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Category:E-Mail
MONTHYEARML24029A1132024-01-16016 January 2024 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information (Email) ML23207A0762023-07-14014 July 2023 EN 56557 - Update to Part 21 Report Re Potential Defect with Trane External Auto/Stop Emergency Stop Relay Card Pn: XI2650728-06 ML23192A0552023-07-11011 July 2023 Relief Request Later Edition of ASME Code for ISI ML23172A0132023-06-20020 June 2023 Duke Fleet - Correction to June 2, 2023, Request for Additional Information Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise Restrictive Surveillance Requirement Frequencies ML23159A0052023-06-0505 June 2023 56557-EN 56557 - Paragon - Redlined ML23153A1892023-06-0202 June 2023 Duke Fleet - Request for Additional Information Proposed License Amendment Request to Revise Restrictive Surveillance Requirement Frequencies ML23151A3482023-05-30030 May 2023 Duke Fleet - Request for Additional Information Proposed Alternative for Pressurizer Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) ML23142A2732023-05-22022 May 2023 Duke Fleet - Request for Additional Information Proposed Alternative for Steam Generator Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) ML23124A1212023-05-0404 May 2023 Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Duke Fleet Proposed Alternative for Pressurizer Welds in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(z)(1) ML23087A0282023-03-27027 March 2023 Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Amendment TSTF-505 ML23087A2492023-03-27027 March 2023 50.69 Acceptance Email ML23073A2282023-03-13013 March 2023 Duke Fleet- Adoption of TSTF-554, Revision 1, Revise Reactor Coolant Leakage Requirements - Acceptance Review ML23058A0562023-02-27027 February 2023 Acceptance of Amendment to Revise Surveillance Frequencies for RCS Pressure Isolation Valve Operational Leakage Testing and Reactor Trip System Instrumentation ML23048A1512023-02-16016 February 2023 Acceptance Review - Proposed Alternative for Steam Generator Welds (L-2023-LLR-0003) ML23030B9032023-01-30030 January 2023 Formal Release of RAIs for McGuire Unit 1, Relief Request Impractical RPV Rx Coolant System Welds, Due March 1, 2023 (Email) ML23017A2232023-01-13013 January 2023 Request for Additional Information (RAI) Issuance for McGuire Unit 1 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report (Email) ML22291A4602022-10-17017 October 2022 Relief Request Impractical RPV and Rx Coolant Sys. Welds ML22242A1602022-08-30030 August 2022 Hardship Relief Request Pilot-Operated Relief Valve Acceptance Review Results ML22115A1412022-04-25025 April 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Duke Common EOF Relocation - Request for Addition Information ML22083A0702022-03-24024 March 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Catawba Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2, Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, and McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 - Acceptance Review for TSTF-569 LAR ML22049B0152022-02-17017 February 2022 NRC RP Inspection Document Request Letter ML22038A1572022-02-0707 February 2022 NRR E-mail Capture - Duke Energy Fleet - Acceptance of License Amendment Request Regarding Adoption of TSTF-541, Revision 2 ML22024A3952022-01-24024 January 2022 Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Amendment McGuire RCS PT Limits Change TS 3.4.3 and EFPY Changes ML22018A0272022-01-18018 January 2022 2022 All RFI Responses - Exercise and Program Inspections - Revl ML21361A0122021-12-23023 December 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Accepted for Review - Duke Energy Fleet License Amendment Request to Relocate Emergency Operations Facility ML21354A8612021-12-15015 December 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Duke Fleet Request RA-19-0352 - Alternative for RPV Closure Stud Exams (L-2020-LLR-0156) ML21286A7812021-11-22022 November 2021 Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Revision to the End of Cycle Moderator Temperature Coefficient Measurement Methodology ML21295A0372021-10-0505 October 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Accepted for Review - Duke Energy Fleet License Amendment Request to Adopt TSTF-577 Revised Frequencies for Steam Generator Tube Inspections ML21252A0532021-09-0808 September 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Formal Release of Rais, 30 Day Response, Mcguire Relief Request, Ref: Later Edition Addenda ASME Code, Section XI, 50.55a(g)(4)(iv) ML21195A2022021-07-14014 July 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - McGuire Relief Request Acceptance Review Results; McGuire Unit 1 RR, Later Edition Addenda ASME Code, Section XI, 50.55a(g)(4)(iv) ML21103A0542021-04-13013 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Extension to Request for Additional Information AMS Topical Report AMS-TR-0720R1 ML21096A3002021-04-0606 April 2021 E-mail for Approval of Proprietary Withholding for Duke Energy Exemptions for the Magnastor Storage Cask ML21096A2512021-04-0505 April 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - McGuire Emergency Plan Submittal, Letter Dated March 31 2021 ML21067A6742021-03-0505 March 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Final Request for Additional Information AMS Topical Report AMS-TR-0720R1 ML21049A2632021-02-0404 February 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Duke Energy Fleet License Amendment Request to Revise Emergency Plan ML21007A3722021-01-0707 January 2021 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Duke Fleet - RA-19-0352 - Proposed Alternative for Reactor Vessel Close Stud Examinations (L-2020-LLR-0156) ML21006A4302021-01-0606 January 2021 Acceptance Review - Duke Fleet RA-20-0207 Request to Revise the Technical Specification for Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation ML20346A0212020-12-10010 December 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Formal Release of RAIs - License Amendment to Change TS 3.8.1 Due Jan. 29, 2021 ML20323A4072020-11-18018 November 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - Brunswick License Exemption Request from 10CFR73 Annual Force on Force Exercise Requirements (EPIC L-2020-LLE-0180) ML20297A3102020-10-13013 October 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Duke Fleet - RA-20-0191 - Request to Use a Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME B&PV Code, Section XI - IWA-5120, IWA-5213, IWA-5241, IWA-5242, and IWA-5250 (L-2020-LLR-0126) ML20297A3082020-10-0707 October 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Duke Fleet - RA-20-0263 - Request to Use a Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME B&PV Code, Section XI for Repair/Replacement (L-2020-LLR-0124) ML20297A3092020-10-0606 October 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Acceptance Review - Duke Fleet - RA-20-0262 - Request to Use a Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME B&PV Code, Section XI - IWA-4540(b) (L-2020-LLR-0125) ML20216A3512020-08-0303 August 2020 Mcquire U-1 ISI RFI ML20177A3792020-06-23023 June 2020 Email from L. Cox, North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services to NRC Regarding Exemption Request for Duke Energy'S McGuire Nuclear Station ML20140A0852020-05-19019 May 2020 ADAMS 2D ML20101L3132020-04-10010 April 2020 Notification of Inspection and Request for Information ML20071D0962020-03-0505 March 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - Request for Additional Information - McGuire Nuclear Station Unit 1 Delay in Update of the Code of Record for in Service Inspections ML20029E8592020-01-24024 January 2020 NRR E-mail Capture - McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 1 -Acceptance of Requested Licensing Action Request to the 10-year ISI Interval Update ML20015A3162020-01-14014 January 2020 1/7/2020, E-Mail from M. Coflin to DCR Approval of Exemption Request McGuire Nuclear Facility ML20008D5592020-01-0707 January 2020 Email to Nc Shpo Exemption Request McGuire Nuclear Facility 2024-01-16
[Table view] Category:Inspection Report Correspondence
MONTHYEARML18180A3222018-06-26026 June 2018 Mcguire Nuclear Station - Emergency Preparedness Inspection and Request for Information IR 05000369/20060042006-10-30030 October 2006 IR 05000369-06-004, IR 05000370-06-004, on 07/01/2006 - 09/30/2006 for McGuire, Units 1 and 2, Maintenance Effectiveness, Operability Evaluations, Other Activities IR 05000369/20060032006-07-27027 July 2006 IR 05000369-06-003, 05000370-06-003, on 04/01/2006 - 06/30/2006, McGuire ML0433101762003-12-29029 December 2003 E-mail, P. Fillion to M. Thomas and C. Ogle - McGuire Open Item Closeout ML0401608912003-12-22022 December 2003 Undated Inspector Post-Inspection Debrief to Region II DRS Managers Regarding McGuire Triennial Fire Protection Inspection 2018-06-26
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[McKenzia Thomas - McGuire Open Item Closeout ___ _ _ ___Page 1 From: Paul Fillion 2 ._
To: Charles R. dgle; McKenzie Thomas Date: 12/29/03 2:18PM
Subject:
McGuire Open Item Closeout As discussed, here is my writeup for closeout of one McGuire FP open item. According to Bob Carroll, he needs input by end of this week to make report for fourth quarter which ended December 13. Since I already charged time to the report it would be advantageous if the input gets in. Noticed that "initially" was mispelled, and already corrected.
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CATEMP\GW)00001.TMP ~Page aj 1 1 TPiTM\W10O Mail Envelope Properties (3FF07DF1.A61: 5: 51853)
Subject:
McGuire Open Item Closeout Creation Date: 12/29/03 2:18PM From: Paul Fillion Created By: PJF@nrc.gov Recipients nrc.gov AT1_PO.ATL_DO CRO (Charles R. Ogle)
MXT2 (McKenzie Thomas)
Post Office Route ATh_PO.ATI_DO nrc.gov Files Size Date & Time pjfmcg305inp.wpd 8082 12/29/03 01:56PM MESSAGE 851 12/29/03 02:18PM Options Expiration Date: None Priority: Standard Reply Requested: No Return Notification: None Concealed
Subject:
No Security: Standard
INPUT FOR MCGUIRE INSPECTION REPORT 03-05
.,by
-Paul J. Fillion 40A5 Other
.01 (Closed) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-369. 370/03-07-01: Fire Suppression System for Dedicated Shutdown Areas Not in Accordance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G.3 requires that a fixed fire suppression system be installed in a fire area where a dedicated shutdown system will be used to achieve post-fire safe shutdown. The NRC has interpreted this requirement to mean the fixed fire suppression system shall cover 100 percent of the area, room or zone under consideration. The NRC opened this Unresolved Item (URI) .to determine whether backf it as defined by 10 CFR 50.109, Backfitting, is warranted to require the licensee to provide fire suppression capability which covers the whole area as opposed to the existing partial area'coverage in certain fire areas. Inspection Report 50-369, 370/03-07 describes the suppression system in Fire Area 4, which is a room in the auxiliary building containing the nuclear service water pumps, as covering only the pump area, leaving a majority of the room area unprotected. The report alludes to other III.G.3 areas with similar partial suppression, but does not give specifics.
The inspector reviewed key historical documents to determine exactly what was initialy reviewed and approved by the NRC with regard to fixed fire suppression systems in the various plant areas. The licensee's Fire Protection Review, which was transmitted to the NRC by letter dated January 31,1979, contains a fire hazards analysis of each fire area.
The fire hazards analysis makes clear statements as to which areas of the plant they have installed fixed sprinkler systems or other type of fire suppression system. The analysis contains a section within the discussion of each fire area titled "Consequences of a Fire." This section addresses the cases of installed suppression systems functioning and no suppression systems functioning. It is apparent from this section which fire areas ultimately depend on the standby shutdown system as an alternative to control room shutdown. The Fire Hazards Analysis also provides a summary of fire protection features for each elevation of the auxiliary building. In general, the January 1979 submittal matches the current Fire Hazards Analysis, although there are some differences. A few fire areas were added or combined,'and two areas were changed from control room shutdown to standby shutdown system areas. The inspector considers these differences to be minor in nature and they do not substantially affect the essential concept of what was initially reviewed and approved.
Supplement No. 2 to the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report, dated March 1979, indicates that the January 1979 Fire Protection Review discussed above was received and reviewed. Safety Evaluation Report, Supplement No. 2, summarizes the entire fire protection system in Section 9.5.1 and in Appendix D. The safety evaluation discussion matches the licensee's Fire Protection Review with regard to the design and extent of the fixed suppression systems. Appendix D states: "As part of the review, we visited the plant site to examine the relationship of safety related components, systems, and structures in specific plant areas to both combustible materials and to associated fire detection and suppression systems."
One conclusion from the historical document'reviewwas that the current design of the fire protection systems as relates to this unresolved item was reviewed by the NRC in 1979 and found to be in compliance with'Appendix A to Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1, "Guidelines for Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants Docketed Prior to July 1, 1976." Supplement No. 5 to the NRC's Safety Evaluation Report, dated April 1981, states that: the licensee committed to implement Appendix R, Section Il.G, as an item to be backfitted. However,'the'description of water suppression systems was the same as given in Supplement No. 2. 'Supplement No. 5 does not state that any additional fire suppression systems would be installed to meet Appendix R, Section Il.G. Except for the control room, all the Appendix R lIl.G.3 areas had fixed suppression, but not necessarily area wide suppression. The concept that a Ill.G.3 area needed to have fixed suppression covering 100 percent of the fire area as opposed to "critical areas" within the fire area may not have been clarified by the'NRC until later.
Supplement No. 6 to the NRC's Safety Evaluation' Report, dated February 1983, was issued to specifically address the standby'shutdown system and compliance with Appendix R, Ill. G and II.L. Description of the water suppression systems as given in Table 9.5.1 is essentially the same as in Supplement 2. 'Based on this review of historical licensing documentation, the potential need for full area suppression was treated as a backfit issue.
The inspector used Significance Determination Process techniques to determine the beneficial change in risk that would result from expanding the existing suppression system from partial coverage to area wide coverage. Because the Significance Determination Process results indicated no significant difference in risk between the normal suppression and degraded suppression cases, the conclusion is that backfitting to provide area wide suppression is not warranted. This analysis considered the worst case of post-fire shutdown with only the Standby Shutdown Facility available. Both the transient worksheet and the loss of nuclear service water worksheet were evaluated.
Insights gained from this analysis, which focused on Fire Area 4, led to the conclusion that the same result would be obtained for any auxiliary building III.G.3 area at McGuire.
This is primarily due to the small difference in initiating event likelihood between the two cases under consideration and the relatively low likelihood values.,: This conclusion envelops all Il.G.3 areas in the plant, since the cable spreading rooms have'an area wide manual misty fog type suppression system and control rooms are a generic exception to the requirement to have suppression systems.
This Unresolved Item is closed.
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