ML022400332

Outline for Phone Calls with Licensees for: Davis-Besse, H.B. Robinson, North Anna Unit 2 and Surry Unit 2

ML022400332
Person / Time
Site:	Davis Besse, Surry, North Anna, Robinson
Issue date:	08/27/2002
From:	Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
References
BL-01-001, FOIA/PA-2002-0229
Download: ML022400332 (2)

Text

, . r OUTLINE FOR PHONE CALLS WITH LICENSEES FOR:

DAVIS-BESSE, H.B. ROBINSON, NORTH ANNA UNIT 2 & SURRY UNIT 2 Purpose of Call: To provide licensees with initial feedback on staff review of their response to Bulletin 2001-01, and indicate the need for licensees to re-think and possibly revise their responses Staff Review of the Bulletin Responses

• Focused on plants with cracking or leakage history and high susceptibility rankings

• Assessment of whether the response demonstrates reasonable assurance of the structural integrity of their vessel head penetration nozzles Key Staff Acceptance Screening Criteria - Acceptability of response based on 0 Past inspection method and timing 0 Future inspection plans, including inspection method and timing Evaluation of the Response for Their Plant 0 Past inspection does not provide reasonable assurance of nozzle integrity -- not a qualified visual inspection of 100% of nozzles

• Timing of next inspection is not adequate -- there isn't reasonable assurance of nozzle integrity prior to the next inspection

• Questions regarding ability to qualify visual examination for the plant Licensee Should Reconsider

• Acceleration of inspection plans in accordance with the Bulletin (e.g., by the end of 2001)

• A more meaningful examination if the plant-specific qualification of their visual examination method is not possible

Items to be documented by FENOC in their commitment letter regarding Davis-Besse continuing to operate until February 16, 2002.

1. Commitment to shutdown by February 16, 2002 to perform VHP Nozzle Inspections

2. Commitment to implement compensatory measures & schedule for implementation

- Operating at a lower RCS hot leg temperature to reduce the head temperature 0

effects on crack initiation and growth (598°F vs. 605 F)

- Maximizing the availability of the plant's redundant critical safety systems until shutdown

- Providing increased human factors reliability through additional training and personnel (e.g., dedicated operator - ECCS switchover from injection to recirc.)

3. Commitment to perform inspection of 100% of VHP Nozzles (e.g. qualified visual examination or other NDE technique(s)).

4. Commitment to a future meeting, prior to shutting down on February 16, 2002, to discuss their inspection plans (e.g., scope, method, etc...)

5. Commitment to characterize any identified flaws through destructive examination.