ML053200302

Calculation CA06450 FHA, Radiological Consequences Design Basis Calculation Using AST Rev 000

ML053200302
Person / Time
Site:	Calvert Cliffs
Issue date:	11/03/2005
From:	Constellation Energy Group
To:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CA06450, Rev 000
Download: ML053200302 (72)

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Enclosure (2)

CA06450 FHA Radiological Consequences Design Basis Calculation Using AST Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power, Inc.

November 3, 2005

EN-1-100 Forms Appendix Revision 3 ESP No.: ES200100401 Supp No. 000 Rev. No. 000 Page I of FORM 19, CALCULATION COVER SHEET A. INITIATION (Control Doc Type - DCALC) Page I of 71 DCALC No.: CA06450 Revision No.: 000 Vendor Calculation (Check one): El Yes 3 No Responsible Group: FOSU Responsible Engineer: Gerard E. Gryczkowski B. CALCULATION ENGINEERING El Civil El Instr& Controls 0 Nuc Engrg DISCIPLINE: El Electrical El Mechanical O Nuc Fuel Mngmt El Other: E Reliability Engrg

Title:

FUEL HANDLING ACCIDENT USING ALTERNATE SOURCE TERMS Unit aI E12 *COMMON Proprietary or Safeguards Calculation D YES 3 NO Comments: NA Vendor Calc No.: NA REVISION No.: NA Vendor Name: NA Safety Class (Check one): E SR El AQ El NSR There are assumptions that require Verification during walkdown: AIT #: NA This calculation SUPERSEDES: NA C. REVIEW AND APPROVAL: 70 Responsible Engineer: Gerard E. Gryczkowvski t d 3/18/2005 Printed N ad Snature Date Independent Reviewer: Ian Sommerville Printed Name and Signature Date Approval: r 2/ 2-0(cj(/ -7 /]

Printed Name and Signatur Date IF the results or conclusions of this calculation or revision might affect a procedure or the basis of a procedure, a Change Notification Form (Form 14) shall be forwarded to the Procedure Development Unit vith a summary of the calculation's purpose and results.

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 2 of 71

2. LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page Latest Page Latest Page Latest Page Latest Page Latest Rev Rev Rev Rev Rev 001 0 002 0 003 0 004 0 005 0 006 0 007 0 008 0 009 0 010 0 011 0 012 0 013 0 014 0 015 0 016 0 017 0 018 0 019 0 020 0 021 0 022 0 023 0 024 0 025 0 026 0 027 0 028 0 029 0 030 0 031 0 032 0 033 0 034 0 035 0 036 0 037 0 038 0 039 0 040 0 041 0 042 0 043 0 044 0 045 0 046 0 047 0 048 0 049 0 050 0 051 0 052 0 053 0 054 0 055 0 056 0 057 0 058 0 059 0 060 0 061 0 062 0 063 0 064 0 065 0 066 0 067 0 068 0 069 0 070 0 071 0

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 3 of 71

3. REVIEWER COMMENTS (1) p.9 Reference 5 - Be more specific about location of info in Ref 5 Response: OK. Added reference to Case CRCB.

(2) p.1 1 One column in the ADC does not appear correct compared with the Ref - ctmtl-vr Response: The The dispersion coefficients in question (Ctmtl-vr taut string) are listed on page 22 of CA06012.

(3)p.1I ACU 12 or 13?

Response: ACU II and 12 denote the Air Conditioning Units (ACU) 11 and 12 in the control room.

These are not to be confused with Access Controls (AC) 11 and 13, which are on the roof of the Auxiliary Building.

(4) p. 18 Should state where (file name) the values are calculated.

Response: OK FHA.XLS(FHAINP3)

(5) p.2 4 What are the large values of DF for. They don't seem to be calculated or used in a calcualation Response: They are Westinghouse's measured values of DF, which are used by the NRC to generate their values. They are described in Section 9.2 and calculated in DFAXLS(WCAP-7518-L) (Attachment A).

They are less conservative than those calculated using the Burley methodology. The Burley methodology was employed in this work: however, the Westinghouse data was presented to demonstrate the conservative nature of the methodology used.

(6) Compartment 3 - 9,000 cfm ??

Response: Control room recirculation flow is 9000 cfm (the minimum value of Input 17a.

(7) p. 42 I-135 #'s don't seem to match FGR II Response: Per the description in FGRI4.JNP. the 1-135 DCFs include the contribution frim the dauglhetr Xe-135m. The branching fraction for 1-135 to Xe-135m is 0.15 per the LOCADOSE User's Manual.

Thus, the DCF value in FGRI4.INP of inhalation gonads should be 1-135 value in FGR-1 I plus 15% of the Xe-135m value in FGR-1 1. => 1-135 (Inhalation-gonads) = (1.70E-1 1+0.15*0.00e+00 ) = 1.70E-1 I Sv/Bq.

(8) p.4 2 I-135 #'s don't seem to match FGR 12 Response: Per the description in FGRI4.INP. the 1-135 DCFs include the contribution frim the daughetr Xe-135m. The branching fraction for 1-135 to Xe-135m is 0.15 per the LOCADOSE User's Manual.

Thus. the DCF value in FGRI4.INP of cloudshine gonads should be 1-135 value in FGR-12 plus 15% of the Xe-135m value in FGR-12. => 1-135 (clodshine-gonads) = (7.77E-14+0.15*2.00e-14) = 8.07E-14 Sv-sec/Bq-m3 (9) p.42 Xe -133 - = 0.0 not per Ref Response: There are no inhalation doses for the xenon isotopes in FGR-1 I.

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 4 of 71

4. TABLE OF CONTENTS

01. COVER SHEET I

02. LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES 2

03. REVIEWER COMMENTS 3

04. TABLE OF CONTENTS 4

05. INTRODUCTION 6

06. INPUT DATA 9

07. TECHNICAL ASSUMPTIONS 13

08. REFERENCES 14

09. METHODS OF ANALYSIS 16

10. CALCULATIONS 19

11. DOCUMENTATION OF COMPUTER CODES 20

12. RESULTS 21

13. CONCLUSIONS 23

14. ATTACHMENTS 24 ATTACHMENT A: DECONTAMINATION FACTORS PER WCAP-7518-L 24 ATTACHMENT B: DECONTAMINATION FACTORS PER BURLEY 25 ATTACHMENT C: GAS GAP RELEASE ACTIVITIES FROM POOL 29 ATTACHMENT D: NUCLEAR INVENTORY FILE FHA14072.NIF 30 ATTACHMENT E: NUCLEAR INVENTORY FILE FHA141OO.NIF 33 ATTACHMENT F: NUCLEAR INVENTORY FILE FHA14072R.NIF 36 ATTACHMENT G: RELEASE FRACTION AND TIMING FILE FHA.RFT 39 ATTACHMENT H: CONVERSION FACTORS FILE FGRI4.INP 40 ATTACHMENT 1: FHACTMT72 OUTPUT FILE 44 ATTACHMENT J: FHACTMT100 OUTPUT FILE 46 ATTACHMENT K: FHACTMT72R OUTPUT FILE 48 ATTACHMENT L: ETP 97-064R CONTROL ROOM INLEAKAGE RESULTS 50

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 5 of 71 ATTACHMENT M: ETP 01-035R PERFLUOROCARBON TRACER GAS TESTING 66 LAST PAGE OF REPORT 71 If

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 6 of 71

5. INTRODUCTION UFSAR 14.18 presents the licensing basis evaluation of the Fuel Handling Accident (FHA), which is assumed to occur in the spent fuel pool (SFP) handling area or in the containment by dropping a fuel assembly during fuel movement operations. The analyses for a FHA in the refueling pool and the SFP both assume that gas gap activity from 176 fuel rods of the highest power assembly is released. In the SFP the fuel assemblies are stored within the racks at the bottom of the SFP. The top of the rack extends above the tops of the stored fuel assemblies. A dropped fuel assembly could not strike more than one fuel assembly in the storage rack. Impact could occur only between the ends of the involved fuel assemblies, the bottom end fitting of the dropped fuel assembly impacting against the top end fitting of the stored fuel assembly. The results of an analysis of the end on energy absorption capability of a fuel assembly indicate that a fuel assembly is capable of absorbing the kinetic energy of the drop with no fuel rod failures. The worst FHA that could occur in the SFP is the dropping of a fuel assembly to the fuel pool floor.

Because of the high energy absorption required to rupture a fuel rod, 176 represents the maximum number of damaged pins expected from any credible fuel handling incident scenario.

The likelihood of a FHA is minimized by administrative controls and physical limitations imposed on fuel handling operations. All refueling operations are conducted in accordance with prescribed procedures under direct surveillance of a qualified supervisor. The possibility of damage to a fuel assembly as a consequence of mishandling is minimized by thorough training, detailed procedures, and equipment design. The single-failure-proof design of the Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane prevents the drop of heavy objects such as shipping/transfer casks on the spent fuel storage racks. Inadvertent disengagement of a fuel assembly from the fuel handling machine is prevented by mechanical interlocks; consequently, the possibility of dropping and damaging of a fuel assembly is remote.

Should a fuel assembly be dropped or otherwise damaged during handling, radioactive release could occur in either the containment or the Auxiliary Building. The air in both of these areas is monitored. The radiation monitors immediately indicate the increased activity level and alarm. The affected area would then be evacuated. The SFP ventilation system draws air across the SFP area; this air is discharged to the atmosphere through the plant vent. If the cask loading hatch and all exterior hatches to the 69' level of the Auxiliary Building are closed, this is the only route for the release of activity from the SFP area to the environment. After a FHA in containment, the activity may be released through the personnel air lock (PAL), the containment outage door (COD), the containment walls themselves, or via the hydrogen or 48" purge lines into the plant vent. The release through the plant vent is most limiting, and thus a FHA in the containment and the SFP will both be assumed to be released to the environment through the plant vent stack.

The original design-basis FHA offsite doses were calculated in calculation NC-94-030 (Ref.20) for a FHA in the SFP with credit for the SFP HEPA and charcoal filters. This bounded the FHA offsite doses in containment, where no activity release was postulated due to the containment closure requirement for fuel movement. Calculation 000-DA-9302 (Ref.19) recalculated the offsite doses to allow the personnel air locks to be open during fuel movement.

The containment offsite doses then became bounding due to a lack of filtration credit. This was approved by the NRC in License Amendments 194/171 (Ref.21). The reasoning was extended to the containment outage door. The NRC allowed the COD to be open during fuel movement in License Amendments 242/216 (Ref.22).

Note that this work also supports Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-312 (Ref.42), which allows penetration flow paths that have direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be unisolated under administrative control. Since this current analysis assumes that the radioactive release is unfiltered, completely released over a two hour time period, and released with the most limiting dispersion coefficients, the analysis will also apply to the containment penetration flow paths that are opened under administrative control.

The NRC requested additional information regarding the control room doses that would result from a FHA in containment with the PAL doors open. Ref.23 documented the FHA control room analysis, which calculated a 30-day control room thyroid dose of 47.94 Rem without protective measures, which exceeds the regulatory limit of 30 Rem thyroid per 10 CFR 50 Appendix A GDC 19. However, Ref.23 also determined that the operators would have approximately 3.89 hours0.00103 days <br />0.0247 hours <br />1.471561e-4 weeks <br />3.38645e-5 months <br /> to initiate protective measures (SCBAs) to remain within the regulatory dose limit of 30

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 7 of 71 rem thyroid. This was reported to the NRC in Ref.24. Subsequently, the NRC issued approval of CCNPP's control room habitability analysis in Ref.25. These analyses were revised to incorporate increased control room inleakage values of 4600 and 3500 cfm in Refs.26-27. Ref.27 determined that the operators would have approximately 82 minutes to initiate protective measures to remain within the regulatory dose limit of 30 rem thyroid.

Failed fuel rods that have released their active gas gap inventory can be stored in encapsulated fuel tubes. These encapsulated fuel tubes can be stored in the peripheral guide tubes of host assemblies or empty grid cages in the SFP.

A single encapsulation tube containing a damaged fuel rod can be stored in an incore instrumentation (ICI) trash can, can be laid temporarily atop the SFP storage racks with administrative restrictions on fuel movement in the laydown area, or can be placed at the bottom of an upender trench with the associated upender tagged out. The addition of up to four encapsulated fuel rods in a host assembly will not cause the radiological consequences of a FHA to increase since administrative controls are employed to ensure that only fuel rods with sufficient clad damage to ensure no residual gas gap activity are stored in the encapsulation tubes in fuel assemblies. The failed rods cannot contribute to gas gap release, since their gas inventory has already been released. Undamaged fuel rods can only be stored in the encapsulation tubes in empty grid cages. This will guarantee that the consequences of a FHA will not be increased.

Only damaged fuel rods with no gas gap activity can be stored in encapsulation tubes stored in ICI trash cans, temporarily atop the SFP storage racks, or at the bottom of an upender trench, thus precluding any fission gas release.

Reconstitution or inspection of a fuel assembly can take place in individual SFP storage racks with spent fuel assemblies placed on rack spacers and with their upper end fittings removed. In such a configuration, the structural integrity of the fuel assemblies is reduced, and the fuel rods may protrude above the SFP racks. Since fuel damage could occur if a heavy object is dropped on top of an assembly seated on a rack spacer with its upper end filling removed, administrative controls will restrict movement of loads over the affected assemblies on rack spacers plus one storage rack cell on each side of the affected assemblies. Heavy loads may only be moved in this area via the single-failure-proof crane, if assemblies are seated on rack spacers with their upper end fittings removed. Only the single-failure-proof crane or single-failure-proof rigging will be used over the reconstitution area in the SFP for loads other than tools. A knowledgeable and briefed person will be present for the entire time that the upper end fitting or template is removed from an assembly to restrict movement of loads other than tools in this area of the SFP. In addition, after the upper end fillings have been removed, the spent fuel handling machine will be administratively prohibited from nearing the affected assemblies on rack spacers plus one storage rack cell on each side of the affected assemblies.

The FHA analysis assumes a total iodine decontamination factor (DF) of 200 based on a minimum water depth of 23' per Ref.08. In the refueling pool this assumption is preserved by the Teclmical Specification requirement of 23' of water above fuel assemblies seated in the reactor core. In the SFP, the Technical Specification only requires 21.5' of water above fuel assemblies seated in the SFP storage racks. This Technical Specification was deemed sufficient to preserve the required 23' of water because a FHA was assumed to occur as a fuel assembly strikes the bottom of the SFP. When assemblies are placed on rack spacers and their upper end fillings are removed, a FHA from a dropped heavy object would require a lower DF based on reduced water coverage. A revised DF of 120 for a FHA during reconstitution/inspection with 20.4' of water between the top of the pin and the surface of the water was computed for a 20.5" rack spacer. Note that this is very conservative, since normal level control will result in at least 21.5' of water above exposed fuel pins.

Previously, power reactor licensees have typically used the U.S.A.E.C Technical Information Document TID-14844, "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites," (Ref.18) as the basis for DBA analysis source terms. TID-14844 is referenced in 10 CFR 100.11, the power reactor siting regulation, which contains offsite dose limits in terms of whole body and thyroid doses. In December 1999, the NRC issued a new regulation, 10 CFR 50.67, "Accident Source Term," which provided a mechanism for licensed power reactors to replace the traditional accident source term used in their DBA analyses with an alternate source term. Regulatory guidance for the implementation of these ASTs is provided in Regulatory Guide 1.183, "Alternative Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors" (Ref.08). Section 50.67 of 10 CFR requires a licensee seeking to use AST to apply for a license amendment and requires that the application contain an evaluation of the consequences of affected DBAs. As part of the implementation of the AST, the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) acceptance criterion of 10 CFR 50.67 replaces the previous whole body and thyroid dose guidelines of 10 CFR 100.11 and 10

CA06450 Rev. 000 Page 8 of 71 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC-19 for the loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA), the main steam line break (MSLB), the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR), the seized rotor event (SRE), the fuel handling accident (FHA), and the control rod ejection accident (CREA).

The current work utilizes the alternate source term (AST) methodology of 10 CFR 50.67 and Regulatory Guide 1.183 to calculate offsite and control room doses for a FHA. A bounding control room inleakage value of 3500 cfm was assumed. Modification of the control room emergency ventilation system to a nominal 10000 cfm flow with a 90%

filtration efficiency was credited. SFP filtration was not credited. Also credited was installation of automatic isolation dampers and radiation monitors at Access Controls 11 and 13 on the Auxiliary Building Roof. This modification limits activity egress into the control room from either the West Road Inlet or the Turbine Building, thus limiting the atmospheric dispersion coefficient value.

The site boundary, low population zone, and control room doses for the design-basis FHA in containment and the SFP calculated in Attachments I, J, and K, are detailed in the following table.

I Fuel Handline Accident Doses in REM TEDE Containment/SFP Containment/SFP Spent Fuel Pool Regulatory DF 200 200 120 Limit Decay Time (hr) 100 72 72 EAB 0.6167 0.6958 1.1136 6.3 (RG L.183)

LPZ 0.1452 0.1638 0.2622 6.3 (RG 1.183)

Control Room 2.0765 2.3314 3.8538 5.0 (IOCFR50.67)

Note that all values are below the regulatory limits. Since the reconstitution SFP case is the most limiting, it will be considered as the design-basis fuel handling accident for alternate source terms.

CA06450 Rev.O000 Page 9 of 71

6. INPUT DATA The input data to determine the site boundary, low population zone, and control room doses from a Fuel Handling Accident in the containment and in the SFP are the following:

(01) Initial thermal power is 2754 MWt (UFSAR 3.2.1/Ref.l).

(02) The pin power peaking factor is 1.70. Per the Core Operating Limits Reports for Units I and 2, (Refs.2-3), the total integrated radial peaking factors (FrT) are less than or equal to 1.65. For conservatisma pin power peaking factor of 1.70 will be used in this work.

(03) Fuel movement does not occur until 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after reactor shutdown. Per TRM 15.9.1, fuel movement can occur 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> after reactor shutdown; however, this value was decreased to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> for conservatism.

(04) Containment volume:

(a) Net free volume: 2.035E+06 cf (UFSAR Tab.14.20-3, Ref.04)

(b) Containment sprayed volume: 1.48E+06 cf (Ref.04)

Volume fraction: 0.7273 (Ref.04)

(c) Containment unsprayed volume: 0.555E+06 cf (Ref.04)

Volume fraction: 0.2727 (Ref.04)

(05) The isotopic source terms (CI/MWT) were extracted from Ref.05 Case CRCB and generated via SAS2H calculations. The isotopic decay constants (1/sec) were also extracted from Ref.06.

Isotope Source Decay Constant (I/SEC)

(Cl/MWT) 1-131 2.7562E+04 9.9783E-07 1-132 3.9464E+04 8.3713E-05 1-133 5.57 15E+04 9.2568E-06 I-134 6.2858E+04 2.1963E-04 1-135 5.2694E+04 2.9129E-05 XE-133M 1.7354E+03 3.6632E-06 XE-133 5.5707E+04 1.5296E-06 XE-135M 1.1635E+04 7.5506E-04 XE-135 1.7708E+04 2.1182E-05 XE-138 4.9330E+04 8.1932E-04 KR-85M 7.9679E+03 4.2978E-05 KR-85 3.7180E+02 2.0489E-09 KR-87 1.6208E+04 1.5141 E-04 KR-88 2.2658E+04 6.7796E-05 (06) Per Ref.07, damaged fuel rods are assumed to release their gas gap activities consisting of the following isotopes:

16% 1-131 10% other iodines 20% Kr-85 10% other noble gases

CA06450 Rev.O000 Page 10 of 71 (07) For assemblies on the storage rack spacers in the SFP for reconstitution/inspection, the height of water above the exposed fuel rods can be calculated to be 20.4'.

21.5' Technical Specification 3.7.13, height of water above assembly seated in storage racks in SFP

-1.7083' 20.5" rack spacer height per Ref.29

+0.6055' 7.266" Upper end fitting (UEF) height per Ref.28

=20.4' Height of water above assembly seated on rack spacers with their UEF removed (08) Per Section 9.2, a decontamination factor of 200 is appropriate for assemblies seated in the storage racks or in the core with internal pin pressures up to 1400 psig, while a decontamination factor of 120 is appropriate for assemblies seated on rack spacers with internal pin pressures up to 1400 psig. The decontamination factor of noble gases in the pool is unity per Ref.08.

(09) The control room volume of 289194 ft3 is extracted from Ref.30.

(10) The breathing rates are extracted from Ref.08:

Time Breathing Rate (hours) (m3/sec) 0-8 3.51E-04 8-24 1.8E-04 24-720 2.31E-04 (11) The control room occ ancy factors are extracted [from Ref.08:

Time Occupancy (hours) Factor 0-24 1.0 24-96 0.6 96-720 0.4 (12) The ventilation stack-to-site boundary, two-hour, atmospheric dispersion coefficient of 1.44E4 sec/n 3 was calculated via the Gifford wake model extracted from UFSAR 2.3.6, as follows VQ = V[p * (7jyo,. + cA)] = 1.44E4 sec/m3 where for 1150 m exclusion area boundary distance and 5% frequency 1u= average wind speed = I rn/sec ory= standard deviation of the distribution in the lateral direction = 92 m (UFSAR Table 2-14) or= standard deviation of the distribution in the vertical direction = 24 m (UFSAR Table 2-14) c= wake factor A= cross-sectional area of structure from which material is released = 0 m (13) Atmospheric dispersion coefficients from containment to low population zone (2 miles) flFPSAR FiMa 9 -lFl ARA 14 24

' 3)

Time X/Q (hours) (sec/in) 0-2 3.39E-05 2-24 2.20E-06 24-720 5.40E-07 Note that the 0-2 hour value was adjusted via the Gifford wake model for a vent stack release rather than a containment release.

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 11 of 71 (14) The dose conversion factors (DCFs) were extracted from Refs.31-32. This data is included in the Conversion Factor File FGRI4.INP in Attachment H for use by RADTRAD. Note that the cloudshine data in FGRI4.INP corresponds to the FGR-12 data, while the inhaled chronic data in FGR14.INP corresponds to the worst-case effective data in FGR-I 1. The remaining data in FGRI4.INP is extraneous and not used by RADTRAD.

(15) Atmospheric dispersion coefficients from the ventilation stack to the Control Room: (Ref.30)

The spent fuel pool ventilation system draws air across the spent fuel pool area; this air is discharged to the atmosphere through the plant vent. If the cask loading hatch and all exterior hatches to the 69' level of the Auxiliary Building are closed, this is the only route for the release of activity from the spent fuel pool area to the environment.

After a FHA in containment, the activity may be released through the personnel air lock (PAL), the containment outage door (COD), the containment walls themselves, or via the hydrogen or 48" purge lines into the plant vent. The release through the plant vent is most limiting, and thus a FHA in the containment and the SFP will both be assumed to be released to the environment through the plant vent stack. The main control room inleakage points include the west road inlets, the turbine building, and Access Controls 11 and 13 on the Auxiliary Building roof. Installation of automatic isolation dampers and radiation monitors at Access Controls 11 and 13 on the Auxiliary Building Roof are credited in this work.

I Atmospheric Dispersion Coefficients l l cod2-tb codl-wr ctmit2-tb ctmtl-wr vsl-wr vs2-tb 0-2 hr 1.02E-03 1.16E-03 1.02E-03 1.11 E-03 9.54E-04 1.68E-03 2-8 hr 8.48E-04 9.49E-04 7.98E-04 7.29E-04 6.86E-04 1.34E-03 8-24hr 3.34E-04 3.90E-04 3.19E-04 3.19E-04 2.95E-04 5.14E-04 1-4 days 2.31 E-04 2.70E-04 2.56E-04 2.36E-04 2.13E-04 3.84E-04 4-30 days 1.90E-04 2.36E-04 2.14E-04 1.98E-04 1.56E.04 3.12E-04 The atmospheric dispersion coefficients corresponding to the Unit 2 vent stack to the turbine building will be conservatively utilized in this work.

(16) Control room inleakage: The control room inleakages for the two trains Air Conditioning Units (ACU) 11 and 12 were measured by NUCON International Inc. via sulfur hexaflouride (SF6 ) tracer gas tests as documented in Refs.34-37 (Attachment L). An additional inleakage test was performed by Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) via a perfluorocarbon tracer gas (PFT) test as documented in Ref.38 (Attachment M).

ACU II ACU 12 SF6 Test 11/11/97 4300+/-300 cfm 3000+/-300 cfm SF 6 Test 11/11/97 3600+/-600 cfm 2550+/-450 cfm SF 6 Test I 1/11/97 2900+/-250 cfm 2750+/-380 cfm SF 6 Test 1/18/00 2600+/-200 cfm 300O250 cfm PFT Test 5/1/02 2930+/-185 cfm 2930+/-185 cfm The latest SF6 and PFT tests show fairly good agreement, as indicated above. A conservative value of 3500 cfm will be utilized in this wvork.

The control room inleakage points were deduced from the PFT testing carried out by Brookhaven National Laboratory and include the Auxiliary Building West Road inlet (WR), the Turbine Building inlet (TB), Access Control II (ACI 1), Access Control 13 (AC13), the Switchgear Rooms (SWGRs), and the Main Steam Isolation Valve Rooms (MSIVs). ACI I and AC13 will be equipped with dampers and radiation monitors, wvhich will isolate this leakage path in case of an accident. The SWGRs are in continual recirculation mode and thus are also isolated from the environment. The MSIV rooms are also isolated from the environment, except for the Main Steam Line Break Accident which occurs in these rooms, due to the thermal buoyancy of the air in these rooms and due to the J-

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 12 of 71 neck exhaust. For conservatism, all of the measured inleakage will be assumed to enter the control room from the most conservative pathway of either the West Road or Turbine Building inlets.

(17) Control room recirculation flow:

(a) Flowrate: 10000.: 1000 cfm (Note that this value will be the result of a new modification.)

(b) Initiation delay time: 20 minutes (Ref.40 conservatively assumes a 20 minute time delay for a manual start of the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System.)

(c) Filter efficiencies: 90% for all iodine species (Ref.39 and Technical Specification 5.5.11 allow a 95% filter efficiency for a 2" activated carbon bed depth; however, NRC Generic Letter 99-02 (Ref.41) requires plants that test their activated charcoal to the ASTM D3803-1989 standards to use a safety factor of two. This results in a maximum credited efficiency of 90% for accident analyses.)

(18) The SFP filters are not credited in this work.

(19) The activity discharged from the 176 broken fuel pins is released from the SFP or containment over a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> time period. This is reflected in the release fraction and timing file FHA.RFT displayed in Attachment G.

(20) Additional RADTRAD Inputs;

• Compartments o Containment: 1 ft3 o Environment o Control Room: 289194 ft3, 9000 cfm recirculation filters @ 90/90/90 efficiency for 0.3333-720 hrs

• Transfer Pathways o Containment to environment: 100 cfm filter @ 0/0/0 efficiency for 0-720 hrs o Environment to control room: 3500 cfm filter @ 0/0/0 efficiency for 0-720 hrs o Control room to environment: 3500 cfm filter @ 0/0/0 efficiency for 0 hrs

• Dose Locations o EAB o LPZ o Control Room

• Source Term and DCF o Nuclear Inventory File: FHA14072.NIF, FHA1410O.NIF, Fl1A14072R.NIF o Release Fraction and Timing File: FHA.RFT o DCF File: FGRI4.INP o Decay and Daughter Products Option

CA06450 Rev. 000 Page 13 of 71

7. TECHNICAL ASSUMPTIONS The following technical assumptions were utilized in this work:

(01) All 176 rods from the highest power fuel assembly will be damaged in the FHA.

(02) No credit is taken for atmospheric cleanup systems in containment or the SFP (spray, filter, plateout).

(03) No credit is taken for deposition of the plume on the ground or decay of isotopes in transit to the site boundary.

(04) Buildup of daughter nuclides is taken into account as source term nuclides decay.

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 14 of 71

8. REFERENCES (01) "Power Levels of Nuclear Power Plants", Regulatory Guide 1.49 Rev. l, 12/73.

(02) CCNPP Core Operating Limits Report for Unit 1 Cycle 17 Rev. l (03) CCNPP Core Operating Limits Report for Unit 2 Cycle 16 Rev.0 (04) "Offsite and Control Room Doses Following a LOCA", Bechtel Calculation M-89-33 Rev.3, 7/9/9 1.

(05) "Control Room Habitability Source Term Calculations", CA06358.

(06) "Chart of the Nuclides - Nuclides and Isotopes", GE Nuclear Energy, Fifteenth Edition.

(07) "Gas Gap Isotopic Fraction Calculations", CA06321.

(08) "Alternate Radiological Source Terms for Evaluating Design Basis Accidents at Nuclear Power Reactors",

Regulatory Guide 1.183 (09) "Topical Report Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident", WCAP-75 18-L (10) "Topical Report Radiological Consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident Supplemental Information", WCAP-7518-L, Addendum I.

(11) "Validation of CCNPP FHA for Increased Fuel Rod Pressure of 1400 Psi", CA06067 (12) "Evaluation of Fission Product Release and Transport for a Fuel Handling Accident", G. Burley, 10/5/71 (13) "RADTRAD: A Simplified Model for Radionuclide Transport and Removal and Dose Estimation", NUREG/CR-6604, SAND98-0272 (14) "RADTRAD: A Simplified Model for Radionuclide Transport and Removal and Dose Estimation", NUREG/CR-6604, SAND98-0272/1, Supplement 1.

(15) "RADTRAD: A Simplified Model for Radionuclide Transport and Removal and Dose Estimation", NUREG/CR-6604, Supplement 2 (16) "RADTRAD 3.03 Installation and Verification on PCB386", CA06210 (17) "RADTRAD 3.03 Validation", CA06207 (18) "Calculation of Distance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites", TID-14844, 3/23/62.

(19) "Revaluation of Fuel Handling Accident Supporting Both Personnel Air Lock Doors Open During Fuel Movement - Open Door Policy", 000-DA-9302 Rev. l, 10/13/93.

(20) "Offsite Doses at the Exclusion Area Boundary Associated with a Fuel Handling Accident in the Spent Fuel Pool Area", NC-94-030 Rev.0, 12122/94.

(21) SER Amendment Numbers 194/171 8/31/94: "Allow Containment Personnel Air Locks to Be Open During Fuel Movement and Core Alterations"

CA06450 Rev. 000 Page 15 of 71 (22) SER Amendment Numbers 242/216 3/12/01: "Allow Containment Outage Door to Be Open During Fuel Movement and Core Alterations" (23) "Control Room Doses from a Fuel Handling Accident", NS-94-009, 3/2/94.

(24) "Supplement to License Amendment Request: Personnel Air Lock Open During Core Alterations", NRC 018,3/94.

(25) Correspondence NRC to BGE 6/22/95: Control Room Interim Analysis for Thyroid Dose (26) CA04807: SCBA Utilization Post FHA with Enhanced Control Room Inleakage (27) CA04986: SCBA Utilization Post FHA with 3500 CFM Control Room Inleakage (28) "Fuel Bundle Assembly", BGE Drawing 12131-0250 Rev.0 (29) Storage Rack Spacer", BGE Drawing 12309-0068SH0001 Rev.l (30) CA06012: CRHVAC Atmospheric Dispersion Coefficient Calculations (31) Federal Guidance Report (FGR) 11, "Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors," 1989 (32) Federal Guidance Report (FGR) 12, "External Exposure to Radionuclides in Air, Water, and Soil," 1993, (33) "Fuel Performance Analysis", Westinghouse Calculation CN-WFE-02-45, Rev.0 (34) "Control Room HVAC Inleakage Test", ETP-97-064R Rev.0, 11/11/1997 (First Run)

(35) "Control Room HVAC Inleakage Test", ETP-97-064R Rev.0, 11/11/1997 (Third Run)

(36) "Control Room HVAC Inleakage Test", ETP-97-064R Rev.0, 11/11/1997 (Fourth Run)

(37) "Control Room HVAC Inleakage Test", ETP-97-064R Rev.0, 1/18/2000.

(38) "Perfluorocarbon Tracer Gas Testing", ETP-01-035R Rev.0, 5/1/2002 (39) "Power Levels of Nuclear Power Plants", Regulatory Guide 1.49 Rev.1, 12/73.

(40) "Control Room Recirculation Filter Initiation Time Delay", NEU-95-026 (41) NRC Generic Letter 99-02: Laboratory Testing of Nuclear-Grade Activated Charcoal (42) Industry/TSTF Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler TSTF-312, Administratively Control Containment Penetrations, Revision I

CA06450 Rev. 000 Page 16 of 71

9. METHODS OF ANALYSIS (9.1) RADTRAD Computations The current work re-analyzes control room habitability for the containment FHA and SFP FHA with and without reconstitution based on the alternate source term methodology of Ref.08 and control room inleakage of 3500 cfm This was accomplished by utilizing the RADTRAD computer code (Refs.13-15).

The RADTRAD computer code calculates TEDE and thyroid doses to personnel at the site boundary, low population zone, and control room per 10 CFR 50.67 resulting from any postulated accident which releases radioactivity within the containment, spent fuel pool, or within any primary system. RADTRAD models the transport of radioactivity (elemental, particulate, and organic iodine isotopes and krypton and xenon isotopes for the FHA) from the sprayed and unsprayed regions of a primary containment or a SFP area, through the secondary containment if any, and then to the environment and to the control room. The code includes the capability to model time-dependent activity release; containment spray, filtration, and leakage; control room filtration and inleakage; primary and secondary containment purge filters; control room intake filters; atmospheric dispersion; and natural decay. Doses are calculated for individuals residing at the site boundary or low population zone and in the control room. RADTRAD is documented and benchmarked in Refs.13-17.

The FHA in containment model is constructed assuming that an FHA occurs at time t'O and assuming that the isotopes AD calculated in an EXCEL spreadsheet are released at time t=0 to the primary containment. No cleanup mechanisms (spray, filtration, plateout) are assumed in containment, thus the sprayed/unsprayed classification has no effect on the results. This activity escapes to the environment assuming complete release in two hours and is transported to the site boundary and to the control room via appropriate atmospheric dispersion coefficients. While time-dependent control room inleakage can be modeled by RADTRAD, it is a constant in this work. The control room and site boundary doses are calculated based on appropriate breathing rates and occupancy factors and on ICRP 30 dose conversion factors.

The FHA in the SFP model is constructed assuming that an FHA occurs at time t=0 and assuming that the isotopes Ao calculated in the EXCEL spreadsheet are released immediately and uniformly into the SFP area. No secondary containment is modeled. No spray or plateout cleanup mechanisms are assumed in the SFP. The SFP ventilation system processes 32000J10% cfm of the SFP volume into the environment with no credit for the HEPA/charcoal filters for the duration of the accident. The SFP activity is also completely released over a two hour time interval.

This activity is transported to the site boundary and to the control room via appropriate atmospheric dispersion coefficients. While time-dependent control room inleakage can be modeled by RADTRAD, it is a constant in this work. The control room and site boundary doses are calculated based on appropriate breathing rates and occupancy factors and on ICRP 30 dose conversion factors.

(9.2) Decontamination Factors When an assembly is damaged in the SFP or RP, the fission product gases and helium are released from the broken rods, carrying the iodine isotopes into the pool. As the gas bubbles rise to the surface, most of the iodine will be transferred from the bubble, dissolve, and hydrolyze in the boric acid solution. The ratio of the initial iodine activity as released from the broken rod to the final iodine activity as released from the pool is designated as the decontamination factor, DF. Note that organic iodine (e.g. CH3 1) is not readily absorbed in the pool and thus has a DF of unity (DFO= I). Likewise, noble gases are not absorbed in the pool and also have a DF of unity.

In an effort to determine a decontamination factor (DFI) for inorganic iodine isotopes (e.g. elemental iodine I2, I, HI and particulate iodine Csl), Westinghouse performed a series of experiments (Refs.9-1 1) which measured DFI as a function of release depth (h), rise time (t), bubble diameter (d), and initial pressure. These simulations assumed that damage to the fuel assembly resulted in complete and instantaneous shearing of all the vertically-oriented fuel rods, which released the contained gases in a burst. The results of these experiments are displayed in Attachment A and can be summarized by the following algorithm:

DFI = 73

• exp(0.313

• t / d

• li/ 23)

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 17 of 71 DF = I / (IFO/DFO + IFI/DFI)

Thus at a depth of 23 feet and 1200 psig internal rod pressure, a DFI of 579.65 was determined. Assuming an inorganic iodine fraction (IFI) of 0.9985 and an organic iodine fraction of 0.0015 (IFO) per Ref.08, an overall DF of 310 can be calculated.

Refs. 11 and 33 indicate that the internal pin pressure can exceed 1200 psig for zirlo-clad value-added-pellet (VAP) fuel. In addition, reconstitution or inspection operations in the SFP require assemblies to be put on 20.5" spacers, which reduce the minimum water level to 20.4' (Section 6-07). Thus, at a depth of 20 feet and 1400 psig internal rod pressure, a DFI of 392.58 can be determined by assuming a linear decrease in bubble rise time with decreasing depth, resulting in an overall DF of 247. Both values (310 and 247) are well above the value of 200 allowed in RG 1.183 (Ref.08).

An alternate methodology for calculating DF, which is endorsed by the NRC, is the methodology of Burley (Ref.12).

The results of this methodology are displayed in Attachment B and can be summarized by the following algorithms:

DFI = exp(6

• Keff

• h / d /v) v 29.86

• V(16) = bubble velocity V = 4

• X / 3 * (d / 2)3 = bubble volume Keff = I/[I /(1.646*0.278/d + 0.00375*v) + I / (11 .3*(0.0000127*v/d)OS]

Based on a depth of 23 feet and 1200 psig internal rod pressure, DFI is defined as 500 per Ref.08 resulting in a bubble diameter of 2.0685 cm. Thus at a depth of 20.4 feet, and 1400 psig internal rod pressure, a DFI of 152 can be determined by assuming a linear increase in bubble volume with increasing pressure, resulting in an overall DF of 124.

Thus a DF of 120 will be conservatively utilized in this work for a depth of 20.4 feet and an internal rod pressure of 1400 psig.

Per Ref.08, the iodine gap activity is composed of 99.85% inorganic species and 0.15% organic species of iodine. If the pool decontamination factors are 285.29 for the inorganic iodine and I for the organic iodine, this yields an overall effective decontamination factor of 200. This difference in decontamination factor for inorganic and organic iodine species results in the iodine above the fuel pool being composed of 70% inorganic and 30% organic species. If the pool decontamination factors are 146.12 for the inorganic iodine and I for the organic iodine, this yields an overall effective decontamination factor of 120. This difference in decontamination factor for inorganic and organic iodine species results in the iodine above the fuel pool being composed of 82% inorganic and 18% organic species.

(9.3) Gas Gap Release Activities EXCEL spreadsheets FHA.XLS(FHAINP3) were developed to calculate the activity released to, the containment or SFP atmosphere post-FHA. Four sets of isotopic activities were generated:

• DF of 200 with 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> of decay prior to fuel movement

• DF of 200 with 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of decay prior to fuel movement

• DF of 120 with 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br /> of decay prior to fuel movement (Reconstitution mode)

• DF of 120 with 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> of decay prior to fuel movement (Reconstitution mode)

Note that the SFP HEPA and charcoal filters are not credited in this work, thus the isotopic activities released to the atmosphere are the same in containment and in the SFP area.

The initial isotopic activity in Curies released to the containment or SFP for isotope 'i' is based on the following algorithm:

CA06450 Rev.OOo Page 18 of 71 Ajo = AST* *

• PPF

• RF; I NASSM / DFj

• exp(-%Di

• to

• 3600.)

where AST; = Isotopic activity per unit power (Ci/MWT)

P = Core power (MWT)

PPF = Power peaking factor RF; = Isotopic gas gap release fraction DF. = Isotopic decontamination factor XDi = Isotopic decay constant (1/sec) to = Time from power shutdown to FHA (hr)

NASSM = Number of assemblies in core = 217 The isotopic activities were inserted into nuclear inventory files for use by RADTRAD. These RADTRAD files are listed in Attachments D through F and consist of the 14 gas-gap noble gas and iodine isotopes. The activities are the total gas gap activities that are released from the pool water at the appropriate decay time and are not per unit power.

Thus a power of one should be designated when employing these files.

CA06450 Rev. 000 Page 19 of 71

10. CALCULATIONS The following computational calculations were performed in this calculational package:

Cases FHACTMTI00 FHACTMT72 FHACTMT72R Location Containment or SFP Containment or SFP Containment or SFP Decontamination Factor 200 200 120 Water depth above fuel 23 feet 23 feet 20.4 feet Decay Period 100 houre 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> Nuclear Inventory File FHA1410O.NIF FHA14072.NIF FHA14072R.NIF Release Fraction File FHA.RFT FHA.RFT FHA.RFT DCF File FGRl4.INP FGR14.INP FGR14.INP Case File FHACTMTIOO.PSF FHACTMT72.PSF FHACTMT72R.PSF Output File FHACTMT1OO.oO FHACTMT72.oO FHACTMT72R.oO Control Room Inleakage 3500 cfm 3500 cfm 3500 cfm Control Room Filtration 9000 cfm 9000 cfm 9000 cfm Control Room Efficiency 90% after 20 min 90% after 20 min 90% after 20 min SFP Filtration 0 cfm 0 cfm 0 cfm Release Point to Unit 2 Unit 2 Unit 2 Environment Ventillation Stack Ventillation Stack Ventillation Stack Entrance Point to Control Turbine Building Turbine Building Turbine Building Room I _I

CA06450 Rev. 000 Page 20 of 71

11. DOCUMENTATION OF COMPUTER CODES This work employed the RADTRAD computer code, which was verified, benchmarked, and documented in Refs.13-17 and which models the transport of halogen and noble gas isotopes from a primary containment to a secondary containment and thence to the environment and control room. The installation of RADTRAD is detailed in Ref.16 and the validation in Ref.17.

The RADTRAD computer code can calculates TEDE and thyroid doses to personnel at the site boundary, low population zone, and control room per the alternate source term methodology 10 CFR 50.67 and Regulatory Guide 1.183 or can calculates whole body and thyroid doses to personnel at the site boundary, low population zone, and control room per the standard source term methodology of TID-14844 (Ref.18) resulting from any postulated accident which releases radioactivity within the containment, spent fuel pool, or within any primary system. RADTRAD models the transport of radioactivity from up to 63 radioisotopes from the sprayed and unsprayed regions of a primary containment or a SFP area, through the secondary containment if any, and then to the environment and to the control room. The code includes the capability to model time-dependent activity release; containment spray, filtration, and leakage; control room filtration and inleakage; primary and secondary containment purge filters; control room intake filters; atmospheric dispersion; and natural decay. Doses are calculated for individuals residing at the site boundary or low population zone and in the control room.

Some inputs for the RADTRAD computer program were generated via an EXCEL spreadsheet.

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 21 of 71

12. RESULTS UFSAR 14.18 presents the licensing basis evaluation of the Fuel Handling Accident (FRA), which is assumed to occur in the spent fuel pool (SFP) handling area or in the containment by dropping a fuel assembly during fuel movement operations. The analyses for a FHA in the refueling pool and the SFP both assume that gas gap activity from 176 fuel rods of the highest power assembly is released. In the SFP the fuel assemblies are stored within the racks at the bottom of the SFP. The top of the rack extends above the tops of the stored fuel assemblies. A dropped fuel assembly could not strike more than one fuel assembly in the storage rack. Impact could occur only between the ends of the involved fuel assemblies, the bottom end fitting of the dropped fuel assembly impacting against the top end fitting of the stored fuel assembly. The results of an analysis of the end on energy absorption capability of a fuel assembly indicate that a fuel assembly is capable of absorbing the kinetic energy of the drop with no fuel rod failures. The worst FHA that could occur in the SFP is the dropping of a fuel assembly to the fuel pool floor.

Because of the high energy absorption required to rupture a fuel rod, 176 represents the maximum number of damaged pins expected from any credible fuel handling incident scenario.

The likelihood of a FHA is minimized by administrative controls and physical limitations imposed on fuel handling operations. All refueling operations are conducted in accordance with prescribed procedures under direct surveillance of a qualified supervisor. The possibility of damage to a fuel assembly as a consequence of mishandling is minimized by thorough training, detailed procedures, and equipment design. The single-failure-proof design of the Spent Fuel Cask Handling Crane prevents the drop of heavy objects such as shipping/transfer casks on the spent fuel storage racks. Inadvertent disengagement of a fuel assembly from the fuel handling machine is prevented by mechanical interlocks; consequently, the possibility of dropping and damaging of a fuel assembly is remote.

Should a fuel assembly be dropped or otherwise damaged during handling, radioactive release could occur in either the containment or the Auxiliary Building. The air in both of these areas is monitored. The radiation monitors immediately indicate the increased activity level and alarm. The affected area would then be evacuated. The SFP ventilation system draws air across the SFP area; this air is discharged to the atmosphere through the plant vent. If the cask loading hatch and all exterior hatches to the 69' level of the Auxiliary Building are closed, this is the only route for the release of activity from the SFP area to the environment. After a FHA in containment, the activity may be released through the personnel air lock (PAL), the containment outage door (COD), the containment walls themselves, or via the hydrogen or 48" purge lines into the plant vent. The release through the plant vent is most limiting, and thus a FHA in the containment and the SFP will both be assumed to be released to the environment through the plant vent stack.

Failed fuel rods that have released their active gas gap inventory can be stored in encapsulated fuel tubes. These encapsulated fuel tubes can be stored in the peripheral guide tubes of host assemblies or empty grid cages in the SFP.

A single encapsulation tube containing a damaged fuel rod can be stored in an incore instrumentation (ICI) trash can, can be laid temporarily atop the SFP storage racks with administrative restrictions on fuel movement in the laydown area, or can be placed at the bottom of an upender trench with the associated upender tagged out. The addition of up to four encapsulated fuel rods in a host assembly will not cause the radiological consequences of a FHA to increase since administrative controls are employed to ensure that only fuel rods with sufficient clad damage to ensure no residual gas gap activity are stored in the encapsulation tubes in fuel assemblies. The failed rods cannot contribute to gas gap release, since their gas inventory has already been released. Undamaged fuel rods can only be stored in the encapsulation tubes in empty grid cages. This will guarantee that the consequences of a FHA will not be increased.

Only damaged fuel rods with no gas gap activity can be stored in encapsulation tubes stored in ICI trash cans, temporarily atop the SFP storage racks, or at the bottom of an upender trench, thus precluding any fission gas release.

Reconstitution or inspection of a fuel assembly can take place in individual SFP storage racks with spent fuel assemblies placed on rack spacers and with their upper end fittings removed. In such a configuration, the structural integrity of the fuel assemblies is reduced, and the fuel rods may protrude above the SFP racks. Since fuel damage could occur if a heavy object is dropped on top of an assembly seated on a rack spacer with its upper end filling removed, administrative controls will restrict movement of loads over the affected assemblies on rack spacers plus one storage rack cell on each side of the affected assemblies. Heavy loads may only be moved in this area via the

CA06450 Rev. OOO Page 22 of 71 single-failure-proof crane, if assemblies are seated on rack spacers with their upper end fittings removed. Only the single-failure-proof crane or single-failure-proof rigging will be used over the reconstitution area in the SFP for loads other than tools. A knowledgeable and briefed person will be present for the entire time that the upper end fitting or template is removed from an assembly to restrict movement of loads other than tools in this area of the SFP. In addition, after the upper end fillings have been removed, the spent fuel handling machine will be administratively prohibited from nearing the affected assemblies on rack spacers plus one storage rack cell on each side of the affected assemblies.

The current work utilizes the alternate source term (AST) methodology of 10 CFR 50.67 and Regulatory Guide 1.183 to calculate offsite and control room doses for a FHA. A bounding control room inleakage value of 3500 cfm was assumed. Modification of the control room emergency ventilation system to a nominal 10000 cfm flow with a 90%

filtration efficiency was credited. SFP filtration was not credited. Also credited was installation of automatic isolation dampers and radiation monitors at Access Controls 11 and 13 on the Auxiliary Building Roof. This modification limits activity egress into the control room from either the West Road Inlet or the Turbine Building, thus limiting the atmospheric dispersion coefficient value.

The site boundary, low population zone, and control room doses for the design-basis FHA in containment and the SFP calculated in Attachments I, J, and K, are detailed in the following table.

Fuel Handling Accident Doses in REM TEDE Containment/SFP Containinent/SFP Spent Fuel Pool Regulatory DF 200 200 120 Limit Decay Time (hr) 100 72 72 EAB 0.6167 0.6958 1.1136 6.3 (RG 1.183)

LPZ 0.1452 0.1638 0.2622 6.3 (RG 1.183)

Control Room 2.0765 2.3314 3.8538 5.0 (IOCFR50.67)

CA06450 Rev.OOO Page 23 of 71

13. CONCLUSIONS All offsite and control room doses are below the regulatory limits. Since the reconstitution SFP case is the most limiting, it will be considered as the design-basis fuel handling accident for alternate source terms. For a VAP assembly at 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> post-shutdown and at 1400 psig internal rod pressure, the EAB, LPZ, and control room doses are 1.2, 0.3, and 3.9 Rem TEDE, respectively.

This work supports the following changes in plant operation:

• This analysis supports a pin power peaking factor of 1.70.

• This analysis supports fuel movement 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after reactor shutdown for assemblies with internal pin pressures up to 1400 psig.

• This analysis allows assemblies to be seated on rack spacers in the SFP with internal pin pressures up to 1400 psig 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> after reactor shutdown.

• This analysis credits the SFP ventilation system, but not the SFP filtration system.

• The Personnel Air Lock and Containment Outage Door are allowed to be open during fuel movement. This work also supports Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF)-3 12 (Ref.42), which allows penetration flow paths that have direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere to be unisolated under administrative control. Since this current analysis assumes that the radioactive release is unfiltered, completely released over a two hour time period, and released with the most limiting dispersion coefficients, the analysis will also apply to the containment penetration flow paths that are opened under administrative control.

This work relies on the following modifications and new methodologies:

• Modification of the control room emergency ventilation system to a nominal 10000 cfm flow with a 90%

filtration efficiency wvas credited.

• Installation of automatic isolation dampers and radiation monitors at Access Controls 11 and 13 on the Auxiliary Building Roof was credited.

• Alternate Source Term Methodology was employed.

CA06450 Rev. 000 Page 24 of 71

14. ATTACHMENTS ATTACHMENT A DECONTAMINATION FACTORS PER WCAP-75 18-L WCAP-751 8-L LargeScale Test alpha= 1 _ _ _

beta= 0.313 _

DF = aloha

• 73 exp(beta-t/d-h2/hl) Algorithm generated in WCAP-7518-L.

__ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ 23 _ _ _ _ 26 40 t d v _ td DF t/d DF DF _ Ud DF DF WCA sec cm cm/sec _ sec/cm sec/cm WCAP _ sec/cm WPC 8.8 1.01 79.8 _ 8.7129 1116.0915 9.8493 1592.8826 1750 _ 15.1528 8377.3925 9200 7.8 0.935 89.9 _ 8.3422 993.84617 9.4304 1397.1136 1550 14.5083 6846.8427 7600 6.6 0.857 106.2 _ 7.7013 813.18708 8.7058 1113.6236 1210 _ 13.3935 4830.1674 5600 5.6 0.780 125.4 _ 7.1795 690.65397 8.1159 925.88431 1000 _ 12.4861 3635.8481 4200 4.7 0.710 149.4 6.6197 579.65394 _ 7.4832 759.52138 810 11.5126 2680.8487 3000 t I d v P h t/d DFI DF _

sec cm cm/sec psig f _ sec/cm AST _

8.8 1.01 79.8 _ 100 23 8.7129 1116.09 417.60 _

7.8 0.935 89.9 200 23 8.3422 993.85 399.25 6.6 0.857 106.2 _ 600 23 _ 7.7013 813.19 366.58 _

5.6 0.780 125.4 _ 900 23 _ 7.1795 690.65 339.47 _

4.7 0.710 149.4 1200 23 6.6197 579.65 310.31 4.1 0.663 165.4 _ 1400 23 _ 6.1809 505.26 287.67 _

3.8 0.64 173.4 _ 1500 23 _ 5.9375 468.20 275.28 _

3.565 0.663 165.4 _ 1400 20 5.3747 392.58 247.31 _

t= bubble rise Ume in sec d = bubble diameter In cm v = bubble velocity in cm/sec p = internal rod pressure in psig h = Initial bubble depth In feet

CA06450 Rev.OOO Page 25 of 71 ATTACHMENT B DECONTAMINATION FACTORS PER BURLEY Iodine decontamination Factor Calculation at 23 ft depth and 1200 psig The decontamination factor (DF) is defined as the ratio of the initial iodine concentration to the final iodine concentration. Gas transfer from a bubble into the surrounding liquid occurs by successive processes of gas phase diffusion, transfer across the bubble interface, and solution in the liquid phase.

The most important parameters in the evaluation of mass transfer characteristics include the bubble dimensions, contact time, and the partition factor. The following calculations are conservative in that the reaction of iodine with zircalov and the vapor pressure limitation on the aas Dhase concentration are neglected. =____--_____--______ _ __=

IFO 0.0015 Organic iodine fraction RG 1.183 IFI 0.9985 Inorganic iodine fraction RG 1.183 DFO 1.0000 Organic DF RG 1.183 d-clad 0.97536 cm Clad ID UFSAR Tab 3.3-1 P 10 Instantaneous partition facor Burley DG 0.278 cm2/sec 12 diffusivity in He Burley DL 1.27E-05 cm2/sec 12 diffusivity in water Burley V-bub 4.6341 cm3 Bubble volume Assumed d-bub 2.0685 cm Bubble diameter Assumed v-bub=29.86 V-bub(1/6) Bubble velocity v-bub 38.5553 cm/sec __ Burley Ko=1.646*DG/d-bub _ _ 7 Burley Ko 0.2212 cm/sec __

Kc=3.75E-3*v-bub For turbulent flow Burley Kc l 0.1446 cm/sec KI=1.1 3*(DL*v-bub/d-bub)A(1 /2) Burley KI 0.0174 cm/sec Keff=1 J(1./(Ko+Kc)+1./(KI *P)) Burley Keff 0.1178 l H 23.0000 ft 701.0400 cm DFI=exp(6*Keff*H/d-bub/v bub) Burley DFI 5.00E+02 DF=1/(IFO/DFO+IFI/DFI) Burley F 286 _

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 26 of 71 Iodine decontamination Factor Calculation at 23 feet depth d 1400 psig The decontamination factor (DF) is defined as the ratio of the initial iodine concentration to the final iodine concentration. Gas transfer from a bubble into the surrounding liquid occurs by successive processes of gas phase diffusion, transfer across the bubble interface, and solution in the liquid phase.

The most important parameters in the evaluation of mass transfer characteristics include the bubble dimensions, contact time, and the partition factor. The following calculations are conservative in that the reaction of iodine with zircalov and the vanor pressure limitation on the aas nhase concentration are neglected. __ __

IFO 0.0015 Organic iodine fraction RG 1.183 IFI 0.9985 Inorganic iodine fraction RG 1.183 DFO 1.0000 Organic DF _RG 1.183 d-clad 0.97536 cm Clad ID l UFSAR Tab 3.3-1 p 10 Instantaneous partition factor Burley DG 0.278 cm2/sec 12 diffusivity in He Burley DL 1.27E-05 cm2/sec 12 diffusivity in water Burley V-bub 5.4064 cm3 Bubble volume Assumed d-bub 2.1776 cm Bubble diameter Assumed v-bub=29.86*V-bubA(1/6) Bubble velociY v-bub 39.5587 cm/sec Burley Ko=1.646*DG/d-bub Burley Ko 0.2101 cm/sec Kc=3.75E-3*v-bub For turbulent flow Burley Kc 0.1483 cm/sec I K1=1.13*(DL*v-bub/d-bub) A(1/2) Burley KI 0.0172 cm/sec Keff=1./(1./(K o+Kc)+1./(KI*P)) I _Burley Keff 0.1161 H 23.0000 ft 701.0400 cm DFI=exp(6*Keff*H/d-bub v-bub) Burley DFI 2.89E+02 DF=pI(IFO/DFO+IFI/DFI_ Burley DF l 202

CA06450 Rev. 000 Page 27 of 71 Iodine decontamination Factor Calculation at 20.4 feet depth and 1200 psig The decontamination factor (DF) is defined as the ratio of the initial iodine concentration to the final iodine concentration. Gas transfer from a bubble into the surrounding liquid occurs by successive processes of gas phase diffusion, transfer across the bubble Interface, and solution In the liquid phase.

The most important parameters in the evaluation of mass transfer characteristics indude the bubble dimensions, contact time, and the partition factor. The following calculations are conservative in that the reaction of iodine with zircaloy and the vapor pressure limitation on the gas phase concentration are neglected._

IFO 0.0015 Organic Iodine fraction RG 1.183 IFI 0.9985 Inorganic iodine fraction RG 1.183 DFO 1.0000 Organic DF RG 1.183 d-cdad 0.97536 cm Clad ID I UFSAR Tab 3.3-1 Instantaneous partition P 10 factor Burley DG 0.278 cm2lsec 12 diffusivity in He Burley DL 1.27E-05 cm2lsec 12 diffusivity in ter Burley Bubble V-bub 4.6341 cm3 volume l Assumed d-bub 2.0685 cm Bubble diameter Assumed

_ IZIEI v-bub=29.86-V-bubA(1/6) Bubble veloc__

v-bub 38.5553 cm/sec Burley Ko j Ko=1 .646-DG/d-bub 0.2212 cm/sec Burley Kc=3.75E-3-v-bub For turbulent flow Burley Kc l 0.1446 cm/sec Kl=1. 13(DLvQ ub/d-bub)A(1M2) Burley KI 0.0174 cm/sec Keff=1 J(1 J(Ko Kc)+1 J(KI-P)) Burley Keff 0.1178 H 20.4000 ft 621.7920 cm DFI=exp(6-Kef Hd-bubN-bub) Burley DFI l 2.48E+02 B DF=1 /(lFO/DFO+IFI/DFI ) lBurley DF l 181l

CA06450 Rev. 000 Page 28 of 71 Iodine decontamination Factor Calculation at 20.4 feet depth and 1400 psig The decontamination factor (DF) is defined as the ratio of the initial iodine concentration to the final iodine concentration. Gas transfer from a bubble into the surrounding liquid occurs by successive processes of gas phase diffusion, transfer across the bubble interface, and solution in the liquid phase.

The most important parameters in the evaluation of mass transfer characteristics include the bubble dimensions, contact time, and the partition factor. The following calculations are conservative in that the reaction of iodine with zircaloy and the vapor pressure limitation on the gas phase concentration are neglected.

IFO 0.0015 Organic iodine fraction RG 1.183 IFI 0.9985 Inorganic iodine fraction RG 1.183 DFO 1.0000 I Organic DF RG 1.183 d-clad 0.97536 cm Clad ID UFSAR Tab 3.3-1 P 10 Instantaneous partition facor Burley DG 0.278 cm2/sec 12 diffusivity in He Burdey DL 1.27E-05 cm2/sec 12 diffusivity in water Burley V-bub 5.4064 cm3 Bubble volume Assumed d-bub 2.1776 cm Bubble diameter Assumed v-bub=29.86*V-bubA(1 /6) I Bubble velocit ,

v-bub 39.5587 cm/sec Burley Ko=1.646*DG/d-bub Burley Ko 0.2101 cm/sec Kc=3.75E-3*v-bub For turbulent flow Burley Kc 0.1483 cm/sec KI=1.13*(DL*v-bub/d-bub) (1/2) Burley KI 0.0172 cm/sec Keff=1./(1./(K o+Kc)+1./(KI P)) Burley Keff 0.1161 H 20.4000 ft 621.7920 cm X DFI =exp(6*Keff*H/d-bub v-bub) Burley DFI 1.52E+02 _ _

DF=1/(IFO/DFO+IFI/DFI) I Burley DF 1 124 _

CA06450 Rev.OOO Page 29 of 71 ATTACHMENT C GAS GAP RELEASE ACTIVITIES FROM POOL Calculation of Fuel Handling Accident Release Activities Halflife lambda Core DF Gas Gap Release Src Release Src Release Src Source Fractions Zero Decay 72 hr decay 100 hr decay sec 1/sec CIIMWT . Ci Ci Ci A B C D E F G H Kr-85 3.3830E+08 2.0489E-09 3.7180E+02 1 0.20 1.6043E+03 1.6035E+03 1.6031E+03 Kr-85m 1.6128E+04 4.2978E405 7.9679E+03 1 0.10 1.7191 E+04 2.4964E-01 3.2800E-03 Kr-87 4.5780E+03 1.5141 E-04 1.6208E+04 1 0.10 3.4969E+04 3.1607E-13 7.4406E-20 Kr-88 1.0224E+04 6.7796E-05 2.2658E+04 1 0.10 4.8885E+04 1.1414E-03 1.2289E-06 1-131 6.9466E+05 9.9783E-07 2.7562E+04 200 0.16 4.7572E+02 3.6731E+02 3.3216E+02 1-132 8.2800E+03 8.3713E-05 3.9464E+04 200 0.10 4.2572E+02 1.6054E-07 3.4743E-11 1-133 7.4880E+04 9.2568E-06 5.5715E+04 200 0.10 6.0103E+02 5.4559E+01 2.1460E+01 1-134 3.1560E+03 2.1963E-04 6.2858E+04 200 0.10 6.7808E+02 1.2821 E-22 3.1137E-32 1-135 2.3796E+04 2.9129E-05 5.29642+04 200 0.10 5.7135E+02 3.0054E-01 1.5949E-02 Xe-133 4.5317E+05 1.5296E-06 5.5707E+04 1 0.10 1.2019E+05 8.0850E+04 6.9298E+04 Xe-135 3.2724E+04 2.1182E-05 1.7708E+04 1 0.10 3.8205E+04 1.5766E+02 1.8641 E+01 Xe-133m 1.8922E+05 3.6632E-06 1.7354E+03 1 0.10 3.7441 E+03 1.4487E+03 1.0014E+03 Xe-135m 9.1800E+02 7.5506E-04 1.1635E+04 1 0.10 2.5103E+04 2.5295E-81 2.2324E-114 Xe138 8.4600E+02 8.1932E-04 4.9330E+04 1 0.10 1.0643E+05 6.2607E-88 8.4962E-124 Kr-85 3.3830E+08 2.0489E-09 3.7180E+02 1 0.20 1.6043E+03 1.6035E+03 1.6031E+03 Kr-85m 1.6128E+04 4.2978E-05 7.9679E+03 1 0.10 1.7191 E+04 2.4964E-01 3.2800E-03 Kr-87 4.5780E+03 1.5141 E-04 1.6208E+04 1 0.10 3.4969E+04 3.1607E-13 7.4406E-20 Kr-88 1.0224E+04 6.7796E-05 2.2658E+04 1 0.10 4.8885E+04 1.1414E-03 1.2289E-06 1-131 6.9466E+05 9.9783E-07 2.7562E+04 120 0.16 7.9287E+02 6.1218E+02 5.5360E+02 1-132 8.2800E+03 8.3713E-05 3.9464E+04 120 0.10 7.0953E+02 2.6756E-07 5.7905E-11 1-133 7.4880E+04 9.2568E-06 5.5715E+04 120 0.10 1.0017E+03 9.0932E+01 3.5767E+01 1-134 3.1560E+03 2.1963E-04 6.2858E+04 120 0.10 1.1301E+03 2.1368E-22 5.1894E-32 1-135 2.3796E+04 2.9129E-05 5.2964E+04 120 0.10 9.5225E+02 5.0091E-01 2.6582E-02 Xe-133 4.5317E+05 1.5296E-06 5.5707E+04 1 0.10 1.2019E+05 8.0850E+04 6.9298E+04 Xe-135 3.2724E+04 2.1182E-05 1.7708E+04 1 0.10 3.8205E+04 1.5766E+02 1.8641E+01 Xe-133m 1.8922E+05 3.6632E-06 1.7354E+03 1 0.10 3.7441 E+03 1.4487E+03 1.0014E+03 Xe-135m 9.1800E+02 7.5506E-04 1.1635E+04 1 0.10 2.5103E+04 2.5295E-81 2.2324E-114 Xe138 8.4600E+02 8.1932E-04 4.9330E+04 1 0.10 1.0643E+05 6.2607E-88 8.4962E-124

CA06450 Rev. 000 Page 30 of 71 A1TACHMENT D Nuclear Inventory File FHA14072.NIF Nuclide Inventory Name:

Normalized MACCS Sample 3412 MWth PWR Core Inventory Power Level:

0. IOOOE+0 I Nuclides:

14 Nuclide 001:

Kr-85 1

0.3382974720E+09 0.8500E+02 1.6035E+03 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 002:

Kr-85m I

0.1612800000E+05 0.8500E+02 2.4964E-01 Kr-85 0.2100E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 003:

Kr-87 I

0.4578000000E+04 0.8700E+02 3.1607E-13 Rb-87 0.IOOOE+01 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 004:

Kr-88 I

0.1022400000E+05 0.8800E+02 1.1414E-03 Rb-88 0.1000E+01 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.000013+00 Nuclide 005:

I-131 2

0.6946560000E+06 0.13103E+03 3.6731 E+02 Xe-131m 0.110013-01 none 0.000013+00

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 31 of 71 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 006:

1-132 2

0.8280000000E+04 0.1 320E+03 1.6054E-07 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 007:

1-133 2

0.7488000000E+05 0.1330E+03 5.4559E+01 Xe-133m 0.2900E-01 Xe-133 0.9700E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 008:

1-134 2

0.3156000000E+04

0. 1340E+03 1.2821E-22 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 009:

1-135 2

0.2379600000E+05 0.1350E+03 3.0054E-01 Xe-135m 0.1500E+00 Xe-135 0.8500E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 010:

Xe-133 I

0.4531680000E+06

0. 1330E+03 8.0850E+04 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 011:

Xe-135 1

0.3272400000E+05

0. 1350E+03 1.5766E+02 Cs-135 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00

CA06450 Rev. 00O Page 32 of 71 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 012:

Xe-133m 1

0.1892200000E+06 0.1330E+03 1.4487E+03 Xe-133 O.1000E+OI none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 013:

Xe-135m I

0.9180000000E+03 0.1350E+03 1.OOOOE-12 Xe-135 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 014:

Xe-138 I

0.8460000000E+03 0.1380E+03 I .OOOOE-12 none 0.OOOOE+O0 none 0.OOOOE+O0 none 0.OOOOE+00 End of Nuclear Inventory File

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 33 of 71 ATTACHMENT E Nuclear Inventory File FHA14100.NIF Nuclide Inventory Name:

Normalized MACCS Sample 3412 MWth PWR Core Inventory PoNver Level:

0. IOOOE+01 Nuclides:

14 Nuclide 001:

Kr-85 I

0.3382974720E+09 0.8500E+02 1.6031E+03 none 0.0000E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 002:

Kr-85m I

0.1612800000E+05 0.8500E+02 3.2800E-03 Kr-85 0.2100E+O0 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 003:

Kr-87 I

0.4578000000E+04 0.8700E+02 I .OOOOE-12 Rb-87 0.IOOOE+0O none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 004:

Kr-88 1

0.1022400000E+05 0.8800E+02 1.2289E-06 Rb-88 0.1000E+01 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 005:

1-131 2

0.6946560000E+06 0.13 1OE+03 3.3216E+02 Xe-131m 0.1100E-01 none O.OOOOE+00

CA06450 Rev. OOO Page 34 of 71 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 006:

1-132 2

0.8280000000E+04 0.1320E+03 3.4743E- Il none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 007:

1-133 2

0.7488000000E+05 0.1330E+03 2.1460E+01 Xe-133m 0.2900E-01 Xe-133 0.9700E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 008:

I-134 2

0.3156000000E+04 0.1340E+03 1.OOOOE-12 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 009:

1-135 2

0.2379600000E+05 0.1350E+03 1.5949E-02 Xe-135m 0.1500E+00 Xe-135 0.8500E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 010:

Xe-133 I

0.4531680000E+06 0.1330E+03 6.9298E+04 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 011:

Xe-135 I

0.3272400000E+05 0.1350E+03 1.8641E+01 Cs-135 O.IOOOE+01 none O.OOOOE+00

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 35 of 71 none O.OOOOE+O0 Nuclide 012:

Xe-133m I

0.1 892200000E+06 0.1330E+03 1.0014E+03 Xe-133 0.IOOOE+01 none 0.OOOOE+0O none 0.OOOOE+0O Nuclide 013:

Xe-135m I

0.9180000000E+03 0.1350E+03 1.OOOOE-12 Xe-135 0.1000E+O1 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 014:

Xe-138 I

0.8460000000E+03 0.1380E+03 1.OOOOE-112 none O.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+O0 none O.OOOOE+00 End of Nuclear Inventory File

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 36 of 71 ATTACHMENT F Nuclear Inventory File FHA 14072R.NIF Nuclide Inventory Name:

Normalized MACCS Sample 3412 MWth PWR Core Inventory Power Level:

0.IOOOE+I0 Nuclides:

14 Nuclide 001:

Kr-85 1

0.3382974720E+09 0.8500E+02 1.6035E+03 none 0.OOOOE+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 none O.0000E+00 Nuclide 002:

Kr-85m I

0.1612800000E+05 0.8500E+02 2.4964E-01 Kr-85 0.2100E+00 none 0.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 003:

Kr-87 I

0.4578000000E+04 0.8700E+02 3.1607E-13 Rb-87 0.IOOOE+OI none 0.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 004:

Kr-88 I

0.1022400000E+05 0.8800E+02 1.1414E-03 Rb-88 0.1000E+01 none 0.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 005:

1-131 2

0.6946560000E+06 0.1310E+03 6.1218E+02 Xe-131m 0.IIOOE-0O none 0.OOOOE+00

CA06450 Rev.OOO Page 37 of 71 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 006:

1-132 2

0.8280000000E+04 0.1320E+03 2.6756E-07 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 007:

I-133 2

0.7488000000E+05 0.1330E+03 9.0932E+01 Xe-133m 0.2900E-01 Xe-133 0.9700E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 008:

1-134 2

0.3156000000E+04 0.1340E+03 2.1368E-22 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 009:

I-135 2

0.2379600000E+05 0.1350E+03 5.0091E-01 Xe-135m 0.1500E+00 Xe-135 0.8500E+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 010:

Xe-133 I

0.4531680000E+06 0.1330E+03 8.0850E+04 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 011:

Xe-135 1

0.3272400000E+05 0.1350E+03 1.5766E+02 Cs-135 0.1000E+01 none O.OOOOE+00

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 38 of 71 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 012:

Xe-133m I

0.1892200000E+06 0.1330E+03 1.4487E+03 Xe-133 O.1000E+O1 none 0.OOOOE+O0 none 0.OOOOE+00 Nuclide 013:

Xe-135m I

0.9180000000E+03 0.1350E+03 1.OOOOE-12 Xe-135 0.IOOOE+01 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+O0 Nuclide 014:

Xe-138 1

0.8460000000E+03 0.1380E+03 I .OOOOE-12 none 0.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 none O.OOOOE+00 End of Nuclear Inventory File

CA06450 Rev.OOO Page 39 of 71 ATTACHMENT G RELEASE FRACTION AND TIMING FILE FHA.RFT Release Fraction and Timing Name:

PWR, RG 1.183, Table 2 Section 3.2 Duration (h): Design Basis Accident 2.0000E+00 O.OOOOE+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 Noble Gases:

1.0000E+00 O.OOOOE+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 Iodine:

1.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 Cesium:

0.0000E+00 O.OOOOE+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 Tellurium:

0.0000E+00 O.OOOOE+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 Strontium:

0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 Barium:

O.OOOOE+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 Ruthenium:

O.OOOOE+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 O.OOOOE+00 Cerium:

0.0000E+00 O.OOOOE+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 Lanthanum:

0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 Non-Radioactive Aerosols (kg):

0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 0.0000E+00 End of Release File

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 40 of 71 ATTACHMENT H CONVERSION FACTORS FILE FGR14.INP FGRDCF 10/24/95 03:24:50 beta-test version 1.10, minor FORTRAN fixes 5/4/95 Implicit daughter halflives (m) less than 90 and less than 0.100 of parent 9 ORGANS DEFINED IN THIS FILE:

GONADS BREAST LUNGS RED MARR BONE SUR THYROID REMAINDER EFFECTIVE SKIN(FGR) 14 NUCLIDES DEFINED IN THIS FILE:

Kr-85 Kr-SSm Kr-87 Kr-88 I-131 D I-132 D 1-133 D I-134 D 1-135 D Including:Xe-135m Xe-133 Xe-135 Xe-133m Xe-135m Xe-138 CLOUDSHINE GROUND GROUND GROUND INHALED INHALED INGESTION SHINE 8HR SHINE 7DAY SHINE RATE ACUTE CHRONIC Kr-85 GONADS 1. 170E-16 8.121E-14 1.704E-12 2.820E-18-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+O0 O.OOOE+00 BREAST 1.340E-16 7.891E-14 1.656E-12 2.740E-18-1.000E+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 LUNGS 1.140E-16 7.056E-14 1.481E-12 2.450E-18-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 RED MARR 1.090E-16 6.998E-14 1.469E-12 2.430E-18-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 BONE SUR 2.200E-16 1.287E-13 2.702E-12 4.470E-18-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 THYROID 1.180E-16 7.459E-14 1.565E-12 2.590E-18-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 REMAINDER 1.090E-16 6.941E-14 1.457E-12 2.410E-18-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 EFFECTIVE 1.190E-16 7.603E-14 1.596E-12 2.640E-18-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 SKIN(FGR) 1.320E-14 2.304E-11 4.835E-10 8.000E-16-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 Kr-85m GONADS 7.310E-15 2.594E-12 3.653E-12 1.570E-16-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 BREAST 8.410E-15 2.527E-12 3.560E-12 1.530E-16-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 LUNGS 7.040E-15 2.379E-12 3.351E-12 1.440E-16-l.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 RED MARR 6.430E-15 2.346E-12 3.304E-12 1.420E-16-l.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+00 BONE SUR 1.880E-14 5.286E-12 7.446E-12 3.200E-16-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+0O O.OOOE+00 THYROID 7.330E-1S 2.395E-12 3.374E-12 1.450E-16-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 REMAINDER 6.640E-15 2.313E-12 3.257E-12 1.400E-16-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 EFFECTIVE 7.480E-15 2.511E-12 3.537E-12 1.520E-16-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 SKIN(FGR) 2.240E-14 2.247E-11 3.164E-11 1.360E-15-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 Kr-87

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 41 of 71 GONADS 4.OOOE-14 4.962E-12 5.026E-12 7.610E-16-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO BREAST 4.500E-14 4.740E-12 4.802E-12 7.270E-16-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO LUNGS 4.040E-14 4.603E-12 4.663E-12 7.060E-16-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO RED MARR 4.OOOE-14 4.708E-12 4.769E-12 7.220E-16-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO BONE SUR 6.020E-14 6.514E-12 6.598E-12 9.990E-16-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO THYROID 4.130E-14 4.473E-12 4.531E-12 6.860E-16-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO REMAINDER 3.910E-14 4.590E-12 4.650E-12 7.040E-16-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO EFFECTIVE 4.120E-14 4.773E-12 4.835E-12 7.320E-16-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO SKIN(FGR) 1.370E-13 8.802E-11 8.916E-11 1.350E-14-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOEOO Kr-88 GONADS 9.900E-14 2.278E-11 2.655E-11 1.800E-15-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO BREAST 1.110E-13 2.177E-11 2.537E-11 1.720E-15-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO LUNGS 1.OlOE-13 2.139E-11 2.493E-11 1.690E-15-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO RED MARR 1.OOOE-13 2.190E-11 2.552E-11 1.730E-15-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO BONE SUR 1.390E-13 2.886E-11 3.363E-11 2.280E-15-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO THYROID 1.030E-13 2.012E-11 2.345E-11 1.590E-15-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO REMAINDER 9.790E-14 2.139E-11 2.493E-11 1.690E-15-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO EFFECTIVE 1.020E-13 2.202E-11 2.567E-11 1.740E-15-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO SKIN(FGR) 1.350E-13 5.607E-11 6.534E-11 4.430E-15-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO I-131 GONADS 1.780E-14 1.119E-11 1.789E-10 3.940E-16-1.OOOE+00 2.530E-11 4.070E-11 BREAST 2.040E-14 1.082E-11 1.730E-10 3.810E-16-1.OOOE+00 7.880E-11 1.210E-10 LUNGS 1.760E-14 1.016E-11 1.626E-10 3.580E-16-1.OOOE+00 6.570E-10 1.020E-10 RED MARR 1.680E-14 1.022E-11 1.635E-10 3.600E-16-1.OOOE+00 6.260E-11 9.440E-11 BONE SUR 3.450E-14 1.675E-11 2.679E-10 5.900E-16-1.OOOE+00 5.730E-11 8.720E-11 THYROID 1.810E-14 1.053E-11 1.685E-10 3.710E-16-1.OOOE+00 2.920E-07 4.760E-07 REMAINDER 1.670E-14 9.908E-12 1.585E-10 3.490E-16-1.OOOE+00 8.030E-11 1.570E-10 EFFECTIVE 1.820E-14 1.067E-11 1.707E-10 3.760E-16-1.OOOE+00 8.890E-09 1.440E-08 SKIN(FGR) 2.980E-14 1.825E-11 2.920E-10 6.430E-16-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO I-132 GONADS 1.090E-13 2.523E-11 2.771E-11 2.320E-15-1.OOOE+00 9.950E-12 2.330E-11 BREAST 1.240E-13 2.414E-11 2.652E-11 2.220E-15-1.OOOE+00 1.410E-11 2.520E-11 LUNGS 1.090E-13 2.305E-11 2.532E-11 2.120E-15-1.OOOE+00 2.710E-10 2.640E-11 RED MARR 1.070E-13 2.360E-11 2.592E-11 2.170E-15-1.OOOE+00 1.400E-11 2.460E-11 BONE SUR 1.730E-13 3.327E-11 3.655E-11 3.060E-15-1.OOOE+00 1.240E-11 2.190E-11 THYROID 1.120E-13 2.381E-11 2.616E-11 2.190E-15-1.OOOE+00 1.740E-09 3.870E-09 REMAINDER 1.O50E-13 2.283E-11 2.509E-11 2.100E-15-1.OOOE+00 3.780E-11 1.650E-10 EFFECTIVE 1.120E-13 2.403E-11 2.640E-11 2.210E-15-1.OOOE+00 1.030E-10 1.820E-10 SKIN(FGR) 1.580E-13 8.199E-11 9.007E-11 7.540E-15-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO I-133 GONADS 2.870E-14 1.585E-11 6.748E-11 6.270E-16-1.OOOE+OO 1.950E-11 3.630E-11 BREAST 3.280E-14 1.519E-11 6.468E-11 6.010E-16-1.OOOE+00 2.940E-11 4.680E-11 LUNGS 2.860E-14 1.446E-11 6.156E-11 5.720E-16-1.OOOE+00 8.200E-10 4.530E-11 RED MARR 2.770E-14 1.466E-11 6.242E-11 5.800E-16-1.OOOE+00 2.720E-11 4.300E-11 BONE SUR 4.870E-14 2.161E-11 9.202E-11 8.550E-16-1.OOOE+00 2.520E-11 4.070E-11 THYROID 2.930E-14 1.502E-11 6.393E-11 5.940E-16-1.OOOE+00 4.860E-08 9.100E-08 REMAINDER 2.730E-14 1.418E-11 6.038E-11 5.610E-16-1.OOOE+00 5.000E-11 1.550E-10 EFFECTIVE 2.940E-14 1.509E-11 6.425E-11 5.970E-16-1.OOOE+00 1.580E-09 2.800E-09 SKIN(FGR) 5.830E-14 1.150E-10 4.897E-10 4.550E-15-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO I-134 GONADS 1.270E-13 1.200E-11 1.202E-11 2.640E-15-1.OOOE+00 4.250E-12 1.100E-11 BREAST 1.440E-13 1.145E-11 1.147E-11 2.520E-15-1.OOOE+00 6.170E-12 1.170E-11 LUNGS 1.270E-13 1.100E-11 1.102E-11 2.420E-15-1.OOOE+00 1.430E-10 1.260E-11 RED MARR 1.250E-13 1.127E-11 1.129E-11 2.480E-15-1.OOOE+00 6.080E-12 1.090E-11

CA06450 Rev. 000 Page 42 of 71 BONE SUR 1.960E-13 1.568E-11 1.571E-11 3.450E-15-1.OOOE+00 5.310E-12 9.320E-12 THYROID 1.300E-13 1.127E-11 1.129E-11 2.480E-15-1.OOOE+00 2.880E-10 6.210E-10 REMAINDER 1.220E-13 1.091E-11 1.093E-11 2.400E-15-1.OOOE+00 2.270E-11 1.340E-10 EFFECTIVE 1.300E-13 1.150E-11 1.152E-11 2.530E-15-1.OOOE+00 3.550E-11 6.660E-11 SKIN(FGR) 1.870E-13 4.477E-11 4.485E-11 9.850E-15-1.OOOE+00 0.000E+00 O.OOOE+00 1-135 GONADS 8.078E-14 3.113E-11 5.489E-11 1.599E-15-1.OOOE+00 1.700E-11 3.610E-11 BREAST 9.143E-14 2.971E-11 5.240E-11 1.526E-15-1.OOOE+00 2.340E-11 3.850E-11 LUNGS 8.145E-14 2.886E-11 5.089E-11 1.482E-15-1.OOOE+00 4.410E-10 3.750E-11 RED MARR 8.054E-14 2.965E-11 5.228E-11 1.523E-15-l.000E+00 2.240E-11 3.650E-11 BONE SUR 1.184E-13 3.983E-11 7.024E-11 2.046E-15-1.OOOE+00 2.010E-11 3.360E-11 THYROID 8.324E-14 2.852E-11 5.030E-11 1.465E-15-1.000E+00 8.460E-09 1.790E-08 REMAINDER 7.861E-14 2.883E-11 5.084E-11 1.481E-15-1.OOOE+00 4.700E-11 1.540E-10 EFFECTIVE 8.294E-14 2.989E-11 5.271E-11 1.535E-15-1.OOOE+00 3.320E-10 6.080E-10 SKIN(FGR) 1.156E-13 9.826E-11 1.733E-10 5.047E-15-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 Xe-133 GONADS 1.610E-15 1.465E-12 2.052E-11 5.200E-17-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 BREAST 1.960E-15 1.SSE-12 2.107E-11 5.340E-17-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 LUNGS 1.320E-15 1.045E-12 1.464E-11 3.710E-17-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 RED MARR 1.070E-15 8.791E-13 1.231E-11 3.120E-17-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 BONE SUR 5.130E-15 4.254E-12 5.958E-11 1.510E-16-1.000E+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 THYROID 1.510E-15 1.181E-12 1.653E-11 4.190E-17-l.000E+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 REMAINDER 1.240E-15 1.042E-12 1.460E-11 3.700E-17-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 EFFECTIVE 1.560E-15 1.299E-12 1.819E-11 4.610E-17-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 SKIN(FGR) 4.970E-15 1.953E-12 2.734E-11 6.930E-17-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 Xe-135 GONADS 1.170E-14 5.455E-12 1.194E-11 2.530E-16-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 BREAST 1.330E-14 5.325E-12 1.166E-11 2.470E-16-1.000E+00 O.OOOE+00 0.OOOE+00 LUNGS 1.130E-14 4.959E-12 1.086E-11 2.300E-16-1.000E+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 RED MARR 1.070E-14 4.959E-12 1.086E-11 2.300E-16-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 BONE SUR 2.570E-14 9.120E-12 1.997E-11 4.230E-16-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 THYROID 1.180E-14 5.023E-12 1.100E-11 2.330E-16-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 REMAINDER 1.080E-14 4.829E-12 1.058E-11 2.240E-16-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 EFFECTIVE 1.190E-14 5.217E-12 1.142E-11 2.420E-16-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 SKIN(FGR) 3.120E-14 4.506E-11 9.867E-11 2.090E-15-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 Xe-133m GONADS 1.420E-15 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 BREAST 1.700E-15 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 LUNGS 1.190E-15 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 RED MARR 1.100E-15 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 BONE SUR 3.230E-15 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 THYROID 1.360E-15 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 REMAINDER 1.150E-15 O.OOOE+00 0.000E+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 EFFECTIVE 1.370E-15 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 SKIN(FGR) 1.040E-14 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 Xe-135m GONADS 2.000E-14 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 BREAST 2.290E-14 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 LUNGS 1.980E-14 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 RED MARR 1.910E-14 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 BONE SUR 3.500E-14 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 THYROID 2.040E-14 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 REMAINDER 1.890E-14 0.000E+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 EFFECTIVE 2.040E-14 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00-1.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00 O.OOOE+00

CA064SO Rev.000 Page 43 of 71 SKIN(FGR) 2.970E-14 O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO Xe-138 GONADS 5.590E-14 O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO BREAST 6.320E-14 O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO LUNGS 5.660E-14 O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO RED MARR 5.600E-14 O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO BONE SUR 8.460E-14 O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO THYROID 5.770E-14 O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO REMAINDER 5.490E-14 O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO EFFECTIVE 5.770E-14 O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO SKIN(FGR) 1.070E-13 O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO-1.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO O.OOOE+OO

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 44 of 71 AT'TACHMENT I FHACTMT72 OUTPUT FILE Cumulative Dose Summary

1. 1. i##f##U################ #####

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. f##U ###fDtf#f########

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. U eab lpz cr Time Thyroid TEDE Thyroid TEDE Thyroid TEDE (hr) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 0.000 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 0.333 3.4121E+00 1.1633E-01 8.0328E-01 2.7387E-02 4.4337E+00 1.3616E-01 0.733 7.5028E+0O 2.5579E-01 1.7663E+00 6.0216E-02 1.6158E+01 4 .9692E-01 1.033 1. 0566E+01 3 .6021E-01 2.4874E+00 8.4799E-02 2.6093E+01 8.0341E-01 1.333 1.3626E+01 4 .6449E-01 3.2077E+00 1.0935E-01 3.6451E+01 1.1235E+00 1.633 1.6681E+01 5.6862E-01 3.9270E+00 1.3386E-01 4.7007E+01 1.4503E+00 1.933 1. 9733E+01 6.7261E-01 4.6454E+00 1.5834E-01 5.7652E+01 1.7802E+00 2.000 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 6.0025E+01 1.8538E+00 2.300 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 6.7663E+01 2.0917E+00 2.600 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.1369E+01 2.2087E+00 2.900 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.3167E+01 2.2668E+00 3.200 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4039E+01 2.2959E+00 3.500 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4462E+01 2.3109E+00 3.800 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4667E+01 2.3188E+00 4.100 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4767E+01 2.3231E+00 4.400 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4815E+01 2.3257E+00 4.700 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4839E+01 2.3272E+00 5.000 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4850E+01 2.3283E+00 5.300 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4856E+01 2.3290E+00 5.600 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4858E+01 2.3295E+00 5.900 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4860E+01 2.3299E+00 6.200 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4860E+01 2.3302E+00 6.500 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3304E+00 6.800 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3306E+00 7.100 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3308E+00 7.400 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3309E+00 7.700 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3310E+00 8.000 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3311E+00 8.300 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3311E+00 8.600 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3312E+00 8.900 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3312E+00 9.200 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3312E+00 9.500 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3313E+00 9.800 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3313E+00 10.100 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3313E+00 10.400 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1. 6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3313E+00 24.000 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3314E+00 96.000 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3314E+00 720.000 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01 4.8050E+00 1.6378E-01 7.4861E+01 2.3314E+00 Worst Two-Hour Doses

1. ~###K##f~f##############ff#####U#######f#~##f#######################l########

CA06450 Rev.OOO Page 45 of 71 eab Time Whole Body Thyroid TEDE (hr) (rem) (rem) (rem) 0.0 7.3317E-02 2.0410E+01 6.9571E-01

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 46 of 71 ATTACHMENT J FHACTMT100 OUTPUT FILE Cumulative Dose Summary

1. 1. UMU#########M## ###U####### M#

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. MU#######UM#### U###

U####U###########

eab lpz cr Time Thyroid TEDE Thyroid TEDE Thyroid TEDE (hr) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 0.000 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 0.333 3.0436E+00 1.0307E-01 7.1652E-01 2.4264E-02 3.9550E+00 1.2130E-01 0.733 6.6930E+00 2.2664E-01 1.5756E+00 5.3355E-02 1.4415E+01 4.4270E-01 1.033 9.4263E+00 3.1919E-01 2.2191E+00 7.5142E-02 2.3279E+0l 7.1575E-01 1.333 1.2156E+01 4.1162E-01 2.8618E+00 9.6902E-02 3.2522E+01 1. OO1OE+00 1.633 1.4883E+01 5.0394E-01 3.5038E+00 1.1864E-0l 4.1943E+01 1.2921E+00 1.933 1.7607E+01 5.9614E-01 4.14SOE+00 1.4034E-01 5.1445E+01 1. 5861E+00 2.000 1.8212E+01 6. 1663E-01 4.2874E+00 1.4516E-01 5.3563E+01 1.6516E+00 2.300 1. 8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1 .4517E-01 6.0381E+01 1.8636E+00 2 .600 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.3689E+01 1.9678E+00 2.900 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.5295E+01 2.0194E+00 3.200 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6074E+0l 2.0453E+00 3.500 1. 8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6451E+01 2.0586E+00 3.800 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6635E+01 2.0655E+00 4.100 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6724E+01 2.0694E+00 4.400 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6767E+01 2.0716E+00 4.700 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6788E+01 2.0729E+00 5.000 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6798E+01 2.0738E+00 5.300 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6803E+01 2.0744E+00 5.600 1. 8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6805E+01 2.0749E+00 5.900 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6807E+01 2.0752E+00 6.200 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6807E+01 2.0755E+00 6.500 1.8212E+0l 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6807E+01 2.0757E+00 6.800 1. 8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.0758E+00 7.100 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.0760E+00 7.400 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-0l 6.6808E+01 2.0761E+00 7.700 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.0761E+00 8.000 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.0762E+00 8.300 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.0763E+00 8.600 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.0763E+00 8.900 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.0763E+00 9.200 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.0764E+00 9.500 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.0764E+00 9.800 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.0764E+00 10.100 1 .8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.0764E+00 10.400 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.0764E+00 24.000 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.0765E+00 96.000 1. 8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.076SE+00 720.000 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01 4.2875E+00 1.4517E-01 6.6808E+01 2.076SE+00 Worst Two-Hour Doses MMMMUMMMM MM MUM UUMMMMMMMM MMMUMMUMM MU U MMM MMMMMUMMUM UMMMMMMMMMM M

CA06450 Rev. 000 Page 47 of 71 eab Time Whole Body Thyroid TEDE (hr) (rem) (rem) (rem) 0.0 6.1767E-02 1.8212E+01 6.1663E-01

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 48 of 71 ATTACHMENT K FHACTMT72R OUTPUT FILE

1. 1. 1. 1. ffff####f f##It##ffC##ul####ffiveDose#####f# f##mmary ############

Cumulative Dose Summary eab lpz cr Time Thyroid TEDE Thyroid TEDE Thyroid TEDE (hr) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) (rem) 0.000 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 O.OOOOE+00 0.333 5.6869E+00 1.8619E-01 1.3388E+00 4.3833E-02 7.3895E+00 2.2634E-01 0.733 1.2505E+01 4 .0939E-01 2.9438E+00 9.6378E-02 2.6931E+01 8.2555E-01 1.033 1.7610E+01 5.7653E-01 4 .1457E+00 1.3572E-01 4.3489E+01 1.3341E+00 1.333 2.2709E+01 7.4344E-01 5.3461E+00 1.7502E-01 6.0752E+01 1.8649E+00 1.633 2 .7802E+01 9.1013E-01 6.5450E+00 2.1426E-01 7.8345E+01 2.4063E+00 1.933 3.2888E+01 1.0766E+00 7.7423E+00 2.5345E-01 9.6087E+01 2.9527E+00 2.000 3 .4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0082E+00 2.6215E-01 1.0004E+02 3.0746E+00 2.300 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.1277E+02 3.4678E+00 2.600 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.1895E+02 3.6602E+00 2.900 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2194E+02 3.7548E+00 3.200 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2340E+02 3.8017E+00 3.500 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2410E+02 3.8252E+00 3.800 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2444E+02 3.8373E+00 4.100 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2461E+02 3.8437E+00 4.400 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2469E+02 3.8472E+00 4.700 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2473E+02 3.8493E+00 5.000 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2475E+02 3.8505E+00 5.300 3 .4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2476E+02 3.8513E+00 5.600 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2476E+02 3.8519E+00 5.900 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8523E+00 6.200 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8527E+00 6.500 3 .4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8529E+00 6.800 3 .4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8531E+00 7.100 3 .4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8532E+00 7.400 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8534E+00 7.700 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2 .6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8534E+00 8.000 3 .4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8535E+00 8.300 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8536E+00 8.600 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8536E+00 8.900 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8537E+00 9.200 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8537E+00 9.500 3 .4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8537E+00 9.800 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8538E+00 10.100 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8538E+00 10.400 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8538E+00 24.000 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8538E+00 96.000 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8538E+00 720.000 3 .4017E+01 1.1136E+00 8.0083E+00 2.6215E-01 1.2477E+02 3.8538E+00

1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. #####ur###

Worst Two-Hour Doses

1. 1. f##f### l#########f##U##### f##############l###U##f########f###############

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 49 of 71 eab Time Whole Body Thyroid TEDE (hr) (rem) (rem) (rem) 0.0 7.6244E-02 3.4017E+01 1.1136E+00

CA06450 Rev.000 Page 50 of 71 ATTACHMENT L ETP-97-064R CONTROL ROOM INLEAKAGE RESULTS

2%Nr'w' CF°OcyS &tov

%QwT P4ee <7 .

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TECHNICAL PROCEDURE

, 41V2 .ENGINEERING TEST PROCEDURE

,AVA UNIT 0 ETP 97-064R CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM INLEAKAGE TEST REVISION 0 Effective Date i/l//// 7 -.

Safety Related.- X Non-Safety Related _ __

Writer. D.T. McElheny Sponsor. V. P. Spunar

-CW0I.oY!ED i

Pe FT-86 (Rev. 1 10/97) - ACUP,1 Attachment 2 Page 37 of 40

• NUCON InternationaI, Inc.

_D . . .. .ecay .. .t Ts F" Decay Test Data Estiiftatd duration oftest: - * '2 houQr Beginning concentration (C7): -19.0ppb Ending concenitration (tC(O)): 2:7 ppb Time at start of test: . .. Timie "zero" for decay test was at 01:15 hours on 18 Nov 97.

Time at end of test: . Q3:Mhoirs on 19 Nov 97 Sample time intervals: - 15 minute. excent for last samnle Time I Sample Concentration Time/Conc. TimdIConc. Time/Conc. TimelConc.

01:151 19.0 / I-01:30 / 14.8 I .1 01:45/ 12.1 I I I 02:00 / 8.3 I 02 15 / 6.7 * / .I 02:30 / 5.1_. --._I /

03:12/ 2.7 .. . . . I (A) Air Change Rate (f/min) (Q) Inleakage Flow Rate (CF1MV 0.0170 4300 95% Confidence Limit 95% Confidence Interval (A) = 0.0170 E O.Qpl, 4000 < Q<

0 4600 -

Comments: Decay samriples taken at a sample port on the discharae of #l I return fan. All sample .. _

concentrations in the Vpb range.

Test persofnnel signature(s) and date: NUCON International lac.

_-86 (Rev. 1 10/97) ACU912 Attachment 2 Page 37 of 40 Ha NUCON International, Inc.

Decay Test Data Estimated duration of test: 1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> Beginning concentration (Ct):. 40.5 pyb Ending concentration (C(O)): 14.2 ppb Time at start of test:  : Time 'zero" for decay test was at 23:16 hours on 19 Nov 97.

Time at end of test: MMY46-hours 620 Nov 97 Sample timi intervals: 15 minute Time I Sample Concentration Time/Couc. Time/Conc. Time/Conc. Time/Conc.

23:16/ 40.5 23:31/ 35.2 I

=

23:46 / 21.2

/

00:01 / 26.7 lI ='

00:161 20.3 I 00:31 I 16.7 .II/

00:46/ 14.2 I (A) Air Change Rate (1/min) (Q)Inleakage Flow Rate (CFM) 0.0118 3000.

95% Confidence Limit 95% Confidence Interval (X4) = 0,0L118 4_L .Q00 - ,2900 <Q< 3300 Comments: Decay samIles taken at a sample port on the discharge of#12 retuti fan. These samples were taken in c6riiuncfion vith samnies taken in CAS and on both CSR retu ducts.

The decay sample taken at 23:46 how=s was disregarded due to a faulty gas sample bag. -

t pa :t o Test personnel signature(s) and date CN International Inc.

'4 CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TECHNICAL PROCEDURE ENGINEERING TEST PROCEDURE UNIT 0 ETP 97-064R v CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM INLEAKAGE TEST REVISION 0 Effective Date /// 7 Safety Related X Non-Safety Related co a Wrter: D.T. McElheny Sponsor V. P. Spunar l

A. / 6C-a"¶ tao 44c%, ?o 7 cr NUCON International, Inc. TELEPHONE: (614) 846-5710 OUTSIDE OHIO: 1-800-992-5192 P.O. BOX 29151 7000 HUNTLEY ROAD FAX: (614) 431.0858 COLUMBUS. OHIO 43229 U.S.A.

!E1_

rIF) Control Room Inleakage Test Report performed for:

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Station 1850 Calvert Cliffs Pkwy.

Lusby, Maryland 20657 P.O. No. 16582 20 April 1998 Distribution:

BG&E:

Dale McElheny (1)

NUCON:

12BG847 MF (1)

Field Test (1)

QA. (1)

Marketing (1)

NUCON 12BG847 /02

6o6(/O z4etr FT-86 (Rev. 1 10/97) ACU#11 Trp 2 Initial CharacterizationTest Attachment 2 Page 37 of 40 Decay Test Data Estimated duration of test: 120 minutes Beginning concentration (Ct): 25.0 ppb Ending concentration (C(O)): 4.1 ppb Time at start of test: Time "zero" for decay test was at 22:03 hrs. on 10 Feb 98 Time at end of test: 00:03 hrs. on 11 Feb 98 Sample time intervals: 20 minutes apart Time / Sample Concentration Time/Conc. Tinie/Conc. Time/Conc. Time/Conc.

22:03/ 25.0 l * /

22:23 / 17.9 / /

22:43 /11.9 / /

/I 23:03/9.7 * /

/

23:23 / 9.0 /

23:43/ 5.7 / /

00:03 / 4.1 /

(A) Air Change Rate ( /min) (Q) Inleakage Flow Rate (CFM) 0.0143 3,600 95% Confidence Limit 95% Confidence Interval (A)= 0.0143 4_ 0.0025 3000 <Q< -4"0

• eloec0 Comments: Decay samples taken at a sample port on the discharge of #11 return fan. All sample concentrations in the ppb range.

-* Ace oz Ad-A /vA A*:7 i/" ,,z t7 Test personnel signature(s) and date: NUCON International Inc.

AN)6Z/5D ersD P4*.e. 57 FT-86 (Rev. 1 10/97) A CU#12 Trip2 Initial CharacterizationTest Attachment 2 Page 37 of 40 Decay Test Data Estimated duration of test: 120 minutes Beginning concentration (C0): 47 ppb Ending concentration (C(O): ' 12.6 ppb Time at start of test: Time "zero" for decay test was at 02:05 hrs. on 11 Feb 98 Time at end of test: 04:05 hrs. on II Feb 98 Sample time intervals: 20 minutes apart Time / Sample Concentration TimefConc. Time/Conc. Time/Cone. Time/Cone.

02:05 / 47.0 02:25 / 33.2 02:45 / 27.4 / l 03:05 / 24.8 Il/

/

03:25 / 21.4 /

l 03:45/ 16.1 04:05/ 12.6 (A) Air Change Rate ( I/min) (Q) Inleakage Flow Rate (CFM) 0.0101 2550 95% Confidence Limit 95% Confidence Interval (A)= 0.0101 +/- 0.0018 2100<Q< 3000 Comments: Decay samples taken at a sample port on the discharge of #12 return fan. All sample concentrations in the ppb range.

-Test personnel signature(s) and date: NUCON International Inc.

6~6vojSZ~ 4ri

/?5t CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TECHNICAL PROCEDURE ENGINEERING TEST PROCEDURE UNIT 0 ETP 97-064R CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM INLEAKAGE TEST mI REVISION 0 Effective Date ///  ?/f7 Safety Related X Non-Safety Related 0

I I-Writer: D. T. McElheny Sponsor V. P. Spunar

ki /. C4.A.4^s C*i6,b A1i

• tS" e0. - 51 11 n

r NUCON International, Inc. TELEPHONE: (614) 846-5710 OUTSIDE OHIO: 1-800-992-5192 U61 P.O. BOX 29151 7000 HUNTLEY ROAD COLUMBUS, OHIO 43229 U.S.A.

FAX: (614) 431-0858 co Control Room Inleakage Test Report performed for:

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Station 1850 Calvert Cliffs Pkwv.

Lusby, Maryland 20657 P0O. No. 16582 20 April 1998 Distribution:

BG&E:

Dale McElheny (1)

NUCON:

12BG847 MIF (1)

Field Test (1)

QA (1)

Marketing (1)

NUCON 12BG847 /02

FT-86 (Rev. 1 10/97) A CU #11 Trip 2 Test wlTemoorarv Modification In-place AXtachment 2 Page 37 of 40 Decay Test Data Estimated duration of test: 120 minutes Beginning concentration (C0): 37.5 vpb_

Ending concentration (C(O)): 9.2 vPb Time at start of test: Time "zero" for decay test was at 01:15 hrs on 12 Feb 98 Time at end of test: 03:15 hrs on 12 Feb 98 Sample time intervals: 20 minutes apart Time / Sample Concentration Time/Conc. Time/Cone. Time/Couc. Time/Conc.

1:15 /37.5 l I 1:35 / 28.1 I l 1:55 / 24.7 l

2:15 / 19.3 l/

2:35 / 15.7 l

/

2:55 /11.7 l 3:15 / 9.2 (A) Air Change Rate (min-') (Q) Inleakage Flow Rate (CFM) 0.0115 2,900 95% Confidence Limit 95% Confidence Interval (A)= 0.0115 +/- .0010 2650 <Q< 3150 Comments: Decay samples taken at a sample port on the discbarge of #11 return fan. All sample concentrations in the ppb range.

Test personnel signature(s) and date: NUCON International Inc.

fe C;,

FT-86 (Rev. 1 10/97) ACU#12 Trip 2 Test wlTemporarv ModificationIn-olace Attachment 2 Page 37 of 40 Decay Test Data Estimated duration of test: 120 minutes Beginning concentration (Ct): 37.5 ppb Ending concentration (C(O)): 9.2 ppb Time at start of test: Time "zero" for decay test was at 21:25 hrs. on 11 Feb 98 Time at end of test: 23:25 hrs. on 11 Feb 98 Sample time intervals: 20 minutes apart Time / Sample Concentration Time/Conc. Time/Conc. Time/Conc. Time/Conc.

21:25 / 37.6 / l /

21:45 / 30.2 / /

/

22:05 / 25.2 / /

l 22:25 / 22.7 l /

22:45/ 15.5

/ / I 23:05 / 13.4 l /

23:25 / 10.5 /

(A) Air Change Rate (1/min) (Q) Inleakage Flow Rate (CFM) 0.0109 2,750 95% Confidence Limit 95% Confidence Interval (A)= 0.0109  : .0015 2370 <Q< 3130 Comments: Decay samples taken at a sample port on the discharge of #12 return fan. All sample concentrations in the npb range.

Test personnel signature(s) and date: NUCON International Inc.

a ;Ct/tb le/, D CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TECHNICAL PROCEDURE qq ENGINEERING TEST PROCEDURE UNIT 0 ETP 97-064R CONTROL ROOM HVAC SYSTEM INLEAKAGE TEST j -

REVISION I Effective Date 1/i/1 oo Safety Related X Non-Safety Related CONTROLLED COPY Writer. D. T. McElheny Sponsor: T. R. Lupold Approved 4/*O Date

&A6CoisV kro /4SCe 3 a"f? " 97-DC' cho" wAed /

TELEPHONE: (614) 846-5710 NUCON International, Inc. TOLL FREE: 1-800-992-5192 FAX: (614) 431-0858 P.O. BOX 29151 7000 HUNTLEY ROAD COLUMBUS, OHIO 43229 U.S.A. WEB SITE: www.nucon-int.com PeC 69s Control Room Inleakage Test Report performed for:

Baltimore Gas and Electric Company Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Station 1850 Calvert Cliffs Pkwy.

Lusby, Maryland 20657 P.O. No. 16582 3 March 2000 I

Distribution:

BG&E:

Dale McElheny (1)

NUCON:

12BG658 MF (1)

Field Test (1)

QA (1)

Marketing (1)

NUCON 12BG658 /01

ET-86 (Rev. 1 10/97) BG&E ETP-97-064R-REVI Attachment 2 Page 37 of 40 Decay Test Data Estimated duration of test: 180 minutes Beginning concentration (Ct): 51.4 pyb Ending concentration (C(O)): 13.2 ppb Time at start of test: Time "zero" for decay test was at 01:05 hrs. on 26 Jan 00 Time at end of test: 04:05 hrs. on 26 Jan 00 Sample time intervals: 15 minutes apart Time / Sample Concentration Time/Conc. Time/Cone. Time/Cone. Time/Conc.

/ 120/23.8 /

30/ 51.4 135/21.0 / /

45/ 47.6 150/17.8 l 60/ 41.9 165/16.4 _ / /

75/ 33.0 180/13.2 l /

90/ 30.7 l /

I 105/ 29.3 / l l

(A) Air Change Rate ( 1/min) (Q) Inleakage Flow Rate (CFMW 0.00896 2600 95% Confidence Limit 95 % Confidence Interval (A)= 0.00896 :h 0.00065 2400 < Q < 2800 Comments: Decay samples taken at a sample port on the discharge of #12 return fan. All sample concentrations in the ppb range.

Test personnel signature(s) and date: NUCON International Inc.

>~6qrS 4.o FT-86 (Rev. 1 10/97) BG&E ETP-97-064R-REVI ,attachment 2 Page 37 of 40 Decay Test Data Estimated duration of test: 180 minutes Beginning concentration (Ct): 59.2 b Q. 15 minutes into test Ending concentration (C(O)): 8.8 ppb Q 195 minutes into test Time at start of test: Time "zero" for decay test was at 23:35 hrs. on 26 Jan 00 Time at end of test: 03:00 hrs. on 27 Jan 00 Sample time intervals: 15 minutes apart to 105 minutes then (, 140. 165. and 195 minutes Time / Sample Concentration Time/Conc. Time/Conc. Time/Couc. Time/Couc.

15/59.2 165/13.8

/.

30/52.5 195/8.8 l

45/42.8 /

/

60/40.2 Il /

75/36.1 /

I 105 /26.2 l 140/ 17.4 /

(A) Air Change Rate ( I/min) (Q) Inleakage Flow Rate (CFM) 0.0103 3000 95% Confidence Limit 95 % Confidence Interval (A)= 0.0103 t 0.00085 2750 <Q< 3250 Comments: Decay samples taken at a sample port on the discharge of #1 1 return fan. All sample concentrations in the ppb range.

/5 IAnL /

Test personnel signature(s) and date: NUCON International Inc.

CA06450 Rev.ooo Page 66 of 71 ATTACHMENT M ETP 01-035R PERFLUOROCARBON TRACER GAS TESTING

. .- zI 61v.5 /

CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Pt-Co -7 TECHNICAL PROCEDURE ENGINEERING TEST PROCEDURE UNIT 0 ETP 01-035R PERFLUOROCARBON TRACER GAS TESTING REVISION 0 Effective Date J/,/o>.

Safety Related x Non-Safety Related Writer D.T. McElheny Sponsor: M. A. Junge Approved .AhMiv Z 4/e I Date 2-'-t-a

5jSLe,,Q 7 O.C lUe-A cr A .ia 5(i /D.-114 PA&61-O 1o5, /V 7 -o>

0 AJ e C TRACER',ECHINOLOGY CENTER BROOKHAVENNATIONAL LABORATORY FACSIMILE DATE: July 29,2002 TO: 'John E. Wynn Jr.

Aux Systems Engr Unit Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant Lusby, MD 20657 FAX NO: (410) 495 - 4727 MESSAGE: _

John, I'm on vacation this week but wanted to send you the final results but without my final assessment. Remarkably, total inleakage was 2930 4 185 cfin. Other flows, in cfn, were:

Zone From/To CR Wneakage  % of total CR Outleakage  % of total 0 Outside 275

• 185 9 1866 4 470 64 2 AB 436*157 15 3664248 13 3 TB 466*4 172 16 599 1 415 20 4 MSIVs 2724134 9 44* 33 2 5 ACII 274* 33 9 19* 3 1 6 AC13 387+ 38 .13 114- 8 0 7 SWGRs 818* 114 28 21* 10 1 More next week. I'll put a copy in the mail also.

Total no. of pages Including this cover page:

From: Russell N. Dietz - Head Telephone: (631) 344-3059 Tracer Technology Center Fax: (631) 344-2887 Atmospheric Sciences Division Confirmation: (631) 344-3275 Brookhaven National Laboratory Email: dietzebnl.gov Bldg 815E Secretary: Barbara J. Roland Upton, NY 11973-5000 Secretary's email: rolandgbnl.gov

- JUL 29 '02 03:37PM ENL DPS/ECD 426  : .: :Z. 4,;9

. 12:36:6 07 2002 PROJECT: CALVVERT CLIFFS START: 09:00; O-06-'9o2) BNL CODE: CArlAO HOUSE:CALVFRT CLIAFS STAOP: 10:00 ( )6-1B-i9O2) ANALYZED: 06-27-1902

• RAT`ES OVERALL INFlLTRkATl0 RkTE= %5159784.L 59(u~'3/h)

C---RALL AIR EXCHANGE RATE = 1.461 q P0.251(1/h.)

b ZONE SOURCE RATE EXFILTRATION . ---- INFILTRATION- -

N LOCATION @25C QTY W T RATE .S RATE SD AS sb F(nL/m) (nLh *(m-3/h') (f/) .(

1CR %663.0 1 4112 317 .4 )797.9 464. 9 0.5 0.04 5

2 AB- `03858. O 4 97321.9 30896.3 11048.8: 32707,.5 11645.0 0.680 .0.2 44 3 TB %3870.0 12 .Z3399361 411130 1 88B19.1 419373..8 90345.6 1.482 0

• 328 4 MSIVS X458.0 4 189594 .22087.4 10568.3 5694.9 8281.4 4.658 .6.77 5 No.11 AC %2150.0 1 132691 30819.8 3244.6 32226.2 3348.5 19.042 2.1 913 6 No.13 AC 6.4 30 12620. 14492.4 1194.7 .8912`2 1907.4 2.460 0.541 7 SWGRs 9.2 10 6435. 3381.7 10458.4 16598.8 1527.7 2.346 0.246 ZONE-ZONE RATE SD (m3/h) ;ZONE-ZONE'.. . RATE g SD (m-3/b) 1 - 2 622.2 421.7. 2 -. 1 741.3 267.9

.1-3 1018 704.6 3-i. 792.5 292.2 1 4 174.5 %56. . . 1 -- 9 .462.227.2 1 5 32..3 5.62 5 1 464. 8 56.!

1 b 19.4 13.7 . 6 - 1 65 .3 . 64.0 3 3 2870-.3 1460.4 . 3- 12 a. ..4 .3. .2

4. 312. .

312 6.0

89. ..

-4 -2 8 a'". 448.3.3-258.1:

2--66 7 4 55O2.

17034.4 %115 1.

220.724:.3 .

. 7 --24 - 314.

314.4 811.4 243.98 5564 2 3 -5 163.4 115.6 6 - 5 807.0 235.2 3 - 6 8416.2 1965.2 76 - 3 1002.9 424.6 3 - 7 215.4 13.1. 7 - 12671.2 11138.9 45- 5O. 3 4 138.1 86.O7 4 102. . .- 2 t3 -4 755.3 506.8

- 7 30.9 19.1 . -4 -541.5 547.4 5 - 6 60.8 11.3 6 9-. 125.9 120.7 57 22.3 7.0 7-5 .27.6 62.7 6 - 7 91.1 210.9 7 -6 *0 214.7

--- _ - - - ------ FLO---

W lN OR.OUT BONE RATE q SD (m-3/h) _RATE. )SD(/h) tL_.9.733 31O9 0q.586 .0.047. 2 35110.03 % 6 02483.9 O.7305 0.262g 3 %437P 722.06 1.25479 0.340c . . 4O0186 %11083.4.O q18.966 9.0 115 5 32847.6 03389.9 19.291 2.223. 6 17439.50 .1095J 0 4.814 0..386O 7 17547.1 1595.5 2.480 0.8O257O ANAILYSIS;-

WI MCI AV.

tpPDaI iicp PDCB T-Flml p~1 acPDCH ip~CH 8490 ptPCD 3.147 e 0.403 9.466 q 0.173 2.352 g 0.Q2 0.786 q 0.06 0.396 0.014 0.101 q 0.005 0.106 q 0 18110 PMCP d.O 0.151 0.086 27.815 g 9.791 0.174 q 0.025 0.103 q 0.090 0.048 q 0.026 0.009 q 0.004 0.008 q 0 Do$

283000 PPB 0.021 q 0.013 0.219 q 0.049 7.784 1.632 0.006 q 0.001 0.009 q 0.001 0.002 q 0.001 0.011 q 0 009 1223 T-P!Cil 0.043 q0.011 0.196q 0.026 5.846 2.452 8.184 1 3.895 0.033 1 0.009 0.025 q0.011. 0.000 0 169 FRCH 0.009 i,.0.001 0.017 q0.003 0.067 0.021. 0.16 0.005. 4..065 0.389

'4 0.003 D.003 0.000 '~0 001 3_622 ocDCR 0.020 q 0.001 0.129 0.010 3.764 0.299 0.010 '~0.001 .. 0.019 2 .0.002 0.725 9 0.035 *0.006 q 0

.75 IPPCI 0.023 D.007 0.888 q0.143 D.138 1 0.054 0.019 0.005' .0.008 1 0.001 '. 0.004 q LO.00 0.367 q 0 Div

..JUL 29 '02 03:38PM BNqL DAS/ECD 426 CON M TRATION(pW L) - (5;O(&VA tXK- A- - -70

-i ----------- 7--------------------------------------7--------------------- I CAMS PtPDCH PHCP PDC T-PICH PMO WMC .IPPCE aotPDCH JtPDCH uPDC 2-?TCH 4277 7.1476 ~.e.99 2.638 0.637 .0O.3'75: 0.096 0.083 .0.000 6.273. 7.315 AP.191.FE 7B 580 7.782 4.630 2.,584 1.290 -0.335 0.090 0.115 0.000 9.035 8.045 0.40 DLTED 8149 8.1 7 4.402 2.249 0.3 .~9 0097 0.096 000 9.463 6.380 022 1240D 9.277 4.810 2.428 0O.B08 0M .00109. 0.107 ,D.000 10.964 9.71H 24 12321 -8.890 4.691 2.32 .0.794 0:91 0.106 0.10 0.000 10.546 9.361 0..23 12055 &.689 4.290 2.432 0.0..0.393 0.104 0.122 "0.000 10.329 9.185 024I 12631 8.324 4.340 2.500 0.777 *-0.379 0.101 0.123 0.000 S.86. 8.75 0'23 10181 8.2fi2 4.382 2.327 0.758 0.425 0.107 0.103 0.000 9.774 8.664 0232 ...

12057 8.446 4.598 2.370 0.970' 0.389 0.101 0.105 0.000 10.017 .8.83 0.304 11079 7.998 4.410 2.484 0.712 0.394 .0.095 0.096 0.000 9.387 8.289 0.218 CA37 -2.169 0.721 0.383 0.093 0.100 0.000 9.420 8.346 0.221, 4;A0,W 2.238 0.777 0. 92 0.100 0.105 0.000 9.-924 8.800 0.237 520 74126 &,865' 2.295 0.657 0.804 t.101 0.089 0.000 8.413 7,441 0.I98.-DELIT P 2268 f.923 4.160 2.469 0.644 0.526 0.110 0.087 0.000 8.174 7.227 0.194 DRITE1D 2138 7.555 4.335 2.589 0.698 0.553 0.118 0.096 0.00 8.920 7.898 0.211 DRUMIE 3644 3.586 -2.498 3.554 0.326 0.184 0.145 0.052 0.000 4.003 3.510 0.094 DELET11 12390 0.204 01.418 15.834 0.020 0.015 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.187 0.184 -0.006'Dfl1fl 12036 5.449 3.128 7.235 0.502 0.276 0.06?1 0.0655 0.000 6.274 54527 0.149 DLELT~I 12M0 5.119 ~'IO.F0 5%.224 e-47jQ ~_7& -0§ ~_Q~ 5 ~N 5-2~ .39 DELETED 12083 1.O3b 0.61Y 3.481 *0:090 1.856 0.410 0.005 o.0o0 1.5 1.08 0.025 DELETED 4779 0.031 0.098 2.728 0.04 0.90 1359 .00 0.00 0.459 0.400 -0.005 DELETD A£ 4827 3.552 2.287 1.977 -0.323 1.448 0.122 .0.043 OAD00 3.9!4 3.458 'O.92DILXED 2 12497 '.829 0.249 1.879 0.106 0.034 0.000 3.014 2.637 .0.010 DRUM!E 2 12183 0.020 0.002 0.009 0.,001 0.003 0.000, 0.000 O0.00 :,.0.

. 0 DELETE 2 12063 0.028 10.242 0.141 0.001. 0.014 0.002 0.007 .0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 DELMTD 2 12393 0.028 1.611 1.856 0.098 1.488 0.338 0.005 0.000 0.W3 0.289 *0.028'DULETD 2 12009 0;072 16.480 0.089 0.076 0.035 0.011- 0.014 :0.000 0.000 0.000: '0O.021.

2 12264 0.143 35.832 0.214 0.202 0.057 0.013 0.008 :0.000 0.000 0.000 .,.058 2 12376 0.167 43.634 0:244 0.257 0.030 MM00 0.008 'O.'oo 0.ooo 0.000 -. 0.072 12297 0.523 14.879 1.321 OA682 0.536 0.11,9 0.009' 0.000 0.641 .oMO - 0.201-.DELETKD' 12191 .(91 16.484 '.166. 0.638 -0.538 0.118 0.008. '.0.000 0.,308 0.269 -04188 DEIEDht 12379 .0.335 30.172 0.222 0.-061 0.088 0.012. U05.00.000 0.408 0.357 -0. 017 -'-

12012 1.489 20.586 0.51 0.175 .0`295 0.030 0.018 :0.000 1.56! 1.362 0.049'DELEED

.12244 0.112 25.193 0.138 0.061 0.069 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.182 0.160 0.017 12155 0.107 26.430 0.094 0.044 0,031 I0.003.-0.003 0.000 0.181 0.159 0.012, 12384 0.507 0.312 4.404 0.04 0.923 0.253 0.011 0.000 0.688- 0.600 0.012 DELETED 11218 4.134 2.583 1.088 .0.367 0.203 0.049 0.A67 U300 14.586 4.026 .0.107 DELETED 0.053 3.165 -0.464 0.092 0.219 0.070 0.008 *. .000 0.124 0.109 0.025 DELETED 0 179 IA 1lM A.714 LAI1R A-014 . 0.01 00tl A A AM A 1T7 A 1M A [Mg 3T TI h 7 10 5 D 8 f 0-T 1 0.002 - 0.0 5 _026 _0 " .2n707 0 1 F7 0 002 3 2590 0.01e .'0J191 7.035 0.05 .0.009 0.002, 0.006 0.000 0.025 0.022 0.002 3 12402 0.020 (0.176 7.297 0.006 0.010 0.00'2 0.009 0.000 0.026 0.023 0.002 3 1233 0.014 D.158 6.492 .0.004 0.009 0.002 .0.004 0.000 0.020 -0.018 0,002 3 12417 0.017 0.235 9.217. .0007 -0.009 0.903- -0.008 .0.000 0.024 0.022 0.002 8 12425 0.030 0.205 8.388 0.008 0.010 . .0.003 .0.005 .0.000 0.038- 0.- 034 0.-003 3 12488 0.062 0.381 15438 0.009'~ .0.009 .0.004 AA0 0.000 0;064 0.057. ::0003 DELETED-3 12383 0.015 0.195 6.342 0.005' 0.007 0.001 0.011. 0.000 0.021 0.019 -0.002 3 12203 0.M5 0.320 10.741 0.M0'-0.009 0.003 0.004' 0.00 0A56 .0.050 '000 3118 .03 0.279 9.691' 0.006. 0.'009 0.001 -0.005 0.00 0.19 0.017 0.002 3 12288 V.031 0.382. 12.712 . .013 0.008 0.002. 0.011 .0.000 0.,035 0.031 0. 004 tmmTE a 1'022 0 A'5 0,17 I A ¶10 51043 0f026 0.01l 0.000 'O000~f 0.000 0.000 , P.19 1818 0.009 0.01V 0.V01 0.020 4.340 O.0= 0.001 0.000 0.U1D U.011 OU.006 AM A~ A AAR 15AIR AM 0R7 Al? n '100 AM0 Arfl 0.000

-l 0 114 h 019 .A 004 707 0.020 0.128 4:011 -0.009 0.021 0.685 0:006 0.000 0.612 0.534 0.004,

.__1281 0-.019 0A ,120 .3,432 0,009 70-017- 0-739 0-005 LOH0 p.857 0 5B2__0_004 12340 0.013 0.970 Oi& 02 0 .010 0~04 03251u7UU -0.02T 0.025 0.008 12502 0.016 1.129 0.203 0.027 .0.009 0.005 0.378 0.000 0.034 0.031 0.008 12307 0.024 0.751 0.05 0.015 0.007 0.004 0.399 0.000 0.040 0.035 0.005 12300 0.031 0.890 0.095 0.019 .0.008 0.004 0.385 0.000 0.046 0.041 0.006 2158 0.019 0.963 0.18420.022 0.007 -0.005 0.392 0.000 0.038 0.034 0.007

.6706 0.017 D.942 D.173 0.022 0.008 0.05 0.389 .0.000 0.037 0.033 0.007 7750 0.029 0.728 0.084 0.013 .0.007 0.003 0.332- 0.0 ND 0.044 0.039 0.004 1083i MM03 0.732 0.085 - 0.015r 0.06 03003 ..339- 0.000 -004 0.3 0,S

~.F GB : ?ThC P~H C lHDp1;DC11 M?DCH P70 8 0Z 1COT PL 0.74 0.74 0.B2:-10.62 -. 0.O5 ;.C.88 0.716C177

• * ** * ** ** * * * *~ *~ NOTES

.hll gas voltmes are reported at 21.5 C. and 1 atm. .

rhe standard deviation in. the source strength has beer. set at* 4 X.

Y standard deviation in the volume measurement has been set at 5  %

1. overall normal.ized condition number (()N-.) 0.42E9 K(DC)/N 1.136 Zona1 condition numbers are: ,

7

ondi~tlon Number 1.053 1.017 1.379 1 .2,46 1.005 1.124 1.044 I Uhre MA I

JUL 29 '02 03:39PM BNL DAS/ECD 426 P.4/4

. ... . . : -: ,, . . , . . .t .:

7/

.O~Ase

. .: . . r ._.: .'; . .

. . { . ._ . - . @ .

FLW-RATIOS S!;D.M. . . . .. . .

iIMETJxPILTRY

t. 147 0.1142 iE 2 1.059 0,0455 I .020 0. 0363,1 0.258 0.3540 5 5 L-046 o.0 oe 0.615 0.1209 iE 7 * .9O8 15.1200 tERZOWAL 2! 2- 1 .83p 0.4851 3/ 3- ! 1.285 0.9277 4/4 - 1 Q.161 0.0969

.5' 5- 1 0.069 0.0093 6/ 6- 1 D.029 0.0209 7!7- 1 0.026 0.0122

-19.743 62,9941 34t 4-.2 0.082 0.1957 5/ 2-2 9.036 0.0273 0.036 0.0722 0.903 0.7688

.4/ 4- 3 C10.353 89.6471 5/ 5- 3 0.203 0.1401 6/ 6- 3 0.392 3.1448 0.017 0.0174 0.455 0.2269

• 0.017 0.0085 7!?- 4 -0.057 0.0552 6/6- 5 0.483 0.465 7/ 1-5 . 0.809 1.8474 717- 6 12.175 396.7011

'ANDW DPIATI0O OF ptPDCH I ZOBE 2 IS GBIUR MN 25 %-I .

.ASDARD MIATIOD OF ptPD -IF zom 3 IISATER TBHAR 25Z

'ANDARD DfATIOR OF ptPDCHN. ZZOE 4 IS GRUYTE TwAN25 X ADAXD DEVIATION OF ptPDIH II 20UE ?. IS FMT1R IA 25X

'lADARD DEVIATI0 OF 'PMC? IU ZXO2 iS GRATER TM 25S AWDARD DEVIATION DF PDCB IN ZOIR 2 IS GRATER THNA 25 1

.fANDAD DEVIATIM OOFPDCB IN ZONE 4 IS CWT1E TM 25 A MDARD DEV IATION Of PDCB IN 30M 5 IS 6 THM 25 X OF FDCB 11 ZOE 7 IS GRIATER THARN 25 X rANDARD DEVIATION OF T-PTN IH ZNEE 2 !ISGM IRAN 25 X tANDARD DEVIATION OF 7-PICH IN IOU 4 IS GREATR ThAN 25 2 rANDAD DMIATIO or I-P7OU IN ZOSE 5 IS GREATER THAI 25 X MDAIMJAh D ATION 1AYDARD DIVIATIO1 OF MCHIN ZONE 2 iS GRET TEAR 25 X . . . . . ..

THNDARD DEVIATION OF "TCHI ZONE 4 IS GATE TM 252 OF DCPD IN zol 2 iS MER TRY 25 2 19!DARD DEVIATION OF P oDC1 IN ZONE 3 IS GREATR THN 25 X IAIDD EVIATION OF ocPDU 1B ZORE 4 iS GREATTI ThAN 25a TA1DARD DE1ATION OF ocPDCR IN ZONE 5 ISG TER TUIN 25X MIDARD MDIAMION OF IPPCH IN ZOPI 21ISGATER THN 25

?' IDDEVIATIOP OF IPcH INZOn BIS GAER TUN 25 X

h. .-AD DEVIATO1 OF iPPCH IN ZONE 5 iS GRIATE? TUAN 25 x