Text

Watt Bar Nuclear Plant (Wbn), Unit 1 - Update to the WBN Fire Protection Report
	ML041130357
Person / Time
Site:	Watts Bar
Issue date:	04/19/2004
From:	Pace P; Tennessee Valley Authority
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	Download: ML041130357 (110)
	v • d • e

Tennessee Valley Authority, Post Office Box 2000, Spring City, Tennessee 37381-2000 APR 19 2004 10 CFR 50.71 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN:

Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.

20555 Gentlemen:

In the Matter of

)

Docket No. 50-390 Tennessee Valley Authority

)

WATTS BAR NUCLEAR PLANT (WBN) UNIT 1 -

UPDATE TO THE WBN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT (FPR)

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.71, please find enclosed an update to the WBN FPR.

This update includes FPR, Revisions 22 through 27 which have been made since the last update dated September 19, 2002.

In accordance with Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2001-05 dated January 25, 2001, one copy of the enclosure is being provided to the Document Control Desk.

There are no new regulatory commitments made by this submittal.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (423) 365-1824.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

Executed on 19th day of April 2004.

Sincerely, P.

ace Manager, Licensing and Industry Affairs Enclosure cc:

See page 2 AOD4k P-ted wwyn leCW paw

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 2 APR 19 2004 cc (Enclosure):

NRC Resident Inspector Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381 Ms. Margaret H. Chernoff, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MS 08G9 One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Page 3 APR 19 2004 PLP:RAS Enclosure cc (Enclosure):

NRC Resident Inspector Watts Bar Nuclear Plant 1260 Nuclear Plant Road Spring City, Tennessee 37381 Ms. Margaret H. Chernoff, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission MS 08G9 One White Flint North 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, Maryland 20852-2738 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 C. E. Ayers, SP 2B-C L. S. Bryant, MOB 2R-WBN M. J. Burzynski, BR 4X-C P. W. Harris, ADM lV-WBN T. W. Johnson, SP 2B-C J. C. Kanmeyer, EQB IA-WBN G. J. Laughlin, MOB 2R-WBN J. E. Maddox, LP 6A-C N. M. Moon, EQB IA-WBN T. J. Niessen, LP 6A-C NSRB Support, LP 5M-C L. V. Parscale, ADM IB-WBN J. A. Scalice, LP 6A-C K. W. Singer, LP 6A-C J. E. Semelsberger, EQB 2W-WBN E. J. Vigluicci, ET 1OA-K J. A. West, MOB 2R-WBN Sequoyah Licensing Files, OPS 4C-SQN EDMS, WT 3B-K M:\\SUBMIT\\Fire Protection Report Update.RAS.doc

FILING INSTRUCTIONS FOR WATTS BAR FIRE PROTECTION REPORT, REVISIONS 22, 23, 24,25,26 and 27 Remove Insert Fire Protection Cover Title Page, Revision 21 Fire Protection Cover Title Page, Revision 27 P Revision Log R22 through R27 Pages i ugh xv Pages i through xv Pa.

YrINl Pages 1-5 through I-8 Pages I-5 through I-8 Pages I-50 through I-16 Pages I-10 through I-16 Pages H-20 through II-21 Pages 1-40 through 6-21 Pages 11-25 through 11-26 Pages 11-25 through 11-26 Page II-46 Page II-46 Pages II-51 through II-52 Pages II-51 through II-52 Page II-55 Page II-55 Page II-57 Page II-57 Page II-59 Page 11-59 Page II-72 Page II-72 Page II-76 Page II-76 Page II-80 Page 11-80 Pages II-82 through II-83 Pages II-82 through II-83 Page II-88 Page 11-88 Pages II-96 through 11-19 Pages 11-96 through 11-19 Figures II-1, II-3, 11-13, 11-23, II-24 Figures II-1, 11-3, II-13, 1I-23, II-24 Page HII-20 Page III-20 Page III-56 Page III-56 Pages III-58 through III-59 Pages III-58 through III-59 Page 111-62 Page II-62 Page III-71 Page III-71 Pages VI-i through VI-xii Pages VI-i through VI-xii Page VI-5 Page VI-5 Page VI-13 Page VI-13

FILING INSTRUCTIONS FOR WATTS BAR FIRE PROTECTION REPORT, REVISIONS 22, 23, 24,25,26 and 27 Remove 1

Insert l

Page VI-30 Page VI-30 Page VI-32 Page VI-32 Page VI-55 Page VI-55 Page VI-149 Page VI-149 Page VI-159 Page VI-159 Page VI-166 Page VI-166 Page VI-169 Page VI-169 Pages VI-453 through VI-454 Pages VI-453 through VI-454 Page '\\1-119 Page VIII-l9 j

TVAN FIRE PROTECTION REPORT APPROVAL PAGE NUCLEAR PLANT FIRE PROTECTION REPORT Revision No.

27 Effective Date:

Revision Sponsor:

SE Mech Ernest T. Haston 47amaon

-0m Change Approval Action Type of Impacts Action Complete R

Organization Needed?

Action (see noe 1)

(Name / Signature)

Date 1

N/A Change Initiator NWA Ernest T. Haston

/

N/A 2

SE - MiN Progran Yes T & Reviews3 s

0T Owner No 0Ernest T. Haston

______o//4 3

SE-EEProgram Yes T & I Review 2 Yes J Owe N

9 Julio GomezI 4

OPS Procedures Yes T & IReviews 2 No E 5

OPS Fire Protoction Yes T & I Reviews 2 yes E[

_______No o

Paul R. BurrgardnerI 6

OPS FP System Yes T & IReviews 2 Ye E koh Engineer Yes No b ohn G. Sterchi eN 3/25/4 7

OPS FP System Note4 T&liReviews 2 Yes 0 Engineer aZ6____

No

\\j W

LpE&-Atiao 8

Note 3 Impact Review Yes

/

9 Plant Manager Yes Approval NWA 1.

2.

3.

4.

Record any Impacts of the FPR change on form FPDP-3-2, TVAN FPR Revision Impacts Technical review of the FPR change and also impact review If change Is outside the design change process.

Additional Impact reviews - as determined needed by sponsor or technical reviewers. N/A rows not needed.

If more than one system/system engineer Is affected by the change.

TVA 40706 [I D2002]

Page 1 of 1 FPDP-3-1 [1D.25-2002]

REVISION

Title:

WBN Fire Protection Report LOG Revision DATE No.

DESCRIPTION OF REVISION APPROVED This revision to the Fire Protection Report adds a deviation to address minor 20 leakage around the RCP oil collection System, and is part of the corrective 3-22-2002 action for PER 01-012111.

The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the Revision Log for Rev. 20.

This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:

Pages added: VII-20 through VII-22 Pages revised: VII-1, IX-20 Pages renumbered: VII-23 through VII-58 This revision to the Fire Protection Report removes the requirement to 21 perform a periodic functional test of door WBN-0-DOOR 410-A036, which was 8-29-2002 permanently locked closed as part of the improved Security Plan.

The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the revision log for Rev. 21.

This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:

Pages Added: none Pages Revised: 11-129,11-132 Pages Renumbered: none 22 This revision to the Fire Protection Report adds OR-14.5.3 and its associated bases information, removes duplicate listings for 1-FCV-1-275 and -277 from 12-6-2002 Table 14.10, and corrects the format in OR-14.3.1.b.2 for readability.

The Licensing Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the revision log for Rev. 22.

This change revises the title for sections associated with Part II, Section 14.10. This title has been revised to add uFire" to make it more descriptive.

This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:

Pages Added: 11-96 Pages Revised: iv, 11-46,11-55,11-57,11-59,11-110,11-112,11-140 to 11-143 Pages Renumbered: 11-97 through 11-143 This revision of the Fire Protection Report notes the installation of an anti-23 static mat at Panel 1-M-13.

2-3-2003 The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the revision log for Rev. 23.

This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:

Pages Added: None Pages Revised: xii, VIII-19 Pages Renumbered: None

Title:

WBN Fire Protection Report LOG Revision l

No.

DESCRIPTION OF REVISION APPROVED This revision of the Fire Protection Report corrects discrepancies between the 24 ORs section in 14.1.4.a, 14.3.1.a, and 14.3.1.b.1 and the Basis for these ORs.

5-8-2003 Modified the B.14.3.1 for the reference to TS SON TS 3.3.3.8, which has been deleted. Corrected elev. For PASF in Table 14.1. Corrected UNID FOR 1-PCV-68-340B in TIR item 14.10.f.

The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the revision log for Rev. 24.

This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below:

Pages Added: None Pages Revised: x, 11-55,11-72,11-76,11-88,11-118 Pages Renumbered: None This revision of the Fire Protection Report, Part 11 provides clarification of the 25 requirements associated with OR-14.2.1.c.

9-18-2003 Pages Added: None Pages Revised: 11-51, 11-80 Pages Renumbered: None This revision of the Fire Protection Report notes the disconnection of the Unit 26 2 120V AC Vital Inverters (2-INV-235-1, -2, -3, -4) and the installation of the 3-2-2004 480V AC Vital Disconnect Panels (0-PNL-236-1 -S, S, S, S).

The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the Revision Log for Rev. 26.

This change revises pages as noted below:

Pages Added: None Pages Revised: Table of Contents (pages i through xiv), 111-20,111-56 Paqes Renumbered: None PER 03-001902-000 (6666) identified that the Fire Protection Report (FPR)in 27 Part 1, page 1-7 and Part VI, pages VI-166 and VI-169, indicates the Unit 1 4-7-2004 North and South Steam Valve Rooms have thermal detection. This detection was abandoned in place by DCN M-38746. The FPR is being revised to delete the thermal detection in Unit 1 North and South Steam Valve Rooms.

PER 03-003890-000 (6869) identified that some discrepancies between the room listings in the FPR Table 1-1 and Part VI Table of Contents (TOC). Only Part VI TOC is being revised to correct the room listings to agree with Table 1-1. Based on this review, the FPR Table 1-1 was revised to correct the Fire Area name for Unit 2, and to add Fire Area Duct Banks.

PER 04-000373-000 (12976) identified that during performance of an inspection, the blast doors to Unit 2 Reactor Building were ajar. Engineering evaluation for these doors found that the detection system should be included in Part 11, Table 14.1

REVISION

Title:

WBN Fire Protection Report LOG Reviion No.

DESCRIPTION OF REVISION APPROVED PER 03-014910-000 (8497) identified that Revision 3 to FPDP-3, 27 Management Of The Fire Protection Report removed the requirement for (cont'd)

PORC review of the Fire Protection Report (FPR), however FPR Part II, section 8.1 a. which states that PORC reviews changes to the FPR was not revised. This section has been revised to agree with FPDP-3 and regulatory guidance.

PER 03-020146-000 (12878) identified that valve 0-PCV-26-18 controls the pressure on System 26 when an electric motor driven fire pump(s) is running.

Due to problems with 0-PCV-26-18 failing to control pressure properly, 0-PCV-26-18 was isolated. To prevent the automatic starting of the electric motor driven fire pumps and relying on the pumps' relief valves to control pressure, the FPS circuit was defeated without entering Operation Requirement (OR) 14.2.3. The defeat of the FPS circuit without entry into an OR is allowed by the FPR, as specified in the bases 8.14.2 to support testing. This same justification was used to defeat the FPS circuit for this maintenance issue.

NCV 50-390/2003-05-01. For completeness and clarity, Section 14.2.8 and B14.2.8 has been added to allow for maintenance of the motor driven fire pumps.

In addition to the PERs, (1) FPR in Part II, page 11-109, 'Bases-Testing and Inspection Requirements (TIR) Emergency Battery Lighting Units" contained a reference to the vendor recommendation and NFPA consensus standard 101 criteria for frequency. Reference to NFPA was deleted. (2) Section 9.1 and 9.5 were revised to add a response within the WBN Reservation to protect offsite power as another example of an emergency that would prevent the brigade from being available onsite. (3) Section 10.0 was revised to reference site administrative procedures instead of fire protection engineer.

eCAP PER numbers are in parenthesis.

The License Condition Impact Evaluation for this revision follows the revision log for Revision 27.

This change revises the Effective Page Listing and additional pages as noted below Pages Added: 1-16, VI-x - VI-xii Pages Revised: x, 1 1-8,1-10,1 1-15, 11-20,11-25, 11-21, 11-26, 11-52,11-82, 11-83,11-109,11-119,111-58,111-59,111-62, 111-71, VI-i - VI-ix, VI-5, VI-13, VI-30, VI-32, VI-55, VI-1 49, VI-1 59, VI-166, VI-169, VI-453 Paces Deleted: None

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS.....................

i LIST OF TABLES......................

iv LIST OF FIGURES v

LIST OF ACRONYMS.......................

vii LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES....................

x I

INTRODUCTION 1.0 Background.........................

1-1 2.0 Purpose.........................

1-1 3.0 Scope.........................

1-1 4.0 Summary Compliance Table.........................

1-3 11 FIRE PROTECTION PLAN

1.0 Purpose and Scope

11.-

2.0 Objective of the Fire Protection Plan 11.-

3.0 Basis of the Fire Protection Plan 1.l-4.0 References.11-2 5.0 Definitions.11-7 6.0 Fire Protection Quality Assurance.11-15 7.0 Fire Protection Organization/Programs.11-16 8.0 Fire Protection Program Administrative and Technical Controls.11-20 9.0 Emergency Response.11-21 10.0 Control of Combustibles.11-25 11.0 Control of Ignition Sources.11-26 12.0 Description of Fire Protection Systems and Features.11-27 13.0 Fire Protection System Impairments and Compensatory Actions.11-40 s

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS 11 FIRE PROTECTION PLAN (Continued) 14.0 Fire Protection Systems and Features Operating Requirements (OR)............................

11-47 Testing and Inspection Requirements............................

11-60 Bases............................

11-74 III SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES 1.0 Introduction.

111-1 2.0 Safe Shutdown Functions.111-3 3.0 Analysis of Safe Shutdown Systems.111-4 4.0 Safe Shutdown Systems.111-10 5.0 Identification of Safe Shutdown System Components.111-23 6.0 Identification of Safe Shutdown Circuits and Cables.111-24 7.0 Associated Circuits of Concern.111-25 8.0 High/Low Pressure Boundary Interfaces.

111-30 9.0 Location of Safe Shutdown Equipment, Cables and Raceways.111-32 10.0 Safe Shutdown System Separation Evaluation Methodology.111-32 IV ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITY 1.0 Introduction..............................

IV-1 2.0 Discussion..............................

IV-1 3.0 Alternate Control Room Capabilities..............................

IV-1 V

MANUAL ACTIONS, REPAIRS AND EMERGENCY LIGHTING 1.0 Introduction.V-1 2.0 Manual Actions.V-1 3.0 Cold Shutdown Repairs.V-7 4.0 Emergency Lighting.V-8 ii

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS VI FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Fire Hazards Analysis Table of Contents.......

VI-i 1.0 Introduction............................

VI-1 2.0 Fire Hazards Analysis Structure............................

VI-1 3.0 Fire Area Hazards Analysis............................

VI-5 VII DEVIATIONS AND EVALUATIONS 1.0 Introduction.

VII-1 2.0 Deviations to 10CFR50 Appendix R.

VII-1 3.0 Engineering Evaluations.

VII-23 4.0 Deviations to BTP 9.5-1 Appendix A............................ VII-38 5.0 NFPA Code Deviations.VII-46 6.0 General Engineering Evaluations.

VII-49 - Sprinkler System Criteria for Resolving Intervening Combustible Concerns........................

VII-57 VIII CONFORMANCE TO APPENDIX A TO BTP 9.5-1 GUIDELINES IX APPENDIX R COMPLIANCE MATRIX X

NFPA CODE EVALUATION 1.0 Introduction.X-1 2.0 Scope.X-1 3.0 Applicable NFPA Codes.X-2 4.0 NFPA Code Conformance Summary Compliance List.

X-9 iii

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT LIST OF TABLES I

INTRODUCTION Table 1-1 Summary Compliance Fire Protection Conformance............................................................................. 1-5 11 FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Table 14.1 Fire Detection Instrumentation.11-112 Table 14.3 Water Based Fire Suppression.11-122 Table 14.5 Fire Detection Panels.11-123 Table 14.6 Fire Hose Stations 1.1-124 Table 14.7 Fire Hydrants.11-127 Table 14.8.1 Fire Doors.11-128 Table 14.8.2 Fire Dampers.11-132 Table 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment.11-138 III SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Table 3-1 Safe Shutdown Systems and Subsystems by Key................ 111-40 Table 3-2 Safe Shutdown Equipment List.............................................. 111-41 Table 3-3 Analysis Volume by Fire Area List......................................... 111-58 VI FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Table 6-1 Local Manual Operator Actions and Main Control Room Operator Actions for All Avs.......................... VI-529 Table 6-2 Manual Actions Required for Spurious SI/Cl Signals.VI-531 Table 6-3 Required RHR Initiation Times.VI-537

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT LIST OF FIGURES 11 FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Figure 11-1 Figure 11-2 Figure 11-3 Figure 11-4 Figure 11-5 Figure 11-6 Figure 11-7 Figure 11-8 Figure 11-9 Figure 11-10 Figure 11-1 1 Figure 11-12 Figure 11-13 Figure 11-14 Figure 11-15 Figure 11-16 Figure 11-17 Figure 11-1 8 Figure 11-19 Figure 11-20 Figure 11-21 Figure 11-22 Figure 11-23 Figure 11-24 Figure 11-25 Figure 11-26 Figure 11-27 Figure 11-28 Figure 11-29 Figure 11-30 Figure 11-31 Figure 11-32 Figure 11-33 Figure 11-34 Figure 11-35 Figure 11-36 Figure 11-37 Figure 11-38 Figure 11-39 Figure 11-40 Turbine Building Flow Diagram Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram Auxiliary Building and Diesel Generator Building Flow Diagram Powerhouse and Control Building Flow Diagram Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram Turbine Building, 5th Diesel Generator Building, Security Backup Power Building and Make-Up Water Treatment Plant Flow Diagram Yard Flow Diagram Intake Pumping Station Flow Diagram Powerhouse and Yard Flow Diagram Diesel Generator Building Flow Diagram Powerhouse and Yard Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse and Yard Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Diesel Generator Building Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram Diesel Generator Building Electrical Logic Diagram Auxiliary Bldg Compartmentation EL 676 Auxiliary Bldg Compartmentation EL 692 Auxiliary Bldg Compartment EL 708 & 713 Auxiliary Bldg Compartment EL 729 & 737 Auxiliary Bldg Compartment EL 755 & 757 Auxiliary Bldg Compartment EL 772 & 786 Control Bldg Compartment EL 692 & 708 Control Bldg Compartment EL 729 & 755 Diesel Generator Bldg Compartmentation Intake Pumping Station Compartmentation Additional Diesel Generator Building Compartmentation Auxiliary and Reactor Buildings Compartmentation EL 729 & 737 Containment Compartmentation EL 702 Containment Compartmentation EL 716 V

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT LIST OF FIGURES III SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Figure 111-1 Figure 111-2 Figure 111-3 Figure 111-4 Figure 111-5 Appendix R Safe Shutdown/Interaction Analysis Flow Chart Analysis Model and Logics Analysis Volumes Appendix R Interaction Analysis Flow Chart Appendix R Safe Shutdown Logic Diagram vi

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT LIST OF ACRONYMS AB Auxiliary Building ABGTS Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System ACR Auxiliary Control Room ADGB Additional Diesel Generator Building AFFF Aqueous Film Forming Foam AFW Auxiliary Feedwater AHJ Authority Having Jurisdiction ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable ANSI American National Standards Institute ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM American Society of Testing and Materials AV Analysis Volume BIT Boron Injection Tank BTP Branch Technical Position BTU British Thermal Unit BWR Boiling Water Reactor CB Control Building CCP Centrifugal Charging Pump CCRS Computerized Cable Routing System CCS Component Cooling System CCTV Closed Circuit Television CCZ Combustible Control Zone CDWE Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator Cl Containment Isolation CIV Containment Isolation Valve CPU Central Processor Unit CRDM Control Rod Drive Mechanism CRT Cathode Ray Tube CST Condensate Storage Tank CSST Common Station Service Transformers CT Current Transformer CVCS Chemical and Volume Control System DBA Design Basis Accident DBE Design Basis Event DCN Design Change Notice DGB Diesel Generator Building ECCS Emergency Core Cooling System EDGB Emergency Diesel Generator Building EGTS Emergency Gas Treatment System EPS Emergency Power System ERCW Essential Raw Cooling Water ERFBS Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier System ETL Electro-Thermo Link FD Fire Department vii

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT LIST OF ACRONYMS FHA Fire Hazards Analysis FP Fire Protection FPP Fire Protection Program FPR Fire Protection Report FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report FSB Field Services Building FSSD Fire Safe Shutdown GDC General Design Criteria HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Absorption HPFP High Pressure Fire Protection HVAC Heating, Ventilation and Air-Conditioning IPEEE Individual Plant Examination for External Events IPS Intake Pumping Station LCC Lower Compartment Cooling LOCA Loss of Coolant Accident MCC Motor Control Center MCR Main Control Room MOV Motor Operated Valve NELPIA Nuclear Energy Liability and Property Insurance Agency NER Nuclear Experience Review NFPA National Fire Protection Association NIOSH National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NSRB Nuclear Safety Review Board OR Operating Requirement OS&Y Outside Screw and Yoke OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration PIV Post Indicator Valve PORC Plant Operations Review Committee PORV Power-Operated Relief Valve PRT Pressurizer Relief Tank PWR Pressurized Water Reactor QA Quality Assurance RADCON Radiological Control RB Reactor Building RCP Reactor Coolant Pump RCS Reactor Coolant System RCW Raw Cooling Water RHR Residual Heat Removal RPS Reactor Protection System RSW Raw Service Water RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SBPB Security Backup Power Building SER Safety Evaluation Report viii

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT LIST OF ACRONYMS SG Steam Generator Si Safety Injection SSEL Safe Shutdown Equipment List TB Turbine Building TDAFWP Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump TIR Testing and Inspection Requirements TSC Technical Support Center TSOB Temporary Storage and Office Building UL Underwriters' Laboratories VCT Volume Control Tank

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Pages i through xv.............................................................. Rev 27 Part I Pages 1-1 through 1-4..................

Rev 10 Pages 1-5 through 1-8..................

Rev 27 Page 1-9..................

Rev 10 Page 1-10 through 1-11..................

Rev 27 Pages 1-12 through 1-16..................

Rev 27 Part 11 Pages 11-1 through 11-10..................

Rev 11 Page 1-1l1....................

Rev 17 Pages 11-12 through 11-18....................

Rev 11 Page 11-19..................

Rev 19 Pages 11-20 through 11-21..................

Rev 27 Pages 11-22 through 11-24..................

Rev 11 Pages 11-25 through 11-26..................

Rev 27 Pages 11-27 through 11-40..................

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Rev 12 Pages 11-42 through 11-43..................

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Rev 12 Page 11-46..................

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Rev 22 Page 1-109..................

Rev 27 Pages 1-110 through 11-117..................

Rev 22 x

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page 11-118...................

Rev 24 Page 11-119...................

Rev 27 Pages11-120 through 11-143.....................

Rev 12 Part III Pages 111-1 through 111-19...................

Rev 10 Page 111-20...................

Rev 26 Pages 111-21 through 111-40...................

Rev 10 Pages 111-41 through 111-48....................

Rev 11 Page 111-49....................

Rev 14 Pages 111-50 through 111-55....................

Rev 11 Page 111-56...................

Rev 26 Page 111-57...................

Rev 11 Pages 111-58 through 111-59...................

Rev 27 Pages 111-60 through 111-61...................

Rev 10 Page 111-62...................

Rev 27 Pages 111-63 through 111-70...................

Rev 10 Page 111-71...................

Rev 27 Pages 111-72 through 111-75...................

Rev 10 Part IV Pages IV-1 through IV-4...................

Rev 10 Part V Page V-1...................

Rev 10 Page V-2...................

Rev 13 Page V-3....................

Rev 10 Page V-4......

Rev 13 Pages V-5 through V-7..................

Rev 10 Page V-8..................

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Rev 10 Part VI Pages VI-i through VI-xii..................

Rev 27 Pages VI-1 through VI-4..................

Rev 10 Page Vt-5..................

Rev 27 Pages VI-6 through VI-12....................

Rev 10 Pages VI-13..................

Rev 27 Pages VI-14 through VI-16..................

Rev 10 Pages VI-17 through VI-18..................

Rev 11 Pages VI-19 through VI-29..................

Rev 10 Page VI-30..................

Rev 27 Page VI-31..................

Rev 13 Page VI-32..................

Rev 27 Page VI 33 through VI-38..................

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Rev 10 xi

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Page VI-99....................

Rev 14 Pages Vl-1 00 through V-1 02.Rev 10 Page VI-103.Rev 11 Pages Vt-1 04 through V-1 07.Rev 10 Page VI-108.Rev11 Pages Vl-1 09 Through VI-113.Rev 10 Page VI-114.Rev14 Pages VI-1 15 through V-1 16.Rev 10 Page VI-117.Rev14 Pages Vt-1 18 through V-1 20.Rev 10 Page VI-121.Rev14 Pages Vt-1 22 through VI-123.Rev 10 Page VI-124.Rev14 Pages VI-125 through Vl-142.Rev 10 Page VI-143.Rev11 Pages Vl-1 44 through VI-148.Rev 10 Page VI-149.Rev 27 Page VI-150.Rev 12 Page VI-151.Rev11 Pages Vt-1 52 through V-1 58.Rev 10 Page V-1 59.Rev 27 Pages Vt-1 60 through V-1 65.Rev 10 Page V-1 66.Rev 27 Pages Vt-1 67 through V-1 68.Rev 10 Page VI-1 69.Rev 27 Pages Vt-1 70 through V-1 79.Rev 10 Pages Vt-1 80 through V-1 81.Rev 11 Pages Vt-1 82 through VI-186.Rev 10 Page V-187.Rev 14 Pages Vt-1 88 through V-196.Rev 10 Page V-197.Rev11 Pages Vt-1 98 through Vl-200.Rev 10 Page Vl-201.Rev 11 Pages VI-202 through Vl-212.Rev 10 Page Vl-213.Rev11 Pages Vl-214 through Vl-216.Rev 10 Page V-217.Rev 14 Page V-218.Rev 13 Pages Vl-219 through Vl-236.Rev 10 Pages Vt-237 through 238.Rev 11 Pages Vi-239 through VI-252.Rev 10 Page Vl-253.Rev 11 Pages Vl-254 through Vl-289.Rev 10 Page VI-290.Rev 11 Pages Vl-291 through Vl-304.Rev 10 Page VI-305.Rev 14 xii

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Pages VI-306 through VI-335......

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.............. Rev 27 Pages Vl-455 through Vl-463......

.............. Rev 10 Page VI-464.....................

Rev 11 Page VI-465 through VI-537....................

Rev 10 Part VII Page VI1-1....................

Rev 20 Pages V11-2 through VII-19....................

Rev 10 Pages VII-20 through VII-58.....................

Rev 20 Part Vill Pages VIII-1 through VIII-19....................

Rev 10 Page VIII-19....................

Rev 23 Pages ViI1-20 through 74....................

Rev 10 Part IX Pages IX-1 through IX-19....................

Rev 10 Page IX-20.....................

Rev 20 Page IX-21.....................

Rev 10 Part X Pages X-1 through 68....................

Rev 10 Figure 11-1 Turbine Building Flow Diagram Figure 11-2 Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram Figure 11-3 Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram Figure 11-4 Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram Figure 11-5 Auxiliary Building and Diesel Generator Building Flow Diagram Figure 11-6 Powerhouse and Control Building Flow Diagram Figure 11-7 Auxiliary Building Flow Diagram xiii

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Figure 11-8 Figure 11-9 Figure 11-10 Figure 11-1 1 Figure 11-12 Figure 11-13 Figure 11-14 Figure 11-15 Figure 11-16 Figure 11-17 Figure 11-18 Figure 11-19 Figure 11-20 Figure 11-21 Figure 11-22 Figure 11-23 Figure 11-24 Figure 11-25 Figure 11-26 Figure 11-27 Figure 11-28 Figure 11-29 Turbine Bldg., 5 h Diesel Generator Bldg.,

Security Backup Power Bldg., and Make-Up Water Treatment Plant Flow Diagram Yard Flow Diagram Intake Pumping Station Flow Diagram Powerhouse and Yard Flow Diagram Diesel Generator Bldg Flow Diagram Powerhouse and Yard Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse and Yard Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Control Diagram Diesel Generator Building Electrical Control Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram Powerhouse Electrical Logic Diagram Diesel Generator Building Electrical Logic Diagram Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 676 Auxiliary Building Compartmentation EL 692 Auxiliary Bldg Compartmentation EL 708&713 XV

Rev. 27 FIRE PROTECTION REPORT LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES Figure 11-30 Figure 11-31 Figure 11-32 Figure 11-33 Figure 11-34 Figure 11-35 Figure 11-36 Figure 11-37 Figure 11-38 Figure 11-39 Figure 11-40 Figure 111-1 Figure 111-2 Figure 111-3 Figure 111-4 Figure 111-5 Auxiliary Bldg Compartmentation EL 729 & 737 Auxiliary Bldg Compartmentation EL 755&757 Auxiliary Bldg Compartment EL 772, 782 & 786 Control Building Compartmentation EL 692&708 Control Building Compartmentation EL 729&755 Diesel Generator Building Compartmentation Intake Pumping Station Compartmentation Additional Diesel Generator Building Compartmentation Auxiliary and Reactor Buildings Compartmentation EL 729 & 737 Containment Compartmentation EL 702 Containment Compartmentation EL 716 Appendix R Safe Shutdown/interaction Analysis Flow Chart........................................

Rev 10 Analysis Model and Logics........................................

Rev 10 Analysis Volumes........................................

Rev 10 Appendix R Interaction Analysis Flow Chart....................... Rev 10 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Logic Diagram........................ Rev 10 xv

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-1

SUMMARY

COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE Rev. 27 Automatic Automatic CSD Repairs Man. Ops. req'd In Safe Shutdown Detection Suppression Fire Combustible Deviation Evaluatlon req'd In any any room due to Equipment or

YIN, YIN, Rated Load, Fire Number In Number In room due to fire In room Room Number and Name Cables YIN Full/Partial Fuli/PartIal Wraps Severity Section VII Section Vii fire In room FIRE AREA 1:

674.0-Al Waste Holdup Tank Room No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 674.0-A2 Waste Evap. Feed Pump Room No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 676.0-Al Corridor Yes es Full No 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months

< 10 minutes 2.6 3.1 Yes Yes 676.0-A2 Holdup Tank Room A No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 676.0-A3 Holdup Tank Room B No No No No

< 5 minutes 2.6 3.1 676.0-A4 Floor Drain Coil. Pump/Fltr Room No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 676.0-A4a Floor Drain Coll. Tank Room No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 676.0-A5 Gas Stripper Feed Pump Room No Yes Full No No

< 10 minutes 3.1 676.0-A6 Spare No Yes Full No No

< 60 minutes 3.1 676.0-A7 Spare No No No No

< 60 minutes 3.1 676.0-A8 Containment Spray Pump 6-B Yese s

s Partial No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 676.0-As Containment Spray Pump 1A-A Yes Yes Partial No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 676.0-A16 Pipe Gallery Yes Yes Full No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 Yes Yes 692.0-Al Corridor (Subdivided into Analysis Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

< 90 minutes 2.4,2.6 3.1 Yes Yes Volumes 692.0-AIAl, AlA2. AIA3, AlAN, (except in Enhanced (Tunnel to AIBN, AlB, AND A1C) tunnel to (except In RWST)

RWST) tunnel to RWST) 692.0-A2 Valve Gallery No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 692.0-A3 Gas Deca Tank Room No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 692.0-A4 Chemical Drain Tank Room No Full Yes Full No

< 5 minutes 692.0-A5 Gas Decay Tank Room No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 692.0-A8 Pipe Gallery and Chase Yes Yes Full No No

<5 minutes 3.1 Yes Yes 692.0-As Charging Pump 1A-A Yes Yes Partial Yes Partial No

<20 minutes 3.1 692.0-A12 Safety Iniection Pump 1B-B Yes Yes Full Yes Full No

< 5 minutes Yes 692.0-A13 Safety Inlection Pump IA-A Yes Yes Full Yes Full No

<5 minutes Yes 692.0-A17 M&TE Tool Room No Yes Full Yes, Partial No

< 5 minutes 3.1 692.0-Al 8 Hot Tool Room Yes Yes Full Yes Partial No

<5 minutes 3.1 Yes Yes 692.0-A27 Concentrate Filter Room No No No No

< 5 minutes 2.6 3.1 692.0-A29 Boric Acid Evap. Pkg Room B No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 692.0-A30 Bori Acid Evap. Pkq Room A No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 692.0-A31 Spare No Yes, Full No No

< 10 minutes 2.6 3.1 713.0-A28 Pipe Chase Yes Yes Full No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 Yes Yes FIRE AREA 1-2:

692.0-A19 Safety Inection Pump Room 2A-A l

No Yes Full I

Yes Full No

< 5 minutes FIRE AREA 2-1:

676.0-A10 RHR Pump Room 1B-B Yes Yes Partial No No

< 5 minutes Yes 1-5

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-1

SUMMARY

COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE Rev. 27 Automatic Automatic CSD Repairs Man. Ops. req'd In Safe Shutdown Detection Suppression Fire Combustible Deviation Evaluation req'd In any any room due to Equipment or

YIN, Y/N, Rated Load, Fire Number In Number In room due to fire In room Room Number and Name Cables Y/N FulI/Partlal FulIPartial Wraps Severity Section Vii Section Vii fire In room FIRE AREA 2-2:

676.0-Al3 - RHR Pump Room 2B3-B No Yes, Partial No No

< 5 minutes FIRE AREA 3-1:

676.0-All RHR Pump Room lA-A Yes Yes, Partial No 7

No

<5 minutes FIRE AREA 3-2:

676.0 Al 2 - RHR Pump Room 2A-A No Yes, Partial No No

< 5 minutes FIRE AREA4:

692.0-A6 Auxlliar Feedwater Pump Room IA-S Yes l

Yes, Full Yes, Full l

No

<5 minutes FIRE AREA 5:

692.0-A7 Pipe Gallery Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 5 minutes Yes FiRE AREA 6:

692.0-A1 0 Charging Pump Room I B-B l

Yes N

620AO ainPmRo188Ys Yes, Partial Yes, Partial No

<20 minutes Yes FIRE AREA7:

692.0-All Charging Pump Room IC Yes Yes, Partial Yes, Partial No

<20 minutes Yes FIRE AREA 8:

713.0-Al -Auxiliary Building (Subdivided into Yes Yes, Full Yes, Partial 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

< 180 minutes 2.4, 2.5,2.6 3.1 (Boric Acid Yes (AlAl-Yes Analysis Vdumes 713.0-AIAl, A1A2, AIA3, Tank Area of AlA4)

AiA4, AIAN, AIBN, AIB, and AIC)

Al B only) 713.0-A2 -Air Lock No Yes Full Yes Full No

<10 minutes 713.0-A3 - Titration Room No Yes Full Yes Full No

<10 minutes 713.0-A4 - Radio Chemical Lab Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 20 minutes 713.0-A5 - Counting Room No Yes, Full Yes Full No

< 60 minutes 713.0-A9 - Valve Gallery No No No No

<5 minutes 3.1 713.0-Al0 - Seal Water Heat Exchanger IA No No No No

<10 minutes 3.1 713.0-All - Heat Exchanger 1B Yes No No No

<5 minutes 3.1 Yes 713.G-A12 - Heat Exchanger IA Yes No No No

<5 minutes 3.1 Yes 713.0-A13 - Sample Room 1 Yes Yes, Full Yes Full No

<10 minutes Yes 713.0-A14 - Sample Room 2 No Yes, Full Yes, Full No

<5 minutes 713.0-A17 - Seal Water Heat Exchanger 2A No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 713.0-A18 -Valve Gallery No No No No

< s minutes 3.1 713.0-A22 - Valve Gallery No Yes, Full Yes, Full No

<10 minutes 713.0-A23 - CVCS Valve Gallery No No No No

<5 minutes 3.1 713.0-A24 - Waste Gas Comp. Valve Gallery No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 713.0-A25 - Waste Gas Compressor B No No No No

<10 minutes 3.1 713.0-A26 -Waste Gas Compressor A No No No No

<10 minutes 3.1 713.0-A27 - Decontamination Room Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

<5 minutes 713.0-A30 - Air Lock No No No No

<5 minutes 3.1 1-6

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-1

SUMMARY

COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE Rev. 27 Automatic Automatic CSD Repairs Man. Ops. req'd In Safe Shutdown Detection Suppression Fire Combustible Deviation Evaluation req d In any any room due to Equipment or

YIN, YIN, Rated Load, Fire Number In Number In room due to fire In room Room Number and Name Cables YIN Full/Partial Fult/Partlal Wraps Severity Section VII Section Vil fire In room FIRE AREA 8 (continued) 713.0-A31 - Waste Gas Analyzer Room No No No No

<5 minutes 3.1 FIRE AREA 9:

713.0-A6-Pipe Gallery Yes Yes, Full Yes Full 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

<120 minutes 2.4 3.3 Yes 713.0-A8 - Reactor Building Access Room No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 FIRE AREA 9-1 713.0-A7-Volume Control Tank (VCT)

Yes Yes, Full Yes, Partial No

<5 minutes Yes FIRE AREA 10:

692.0-A14 Cask Decon. Coll. Tank Room No Yes, Partial Yes, Full No

< 5 minutes 692.0-Al 5 Spent Resin Tank Room No No No No

< 5 minutes 692.0-A16 Valve Gallery No No No No

< 5 minutes 728.0-A7 - Cask Decontamination Room No No No No

< 5 minutes X

729.0-A5 - Cask Unloading Area No Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 10 minutes 729.0-A6 - Nitrogen Storage Area Yes Yes, Full No No

< 5 minutes 2.6 729.0-A8 - Fuel Transfer Valve Room Yes Yes, Room Yes, Room No

< 5 minutes 2.6 Yes Full, Corridor Full, Corridor None None 729.0-A9 - U2 Fuel Transfer Valve Room No Same as A8 Same as A8 No

< 5 minutes 2.6 757.0-A13 - Refueling Room Yes No No No

< 5 minutes 4.5 l _

772.0-A9 - HEPA Filter Plenum Room Yes Yes,Full Full No

< 20 minutes Yes 776.0-Al - Elevator Machine Room No No No No

> 180 minutes 786.0-Al - Fan Room No No No No

< 5 minutes 814.75-ACS - Roof Access Room No No No No

< 5 minutes New Fuel Storage Area No Yes, Full No No

< 5 minutes Stairwell No. 4 No Yes, Full No No

< 5 minutes FIRE AREA 11:

729.0-A3 - Waste Package Area l

No Yes Full Yes. Full No

< 5 minutes l l

l 729.0-A4 -Waste Package Area No Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 120 minutes FIRE AREA 12:

729.0-Al - Main Steam Valve Rm (Unit 1 South)

Yes No No No

< 5 minutes Yes 737.0-A6 - Air Lock Yes No No No

< 5 minutes Yes FIRE AREA 13:

=

729.0-A2 - Main Steam Valve Rm (Unit 1 North)

Yes No No 3 hour3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months

<5 minutes 1

Yes 729.0-Al6 - Shield Building Vent Radiation Yes No No No

< 5 minutes Yes Monitoring Room

___-l_I____

Additional Equip. Building (AEB) - (729.0-A14, Yes (729.G-A14 Yes (Partial &

No No

<20 minutes Yes(763A1, 737.0-A13, 763.5-Al, 775.25-Al, 786.5-Al) and 763.5-Al)

A13 none) l 729A14) 729.0-Al2 - Steam Valve Instrument Room A Yes No No No

< 5 minutes l

l l

Yes 1-7

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-1

SUMMARY

COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE Rev. 27 Automatic Automatic CSD Repairs Man. Ops. req'd In Safe Shutdown Detection Suppression Fire Combustible Deviation Evaluation req'd In any any room due to Equipment or Y/N, Y/N, Rated Load, Fire Number In Number In room due to fire In room Room Number and Name Cables Y/N FullPartial Full/Partlal Wraps Severity Section Vii Section Vil fire In room FIRE AREA 14:

737.0-Al - Auxilary Building (Subdivided Into Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

< 180 minutes 2.4,2.6 Yes Yes Analysis Volumes 737.0-AlA, AIAN, AlBN, AIB, and AlIC)__

737.0-A2 - Hot Instrument Shop No Yes Full No No

< 20 minutes 3.1 737.0-A4 - Air Lock No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 737.0-A7 - Unit 1 Letdown Heat Exchanger No No No No

< 10 minutes 3.1 737.0-A8 - Unit 2 Letdown Heat Exchanger No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 737.0-All -Air Lock No No No No

< 5 minutes 3.1 FIRE AREA 15-1:

737.0-A3 - Heat and Vent Equipment Room Yes Yes, Full Yes Full 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

<30 minutes yes yes FIRE AREA 15-2:

737.0-A12 - Heat and Vent Equipment Room Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 5 minutes Yes FIRE AREA 16:

737.0-AS - Ventilation and Purge Air Room Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full

-No l < 20 minutes l 2.6 l

l lYes 737.0-A15 - Gross Failed Fuel Detector Room No None Yes, Full No

< 5 minutes See Note 1 See Note I FIRE AREA 17:

757.0-A2 - 6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Yes l

Yes, Full 1 Yes, Full 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months 1< 180minutes 2.6 y

Yes Yes Room A I____

I I____

757.0-A9 - Personnel and Equipment Access Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

< 90 minutes l_l_

l Yes Yes FIRE AREA 18:

757.0-A3-125V Vital Battery Board Room l1 Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

<60 minutes Yes (manual)

FIRE AREA 19:

757.0-A4 - 125V Vital Battery Board Rm I Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

<60 minutes Yes (manual FIRE AREA 20:

757.0-Al - Auxiliary Control Room Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full i1 hour

< 90 minutes 2.1 Yes FIRE AREA21:

757.0-A25 - Auxdllary Control Instrument Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

<180 minutes Yes Room IA FIRE AREA 22:

757.0-A26 - Auxiliary Control Instrument Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

<180 minutes Yes Room IB 1-8

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-1

SUMMARY

COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE Rev. 27 Automatic Automatic CSD Repairs Man. Ops. req'd In Safe Shutdown Detection Suppression Fire Combustible Deviation Evaluation req'd In any any room due to Equipment or

YIN, Y/N, Rated Load, Fire Number In Number In room due to fire In room Room Number and Name Cables Y/N Full/Partial Full/Partial Wraps Severity Section Vii Section Vii fire In room FIRE AREA 33:

772.0-A2 - 480V Board Room 1-B (Subdivided Yes Yes, Full Yes, Partial 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months

< 180 minutes 2.4 3.1 yes Into Analysis Volumes 772.0-A2AI, A2A2, A2A3, (C

olumn _ines A2A4)

A6-AS/0-R only)

FIRE AREA 34:

772.0-A3 - 125V Vital Battery Room II Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 60 minutes Yes (manual)

FIRE AREA 35:

772.0-A4 - 125V Vital Battery Room I Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 60 minutes Yes (manual)

FIRE AREA 36:

772.0-A5 - 480V Transformer Room 1-B Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full 1 hourI < 180 minutes l 2.4 l

l l

Yes FIRE AREA 37:

772.0-A6 - 480V Transformer Room I1-A Yes Yes, Full-Yes. Full I hourI < 180 minutes 1 2.4 1

yes Yes FIRE AREA 38:

772.0-A7l-Mechanical Equipment Room Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

> 180 minutes Yes FIRE AREA 39:

772.0-Al - F4ft0 Vital Batter and Board Room Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 60 minutes 2.4 Yes FIRE AREA 40:

772.0-Al 0- MechanicalEquipment Room Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

<180 minutes 2

Yes FIRE AREA 41:

772.0-A1I -480V Transfolmer Room 2-IV Yes Yes, Full I

Yes, Full No

< ISO minutes 2.4 yes FIRE AREA 42:

772.0-Al2 -480V Transformer Room 2-A l

Yes lYes, Full

lYes, Full l

No

<180 minutes l 2.4 lll Yes FIRE AREA 43:

772.0-A13 - 125V Vital Battery Room IV yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

<60 minutes Yes (manual)

FIRE AREA 44:

772.0-A14 - 125V Vital Battery Room III l

Yes lYes, Full lYes, Full l

No l< 60 minutes llll Yes 1-10

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-1

SUMMARY

COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE Rev. 27 Automatic Automatic CSD Repairs Man. ops. req'd In Safe Shutdown Detection Suppression Fire Combustible Deviation Evaluation req'd In any any room due to Equipment or

YIN, YIN, Rated Load, Fire Number In Number In room due to fire In room Room Number and Name Cables Y/N Full/Partial Full/Partial Wraps Severity Section VII Section VII fire In room FIRE AREA 45:

772.0-A15 - 480V Board Room 2-B (Subdivided Yes Yes, Full Yes, Partial No

> 180 minutes 2.4 3.1 Yes Into Analysis Volumes 772.0-AlSA1, A15A2, (Column lines AISA3, A15A4)

A8-AlO/Q-R only)

FIRE AREA 46:

772.0-A16 -480V Board Room 2-A Yes J

Yes, Full Yes, Full I

No I <l180minutesj1 2.4, 2.6 (

1 _____yes FIRE AREA 47:

786.0-A2 - Roof Access Air Lock No No No I No

<5 minutes 786.0-A3 - Mechanical Equipment Room No No No No

< 5 minutes 786.0-A4 - Mechanical Equipment Room No No No No

< 5 minutes FIRE AREA 48: Control Building See Note 2 See Note 2 See Note 2 692.0-CI - Mechanical Equipment Room Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 5 minutes 2.6 Yes 692.0-C2 - Mechanical Equipment Room Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes Full No

<5 minutes Yes 692.0-C3 - 250V Battery Room I Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 60 minutes Yes 692.0-C4 - 250V Battery Board Room 1 Assumed Yes Yes Full No No

< 10 minutes 2.3 Yes 692.0-C5 - 250V Battery Board Room 2 Assumed Yes Yes, Full No No

<10 minutes 2.3 Yes 692.0-C6 - 250V Battery Room 2 Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes. Full No

< 30 minutes Yes 692.0-C7 - 24V and 48V Battery Room Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 20 minutes Yes 692.0-C8 - 24V and 48V Battery Board and Assumed Yes Yes, Full No No

<10 minutes 2.3 Yes Charger Room 692.0-C9 - Communications Room Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

<90 minutes Yes 692.0-C 10 - Mechanical Equipment Room Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

<5 minutes 2.6 Yes 692.0-C11 - Corridor Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 20 minutes 4.2 Yes 692.0-C12 - Secondary Alarm Station Room Assumed Yes Yes Full Yes, Full No

<90 minutes Yes 708.0-Cl - Unit 1 Auwdliary Instrument Room Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 180 minutes Yes (C02) 708.0-C2 - Corridor Assumed Yes Yes, Full No No

< 20 minutes 2.3 Yes 708.0-C3 - Computer Room Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 180 minutes Yes (CO2) 708.0-C4 - Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room Assumed Yes Yes, Partial Yes, Full No

< 180 minutes 2.3 Yes (C02) 729.0-Cl - Spreading Room Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

> 180 minutes Yes 755.0-Cl-Mechanical Equipment Room Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 10 minutes Yes 755.0-C2 - Women's Restroom Assumed Yes Yes Full Yes, Full No

<10 minutes Yes 755.0-C3 - Corridor Assumed Yes Yes Full Yes Full No

<10 minutes Yes 755.0-C4 -Kitchen Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Ful No

<10 minutes Yes 755.0-C5 -Toilet Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

<10 minutes Yes 755.0-C6 - Locker Room Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 5 minutes Yes 755.0-C7 - Shower Assumed Yes No No No

< 5 minutes 2.3 Yes 755.0-C8 - Shower Assumed Yes No No No

< 5 minutes 2.3 Yes 1-11

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-1

SUMMARY

COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE Rev. 27 Automatic Automatic CSD Repairs Man. Ops. req'd In Safe Shutdown Detection Suppression Fire Combustible Deviation Evaluation req'd In any any room due to Equipment or

YIN, YIN, Rated Load, Fire Number In Number In room due to fire In room Room Number and Name Cables Y/N Full/Partial Full/Partial Wraps Severity Section Vii Section VII fire In room FIRE AREA 48: Control Building (continued) 755.0-C9 - Conference Room Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 180 minutes Yes 755.0-C10 - SOS Office Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

> 180 minutes Yes 755.0-C 12 - Main Control Room Yes Yes Full No No

< 20 minutes 2.3 Yes 755.0-C13 - Relay Room Assumed Yes Yes Full No No

< 20 minutes 2.3 Yes 755.0-C14 - Technical Support Center Assumed Yes Yes Full Yes, Full No

< 20 minutes Yes 755.0-C 15 -Corridor Assumed Yes Yes, Full No No

< 5 minutes 2.3 Yes 755.0-C16 - Conference Room Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 20 minutes Yes 755.0-C 17-Telephone Room Assumed Yes No No No

< 5 minutes 2.3 Yes 755.0-C18 - NRC Office Assumed Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 30 minutes Yes 755.0-C19 - Corridor Assumed Yes Yes. Full Yes, Full No

<10 minutes Yes 755.0-C20 - DPSO Shop Assumed Yes Yes, Full No No

< 30 minutes 2.3 Yes 692.0-755.0 - Stairwell C1 Assumed Yes No No No

< 30 minutes 2.3, 4.2 Yes 692.0-755.0 - Stairwell C2 Assumed Yes No No No

<10 minutes 2.3,_4.2 Yes FIRE AREA 49: Diesel Generator Building 742.0 Diesel Generator Unit 1A-A Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 180 minutes 4.4 (C02) 760.5 Unit I A-A Air Exhaust Room Yes Yes, Full No No

< 90 minutes 760.5 480V Board Room 1A-A Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 120 minutes (C 02 )_

760.5 Unit 1A-A Air Intake Room Yes Yes, Full No No

<10 minutes FIRE AREA 50: DIesel Generator Buildin 742.0 Diesel Generator Unit 2A-A Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 180 minutes 4.4 760.5 Unit 2A-A Air Exhaust Room Yes Yes, Full No No

<90 minutes 760.5 480V Board Room 2A-A Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

<90 minutes (CO2) 760.5 Unit 2A-A Air Intake Room Yes Yes, Full No No

<10 minutes FIRE AREA 51: DIesel Generator Building 742.0 Diesel Generator Unit 1B-B Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 180 minutes 4.4 (C 0 2 )

760.5 Unit 1 B-B Air Exhaust Room Yes Yes Full No No

<90 minutes 760.5-10 -480V Board Room 1B-B Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 120 minutes 760.5 Unit lB-B Air Intake Room Yes Yes, Full No No

< 10 minutes I FIRE AREA 52: DMesel Generator Buliding 742.0 Diesel Generator Unit 2B-B Yes Yes, Full I

Yes, Full No

< 180 minutes 4.4 (C02) 1-12

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-1

SUMMARY

COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE Rev. 27 Automatic Automatic CSD Repairs Man. Ops. req'd In Safe Shutdown Detection Suppression Fire Combustible Deviation Evaluation req'd In any any room due to Equipment or Y/N,

YIN, Rated Load, Fire Number In Number In room due to fire In room Room Number and Name Cables YIN Full/Partfal FulltPartlal Wraps Severity Section Vii Section VII fire In room FIRE AREA 52: Diesel Generator Building (cortnued_

760.5 Unit 2B-B Air Exhaust Room Yes Yes, Full No No

< 90 minutes 760.5 480V Board Room 2B-B Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 120 minutes (C02) 760.5 Unit 2B-B Air Intake Room Yes Yes, Full No No

< 10 minutes FIRE AREA 53: Diesel Generator Building 742.0 Toilet No No No No

< 10 minutes 742.0 Fuel Oil Transfer Room No Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 5 minutes (C02) 742.0-9 Pipe Gallery and Corridor (Subdivided in Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 60 minutes 4.4 Analysis Volumes 742.0-A, B. N).

FIRE AREA 54: Diesel Generator Building 742.0 C02 Storage Room No No No No

< 5 minutes l

lI 742.0 Lube Oil Storage Area No Yes, Full Yes, Full No

> 180 minutes l

l l

~~~(C02) l l

742.0-.10- Conduit Interface Room No es, Full No No

< 120 minutes 1 1_1_l 760.5 Corridor No No No No

<5 minutes l l

l

_l 760.5-2 -Radiation Shelter l

No l

No lNo l<

Io minuteslllI 742.0-760.5 - Stairwell D1 l

No No No No

< 10 minutes l l

l l

FIRE AREA 57: Additonal Diesel Generator Building Not required for Unit 1 Operation 742.0 Diesel Generator Unit C-S No Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 120 minutes (Foam) 742.0 Fuel Oil Transfer Room No Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 5 minutes (Foam) 742.0 Pipe Gallery No Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 60 minutes l__

l(Foam

)

llllll 742.0 6.9-KV SwItchgear Room No Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 20 minutes

_ l (Foam )

l l

ll 742.0 Corridor No Yes, Full No No

< 5 minutes l

1 1

742.G6 - Closet No No No No

< 5 minutes l l

l l

760.5 Air Intake Room No No No

<Y10 minutes.

760.5 480V Auxiliary Board Room No Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 90 minutes I_

I I

(Water)

I I

I _

1760.5.3 - Air Exhaust Room No

IYes, Full I

No INo I< 60 minutes I_____

___I___

1-13

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-1

SUMMARY

COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE Rev. 27 Automatic Automatic CSD Repairs Man. Ops. req'd in Safe Shutdown Detection Suppression Fire Combustible Deviation Evaluation req'd In any any room due to Equipment or

YIN, Y/N, Rated Load, Fire Number In Number In room due to fire In room Room Number and Name Cables YIN Full/Partial Full/Partial Wraps Severity Section Vii Section Vii fire In room FIRE AREA 57: Additional Diesel Generator Building (continued)

Not required for Unit 1 Operation 760.5 Transfommer Room No Yes, Full Yes, Full No

< 90 minutes (Foam) 760.5 Fire Protection Room No Yes, Full No No

< 5 minutes 760.5 Janitors Closet No Yes, Full No No

< 5 minutes 760.5 Corridor No Yes, Full No No

< 5 minutes 760.5 Closet No No No No

< 5 minutes 742.0-760.5 -Stairwell D3 No No No No

< 5 minutes FIRE AREA 58: IPS IPS EL 741 - ERCW Pump Room A Yes Yes, Partial No No

< 90 minutes 2.6 Yes IPS EL 741 - Screen Wash and HPFP A Pumps Yes No No No

< 20 minutes 2.6, 5.1 3.4 Yes RoomI IPS EL 722 - ERCW Strainer Room A Yes Yes, Full No No

< 5 minutes Yes FIRE AREA 59: II'S Yes____

IPS EL741 - ERCW Pump Room B Yes Yes, Partial No

[

No

<90 minutes 1 2.6 1 6

Yes IPS EL 741 - HPFP B Pumps Room Yes No No l

No

< 5 minutes i 5.1 3.4 Yes IPS EL 722 - ERCW Strainer Room B Yes l

Yes, Full No l

No

< 5 minutes l Yes FIRE AREA 60: IPS IPS EL 711 Board Room (Subdhnded Into Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full l

No

<150 minutes 2.4 l

l Yes Analysis Voumes IPS-CA, IPS-CC-A, IPS-CB, IPS-CC-B)

I IPS EL 728 - RCW Pump Deck I

No l

No No No

< 5 minutes FIRE AREA 61:

Unit 1 Reactor Building - Annulus (SubdMded Into Yes Yes, Partial Yes, Partial Yes

> 180 minutes l

3.3 l

Yes Yes Analysis Volumes RO, RI, RIR, RAI, RA2, RA3, j

(RES)

RA4, RF1, RF2)

Unit 1 Reactor Building - Primary Containment Yes l Yes, Partial Yes, Partial Yes

< 90 minutes 2.2 Yes Yes l

(RCPs)

(RCPs) l (RES) l FIRE AREA 62:

Not required for Unit 1 Operation Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator No No No No

<10 minutes Building FIRE AREA 63:

Turbine Building Yes (Steam Yes (NSR Yes (CB wall; No 2.6 3.2 Isolation valves, turbine oil NSR turb.oil off site power &

reservoir & H2 reservoir & H2 RCP trip ckts) seal oil) seal oil) 1-14

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-1

SUMMARY

COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE Rev. 27

. Automatic Automatic l CSD Repairs Man. Ops. req'd in Safe Shutdown Detection Suppression Fire Combustible Deviation Evaluation req'd In any any room due to Equipment or Y/N,

YIN, Rated Load, Fire Number In Number In room due to fire In room Room Number and Name Cables Y/N Full/Partial Full/Partial Wraps Severity Section VII Section VII fire In room FIRE AREA 64:

Yard Yes (Duct Banks Yes (Only Yes (Only No 2.6 (duct Yes and Tanks)

Transformers Transformers banks) and H2 and H2 Storage Storage Trailers)

Trailers)

Fire Area Unit 2 Locations 676.0-A14 - U2 Containment Spray Pump 2A-A 676.0-A15 - U2 Containment Spray Pump 2B-B 676.O-A17 - U2 Pipe/Valve Gallery 2.6 (hatch) 692.0-A20 - U2 Safety Iniection Pump 28-B13 692.0-A21 - U2 Charging Pump 2C 692.0-A22 - U2 Charging Pump 28-B 692.0-A23 - U2 Charging Pump 2A-A 692.0-A24 - U2 Pip alve Galle!X and Chase 692.0-A25 - U2 Pipa Valve Gallery Yes

< 5 minutes Yes 692.0-A26 - U2 TDAFW Pump 2A-S Yes

< 5 minutes Yes 713.G-A15 - U2 Heat Exchanger 2A 713.0-A1 6 - U2 Heat Exchanger 2B 713.0-A19 - U2 Pipe Gallery Yes

< 5 minutes Yes 713.G-A20 - U2 Volume Control Tank Room 713.0-A21 - U2 Reactor Building Access Room 71 3.0-A29 - U2 Pipe Chase 729.0-A10 - U2 North Main Steam Valve Room 729.0-All - U2 South Main Steam Valve Room 729.0-A13 - U2 Steam Valve Instrument Room B.

729.0-A15 - U2 Upper Head Injection Room 729.0-A17 - U2 Shield Building Vent Radiation Monitoring Room 737.0-A9 - U2 Ventilation and Purge Air Room 2.6 Yes 737.0-A10 - U2 Air Lock 737.0-A14 - U2 Air Lock 737.0-A16 - U2 Gross Failed Fuel Detector Room 757.0-A14 - U2 Reactor Building Access Room Yes, Full Yes Full 4.7 757.0-Al 5 - U2 Reactor Building Hatch Yes Full Yes Full 4.7 757.0-Al6 - U2 Emergency Gas Treatment Filter Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full

-60 minutes Yes Room_____

782.0-A3 - U2 Control Rod Drive Equipment Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full

< 60 minutes Yes Room 782.0-A4 - U2 Pressurizer Heater Transformer Yes Yes, Full Yes, Full

< 90 minutes Yes Room 2 Fire Area Duct Banks AB 713.0-AlB - DPIPS-A Cable Chase from Auxm Yes No No No No No Bldg. 713.0-A1B to IPS-A I

I

_I I

I I

1-15 I-

PART I - INTRODUCTION TABLE 1-1

SUMMARY

COMPLIANCE FIRE PROTECTION CONFORMANCE Rev. 27 Note 1:

737.0-A15 is provided with full suppression, but Is not provided with detection. Actuation of detection system in 737.0-A5 Is required to release deluge valve and charge system head in 737.0-A15. See Part VI Section 3.21.1.

Note 2:

Entire control building Is an alternative shutdown area. Cable location by room not routed; therefore, assumed to be In any room.

1-16

PART II-FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 27 8.0 FIRE PROTECTION PROGRAM ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL CONTROLS This section of the WBN Plan provides the administrative process and controls for implementation of the Fire Protection Program.

8.1 Program Changes and Associated Review and Approval

a.

The Nuclear Safety Review Board (NSRB) provides independent review, oversight, and technical reviews.

b.

The Fire Protection Supervisor reviews proposed changes to the Fire Protection Report and fire protection administrative procedures to ensure adequacy and compliance with established regulatory commitments in accordance with site specific procedures.

c.

WBN may make changes to the approved Fire Protection Report without prior approval of the NRC only if those changes would not adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of a fire.

d.

The Fire Protection Report is updated in accordance with 1 OCFR50.71.

8.2 Modification Control A fire protection evaluation is performed (when required) for plant modifications in accordance with established Nuclear Engineering procedures. This evaluation is performed to ensure that adequate fire protection measures are maintained, combustible loading considerations are addressed, the overall Fire Protection Program is not degraded, and requirements and guidelines of regulatory agencies have been considered. The evaluation also addresses specific commitments to the applicable sections of 1 OCFR50, Appendix R.

8.3 Audits/lnspections of the Fire Protection Program Generic Letter No. 82-21, "Technical Specifications for Fire Protection Audits' provides for a system of audits to be conducted to assess the WBN fire protection equipment and FPP implementation to verify continued compliance with NRC requirements and TVA commitments. The audit program is provided in the NQAP.

11-20

PART 11-FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 27 8.4 Assessment of Information Notices. Generic Letters. Bulletins, etc.

The Watts Bar Nuclear Experience Review (NER) Program ensures that NRC Information Notices, Generic Letters, Bulletins, and other relevant documents that provide information on generic or specific fire protection and/or fire safe shutdown issues are assessed for applicability to WBN. The responsible organizations (i.e.,

licensing, engineering, operations, etc.) for addressing the applicable issues are determined upon assessment of the issues identified in the documents.

8.5 Violation and Reportabilitv Violations of an Operating Requirement (OR) or a Testing and Inspecting Requirement (TIR) described in Section 14.0 shall be evaluated for reportability in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. Violations occur when the limits of the TIR (including allowable extensions) are exceeded or conditions of the OR and its associated action statement are not met.

9.0 EMERGENCY RESPONSE 9.1 Fire Brigade Staffing Effective handling of fire emergencies is an important aspect of the WBN Fire Protection Program. This is accomplished by trained and qualified emergency response personnel. The fire response organization is staffed and equipped for firefighting activities. The fire brigade is comprised of a fire brigade leader and four fire brigade members. The fire brigade shall not include the Shift Manager nor the other members of the minimum shift crew necessary for safe shutdown of the unit, nor any personnel required for other essential functions during a fire emergency.

Additional support is available when needed through an agreement with a local fire department.

An Incident Commander is available to direct each shift fire brigade. The Incident Commander meets the requirements of a Unit Supervisor, Shift Technical Advisor or Shift Support Supervisor and has sufficient training in or knowledge of plant safety-related systems to understand the effects of fire and fire suppressants on safe shutdown capability.

The fire brigade composition may be less than the minimum requirements for a period of time not to exceed two hours, in order to accommodate unexpected absence, provided immediate action is taken to fill the required positions. The following are examples of emergencies that would prevent the full fire brigade from being available onsite: (a) a life-threatening medical emergency, requiring the plant ambulance and EMT responders to leave the site for transport of the patient, and (b) the fire brigade may respond to fires outside the site area, but still on the TVA Reservation, to respond to a fire that has the potential to or is affecting the ability for WBN to maintain the ability to safely shut down. This would include areas such as the Watts Bar Hydro and Fossil Plant switchyards. This response would be at the direction of the Shift Manager based on a concern for plant stability due to the fire or fire's threat.

These are expected to be rare occurrences.

11-21

PART 11-FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 27 9.5 Fire Emergency Procedures and Prefire Plans Fire emergency procedures and prefire plans specify actions taken by the individual discovering a fire and actions considered by the emergency response organization.

Included in these procedures are operational instructions for response to the fire detection system annunciation. These procedures provide different levels of response based on whether there Is an actual fire or an annunciation (e.g., a single zone annunciation in a cross zoned area will not carry the same level of response as a cross zone annunciation in the same area). An annunciation may or may not carry the same level of response as the report of a fire by site personnel. Prefire plans are not intended to establish a procedure or step-by-step process but to provide guidance, depending upon the particular circumstances, to aid in firefighting efforts.

It is recognized that many different firefighting techniques or strategies exist which would be acceptable for fire suppression efforts.

Prefire plans are developed to support firefighting activities in safety-related areas, in fire safe shutdown system areas, and areas which may present a hazard to safety-related or FSSD equipment inside the boundaries of the Site Perimeter. The pref ire plans include the following information, as appropriate:

Identification of plant equipment Access and egress routes for fire areas Fire fighting strategy and tactics Location of fire protection features Identification of special fire, toxic material, and radiological hazards Special consideration of hazards Ventilation methodology Safe shutdown procedures are available in the event a fire occurs in safety-related or FSSD equipment areas of the plant.

10.0 CONTROL OF COMBUSTIBLES Combustibles are controlled to reduce the severity of a fire which might occur in a given area and to minimize the amount and type of material available for combustion.

The use and application of combustible materials at WBN are controlled utilizing the following methods:

Instructions/guidelines provided during general employee training/orientation programs.

The chemical traffic control program.

Periodic plant housekeeping Inspections/tours by management and/or the plant fire protection organization.

Design/modification review and installation process.

Administrative procedures (e.g., Transient Combustible Control Program).

11-25

PART 11-FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 27 The fire protection organization performs a periodic fire safety inspection of the safety-related areas of the plant to identify and minimize potential fire hazards.

The use and handling of combustible materials such as fire retardant-treated lumber, paper, plastic, and flammable/combustible gases and liquids are controlled in safety-related areas. The use of untreated lumber requires specific approval of the fire protection organization.

Combustible materials generated as a result of work activities are removed/cleaned up from the work area at the end of the shift or at the conclusion of the work activity, whichever is sooner.

The storage of combustible materials within safety-related areas is controlled by the fire protection organization.

The control of hazardous waste and hazardous materials is conducted in accordance with the chemical control and hazardous material processes.

Design considerations in the control of combustibles is utilized when appropriate. For example, these considerations include the application of noncombustible or limited combustible construction materials or components, use of noncombustible fluids in operating equipment, dikes, or containments provided for equipment containing combustible liquids, etc.

Combustible Control Zones (CCZs) are established at WBN to strictly control or prohibit the placement of transient combustibles. Transient combustibles brought into CCZs require an evaluation in accordance with site administrative procedures. The strict control or prohibition of combustibles by site procedures within the combustible control zone provides reasonable assurance that fire will not propagate and jeopardize redundant FSSD equipment. CCZs are shown on the compartmentation drawings (Figures 11-27 though 11-41).

11.0 CONTROL OF IGNITION SOURCES The use of ignition sources such as welding, flame cutting, thermite welding, brazing, grinding, arc gouging, torch applied roofing, and open flame soldering within safety-related areas are controlled through the approval and issuance of an ignition source permit. Permits are reviewed and approved by appropriate plant personnel. The ignition source permit is valid for one job. Job area inspection shall be performed and documented at the start of each shift that ignition source activities are being performed. If no ignition sources activities are performed, then reinspection is not required.

Designated ignition source activity areas are located and approved by the fire protection organization. A fire watch system shall be established for all ignition source work activities that are performed in safety-related areas of the plant. Ignition source fire watches are established and will remain for 30 minutes following the elimination of the ignition source, unless other durations are approved by the fire protection organization.

Smoking is not allowed in any safety-related area.

11-26

PART 11-FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 SECTION 14.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS OR TIR Bases OR Bases TIR Associated Table Section l

14.0 Operating Requirements 11-47 NIA N/A N/A N/A 14.1 Fire Detection 11-49 11-60 11-74 11-77 11-114 (Early Warning Fire Detection and Notification Only) 14.2 WaterSupply 11-50 11-61 11-78 11-84 N/A 14.3 Water Based 11-54 11-64 11-87 11-90 11-124 Fire Suppression 14.4 Carbon Dioxide (C0 2) 11-56 11-66 11-92 11-94 N/A Suppression Systems 14.5 Fire Detection Supervision 11-57 11-66 11-95 N/A 11-125 14.6 Fire Hose Stations/Standpipes 11-57 11-67 11-97 11-98 11-126 14.7 Fire Hydrants 11-58 11-69 11-101 11-102 11-129 14.8 Fire-Rated Assemblies 11-58 11-70 1I1-103 11-105 11-130 (Fire Barriers)11-134 14.9 Emergency Battery 11-59 11-71 11-107 11-108 NA Lighting Units 14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment 11-59 11-72 11-110 11-112 11-140

.11-46

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 25 14.2.1 With two electric pumps operable and the diesel driven fire pump inoperable:

a.

Restore the diesel driven fire pump to operable status within 7 days

-OR-

b.

Ensure three electric driven pumps operable AND within one hour a fire watch is established as follows:

1. hourly roving fire watch is established in the Auxiliary Building Elevations 713, 737, 757, 772 and IPS if the fire detection equipment for the area is operable -OR-,

2. continuous fire watches are established in the Auxiliary Building Elevations 713, 737, 757, 772 and IPS if the fire detection equipment for the area is inoperable.

-OR-

c.

Provide a backup pump with at least the same capacity as an electric fire pump AND establish hourly roving fire watch coverage for the areas with common power supplies. Within 7 days after entry from either 14.2.1.a or 14.2.1.b, either enter 14.2.1.b or restore the diesel driven fire pump to operable status.

14.2.2 With only one electric driven fire pump operable AND the diesel driven fire pump operable:

a. Restore an additional electric driven fire pump to operable status within 30 days.

14.2.3 With no electric driven pumps operable AND the diesel driven fire pump operable:

a. Restore one electric driven pump to operable status within 7 days AND enter 14.2.2.

14.2.4 With only one electric driven pump operable AND the diesel driven fire pump inoperable:

a. Restore an additional electric driven pump to operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , restore the diesel fire pump to operable within 7 days, AND enter 14.2.2, -OR-

b. Restore the diesel driven fire pump to operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months AND enter 14.2.2.

14.2.5 With no water supply system pumps operable:

a. Establish a backup water supply system within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , AND restore one electric driven pump to operable within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months AND a second electric driven pump to operable with 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months , AND restore the diesel fire pump to operable within 7 days, -OR-

b. Establish a backup water supply system within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months , AND restore the diesel driven fire pump within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months AND enter 14.2.3.

c. Perform 1 OCFR50.72 and/or 1 OCFR50.73 reviews in accordance with site administrative procedures 11-51

PART II-FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 27 14.2.6 With the Fire Suppression Water supply system inoperable for reasons other than loss of a fire pump:

a. Within one (1) hour enter the applicable Operating Requirements of Section 14.3 AND/OR 14.6 AND/OR 14.7 for those devices with no flow path available. No other action is necessary.

b. If the condition involves powering up a normally de-energized valve operator to cycle the valve, then within one (1) hour establish a constant attendant at the breaker.

c. Restore the system to normal alignment within 30 days. If not restored within 30 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 1 OCFR50.72 and/or 1 OCFR50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.

14.2.7 With High Pressure Fire Protection (HPFP) or raw service water (RSW) usage's that are not as-designed loads or as-designed loads that have inhibited automatic isolation capability:

a. Provide isolation capability AND within one (1) hour establish a constant attendant in communication with the O-M-29 Operator for HPFP/RSW usage's that are not as-designed.

b. Ensure the inhibited autorriatic isolation is controlled by procedure.

c. Remove the non-as-designed HPFP/RSW usage or restore the automatic isolation capability within 30 days. If not restored within 30 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 1 OCFR50.72 and/or 1 OCFR50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.

14.2.8 With three of the electric driven pumps capable of manual starting from the Main Control Room (MCR) or their associated 480V shutdown board but the automatic start circuitry inoperable.

a. Ensure the inhibited automatic start circuitry is controlled by procedure.

b. Restore the system to normal alignment within 30 days. If not restored within 30 days perform 10 CFR 50.72 and/or 10 CFR 50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.

11-52

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 24 14.3.1.

With either suppression and/or associated Function B fire detectors inoperable in any of the locations noted above (a-h) in which redundant safe shutdown systems or components could be damaged by a single fire, within one hour, restore the inoperable equipment or:

a. For accessible areas, within one hour establish the following:

1. A continuous fire watch AND backup suppression equipment for those areas, if detection or both suppression and detection are inoperable, -OR-

2. A roving fire watch and backup suppression equipment for those areas, except for 737' elevation of the Auxiliary Building, if only the suppression is inoperable.

3. A continuous fire watch and backup suppression equipment for the 737' elevation of the Auxiliary Building if suppression or detection or both are inoperable. This watch shall be limited to the 737' elevation of the Auxiliary Building.

b. For inaccessible areas, as noted, within one hour establish the following:

1. For the Unit 1 Reactor Building, Lower Containment, within one hour establish a continuous fire watch -OR-monitor the air temperature in the area once per hour using U-9020 on Plant Computer.

2. For other inaccessible areas with detection inoperable OR both suppression and detection inoperable, within one hour establish backup suppression equipment and:

a. A continuous fire watch, OR

b. Provide alternate compensatory actions.

3. For other inaccessible areas with inoperable suppression only, within one hour establish backup fire suppression equipment AND:

a. An hourly roving fire watch, OR

b. Provide alternate compensatory actions.

14.3.2 With either inoperable suppression or associated Function B fire detectors in any of the locations noted above (a-h) In which redundant safe shutdown systems or components are NOT exposed to the damage of a single fire, within one hour establish a roving fire watch AND backup suppression equipment for those areas.

14.3.3 Restore the inoperable suppression and/or associated detection to Operable status within 14 days. If not restored within 14 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 1 OCFR50.72 and/or 1 OCFR50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures. Also, determine if any continuous fire watch routes are to be augmented as specified in Section 13.0.A.

11 - 55

PART II-FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 14.5 Fire Detection Supervision The supervision capabilities of the local control panels identified on Table 14.5 shall be Operable when the associated fire detectors identified on Table 14.1 are required to be operable.

NOTE:

These action statements apply to both Function A and Function B detectors and the actuation circuits for automatic valves in the flow path.

14.5.1 With the supervisory function of a panel listed in Table 14.5 masked by a panel alarm or trouble, within eight hours, restore the inoperable equipment, -OR-jumper out the zone(s) providing the masking condition (alarm or trouble) AND implement the compensatory actions and time limits of Section 14.1, 14.3, or 14.4 as appropriate.

14.5.2 If the masking condition can not be cleared by jumpering out a zone(s), within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months evaluate the condition for affects on the equipment operation and implement the compensatory actions and time limits of Section 14.1, 14.3, and 14.4 as appropriate -AND-restore the panel to Operable status within 14 days. If not restored within 14 days, continue the established compensatory actions AND perform 1 OCFR50.72 and/or 1 OCFR50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.

14.5.3 If conditions exist that would warrant returning a masked circuit to a functional status prior to the circuit's return to normal, with the supervisory function of a panel listed in Table 14.5 masked by a panel alarm or trouble, defeat the alarm or trouble masking condition while maintaining the circuit's functional capability, verify the circuit's functional capability, -AND-establish the controls to monitor the circuit's functional capability periodically. Restore the panel to Operable status within 30 days. If not restored within 30 days, continue the established compensatory actions -AND-perform 1 OCFR50.72 and/or 1 OCFR50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.

14.6 Fire Hose Stations/Standpipes The fire hose stations listed in Table 14.6 have been provided to support manual fire fighting efforts in safety-related or FSSD buildings, areas, and/or rooms at WBN Unit 1. The fire hose stations also provide backup suppression when the automatic suppression systems are inoperable. The fire hose stations listed in Table 14.6 shall be Operable whenever the safety-related or FSSD equipment in the areas protected by the fire hose stations is required to be Operable.

14.6.1 With one or more of the fire hose stations listed in Table 14.6 inoperable, within eight hours restore the inoperable equipment -OR-provide alternate protection for the area served by the inoperable hose stations(s).

14.6.2 Restore the fire hose station(s) to Operable status within 14 days. If not restored within 14 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 1 OCFR50.72 and/or 1 OCFR50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.

11-57

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 14.9 Emergency Battery Lighting Units Emergency battery lighting units provided for FSSD shall be Operable whenever the illuminated associated fire safe shutdown equipment is required.

14.9.1 With any of the emergency battery lighting units provided for FSSD inoperable, restore the inoperable units to Operable status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months -OR-ensure alternate lighting is available.

14.9.2 Restore the inoperable emergency battery lighting unit to Operable status within 14 days. If not restored within 14 days, continue the compensatory actions AND perform 1 OCFR50.72 and/or 1 OCFR50.73 reviews per site administrative procedures.

14.10 Fire Safe Shutdown Equipment The equipment listed on Table 14.10 is required for Fire Safe Shutdown(FSSD) and shall be Operable (or in its FSSD condition) when the unit is in modes 1, 2, and 3.

The non-System 26 valves noted on the plants mechanical flow diagrams as being administratively locked in the open, closed, or throttled position (with breaker open) for Appendix R shall be maintained in that condition when the unit is in Modes 1, 2 and 3.

14.10.1 With one or more required equipment in Table 14.10 inoperable (or not in its FSSD condition), restore to operable status (or its FSSD condition) within 30 days.

14.10.2 With one or more of the breakers and/or valves specified in design output documents not in the noted position or condition, return the breakers and/or valve to the required position within 30 days.

14.10.3 If required action and associated completion time cannot be met,

a.

place the equipment in the condition required for FSSD, -OR-

b.

provide a back-up means of instrumentation monitoring for the equipment in Table 14.10, -OR-

c.

perform an evaluation to justify using alternate means to provide FSSD, -OR-

d.

be in Mode 3 within 6-hours and Mode 4 within the following 12-hours.

11-59

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 24 TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)

PAGE 130F14 ITEM NO.

I TYPE OF SYSTEM/COMPONENT I FREQUENCY I

TESTING/INSPECTION REQUIREMENT (TIR)

I NOTES 14.10.a I 14.1O.b 14.10.c 14.10.d 14.10.e 14.10.f 250 V Batteries 0-BAT-239-1 O-BAT-239-2 250 V DC Battery Boards 0-BD-239-1 0-BD-239-2 250 V DC Distribution Panels 0-DPL-239-1 0-DPL-239-2 Main Steam System Valves (Table 14.10)

Instrumentation Component Cooling System (CCS) Pump 2B-B Thermal Barrier Booster Pump 1 A Thermal Barrier Booster Pump 1 B RCS Pressurizer Spray Valves 1-PCV-68-340B 1 -PCV-68-340D 31 days 31 days 18 months 18 months 92 days 92 days 92 days Verify battery terminal voltage and alignment to its associated DC bus.

Verify proper breaker alignment for supply of control power to steam load trip circuits and RCP breaker trip circuits.

Verify capability to close valves using the associated hand switch in the Main Control Room or manually at the valve.

Perform a channel calibration for each required instrument channel.

Perform augmented in-service testing of pumps.

Verify capability of pumps to provide 40 gpm to each thermal barrier heat exchanger.

Verify capability to close valves using the associated hand switch in the Main Control Room I

I ________

(continued) 11-72

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 24 B14.1.3 The restoration of equipment to Operable in 14 days is reasonable based on the type of equipment that is out of service. The time frame is consistent with standard Technical Specifications.

B14.1.4.a With the CPU inoperable, for zones containing Function A Fire Detection Instrumentation shown in Table 14.1 in an accessible area, the panel shall be monitored within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months . If the inoperable CPU cannot be restored within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months , a continuous monitor patrol must be established. The establishment of a continuous monitor patrol for the affected panels is required to provide detection capability and notification to a constantly attended location until the inoperable CPU is restored to Operability. The Completion Time of one hour to establish a continuous roving monitor is reasonable and based upon the typical time necessary to establish a monitor patrol and to perform an inspection. These actions are consistent with the standard Technical Specifications requirements should the detectors have been declared inoperable. The Main Control Room (MCR) is exempted from this action since the MCR is the constantly attended location that is normally notified.

B14.1.4.b With the CPU inoperable, forzones containing Function A Fire Detection Instrumentation shown in Table 14.1 in an inaccessible area, the monitoring of the air temperature for the affected area once per hour or the monitoring of the panel once per hour is to be established within one hour. The time frame of one hour to establish one of the compensatory actions is reasonable considering that it is consistent with standard Technical Specifications. The establishment of temperature monitoring or monitor patrols for the affected panels is required to provide detection capability to a constantly attended location until the inoperable CPU is restored to Operability. The time frame and actions are reasonable and based upon the necessary times and actions that would be required if these devices had been declared inoperable.

B14.1.4.c With the CPU inoperable, for zones containing Function B Fire Detection Instrumentation shown In Table 14.1 in an inaccessible or accessible area, the panel shall be monitored hourly within one hour. The establishment of a monitor patrol once per hour for the affected panels is required to provide detection notification to a constantly attended location until the inoperable CPU is restored to Operability. The automatic actuations are still operable so the more restrictive compensatory actions of a continuous fire watch is not needed. The completion time of one hour to establish an hourly roving monitor is reasonable and is consistent with the standard Technical Specifications for when annunciation to a constantly attended location is inoperable such as in OR-14.1.1.

B.14.1.5 The restoration of equipment to Operable in 14 days is reasonable based on the type of equipment that is out of service. The time frame is consistent with standard Technical Specifications.

11-76

PART II-FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 25 Either Action (a) or (b) is to be taken within 7 days so that three pumps are available.

This provides 150% pump capacity to safety-related areas. The completion time of 7 days is reasonable considering that 100% of the required pumping capacity to safety-related areas is still provided, and the time required to identify the problem and to take the corrective actions. This is consistent with the standard Technical Specifications.

Action (c) is anticipated for planned outage activities where normally an entry will be made into (a) or (b) and then enter (c) for 7 days before re-entry into (a) or (b). While in cases of unplanned outages, it is anticipated an entry will be made into (a), (b), or OR 14.2.2,14.2.3, 14.2.4 or 14.2.5 as appropriate. The backup pump for Action (c) also provides a measure of diversity by the general nature of how the existing electric pumps are installed. The backup pump will tend to be located on another water source, with another energy source and a diverse location to provide a tie-in for supplying the fire protection system. For Action (c), the two electric fire pumps and a backup fire pump, a continuous fire watch will be established in areas containing common power supplies. The determination of the fire watches' area of coverage will be based on information provided in Action (b) and additional areas where the power supplies for the backup pump are not separated by at least a one hour fire barrier from the cables associated with the Operable electric fire pumps.

The provision of fire watches in areas of power supply interaction between the available electric fire pumps as well as the backup pump is consistent with other actions of OR-14.2.1.b. The completion time of 7 days to restore the 150% pump capacity (i.e., entering OR-14.2.1.b or restoration of the diesel fire pump) is reasonable and is consistent with other existing actions to ensure there is 150%

pump capacity.

The backup pump shall be installed to meet the following criteria which will ensure that the pump is operated within the HPFP design limits.

1. The pump driver will be a diesel engine capable of operation for two hours.

2. The pump will provide a minimum 1590 gpm at 300 ft. head as demonstrated by a flow test.

3. Suction supply for the pump will be from the Tennessee River, a cooling tower basin, the 35 acre pond, the lined pond or other pond with a minimum of two hour supply at 1590 gpm.

4. A maximum pressure capability of 135 psig at elevation 729 feet. This maximum can be controlled manually provided the pump is constantly attended.

5. The pump will be connected to the High Pressure Fire Protection system via a non-OR fire hydrant using 1-5inch and 2 nominal 2Y2 hoses that are in current hydrostatic test requirements.

6. Manual start and control of the pump is acceptable provided the pump is constantly attended when required to be available.

In Modes 5 and 6 the locations where a continuous fire watch would be required may be combined and patrolled by a roving fire watch(es). While the plant is in cold shutdown or refueling, there are fewer systems needed for maintaining cold shutdown. Roving fire watches provide an adequate level of coverage for these systems by ensuring that potential fire hazards are detected and corrected in a timely manner, or if a fire were to occur, ensuring that timely action is taken.

11-80

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 27 B.1 4.2.6 The closing of multiple sectional valves in the water supply piping of Section 14.2 can isolate the flow path to the using devices of Section 14.3,.6 and.7.

a. In such a situation, the more restrictive requirements of Section 14.3,.6 or.7 would apply. The requirements of 14.3,.6 or.7 although more restrictive, address the specifically affected area(s). The entering of compensatory actions for the isolated using devices is reasonable.

b. Specific valve operators that have had power removed due to Appendix R concerns require re-energizing to perform periodic testing such as cycling of valves to meet other regulatory requirements. The establishment of an attendant at the breaker will allow prompt action to be taken if a fire condition would occur during this time period.

c. The restoration time of thirty (30) days is reasonable based on the equipment involved and the limited impairment to the Fire Suppression System.

B1 4.2.7 Specific usage's are supplied by the HPFP/RSW system and are required to be operable during normal plant operation. A calculation determined the limits for the total HPFP/RSW usage and is as follows:

a. Selected as-designed RSW loads to remain unisolated during a fire condition (e.g., chiller packages and plant processes required during plant operation).

b. Manual RSW isolation valves to be locked closed to preclude non-as designed RSW loads being added.

c. Selected as designed RSW loads to automatically isolate during a fire condition.

This provides control of HPFP/RSW usage to ensure an adequate water supply is available for fire protection when needed.

RSW was originally designed to be used for multiple usage's (e.g., supply various chiller units and plant processes, cleaning of plant areas and other miscellaneous uses). Therefore when HPFP/RSW is needed outside the bounds of the established calculation, it is acceptable to establish compensatory actions employing isolation capability that will allow for prompt isolation of additional usage without requiring a Temporary Alteration Control Form (TACF).

a. For HPFPIRSW usage that automatically isolates, it is not necessary to have the isolation point constantly attended with the attendant in communication with the Main Control Room (MCR), 0-M-29 Operator. In the case where non-as designed HPFP/RSW loads are needed, a manual isolation capability is required and an attendant established in the area within one (1) hour. The attendant will be in communication (radio, telephone, PA, etc.) with the 0-M-29 Operator in the MCR.

11-82

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 27

b. For those as designed RSW usage's that are designed to automatically isolate on a fire pump start, there will be times when this automatic isolation capability will need to be inhibited (e.g., during fire pump testing). During hot weather, there are chillers that are needed for plant operations and since the inhibiting of the automatic isolation is procedurally controlled, this will allow the plant to continue to operate normally during testing and still provide adequate compensatory actions to ensure an adequate supply of water for fire fighting if needed.

c. Thirty (30) days is reasonable based on the actions required by Operating Requirement (OR) 14.10, which requires restoration of equipment required for 1 OCFR50, Appendix R within that time limit.

B14.2.8 The electric driven pump start circuitry, including the buffer relays, may be temporarily inhibited during maintenance/testing to prevent the fire pumps from starting automatically. The excessive starting of the deep draft electric motor driven fire pumps is an industry concern, therefore, limiting the starting of the electric driven fire pumps is a good practice. This action does not require additional compensatory measures for the following reasons:

a. Taking the circuitry out of service and returning it to service will be administratively controlled by the testing documentation.

b. The manual starting of the electric motor driven fire pumps from the Main Control Room (MCR) or their associated 480V shutdown board is not impaired. Additional administrative controls and abnormal operating instructions exist that ensure fire pumps are started upon the discovery of a fire.

c. The system is normally pressurized without the operation of the fire pumps.

11-83

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 24 B.14.3.1 More restrictive compensatory actions are appropriate where water based suppression equipment or associated fire detection equipment are provided to protect redundant safe shutdown systems or components that could be damaged if a fire occurred. With any fire suppression shown in Table 14.3 inoperable in any accessible or inaccessible area, the inoperable equipment must be restored within one hour. If both the suppression and associated detection are inoperable in an area containing both trains of safe shutdown equipment, then it is appropriate to provide continuous fire watch coverage except as modified below. The completion time of one hour is based on the standard Technical Specifications.

a. When both the suppression and associated detection are inoperable or detection is inoperable in an area, then the more stringent compensatory actions are needed. If only the water based suppression is inoperable, then the early warning detection system will provide more extensive coverage of the area and faster notification than can be provided by a fire watch. Therefore, it is appropriate to provide a lesser degree of fire watch coverage (i.e., Hourly roving fire watch).

When the detection is inoperable and the associated suppression is still operable then the more restrictive compensatory action is required. In this situation, not only is the early warning capability lost, but so is the automatic actuation capability of the suppression system.

b.

The inoperable suppression is to be restored within one hour. If the area in the Unit 1 Reactor Building, Lower Containment, then special consideration is needed due to the radiological conditions, building construction, and hazards present. In this case the area with inoperable suppression and/or detection must have a continuous fire watch established, or the air temperature must be monitored in the affected area once per hour. The completion time of one hour to establish continuous fire watch or hourly monitoring of the air temperature is reasonable.

Either of these compensatory actions and associated time frequency are acceptable based on the air supervision for the Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) sprinkler system, the RCP oil collection system and the capability to monitor RCP bearings temperatures in the MCR. Furthermore, the one hour frequency for air temperature monitoring is considered adequate in view of other indications available in the MCR, including alarms to alert the operator to abnormal containment temperature conditions. This is also consistent with the standard Technical Specification on the loss of detection in an inaccessible area such as Lower Containment.

Fire suppression is not assumed to be operable to mitigate the consequences of a design accident or transient. In designing the accident sequence for theoretical hazard evaluation, fires are not assumed to take place simultaneously with the design basis event (DBE) or transient. Therefore, observing the same instruments that are used by SRs 3.6.5.1 and 3.6.5.2 once per hour along with the other indications available in the main Control Room, including alarms to alert the operator of abnormal Containment temperature conditions provides an equivalent level of fire safety without exposing personnel to unnecessary radiation exposure. Additionally, this method of compensatory actions for inoperable suppression systems in Lower Containment was approved by NRC for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's TS 3.3.3.8 that was current at the time Watts Bar Nuclear Plant's FPR was written. This approval was also contained in Sequoyah Nuclear Plant's FPR when Sequoyah's fire protection was removed from TS and placed in the FPR.

II - 88

PART II-FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 Normally a circuit that causes an alarm or trouble condition that results in a masking condition is repaired within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months or taken out of service. Due to special situations, it may be desired to clear this masking condition while maintaining the circuit's functional capability to actuate (i.e.,

alarm) and to detect grounds and to monitor for internal module failures (i.e., trouble) but not the Class A supervision to detect conductor failure. In such special conditions, the resulting temporary alteration control form (TACF) will provide the advantage of the circuit remaining alarm functional which is preferable to the lifting the field wiring, jumpering the monitoring module out of service, and thus completely removing any capability of the circuit. An example of this situation is a problem such as a cable between two devices on a circuit must be removed for operational purposes and this would cause a trouble but due to the Class A design of the system the devices would remain functional. If the circuit field wiring was to be lifted at the controlling module and the devices taken completely out of service then the resulting compensatory measures could be a hourly or continuous fire watch. There is an advantage of having the equipment functional for normal automatic operation in lieu of the manual actions of a fire watch and the subsequent fire brigade. The module providing the supervision will continue to monitor itself and report trouble conditions of the module and grounds on the circuit. The propose of OR-14.5.3 is to address the masking concern by applying jumpers to the controlling module to clear the trouble and cause the loss of supervision of the field wiring for a break in the conductors but will allow the circuit actuation capability to remain functional to provide actuation as well as the circuits ability to detect grounds and internal failures of the monitoring module. The device(s) on either side of this lifted cable would be functionally tested for actuation capability at the time the TACF is first installed to ensure the functional actuation capability then periodically tested to ensure the continued integrity of the remainder of the circuit. Should the portion of the circuit taken out of service include an initiating device then the appropriate OR-1 4.1, -14.3, or -14.4 will be entered for the device taken out of service and OR-1 4.5.3 will be entered for the balance of the circuit that is actuation functional. This periodic testing of the circuit is expected to be every 7 days for detection circuits and every 6 months for suppression system actuation circuits for automatic valves in the flow path. These frequencies are reasonable due to the configuration and work control processes provided at WBN and the problem reporting process (e.g., corrective action program) that would investigate a condition that might have endangered a circuit. In addition, the 6 month testing frequency for the suppression system actuation circuits for automatic valves in the flow path, is reasonable since the associated detection circuits would still be available to alert plant personnel of any fire. The frequency of 6 months is the same frequency SQN tests similar suppression system actuation circuits for automatic valves in the flow path.

The 30 days to correct this condition is reasonable since the problem is of such a nature that the desire for the continued function of the circuit is of sufficient importance that a TACF was generated in lieu of using the 14 day limits the other ORs referenced. This desire includes the advantage of maintaining equipment in a automatic mode instead of the reliance on manual actions coupled with the reliability of the administrative controls to prevent damage to the equipment. The need for the extra time could be caused by such factors as inaccessibility due to radiological or personnel safety reasons. The physical action, lifting the field cable in the above example, is a TACF and will be addressed by appropriate site procedures which will be prepared to established the requirements to address this condition in advance of its implementation.

11-96

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS(OR)

FIRE HOSE STATIONS/STANDPIPES B.14.6 Fire hose stations listed in Table 14.6, as part of the water suppression system, ensure that adequate manual fire suppression capability is available to confine and extinguish fires occurring in any portion of the facility where safety-related or FSSD equipment is located and to provide backup to primary suppression systems.

B.14.6.1 With one or more of the fire hose stations inoperable, the degree of fire protection provided to safety related equipment and fire safe shutdown equipment is degraded.

Consequently, a backup source of fire hose protection must be supplied from the nearest operable fire hose station. This can be accomplished by routing additional fire hose from an Operable water source (hydrant, hose station, etc.) to the affected area; by staging fire hose immediately outside the affected area; or by providing alternate fire suppression equipment commensurable with the fire hazards present.

Normally the method to do this is by providing a gated wye(s) and additional fire hose at the nearest operable fire hose station. In some instances, the physical routing of fire hoses from the Operable hose station to the inoperable hose station may result in a recognizable hazard to operating technicians, plant equipment (e.g., breaching a fire barrier), or the hose itself. In such cases, the hose will be appropriately stored at the operable hose station. The completion time of eight hours is reasonable since normally the responding fire brigade would bring additional fire hose. In addition, this hose is not for occupant use but restricted for use by trained fire fighting personnel.

The hose stations in the Reactor Building Lower Containment require special consideration. To provide protection during outages (during Modes 5 and 6),

appropriate lengths of hose and nozzles are provided at the fire protection siamese located at the entrance to Lower Containment. In Modes 1 through 4 these hoses are not required since occupancy and access is limited, thus personnel are normally not available locally to use this manual means of fire fighting. The hose station valves and water supply will be maintained operable. Extra hose and nozzles are available in the Fire Equipment Cages in the plant in case of an emergency.

B.14.6.2 Restoration of the equipment to Operable status within 14 days is reasonable considering the equipment involved. The time frame is consistent with the standard Technical Specifications.

11-97

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)

FIRE HOSE STATIONS/STANDPIPES B.14.6.a TIR 14.6.a requires performance of a visual inspection of the fire hose stations in any accessible area to assure all required equipment is at the station and the station is not blocked or obstructed. The frequency of 92 days is considered reasonable in view of the infrequent problems found with hoses and is based on operating experience.

B.1 4.6.b TIR 1 4.6.b verifies the correct alignment for testable valves (except hose valves) in any accessible area in the fire hose station/standpipe system flow paths and provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for hose station operation. Valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position need only be verified to still be locked, sealed, etc., since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This inspection does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves capable of being mispositioned and preventing or inhibiting fire suppression activities are in the correct position. A frequency of 92 days has been established and is more conservative than the inspection criteria established for primary systems valves that are locked, sealed, etc.

B.14.6.c TIR 14.6.c ensures that each testable valve (except hose valves) in any accessible area will travel through at least one cycle. This TIR is necessary to ensure the valves are Operable in the event of an actuation for fire suppression needs. A frequency of 12 months has been established based on operating experience, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements and NFPA consensus standard 25 criteria.

B.14.6.d TIR 14.6.d requires that fire hose, associated with fire hose stations identified in Table 14.6 and stored in unheated areas, undergo a hydrostatic test once every 12 months. This hydrostatic test ensures that the hose is reliable and can withstand the working fire main pressure. Appropriate manufacturers' markings or initials and date by test personnel are sufficient to document this hydrostatic test. The manufacturers' markings are done in accordance with industry consensus standards. Initials and date by test personnel are sufficient to ensure proper controls are maintained. The frequency of 12 months is based upon regulatory guidelines, has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.

11-98

PART II-FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 B.14.6.e TIR 14.6.e ensures thai each dry standpipe water flow device actuates to its correct position upon an initiation signal. The dry standpipe control valve is a deluge valve for which there is limited means to ensure a complete cycle of travel is achieved. For cycling these valves, the industry practice of closing the isolation valve all but a few turns until the deluge valve opens and then completing the closing of the isolation valve. Also, each testable valve in any inaccessible area, will travel through at least one cycle. The pushbuttons associated with these hose stations in the Reactor Building not only provide a means to open the deluge valve that allows water into the normally dry standpipe system as discussed in Section 12.2 but also start of the fire pumps. Although these Reactor Building hose stations are manual and plant personnel are trained to report a fire before fighting it, there are no administrative controls to ensure the deluge valve is activated as there are for the start of the electric motor driven fire pump(s). Therefore, these push buttons are tested. Any other pushbuttons provided at hose stations other than the Reactor Building for manual start of the fire pumps are not tested as part of this TIR. The 18 month frequency for accessible and Refueling Outage frequency for inaccessible areas was developed considering the scope and requirements of some tests and inspections can only be performed during a unit outage. Operating experience has shown these components routinely pass the TIR when performed on the 18 month/Refueling Outage frequency. Therefore, the frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.

B.14.6.f TIR 14.6.f requires performance of a visual inspection of the fire hose stations that are in any inaccessible area to assure all required equipment is at the station and the station is not blocked or obstructed. The Refueling Outage frequency was developed considering that many tests and inspections can only be performed during a unit outage. Operating experience has shown these components routinely pass the TIR when performed on the Refueling Outage frequency. Therefore, the frequency was concluded to be acceptable from a reliability standpoint, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.

B.14.6.g TIR 14.6.g requires removal of each fire hose for inspection of the hose condition and gaskets in the hose couplings. Degraded gaskets and/or hoses require replacement.

Following inspection and gasket and/or hose replacement, the fire hose must be reracked, preferably at different folds. The 18 month or Refueling Outage frequency was developed considering that some areas can only be accessed during a unit outage, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.

B.14.6.h TIR 14.6.h requires that fire hose, associated with fire hose stations identified in Table 14.6 and stored in a heated area, undergo a hydrostatic test once every three years. This hydrostatic test ensures that the hose is reliable and can withstand the working fire main pressure. Appropriate manufacturers' markings or initials and date by test personnel are sufficient to document this hydrostatic test. The manufacturers' markings are done in accordance with industry consensus standards. Initials and date by test personnel are sufficient to ensure proper controls are maintained. The frequency of three years is based upon regulatory guidelines, has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.

11-99

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 B.14.6.1 TIR 14.6.1 verifies the Operability of each fire hose station valve by partially opening the hose station valve with limited water flow. In the case of selected areas such as the Reactor Building, this flow test can use air in order to address the ALARA concerns. The period of three years between tests is reasonable because the infrequent use of the fire hoses provides for little opportunity for physical degradation or buildup of silt or other obstructions. This surveillance frequency and criteria is consistent with standard Technical Specifications.

B.1 4.6.j TIR 14.6.j verifies correct alignment during outages for each testable valve (except hose valves) in any inaccessible area in the fire hose station/standpipe system flow path and provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for hose station operation. The test is performed during each cold shutdown exceeding 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months unless the TIR was performed in the previous 92 days. The verification is to be performed each 92 days during extended outages. The frequency for the TIR is based on the assumption that the required valves cannot be tested until the plant is in cold shutdown for more than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . Valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position need only be verified to be locked, sealed, etc. since these were verified to be in the correct position before locking, sealing, or securing. A frequency of 92 days during outages has been established and is more conservative than the inspection criteria established for primary system valves that are locked, sealed, etc.

The expected frequency for this testing is each Refueling outage and is based on operating experience.11-100

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (OR)

FIRE HYDRANTS B.14.7 Fire hydrants listed in Table 14.7, as part of the water suppression system, ensure that adequate fire suppression capability is available to provide coverage for selected portions of safety-related structures.

The Intake Pumping Station uses fire hydrants as a backup water source for fire hoses used in manual fire fighting. For the Diesel Generator Building's Conduit Interface Room, the fire hydrants are the primary and backup water source for fire hoses used in manual fire fighting.

B.14.7.1 With one or more of the fire hydrants inoperable, the degree of fire protection provided to safety-related equipment and fire safe shutdown systems is degraded.

Consequently, a backup source of fire hose protection must be supplied from the nearest Operable water supply whether it is another Operable fire hydrant or a hose station. This is done by providing a gated wye(s) at the nearest Operable water source. In some instances, the physical routing of fire hoses from the Operable water source to the inoperable fire hydrant may result in a recognizable hazard to operating personnel, plant equipment (e.g., breaching fire barriers), or the hose itself. In such cases, the hose will be appropriately stored at the Operable water source with the hose dedicated for hydrant use. The completion time of eight hours is reasonable since normally the responding 'fire brigade would bring additional fire hose. In addition, this hose is not for occupant use, but restricted for use by trained fire fighting personnel.

B.14.7.2 Restoration of the equipment to Operable status within 28 days is reasonable considering the restraints to getting to (i.e., digging up) and restoring (i.e., cure time for concrete thrust blocks) the equipment involved.11-101

PART II-FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)

FIRE HYDRANTS B.14.7.a TIR 14.7.a requires performance of a visual inspection of the fire hose equipment dedicated to support the use of fire hydrants for manual fire fighting. This assures all required equipment is at the assigned location and is available for use. The frequency of 92 days is considered reasonable in view of the infrequent use of the hose, and is consistent with operating experience.

B.1 4.7.b TIR 1 4.7.b verifies the correct alignment for testable valves in any accessible area in the fire hydrant flow path and provides assurance that the proper flow paths will exist for fire hydrant operation. Valves that are locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position need only be verified to still be locked, sealed, etc., since these were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing. This inspection does not require any testing or valve manipulation. Rather, it involves verification that those valves, capable of being mispositioned and preventing or inhibiting fire suppression activities, are in the correct position. A frequency of 92 days has been established and is more conservative than the inspection criteria in standard Technical Specifications for safety system valves that are locked, sealed, etc.

B.14.7.c TIR 14.7.c this visual inspection ensures accessibility and condition of the fire hydrants. Fire hydrants are more likely subject to mechanical damage due to their normal locations. The six-month frequency is needed to ensure continued Operability. The frequency of six months is based on industry operating experience and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements.

B.14.7.d TIR 14.7.d requires that fire hose dedicated to support fire hydrant use undergo a hydrostatic test once every 12 months. This hose is normally located on a motorized apparatus and will be periodically exposed to uncontrolled environmental conditions, mainly atmospheric temperature extremes. This hydrostatic test ensures that the hose is reliable and can withstand the working fire main pressure. Appropriate manufacturers' markings or initials and date by test personnel are sufficient to document this hydrostatic test. The manufacturers' markings are done in accordance with industry consensus standards. Initials and date by test personnel are sufficient to ensure proper controls are maintained. The frequency of 12 months is based upon regulatory guidelines, has been shown to be acceptable through operating experience, and is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements and NFPA consensus standard 25 criteria.

B.14.7.e TIR 14.7.e requires that fire hydrants be inspected and operated once every 12 months to ensure proper function and to flow water from the hydrant until perceptible foreign material has cleared. The frequency of 12 months is consistent with standard Technical Specification requirements and NFPA consensus standard 25 criteria.11-102

PART II-FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (OR)

FIRE-RATED ASSEMBLIES B.14.8 Fire-rated assemblies/fire barriers (including walls, floors, ceilings, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barrier systems [ERFBS] and radiant energy shields, and fire dampers that comprise the fire boundaries separating redundant safe shutdown components) or separating systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area ensure that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility prior to detection and extinguishment. Fire-rated assemblies/fire barriers are used In conjunction with other fire protection features such as fire detection and fire suppression systems. Thus, the completion times and compensatory action requirements vary based on the Operability of the other fire protection features. With the exception of electrical raceway fire barrier systems and radiant energy shields, fire-rated assemblies/fire barriers are depicted on drawings in Part VI of the FPR. Raceways requiring fire barriers or radiant energy shields are identified by raceway number in Part VI of the FPR.

In Modes 5 and 6 the locations where a continuous fire watch would be required may be combined and patrolled by a roving fire watch(es). While the plant is in cold shutdown or refueling there are fewer systems needed for maintaining cold shutdown. Roving fire watches provide an adequate level of coverage for these systems by ensuring that potential fire hazards are detected and corrected in a timely manner, or if a fire were to occur, ensuring that timely action is taken.

Additionally, during Modes 5 and 6, it will be necessary to breach some fire barriers for longer than 30 days. These breaches will be excluded from the 1 OCFR50.72 and 1 OCFR50.73 reviews. These fire barrier components that will be breached are as follows:

Reactor Building Equipment Hatch Shield Blocks Doors: A64 A65 A156 A164 A165 The exemption of the 1 OCFR50.72 and 1 OCFR50.73 reviews for those identified components that are breached to facilitate the outage for longer than 30 days is consistent with other nuclear station practices. Roving fire watches will be used until the breaches are restored.

Other than that specified above, the time requirements for correcting equipment problems of OR 14.8 will remain the same.

In addition, those fire rated assemblies/fire barriers that are not accessible due to being in long-term high radiation areas are evaluated in Part VII.11-103

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 B.14.8.1 The fire-rated assemblies/fire barriers are provided as a part of the defense-in-depth concept of fire protection. The degradation of an assembly/barrier is to be reviewed in concert with the other fire protection features available. Thus, this review produces the following:

a. When the assembly/barrier is degraded and there is no fire detection designed to protect both sides of the assembly/barrier, the continuous fire watch is reasonable.

b. When the assembly/barrier is degraded and there is fire detection designed to protect one side of the assembly/barrier, then a roving fire watch is reasonable.

c. When the assembly/barrier Is degraded and there is suppression and fire detection designed to protect both sides of the assembly/barrier, then no compensatory action is reasonable.

The Operability or inoperability of the suppression or fire detection does not need to be addressed in the cases of degraded assemblies/barriers. This is because of the fact that an inoperable suppression or fire detection system/feature that protects Operable safety-related and FSSD equipment has its own compensatory actions.

B.14.8.2 The completion time of 30 days is reasonable based on the curing time of common fire barrier materials.11-104

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)

FIRE-RATED ASSEMBLIES B.14.8.a TIR 14.8.a ensures that fire doors are in the correct position, free to close, and the door is not damaged. NFPA consensus standards do not delineate specific frequencies for visual inspections of fire doors. Plant personnel are provided training in General Employee Training of the importance of maintaining fire doors closed and Operable. Plant fire doors are conspicuously identified as fire doors. Therefore, the 31 day frequency is considered acceptable.

B.14.8.b TIR 14.8.b requires a functional test of all associated release and closing mechanisms and latches on fire door assemblies to ensure fire door Operability. The frequency of 12 months is consistent with the guidance found in NFPA 80.

B.14.8.c TIR 14.8.c requires visual inspections of the surface areas of fire-rated barriers to verify Operability. Approximately twenty percent of the barriers will be inspected every 12 months to ensure that all barriers are inspected at least once every five years. Inspection of bellows, metal plates, ERFBS, or insulation covering a penetration seal, provides verification of the fire-rated assembly/fire barrier integrity, provided there is no apparent change In appearance or abnormal degradation.

Inspections validate their functional integrity and ensure that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.

The exposed surfaces of the fire-rated assembly/fire barrier will be visually inspected to ensure the integrity of the assembly. Fire dampers are part of the fire-rated assembly/fire barrier. Damper cycling is addressed in the WBN Preventative Maintenance Program. There will be no disassembly of equipment (e.g., removal of damming material, junction box covers, or conduit fitting covers) to perform this visual inspection. Documentation of these inspections will be based on the acceptability of the barrier or barrier portion (i.e., individual sign-offs for each penetration will not be required). The barrier acceptability is used since a failed assembly leads to the barrier being declared inoperable not just the assembly. The surveillance frequency and criteria are considered to be adequate since they are consistent with current industry practice of ensuring all barriers are Inspected within 5 years. Although the Standard Technical Specifications call for the inspection of the exposed surfaces of each fire rated assemblies every 18 months, it only required 10% of the penetration seals to be inspected. This results in a delay of 15 years to review all penetration seals. These penetration seals are more susceptible to damage than concrete walls and thus fire safety is increased with the additional inspections.

B.14.8.d TIR 14.8.d requires Refueling Outage frequency visual inspection of approximately 33-1/3 percent of the surface area of fire rated assemblies/fire barriers to determine Operability. Inspection of bellows, metal plates, ERFBSs, radiant energy shields, or insulation covering a penetration seal, provides verification of the fire rated assembly/fire barrier integrity, provided there is not apparent change in appearance or abnormal degradation. Inspections validate their functional integrity and ensure that fires will be confined or adequately retarded from spreading to adjacent portions of the facility.11-105

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 The exposed surfaces of the fire-rated assembly/fire barrier will be visually inspected to ensure the integrity of the assembly. There will be no disassembly of equipment (e.g., removal of damming material, junction box covers, or conduit fitting covers) to perform this visual inspection. Documentation of these inspections will be based on the acceptability of the barrier or barrier portion (i.e., individual sign-offs for each penetration will not be required). The barrier acceptability is used since a failed assembly leads to the barrier being declared inoperable not just the assembly. The surveillance frequency and criteria are considered conservative since they exceed current industry practice of ensuring all barriers are inspected within 5 years. The frequency for inaccessible areas follows the criteria set out for inspections in accessible areas but adapted to the special circumstances associated with inaccessible areas.

11

- 106

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (OR)

EMERGENCY BATTERY LIGHTING UNITS B.14.9 Emergency battery lighting units are required to support a unit shutdown in the event of a fire and coincident loss of offsite power.

An ability to access and operate fire safe shutdown systems is required as well as the protection of such systems. This ability must be capable of being performed in conjunction with the loss of offsite power. To achieve this, emergency battery lighting units with 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months lighting capacity are provided.

B.14.9.1 Section 14.9.1 uses the term 'altemate battery lighting' for a temporary substitute for installed emergency battery lighting units. This 'alternate battery lighting' generally refers to portable, hand-held lighting as addressed in Section 12.7, "Emergency Lighting' of this report.

B.14.9.2 The restoration of the equipment to Operable in 14 days is reasonable based on the type of equipment that is out of service.11-107

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)

EMERGENCY BATTERY LIGHTING UNITS B.14.9.a TIR 14.9.a verifies proper operation of Emergency Battery Lighting (EBL) units by simulating a loss of power. When manually actuated, normal AC power is interrupted to the EBL at the primary or secondary side of the step-down transformer. Thus, the EBL's ability to go from the float charge mode to the discharge mode is fully exercised. This functional test also demonstrates:

1) The EBL is configured for automatic operation and is not in the standby mode

2) The load transfer circuitry is functional

3) The lamps are functional

4) Continuity exists between the battery and all lamps

5) The battery is functional

6) The charging circuit is functional

7) The status indicators are functional A visual inspection to assess the general condition of the EBL, to detect obvious signs of degradation, and to detect any damage to the unit that may affect Operability is included. The visual inspection can identify degradation mechanisms at an early stage, and in many cases, can warn personnel of an impending failure. Included is a visual inspection to identify electrolyte leakage, and for vented cells, to determine whether water addition is needed. Early detection of battery leakage allows battery replacement before the leakage results in complete battery failure or in severe damage to other EBL components.

The frequency of 92 days for accessible EBLs is based upon vendor recommendations and industry practice. Over time, the optimal inspection frequency will be driven by trending data.

The turbine building standby lighting is not tested as a part of the TIR.

B.14.9.b TIR 14.9.b requires that a battery is replaced periodically as a function of its service life, the environmental conditions the battery will experience, and a safety factor. The service life and the environmental factors are based on information from the manufacturer. This manufacturers information plus the safety factor results in the frequencies as shown in chart.

B.14.9.c TIR 14.9.c requires that the EBL in inaccessible areas inside the Unit 1 Annulus be replaced each refueling outage and that the tests and inspection described under bases 14.9.a be performed to ensure EBL operability. This is being done due to the ALARA considerations in the Reactor Building and the limited accessibility during plant operation. The surveillance frequency and battery replacement is considered conservative and reasonable based on the fact that these are 15 year service life batteries that are being replaced on a refueling outage frequency.11-108

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 27 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)

EMERGENCY BATTERY LIGHTING UNITS Type of Environmental Service Replacement Battery Conditions*

Life Frequency (ambient temperature)

(Years)

Seared lead constantly below 950F 8

5 acid and 15 8

calcium alloy 20 11 Sealed lead constantly above 950F 8

3 acid and 15 6

calcium alloy 20 8

Sealed lead Unit 1 Annulus 15**

Refueling Outage acid and calcium alloy Solid gel constantly below 950F 4

3 Solid gel constantly above 950F 4

2

Based on site environmental drawings for average temperature during normal operation.

- The 15 year service life is for the existing Exide LEC-36. Replacement battery (Sentry PM 6420) has a service life of 8 years. Replacement EBL (Lightguard F-100 w/LC-361 battery) has a service life of 20 years. Regardless of the battery/EBL combination used, the replacement frequency is every refueling outage for batteries in the Unit 1 Annulus.

The replacement method is preferred for the accessible EBL since a periodic, deep discharge (8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months ) test is not recommended by the manufacturer. The refueling outage replacement for inaccessible EBLs is preferred due to ALARA considerations and very limited access to the Reactor Building during operations which means that inspection and testing would only be practical during outages. The frequency and criteria is based on vendor recommendations.

The turbine building standby lighting is not tested as a part of the TIR.11-109

I PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 BASES - OPERATING REQUIREMENTS (OR)

FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT B.14.10 A minimum set of plant systems and components has been identified at WBN to ensure that the plant can achieve and maintain safe shutdown in the event of plant fires (see Part IlIl, Safe Shutdown Capabilities). In the majority of cases the identified plant systems and components are addressed by WBN Technical Specifications and Technical Requirements Manual which list surveillance requirements for verifying the Operability of the systems and components. This OR lists the systems and components which are not included as part of a Technical Specification or Technical Requirement.

Thermal overloads that are by-passed during accident conditions must remain operable during normal plant operation. This will ensure that valves that are required for a Control Building fire are not damaged due to a hot short that could by-pass the torque switch. In addition, the thermal overloads are required for limiting current flow in the event of fire induced multiple high impedance faults and documented in the Multiple High Impedance Fault Analysis. The Technical Requirements Manual, Table 3.8.3-1, "Motor-Operated Valves Thermal Overload Devices Which Are Bypassed Under Accident Conditions" provides the list of thermal overloads this statement addresses.

This OR is provided to ensure that systems and components which are required for safe shutdown are maintained operable and tested to ensure operability. The intent of this OR is to ensure the equipment listed in Table 14.10 is capable of performing its FSSD function. To ensure this, equipment listed in Table 14.10 shall satisfy the FSSD Condition listed by being Operable, capable of achieving its FSSD Condition, or in its FSSD Condition. The equipment listed in Table 14.10 is considered inoperable when it is not in or can not achieve its listed FSSD Condition. The actions are based on Technical Specifications 3.3.4, Remote Shutdown System.

B.14.10.1 With a safe shutdown component shown in Table 14.10 inoperable, the inoperable component must be restored within 30 days when the unit is in modes 1, 2, or 3.

B.1 4.10.2 With a breaker and/or valve specified in design output documents as being administratively controlled for Appendix R out of it's required position (as noted on the drawing), the breaker and/or valve must be returned to the required position within 30 days when the unit is in Modes 1, 2, or 3. These breakers and/or valves are administratively controlled to prevent inadvertent operation during an Appendix R fire event. There is no TIR associated with the OR since the valves and/or breaker positions are controlled by the applicable System Operating Instruction and the plant's configuration control program.11-110

PART II-FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 B.14.10.3 If the required action and associated completion time are not met, the plant must be placed in a condition where the OR does not apply. If possible, the Inoperable or misconfigured component can be placed in the condition required for safe shutdown (i.e., close a valve, shutdown a pump, lock open a breaker), or a backup instrument can be provided for monitoring temperature, flow, or pressure. If this cannot be accomplished, an evaluation can be performed to justify using an alternate means to achieve compliance with Appendix R FSSD requirements. The plant's Temporary Control and Alteration process (TACF) along with a 1 OCFR50.59 review can also be used to provide the alternate means of FSSD compliance. If none of the above actions can be accomplished, the unit must be brought to at least Mode 3 within 6-hours and to Mode 4 within the following 12-hours.11-111

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 BASES - TESTING AND INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS (TIR)

FIRE SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT B.14.10.a TIR 14.10.a is performance of a terminal voltage check and on alignment check of the plant's 250 VDC Batteries 1 and 2. This provides assurance that the batteries are operable and aligned to the appropriate DC bus. This check will be performed at least once every 31 days when the plant is in modes 1, 2, or 3.

B.14.10.b TIR 14.10.b is performance of a breaker alignment check for the 250 VDC Battery Boards 1 and 2 and Distribution Panels 1 and 2. This check provides assurance that breakers which supply control power to steam load trip circuits and RCP breaker trip circuits are aligned properly. This check will be performed at least once every 31 days when the plant is in modes 1, 2, or 3.

B.14.10.c TIR 14.1 0.c verifies every 18 months that main steam system valves are capable of being closed via Main Control Room switch or locally by manual operation of the valve. This verifies that each valve operates properly to ensure the isolation of main steam loads should main steam isolation valves become inoperable in the event of a fire damage. The valves are tested every 18 months when the unit is shutdown since operation of the valve via the hand switch during operation can cause a reactor trip.

B.14.10.d TIR 14.1 O.d is performance of a channel calibration on instruments required for safe shutdown. Many of these instruments are required for local operation of plant systems and components during a fire event. The performance of the calibration ensures the accuracy of these instruments should they be required for use. This calibration is performed once per 18 months.

B.1 4.1 0.e TIR 14.1 0.e is performance of in-service testing for CCS pump 2B-B under the augmented in-service testing program. This pump is needed to support Unit 1 fire safe shutdown requirements. The augmented in-service testing program requires a flow verification at least once per 92 days to ensure that the pump is operable.

B.14.10.f TIR 14.1 0.f verifies every 92 days that RCS Pressurizer Spray Valves are capable of being closed from the Main Control Room controller. The valves are tested every 92 days (quarterly) in accordance with the augmented in-service testing program.

B.14.10.g TIR 14.1 O.g verifies every 18 months that the Control Rod Drive Cooler Motors and associated dampers operate properly from MCR controls. The CRDM Coolers and dampers are tested every 18 months when the unit is shutdown since these coolers are normally in operation during unit operation. Also, cycling these coolers on and off during plant operation could have an adverse effect on the Rod Position Indication System.

II-112

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 B.14.10.h TIR 14.10.h verifies every 18 months that the Generator Control System Solenoid can be operated from its associated hand switch in the MCR. This test is performed every 18 months when the unit is shutdown since operation of this solenoid will cause a unit trip. The solenoid is tested every 18 months as part of the Technical Requirements Surveillance Program.

B.14.10.i TIR 14.1 0.i verifies every 18 months that the Lower Compartment Cooler System Temperature Control Valves (TCVs) operate properly from MCR controls. The TCVs are tested every 18 months when the unit is shutdown since these coolers are required for Containment cooling during unit operation.

B.14.1O.j TIR 14.1 0j.a verifies every 31 days that the nitrogen tanks have the quantity and pressure of nitrogen required for operation of the valves. This check will be performed at least once every 31 days when the plant is in modes 1, 2 or 3.

TIR 14.1 O.j.b verifies every 18 months that the SG PORVs and AFW LCVs can be operated properly from backup control stations using the compressed nitrogen. The PORVs and LCVs are tested every 18 months when the unit is shutdown since these valves are required to be operable per plant Technical Specifications when the plant is in operating modes 1 through 4 and testing these valves utilizing the nitrogen system would make the valves inoperable.

B.14.10.k TIR 14.1 O.k verifies every 92 days that the Auxiliary Control Air Compressors are capable of starting automatically if the air receiver pressure drops below a pre-established setpoint. Re-establishing and maintaining system pressure ensure adequate capacity to meet the needs of the small set of components credited for remote pneumatic operation during Fire Safe Shutdown.

B.14.10.1 TIR-14.10.l is for tracking only. The thermal overload bypass devices are tested by the Technical Requirements Manual and no further testing is needed. The concern for the FPR is for the overloads to be bypassed and thus defeating their protection features as addressed in the bases to OR-14.10. This provides a method forthe surveillance program to ensure OR-1 4.10 is entered should the associated tests not be performed and the overloads are bypassed.

B.14.10.m TIR 14.10.m verifies every 18 months that the CREATCS Appendix R transfer switches (O-XS-31 A and 0-XS-31 B) function as intended by the performance of a continuity check. This will ensure that CREATCS is available for local control during an Appendix R fire that takes out the normal control circuit. The continuity test is consistent with the surveillance requirements for other safety-related transfer switches (reference Technical Specification Bases SR3.3.4.2).

II-113

PART II-FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 1 OF 10)

A.

Diesel Generator Building Total Number of Instruments **

HEAT SMOKE ZONE INSTRUMENT LOCATION (NB)

(A1B) 1 Diesel Gen. Rm. 2B-B, El. 742 0/5 2

Diesel Gen. Rm. 2B-B, El. 742 0/5 3

Diesel Gen. Rm.1 B-B, El. 742 0/5 4

Diesel Gen. Rm.1 B-B, El. 742 0/5 5

Diesel Gen. Rm. 2A-A, El. 742 0/5 6

Diesel Gen. Rm. 2A-A, El. 742 0/5 7

Diesel Gen. Rm. 1A-A, El. 742 0/5 8

Diesel Gen. Rm. 1A-A, El. 742 0/5 9

Lube Oil Storage Rm., El. 742 0/1 10 Lube Oil Storage Rm., El. 742 0/1 11 Fuel Oil Transfer Rm., El. 742 0/1 12 Fuel Oil Transfer Rm., El. 742 0/1 13 Diesel Gen. Corridor, El. 742 0/6 14 Air Intake & Exhaust Rm. 2B, El. 760 10/0 15 Air Intake & Exhaust Rm. 1 B, El. 760 10/0 16 Air Intake & Exhaust Rm. 2A, El. 760 10/0 17 Air Intake & Exhaust Rm. 1 A, El. 760 10/0 18 Diesel Gen. 2B-B Relay Bd. El. 742 3/0 19 Diesel Gen. 1 B-B Relay Bd. El. 742 3/0 20 Diesel Gen. 2A-A Relay Bd. El. 742 3/0 21 Diesel Gen. 1A-A Relay Bd. El. 742 3/0 22 Diesel Gen. Board Rm. 2B-B, El. 760 0/2 23 Diesel Gen. Board Rm. 2B-B, El. 760 0/2 24 Diesel Gen. Board Rm.1 B-B, El. 760 0/2 25 Diesel Gen. Board Rm. 1 B-B, El. 760 0/2 26 Diesel Gen. Board Rm. 2A-A, El. 760 0/2

=

27 Diesel Gen. Board Rm. 2A-A, El. 760 0/2 28 Diesel Gen. Board Rm. 1A-A, El. 760 0/2 29 Diesel Gen. Board Rm. 1A-A, El. 760 0/2 36 DGB Tr B Conduit Entry, El. 742 0/1 37 DGB Tr A Conduit Entry, El. 742 0/1 432 DGB Conduit Interface Room 9/0 See Table Notation, Page 10 of 10 11-114

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 2 OF 10)

B.

Control Building Total Number of Instruments **

HEAT SMOKE ZONE INSTRUMENT LOCATION (B)

(AIB) 30 Cable Spreading Rm. C7-Cl 1, El. 729 0/15 31 Cable Spreading Rm. C7-C1 1, El. 729 0/15 32 Cable Spreading Rm. 07-Cl, El. 729 0/15 33 Cable Spreading Rm. C7-Cl 1, El. 729 0/15 34 Cable Spreading Rm. C3-C7, El. 729 0/15 35 Cable Spreading Rm. C3-C7, El. 729 0/15 48 Control Bldg. Corridor, El. 692 0/4 49 Control Bldg. Corridor, El. 692 0/4 50 Mech. Equip Rm., Col. C1, El. 692 A0/2 51 Mech. Equip Rm., Col. C1, El. 692 0/2 52 Mech. Equip Rm., Col. C3, El. 692 0/2 53 Mech. Equip Rm., Col. C3, El. 692 0/2 54 Battery Rm., El. 692 X__

0/3 55 Battery Rm., El. 692 0/3 56 Battery Bd. Rm., El. 692 2/0 57 Battery Bd. Rm., El. 692 2/0 58 Battery Bd. Rm., El. 692 X

2/0 59 Battery Bd. Rm., El. 692 2/0 60 Battery Rm., El. 692 0/3 61 Battery Rm., El. 692 0/3 62 Battery Rm., El. 692 0/3 63 Battery Rm., El. 692 0/3 64 Battery Bd. Rm., El. 692 2/0 65 Battery Bd. Rm., El. 692 2/0 66 Communications Rm., El. 692 0/4 67 Communications Rm., El. 692

=__

0/4 68 Mech. Equip Rm., Col. C11, El. 692 0/2 69 Mech. Equip Rm., Col. C11, El. 692 0/2 149 Cable Spreading Rm. C3-C7, El. 729 0/15 150 Cable Spreading Rm. C3-C7, El. 729 0/15 214 Mech. Equip Rm., Col. C1-C2, El. 755 0/5 215 Mech. Equip Rm., Col. C1 -C2, El. 755 0/5 216 CR Fltr. B, Duct Det., El. 755 0/1 217 CR Fltr. B, Duct Det., El. 755 0/1 (continued)

See Table Notation, Page 10 of 10 11-115

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 3 OF 10)

B.

Control Buildina (continued)

Total Number of Instruments **

HEAT SMOKE ZONE INSTRUMENT LOCATION (ANB)

(AB) 218 CR Fltr. A, Duct Det., El. 755 0/1 219 CR Fltr. A, Duct Det., El. 755 0/1 220 Main CR, El. 755 27/0 221 Tech Support Center, El. 755 0/6 222 Tech Support Center, El. 755 0/6 223 PSO Eng. Shop, El. 755 0/1 224 PSO Eng. Shop, El. 755 0/1 225 Relay Bd. Rm., El. 755 11/0 226 Electric Cont. Bds., El. 755 12/0 227 Operation Living Area, E. 755 0/4 0/4 228 Operation Living Area, E. 755 0/8 229 Main Control Bds., El. 755 8/0 267 Aux. Instr. Rm., Unit 1, El. 708 0/8 268 Aux. Instr. Rm., Unit 1, El. 708 0/10 269 Computer Rm., El. 708 0/4 270 Computer Rm., El. 708 0/4 271 Aux. Instr. Rm., Unit 2, El. 708 0/8 272 Aux. Instr. Rm., Unit 2, El. 708 0/10 X

273 Computer Rm. Corridor, El. 708 3/0 298 Common Main Cont. Bds. & Ml5, El. 755 12/0 387 Control/Turbine Bldg. Wall 0/26 412 Duplex Relay Bds., El. 755 4/0 See Table Notation, Page 10 of 10 11-116

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 22 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 4 OF 10)

C.

Auxiliary Building Total Number of Instruments **

HEAT SMOKE ZONE INSTRUMENT LOCATION (A/B)

(A/B) 39 Cont. Spray Pump 1 A-A, El. 676 2/0 40 Cont. Spray Pump 1 B-B, El. 676 2/0 43 RHR Pump 1A-A, El. 676 2/0 44 RHR Pump 1 B-B, El. 676 2/0 47 Corridor of Aux. Bldg., El. 676 11/0 70 A5-A1 1, Col. W-X, El. 692 0/6 71 A5-Al 1, Col. W-X, El. 692 0/6 72 Aux. FW Pump Turbine 1A-S, El. 692 0/1 73 Aux. FW Pump Turbine 1A-S, El. 692 0/1 76 S.1 & Charging Pump Rms., El. 692 0/5 77 S. I. Pump Rm.1 A, El. 692 0/1 78 S. I. Pump Rm. 1B, El. 692 0/1 79 Charging Pump Rm.1 C, El. 692 0/1 80 Charging Pump Rm. 1 B, El. 692 0/1 81 Charging Pump Rm. 1A, El. 692 0/1 88 Aux. Bldg. Corridor A1-A8, El. 692 0/8 89 Aux. Bldg. Corridor Al -A8, El. 692 0/8 90 Aux. Bldg. Corridor A8-A1 5, El. 692 0/12 91 Aux. Bldg. CorridorA81-Al5, El. 692 0/12 92 Aux. Bldg. Corridor U-W, El. 692 0/4 93 Aux. Bldg. Corridor U-W, El. 692 0/4 94 Pipe Gallery, El. 692 0/2 95 Pipe Gallery, El. 692 0/2 98 Cntmt. Purge Air Fltr., A & B, Duct Det., El.

0/2 713 99 Cntmt. Purge Air Fltr., A & B, Duct Det., El.

0/2 713 102 Pipe Gallery, El. 713 0/4 103 Pipe Gallery, El. 713 0/4 106 Aux. Bldg. Corridor A5-11, Col. T-W, El. 713 0/8 107 Aux. Bldg. Corridor A5-11, Col. T-W, El. 713 0/8 108 Radio Chemical Lab. Area, El. 713 0/3 109 Radio Chemical Lab. Area, El. 713 0/3 110 Aux. Bldg. A1-A8, Col. Q-U, El. 713 0/24 (continued)

See Table Notation, Page 10 of 10 II-117

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 24 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 5 OF 10)

C.

Auxiliarv Buildino [continued)

Total Number of Instruments **

HEAT SMOKE ZONE INSTRUMENT LOCATION (ANB)

(B) 111 Aux. Bldg. Al-A8, Col. Q-U, El. 713 0/22 112 Aux. Bldg. A8-A15, Col. Q-U, El. 713 0/15 113 Aux. Bldg. A8-A15, Col. Q-U, El. 713 0/15 114 Waste Packaging Area, El. 729 0/3 115 Waste Packaging Area, El. 729 0/3 116 Cask Loading Area, El. 729 0/2 117 Cask Loading Area, El. 729 0/2 118 New Fuel Storage Area 4/0 120 Aux. Bldg. Gas Trtmt. Fltr., U1, El. 737 0/1 121 Aux. Bldg. Gas Trtmt. Fltr., U1, El. 737 0/1 123 Vol. Control Tank Rm. 1A, El 713 0/3 125 Vol. Control Tank Rm. 1A, El 713 0/3 128 Post Accident Samp. Fac. U1, El. 729 0/3 129 Post Accident Samp. Fac. U1, El. 729 0/3 130 Ventilation & Purge Air Rm., U2, El. 737 0/5 131 Ventilation & Purge Air Rm., U2, El. 737 0/5 132 Ventilation & Pure Air Rm., U2, El. 737 0/5 133 Ventilation & Purge Air Rm., U2, El. 737 0/5 134 Aux. Bldg. A5-A11, Col. U-W, El. 737 0/7

.135 Aux. Bldg. A5-A1l, Col. U-W, El. 737 0/7 136 Heating & Vent Rm., U1, El. 737 0/5 137 Heating & Vent Rm., U1, El. 737 0/5 138 Heating & Vent Rm., U2, El. 737 0/5 139 Heating & Vent Rm., U2, El. 737 0/5 140 Hot Instrument Shop, El. 737 0/1 141 Hot Instrument Shop, El. 737 0/1 142 Aux. Bldg. A1-A8, Col. Q-U, El. 737 0113 143 Aux. Bldg. Al-A8, Col. Q-U, El. 737 0/13 144 Aux. Bldg. A8-A15, Col. Q-U, El. 737 0/10 145 Aux. Bldg. A8-A15, Col. Q-U, El. 737 0/10 146 N2 Storage, El. 729 4/0 147 Aux. Bldg Gas Trtmt. Fltr, U2, El. 737 0/1 (continued)

See Table Notation, Page 10 of 10 11-118

PART II - FIRE PROTECTION PLAN Rev. 27 TABLE 14.1 FIRE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION (PAGE 6 OF 10)

C.

Auxiliary Building (continued)

Total Number of Instruments HEAT SMOKE ZONE INSTRUMENT LOCATION (A/B)

(A/B) 148 Aux. Bldg Gas Trtmt. Fltr, U2, El. 737 0/1 156 Reactor Bldg. Access Rm., El. 757 0/2 157 Reactor Bldg. Access Rm., El. 757 0/2 160 Spare Room (Reverse Osmosis), El. 757, A4-V 0/4 161 Spare Room (Reverse Osmosis), El. 757, A4-V 0/4 162 EGTS Rm., El. 757 0/3 163 EGTS Rm., El. 757 0/3 164 EGTS Fltr. A, El. 757 0/1 165 EGTS Fltr. A, El. 757 0/1 166 EGTS Fltr. B, El. 757 0/1 167 EGTS Fltr. B, El. 757 0/1 168 Reactor Bldg. Equip. Hatch, El. 757 Unit 1 0/1 169 Reactor Bldg. Equip. Hatch, El. 757 Unit 1 0/1 170 Reactor Bldg. Equip. Hatch, El. 757 Unit 2 0/1 171 Reactor Bldg. Equip. Hatch, El. 757 Unit 2 0/1 172 Unit 1 Mech. Eqpt. Rm., El. 757 0/1 173 Unit 1 Mech. Eqpt. Rm., El. 757 0/1 174 Unit 2 Mech. Eqpt. Rm., El. 757 0/1 175 Unit 2 Mech. Eqpt. Rm., El. 757 0/1 176 480V Shtdn Bd. Rm. 1 Al, El. 757 0/2 177 480V Shtdn Bd. Rm. 1Al, El. 757 0/2 178 480V Shtdn Bd. Rm. 1A2, El. 757 0/2 179 480V Shtdn Bd. Rm. 1A2, El. 757 0/2 180 480V Shtdn Bd. Rm. 181, El. 757 0/2 181 480V Shtdn Bd. Rm. 1 B1, El. 757 0/2 182 480V Shtdn Bd. Rm. 1 B2, El. 757 0/3 183 480V Shtdn Bd. Rm. 1 2, El. 757 0/3 184 6.9 kV Shtdn. Bd. Rm. A, El. 757 0/7 185 6.9 kV Shtdn. Bd. Rm. A, El. 757 0/7 186 6.9 kV Shtdn. Bd. Rm. B, El. 757 0/7 187 6.9 kV Shtdn. Bd. Rm. B, El. 757 0/7 188 480V Shtdn Bd. Rm. 2A1, El. 757 0/2 189 480V Shtdn Bd. Rm. 2A1, El. 757 0/2 190 480V Shtdn Bd. Rm. 2A2, El. 757 0/3 (continued)

See Table Notation, Page 10 of 10 II-119

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 26 4.10.1 6.9KV Shutdown Power System Each of the four 6.9kV shutdown boards is normally fed from 161 kV/6.9kV common station service transformers (CSSTs) that receive power from offsite sources. In addition, upon loss of the normal CSST, the 6.9kV boards will transfer the power source to another CSST.

Each of four 6.9kV shutdown boards can also be fed from the corresponding 6.9kV diesel generator. Loss of offsite power to the 6.9kV boards is sensed by undervoltage relays. Upon sensing an undervoltage, the master relay(s) automatically start the emergency generators, trip the normal feed switchgear breakers and trip all motor feeder breakers on the boards. The generators can also be manually started locally, from the MCR, or from the ACR. For shutdown scenarios that do not require MCR abandonment, a switchgear breaker on each board is automatically closed when its diesel generator is at rated speed and rated voltage and re-energizes the bus. The essential loads are sequentially connected to the bus. For shutdown scenarios from the ACR, breaker closure and diesel generator loading is done manually. The diesel generators will then supply all equipment which must operate under emergency conditions for the respective safeguard train.

4.10.2 480V AC Shutdown Power System The 480V power system distributes power for low voltage station service demands. The normal source of power is the 6.9kV shutdown boards via the 6.9kV/480V transformers.

The 480V power system consists of eight boards, two per unit per train. Each 480V board is fed from the associated unit/train 6.9kV board through the normal or spare 6.9kV/480V transformers. There are a total of eight normal and four spare transformers, with each spare transformer able to feed either of the two boards of the same train/unit. The 480V shutdown boards feed 480V loads and various MCCs. The MCCs in turn feed various motor operated valves and other loads required for safe shutdown. Each MCC has a normal and alternate power source that can be utilized when needed for equipment maintenance.

4.10.3 120V AC Vital Instrument Power Svstem The 120V AC Vital Instrument Power System consists of four separate vital boards per unit.

Each 120V AC Vital Bus is supplied by an independent inverter. Each station battery supplies two inverters (one per unit) of the same channels. Each inverter is normally supplied by the 480V AC power system of the associated train (A for D or F/B for E or G) and can be supplied from the opposite trains via a manual transfer switch. In addition, the uninterrupted supply to each inverter is its respective 1 25vdc battery board via a static transfer switch scheme.

The output of each inverter is connected to its 120V AC vital instrument power boards through a normally closed circuit breaker. The vital instrument power boards supply all of the required normal safe shutdown instrumentation per channel.

Note: For operation of Unit 1 only, the Unit 1 and Unit 2 vital instrument power boards for each channel may be interconnected and supplied from a single UPS or maintenance source. In this configuration, the only loads supplied from the boards would be those required for operation of Unit 1.

111-20

Rev. 26 PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES TABLE 3-2 Page 16 of 17 SAFE SHUTDOWN EQUIPMENT LIST EQUIPMENT ID 1 -MCC-214-Al 1 -MCC-214-Bl 2-MCC-214-Al 2-MCC-214-B1 1 -MCC-215-Al 1 -MCC-215-A2 1 -MCC-215-B1 1 -MCC-215-B2 2-MCC-215-Al 2-MCC-215-A2 2-MCC-215-B1 2-MCC-215-B2 1 -BD-235-1 1 -BD-235-2 1 -BD-235-3 1 -BD-235-4 1 -INV-235-1 1-INV-235-2 1 -I NV-235-3 1-INV-235-4 2-BD-235-1 2-BD-235-2 2-BD-235-3 2-BD-235-4 0-BAT-236-5 0-BAT-236-1 O-BAT-236-2 O-BAT-236-3 0-BAT-236-4 0-BD-236-1 O-BD-236-2 0-BD-236-3 O-BD-236-4 0-CHGR-236-1 0-CHGR-236-2 0-CHGR-236-3 0-CHGR-236-4 0-CHGR-236-6 O-CHGR-236-7 0-XSW-236-1 0-XSW-236-2 0-XSW-236-3 0-XSW-236-4 O-XSW-236-6AC 0-XSW-236-6DC 0-XSW-236-7AC 0-XSW-236-7DC 0-PNL-236-1 -S O-PNL-236-2-S 0-PNL-236-3-S 0-PNL-236-4-S DESCRIPTION C & A BLDG VENT BD 1A1-A C & A BLDG VENT BD 1 B1 -B C & A BLDG VENT BD 2A1 -A C & A BLDG VENT BD 281-B DIESEL AUX BD 1 A1 -A DIESEL AUX BD 1 A2-A DIESEL AUX BD 1 B1-B DIESEL AUX BD 1 B2-B DIESEL AUX BD 2A1 -A DIESEL AUX BD 2A2-A DIESEL AUX BD 281-B DIESEL AUX BD 282-B 120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 1-I 120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 1-Il 120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 1-l l 120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 1-IV 120VAC VITAL INVERTER 1-I 120VAC VITAL INVERTER 1-lI 120VAC VITAL INVERTER 1-lIl 120VAC VITAL INVERTER 1-IV 120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 2-I 120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 2-Il 120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 2-Ill 120V AC VITAL POWER BOARD 2-lV BATTERY V BATTERY I BATTERY II BATTERY III BATTERY IV 125V VITAL BATTERY BOARD I 125V VITAL BATTERY BOARD II 125V VITAL BATTERY BOARD IlIl 125V VITAL BATTERY BOARD IV BATTERY CHARGER 1-D BATTERY CHARGER 2-E BATTERY CHARGER 3-F BATTERY CHARGER 4-G BATTERY CHARGER 6-S FOR 1-D AND 2-E BATTERIES BATTERY CHARGER 7-S FOR 3-F AND 4-G BATTERIES 480VAC VITAL TRANSFER SWITCH I 480VAC VITAL TRANSFER SWITCH II 480VAC VITAL TRANSFER SWITCH IlIl 480VAC VITAL TRANSFER SWITCH IV 480VAC VITAL SPARE CHARGER TRANSFER SWITCH 125V DC VITAL SPARE CHARGER TRANSFER SWITCH SPARE 480VAC VITAL TRANSFER SWITCH SPARE 125V DC VITAL TRANSFER SWITCH 480VAC VITAL DISCONNECT PANEL I 480VAC VITAL DISCONNECT PANEL II 480VAC VITAL DISCONNECT PANEL III 480VAC VITAL DISCONNECT PANEL IV 111-56

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 27 TABLE 3-3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 1 AV001 ROOM NO.

674.0-Al 674.0-A2 676.0-Al 676.0-A2 676.0-A3 676.0-A4 676.0-A4a 676.0-A5 676.0-A6 676.0-A7 676.0-Al 6 692.0-Al C 692.0-A8 692.0-A31 713.0-A28 DESCRIPTION Waste Holdup Tank Room Waste Evaporator Feed Pump Room Corridor Holdup Tank Room A Holdup Tank Room B Floor Drain Collection Pump and Filter Room Floor Drain Collection Tank Room Gas Stripper Feed Pump Room Spare Spare Pipe Gallery Corridor Pipe Gallery and Chase Spare Pipe Chase FIRE AREA 1 ROOM NO.

AV-002 692.0-Al Al 692.0-Al A2 692.0-A2 692.0-A3 692.0-A4 692.0-A5 676.0-A2 676.0-A3 DESCRIPTION Corridor, Column Lines Q-U/Al -A4 Corridor, Column Lines S-T/A4-A5 Valve Gallery Gas Decay Tank Room Chemical Drain Tank Room Gas Decay Tank Room Holdup Tank Room A Holdup Tank Room B FIRE AREA 1 ROOM NO.

AV-003 692.0-Al A2 692.0-Al A3 692.0-Al AN 676.0-A2 676.0-A3 DESCRIPTION Corridor, Column Lines S-T/A4-A5 Corridor, Column Lines S-T/A5-A6 Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A6-A8 Holdup Tank Room A Holdup Tank Room B FIRE AREA 1 ROOM NO.

DESCRIPTION AV-004A AV-004B (Note 1) 692.0-Al AN 692.0-Al BN 676.0-A2 676.0-A3 Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A6-A8 Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A8-Al 0 Holdup Tank Room A Holdup Tank Room B FIRE AREA 1 AV-004AC AV-004BC (Note 2)

ROOM NO.

DESCRIPTION 692.0-Al AN 692.0-Al BN 692.0-Al C Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A6-A8 Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A8-Al0 Corridor 111-58

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 27 TABLE 3-3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 1 AV-005 ROOM NO.

692.0-Al B 692.0-Al BN 692.0-A27 692.0-A29 692.0-A30 692.0-A31 676.0-A2 676.0-A3 DESCRIPTION Corridor, Col Lines S-T/Al 0-Al 3, S-U/A1 3-Al 4, Q-T/Al 4-Al 5 Corridor, Column Lines S-U/A8-A1 0 Concentrate Filter Room Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room B Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room A Spare Holdup Tank Room A Holdup Tank Room B FIRE AREA 1 AV-006 FIRE AREA 1 AV-007 FIRE AREA 1 AV-008 FIRE AREA 1 AV-009 FIRE AREA 1 AV-010 FIRE AREA 1 AV-011 FIRE AREA 1-2 AV-012 ROOM NO.

692.0-Al C 692.0-Al 7 692.0-Al 8 713.0-Al C ROOM NO.

676.0-AB ROOM NO.

676.0-A9 ROOM NO.

692.0-A9 ROOM NO.

692.0-Al 2 ROOM NO.

692.0-Al 3 ROOM NO.

692.0-Al 9 DESCRIPTION Corridor, Column Lines U-RxCL/A5-Al 1 M & TE Hot Tool Room Hot Tool Room Corridor, Column Lines U-W/A7-A9 DESCRIPTION Containment Spray Pump 1 B-B DESCRIPTION Containment Spray Pump 1 A-A DESCRIPTION Charging Pump 1A-A DESCRIPTION Safety Injection Pump 1 B-B DESCRIPTION Safety Injection Pump 1A-A DESCRIPTION Safety Injection Pump 2A-A 111-59

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 27 TABLE 3-3 ANALYSIS VOLUME BY FIRE AREA LIST FIRE AREA 8 AV-027 ROOM NO.

DESCRIPTION 713.0-A2 713.0-A3 713.0-A4 713.0-A5 713.0-A30 Air Lock Titration Room Radio Chemical Lab Counting Room Air Lock FIRE AREA 8 ROOM NO.

DESCRIPTION AV-028 713.0-A1l Heat Exchanger lB FIRE AREA 8 AV-029 FIRE AREA 9 AV-030 ROOM NO.

713.0-A12 713.0-A6 713.0-A8 Heat Exchanger IA DESCRIPTION Pipe Gallery Reactor Bu lding Access Room DESCRIPTION FIRE AREA 9-1 AV-031 ROOM NO.

DESCRIPTION 713.0-A7 Volume Control Tank (VCT) room FIRE AREA 10 ROOM NO.

DESCRIPTION AV-032 Stair No. 4 692.0-Al 4 692.0-Al 5 692.0-Al 6 728.0-A7 (no room #)

729.0-A5 729.0-A6 729.0-A8 729.0-A9 757.0-Al 3 772.0-A9 776.0-Al 786.0-Al 814.715-ACS Stairwell Cask Decontamination Collection Tank Room Spent Resin Tank Room Valve Gallery Cask Decontamination Room New Fuel Storage Area Cask Unloading Area Nitrogen Storage Area Unit 1 Post Accident Sampling Room Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling Room Refueling Room HEPA Filter Plenum Room Elevator Machine Room Fan Room Roof Access Room 111-62

PART III - SAFE SHUTDOWN CAPABILITIES Rev. 27 FIRE AREA 57 ROOM NO.

DESCRIPTION AV-085 DGB-OS Additional Diesel Generator Building 742.0-1, Diesel Generator Unit C-S 742.0-2, Fuel Oil Transfer Room 742.0-3, Pipe Gallery 742.0-4, 6.9-KV Switchgear Room 742.0-5, Corridor 742.0-6, Closet 742.0-760.5, Stairwell D3 760.5-1, Air Intake Room 760.5-2, 480-V Auxiliary Board Room 760.5-3, Air Exhaust Room 760.5-4, Transformer Room 760.5-5, Fire Protection Room 760.5-6, Janitor's Closet 760.5-7, Corridor 760.5-8, Closet FIRE AREA 58 ROOM NO.

DESCRIPTION AV-086 IPS-A El. 741 ERCW Pump Room A IPS-A El. 741 Screen Wash and HPFP A Pumps Room IPS-A El. 722 ERCW Strainer Room A FIRE AREA 59 ROOM NO.

DESCRIPTION AV-087 IPS-B El. 741 ERCW Pump Room B IPS-B El. 741 HPFP B Pump Room IPS-B El. 722 ERCW Strainer Room B FIRE AREA 60 ROOM NO.

DESCRIPTION AV-088 IPS-CA El. 712.0 Board Room, 20ft west of 480V BdfTransformer IPS-CC-A El. 712.0 Board Room, Mid to 20ft west of 480V Bd/Transformer FIRE AREA 60 ROOM NO.

DESCRIPTION AV-089 IPS-CC-A El. 712.0 Board Room, Mid to 20ft west of 480V Bd/Transformer IPS-CC-B El. 712.0 Board Room, Mid to 20ft east of 480V Bd/Transformer 111-71

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Title Page

1.0 INTRODUCTION

A-1 2.0 FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS STRUCTURE V-1 2.1

SUMMARY

OF CLASSICAL FIRE PROTECTION FEATURES -------------------------- VI-1 2.2

SUMMARY

OF SAFE SHUTDOWN ANALYSES FOR THE FIRE AREA------------VI-3 3.0 FIRE AREA HAZARDS ANALYSIS V1-5 3.1 FIRE AREA 1 ------------------------------------------------------------------- VI-5 thru 68 Room No.

DescriatiOn 674.0-Al Waste Holdup Tank Room 674.0-A2 Waste Evaporator Feed Pump Room 676.0-Al Corridor 676.0-A2 Holdup Tank Room A 676.0-A3 Holdup Tank Room B 676.0-A4 Floor Drain Collection Pump and Filter Room 676.0-A4a Floor Drain Collection Tank Room 676.0-A5 Gas Stripper Feed Pump Room 676.0-A6 Spare 676.0-A7 Spare 676.0-AB Containment Spray Pump 1B-B 676.0-A9 Containment Spray Pump 1A-A 676.0-Ai6 Pipe Gallery 692.0-Al Corridor (Subdivided into Analysis Volumes 692.0-A1Al, A1A2, AlA3, AlAN, A1BN, AlB, AND A1C) 692.0-A2 Valve Gallery 692.0-A3 Gas Decay Tank Room 692.0-A4 Chemical Drain Tank Room 692.0-A5 Gas Decay Tank Room 692.0-A8 Pipe Gallery and Chase 692.0-A9 Charging Pump 1 A-A 692.0-A12 Safety Injection Pump 1B-B 692.0-A13 Safety Injection Pump 1A-A 692.0-A17 M & TE Hot Tool Room 692.0-Al 8 Hot Tool Room 692.0-A27 Concentrate Filter Room 692.0-A29 Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room B 692.0-A30 Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room A 692.0-A31 Spare 713.0-A28 Pipe Chase 3.2 FIRE AREA 1-2 -................----------....--.....----....--...--....-..... VI-69 THRU 72 Room No.

Descrintion 696.0-A19 Safety Injection Pump Room 2A-A 3.3 FIRE AREA 2-1 -----------------

VI-73 thru 76 Room No.

Description 676.0-A10 RHR Pump Room lB-B VI-i

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Section Title Page 3.4 FIRE AREA 2-2 ---------------------

VI 77 thru 79 Room No.

Description 676.0-A13 RHR Pump Room 2B-B 3.5 FIRE AREA 3-1 ------

V.-----------------------

VI 80 thru 82 Room No.

Description 676.0-A1l RHR Pump RoomlA-A 3.6 FIRE AREA 3-2 --------

VI 83 thru 85 Room No.

Description 676.0-A12 RHR Pump Room 2A-A 3.7 FIRE AREA 4 ------------------------------------------------------- VI 86 thru 89 Room No.

Description 692.0-A6 Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Room 1A-S 3.8 FIRE AREA 5 ----------------.-------------------

VI 90 thru 93 Room No.

Description 692.0-A7 Pipe Gallery 3.9 FIRE AREA 6-----------------------

VI 93 thru 96 Room No.

Description 692.0-AI0 Charging Pump Room 1B-B 3.10 FIRE AREA 7 --

VI 96 thru 99 Room No.

Description 692.0-Al 1 Charging Pump Room 1C 3.11 FIRE AREA 8--------

1 4----.-

--- VI 100thru140 Room No.

Description 713.0-Al Auxiliary Building (Subdivided into Analysis Volumes 713.0-AlAl, AlA2, AlA3, AlA4, AlAN, A1BN, AlB, and AlC) 713.0-A2 Air Lock 713.0-A3 Titration Room 713.0-A4 Radio Chemical Lab 713.0-A5 Counting Room 713.0-A9 Valve Gallery 713.0-Al0 Seal Water Heat Exchanger 1 A 713.0-A1l Heat Exchanger 1 B 713.0-A12 Heat Exchanger 1A 713.0-A13 Sample Room 1 713.0-A14 Sample Room 2 VI-ii

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 Section Title TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page 3.11 FIRE AREA 8 (continued) ------------------------------------------------------------------ VI 100 thru 140 713.0-Al 7 713.0-Al 8 713.0-A22 713.0-A23 713.0-A24 713.0-A25 713.0-A26 713.0-A27 713.0-A30 713.0-A31 Seal Water Heat Exchanger 2A Valve Gallery Valve Gallery CVCS Valve Gallery Waste Gas Comp. Valve Gallery Waste Gas Compressor B Waste Gas Compressor A Decontamination Room Air Lock Waste Gas Analyzer Room 3.12 FIRE AREA 9.

.VI 141 thru 146 Room No.

713.0-A6 713.0-A8 Description Pipe Gallery Reactor Building Access Room 3.13 FIRE AREA 9-1

.. V l 146 thru 149 Room No.

713.0-A7 Description Volume Control Tank (VCT) Room 3.14 FIRE AREA 10 VI 149 thru 161 Room No.

692.0-A14 692.0-Al 5 692.0-Al 6 728.0-A7 729.0-A5 729.0-A6 729.0-A8 729.0-A9 757.0-A13 772.0-A9 776.0-Al 786.0-Al 814.75-ACS Descrintion Cask Decontamination Collection Tank Room Spent Resin Tank Room Valve Gallery Cask Decontamination Room Cask Unloading Area Nitrogen Storage Area Unit 1 Post Accident Sampling Room Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling Room Refueling Room HEPF Filter Plenum Room Elevator Machine Room Fan Room Roof Access Room Stair No. 4 New Fuel Storage Area 3.15 FIRE AREA 11 VI 162 thru 164 Room No.

729.0-A3 & A4 Description Waste Packaging Areas VI-iii

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 Section Title TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page 3.16 FIRE AREA 12..

- VI 165 thru 168 Room No.

729.0-Al 737.0-A6 Description Main Steam Valve Room (Unit 1 South)

Air Lock 3.17 FIRE AREA 13.

VI 168 thru 176 Room No.

729.0-A2 729.0-Al 6 Additional Equip.

Al, 786.5-Al) 729.0-A12 Description Main Steam Valve Room (Unit 1 North)

Shield Building Vent Radiation Monitoring Room Building (AEB) - (729.0-A14, 737.0-AlS, 763.5-Al, 775.25-Steam Valve Instrument Room A 3.18 FIRE AREA 14

VIl 176 thru 196 Room No.

737.0-Al 737.0-A2 737.0-A4 737.0-A7 737.0-A8 737.0-A1l Description Auxiliary Building (Subdivided into Analysis Volumes 737.0-AlA, Al AN, A1 BN, Al B. and Al C)

Hot Instrument Shop Air Lock Unit 1 Letdown Heat Exchanger Unit 2 Letdown Heat Exchanger Air Lock 3.19 FIRE AREA 15-1.

VI 197 thru 200 Room No.

737.0-A3 Description Heat and Vent Equipment Room 3.20 FIRE AREA 15-2.

VI 201 thru 203 Room No.

737.0-A12 Descrintion Heat and Vent Equipment Room 3.21 FIRE AREA 16 VI 204 thru 212 Room No.

737.0-A5 737.0-Al 5 Description Ventilation and Purge Air Room Gross Failed fuel Detector Room 3.22 FIRE AREA 17 VI 212 thru 227 Room No.

757.0-A2 757.0-A9 Description 6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room A Personnel and Equipment Access VI-iv

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Section Title Page 3.23 FIRE AREA 18......---

VI 228 thru 231 Room No.

757.0-A3 Description 125V Vital Battery Room II 3.24 FIRE AREA 19I -

- VI 232 thru 235 Room No.

757.0-A4 Description 125V Vital Battery Room I 3.25 FIRE AREA 20 VI 236 thru 241 Room No.

757.0-Al Description Auxiliary Control Room 3.26 FIRE AREA 21 VI 241 thru 244 Room No.

757.0-A25 Description Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 1A 3.27 FIRE AREA 22--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI 245 thru 248 Room No.

757.0-A26 Description Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 1B 3.28 FIRE AREA 23 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI 249 thru 252 Room No.

757.0-A27 Description Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 2A 3.29 FIRE AREA 24 VI 253 thru 256 Room No.

757.0-A28 Description Auxiliary Control Instrument Room 2B 3.30 FIRE AREA 25 VI 257 thru 266 Room No.

757.0-Al 0 757.0-Al 2 782.0-Al 782.0-A2 Description Reverse Osmosis Equipment Room Reactor Building Access Room (Unit 1)

Control Rod Drive Equipment Room Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room 3.31 FIRE AREA 26 VI 267 thru 270 Room No.

757.0-Al I Descrintion Reactor Building Equipment Hatch (During power operations this Room is considered part of Unit 1 Reactor Building)

Vt-v

Rev. 27 PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Siection Title 3.32 FIRE AREA 27 Room No.

757.0-A5 3.33 FIRE AREA 28 Room No.

757.0-A21 3.34 FIRE AREA 29 Room No.

757.0-A22 3.35 FIRE AREA 30 Room No.

757.0-A23 3.36 FIRE AREA 31 Room No.

757.0-Al 7 757.0-A24 3.37 FIRE AREA 32 Room No.

772.0-Al 3.38 FIRE AREA 33 Room No.

772.0-A2 3.39 FIRE AREA 34 Room No.

772.0-A3 Page VI 271 thru 275 Description 480V Shutdown Board Room 1 B VI 276 thru 280 Description 480V Shutdown Board Room 2A VI 281 thru 284 Description 125V Vital Battery Board Room IV VI 285 thru 288 Description 125V Vital Battery Board Room IlIl VI 289 thru 304 Description Personnel and Equipment Access Room 6.9kV and 480V Shutdown Board Room B VI 304 thru 308 Description 480V Board Room 1-A VI 308 thru 315 Description 480V Board Room 1-B (Subdivided into Analysis Volumes 772.0-A2A1, A2A2, A2A3, A2A4)

------------------------- VI 315 thru 319 Description 125V Vital Battery Room II VI-vi

Rev. 27 PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Siaction Title 3.40 FIRE AREA 35 Room No.

772.0-A4 3.41 FIRE AREA 36 Room No.

772.0-A5 3.42 FIRE AREA 37 Room No.

772.0-A6 3.43 FIRE AREA 38 Room No.

772.0-A7 3.44 FIRE AREA 39.

Room No.

772.0-A8 3.45 FIRE AREA 40.

Room No.

772.0-Al 0 3.46 FIRE AREA 41.

Room No.

772.0-Al 1 3.47 FIRE AREA 42.

Page VI 320 thru 324 Description 125V Vital Battery Room I VI 324 thru 327 Description 480V Transformer Room 1-B VI 328 thru 331 Description 480V Transformer Room IA VI 332 thru 335 Description Mechanical Equipment Room I --

VI 336 thru 347 Description Fifth Vital Battery and Board Room VI 348 thru 351 Description Mechanical Equipment Room VI 352 thru 355 Description 480V Transformer Room 2-B VI 356 thru 359 Room No.

772.0-A12 3.48 FIRE AREA 43 Description 480V Transformer Room 2-A VI 360 thru 363 Room No.

772.0-Al3 3.49 FIRE AREA 44 Description 125V Vital Battery Room IV VI 364 thru 368 Room No.

772.0-Al 4 Description 125V Vital Battery Room III VI-vii

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Section Title Page 3.50 FIRE AREA 45 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

VI 368 thru 374 Room No.

772.0-Al 5 Description 480V Board Room 2-B (Subdivided into Analysis Volumes 772.0-Al 5Al, Al 5A2, Al 5A3, Al 5A4) 3.51 FIRE AREA 46 ------------

VI 375 thru 378 Room No.

772.0-Al 6 Description 480V Board Room 2-A 3.52 FIRE AREA 47.

VI 379 thru 382 Room No.

786.0-A2 786.0-A3 786.0-A4 Description Roof Access air Lock Mechanical Equipment Room Mechanical Equipment Room 3.53 FIRE AREA 48 VI 383 thru 413 Room No.

692.0-C1/C2 692.0-C3 692.0-C4 692.0-C5 692.0-C6 692.0-C7 692.0-C8 692.0-C9 692.0-Cl 0 692.0-Cl 1 692.0-Cl 2 708-0-Cl 708.0-C2 708.0-C3 708.0-C4 729.0-Cl 755.0-Cl 755.0-C2 755.0-C3 755.0-C4 755.0-C5 755.0-C6 755.0-C7 755.0-C8 755.0-C9 755.0-C10 Description Mechanical Equipment Rooms 250V Battery Room 1 250V Battery Board Room 1 250V Battery Board Room 2 250V Battery Room 2 24V and 48V Battery Room 24V and 48V Battery Board and Charger Room Communications Room Mechanical Equipment Room Corridor Secondary Alarm Station Room Unit 1 Auxiliary Instrument Room Corridor Computer Room Unit 2 Auxiliary Instrument Room Spreading Room Mechanical Equipment Room Women's Restroom Corridor Kitchen Toilet Locker Room Shower Shower Conference Room Shift Operations Supervisor's Office VI-viii

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Section Title Page 3.53 FIRE AREA 48 (continued)

VI 383 thru 413 Room No.

755.0-C12 755.0-C13 755.0-C14 755.0-C15 755.0-C16 755.0_C17 755.0-C18 755.0-C19 755.0-C20 692.0-755.0 692.0-755.0 Description Main Control Room Relay Room Technical Support Center Corridor Conference Room Telephone Room NRC Office Corridor DPSO Shop Stairwell C1 Stairwell C2 3.54 FIRE AREA 49 I--.-.-.

VI 414 thru 418 Room No.

742.0-4 760.0-5-3 760.5-4 760.5-5 Description Diesel Generator Unit 1A-A Unit 1A-A Air Exhaust Room 480V Board Room 1A-A Unit 1 A-A Air Intake Room 3.55 FIRE AREA 50.------------------

VI 419 thru 423 Room No.

742.0-5 760.5-6 760.5-7 760.5-8 Description Diesel Generator Unit 2A-A Unit 2A-A Air Exhaust Room 480V Board Room 2A-A Unit 2A-A Air Intake Room 3.56 FIRE AREA 51 VI 424 thru 428 Room No.

742.0-6 760.5-9 760.5-10 760.5-11 Description Diesel Generator Unit 1 B -B Unit 1B-B Air Exhaust Room 480V Board Room 1 B-B Unit 1 B-B Air Intake Room 3.57 FIRE AREA 52 VI 429 thru 433 Room No.

742.0-7 760.5-12 760.5-13 760.5-14 Description Diesel Generator Unit 2B -B Unit 2B-B Air Exhaust Room 480V Board Room 2B-B Unit 2B-B Air Intake Room VI-ix

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Section Title Page 3.58 FIRE AREA 53 VI 434 thru 440 Room No.

742.0-3 742.0-8 742.0-9 3.59 FIRE AREA 54 DescriDtion Toilet Fuel Oil Transfer Room Pipe Gallery and Corridor (Subdivided in Analysis Volumes 742.0-A, B, N)

-- - VI 441 thru 446 Room No.

742.0-1 742.0-2 742.0-10 760.5-1 760.5-2 742.0-760-5 Description C02 Storage Room Lube Oil Storage Area Conduit Interface Room Corridor Radiation Shelter Stairwell DI 3.60 FIRE AREA 55

.VI 447 thru 449 Room No.

Description DGB Cable Chase A 3.61 FIRE ILOrA CM VI 450 thru 452 aIFL--

Room No.

DescriDtion DGB Cable Chase B 3.62 FIRE AREA 57 ----

VI 453 thru 456 Room No.

742.0-1 742.0-2 742.0-3 742.0-4 742.0-5 742.0-6 760.5-1 760.5-2 760.5-3 760.5-4 760.5-5 760.5-6 760.5-7 760.5-8 742.0-760-5 DescriDtion Diesel Generator Unit C-S Fuel Oil Transfer Room Pipe Gallery 6.9KV Switchgear Room Corridor Closet Air Intake Room 480-V Auxiliary Board Room Air Exhaust Room Transfer Room Fire Protection Room Janitors Closet Corridor Closet Stairwell D3 VI-x

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Section Title Page 3.63 FIRE AREA 58

-VI 457 thru 462 Room No.

IPS EL. 722 West IPS El. 741 West IPS EL. 741 West Description ERCW Strainer Room A (EL 722)

ERCW Pump Room A (EL 741)

Screen Wash and HPFP A Pumps Room (EL 741) 3.64 FIRE AREA 59I -

- VI 463 thru 468 Room No.

IPS EL 722 East IPS EL 741 East IPS EL 741 East Description ERCW Strainer Room B (EL 722)

ERCW Pump Room B (EL 741)

HPFP B Pumps Room (EL 741) 3.65 FIRE AREA 60 VI 469 thru 476 Room No.

IPS EL 711 IPS EL 728 Description Board Room (Subdivided into Analysis Volumes IPS-CA, IPS-CC-A, IPS-CB, IPS-CC-B)

RCW Pump Deck 3.66 FIRE AREA 61 VI 477 thru 510 Room No.

Description Unit 1 Reactor Building -- Annulus (Subdivided into Analysis Volumes RO, R1, R1 R, RA1, RA2, RA3, RA4, RF1, RF2)

Unit 1 Reactor Building - Primary Containment 3.67 FIRE AREA 62 -------------------------------------------------

VI 511 thru 513 Room No.

Description Condensate Demineralizer Waste Evaporator Building 3.68 FIRE AREA 63 ---------------------------------

VI 514 thru 518 Room No.

Description Turbine Building 3.69 FIRE AREA 64 ---------------------------------------------------

VI 519 thru 521 Room No.

Description Yard VI-xi

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Section Title Page 3.70 FIRE AREA UNIT 2 LOCATIONS (AV-096)

VI 522 thru 524 Room No.

Descrir~tion 676.0.A14 U2 Containment Spray Pump 2A-A 676.0-Al 5 U2 Containment Spray Pump 26-B 676.0-A17 U2 Pipe/Valve Gallery 692.0-A20 U2 Safety Injection Pump 26-B 692.0-A21 U2 Charging Pump 2C 692.0-A22 U2 Charging Pump 26-B 692.O-A23 U2 Charging Pump 2A-A 692.0-A24 U2 Pipe/Valve Gallery and Chase 692.O-A25 U2 Pipe/Valve Gallery 692.O-A26 U2 TDAFW Pump 2A-S 713.0-AlS U2 Heat Exchanger 2A 713.0-A16 U2 Heat Exchanger 26 713.0-A19 U2 Pipe Gallery 713.0-A20 U2 Volume Control Tank Room 713.0-A21 U2 Reactor Building Access Room 713.0-A29 U2 Pipe Chase 729.0-A10 U2 Main Steam Isolation Valve Room 729.0-All U2 Main Steam Isolation Valve Room 729.0-A13 U2 Steam Valve Instrument Room B 729.0-Al15 U2 Upper Head Injection Room 729.0-A17 U2 Shield Building Vent Radiation Monitoring Room 737.0-A9 U2 Ventilation and Purge Air Room 737.0-Al10 U2 Air Lock 737.0-A14 U2 Air Lock 737.0-Al16 U2 Gross Failed Fuel Detector Room 757.0-A14 U2 Reactor Building Access Room 757.0-A15 U2 Reactor Building Hatch 757.0-Al16 U2 Emergency Gas Treatment Filter Room 782.0-A3 U2 Control Rod Drive Equipment Room 782.0-A4 U2 Pressurizer Heater Transformer Room 2 3.71 FIRE AREA DUCT BANKS (AV-097)

VI 525 thru 537 Room No.

Description AB 713.0-A1B DPIPS-A Cable Chase from Aux. Bldg. 713.0-A1B to IPS-A Vl-xii

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 3.0 FIRE AREA HAZARDS ANALYSIS 3.1 FIRE AREA 1 Fire Area 1 consists of the following rooms on the lower four elevations of the Auxiliary Building as depicted on Figures 11-27,11-28,11-29 and 11-30.

Room No.

674.0-Al 674.0-A2 676.0-Al 676.0-A4 676.0-A4a 676.0-A5 676.0-A6 676.0-A7 676.0-Al 6 692.0-A8 71 3.0-A28 692.0-Al 692.0-A2 692.0-A4 692.0-A1 8 692.0-A27 692.0-A29 692.0-A30 676.0-A8 676.0-A9 676.0-A2 676.0-A3 692.0-A3 692.0-A5 692.0-A9 692.0-Al 2 692.0-Al 3 692.0-Al 7 692.0-A31 Description Waste Holdup Tank Room Waste Evaporator Feed Pump Room Corridor Floor Drain Collection Pump and Filter Room Floor Drain Collection Tank Room Gas Stripper Feed Pump Room Spare Spare Pipe Gallery Pipe Gallery and Chase Pipe Chase Corridor (Subdivided into 692.0-AlA, -AlB, and -A1C)

Valve Gallery Chemical Drain Tank Room Hot Tool Room Concentrate Filter Room Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room B Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room A Containment Spray Pump 1 B-B Containment Spray Pump 1A-A Holdup Tank Room A Holdup Tank Room B Gas Decay Tank Room Gas Decay Tank Room Charging Pump lA-A Safety Injection Pump 1B-B Safety Injection Pump 1 A-A M & TE Hot Tool Room Spare Vl-5

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 3.1.3 Rooms 692.0-Al. A2, A4. Al8, A27, A29, and A30

==

Description:==

692.0-Al - Corridor (Subdivided into 692.0-Al A, -Al B, and -Al C) 692.0-A2 - Valve Gallery 692.0-A4 - Chemical Drain Tank Room 692.0-Al 8 - Hot Tool Room 692.0-A27 - Concentrate Filter Room 692.0-A29 - Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room B 692.0-A30 - Boric Acid Evaporator Package Room A Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of various amounts of lube oil associated with several pumps and valves, plastics associated with various electrical panels and boxes, transformer oil associated with two transformers, insulation on cables in the cable trays and anticipated amounts of radwaste trash and laundry. The fire severity loading for room 692.0-Al is classified as moderate. The other rooms contain insignificant amounts of combustibles.

Compartmentation: Room 692.0-Al has been subdivided into 692.0-AlA (column lines Al-A8/Q-U), 692.0-Al B (A8-A1 5/Q-U), and 692.0-Al C (remaining area of 692.0-Al north of column line U), each of which is identified in the tabular listing of regulatory barriers. There are one rectangular heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) duct penetration and two round Emergency Gas Treatment System (EGTS) duct penetrations without fire dampers in the 692.0 floor slab, and one round EGTS duct penetration without fire dampers in the ceiling of 692.0. Stairwell No. 3, an equipment hatch, and the elevator shaft are also unprotected openings in the floor slab.

Barriers:

FPR Regulatory Room Direction Adjacent Area/Room Figure Barrier Reference Rating 692.0-Al A North Wall Area 4, Room 692.0-A6 11-28 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Area 5, Room 692.0-A7 11-28 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Area 6, Room 692.0-A10 11-28 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Area 7, Room 692.0-Al 1 11-28 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Area 1, Room 692.0-A9 11-28 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Area 1, Room 692.0-A12 11-28 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Area 10, Elevator Shaft 11-28 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months VI-13

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 3.1.11 Room 692.0-A17

==

Description:==

M & TE Hot Tool Room Fire Loading: There are no significant combustibles in the room. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.

Compartmentation: The floor (partial) and ceiling of this room are regulatory fire barriers.

Barriers:

FPR Regulatory Barrier Room Direction Adjacent Area/Room Figure Rating Reference 692.0-A17 Floor Area 1, Room 674.0-Al 11-27,11-28 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months (partial)

Area 1, Room 676.0-Al 11-27, 11-28 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Ceiling Area 8, Room 713.0-Al C 11-28, 11-29 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Area 8, Room 713.0-A14 11-28, 11-29 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Area 8, Room 713.0-A31 11-28,11-29 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Unit 2, Room 713.0-A15 11-28,11-29 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months Doors: None.

Dampers: None.

Detection: Ionization smoke detectors are provided for this room.

Suppression: An automatic pre-action sprinkler system is provided in the room (except in the entrance labyrinth). A standpipe and hose station is provided in the adjacent room (Corridor 692.0-Al).

Deviations: None.

Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression in the entrance labyrinth is documented in Part V11, Section 3.1.

VI-30

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 Deviations: There is an unprotected opening in the floor to a chase down to room 676.0-A4a, and a non-fire rated hatch cover in the ceiling to a monolithic enclosure on elevation 713. The non-fire-rated hatch cover provides a sufficient level of protection due to the insignificant quantities of combustibles on both sides of the hatch. Justification is documented in Part VII, Section 2.6.

Evaluations: The lack of total area suppression is documented in Part VII, Section 3.1.

3.1.13 3.1.13.1 Fire Area I Safe Shutdown Analvsis bv Analvsis Volume AV-001 674.0-Al 674.0-A2 676.0-Al 676.0-A2 676.0-A3 676.0-A4 676.0-A4a 676.0-A5 676.0-A6 676.0-A7 676.0-Al 6 692.0-Al C 692.0-A8 692.0-A31 713.0-A28 Waste Holdup Tank Room Waste Evaporator Feed Pump Room Corridor Holdup Tank Room A Holdup Tank Room B Floor Drain Collection Pump and Filter Room Floor Drain Collection Tank Room Gas Stripper Feed Pump Room Spare Spare Pipe Gallery Corridor Pipe Gallery and Chase Spare Pipe Chase A fire in Analysis Volume 1 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal and steam generator inventory control functions.

Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Specifically, safe shutdown is achieved through the use of the A RHR pump, A and B Auxiliary Feedwater and Charging pumps, and associated flow paths. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include providing fire wrap to selected cables to preclude damage to the RHR pump power cable in the event of a fire and manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and post fire repairs. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified below:

Power Systems Affected:

NONE Power Systems Credited:

6.9KV AC 1A (OFFSITE), 1B (OFFSITE), 2A (OFFSITE), 2B (OFFSITE) 480VAC 1A,lB,2A,2B 120VAC 1D,1E,1F,1G,2D,2E,2F,2G 125VDC D,E,F,G VI-32

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 Main Control Room Operator Actions:

NO ROOM-SPECIFIC ACTION Cable Protection:

NONE 3.1.13.9 AV-006 692.0-Al C 692.0-Al 7 692.0-Al 8 713.0-AiC Corridor, Column Lines U-RxCUA5-Al 1 M & TE Hot Tool Room Hot Tool Room Corridor, Column Lines U-W/A7-A9 A fire in Analysis Volume 6 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the long term decay heat removal and reactor coolant inventory control functions.

Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Specifically, safe shutdown is achieved through the use of the A RHR pump, A and B Auxiliary Feedwater and Charging pumps, and associated flow paths. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown and repair procedures. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified below:

VI-55

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 Local Manual Operator Actions and Repairs:

WHEN CONTROL COMPONENT FUNCTION PERFORMED CONTROLOPERATED REQUIRED LOCATION 1-FCV-62-1228-A CLOSE 1-HS-62-1228-A 70 757-A4 1-LCV-62-132-A CLOSE HANDWHEEL 70 713-A7 Main Control Room Operator Actions:

WHEN COMPONENT FUNCTION PERFORMED CONTROL OPERATED REQUIRED 1-LCV-62-135-A OPEN 1-HS-62-135A-A 0

Cable Protection:

NONE 3.14 FIRE AREA 10 Fire Area 10 consists of several rooms in the Auxiliary Building on elevations 692.0, 729.0, 757.0, and 772.0, and connecting spaces.

3.14.1 Auxiliary Building Elevation 729.0

==

Description:==

728.0-A7 - Cask Decontamination Room No Room Number - New Fuel Storage Area 729.0-A6 - Nitrogen Storage Area 729.0-A8 - Unit 1 Post Accident Sampling Room 729.0-A9 - Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling Room Stair No. 4 Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in motors, charcoal in the filter units, and plastic associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights. The Fuel Transfer Valve Rooms contain small compressed gas cylinders of hydrogen at concentrations of less the 10 percent by volume. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.

Compartmentation: The rooms are of reinforced concrete construction. The barriers of the rooms in this fire area have been evaluated in accordance with the guidelines of Appendix A, Section D.1.j. The barrier ratings are adequate for the level of fire hazard (i.e., insignificant fire severity) in the area/rooms.

VI-149

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 Suppression: Automatic sprinklers are provided in 692.0-A14 only. A standpipe and hose station is provided in room 692.0-A14.

Deviations: None.

Evaluations: None.

3.14.7 3.14.7.1 Fire Area 10 Safe Shutdown AnalVsis bV AnalVsis Volume AV-032 Stair No. 4 692.0-Al 4 692.0-Al 5 692.0-Al 6 728.0-A7 (no rm no.)

729.0-A5 729.0-A6 729.0-A8 729.0-A9 757.0-Al 3 772.0-A9 776.0-Al 786.0-Al 81 4.75-ACS Stairwell Cask Decontamination Collection Tank Room Spent Resin Tank Room Valve Gallery Cask Decontamination Room New Fuel Storage Area Cask Unloading Area Nitrogen Storage Area Unit 1 Post Accident Sampling Room Unit 2 Post Accident Sampling Room Refueling Room HEPA Filter Plenum Room Elevator Machine Room Fan Room Roof Access Room A fire in Analysis Volume 32 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the reactor pressure control functions. Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown. Specifically, safe shutdown is achieved through the use of the A and B RHR, Charging and Auxiliary Feedwater pumps, and associated flow paths. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified below:

Power Systems Affected:

480V AC 2A Power Systems Credited:

6.9KV AC 1A (OFFSOE), 1B (OFFSTE), 2A (OFFSITE), 2B (OFFSITE) 480VAC 1A, 1B,2B 120VAC 1D,1E,1F,1G,2D,2E,2F,2G 125VDC D,E,F,G VI-159

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 Dampers: None.

Detection: No detectors are provided in room 729.0-Al. No detection is provided in room 737.0-A6.

Suppression: Standpipes and hose stations are provided from adjacent rooms.

Deviations: None.

Evaluations: None.

3.16.2 3.16.2.1 Fire Area 12 Safe Shutdown Analvsis by Analysis Volume AV-034 729.0-Al Main Steam Valve Room (Unit 1 South) 737.0-A6 Air Lock A fire in Analysis Volume 34 could potentially affect systems and components necessary to maintain the secondary side isolation, reactor pressure control functions.

Mitigating features are required to restore systems necessary for safe shutdown.

Specifically, safe shutdown is achieved through the use of the A RHR pump, the A and B Auxiliary Feedwater and Charging pumps, and associated flow paths. Offsite power is available. The required mitigating features include manual operation of equipment required for safe shutdown. These features and equipment affected and credited are identified below:

Power Systems Affected:

NONE Power Systems Credited:

6.9KV AC 1A (OFFSITE), 1B (OFFSITE), 2A (OFFSITE), 2B (OFFSITE) 480VAC 1A,lB,2A,2B 120VAC 1D,1E,1F,1G,2D,2E,2F,2G 125V DC D,E,F,G Major Equipment Affected:

COMPONENT DESCRIPTION SHUTDOWN PATH 1-MTR-30-191-B CCS/AFWPUMPROOMCOOLERlB KEY370 Major Equipment Credited:

COMPONENT DESCRIPTION SHUTDOWN PATH 0-MTR-31-11-B MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLER B-B KEY 37A PATH 2 O-MTR-31-12-A MAIN CONTROL ROOM AIR HANDLER A-A KEY 37A PATH 1 0-MTR-67-28-A EMERGENCY RAW COOLING WATER PUMP A-A KEY I PATH 1 VI-1 66

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 Dampers: None.

Detection: No detectors are provided in the room.

Suppression: A standpipe and hose station is provided from the Additional Equipment Building (729.0-A14).

Deviations: None.

Evaluations: None.

3.17.2 Room 729.0-A16

==

Description:==

Shield Building Vent Radiation Monitoring Room Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil in pumps and plastic associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights. The fire severity is classified as insignificant.

Compartmentation: The room is of reinforced concrete construction.

Barriers:

l FPR Figure Regulatory Room Direction Adjacent Area/Room

! Reference I Barrier Rating 729.0-Al6 South Wall Area 61, Reactor Building 11-38 3 hours3.472222e-5 days 8.333333e-4 hours 4.960317e-6 weeks 1.1415e-6 months Doors: None.

Dampers: None.

Detection: None.

Suppression: A standpipe and hose station is provided from the adjacent room (729.0-Al 4).

Deviations: None.

Evaluations: None.

3.17.3 AEB

==

Description:==

Additional Equipment Building (AEB) (729.0-Al 4, 737.0-Al 3, 763.5-Al1, 775.25-Al, 786.5-Al)

Fire Loading: The combustibles consist of lube oil and hydraulic fluid in valves, pumps and motors, plastics associated with electrical panels and boxes and lights and glycol in the chiller packages and barrels. The fire severity is classified as low.

VI-169

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 3.62 FIRE AREA 57 3.62.1 Additional Diesel Generator Buildinq

==

Description:==

742.0 Diesel Generator Unit C-S 742.0 Fuel Oil Transfer Room 742.0 Pipe Gallery 742.0 6.9KV Switchgear Room 742.0 Corridor 742.0 Closet 760.5 Air Intake Room 760.5 480-V Auxiliary Board Room 760.5 Air Exhaust Room 760.5 Transformer Room 760.5 Fire Protection Room 760.5 Janitor's Closet 760.5 Corridor 760.5 Closet 742.0-760.5 -- Stairwell D3 Fire Loading: The combustibles in room 742.0-1 consist of the fuel oil for the diesel generator, plastics associated with electrical panels and insulation on cables in trays.

The fire severity is classified as moderately severe. The combustibles in room 742.0-3 consist of plastics associated with electrical panels and insulation on cables in trays.

The fire severity is classified as low. The combustibles in room 742.0-4 consist of plastics associated with the switchgear and electrical panels and insulations on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as low. The combustibles in room 760.5-1 consist of oil in the intake filters and hoist and plastics associated with lighting units and junction boxes. The fire severity is classified as low. The combustibles in room 760.5-2 consist of plastic associated with electrical boards and panels and insulations on cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderate. The combustibles in room 760.5-3 consists of plastic associated with electrical panels and insulation on cables in trays.

The fire severity is classified as low. The combustibles in room 760.5-4 consist of resins in the transformers, plastic associated with the electrical boards and panels, and insulation on the cables in trays. The fire severity is classified as moderate. The fire severity classification in rooms 742.0-2, 5 and 6 and 760.5-5, 6, 7 and 8 and Stairwell D3 is insignificant.

Compartmentation: The Additional Diesel Generator Building is of reinforced concrete construction.

Barriers: None.

Doors: None.

Dampers: None.

VI-453

PART VI - FIRE HAZARDS ANALYSIS Rev. 27 Detection: Heat detectors are provided in rooms 742.0-1, 2, and 3 and 760.5-1 and 3.

Ionization smoke detectors are provided in rooms 742.0-4 and 5 and 760.5-2, 4, 5, 6 and 7.

Suppression: An automatic foam pre-action sprinkler system is provided in rooms 742.0-1, 2, 3, and 4 and 760.5-4. An automatic pre-action sprinkler system (water) is provided for room 760.5-2. Standpipe and hose stations are provided in rooms 742.0-1 and 760.5-1.

Deviations: None.

Evaluations: None.

3.62.2 Fire Area 57 Safe Shutdown Analysis by Analysis Volume 3.62.2.1 AV-085 DGB-OS Additional Diesel Generator Building 742.0-1, Diesel Generator Unit C-S 742.0-2, Fuel Oil Transfer Room 742.0-3, Pipe Gallery 742.0-4, 6.9-KV Switchgear Room 742.0-5, Corridor 742.0-6, Closet 742.0-760.5 - Stairwell D3 760.5-1, Air Intake Room 760.5-2, 480-V Auxiliary Board Room 760.5-3, Air Exhaust Room 760.5-4, Transformer Room 760.5-5, Fire Protection Room 760.5-6, Janitor's Closet 760.5-7, Corridor 760.5-8, Closet A fire in Analysis Volume 85 would not impact major equipment required to maintain safe shutdown functions. Shutdown can be achieved by utilizing both train A and B systems and components without mitigating actions. Equipment available to achieve shutdown is identified below:

Power Systems Affected:

NONE VI-454

PART ViIl - CONFORMANCE TO APPENDIX A TO BTP 9.5-1 GUIDELINES Rev. 23 Appendix A Guidelines Plant Conformance Alternatives Remarks

d. Interior wall and structural components, thermal insulation materials and radiation shielding materials and sound-proofing should be noncombustible.

Interior finishes should be noncombustible or listed by a nationally recognized testing laboratory, such as Factory Mutual or Underwriters' Laboratory, Inc.,

for flame spread, smoke, and fuel contribution of 25 or less in its use configuration (ASTM E-84 Test,

'Surface Burning Characteristics of Building Materials').

The facility is designed in accordance with General Design Criterion 3, which requires that noncombustible and fire-resistant materials be used throughout the facility.

Noncombustible materials are used to the extent practicable. The fire protection standard and methodology that was in effect at that time for testing carpeting (interior finishes) was ASTM E-84 and NFPA 255. In 1990, the standard and methodology for testing carpeting changed to ASTM E-648 and NFPA 253. In light of the noted standard/methodology change, TVA installed carpeting in the control room that was tested in accordance with NFPA 253 and has a critical radiant flux (CRF) factor of Ž0.45 w/cm2. The noted CRF of 0.45 w/cm2 is consistent with our insurer's (Nuclear Mutual Umited) loss prevention standard and is also consistent with previous NRC approvals such as that documented in the Safety Evaluation Report for Texas Utilities' Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (NUREG-0797, Supplement No. 26, Section 9.5.1.7b).

Additionally, our insurer has given us permission to install carpet with a smoke development rating of '450 when tested in accordance with ASTM E-662 and NFPA 258. The small anti-static mat installed at Panel 1 -M-1 3 is provided to prevent static discharge to the panel. A non-combustible mat was not commercially available for this installation.

Fuel contribution values of 50 or less are acceptable based on BTP guidelines.

a a ____________________________

Vill - 19

ML041130357

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

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