Information Notice 1993-21, Summary of NRC Staff Observations Compiled During Engineering Audits or Inspections of Licensee Erosion/Corrosion Programs

Summary of NRC Staff Observations Compiled During Engineering Audits or Inspections of Licensee Erosion/Corrosion Programs

ML031080042
Person / Time
Site:	Beaver Valley, Millstone, Hatch, Monticello, Calvert Cliffs, Dresden, Davis Besse, Peach Bottom, Browns Ferry, Salem, Oconee, Mcguire, Nine Mile Point, Palisades, Palo Verde, Perry, Indian Point, Fermi, Kewaunee, Catawba, Harris, Wolf Creek, Saint Lucie, Point Beach, Oyster Creek, Watts Bar, Hope Creek, Grand Gulf, Cooper, Sequoyah, Byron, Pilgrim, Arkansas Nuclear, Three Mile Island, Braidwood, Susquehanna, Summer, Prairie Island, Columbia, Seabrook, Brunswick, Surry, Limerick, North Anna, Turkey Point, River Bend, Vermont Yankee, Crystal River, Haddam Neck, Ginna, Diablo Canyon, Callaway, Vogtle, Waterford, Duane Arnold, Farley, Robinson, Clinton, South Texas, San Onofre, Cook, Comanche Peak, Yankee Rowe, Maine Yankee, Quad Cities, Humboldt Bay, La Crosse, Big Rock Point, Rancho Seco, Zion, Midland, Bellefonte, Fort Calhoun, FitzPatrick, McGuire, LaSalle, Fort Saint Vrain, Shoreham, Satsop, Trojan, Atlantic Nuclear Power Plant
Issue date:	03/25/1993
From:	Grimes B Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
IN-93-021, NUDOCS 9303190051
Download: ML031080042 (15)

r

UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 March 25, 1993 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 93-21: SUMMARY OF NRC STAFF OBSERVATIONS COMPILED

DURING ENGINEERING AUDITS OR INSPECTIONS OF

LICENSEE EROSION/CORROSION PROGRAMS

Addressees

All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for light water

nuclear power reactors.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information

notice to inform addressees of NRC observations of the design and

implementation of licensee erosion/corrosion programs. These observations are

derived from a number of audits and reactive inspections performed by NRC

audit teams and by Region I office inspectors. It is expected that recipients

will review the information for applicability to their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not NRC requirements;

therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Background

Erosion/corrosion has occurred in systems containing carbon steel components

in certain nuclear plant systems, such as main feedwater or other power

conversion systems, which are important to the safe operation of the plant.

Failures at the Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Units 2 and 3, and numerous

repairs and replacements in extraction steam and moisture separator systems at

other facilities indicate that erosion/corrosion continues to be a problem in

balance of plant systems. Some boiling water reactor (BWR) licensees have

discovered erosion/corrosion in American Society of Mechanical Engineers

(ASME) Code Class 1 portions of their feedwater systems. Some pressurized

water reactor (PWR) licensees have discovered erosion/corrosion in ASME Code

Class 2 portions of their feedwater systems and in ASME Code Class 3 portions

of their main steam systems. The worn areas affected by erosion/corrosion in

Class 1 piping have typically been in regions directly downstream of feedwater

reducing tees which branch to the feedwater risers. The worn areas of the

Class 2 feedwater piping have typically been just upstream of the feedwater

nozzles to the steam generator, although the licensee for the Diablo Canyon, Unit 1, nuclear power plant recently reported erosion/corrosion wear behind a

9303190051' paR tO

ML i3 I-

300042 fol

IlI

IN 93-21 March 25, 1993 thermal sleeve on the interior of the feedwater nozzle and on the feedwater

nozzle itself. The worn area in the Class 3 system at the North Anna, Unit 1, nuclear power plant was located in a main steam drain line upstream of a main

steam trap valve (an automatic isolation valve). These findings indicate that

erosion/corrosion can occur in safety-related portions of plant feedwater and

main steam systems.

Summary of NRC Observations from Audits and Inspections

The results of recent NRR audits and regional inspections of licensee

erosion/corrosion programs indicate that most licensees have spent substantial

time and resources to implement erosion/corrosion programs in accordance with

the guidelines of Generic Letter 89-08, "Erosion/Corrosion-Induced Pipe Wall

Thinning." This information notice presents some specific observations on the

design and implementation of erosion/corrosion programs, which vary in scope.

Most of the problems that licensees have had in implementing erosion/corrosion

programs pertained to weaknesses or errors in (1) using predictive models,

(2) calculating minimum wall thickness acceptance criteria of the code,

(3). analyzing the results of ultrasonic testing (UT) examinations, (4) self- assessment of erosion/corrosion program activities, (5) dispositioning

components after reviewing the results of the inspection analyses, or

(6) repairing or replacing components that failed to meet the minimum wall

thickness acceptance criteria of the licensee.

Concerning item (1) above, some licensees have selected systems and components

for UT examinations based on the analytical results of predictive models, such

as the CHEC or CHECMATE computer codes of the Electric Power Research

Institute or the Massachusetts Institute of Technology method described in

NUREG/CR-5007, "Prediction and Mitigation of Erosion-Corrosive Wear in

/Secondary Piping Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," which ranks systems and

components according to their erosion/corrosion susceptibility. Other

licensees'have selected systems and components based on engineering judgment.

Recent events at Millstone 2 [Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-336/91-12] and

Millstone 3'(LER 50-309/92-07), before the licensee restructured its

erosion/corrosion program, and at Maine Yankee (LER 92-007-00), indicate that

such erosion/corrosion programs based on engineering Judgment alone may lack

the scope needed to predict these phenomena in high energy, carbon steel

systems.

The-Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) audit teams and regional

inspection teams found, for those cases in which CHECMATE was used as a

predictive model, that licensees sometimes made errors in entering the proper

plant parameters into the computer code. The most common of these errors had

to do with selecting the proper geometry code for a component of a system.

Errors in entering plant parameters into CHECMATE can result in errors in the

predicted wear rate.

. I .

IN 93-21 March 25, 1993 Concerning item (4) above, the inspection teams also observed that some

licensees do not have programs to assess their own erosion/corrosion-related

activities, especially for activities associated with computer-generated

analyses. Licensee Quality Assurance (QA) programs typically did not cover

the implementation of the erosion/corrosion programs for safety-related

piping, although some licensees assessed their erosion/corrosion programs

during audits of their inservice inspection programs. ASME Section XI,

referenced in 10 CFR 50/55a(g)(4), requires that activities within the

Jurisdiction of the Code be covered by a quality assurance program (ASME

Section XI, IWA 1400).

Concerning item (6) above, the inspections also revealed that not all repairs

or replacements of erosion/corrosion-worn safety-related components are being

performed in accordance with the applicable requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI, Article IWA 4000/7000. One licensee (Susquehanna; Combined

Inspection Reports 50-387/92-05 and 50-388/92-05) repaired a worn, Class 1 feedwater riser by depositing a weld overlay on the exterior of the pipe.

Repairs or replacements of worn components in systems designed or reclassified

as ASME Code Class 1, 2, or 3 systems must satisfy the requirements of

10 CFR 50.55a(g) and ASME Code,Section XI. Reinforcement of worn areas by

weld overlays on the outside of high energy, safety-related pipe do not comply

with the ASME Code because the Code requires that flaws be removed from the

pipe before the weld material is applied (ASME XI, IWA-4300) for repairs of

safety-related pipe.

NRC inspection teams have also observed the following during inspections of

licensee erosion/corrosion programs:

• An improper determination of code minimum wall thickness acceptance

criteria, resulting in improper disposition of degraded components

(Salem Unit 1; Inspection Report 50-272/92-08)

• A lack of baseline thickness measurements (history) on originally

designed piping (Hope Creek; Inspection Report 50-354/92-11) and on

replacement piping before the replacement piping is put into service- (Millstone Unit 1; Inspection Report 50-245/92-80)

• Inconsistency in reproducing UT grid locations during later UT

examinations of the same component (Maine Yankee; Inspection

Report 50-309/92-14)

• Use of engineering personnel who are not familiar with plant operating

conditions, plant as-built designs, or erosion/corrosion history

(Millstone Unit 2; Inspection Report 50-336/91-81 and Hope Creek;

Inspection Report 50-354/92-11)

IN 93-21 March 25, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Jim Medoff, NRR

(301) 504-2715 Krys Parczewski, NRR

(301) 504-2705 Attachment:

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

Attachment

IN 93-21 March 25, 1993 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

93-20 Thermal Fatigue Cracking 03/24/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

of Feedwater Piping to for PWRs supplied by

Steam Generators Westinghouse or Combustion

Engineering.

93-19 Slab Hopper Bulging 03/17/92 All nuclear fuel cycle

licensees.

93-18 Portable Moisture-Density 03/10/93 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Gauge User Responsibilities Commission licensees that

during Field Operations possess moisture-density

gauges.

93-17 Safety Systems Response 03/08/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

to Loss of Coolant and for nuclear power reactors.

Loss of Offsite Power

93-16 Failures of Nut-Locking 02/19/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Devices in Check Valves for nuclear power reactors.

93-15 Failure to Verify the 02/18/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Continuity of Shunt Trip for nuclear power reactors.

Attachment Contacts in

Manual Safety Injection

and Reactor Trip Switches

93-14 Clarification of 02/18/93 All licensees who possess

10 CFR 40.22, Small source material.

Quantities of Source

Material

93-13 Undetected Modification 02/16/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

of Flow Characteristics for nuclear power reactors.

in the High Pressure

Safety Injection System

93-12 Off-Gassing in Auxiliary 02/11/93 All holders of OLs or CPs

Feedwater System Raw for nuclear power reactors.

Water Sources

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit

IN 93-21 March 25, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Original signed by

Brian K.Eri 's

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Jim Medoff, NRR

(301) 504-2715 Krys Parczewski, NRR

t (301) 504-2705 Attachment: _ ,or*

List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRE t

Document Name: 93,g24{f

D/Xt~dA C/OGCB: DORS:NRR RPB:ADM D/DE:NRR

GMarcus* TechEd* JERichardson*

02/03/93 01/04/93 02/02/93 OGCB:DORS:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR C/EMCB:DE:NRR

CVHodge* JMedoff* KIParczewski* RAHermann* JRStrosnider*

02/03/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 Harold Gray of Region I consulted on this information notice

C;" //C'

i

IN 93-XX

March , 1993 * Inconsistency in reproducing UT grid locations during later UT

examinations of the same component (Maine Yankee; Inspection

Report 50-309/92-14)

• Use of engineering personnel who are not familiar with plant operating

conditions, plant as-built designs, or erosion/corrosion history

(Millstone Unit 2; Inspection Report 50-336/91-81 and Hope Creek;

Inspection Report 50-354/92-11)

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Jim Medoff, NRR

(301) 504-2715 Krys Parczewski, NRR

(301) 504-2705 Attachment:

1. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

CONCURRENCE: *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

Document Name: EROS0301.CVH

D/DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR*RPB:ADM D/DE:NRR

BKGrimes 4 GMarcus* TechEd JERichardson*

03/ /93 4 02/03/93 01/04/93 02/02/93 OGCB:DORS "'RR EMCB:DE:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR C/EMCB:DE:NRR

CYHodge a JMedoff* KIParczewski* RAHermann* JRStrosnider*

1Or/W/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 o3 11 Harold Gray of Region I consulted on this information notice

IN 93-XX

March , 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Jim Medoff, NRR

(301) 504-2715 Krys Parczewski, NRR

(301) 504-2705 Attachments:

1. List of Pilot Program Audit and Inspections Reports

2. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

CONCURRENCE: *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

Document Name: EROS0301.CVH

D/DORS:NRR C/OGCB: DORS:NRR*RPB:ADM D/DE:NRR

BKGrime GMarcus* TechEd JERichardson*

03/ /93 02/03/93 01/04/93 02/02/93 OGCB:DORS:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR C/EMCB:DE:NRR

CVHodge JMedoff* KIParczewski* RAHermann* JRStrosnider*

02/03/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 Harold Gray of Region I consulted on this information notice

IN 93-XX

February xx, 1993 The inspections also revealed that not all repairs or replacements of EC-worn

safety-related components are being performed in accordance with the

applicable requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI, Article IWA 4000/7000.

One licensee (Combined IRs 50-387/92-05 and 50-388/92-05) repaired a worn, Class 1 feedwater riser by depositing a weld overlay on the exterior of the

pipe. Repairs or replacements of worn components in systems designed or

reclassified as ASME Code Class 1, 2, or 3 systems must satisfy the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g) and ASME Code,Section XI. The NRC does not

accept reinforcement of worn areas by weld overlays on the outside of high

energy, safety-related pipe because Code repairs of safety-related pipe

require that the flaws be removed from the pipe before the weld material is

applied (ASME XI, IWA-4300).

NRC staff members have also observed the following during inspections of

licensee EC programs (see Attachments 1 and 2):

• An improper determination of code minimum wall thickness acceptance

criteria, resulting in improper disposition of degraded components;

• A lack of baseline thickness measurements (history) on new or replaced

piping before placing the piping in service;

• Inconsistency in reproducing UT grid locations during later UT

examinations of the same component; and

• Use of engineering personnel who are not familiar with plant operating

conditions and EC history.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Jim Medoff, NRR

(301) 504-2715 Krys Parczewski, NRR

(301) 504-2705 Attachments:

1. List of Pilot Program Audit and Inspections Reports

2. List of Erosion/Corrosion Inspections Performed by

the Division of Reactor Safety in Region I

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

CONCURRENCE: *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

Document Name: EROSCORR.IN2 D/DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS,:INRR*RPB:ADM D/DE:NRR

BKGrimes&$L, GMarcus 6#tl TechEd JERichardson*

02/ /93 02/3, /93 01/04/93 02/02/93 OGCB:DORS:fRR EMCB:DE:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR C/EMCB:DE:NRR

CVHodgef tj. JMedoff* KIParczewski* RAHermann* JRStrosnider*

02./03/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 Harold Gray of Region I consulted on this information notice

IN 93-XX

January xx, 1993 The inspections also revealed that not all repairs or replacements of EC-worn

safety-related components are being performed in accordance with the

applicable requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI, Article IWA 4000/7000.

One licensee (Combined IRs 50-387/92-05 and 50-388/92-05) repaired a worn, Class 1 feedwater riser by depositing a weld overlay on the exterior of the

pipe. Repairs or replacements of worn components in systems designed or

reclassified as ASME Code Class 1, 2, or 3 systems must satisfy the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g) and ASME Code,Section XI. The NRC does not

accept reinforcement of worn areas by weld overlays on the outside of high

energy, safety-related pipe because Code repairs of safety-related pipe

require that the flaws be removed from the pipe before the weld material is

applied (ASME XI, IWA-4300).

NRC staff members have also observed the following during inspections of

licensee EC programs (see Attachments 1 and 2):

• An improper determination of code minimum wall thickness acceptance

criteria, resulting in improper disposition of degraded components;

• A lack of baseline thickness measurements (history) on new or replaced

piping before placing the piping in service;

• Inconsistency in reproducing UT grid locations during later UT

examinations of the same component; and

• Use of responsible engineering personnel who are not familiar with plant

operating conditions and EC history.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: James Medoff, NRR

(301) 504-2715 Dr. Krzysztof I. Parczewski, NRR

(301) 504-2705 Attachments:

1. List of Pilot Program Audit and Inspections Reports

2. List of Erosion/Corrosion Inspections Performed by

a. - A_ __S - o n_ __ ^_... F_. A_ n_ _A._ T

the ulvi ision OT Keactor Mwetey in Region I -

3. List of Re%cently Issued NRC Information Notices

CONCURRENCE: *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

Document Name: EROSCORR.IN2 D/DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR*RPB:ADM D/ . R

BKGrimes GMarcus TechEd W ERI Ardson

02/ /93 02/ /93 01/04/93 02/? 193 OGCB:DORS:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR C/EMCB:DE:NRR

CVHodge* JMedoff* KIParczewski* RAHermann* JRStrosnider*

02/01/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 Harold Gray of Region I consulted on this information notice .05. , .

K> IN 93-XX

January xx, 1993 Pane I nf I

. .

The inspections also revealed that not all repairs or replacements of EC-wor

safety-related components are being performed in accordance with the

applicable requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI, Article IWA 4000/710.

One licensee (Combined IRs 50-387/92-05 and 50-388/92-05) repaired a won, Class 1 feedwater riser by depositing a weld overlay on the exterior the

pipe. Repairs or replacements of worn components in systems design or

reclassified as ASME Code Class 1, 2, or 3 systems must satisfy t

requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g) and ASME Code,Section XI. The RC does not

accept reinforcement of worn areas by weld overlays on the out de of high

energy, safety-related pipe because Code repairs of safety-re ted pipe

require that the flaws be removed from the pipe before the ld material is

applied (ASME XI, IWA-4300).

NRC staff members have also observed the following dur g inspections of

licensee EC programs (see Attachments 1 and 2):

• An improper determination of code minimum wall thickness acceptance

criteria, resulting in improper disposition degraded components;

• A lack of baseline thickness measurements history) on new or replaced

piping before placing the piping in serv e;

• Inconsistency in reproducing UT grid cations during later UT

examinations of the same component; d

• Use of responsible engineering per onnel who are not familiar with plant

operating conditions and EC hist y.

This information notice requires no pecific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the i ormation in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts lis ed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) roject manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Jim edoff, NRR

(30 504-2715 K ys Parczewski, NRR

01) 504-2705 Attachments:

1. List of Pilot P ogram Audit and Inspections Reports

2. List of Erosio /Corrosion Inspections Performed by

the Divisio of Reactor Safety in Region I

3. List of Rece ly Issued NRC Information Notices

CONCURRENCE: EE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

4 Document ame: EROSCORR.IN2 D/DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR*RPB:ADM D/DE:NRR #sW'ht

BKGrimes GMarcus TechEd JERichardson

01/ /93 01/ /93 01/04/93 01/ /93 OGCB:DOR . RR EMCB:DE:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR EMCB:DE:NRR C/EMCB:DE:NRR

CVHodge JMedoff* KIParczewski* RAHermann* JRStrosnider*

O / 01/27/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 01/27/93 Harold Gray of Region I consulted on this information notice

CONCURREDiM: *SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

Doct iment Name: EROSCORR.INZL /

D/DORS:NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR*RPB:ADM D/DE:NRR

BKGrimes GMarcus TechEd JERichardson

01/ /93 01/ /93 01/04/93 01/ /93 OGCB:DOR! EMCB:D

1:NRR R EMCB:DE:NR EMCB:D .NMfi C/EMCB:DE:NR

CVHodge JMedofffY(. KIParczews wi RAHe ann JRStrosnider

01/ /93 a1oRgio7 c 01/n

eha /93 01 n ot /1/93ic

Harold Gr,a fRgo I cosule on thi in t ntc

IN 93-XX

January xx, 1993 The inspections also revealed that not all repairs or replacements of EC-worn

safety-related components are being performed in accordance with the

applicable requirements of the ASME Code,Section XI, Article IWA 4000/7000.

One licensee (Combined IRs 50-387/92-05 and 50-388/92-05) repaired a worn, Class 1 feedwater riser by depositing a weld overlay on the exterior of the

pipe. Repairs or replacements of worn components in systems designed or

reclassified as ASME Code Class 1, 2, or 3 systems must satisfy the

requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g) and ASME Code,Section XI. The NRC does not

accept reinforcement of worn areas by weld overlays on the outside of high

energy, safety-related pipe because Code repairs of safety-related pipe

require that the flaws be removed from the pipe before the weld material is

applied (ASME XI, IWA-4300).

NRC staff members have also observed the following during inspections of

licensee EC programs (see Attachments 1 and 2):

• An improper determination of code minimum wall thickness acceptance

criteria, resulting in improper disposition of degraded components;

• A lack of baseline thickness measurements (history) on new or replaced

piping before placing the piping in service;

• Inconsistency in reproducing UT grid locations during later UT

examinations of the same component; and

• Use of responsible engineering personnel who are not familiar with plant

operating conditions and EC history.

This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contact

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Reactor Support

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Technical contacts: Jim Medoff, NRR

(301) 504-2715 Krys Parczewski, NRR

(301) 504-2705 Attachments:

1. List of Pilot Program Audit and Inspections Reports

2. List of Erosion/Corrosion Inspections Performed by

the Division of Reactor Safety in Region I

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

CONCURRENCE: See Attached

IN 93-XX

January xx, 1993 This information notice requires no specific action or written response.

you have any questions about the information in this notice, please contrct

one of the technical contacts listed below or the appropriate Office o

Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.

Brian K. Grimes, Director

Division of Operating Rea or Support

Office of Nuclear Reacto Regulation

Technical contacts: Jim Medoff, NRR

(301) 504-2715 Krys Parczewski, NRR

(301) 504-2705 Attachments:

1. List of Pilot Program Audit and Inspections Reports

2. List of Erosion/Corrosion Inspections Perf rmed by

the Division of Reactor Safety in Regi I

3. List of Recently Issued NRC Information otices

Harold Gray of Region I onsulted on this information notice

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURR CE

Document Name: ROSCORR.IN

D/DO :NRR C/OGCB:DORS:NRR*RPB:ADM D/DE:NRR

BKG imes GMarcus TechEd JERichardson

01 /93 01/A /93 01/04/93 01/ /93 OGCB:DORS: RR CB:DE:NRR EMCB:DE:NRP4 ,) EMCB:DE: C/EMCB:DE:N

CVHodge Medoff1.- KIParczewsK rR Hermanyl). JRStrosnider

01/25/93 1/S2i/93 01/46/93 01/16/93 01/1,1/93

• /

Attachments:

1. List of Pilot Program Audit and Inspections Reports

2. List of Erosion/Corrosion Inspections Performed by

the Division of Reactor Safety in Region I

3. List of NRC Recently Issued NRC Information Notices

,. Herman Gray of Region I consulted on this information notice

• SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE

OGCB:DORS:NRR TECH ED EMCB:DE:NRR EMC :DE:NRR *EMCB:DE:NRR

CVHodge:mkm ZlMa(nP JMedoff K arczewski RAHermann

12/ /92 12/ /2 12/ /92 / /92 12/ /92

141 /2.

• C:EMCB:DE:NRR *D: 'E:'NRR C:OGCB:DO :NRR D:DORS:NRR

JRStrosnider JERichardson GHMarcus BKGrimes

12/ /92 12/ /92 12/ /9 12/ /92