ML040160891
| ML040160891 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 12/22/2003 |
| From: | Rodney Fanner, Fillion P, Maxey K, Melly B, Reinaldo Rodriguez, Schin R, Matt Thomas NRC/RGN-II |
| To: | |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2003-0358 IR-03-007 | |
| Download: ML040160891 (4) | |
Text
ENGINEERING BRANCH I FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION DEBRIEF Inspection of: McGuire Nuclear Station Report Number: 50-369,370/03-07 Inspection Dates: May 5-9 and 19-23, 2003 (onsite inspection)
Type of Inspection: TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION BASELINE INSPECTION: Fire Protection Features and Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Capability Inspectors: M. Thomas, Lead/Operations Inspector; P. Fillion, Electrical Inspector; K. Maxey, Electrical Inspector; B. Melly, (Contractor) Fire Protection Inspector, R. Schin (Open item followup during pre-inspection information gathering visit)
Accompanying Personnel: R. Fanner and R. Rodriguez, Nuclear Safety Interns (training and support the open items followup/Electrical/Operations areas)
Inspection Scope: This inspection was conducted in accordance with revised Inspection Procedure 71111.05, Fire Protection, dated 03/06/03, and the NRC Reactor Oversight Process.
The inspection team focused their review on the separation of the systems and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown and fire protection features of these plant areas. The team used IPEEE data, with assistance from the RiI Senior Risk Analyst, to identify risk significant plant areas and components among those with the highest CDFs and CCDPs.
The fire areas/fire zones chosen for review during this inspection are:
- 1. Fire Area 4 - Auxiliary Building Common Area: This fire area is common to Unit 1 and Unit 2. Alternative shutdown from the standby shutdown facility (SSF) using the standby shutdown system (SSS) is credited for safe shutdown for a fire in this area.
- 2. Fire Area 13 - Battery Rooms: This fire area is common to both units. Altemative shutdown from the SSF using the SSS is credited for a fire in this area.
- 3. Fire Area 16/18 - Unit 2 Train A 4160 Volt Switchgear Room: Unit 2 shutdown from the main control room (MCR) using Train B equipment is credited for a fire in this area.
- 4. Fire Area 24 - Control Room: This fire area is common to both units. MCR evacuation and alternative shutdown from the SSF using the SSS is credited for a fire in this area.
INSPECTION RESULTS: Two Findings involving violations of NRC requirements, four URls, and one observation were identified. Two of the URls may involve evaluations to determine if backfits should be pursued.
Finding No. 1 The turbine driven AFW suction supply motor operated valve 2CA007A was not evaluated in the licensee's Fire Protection Program (i.e., safe shutdown analysis) for potential impact on safe shutdown in the event of a fire in fire areas where the turbine driven AFW pump is needed for safe shutdown. PIPs M-03-02084, M-03-02118, M-03-02311 initiated to address various aspects of this findings. A revision to Procedure AP/01NA5500145, Plant Fire, was issued to include a step for operators to assure that valve 2CA007A is open and de-energize within the
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first 10 minutes of a fire. Finding still being evaluated for significance. Awaiting additional information requested from licensee.
Finding No. 2 A Green NCV was identified for the licensee's use of manual operator actions outside the MCR for 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 areas (Fire Area 18 for this inspection) without prior NRC approval. Manual operator actions were used in lieu of physical protection of cables and equipment relied on for SSD during a fire. This was not in accordance with the approved Fire Protection Program. The licensee initiated PIP M-03-02311 to address this issue. This finding is More Than Minor. (NOTE: The NRC and the Nuclear industry are working to resolve this issue on a generic basis).
Unresolved Items
- 1) RCS Pressure Control from the standby shutdown facility (SSF) during a fire - The team questioned if the pressurizer heater capacity (70 KW) powered from the SSF was adequate to maintain and control RCS pressure in hot standby; the team also questioned the licensee's procedural guidance in AP/2/A/5500124 which allows the pressurizer to go water solid for controlling RCS pressure during hot standby conditions if pressure cannot be maintained with the pressurizer heaters. Water solid operation from the SSF is not consistent with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section Ill.L for alternative shutdown, nor is it consistent with the licensee's fire protection licensing basis discussed in SER Supplement 6 dated February 1983. The licensee stated that there was no calculation that provided the basis for the number of heaters powered from the SSF.
Also, the licensee did not provide a calculation/analysis which demonstrated that the standby makeup pump had adequate capacity to achieve and control solid plant operation from the SSF. This issue is Unresolved pending NRC review of additional information that was requested from the licensee.
- 2) Lack of Fire Detection in HVAC Equipment room 805A (HVAC supply for Unit 2 Train A 4160Vswitchgearroom 2ETA). This room was listed in the licensee's fire hazards analysis as having no detection. The NRC reviewed and approved the FHA. However, it appears that information regarding the contents of room 805A was not provided to the NRC for review prior to NRC's approval of the FHA. For example, the FHA did not state that the room has a moderate to high fire loading which consists primarily of cables (including some Train B cables). This issue is Unresolved pending further NRC review to determine if the additional Information regarding room 805A requires adding fire detection to the room, and if so, does this require a 10 CFR 50.109 backfit evaluation.
PIPs M-03-02091, M-03-02106 were initiated to address this issue. (Note: This finding also applies to room 803A, which Is the HVAC supply for Unit I Train A 4160V switchgear room 1ETA).
- 3) Number of Spurious Operations that Must be Postulated During a Fire - The team identified an URI involving the number of concurrent spurious operations that must be postulated (e.g., the PORVs/PORV Block Valves). The licensee's analysis assumed that only one spurious operation due to fire need be postulated. This assumption is not consistent with the NRC requirement for protection of cables. (Note: Licensee's 2
a position Isconsistent with that of the Nuclear Industry). This issue Is Unresolved pending further NRC review.
- 4) Fire Areas Designated as 10 CFR 50, Appendix R,Section III.G.3 areas do not meet the Requirements of Section III.G.3 for Having Detection and Fixed Suppression - This issue has been reviewed previously by the NRC and was dosed based on a deterministic review. This Issue will be reviewed further using risk Insights to determine
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-- 50109 evaluation should be pursued.
PI&R Observation Adequacy and timeliness of corrective actions to address fire protection audit findings regarding fire detection in the Battery Rooms (Fire Area 13) were not commensurate with the risk significance associated with a fire Inthis area. The licensee's IPEEE identified that a fire In the Battery Rooms ranked as the top contributor to CDF. The fire detection findings were Identified in a 1999 licensee self-Initiated technical audit (SITA) SA-99-04. However, the Initial modification scope was Inadequate Inthat only two additional detectors were to be Installed In the Battery Rooms (instead of 9 required to comply with the NFPA Code). Additionally, the modification Implementation date was postponed at least twice. Also, the licensee had initiated PIP M-03-01675 (dated 4110/03) regarding detectors not being installed In accordance with NFPA codes. When the Battery Rooms were selected by the team during the pre-inspection S information gathering visit, the team noted that the modification was revised to install the required number of detectors and received high priority status for implementation. The Battery Room detectors were Installed prior to the first week of the onsite inspection (5/5-9/03).
In additionto the PiPswritten for the findings and URis above, otherPiPs were written as a result of this Inspection. The PiPs were evaluated againstand determined to meet the NRC criteriafor minor findingsvblatlonsand will not be discussedIn the IR details.
M-03-02086 Discrepancy between Appendix R DBD and Procedure AP12/A/5500/24 M-03-02092 Discrepancy between drawings and fire pre-plans for fire hose lengths M-03-02093 Drawing discrepancy for as-built configuration of HVAC Equipment Room 805A M-03-02115 Appendix R logic diagrams not updated to show function of valve 2CA002 M-03-02249 Detector zones 203 and 204 not in SLC 16.9.6, Table 16.9.6-1 M-03-02275 Calculation (MCC 1223.48-00-0030) In support of sprinkler system design over the Nuclear Service Water Pumps needs revising M-03-02294 SLC Table 16.9.7-1 appears to be missing some Information M-03-02327 Calculation MCC-1435.03-00-0002 contained deleted pages that were not marked as being deleted 3
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, U URI 50-369,370/00-09-01, Potential for Loss of AFW Flow for a Fire In Fire Areas 2 and 14 URI 50-369,370/00-09-02, Potential for Pressurizer PORV Actuations URI 50-369,370/00-09-03. Availability of the Charging Pumps for Fire Damage to the Volume
-- ControLThnWQiM OutlValves _ _
(Closed) URI 50-369,370/00-09-04, Adequacy of the Fire Rating of Mineral Insulated Cables in Lieu of Thermo-Lag Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems URI 50-369,370/009-05, Adequacy of HEMYC Cable Wrap Fire Barrier Qualification Tests and Evaluations to Scope Installed Configurations LESSONS LEARNED:
Successes:
- Followed up on five open items - closed one of the items
- Nuclear Safety Interns Involvementlsupport for open items and assigned Inspection areas (Note: Rodney Fanner conducted portions of the entrance/exit meeting to satisfy Inspectorqualificatlonrequirements)
Experience/knowledge of Fire Protection Contractor Inspector TFPI team provided site coverage (515-8/03) while resident Inspectors attended the Resident Inspectors Counterpart Meeting Inthe Regional Office
- W information on RCP seal water flow Challenaes:
- Adequate Inspection preparation time for team lead 4