New England Coalition, I have performed a technical assessment of the May 17, 2006 Statements of Position of ENVY and NRC Staff.
Dr. Hopenfeld addresses and rebuts key points in the ENVY and NRC Staff Statements of Position while providing a critical discussion of the technical aspects of the proposed exemption from full-transient testing.
Dr. Hopenfeld relies upon ample qualifications as an expert in the pertinent scientific and technical fields and on evidence provided by ENVY and NRC Staff to assess ENVY's proposed exemption from full-transient testing.
A list of the references drawn from ENVY and NRC Staff filings cited by Dr. Hopenfeld in his testimony precedes his Declaration.
References
- 1. New England Coalition's Answer to Entergy's Statement of Material Facts Regarding NEC Contention 3 - Docket No 50-271, ASLB No.04-832 OLA
- 3. Entergy's motion for summary Disposition of New England coalition on 3, December 2, 2005.- Docket No 50-27 1, ASLB No.04-832 OLA
- 4. Entergy's Initial Statement of Position on New England Coalition Contention 3.
May 17,2006 -Docket No 50-271, ASLB No.04-832 OLA
- 5. Testimony of Craig J. Nichols and Jose L. Cassillas on NRC Contention 3- Large Transient Testing, May 17, 2006- Docket No 50-271, ASLB No.04-832 OLA
- 6. NRC Staff s Initial Statement of Position Concerning NEC Contention 3 - May 17, 2006- Docket No 50-271, ASLB No.04-832 OLA
- 7. NRC Staff Testimony of Richard B. Ennis, Steven R. Jones, Robert L. Pettits Jr.,
A George Thomas, and Zeynab Abdullahi, Concerning NEC Contention 3 -17, 2006-Docket No 50-271, ASLB No.04-832 OL 2
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC June 14,2006 and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) (Technical Specification Docket No. 50-271-OLA Proposed Change No. 362) ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA DECLARATION OF DR. JORAM HOPENFELD IN SUPPORT OF NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S RESPONSE TO THE STATEMENTS OF POSITION OF ENTERGY AND NRC STAFF On behalf of New England Coalition, Dr. Joram Hopenfeld hereby submits the following declaration in support of New England Coalition's Response to the Statements of Position of Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee, LLC and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc (herein, "Entergy or ENVY") and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff (herein, "NRC Staff").
Q.1. Please state your name and address.
A.1. My name is Dr. Joram Hopenfeld and my business address is 1724 Yale Place, Rockville, MD, 20850.
Q.2. What is your educational and professional background?
A.2. I have received the following degrees in engineering from the University of California at Los Angeles: BS 1960, MS 1962, and PhD 1967.
My major fields were in Fluids Flow, Heat Transfer and Electrochemistry.
I am an expert in the development of thermal hydraulic computer codes and models as they relate to the assessment of nuclear safety issues. I have 45 years of professional experience in the fields of instrumentation, design, project management, and 3
nuclear safety; including 18 years, in the employ of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
My resume' has been provided to the Board and to the parties as an attachment to a Declaration Of Dr. Joram Hopenfeld Supporting New England Coalition's Response To Envy's Motion For Summary Disposition, December 21, 2005.
Q.3. What is the purpose of your declaration?
A.3. At the request of New England Coalition, I have performed a technical assessment of the May 17, 2006 Statements of Position of ENVY and NRC Staff. The purpose of this declaration is to provide a critical discussion of the technical aspects of the statements of position and to provide my conclusions regarding them.
Q.4. Please summarize your rmdings.
A.4. I have examined the Statements of Position of ENVY and NRC Staff Entergy and have concluded that ENVY's position that the ODYN computer code can be used as a replacement to transient testing is completely void of any technical justification. In my professional opinion ENVY should be required to reduce power to original licensed thermal power ("OLTP or 100%") until it can demonstrate by transient testing or by a valid analysis that it is safe to operate the plant at 120% power.
In ENVY's most recent communication, a Statement of Position, May 17, 2006, ENVY averred that the ODYN code can predict only the maximum pressure in the reactor vessel and not the stresses of reactor components during transients. (Ref. 5, A 39)
This represents a considerable change from ENVY's December 2, 2005 Motion for Summary Disposition in which they claimed that the ODYN code is capable of predicting plant performance during transients, 4
- 1. The analytical tools used by Entergy will accurately predict plant performance in large transient events under EPU conditions The transient analyses for VY are performed using the NRC-approved code ODYN, which models the behavior of the safety- and non-safety-related systems of the plant during operational events... [Page 5]
In discussing the benchmarking of the ODYN code, ENVY provided no comparison of experimental data with code predictions nor did ENVY describe in sufficient details how the code was qualified.
In discussing industry exp.-rience, ENVY referenced several BWR reactors that have undergone transients and for which it claimed that no new phenomenon have been exhibited. However, ENVY has not provided any analysis to indicate why the above results are applicable to the VY plant at the EPU conditions.
ENVY provides no direct justification for using the ODYN code. ENVY seems to be saying that the code can predict transient behavior because they say so.
Review of the May 17, 2006 NRC Staff Statement of Position seems to indicate that the NRC basically accepts ENVY's contentions without apparent scrutiny.
The purpose of transient tests is to verify that the performance of a given plant is consistent with its design. When ENVY seeks to forgo transient testing by using analyses instead, ENVY must demonstrate that the analyses include sufficient details so that it is representative of the actual tests that are being excluded. As part of this requirement, ENVY should provide material that permits the public to quantify the effects of key assumptions. ENVY has not done so.
Q.5. Please provide a discussion of your review of ENVY and NRC Statements of Position and your findings with respect to the issues raised in NEC Contention 3.
5
A.5. In previous communications to the ASLB (references 1, 2) NEC stated that Vermont Yankee, VY, should not be allowed to operate at the 120% of OLTP without a complete revalidation of the plant ability through analysis, and both individual component and full transient testing to operate at these power levels. Entergy Nuclear Vermont Yankee (ENVY) claimed (3, 4, 5) that full transient testing is not required largely because the ODYN computer code is capable of predicting plant behavior during transients.
Since ENVY did not discuss benchmarking, I have raised the question (referencel) of how the ODYN code was benchmarked (or not) for the type of transients that ENVY claimed to have analyzed for the EPU.
In a reply to the board regarding this issue, ENVY and the NRC stated (4, 5, 6) that the ODYN code was benchmarked against Peach Bottom and other transient data.
Neither ENVY nor the NRC provided a comparison between ODYN predictions and experimental data. Both the ENVY and the NRC state that ODYN provide conservative predictions. Review of ENVY's latest submittals (4 and 5) reveals some new information regarding ODYN, which is discussed below.
In Reference 3 ENVY stated that the ODYN code would accurately predict plant performance during large transients under EPU conditions.
From the latest ENVY submittals, we are now discovering (Ref. 5, A 39) that the ODYN code was used only to predict the peak pressure rather than stresses on various components during transients.
It is not clear to me why ENVY is referring to "plant performance" while the ODYN code is capable of predicting only the maximum pressure. On page 5 of Reference 3, ENVY stated:
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- 1. The analytical tools used by Entergy will accurately predict plant performance in large transient events under EPU conditions.
The transient analyses for VY are performed using NRC- approved code ODYN, which models the behavior of the safety-and non-safety-related systems of the plant during operational events.
Since ENVY did not define "plant performance" one can reasonably assume that "plant performance" refers the performance of structures, systems and components as defined in Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50 for exemptions from transient testing.
A test program shall be established to assure that all testing required to demonstrate that structures, systems, and components ("SSCs") will perform satisfactorily in service is identified and performed in accordance with written test procedures which incorporate the requirements and acceptance limits contained in applicable design documents. The test program shall include, as appropriate, proof tests prior to installation, preoperational tests, and operational tests during nuclear power plant or fuel reprocessing plant operation, of structures, systems, and components. Test procedures shall include provisions for assuring that all prerequisites for the given test have been met, that adequate test instrumentation is available and used, and that the test is performed under suitable environmental conditions. Test results shall be documented and evaluated to assure that test requirements have been satisfied.
If ODYN were able to predict system performance during transient then its output would have been consistent with the requirements for exemptions from transienttesting.
However, since ODYN can potentially predict only the maximum pressure its output is not consistent with Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50. Since plant safety depends on the structural integrity of key vessel components the integrity of these components must be addressed as part of system performance. The applied structural stresses and the allowable stresses, would ultimately determine whether a given component would perform satisfactorily in service. Knowledge of the maximum pressure alone is not a sufficient to assure system performance. The frequency and amplitude of the vibrations as well as the component's natural frequency, which is affected by 7
temperature and temperature gradients, for example, govern failure of components from vibrations.
With the newly provided understanding that ODYN can predict only maximum pressure, ENVY must in addition to describing the benchmarking of ODYN address the issues of how the stresses of SSC were calculated during transient in order to assure compliance with Appendix B 10CFR Part 50. These two issues are further discussed below.
- a. Peak pressure during transients According to ENVY the ODYN code is a one-dimensional code.
This characterization of the ODYN code is confirmed in the NRC Staff Statement of Position at Page 11, As part of its justification for not performing large transient testing, Entergy stated that the MSIV closure pressurization transient analysis (that bounds the load reject without bypass pressurization event) had been performed at Vermont Yankee for the EPU conditions using the ODYN code. The results of this analysis showed the response of the plant to this bounding transient to be acceptable. Id. at 18. The One Dimensional DYNamic Core Transient model
("ODYN") code has been qualified by comparing its predicted response to actual data. Id. at 18-20. [NRC Staff Testimony NRC Staff Testimony Of Richard B.
Ennis, Steven R. Jones, Robert L Pettis Jr., George Thomas, And Zeynab Abdullahi ConcerningNEC Contention3, May 17, 2006]
Such codes incorporate certain simplifications that describe transient behavior therefore; their validity is limited to the cases where the code was benchmarked. For this reason, I disagree with ENVY and the NRC that the observation that the code is conservative or that it over predicts, pressure also means that the code is suitable to predict all transients.
It is important to understand that a code can predict certain quantities very accurately under a certain set of boundary conditions yet it will be very inaccurate in 8
predicting the same parameters under different boundary conditions. It is not the amount of conservatism that is important, it the understanding of the reasons for the discrepancy between the experimental data and code predictions. Neither Envy nor the NRC discusses the specific Peach Bottom test data that was compared to ODYN predictions nor do they explain why the predicted peak pressure exceeded the experimental data.
Perhaps the lack of transparency on part of ENVY and the NRC is due to the fact that some data may be proprietary. If that is the case, it is my opinion that ENVY and the NRC should not be allowed to hide behind a veil of "proprietary information" instead of being required to present a straightforward comparison of the experimental data with ODYN predictions.
We need not review nor need we be interested in the specific mathematical techniques or proprietary data. Instead, it would serve the record to be able to determine from information that ENVY should be supplying, for example, how accurately ODYN can predict the core exit pressure rise and pressure oscillations, and water levels during the turbine trip tests at Peach Bottom It would also be appropriate to be able to determine from information provided by ENVY the basic assumptions regarding the coupling between neutronics and thermal hydraulic and the flow through the moisture separator.
Such information is essential in assessing the ability of the code to provide meaningful information for different transients and boundary conditions.
The board should require that ENVY list and make public all key assumptions and models that were used in ODYN. ENVY should also compare key VY plant 9
parameters such as flow velocities vs the parameters that were used to benchmark ODYN.
- b. Loads on key components during transients Transients can introduce large stresses on vessel components due to induced vibration. The EPU involves an increase of 20% in the flow velocity; this change in velocity increases the potential for flow-induced vibration both under steady state and transient conditions.
When during a transient, the frequency of the induced vibrations is close to the natural frequency of a component, that component can fail catastrophically.
This is the reason why key components such as the dryer must undergo an integrity assessment to assure that the applied stresses remain within the design limits.
Q.6. Please provide any additional, specific comments on ENVY's Statement of Position to which you wish to draw the Board's attention.
A.6. Referenced by page number and topic, I provide the following few specific comments:
- a. Page 5 - Expertise ENVY stated that unlike Mr. Nicholas, BSEE and Mr. Casillas, BSME, Dr. Hopenfeld has no expertise in the issues that were raised by Contention 3 because he has no operational experience at VY with large transients and other BWR plants.
Reply Since ENVY relies on the ODYN code as a replacement to transient testing, the main expertise that is required in this regard is an in depth knowledge of thermal 10
hydraulic (T-H) modeling and code verification. Dr. Hopenfeld has experience and knowledge in this area.
Scientists who are familiar with the various T-H theories and numerical schemes write T-H codes. Experience with transients at VY, or other BWR plants, does not appear to be a prerequisite for the development of T-H codes. Very few if any, of the code developers have been project managers at nuclear facilities also the field of thermal hydraulics is not subdivided into PWR or BWR branches.
Although Dr. Hopenfeld has not been working at VY, he has published in peer reviewed journals several papers on complex problems in T-H and material coolant interaction, his experience include, Hand on modeling T-H phenomena and testing o two phase flow in channels, o transient boiling, o fire behaviour and propagation.
o Radioactivity transport following SG tube rupture o Steam Explosions
" A US representative to an International Conference on Cavitation,
" Project Manager for the development of major (T-H) computer codes such as COBRA.
" Project Manage for a major international program on transient testing of prototypical steam generators (MB-2).
" Supervised the use of the RELAP code for the calculations of temperatures during PWR transients.
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The above background qualifies Dr. Hopenfeld to address the issues, which relate to the assessment of the ODYN code as a substitute for transient testing.
In contrast, Mr. Nicholas and Mr. Casillas have not demonstrated in depth knowledge of T-H by any publication in the open literature. Their resumes give no indication that they have been involved in code development or code verifications. Mr.
Nicholas does not even appear to have any significant educational background in T-H since his degree is in electrical engineering.
It may be that Mr. Nichols and Mr. Casillas have some experience with T-H analysis but the level and complexity of that experience is not specified. Mr. Nichols' and Mr. Casillas' resumes do not reflect an in-depth knowledge of T-H modeling development or testing. T-H computer codes validation is a complex task. Mr. Nichols' and Mr. Casillas' training and discipline do not appear to meet professional standards for assessing T-H computer codes.
- b. Page 8 - Generalities Item 8 ENVY states that, ODYN code has been benchmarked against all significant plant transients including turbine trip (equivalent in its effects to generator load rejection test) and MSIV closure events.
The turbine data were obtained from Peach Bottom and KKM and the MSIV data were obtained from the Hatch plant Item 9 ENVY states, 12
The results of the ODYN's bench mark assessment demonstrate the ability of the code to accurately predict plant performance during transients The current version of the ODYN code continues to accurately predict the over power magnitude and slightly over predict the overpressure magnitude.
Item 10 Envy states.
... it is reasonable to assume the ODYN code of VY behavior during large transients at EPU operations accurately predict the actual plant response to those transients because the ODYN model is qualified for the analysis of this type of a transient.
Reply The above information is too general as to be of any use in evaluating ENVY's analysis or determining if ENVY is qualified exemption to the requirement for transient testing.
It is my professional opinion that, at a minimum, Energy should be required to plot the measured plant parameters such as pressure and flow velocities vs. code predictions and explain the reasons for any differences between code predictions and experimental data.
ENVY should be required to explain in detail how the code was qualified for transients under EPU conditions.
- c. Pages 9 - 10, Items 12 Industry Experience ENVY discusses several BWR reactors, Hatch 1&2, Brunswick 2, Dresden 3 and KKL where transient have occurred at various power level and the ODYN code was used to compare system performance. Since it is claimed that no new related phenomena were observed at these plants, ENVY concluded without analyses that the same results would be obtained at VY.
Reply 13
System performance can only be predicted by considering the stresses on key reactor components during the transients.
To make a valid comparison between the above reactor experience and what is expected to occur at VY under transient conditions, ENVY must show by actual analysis, including stresses on key components, that the above reactor experience is sufficient relevant to forgo transient testing.
If ENVY chooses to use statistical consideration alone, (which apparently appeared to be their approach) to conclude that based on reactor experience one can eliminate transient testing than ENVY should elaborate on the validity of their statistical sampling.
Q.7. Please provide any additional, specific comments on NRC Staff's Statement of Position to which you wish to draw the Board's attention.
A.7. NRC Staffs position regarding the use of ODYN and its benchmarking can be summarized by referring to pages 11 and 12 of Reference 6.
Page 11 As part of its justification for not performing large transient testing, Entergy stated that the MSIV closure pressurization transient analysis (that bounds the load reject without bypass pressurization event) had been performed at Vermont Yankee for the EPU conditions using the ODYN code.
The results of this analysis showed the response of the plant to this bounding transient to be acceptable. Id. at 18. The One Dimensional Dynamic Core Transient model ("ODYN") code has been qualified by comparing its predicted response to actual data. Id. at 18-20.
Page 12 The facts show that the ODYN code has been properly benchmarked for modeling EPU operations and is appropriate for use in demonstrating reasonable assurance that SSCs will perform satisfactorily in service.
Reply 14
There is nothing that links even remotely the NRC conclusions on page 12 with the discussion of Reference 7 a on pages-18-20.
First, the NRC has not reviewed the benchmarking of ODYN for the Hatch and the KKL plants.
Secondly, The staff has not demonstrated the comparison of ODYN with Peach Bottom and with RELAP-3B data.
From the discussion provided by the NRC one must conclude that the NRC evaluation was limited to the ability of the ODYN code to predict general system performance, like maximum system pressure for example. NRC is silent about the ability of ODYN to such parameters which are required to asses stresses and integrity of SSCs.
during transients.
As already discussed above, overall predictions of system performance is not sufficient to assure that SSCs will perform satisfactory one must ensure that the applied stresses do not exceed allowables. The purpose of transient testing is to do just that:
provide confirmation that the system will perform as designed.
When one seeks to substitute actual integral testing with analytical tools he must use analytical tools that can predict those parameters that are relevant to the stress of the SSSc. Pressure, temperature and flow variations with time are required for such analyses.
NRC has not demonstrated (and therefore it is only speculating) that that the ODYN code has properly been benchmarked to ensure that the " SSCs will perform satisfactory in service" and comply with Appendix B to 10 C.F.R. Part 50.
Q.8. Have you anything further?
A.8 I offer the following conclusion:
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Based upon my examination and professional assessment of the ENVY and NRC Staff Statements of Position, I conclude that ENVY has yet to provide technically defensible justification for avoiding full transient testing; and that the sum total of information to be gained from consideration of ENVY's proposed computer code (s),
individual component testing, and very limited applicable industry experience is insufficient to displace the information to be gained from full transient testing.
Therefore, it remains my professional opinion that adequate assurance of public health safety cannot be determined from the license application in this case.
Nothing in the ENVY and NRC Staff Statements of Position has altered my professional opinion that Atomic Safety and Licensing Board should examine the issue of full transient testing (per NEC Contention 3) in the context of a full hearing before making a final decision on the Vermont Yankee EPU application.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed this day, June 12, 2006 at Rockville, Maryland.
Joram Hopenfeld, P 16
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of ))
ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE) Docket No. 50-271-OLA LLC and ENTERGY NUCLEAR )
OPERATIONS, INC. ) ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA
)
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of New England Coalition's Response to ENVY and NRC Staff Statements of Position and the Declaration of Dr. Joram Hopenfeld in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class this 14 th day of June 2006 and by e-mail as indicated by a double asterisk (**), this 14tday of June, 20061.
Alex S. Karlin, Chair** Dr. Anthony J. Baratta**
Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Mail Stop T-3F23 Panel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop T-3F23 Washington, DC 20555-0001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission E-mail: ask2@nrc.gov Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: ajb5@nrc.gov Lester S. Rubenstein" Office of the Secretary" Administrative Judge ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudications Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Staff 4760 East Country Villa Drive Mail Stop: O-16C1 Tucson, AZ 85718 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission E-mail: lesrrr@comcast.net Washington, DC 20555-0001 E-mail: HEARINGDOCKET@nrc.gov Office of Commission Appellate John M. Fulton, Esq.
Adjudication Assistant General Counsel Mail Stop: O-16C1 Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 440 Hamilton Avenue Washington, DC 20555-0001 White Plains, NY 10601 Through an inadvertent omission in New England Coalition's outgoing mail list, conforming hardcopy this Motion was not deposited in the US Mail on February 0,6 as represented in New England Coalition's electronic filing of February 6,2006. Conforming hardcopy is provided today, February 14,2006. New England Coalition deeply regrets an inconvenience, concern, or confusion that may have resulted.
p Jay E. Silberg, Esq.** Sarah Hofmann, Esq.**
Matias Travieso-Diaz, Esq.** Special Counsel Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, LLP Department of Public Service 2300 N St., NW 112 State Street - Drawer 20 Washington, DC 20037-1128 Montpelier, VT 05620-2601 E-mail: jay.silberg@pillsburylaw.com E-mail: sarah.hofmann@state.vt.us matias.travieso-diaz@pillsburylaw.com Anthony Z. Roisman, Esq.**
National Legal Scholars Law Firm 84 East Thetford Rd.
Lyme, NH 03768 E-mail: aroisman@nationallegalscholars.com Jonathan M. Rund, Esq.** Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.**
Law Clerk Jason C. Zorn, Esq.**
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Office of the General Counsel Mail Stop: T-3F23 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-15 D21 Washington, DC 20555-0001 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (E-mail: imr3@nrc..qov) Washington, DC 20555-0001 set(a.-nrc.gov, jczcnrc.gov Raymond Shadis Pro Se Representative New England Coalition Post Office Box 98, Edgecomb, Maine 04556 207-882-7801 ,
shadis@prexar.com
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the matterof June 14, 2006 ENTERGY NUCLEAR VERMONT YANKEE, LLC Docket No. 50-271 and ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC.
(Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station) ASLBP No. 04-832-02-OLA Office of the Secretary ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff Mail Stop: O-16C1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001
Dear Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff,
Please find for filing in the above captioned matter one original and two copies of NEW ENGLAND COALITION'S RESPONSE TO ENVY and NRC Staff STATEMENTS OF POSITION and DECLARATION OF DR. JORAM HOPENFELD Thank you for your kind assistance in making this filing, q3lýý Raymond Shadis Pro se Representative New England Coalition Post Office Box 98 Edgecomb, Maine 04556 207-882-7801
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