IR 05000282/2002008
| ML023040324 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 10/30/2002 |
| From: | Kenneth Riemer Division of Nuclear Materials Safety III |
| To: | Nazar M Nuclear Management Co |
| References | |
| IR-02-008 | |
| Download: ML023040324 (36) | |
Text
October 30, 2002
SUBJECT:
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT, UNITS 1 AND 2 NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION REPORT 50-282/02-08; 50-306/02-08
Dear Mr. Nazar:
On September 30, 2002, the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an integrated inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on September 27, 2002, with you and members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
Based on the results of this inspection, the NRC identified two issues of very low safety significance (Green). One of the issues was determined to involve a violation of NRC requirements. However, because of its very low safety significance and because it has been entered into your corrective action program, the NRC is treating the issue as a Non-Cited Violation, in accordance with Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy.
If you contest the subject or severity of a Non-Cited Violation, you should provide a response within 30 days of the date of this inspection report, with the basis for your denial, to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532-4351; the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; and the Resident Inspector Office at the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant.
In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC issued an Order and several threat advisories to commercial power reactors to strengthen licensees capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack. The NRC established a deadline of September 1, 2002, for licensees to complete modifications and process upgrades required by the order. To confirm compliance with this order, the NRC issued Temporary Instruction 2515/148 and over the next year, the NRC will inspect each licensee in accordance with this Temporary Instruction. The NRC continues to monitor overall security controls and may issue additional temporary instructions or require additional inspections should conditions warrant.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-282/02-08; 50-306/02-08
REGION III==
Docket Nos:
50-282; 50-306 License Nos:
50-282/02-08; 50-306/02-08 Licensee:
Nuclear Management Company, LLC Facility:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2 Location:
1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089 Dates:
July 1 through September 30, 2002 Inspectors:
J. Adams, Senior Resident Inspector D. Karjala, Resident Inspector R. Daley, Reactor Engineer R. Walton, Operations Specialist Approved by:
Kenneth Riemer, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
IR 05000282-02-08, 05000306-02-08; Nuclear Management Company, LLC; on 07/01 -
9/30/02, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2. Maintenance Effectiveness and Identification and Resolution of Problems.
This report covers a 3-month period of baseline resident inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III inspectors and the resident inspectors. Two findings of significance were identified. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White,
Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be Green or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, Reactor Oversight Process, Revision 3, dated July 2000.
A.
Inspection Findings
Cornerstone: Initiating Events
- Green.
A finding of very low safety significance was identified by the inspectors investigating the repeat failures of the external circulating water intake screen bypass gates to fully open and to latch in the open position. The finding resulted from performance deficiencies associated with the establishment of an appropriate maintenance rule safety significance classification of the external circulating water intake screen bypass gates. The bypass gates were classified as low safety significant components, not as low safety significant standby components as specified by industry maintenance rule guidance.
This finding was more than minor because it increased the likelihood of a reactor trip event due to a loss of circulating water. The finding was of very low safety significance because it did not contribute to the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident, did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, and did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood. A violation determination could not be completed until appropriate maintenance rule performance criteria have been established and will be tracked by an Unresolved Item. (Section 1R12.1)
Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
- Green.
A finding of very low safety significance was identified by the inspectors during a review of licensee corrective action taken to address concerns documented in Licensee Event Report (LER) 1-98-15 pertaining to Appendix R potential flow diversion paths.
The primary cause of this finding was related to a failure to correct or implement appropriate compensatory actions to address potential flow diversion paths that had existed since 1999.
This finding is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the finding would become a more significant safety concern. Failure to resolve fire protection non-compliance items and failure to establish appropriate compensatory measures could potentially affect the availability, reliability, and capability of fire protection safe shutdown equipment and response efforts. The inspectors determined that the finding was not suitable for SDP analysis. However, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the probability of having a fire event in the affected areas such that the fire would cause more than one valve to reposition to cause a flow diversion was very low.
This was determined to be a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B,
Criterion XVI. (Section 4OA2.1)
Licensee-Identified Violations
A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee, has been reviewed by the inspectors. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees corrective action program. This violation and corrective action tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
REPORT DETAILS
Summary of Plant Status
Unit 1 was operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period. Unit 2 was operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period.
REACTOR SAFETY
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
1R04 Equipment Alignment
.1 Partial Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors performed partial walkdowns of accessible portions of trains of risk-significant mitigating systems equipment during times when the trains were of increased importance due to the redundant trains or other related equipment being unavailable.
The inspectors utilized the valve and electric breaker checklists listed at the end of this report to verify that the components were properly positioned and that support systems were lined up as needed. The inspectors also examined the material condition of the components and observed operating parameters of equipment to verify that there were no obvious deficiencies. The inspectors reviewed outstanding work orders (WOs) and Corrective Action Program (CAP) Action Requests (ARs) associated with the trains to verify that those documents did not reveal issues that could affect train function. The inspectors used the information in the appropriate sections of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) to determine the functional requirements of the systems.
The inspectors verified the alignment of the following trains:
- D1 emergency diesel generator during the unavailability of the D2 emergency diesel generator on July 29, 2002;
- 12 safety-related cooling water pump and 121 safety-related traveling screen during the unavailability of the 22 safety-related cooling water pump and 122 safety-related traveling screen on July 30, 2002; and
- 22 and 121 safety-related cooling water pumps following the emergent failure of the 12 safety-related cooling water pump on August 15, 2002.
The inspectors reviewed the ARs listed at the end of this report to verify that the licensee was identifying issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into their corrective action program. The inspectors also reviewed ARs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection
.1 Area Walkdowns
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns that were focused on the availability and accessibility of fire protection equipment, the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient combustibles, and the condition and operating status of installed fire barriers as described in fire hazards analysis and pre-fire plans. The inspectors selected fire areas for inspection based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE); their potential to impact equipment which could initiate a plant transient; or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. The inspectors reviewed the as-found condition of fire doors, dampers, penetration seals, fire detectors, sprinklers, fire hoses and extinguishers, comparing the as-found conditions to the configuration described in fire hazards analysis and pre-fire plans. The inspectors also reviewed equipment to verify that it was in its appropriate location, was available for immediate use, and was not obstructed. The as-found transient combustible loading was also reviewed to verify that it was within the analyzed limits. The inspectors reviewed the ARs listed at the end of this report to verify that the licensee was identifying fire protection issues at an appropriate threshold and entering them into their corrective action program.
The inspectors assessed the following areas:
- Fire Area 13, Unit 1 and 2 Control Room on July 13, 2002;
- Fire Area 18, Unit 1 and 2 Cable Spreading and Relay Rooms on July 11, 2002;
- Fire Area 35, 21 Battery Room on July 10, 2002;
- Fire Area 36, 22 Battery Room on July 11, 2002;
- Fire Area 69, Turbine Ground Floor and Mezzanine;
- Fire Area 101, D5 Emergency Diesel Generator Room; and
- Fire Area 102, D6 Emergency Diesel Generator Room.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Fire Brigade Drills
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed the performance of a fire brigade drill in the Unit 1 electrical bus 150/160 room on July 19, 2002. This area was considered risk significant because a fire could cause a unit trip initiating event. The inspectors observed the initial response of the fire brigade leader, the fire brigade, security personnel, and the duty Emergency Medical Technician. The inspectors observed establishment of communications with the control room, the brigade response strategy briefing, and the brigades response to the simulated fire. The inspectors used the NRC inspection procedure listed above and the documents listed at the end of this report to evaluate the drill. At the conclusion of the drill, the inspectors observed the licensees drill critique to ensure that any weaknesses noted during the drill were addressed.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
a. Inspection Scope
On September 10, 2002, the inspectors observed an operating crew during a requalification examination on the simulator. The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the areas of:
- clarity and formality of communications;
- ability to take timely, appropriate, and safe actions;
- prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms;
- procedure use;
- control board manipulations;
- oversight and direction from supervisors; and
- group dynamics.
The inspectors compared crew performance in the above areas to the critical tasks listed in the exercise guide at the end of this report. The inspectors also compared simulator configurations with actual control room board configurations. The inspectors attended the post-examination critique to verify that the licensee evaluators noted the same weaknesses observed by the inspectors and discussed them during the critique.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Effectiveness
.1 External Circulating Water Intake Screen Bypass Gate Repeat Failures
a. Inspection Scope
On August 20, 2002, while investigating the repeat failures of the external circulating water intake screen bypass gates, the inspectors identified that the maintenance rule safety significance classification of the external circulating water intake screen bypass gates was inappropriate.
b. Findings
The inspectors identified a Green finding associated with the inappropriate maintenance rule safety significance classification of the external circulating water intake screen bypass gates. The bypass gates were classified as low safety significant components, contrary to the NRC-endorsed, industry guidance of NUMARC 93-01.
On June 19, 2002, the sequential loss of external circulating water intake traveling screens caused a low intake bay level. In response to the intake bay low level, operators initiated the opening of the intake bypass gates by isolating power to the bypass gates. This action simulated a loss of power to the traveling screens and should have caused the bypass gates to open hydraulically. However, the 121 intake bypass gate failed to open and the 122 only partially opened. The partial opening of 122 gate allowed sufficient makeup to the intake bay to prevent a loss of circulating water and reactor trip.
The inspectors conducted a historical evaluation of the intake bypass gates performance. The inspectors noted a history of problems with the failure of the intake gates to fully open and to latch in the open position. Based on the number of repeat failures documented in the licensees corrective action program, the inspectors evaluated whether the intake bypass gate were scoped in accordance with the maintenance rule, 10 CFR 50.65; whether the intake bypass gates had been assigned the proper safety significance classification; whether the established performance criteria was appropriate; whether the performance problems associated with intake bypass gates constituted maintenance rule functional failures or repeat maintenance rule functional failures; and whether the intake bypass gates were properly classified as (a)(1) or (a)(2).
The inspectors determined that the bypass gates were properly included in the scope of the maintenance rule, but found that the licensee had inappropriately classified the bypass gates as low safety significant components. The licensee should have recognized the bypass gates as low safety significant standby components since their function was to open automatically on loss of power to the external circulating water intake traveling screens, or on a high differential level across the external circulating water intake traveling screens. Since the bypass gates were improperly classified, the licensees performance criteria were also inappropriate and bypass gate failures were not properly evaluated for maintenance preventable functional failures. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program with AR CAP 024744. A list of documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of this report.
The inspectors determined that the inappropriate maintenance rule safety significance classification of the intake bypass gates was a performance deficiency warranting a significance evaluation in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Disposition Screening, issued on April 29, 2002. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it:
- (1) involved the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and
- (2) affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability during power operations.
The inspectors determined that the finding could be evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, because the finding was associated with an increase in the likelihood of an initiating event. For the Phase 1 screening, the inspectors determined that the finding did not contribute to the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident, did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, and did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood. This finding (FIN 50-282/306/02-08-01), screened out of the Phase 1 SDP, was determined to be of very low safety significance.
The inspectors discussed the potential of a violation of NRC maintenance rule requirements with Region III, Division of Reactor Safety inspectors. Based on that discussion, the inspectors concluded that a violation determination could not be completed until appropriate performance criteria for the low safety significant standby safety significance classification were first established by the maintenance rule expert panel. Following the establishment of appropriate performance criteria, a maintenance rule functional failure evaluation of all bypass gate failures for the previous 2 years can be performed. If the results of that evaluation show that the intake bypass gates should have been classified as (a)(1) based on their performance and were not, a violation may exist. This is an Unresolved Item (URI 50-282/306/02-08-02).
.2 Repeat Failures of the Containment Fan Cooling Unit Cooling Water Return Orifice
Bypass Valve, CV 39201
a. Inspection Scope
On August 13, 2002, the inspectors reviewed AR CAP 023812 that identified a repeat failure of the containment fan cooling unit cooling water return orifice bypass valve, CV 39201. The proper operation of CV 39201 supports the performance of the safety-related maintenance rule function of providing cooling water to the containment fan cooler Units 11 and 13 and was within the scope of the maintenance rule.
The inspectors performed an in-office review of work orders and corrective action program documents associated with the failures of CV 39201. The inspectors compared the licensees maintenance documentation to the requirements contained in the administrative work instruction (AWI) procedures for the performance of nuclear maintenance, investigation, and troubleshooting. The documents reviewed are listed at the end of this report. The inspectors also conducted an extent-of-condition assessment by searching the licensees corrective action program database for similar failures of valves in redundant containment fan cooling unit trains.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the maintenance rule for the repeat failures of CV 39201 by comparing their actions to the requirements contained in the Maintenance Rule, 10 CFR 50.65, and Industry Guidelines for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants, NUMARC 93-01. The inspectors evaluated whether the CV 39201 was scoped in accordance with the maintenance rule; whether the performance problems associated with CV 39201 constituted maintenance rule functional failures; whether the cooling water system had been assigned the proper safety significance classification; whether the system was properly classified as (a)(1) or (a)(2); and whether appropriate performance criteria and/or goals were established. The above aspects were evaluated using the maintenance rule scoping and report documents listed at the end of this report. For each structure, system and component reviewed, the inspectors also reviewed the significant work orders (WO) and ARs listed at the end of this report to verify that failures were properly identified, classified, and corrected, and that unavailable time had been properly calculated.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the licensees management of plant risk during emergent maintenance activities and during activities where more than one risk significant system or train was unavailable. The activities were chosen based on their potential impact on increasing the probability of an initiating event or impacting the operation of safety significant mitigating equipment. The inspection was conducted to verify that evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to reduce the risk and minimize the duration where practical, and that contingency plans were in place where appropriate. Inspectors reviewed the licensees daily configuration risk assessment records, observed shift turnover meetings, observed daily plant status meetings, and reviewed risk assessment documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the equipment configurations were properly listed, that protected equipment was identified and controlled, and that significant aspects of plant risk were communicated to the necessary personnel. The inspectors discussed daily and emergent risk assessments with risk assessment engineers and operators.
The inspectors reviewed the following emergent and planned maintenance activities associated with maintenance rule risk significant systems:
- Repair of the 22 safety injection (SI) pump while Unit 2 was in a yellow risk situation because the 22 residual heat removal (RHR) pump and heat exchanger were out-of-service for preventive maintenance;
- Testing of the 22 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump while Unit 2 was in a yellow risk situation because the 125 air compressor was out-of-service for repair;
- Testing of the 22 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump while the 122 control room chiller was out-of-service for repair;
- Quarterly check valve testing on the 21 motor-driven AFW pump while the train A inadequate core cooling monitor was out-of-service;
- Emergent work due to failure of the 12 diesel-driven cooling water pump (DDCLP);
- The 12 motor-driven AFW pump failed a surveillance test due to sluggish operation of the outboard motor slinger ring; and
- Unit 1 in yellow risk configuration while D2 diesel generator, 18 inverter, 11 charging pump, and the 12 motor-driven AFW pump were out-of-service for maintenance.
The inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that problems associated with plant risk assessment were identified at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R14 Personnel Performance Related to Non-Routine Plant Evolutions and Events
a. Inspection Scope
On August 23, 2002, the inspectors completed their review of licensee personnel performance during a June 19, 2002, transient that resulted in a decreasing intake bay level. The level decrease was caused by the loss of intake traveling screens and a failure of the intake bypass gates to open. The inspectors compared operator performance to the applicable response procedures. The inspectors reviewed plant data and operator logs to determine if the plant responded as designed. The inspectors also reviewed the licensees root cause evaluation to verify that noted deficiencies were recognized and entered in their corrective actions program. The documents reviewed during this inspection are listed at the end of this report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors evaluated plant conditions, selected ARs, and CAP documents for risk significant components and systems in which operability issues were questioned on the dates that appear in the list below. These conditions were evaluated to determine whether the continued operability of the components and systems was justified. The inspectors compared the component or systems function and design criteria in the applicable sections of the Technical Specifications (TSs) and USAR to the licensees evaluations in order to verify that the components and systems were operable. The inspectors verified that compensatory measures necessary to maintain operability were in place, functioned as intended, and were properly controlled. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
The inspectors evaluated the following conditions:
- 12 and 22 diesel-driven cooling water pump speed oscillations on July 10, 2002;
- The hot chemical laboratory ventilation in the auxiliary building draws air from the turbine building at a flow rate sufficient to prevent the auxiliary building special ventilation system from achieving a negative pressure with the doors to the hot chemical laboratory open on July 15, 2002;
- The Unit 2 reactor missile shield was weighed during the 2002 refueling outage and found to weigh more than listed in the USAR on July 16, 2002;
- Operation of the 21 AFW pump with insufficient packing leakoff on August 12, 2002;
- 22 containment fan cooling unit high vibrations on August 22, 2002;
- System grid voltage dropped to the point where the Grid Security Analysis for the Prairie Island Two Unit Trip Contingency failed on August 26, 2002; and
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R16 Operator Workarounds (OWA)
.1 Review of Selected Workarounds
a. Inspection Scope
On August 7, 2002, the inspectors reviewed OWAs associated with the 12 station battery charger. During an accident or transient that results in a safety injection, the 12 station battery charger may require manual restarting. The inspectors verified that the functional capability of the system, human reliability in responding to an initiating event, or the ability of operators to implement abnormal or emergency operating procedures was not significantly affected. The inspectors reviewed the applicable sections of USAR and TSs and discussed the OWAs with control room operators. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Cumulative Effects of OWAs
a. Inspection Scope
On August 12, 2002, the inspectors reviewed the cumulative effect of all identified OWAs to determine whether the cumulative conditions had a significant impact on plant risk or on the operators ability to respond to a transient or an accident. The inspectors used the NRC inspection procedure listed above and the documents listed at the end of this report to evaluate the list of OWAs.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities associated with maintenance on important mitigating, barrier integrity, and support systems to ensure that the post-maintenance testing was performed adequately, demonstrated that the maintenance was successful, and that operability was restored. The inspectors reviewed the appropriate sections of the TSs, the USAR, and maintenance documents to determine the systems safety functions and the scope of the maintenance. In addition, the inspectors reviewed ARs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
The inspectors observed and evaluated the post-maintenance activities for the following:
- Refueling water storage tank (RWST) to SI pumps header isolation valve MV-32182 following modification to the control circuit on July 29, 2002;
- D2 6-month inspection on July 30, 2002;
- 22 diesel-driven cooling water pump following replacement of a jacket water heater, starting air compressor preventive maintenance (PM), and pump bearing seal water filter change and line flush on July 31, 2002;
- 122 control room chiller and air handler PM, and chilled water pump seal replacement on August 26, 2002; and
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors observed selected surveillance tests and/or reviewed test data to verify that the equipment performance met Surveillance Procedure (SP) acceptance criteria.
The inspectors verified that the tested equipment was capable of performing its intended safety functions as described in TSs and the USAR. The inspectors verified that the testing met the required TS frequency; that the tests were conducted in accordance with the applicable procedures; that operators met prerequisites and established the proper plant conditions; and that the results of the tests were properly reviewed and recorded.
In addition, the inspectors reviewed several ARs to verify that the licensee was identifying surveillance problems at an appropriate threshold, and that corrective actions commensurate with the significance of the issue were identified and implemented. A detailed list of the documents reviewed during this inspection is included at the end of the report.
The following tests were observed and/or evaluated:
- SP 1093, D1 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start Test on September 9, 2002;
- SP 1106A, 12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Monthly Test on September 12, 2002;
- SP 2307, D6 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start Test on September 16, 2002; and
- SP 2295, D5 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start Test on September 30, 2002.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
SAFEGUARDS
Cornerstone: Physical Protection
3PP3 Response to Contingency Events (71130.03)
a. Inspection Scope
The Office of Homeland Security developed a Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) to disseminate information regarding the risk of terrorist attacks. The HSAS implements five color-coded threat conditions with a description of corresponding actions at each level. NRC Regulatory Information Summary (RIS) 2002-12a, dated August 19, 2002, NRC Threat Advisory and Protective Measures System, discusses the HSAS and provides additional information on protective measures to licensees.
On September 10, 2002, the NRC issued a Safeguards Advisory to reactor licensees to implement the protective measures described in RIS 2002-12a in response to the Federal government declaration of threat level Orange. Subsequently, on September 24, 2002, the Office of Homeland Security downgraded the national security threat condition to Yellow and a corresponding reduction in the risk of a terrorist threat.
The inspectors interviewed licensee personnel and security staff, observed the conduct of security operations, and assessed licensee implementation of the threat level Orange protective measures. Inspection results were communicated to Region III and Headquarters security staff for further evaluation.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
OTHER ACTIVITIES
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity
a. Inspection Scope
The inspectors reviewed the performance indicator data submitted by the licensee for completeness and accuracy, and to verify that the licensee had reported data in accordance with the guidance provided by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). The inspectors reviewed documents listed at the end of this report for performance indicator data for initiating events, mitigating systems, and barrier integrity cornerstones. The inspectors reviewed the following performance indicators from the 3rd quarter 2001 through the 2nd quarter 2002:
- Safety system functional failures on July 31, 2002;
- Reactor coolant system specific activity on August 2, 2002; and
- Unplanned power changes on August 26, 2002.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Failure to Correct Deficiencies Involving Potential Flow Diversion Paths
a. Inspection Scope
On August 6, 2002, during a selected issues followup inspection of corrective actions to address potential Appendix R flow diversion paths concerns, the inspectors identified that specified corrective action to implement modifications and/or administrative controls to resolve flow diversion issues were not completed.
b. Findings
The inspector identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to correct deficiencies adverse to quality involving potential flow diversion paths.
These deficiencies had existed since 1999, but had not been corrected. Additionally, no compensatory actions had been established to address these flow diversion paths.
The licensee issued Condition Report (CR) 19982008 and LER 1-98-15 to identify and report concerns associated with the effects of potential spurious opening of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 containment sump B to RHR motor-operated valves. Specifically, it was noted that if any pair of the valves were to spuriously open during a fire, the RWST would drain to the containment sump leaving a less than required volume of borated water available for make-up. In fire protection terminology, this type of issue is referred to as a flow diversion issue, since the diversion of flow may potentially affect safe shutdown capability in the event of a fire.
As a result of the LER, the licensee issued two specific corrective action items to address generic concerns associated with this issue. The first action item required the licensee to review the Appendix R safe shutdown list against the appropriate flow diagrams to ensure that all other flow paths vulnerable to diversion were included in the Safe Shutdown
Analysis.
The second action item was to implement modifications and/or administrative controls to resolve this issue (and any other flow diversion issues identified subsequent to the LER). The second action item had not been completed as of August 6, 2002.
The first action item was completed and closed in 1999. The results of the review of flow diversion pathways was documented and issued as calculations GEN-PI-034, 035, 036, 037, 038, and 040. These calculations identified a large number of safe shutdown required flow diversion components. However, the calculations ambiguously stated in their Conclusion sections, Those components not previously identified are indicated with a note in the attached table. Subsequent analysis may show that some of the components can be eliminated from the Appendix R component list. The calculations were extremely conservative and identified all potential flow diversion paths. Because of this, compensatory measures were never established for the potential flow paths. Since the engineering staff knew that the calculations were extremely conservative, the licensee decided to wait and perform the second action item to implement modifications and/or administrative controls to resolve this issue (and any other flow diversion issues identified subsequent to the LER) as specific flow paths were identified.
Since the calculations identified required flow diversion paths, the NRC inspector asked the licensee why compensatory actions were not in place. As a result of this questioning, the licensee documented this issue in their corrective action program as AR CAP 024536. In AR CAP 024536, the licensee stated that the calculations were potentially misleading and do not meet the original intention behind their issuance, they should be canceled. Subsequently, all six calculations were canceled.
The flow diversion review committed to in LER 1-98-15 was to identify if any flow diversion paths existed. An additional corrective action document was initiated by the licensee, AR CAP 024537, which documented that this LER action item was inappropriately closed, since the calculations did not fully address the LER commitment.
Also, AR CAP 024537 recommended that the action item either be reopened or a new action item be entered to track the eventual completion of this commitment.
As a result, subsequent to the NRC identifying these issues, the licensee performed another review of flow diversion paths. While this review was again conservative, the licensee had procedure actions and guidance that would address spurious operations in these flow diversion paths in the event of a fire.
Criterion II of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, requires that the licensee establish a quality assurance program. It states, This program shall be documented by written policies, procedures, or instructions and shall be carried out throughout plant life in accordance with those policies, procedures, or instructions.
The Prairie Island Quality Assurance Plan Appendix C implements Quality Assurance requirements for the Fire Protection Program. Section 12.2 states that work control process procedures shall be used to correct equipment failure, malfunctions, deficiencies, and defective components of fire protection systems.
In 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, it states that Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected. Contrary to Criterion XVI of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, deficiencies adverse to quality involving potential flow diversion paths were known to exist since 1999, but were not corrected. Additionally, no compensatory measures for these deficiencies were established to address these flow diversion paths.
This finding is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the finding would become a more significant safety concern. Failure to resolve fire protection non-compliance items and failure to establish appropriate compensatory measures could potentially affect the availability, reliability, and capability of fire protection safe shutdown equipment and response efforts. This finding was not suitable for SDP analysis. However, this issue has very low safety significance (Green) because the probability of having a fire event in the affected areas such that the fire would cause more than one valve to reposition to cause a flow diversion was very low. Since the licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program with AR CAP 024536 and AR CAP 024537, this violation is being treated as an NCV in accordance with VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy (NCV 50-282/306/02-08-03).
.2 Routine Review of Identification and Resolution of Problems
a. Inspection Scope
As discussed in previous sections of this report, the inspectors routinely reviewed issues during baseline inspection activities and plant status reviews to verify that they were being entered into the licensees corrective action system at an appropriate threshold, that corrective actions were performed in a timely manner, and that adverse trends were identified and addressed. Minor issues entered into the licensees corrective action system as a result of inspectors observations are generally denoted in the report.
b. Findings
No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Followup
(Closed) LER 1-02-01: Condition Prohibited by TSs Due to Potential for Auxiliary Building Special Vent Zone Boundary Degradation.
The LER concerns a modification during plant construction in 1973 to the hot chemistry lab ventilation, which was within the auxiliary building special ventilation zone (ABSVZ).
The modification supplied ventilation to the lab from the turbine building. If the lab doors were open during an accident that generated a safety injection signal, the lab supply booster fans, which do not receive a trip signal on a safety injection, would continue to supply air, affecting the ability of the ABSVZ system to perform its required functions to maintain a negative pressure. Technical Specification 3.6.E.2 requires that openings in the ABSVZ be under direct administrative control and be reduced to less than 10 square feet within 6 minutes following an accident. Contrary to the above, the hot chemistry lab doors were not under direct administrative control. The licensee entered this condition into their corrective action program with AR CAP 024185. The inspectors reviewed this licensee-identified finding and determined that it met the criteria to be considered a NCV of TS 3.6.E.2 (see Section 4OA7). The finding was screened by the inspectors using the SDP and determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding only represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the auxiliary building. No new significant issues were identified during the review of the LER.
Inspectors verified that the licensee implemented immediate actions to place the hot chemistry lab doors under direct administrative control by adding them into the ABSVZ boundary control log.
4OA5 Other Activities
.1 Review of Institute of Nuclear Power Operations Report
On September 13, 2002, the inspectors completed a review of the final report, dated July 2002, for the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, November 2001 Evaluation.
4OA6 Meeting(s)
.1 Exit Meeting
The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. M. Nazar and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on September 27, 2002. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.
4OA7 Licensee-Identified Violation
The following violation of very low significance was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Manual, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as an NCV.
Cornerstone: Reactor Safety
Technical Specification 3.6.E.2 states that openings in the ABSVZ are permitted provided they are under direct administrative control and can be reduced to less than 10 square feet within 6 minutes following an accident. As described in AR CAP 024185 and LER 1-02-01, on July 16, 2002, the licensee identified that there were no direct administrative controls associated with the hot chemistry lab doors. A 1973 design change to the hot chemistry lab ventilation could affect the ability of the ABSVZ system to perform its required functions to maintain a negative pressure with these doors open.
The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the auxiliary building.
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee T. Amundson, Manager Business Support P. Huffman, Manager of System Engineering B. Jefferson, Director Site Operations J. Jensen, Production Planning Manager A. Johnson, General Superintendent Radiation Protection and Chemistry J. Kivi, Licensing Engineer R. Lingle, Operations Manager M. McKeown, Manager of Design Engineering L. Meyer, General Superintendent Plant Maintenance M. Nazar, Site Vice President S. Northard, Director of Engineering J. Waddell, Superintendent Security M. Werner, Plant Manager R. Womack, Manager of Engineering Programs LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 50-282/306/02-001-00 LER Condition Prohibited by TSs Due to Potential for Auxiliary Building Special Vent Zone Boundary Degradation (Section 4OA3)
50-282/306/02-08-01 FIN Inappropriate Maintenance Rule Safety Significance Classification of the External Circulating Water Intake Screen Bypass Gates (Section 1R12.1)50-282/306/02-08-02 URI Maintenance Rule Functional Failure Evaluation of Bypass Gate Failures (Section 1R12.1)50-282/306/02-08-03 NCV Failure to Correct Deficiencies Adverse to Quality Involving Potential Flow Diversion Paths (Section 4OA2.1)
Closed 50-282/306/02-001-00 LER Condition Prohibited by TSs Due to Potential for Auxiliary Building Special Vent Zone Boundary Degradation (Section 4OA3)
50-282/306/02-08-01 FIN Inappropriate Maintenance Rule Safety Significance Classification of the External Circulating Water Intake Screen Bypass Gates (Section 1R12.1)50-282/306/02-08-03 NCV Failure to Correct Deficiencies Adverse to Quality Involving Potential Flow Diversion Paths (Section 4OA2.1)
Discussed None.
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED ABSVZ Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Zone ACE Apparent Cause Evaluation ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System AFW Auxiliary Feedwater AR Action Request AWI Administrative Work Instruction CAP Corrective Action Program CE Condition Evaluation CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report DBD Design Bases Document DDCLP Diesel-Driven Cooling Water Pump FIN Finding HSAS Homeland Security Advisory System IMC Inspection Manual Chapter INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operations IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events IR Inspection Report LCO Limiting Conditions for Operation LER Licensee Event Report MOV Motor Operated Valve NCV Non-Cited Violation NEI Nuclear Energy Institute OOS Out-of-service OPR Operability Recommendation OWA Operator Workaround PARS Publicly Available Records PINGP Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant PM Preventive Maintenance RHR Residual Heat Removal RIS Regulatory Information Summary RWST Refueling Water Storage Tank SDP Significance Determination Process SI Safety Injection SP Surveillance Procedure TS Technical Specification USAR Updated Safety Analysis Report NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission WO Work Order LIST OF
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
1R04 Equipment Alignment
Cooling Water System
TS 3.3-7
Cooling Water System
Revision 131
USAR 10.4.1
Cooling Water System
Revision 22
Plant Procedure B35
Cooling Water System
Revision 5
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.35-3
Cooling Water System
Revision 21
Operating Procedure C35
Cooling Water System
Revision 48
Remove T Mod 00T076
April 3, 2002
21 CLP Bearing Seal Water Filter Changes March 27, 2002
Bearing Water Flow to Lineshaft and
Suction Bell Less than 50%
May 27, 2002
Unable to Make Bearing Water Flow
Adjustments on DDCLP Flows
June 10, 2002
DDCLP Declared Inoperable
August 15, 2002
High Risk Work Not Complete As
Scheduled
August 31, 2002
D1 Emergency Diesel
Generator
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-1
D1 Diesel Generator Valve Status
Revision 19
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-2
D1 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries and Room
Cooling Local Panels
Revision 8W
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-3
Diesel Generator D1 Main Control Room
Switch and Indicating Light Status
Revision 13
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-4
D1 Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers and
Panel Switches
Revision 11
Auxiliary Electrical Systems
Revision 110
USAR Section 8.4
Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems
Revision 23
Pressure Indicator 11079, 21 Heater Drain
Tank Pump Discharge Pressure Indicator
Was Isolated During WO 0205739
August 30, 2002
1R05 Fire Protection
Area Walkdowns
Plant Safety Procedure
F5, Appendix A
Fire Strategies for Fire Areas 13, 18, 35, 36,
69, 101, and 102
Revision 7
IPEEE NSPLMI-96001
Appendix B
Internal Fires Analysis
Revision 2
Plant Safety Procedure
F5, Appendix F
Fire Hazard Analysis for Fire Areas 13, 18,
35, 36, 69, 101, and 102
Revision 16
Transient Combustibles Stored In Safety-
Related Area, Repeat Occurrence
July 11, 2002
Pressure Switch Communication Failure
With Fire Panel
September 23,
2002
Fire Brigade Drill
Plant Safety Procedure
F5, Appendix J
Fire Drills
Revision 8
Plant Safety Procedure
F5, Appendix A
Fire Detection Zone 83
Revision 8
1R011 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
USAR 14.5.4
Steam Generator Tube Rupture
Revision 22
Procedure 1E-0
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
Revision 21
NRC Inspection Report
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
NRC Inspection Report 50-282/01-18;
50-306/01-18
January 17, 2002
November 2001 INPO [Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations] Evaluation
December 18,
2001
Simulator Team
Evaluation PITCQ-83
Simulator Team Evaluation
September 4,
2002
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation
Repeat Failure of External
Circulating Water Intake
Bypass Gates
Root Cause Investigation
Report 000171
Decreasing Intake Canal Level Due to
Failure of the Intake Traveling Screens
Revision 0
Plant Procedure H24
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Revision 4
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Maintenance Rule System Specific Basis
Document, External Circulating Water
Section
Revision 3
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Maintenance Rule Scope Determination and
Performance Criteria Spreadsheet
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Quarterly Equipment Performance Report,
2nd Quarter 2002
Decreasing Intake Bay Levels Due to Loss
of Intake Screens
June 19, 2002
Maintenance Rule Evaluation of Intake
Screens and Bypass Gates
June 20, 2002
21 Bypass Gate Failed to Open with Loss
of Control Power
June 24, 2002
2 Bypass Gate Failed to Open with Loss
of Control Power
June 24, 2002
Need Acceptance Criteria for Operability of
Intake Bypass and Screens
September 3,
2001
Maintenance Rule Performance Criteria for
Screenhouse Bypass Gates Not In
Accordance With the Guidance of
August 20, 2002
Apparent Cause Evaluation of CAP 024744
August 22, 2002
Unsatisfactorily Completed Test
Procedure 2537
August 30, 2002
Failure of Test Procedure 2537
September 11,
2002
Failure of CV 39201,
11/13 Containment Fan
Cooling Unit Cooling
Water Return Bypass
Control Valve
5AWI 3.2.10
Investigation and Troubleshooting
Revision 7
5AWI 3.12.0
Nuclear Plant Maintenance
Revision 10
USAR, Section 10.4.1
Cooling Water System
Revision 22
Flow Diagram
NF-39216-3
Unit 1 Cooling Water - Auxiliary Building
Revision R
CV 39201, 11/13 Containment Fan Cooling
Unit Cooling Water Return Bypass Control
Valve Found Open
June 12, 2002
Maintenance Rule Evaluation of CV-39201
Failure
June 13, 2002
Condition Evaluation of CAP 023812
June 13, 2002
Investigate and Repair CV 39201
June 13, 2002
Investigate and Repair CV 39201
July 9, 2001
Investigate and Repair CV 39201
May 14, 2002
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Maintenance Rule System Specific Basis
Document, Cooling Water Section
Revision 3
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
Pump and Heat
Exchanger Out-of-service
Safety Injection and Residual Heat Removal
Systems
Revision 161
Inservice Inspection and Testing of Pumps
and Valves Requirements
Revision 60
WO and Work Plan
202701
SI Pump Has a Leak on the Pump Head
September 9,
2002
10CFR50.59 Screening
No. 1567
NMC Standard 10 CFR 50.59 Screening
Revision 0
ENG-ME-525
Calculation
Revision 0
Unit 2 Configuration Risk Assessment
September 17,
2002
Turbine-Driven AFW
Pump Surveillance with
25 Air Compressor Out-
of-service
Unit 2 Configuration Risk Assessment
September 17,
2002
Turbine-Driven AFW
Pump Testing with 122
Control Room Chiller Out-
of-service
Plant Procedure H24.1
Assessment and Management of Risk
Associated with Maintenance Activities
Revision 4
Risk Assessment for Work Week 2B33
August 20, 2002
Motor-Driven AFW
Pump Check Valve
Testing with Train A ICCM
Out-of-service
Unit 2 Configuration Risk Assessment
July 10, 2002
DDCLP Emergent
Work
Operation Log Entries
August 14, 2002
Plant Status Report
August 15, 2002
Open Limiting Conditions for Operation
(LCO) Log
August 15, 2002
Motor-Driven AFW
Pump Failed Surveillance
Operation Log Entries
August 30, 2002
Plant Status Report
August 30, 2002
Open LCO Log
August 30, 2002
Motor-Driven AFW Pump Failed SP 1000
Due to Sluggish Motor Slinger Ring
Operation
August 30, 2002
Motor-Driven AFW Pump Made
Unavailable When in an Indeterminate
Condition
August 30, 2002
D2 Diesel Generator, 18
Inverter, 11 Charging
Pump, and 12 Motor-
Driven AFW Pump Out-
of-Service
Operations Log Entries
August 26, 2002
Open LCO Log
August 25, 2002
Unit 1 Configuration Risk Assessment
August 25, 2002
1R14 Non-Routine Evolutions
Root Cause Investigation
Report 000171
Decreasing Intake Canal Level Due to
Failure of the Intake Traveling Screens
Revision 0
Decreasing Intake Bay Levels Due to Loss
of Intake Screens
June 19, 2002
21 Bypass Gate Failed to Open with Loss
of Control Power
June 24, 2002
2 Bypass Gate Failed to Open with Loss
of Control Power
June 24, 2002
Operations Control Room Logs
June 19, 2002
Plant Procedure C41.5
Emergency Response Computer System
Operating Procedure Alarms, Displays, and
Responses, Computer Alarm 26
Revision 16
Plant Procedure C25
Revision 23
C91802
Annunciator Response Procedure for
External Circulating Water Remote
Panel 91802, High Traveling Screen
Revision 1
C47501
Annunciator Response Procedure for
Control Room Panel 47501, Alarm 47501-
0101, Intake Screenhouse Traveling Screen
High Differential Pressure
Revision 22
1R15 Operability Evaluations
Unit 2 Reactor Missile
Shield Weight
USAR 12.2, Table 12.2-
Loads Handled Over Safety Related
Components, Components Required for
Plant Shutdown or Decay Heat Removal
Revision 23
Plant Procedure D58
Heavy Loads Program
Revision 30
U2 Reactor Missile Shield Weight Measured
74,500 Pounds Versus SAR Listed Weight
of 56, 200 Pounds
May 19, 2002
Determine Extent of Condition Regarding
the Weight of the U2 Reactor Missile Shield
May 30, 2002
Auxiliary Building Special
Ventilation Boundary
TS 1.0 and 3.6.E
Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation Zone
Integrity
Revision 111 and
USAR 10.3.4
Auxiliary Building Special Ventilation System Revision 23
Plant Procedure B19
Containment Systems
Revision 6
Plant Procedure D54
Control of Openings in the Auxiliary Building
Special Ventilation Zone Boundary
Revision 13
ABSVZ Boundary at Hot Chem Lab
July 16, 2002
AR OPR 000324
Operability Recommendation for Auxiliary
Building Special Vent Zone Boundary Issue
July 17, 2002
and 22 DDCLP
Oscillations
USAR, Section 10.4.1
Cooling Water System
Revision 22
TS 3.3-7
Cooling Water System
Revision 131
Operating Procedure C35
Cooling Water System
Revision 48
Plant Procedure B35
Cooling Water System
Revision 5
DBD SYS-35
Design Basis Document for the Cooling
Water System
Revision 4
Sluggish Governor Response on 22 Diesel
Driven Cooling Water Pump
June 28, 2002
Condition Evaluation of AR CAP 024010
July 1, 2002
Apparent Cause Evaluation
June 13, 2002
Operation of the 21 AFW
Pump with Insufficient
Packing Leakoff
USAR Section 11.9.2.2
Auxiliary Feedwater System
Revision 23
XH-258-24
Auxiliary Feedwater Technical Manual
Condition Report Notebook Issue #
20000592
No Seal Leakage During Run of SP 2100,
Auxiliary Feedwater Pump
August 8, 2002
Containment Fan
Cooling Unit High
Vibrations
Containment Fan Cooling Unit Vibration in
Alert Range at 5 Mils in Fast Speed
July 23, 2002
Condition Evaluation of AR CAP 024294
July 25, 2002
AR OPR 000327
Operability Recommendation of
July 25, 2002
Containment Fan Cooling Unit Inspection
Summary
August 7, 2002
USAR, Section 6.3.2
Containment Air Cooling System Design
and Operation
Revision 22
Grid Security Analysis for
the Prairie Island Two
Unit Trip Contingency
Failed
Low Grid Voltage, Security Analysis Failure
to Satisfy Two Unit Trip Contingency
August 19, 2002
AR OPR 000330
Operability Recommendation of
August 20, 2002
Guidance for Response to Security Analysis
Alarm Needs Improvement
June 25, 2002
Auxiliary Electrical Systems
Revision 110
USAR, Section 8.2
Transmission System
Revision 23
Inadequate Thread
Engagement on 22 SI
Pump Suction Flange
Bolts
Safety Injection Pump Suction Flange
Bolts Do Not Meet D63 Requirements
September 24,
2002
Plant Procedure D63
Installation Guidelines for Threaded
Fasteners (Studs or Bolts)
Revision 9W
Calculation ENG-CS-080
Acceptable Thread Engagement
1R16 OWAs
Station Battery
Charger
Operator Workarounds
August 7, 2002
CR 19971622
Intermittent Operation During SP 1083
December 5, 1997
CR 19991958
Intermittent Operation During SP 1083
June 6, 1999
Safety Evaluation 534
Station Battery Charger Current Limit
Setpoint Change
Revision 0,
April 12, 1999
Safety Evaluation 534
Station Battery Charger Current Limit
Setpoint Change
Revision 1,
August 10, 1999
SP 1083
Integrated SI Test With a Simulated Loss of
Offsite Power
Revision 26W
Cumulative Effects of
5AWI 3.10.8
Equipment Problem Resolution Process
Revision 0
Prairie Island Nuclear
Generating Plant (PINGP)
Operation Committee
Meeting Minutes
Minutes #2714
August 7, 2002
1R19 Post Maintenance Testing
Diesel-Driven Cooling
Water Pump
Cooling Water Systems
Revision 131
USAR 10.4.1
Cooling Water System
Revision 22
Plant Procedure B35
Cooling Water System
Revision 5
SP 1106B
Diesel Cooling Water Pump Monthly Test Revision 58
SP 1106B 22 Diesel Cooling Water Pump
Monthly
July 29, 2002
Isolation Valve MV-32182
TS 3.3.A.2.d
Safety Injection and Residual Heat Removal
Systems
Revision 161
USAR 6.2
Safety Injection System
Revision 22
Plant Procedure B18A
Safety Injection System
Revision 4
Refueling Water to Safety Injection Pumps
Header Isolation Motor Valve A
July 29, 2002
RHR Pump
Safety Injection and Residual Head
Removal Systems
Revision 161
USAR 6.2.2.2.4
Safety Injection and Residual Heat Removal
Pumps
Revision 22
Plant Procedure H10.1
ASME Inservice Testing Implementing
Program
Revision 12
Plant Procedure B15
Residual Heat Removal System
Revision 7
P3124-1-21 21 RHR Pump Annual
Inspection
July 16, 2002
SP 2089AL Light Verification During
SP 2089A
August 7, 2002
SP 2089A RHR Pump and Suction Valves
from the RWST
August 7, 2002
2 Control Room Chiller
and Air Handler
Replace Mechanical Seals and Inspect
Chilled Water Pump
2 Control Room Chiller Electrical Breaker
15-Year PM
2 Control Room Chiller Annual Inspection
6-Month Inspection of Control Room Air
Handling Unit
2-Month Inspection of Control Room Air
Handling Unit
Leak Check 122 Control Room Chiller
Control Room Train B Chilled Water Pump
Test
Alternating In-Service Control Room Chillers
Change Wire Codes at Pump Push Button
Station
Drawing NF-39603-1
Admin Bldg, Screen House, and Control
Room Flow Diagram
Revision AL
Drawing NF-40890-3
External Connections Motor Control Center
1T
Revision N
Control Room Air Treatment System
Revision 91
Control Room Air Treatment System Tests
Revision 91
USAR 10.3.3
Control Room Ventilation System
Revision 23
D2 Diesel Generator 6-
Month Inspection
PM 3001-2-D2
D2 Diesel Generator 18-Month Inspection
Revision 17
PM 3001-4-D2
D2 Diesel Generator Inspection Electrical
Revision 5
SP 1306
D2 Diesel Generator 18-Month Relay
Functional Test
Revision 6
SP 1307
D2 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start
Test
Revision 22
Auxiliary Electrical Systems
Revision 110
Periodic Testing of the Emergency Power
System
Revision 91
1R22 Surveillance Testing
Turbine-Driven AFW
Pump Monthly Test
Auxiliary Feedwater System
Revision 123
Auxiliary Feedwater System
Revision 116
USAR 1.9
Condensate, Feedwater and Auxiliary
Feedwater Systems
Revision 23
Plant Procedure B28B
Auxiliary Feedwater System
Revision 5
SP 2102
Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test
Revision 69
D1 Diesel Generator
Monthly Slow-Start Test
Auxiliary Electrical Systems
Revision 110
Periodic Testing of Emergency Power
System
Revision 147
Plant Procedure B38A
Unit 1 Diesel Generators
Revision 5
SP 1093
D1 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start
Test
Revision 73
Diesel Cooling Water
Pump Monthly Test
Cooling Water System
Revision 131
Inservice Inspection and Testing of Pumps
and Valves Requirements
Revision 60
TS 4.5.B.1.b
Component Test, Pumps
Revision 161
USAR 10.4.1
Cooling Water System
Revision 22
Plant Procedure B35
Cooling Water System
Revision 5
SP 1106A
Diesel Cooling Water Pump Monthly Test Revision 61
Diesel Driven Cooling Water Pump
September 12,
2002
DDCLP Fell in the Performance Curve
Alert Range During 9/12/02 Run
September 12,
2002
D6 Diesel Generator 6-
Month Fast-Start Test
TS 4.6.A.2
Periodic Testing of Emergency Power
System
Revision 113
Operating Procedure
2C38
D5/D6 Fuel Oil System
Revision 16
SP 2307
D6 Diesel Generator 6 Month Fast Start
Test
Revision 17
Positive Glycol Test D5 Engine 2
September 18,
2002
WO to Fill D6 Coolant Expansion Tanks
Issued While Monthly Diesel Run In
Progress
September 20,
2002
Discrepancy Between SP 2305 and
SP 2307 for 2LI-6011A for Acceptance
Criteria
September 16,
2002
D5 Diesel-Driven
Generator 6-Month Fast-
Start Test
Auxiliary Electrical Systems
Revision 110
TS 4.6.A.2
Periodic Testing of Emergency Power
System
Revision 113
Plant Procedure B38C
Unit 2 Diesel Generators
Revision 2
SP 2295
D5 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast Start
Test
Revision 23
SP 2295 D5 Diesel Generator 6-Month Fast
Start Test
September 30,
2002
D5 Generator Stator Temperature
Channel 3 Failed
September 30,
2002
SP 2295 D5 Fast Start Scheduled When D5
1B Was Scheduled OOS [Out-of-service]
September 30,
2002
D5 2A Air Dryer Dust Filter Drain Plugged
October 1, 2002
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
Safety System Functional Failure
LER 1-01-02
Auto Activation of Unit 1 4160 Volt
Safeguards Bus 16 Source Sequencer
Following Grid Disturbance Caused by
Severe Weather
Revision 0
LER 1-01-03
Plant In Unanalyzed Condition Due To
Flood Panel Deficiencies
Revision 0
LER 1-01-03
Plant In Unanalyzed Condition Due to Flood
Panel Deficiencies
Revision 1
LER 1-01-04
Water Intrusion Into a Control Rod Electrical
Cabinet Results in Dropped Rods Causing a
Negative Flux Reactor Trip
Revision 0
LER 1-01-05
Fault and Fire in Non-Safeguards Circuit
Breaker Results in Reactor Trip and
Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation
Revision 0
LER 1-01-06
Security Responders Out of Position Due to
Plant Fire
Revision 0
LER 2-01-01
Failure to Meet TS Limiting Condition for
Operation Verification Within Eight Hour
Limit Due to Personnel Error
Revision 0
LER 2-01-02
Emergency Diesel Generator Out-of-service
Longer Than TS Allowed Outage Time
Revision 0
LER 2-01-03
Technical Specification Required Shutdown
of Unit 2 Due to Declared Inoperability of
Both Emergency Diesel Generators
Revision 0
LER 2-01-03
Technical Specification Required Shutdown
of Unit 2 Due to Declared Inoperability of
Both Emergency Diesel Generators
Revision 1
LER 2-01-03
Technical Specification Required Shutdown
of Unit 2 Due to Declared Inoperability of
Both Emergency Diesel Generators
Revision 2
LER 2-01-04
Manual Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Due to
High Differential Condenser Backpressure
Revision 0
LER 2-01-05
Manual Reactor Trip on Unit 2, Initiated in
Response to a High Differential Pressure
Between the Turbine Steam Condensers,
Caused By an Inadvertent Venting of One
Condenser While Isolating a Steam Leak
Revision 0
Operator Logs from April 1, 2001, to
March 31, 2002
Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline
Revision 2
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Quarterly Equipment Performance Report
2nd Quarter 2001
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Quarterly Equipment Performance Report
3rd Quarter 2001
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Quarterly Equipment Performance Report
4th Quarter 2001
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant
Quarterly Equipment Performance Report
1st Quarter 2002
Plant Procedure H33
Performance Indicator Reporting
Revision 5
Plant Procedure H33.3
Safety System Functional Failure
Performance Indicator Reporting
Instructions
Revision 0
PINGP Form 1318C
Performance Indicator-Safety System
Functional Failure
2nd Quarter 2001
PINGP Form 1318C
Performance Indicator-Safety System
Functional Failure
3rd Quarter 2001
PINGP Form 1318C
Performance Indicator-Safety System
Functional Failure
4th Quarter 2001
PINGP Form 1318C
Performance Indicator-Safety System
Functional Failure
1st Quarter 2002
Specific Activity
TS 3.1-10
Maximum Coolant Activity
Revision 147
SP 1057
Unit 1 Reactor Coolant Monthly
Radiochemical Analysis
Revision 17
Unit 1 Radiochemistry Report
July 1, 2001 to
May 31, 2002
Unit 2 Radiochemistry Report
July 1, 2001 to
May 31, 2002
Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline
Revision 2
Unplanned Power
Changes
Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline
Revision 2
Plant Procedure H33.2,
Figure 1
Data Sheets 3rd Quarter 2001 to 2nd Quarter
2002
Revision 3
PINGP Form 1318A
Data Sheets 3rd Quarter 2001 to 2nd Quarter
2002
Revision 0
4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
LER 1-98-15
Containment to RHR MOVs [Motor
Operated Valves] Appendix R Safe
Shutdown Analysis Issues
10/26/98
CR 19982008
FPFI [Fire Protection Functional Inspection]
Question FP-I072: Sump B to RHR MOVs
Not on SSEL [Safe Shutdown Equipment
List]. Can NPSH [Net Positive Suction
Head] be obtained if these MOVs spuriously
open due to a fire?
9/25/98
GEN-PI-034
Appendix R Equipment List Review - Decay
Heat Removal Function
3/30/99
GEN-PI-035
Appendix R Equipment List Review - RCS
[Reactor Coolant System] Inventory Control
Function
5/25/99
GEN-PI-036
Appendix R Equipment List Review - Safe
Shutdown Support Function
5/25/99
GEN-PI-037
Appendix R Equipment List Review -
Process Monitoring Function
5/25/99
GEN-PI-038
Appendix R Equipment List Review -
Electrical Power Supply Function
7/9/99
GEN-PI-039
Appendix R Equipment List Review -
Containment Integrity Function
7/9/99
Appendix R Equipment List Evaluations
Should Be Canceled
8/7/02
Appendix R Commitment Closed
Prematurely
8/7/02
G
4OA3 Event Followup
Appendix R Equipment List Evaluations
Should Be Canceled
8/7/02
LER 1-02-01
Condition Prohibited by TS Due to Potential
for Auxiliary Building Special Vent Zone
Boundary Degradation
September 16,
2002
ABSVZ Boundary at Hot Chem Lab
July 16, 2002
AR OPR 000324
Operability Recommendation for Aux
Building Special Vent Zone Boundary Issue
July 16, 2002
Plant Procedure D54,
Temporary Change
Notice 2002-1367
Control of Openings in the Aux Building
Special Ventilation Zone Boundary
July 25, 2002
Log Entry
Category 1 Special Vent Zone Report
September 8,
2002