IR 05000333/2002002
| ML021510281 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | FitzPatrick  |
| Issue date: | 05/31/2002 |
| From: | Linville J NRC/RGN-I/DRS/EB |
| To: | Ted Sullivan Entergy Nuclear Northeast |
| References | |
| FOIA/PA-2003-0358, FOIA/PA-2004-0107 IR-02-002 | |
| Download: ML021510281 (27) | |
Text
May 31, 2002
SUBJECT:
JAMES A. FITZPATRICK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT - NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-333/02-002
Dear Mr. Sullivan:
On April 26, 2002,, NRC completed a triennial fire protection team inspection at your James A.
Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed at an exit meeting on April 26, 2002, with yourself and other members of the Entergy Nuclear staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions regulations and with the conditions of your license. The purpose of the inspection was to evaluate your post-fire safe shutdown capability and fire protection program. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
No findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRCs document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/ADAMS.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
James C. Linville, Chief Electrical Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket No. 50-333 License No. DPR-59
Enclosure:
NRC Inspection Report 50-333/02-002
Mr. Theodore Sullivan
REGION I==
Docket No:
50-333 License No:
DPR - 59 Report No:
50-333/02-002 Licensee:
Entergy Nuclear Facility:
James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Location:
Lake Road Scriba, NY Dates:
April 8 - 12, and April 22 - 26, 2002 Inspectors:
R. Fuhrmeister, Sr. Reactor Inspector, Division of Reactor Safety G. Morris, Reactor Inspector, DRS K. Young, Reactor Inspector, DRS Approved By:
James C. Linville, Chief Electrical Branch Division of Reactor Safety
ii SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000333/02-002, on 4/8 - 4/12 and 4/22 - 4/26/2002, Entergy Nuclear, James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant. Fire Protection.
The inspection was conducted by a team composed of regional specialists. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by no color or by the severity level of the applicable violation.
A.
Inspector Identified Findings Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems
No findings of significance were identified.
Report Details Background This report presents the results of a triennial fire protection team inspection conducted in accordance with NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 71111.05, Fire Protection. The objective of the inspection was to assess whether Entergy Nuclear has implemented an adequate fire protection program and that post-fire safe shut down capabilities have been established and are being properly maintained. The following fire areas were selected for detailed review based on risk insights from the James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant Individual Plant Evaluation and Individual Plant Evaluation for External Events:
RB-1B, Reactor Building West Side, 272' and 300'
CT-1, West Cable Tunnel
CS-1, Cable Spreading Room
BR-4, Battery Charger Room B
TB-1, Turbine Building This inspection was a reduced scope inspection in accordance with the March 23, 2001, revision to IP 71111.05, Fire Protection. Issues regarding equipment malfunction due to fire-induced failures of associated circuits were not inspected. Criteria for review of fire-induced circuit failures are currently the subject of a voluntary industry initiative. The definition of associated circuits of concern used was that contained in the March 22, 1982, memorandum from Mattson to Eisenhut, which clarified the requests for information made in Generic Letter 81-12.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems 1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
.1 Programmatic Controls a.
Inspection Scope During tours of the facility, the team observed the material condition of fire protection systems and equipment, the storage of permanent and transient combustible materials, and control of ignition sources. The team also reviewed the procedures that controlled hot-work activities and combustibles at the site, as well as several hot-work permits and combustible control permits. These reviews were accomplished to ensure that the licensee was maintaining the fire protection systems, controlling hot-work activities, and controlling combustible materials in accordance with AP-14.02, Combustibles and Flammable Material Control, and other fire protection program procedures.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 Passive Fire Barriers a.
Inspection Scope The team walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries, fire doors, and fire dampers. The team reviewed engineering evaluations, as well as surveillance and functional test procedures for selected items. The team also reviewed the licensee submittals and NRC safety evaluation reports (SERs) associated with fire protection features at JAFNPP. These reviews were performed to ensure that the passive fire barriers met the licensing and design bases as described in the licensee submittals, NRC SERs, and the JAFNPP Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) report.
The team randomly selected four fire barrier penetration seals for detailed inspection to verify proper installation and qualification. The team reviewed associated design drawings, selected barrier and penetration seal engineering evaluations, and a fire barrier and penetration seal inspection procedure. The team compared the observed in-situ seal configurations with the design drawings and tested or evaluated configurations.
The team also compared the penetration seal ratings with the ratings of the barriers in which they were installed. This was accomplished to ensure that the licensee had installed and maintained fire barrier penetration seals in accordance with the design and licensing bases as described in the licensee submittals and NRC SERs.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.3 Fire Detection Systems a.
Inspection Scope The team reviewed the adequacy of the fire detection systems in the selected plant fire areas. This included a walk-down of the systems and review of the type of installed detectors as shown per location drawings. The team also reviewed licensee submittals and NRC SERs associated with the selected fire areas. Additionally, the team reviewed the licensees fire protection design basis document (DBD) and the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) conformance report. These reviews were performed to ensure that the fire detection systems for the selected fire areas were installed and maintained in accordance with the design and licensing bases as described in the licensee submittals and NRC SERs. The team also reviewed fire detection surveillance procedures and the technical requirements of procedure AP-01.04, Technical Specification Related Requirements, Lists, and Tables, Rev. 7, to determine the adequacy of fire detection component testing and to ensure that the detection systems could function when needed.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.4 Fixed Fire Suppression Systems and Equipment a.
Inspection Scope The team reviewed the adequacy of the automatic carbon dioxide (CO2) suppression system in the cable spreading room, the automatic water spray curtains in the reactor building, the automatic wet pipe sprinklers in the west cable tunnel, and the automatic wet pipe and pre-action sprinkler systems in the turbine building by performing walk-downs of the systems. The team verified suppression system functionality and the adequacy of surveillance procedure testing by reviewing completed surveillance procedures, the technical requirements procedure, the NFPA conformance report, the DBD, and hydraulic calculations for the sprinkler systems. The team reviewed initial discharge testing, design specifications, calculations, the DBD and engineering evaluations for the cable spreading room CO2 suppression system. The team also reviewed and walked down pre-fire plans for the target areas. These reviews were performed to ensure that the fixed suppression systems in the selected risk significant fire areas met the design and licensing bases as described in the licensee submittals and NRC SERs, and that the systems could perform their intended functions in the event of a fire in the respective areas.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.5 Manual Fire Suppression Capability a.
Inspection Scope The team walked down selected standpipe systems and observed portable extinguishers to determine the material condition of manual fire fighting equipment and verify locations as specified in the pre-fire plans and fire protection program documents.
Electric fire pump and diesel fire pump flow and pressure tests were also reviewed by the team to ensure that the pumps were meeting their design requirements. The team inspected the fire brigades protective ensembles, self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), and various fire brigade equipment to determine operational readiness for fire fighting.
The team reviewed the fire brigade leader/member training and qualifications to assure that fire fighting personnel were properly trained and qualified. The team verified that selected fire brigade leaders and members had recently participated in a minimum of two fire drills and had current SCBA certification. The team also reviewed the fire brigade leader and fire brigade training documents. Additionally, the team toured the fire fighting training facility located in Oswego, NY, to witness fire brigade training and to determine fire brigade training capability and quality. The team discussed enhancements planned for the facility with the instructors.
The team reviewed pre-fire plans for the selected areas to determine if appropriate information was provided to fire brigade members and plant operators to identify safe shutdown equipment and instrumentation, and to facilitate suppression of a fire that could impact safe shutdown.
The team reviewed the JAFNPP fire suppression effects analysis to determine if a pipe rupture, inadvertent actuation of a suppression system, or manual fire suppression activities in the selected fire areas could inhibit the plants ability reach a safe shutdown condition. Additionally, the team performed in-plant walk-downs to evaluate the physical configuration of electrical raceways and safe shutdown components in the cable spreading room (CSR), west cable tunnel, areas of the reactor building, areas of the turbine building and the battery charger room B to determine whether water from manual fire suppression activities in these areas could cause damage that could inhibit the plants ability to safely shutdown. The team also reviewed the licensees actions to address the potential for CO2 migration to ensure that fire suppression and post-fire safe shutdown actions would not be impacted.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.6 Safe Shutdown Capability a.
Inspection Scope The team reviewed the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR), the Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA), design basis documents (DBD), and the Safe Shutdown Analysis, to evaluate the methods and equipment used to achieve hot shutdown following postulated fires in the selected fire areas. The team further reviewed piping and instrumentation drawings (P&IDs) for post-fire safe shutdown systems to determine required components for establishing flow paths, to identify equipment required to isolate flow diversion paths, and to verify appropriate components were identified as required safe shutdown equipment.
The team evaluated the separation of selected power, control and instrumentation cables necessary to achieve safe shutdown. The team walked-down a sample of cable raceways and compared the as-built raceways to the related drawings and cable routing printouts to confirm the accuracy of the safe shutdown analysis.
The team evaluated, on a sample basis, electrical protective device coordination studies to ensure adequate protection for the power source for the redundant or alternate safe shutdown equipment.
The team reviewed system flow diagrams, electrical schematics and one line diagrams to evaluate the adequacy of the alternate shutdown transfer and isolation capability for safe shutdown control functions.
The team also performed field walk-downs to validate the equipment locations considered in the analysis and to evaluate the protection of the equipment from the effects of fires.
The team sampled sections of abnormal operating procedures (AOPs), associated with shutdown following a fire, to confirm the availability of selected components required for different fire scenarios.
The team verified that the applicable requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, sections III.G and III.L for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown were properly addressed.
The team verified that systems necessary to assure the safe shutdown functions of reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, reactor heat removal, and process monitoring were protected or independent from the selected areas. Where deviations from Appendix R requirements were identified, the team verified that the deviations had been approved and that conditions required by the deviations were implemented and being maintained.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.7 Safe Shutdown Analyses a.
Inspection Scope The team reviewed system flow diagrams, electrical one line diagrams, control panel diagrams, control circuit schematic diagrams, cable tray designations, fire zone/area arrangements drawings, panel and rack diagrams, design and operating procedures, circuit breaker coordination curves, calculations, modifications, vendor information and the electrical cable and raceway information system (ECRIS) to verify the conclusions of selected sections of the safe shutdown analysis and to ensure that procedures, equipment, fire barriers, and systems exist so that the post-fire capability exists to safely shut down the plant.
Due to the issuance of Change Notice 00-020 against Inspection Procedure 71111.05, Fire Protection, the team did not review associated circuit issues during this inspection.
This change notice has suspended this review pending completion of an industry initiative in this area.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.8 Operational Implementation of Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Capability a.
Inspection Scope
The team reviewed post-fire shutdown procedures for the selected areas to determine if appropriate information is provided to plant staff to perform required actions to achieve and maintain safe shutdown. This review included a comparison of the procedures with the safe shutdown analysis to ensure that the actions assumed in the safe shutdown analysis were included in the procedures. The team also reviewed training lesson plans and job performance measures (JPMs) for post-fire shutdown activities.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.9 Post-Fire Safe Shutdown Emergency Lighting and Communications a.
Inspection Scope The team observed the placement and aim of emergency battery light units throughout the plant to evaluate their adequacy for illuminating access and egress pathways and any equipment requiring local operation for post-fire safe shutdown. The team also evaluated installed and portable communication systems to determine if communications could be maintained in the event of a fire in the selected areas and during a shutdown from outside of the control room.
The team reviewed preventive maintenance procedures, surveillance procedures and vendor information to determine if adequate surveillance testing was being accomplished to ensure operation of the emergency lights.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.10 Electrical Raceway Fire Barrier Systems a.
Inspection Scope The design and qualification testing for raceway fire barriers were also reviewed and a walk-down of installed barriers was performed for the selected fire areas. These reviews were performed to ensure that the electrical raceway fire barrier systems met the licensing and design bases as described in the licensee submittals, NRC SERs, and the JAFNPP Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA) report.
b.
Findings At JAFNPP, Hemyc fire wrap is used to protect conduit associated with power cables in the west cable tunnel. The Hemyc fire wrap is provided to meet the separation requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section G, Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability. A fire barrier with a one hour fire rating is required to ensure the availability of an air handling unit which supports B train DC power for postulated fires in the west cable tunnel area. Since the Hemyc fire barriers were installed after the effective date of Appendix R, they are required to meet the technical requirements of Appendix R or have appropriate documentation to justify a deviation.
The NRC previously identified issues at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant (IR 50-400/99-13) regarding the acceptability of the Hemyc fire barrier qualification tests. The NRC Region II staff requested the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR)
assistance in a Task Interface Agreement (TIA), in evaluating the resolution of these issues.
At JAFNPP, the licensee evaluated the adequacy of the Hemyc fire barrier in evaluation JAF-ANAL-FPS-00816, Fire Barrier Analysis Promatec [B & B Insulation, Inc.]
Insulco/Hemyc Protective Wrap System, Rev. 0. This analysis, which concluded the installations at JAFNPP provided a one hour fire resistance capability, was based, in part, on the results of the qualification tests discussed in the TIA. These qualification tests are CTP-1026, Hemyc Cable Wrap System (Redundant Cable Protection - One Hour), dated December 8, 1982, and CTP-1077, One (1) Hour Fire Qualification Test 2 Inch Hemyc System Direct Wrap on Conduit, dated March 10, 1986.
The team noted that the Hemyc fire wrap at JAFNPP was in good repair and was included in the licensees surveillance program for periodic inspections.
The adequacy of the Hemyc barrier at JAFNPP is unresolved pending further NRC review to determine whether the qualification tests of the Hemyc fire wrap systems are acceptable (URI 05000333/2002-002-01).
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems
.1 Corrective Actions for Fire Protection Deficiencies a.
Inspection Scope The team reviewed self-assessment reports and quality assurance audit reports for fire protection activities conducted during the past two years. Selected deviation/event reports (DERs) for fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown equipment were also reviewed. This review included the DERs initiated to address issues identified during this inspection. The team also reviewed selected outstanding and completed fire protection equipment work requests. These reviews were conducted to determine if
Entergy Nuclear Northeast at JAFNPP was identifying fire protection deficiencies and implementing appropriate corrective actions.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meetings, Including Exit
.1 Exit Meeting Summary The inspectors presented their preliminary inspection results to Mr. and other members of the Entergy Nuclear staff at an exit meeting on April 26, 2002.
The inspectors asked whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. Materials identified as proprietary were returned to Entergy at the completion of the inspection.
PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED Entergy Nuclear T. Sullivan, Vice President of Operations B. OGrady, General Manager A. Halliday, Regulatory Compliance Manager P. Russel, Operations Manager R. Davis, System Engineering Manager A. Khanifar, Design Engineering Manager S. Downer, Human Relations Manager O. Limpias, Director of Site Engineering T. Savory, Electrical Design Supervisor G. Tiner, Training Coordinator V. Wall, Operations Shift Manager J. Pachacek, Fire Protection Engineer R. Angus, Fire Protection System Engineer D. Stokes, Fire and Safety Specialist J. Stead, Component Engineer T. Andersen, Senior Electrical Design Engineer B. Eng, Engineering Programs, White Plains F. McGuiness, Electrical Engineer, Pilgrim Nuclear Regulatory Commission R. Rasmussen, Senior Resident Inspector D. Dempsey, Resident Inspector J. Linville, Chief, Electrical Branch ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened 05000333/2002-002-01 URI Adequacy of Hemyc Cable Wrap Fire Barrier Test and Evaluation (Section 1R05.10)
Closed None
LIST OF ACRONYMS USED CFR Code of Federal Regulations CO2 Carbon Dioxide CSR Cable Spreading Room DBD Design Basis Document DER Deviation/Event Report FHA Fire Hazards Analysis IPE Individual Plant Evaluation IPEEE Individual Plant Evaluation for External Events IP Inspection Procedure IR
Inspection Report
James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant
National Fire Protection Association
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Piping and Instrumentation Drawing
Self Contained Breathing Apparatus
Safety Evaluation Report
Task Interface Agreement
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report
Unresolved Item
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Fire Protection Program Documents
Design Basis Documents (DBD) for Fire Protection (076 System), Rev. 3:
DBD - 076, Tab I,
Water Supply and Distribution System
DBD - 076, Tab II,
Fixed Suppression Systems
DBD - 076, Tab III,
Portable Fire Suppression Equipment
DBD - 076, Tab IV,
Fire Detection and Alarm System
DBD - 076, Tab V,
Fire Hazards Analysis
DBD - 076, Tab VI,
Fire Resistive Building Features
DBD - 076, Tab VII,
Smoke Removal Systems
DBD - 076, Tab VIII, Plant Drains System
DBD - 076, Tab IX,
Safe Shutdown Analysis
DBD - 076, Tab X,
Emergency Lighting System
DBD - 076, Tab XI,
Shutdown Communication Systems
Pre-Fire Plans:
PFP-PWR02, West Cable Tunnel/Elev. 258' Fire Area/Zone IC/CT-1, Rev. 2
PFP-PWR04, Battery Room Complex/Elev. 272', 282' Fire Area/Zone III/BR-1, IV/BR-3,
BR-4, XVI/BR-5, Rev. 2
PFP-PWR11, Cable Spreading Room/Elev. 272' Fire Area/Zone VII/CS-1, Rev. 2
PFP-PWR21, Reactor Building - West/Elev. 272' Fire Area/Zone X/RB-1B, Rev. 3
PFP-PWR25, Reactor Building - West/Elev. 300' Fire Area/Zone X/RB-1B, VIII/RB-1C,
Rev. 3
PFP-PWR41, Condenser Pit/Elev. 244' Fire Area/Zone 1E/TB-1, Rev. 1
PFP-PWR42, Turbine Building -North/Elev. 252' Fire Area/Zone 1E/TB-1, Rev. 2
PFP-PWR43, Turbine Building - South/Elev. 252' Fire Area/Zone 1E/TB-1, Rev. 3
PFP-PWR45, Turbine Building - North/Elev. 272' Fire Area/Zone 1E/TB-1, Rev. 2
PFP-PWR46, Turbine Building - South/Elev. 272' Fire Area/Zone 1E/TB-1, Rev. 2
PFP-PWR48, Turbine Building/Elev. 300' Fire Area/Zone 1E/TB-1, Rev. 3
Modification Packages
DCN JD-00-004, Permanent Hydrogen Storage Facility
Piping and Instrumentation Drawings
FB-30A, Administration Building Plumbing & Fire Protection, Rev. 21
FB-48A, Flow Diagram Fire Protection Water Piping System 76, Rev. 29
FB-48B, Site Utilities Fire Protection Water Supply Flow Diagram, Rev. 9
FB-49A, Flow Diagram Fire Protection Water System 76, Rev. 39
FB-49B, Flow Diagram Fire Protection Water Piping System 76, Rev. 9
FB-56A, Flow Diagram CO2 and Foam Fire Extinguishing System, Rev. 11
FM-22A, Rev. 52, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System 13
FM-23A, Rev. 44, Core Spray System 14
FM-25A, Rev. 65, High Pressure Coolant Injection System 23
FM-47A, Rev. 45, Nuclear Boiler Vessel Instruments
Control Circuit Schematics
ESK-5BF, Rev. 24
Pump 14P-1A
ESK-5BH, Rev. 12
Pump 10P-1B
ESK-5BR, Rev. 14
Pump 10P-1D
ESK-5BX, Rev. 24
Pump 10P-3D
ESK-6MH, Rev. 12
Valve 10 MOV-13D
ESK-6MP, Rev. 22
Valve 10 MOV-25B
ESK-6MZ, Rev. 15
Valve 10 MOV-89B
ESK-6MAJ, Rev. 9
Valve 14 MOV-12A
ESK-6MAN, Rev. 7
Valve 14 MOV-7A
ESK-11AK, Rev. 17
Valves 23 MOV-14 & 16
ESK-11AL, Rev. 14
Valve 23 MOV-19
ESK-11AS, Rev. 14
Valve 13 MOV-21
ESK-11AQ, Rev. 17
Valve 13 MOV-131
Design Drawings
One Line Diagrams
FE-1H, REV. 13, 4160 Volt One Line Diagram, Emergency Bus 10500
FE-1J, REV. 14, 4160 Volt One Line Diagram, Emergency Bus 10600
FE-1L, REV. 30, 600 Volt One Line Diagram, Swgrs. L15 & 16, MCCs 153 & 163
FE-1P, REV. 26, 600 Volt One Line Diagram, Swgr. L34, MCC 343
FE-1Q, REV. 27, 600 Volt One Line Diagram, Swgr. L44
FE-1S, REV. 38, 600 Volt One Line Diagram, MCCs 152, 161 & 162
FE-1Y, REV. 31, 600 Volt One Line Diagram, MCC 165
FE-!AJ, Rev. 20, 125 Volt DC One Line Diagram, MCCs B1, B2, B3 & B6
FE-1AL, Rev. 27, 125 Volt DC One Line Diagram, Distribution Centers A2 & B2
FE-1AN, Rev. 18, 125 Volt DC One Line Diagram, Distribution Center B3
FE-1AX, Rev. 20, 125 Volt DC One Line Diagram, Distribution Center A5
Cable Tray Designation Drawings:
FE-34AC, Rev. 6, Control Bay - X Trays
FE-34AD, Rev. 6, Control Bay - K Trays
FE-34AE, Rev. 5, Control Bay - L Trays
FE-34AF, Rev. 12, Control Bay - C Trays
FE-34V, Rev. 4, Reactor Building - H & L Trays
FE-34W, Rev. 4, Reactor Building - K & X Trays
FE-34X, Rev. 9, Reactor Building - C Trays
FE-34Y, Rev. 6, Turbine Building - K Trays
FE-34Z, Rev. 11, Turbine Building - C Trays
FE-34AA, Rev. 5, Turbine Building - X Trays
FE-34AB, Rev. 6, Turbine Building - H & L Trays
Fire Area/Zone Arrangement Drawings:
FPSSK-1, Rev 1, Plan Below EL. 272
FPSSK-2, Rev 1, Plan EL. 272
FPSSK-3, Rev 1, Plan EL. 300
FPSSK-4, Rev 1, Plan EL. 286
FPSSK-6, Rev 1, Sections
FPSSK-7, Rev 1, Sections
Rack Drawings:
7.70-163, Rev. F, Instrument Rack 25-51, Sheet 2
7.70-181, Rev. F, Instrument Rack 25-51, Sheet 1
Coordination Curves:
JAF-CRVE-ELEC-CC-H05-L15 & 25
JAF-CRVE-ELEC-CC-H05 & 06-10P-1AC & BD
JAF-CRVE-ELEC-CC-H05 & 06-10P-3AC & BD
JAF-CRVE-ELEC-CC-H05 & 06-14P-1A & B
JAF-CRVE-ELEC-CC-H06-L16 & 26
JAF-CRVE-ELEC-CC-H05 & 06-BUSCOORD
JAF-CRVE-ELEC-CC-L15-MCC152
JAF-CRVE-ELEC-CC-L15-MCC153
JAF-CRVE-ELEC-CC-L15-MCC161
JAF-CRVE-ELEC-CC-L15-MCC163
JAF-CRVE-ELEC-CC-L15-MCC165-OB2
JAF-CRVE-ELEC-CC-L16-BUSCOORD
FE-67B Lighting Plan - Reactor Building EL. 272'0", Rev. 19
FE-67C, Lighting Plan - Reactor Building EL. 300'0", Rev. 16
FPSSK-1 - 7, Fire Area/Zone Arrangement Plan
FPSSK-100, Fire Barrier Penetrations Arrangement Plan Below EL 272'0", Rev. 4
FPSSK-101, Fire Barrier Penetrations Arrangement Plan EL 272'0", Rev. 5
FPSSK-102, Fire Barrier Penetrations Arrangement Plan EL 300'0", Rev. 4
FPSSK-103, Fire Barrier Penetrations Arrangement Plan EL 286'0", 326'9", & EL 369'6",
Rev. 4
FPSSK-1000, Fire Protection System Hydraulic Data Sheets, Sheets 2 & 3
FPSSK-1001, Fire Protection System Isometric Drawing Distribution System Outside Loop
West Side, Sheets 1 - 5
FPSSK-1002, Fire Protection System Isometric Drawing Distribution System Outside Loop
East Side, Sheets 1 - 4
FPSSK-1003, Fire Protection System Isometric Drawing Distribution System Screenwell, West
Electrical Tunnel, Admin. Bldg., Sheets 1 - 3
FPSSK-1005,Fire Protection System Isometric Drawing Distribution System West Cable
Tunnel, Sheets 1 - 3
FPSSK-1006,Fire Protection System Isometric Drawing Distribution System Turbine Bldg.
Foam Room Manifolds, Sheets 1 - 3
FPSSK-1007, Fire Protection System Isometric Drawing Distribution System Reactor Building
West Cable Tunnel, Sheets 1 - 3
NP12-104, Detail E-4" Silicone Foam Typical Electrical Pen. Seals (Walls and Floors), Rev. 1
NP-12-TE-02, Typical Silicone Elastomer Installation for Upgrading Existing Penetration,
Rev. 1
Engineering Evaluations/Modifications/Safety Evaluations/Change Requests
CTP-1026, Hemyc Cable Wrap System (Redundant Cable Protection - One Hour), 12/8/82
CTP-1077, One (1) Hour Fire Qualification Test 2" Hemyc System Direct Wrap on Conduit,
3/10/86
F1-92-294, Upgrade of Shutdown Communication System, Rev. 0
JAF-ANAL-FPS-00322, Fire Area VII EDG, ESW, RHR Pump B & Associated Min. flow Valve
Operability, 8/9/91
JAF-ANAL-FPS-00636, Fire Barrier Analysis, Thermal Ceramics (Babcock & Wilcox) FP-60
Electrical Circuit Protective System, Rev. 0
JAF-ANAL-FPS-00734, Fire Doors with Excessive Clearances That are Qualified Per Warnock
Hersey International, Inc. Test No. WHI-495-0799, Rev. 2
JAF-ANAL-FPS-00816, Fire Barrier Analysis, Promatec [B&B Insulation, Inc.] Insulco/Hemyc
Protective Wrap System, Rev. 0
JAF-ANAL-FPS-01183, Fire Barrier Analysis Electrical & Mechanical Penetration Seals, Rev.
JAF-ANAL-FPS-01392, Fire Barrier Analysis, RB-1B to RB-1A 326' Elev. Of Reactor Bldg.
Rev. 0
JAF-ANAL-FPS-01393, Fire Damper Evaluation For Appendix R Compliance, Rev.0
JAF-ANAL-FPS-01396, Fire Barrier Analysis, Electrical Conduits Not Sealed Internally in the 3
Hour Rated Fire Barrier Separating the Screen Well House from the Turbine Bldg.,
Rev. 0
JAF-ANAL-FPS-01400, Fire Barrier Analysis - Electrical Conduit Not Sealed Internally
Penetrating the 3 hour3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> Rated Fire Barrier Separating East Electrical Bay from the
Condenser Bay on El. 272', Rev. 0
JAF-ANAL-FPS-01407, Fire Barrier Analysis - Penetrations Located in the Reactor Building
Drywell Fire Boundaries, Rev. 0
JAF-ANAL-FPS-01408, Fire Barrier Analysis - Electrical Conduits Not Sealed Internally
Penetrating the Reactor Building Water Spray Curtains Separating Fire Areas, Rev. 0
JAF-ANAL-FPS-03392, Review of Flow Paths and Procedures for Venting Areas Protected by
Halon or CO2 Systems, Rev. 0
JAF-RPT-FPS-01490, NFPA Code Conformance Review Report, Rev. 0
JAF-RPT-FPS-01940, CO2 Protected Area Integrity Activities JAF Nuclear Power Plant,
Rev. 2
JAF-RPT-FPS-01975, Safe Shutdown Capability Reassessment 10 CFR 10 Appendix R,
Rev. 1
JAF-RPT-FPS-02367, Fire Protection Plan, Rev. 8
JAF-RPT-FPS-02708, Fire Protection Surveillance Frequency Engineering Evaluation, Rev. 0
Nuclear Safety Evaluation JAF-SE-98-002, ST Reduction Project, Rev. 0
R11044-1, Electrical Circuit Protective Materials, 3/22/85
Test Report TS-TP-0043, Fire & Hose-Stream Tests of 20 Penetration Seal Configurations,
8/29/80
Tech-Sil, Inc., Test # TS-TP-0004, Fire Tests of Floor Penetration Seals, 1/77
Work Orders
WR No. 95-03018-00
WR No. 97-07410-00
WR No. 98-00509-00
WR No. 98-00514-30
WR No. 98-01428-00
WR No. 99-05921-00
WR No. 00-04369-00
WR No. 00-09890-00
WR No. 01-03137-00
Calculations
JAF-CALC-FPS-00702, Low Pressure CO2 Flow Calculations, Rev. C
JAF-CALC-FPS-01170, Fire Pump Performance, 5/5/93
JAF-CALC-FPS-01977, Cable Spreading Room CO2 Discharge Timer Setting, Rev. 0
JAF-CALC-FPS-01977, Verification of Calc., Cable Spreading Room Co2 Timer Setting,
2/8/95
JAF-CALC-FPS-01979, Cable Spreading Room CO2 Discharge Timer Setpoint Calculation
Rev. 0
JAF-CALC-FPS-02204, Hydraulic Calculations for Standpipes, Rev. 0
JAF-CALC-FPS-02013, Hydraulic Calculations for Fire Suppression Systems, Rev.1
JAF-CALC-FPS-02013, Assessment of Need to Revise JAF Sprinkler Systems Hydraulic
Calculation, Rev. 1
Vectra Doc. No. 0090-00066-C-003, Fire Suppression Effects Analysis for JAP NPP, Rev. 4
Vectra Doc. No. 0090-00066-C-005, JAF FHA Portable Ventilation Route Verification, Rev. 0
92-092, Rev. A, Loop Accuracy Calculation, Alternate RV Level Instrumentation
94-051, Rev. A, Electrical Considerations for MOD M1-93-101
E-76, Rev. 0A, Load Duty Cycle for LPCI MOV Power Supply
IPEEE - RB1B Hot Gas Layer Timing Study
Procedures
AOP-28, Rev. 11, Operation During Plant Fires
AOP-43, Rev. 26, Plant Shutdown From Outside The Control Room
DCM-25A, Rev. 2, Electrical Cable and Raceway Information System
Pre-Operational Test Procedure No. 76B, CO2 System Group 20-2, October 15, 1974
AP-01.04, Technical Specification Related Requirements, Lists, and Tables, Rev. 7
AP-14.01, Fire Protection Program, Rev. 6
AP-14.02, Combustibles and Flammable Material Control, Rev. 10
AP-14.03, Hot Work Permits, Rev. 2
FPP-1.0, Fire Protection & Prevention Program, Rev. 11
FPP-1.1, Fire Brigade Duties & Outside Fire Department, Rev. 8
FPP-1.12, Fire Protection Impairments, Rev. 2
FPP-3.24, Fire Protection Manifold #6 Sprinkler System Main Drain & Water Flow Alarm Test,
Completed 1/4/01 and 10/3/01
FPP-3.25, Fire Protection Manifold #5 Sprinkler System Main Drain & Water Flow Alarm Teat,
Completed 10/22/01 and 1/26/02
FPP-3.26, Fire Protection Manifold #4 Sprinkler System Main Drain & Water Flow Alarm Test,
Completed 9/26/01 and 12/29/01
FPP-3.27, Fire Protection Manifold #3 Sprinkler System Main Drain & Water Flow Alarm Test,
Completed 9/21/01 and 1/4/02
FPP-3.33, Heat Detector Functional Test & Spray Nozzle Air Flow Test - RFP A & RFP B,
Completed 11/7/00
FPP-3.36, Heat Detector Functional Test Main Turbine Generator Bearing, Completed 11/7/00
F-ST-76U, Fire System Flow Test, Completed 9/15/89 and 9/20/92
F1-85-065, Appendix R Fire Wrapping of Selected Electrical Raceways, Rev. 0
ISP-76-1, Electric and Diesel Fire Pump Start Pressure Switch Functional Test, Completed
8/25/00 and 6/12/01
MP-076.07, 6-Volt Battery-Pack Emergency Light Maintenance, Rev. 11
MST-076.05, Exide/Lightguard F-100 Emergency Light Surveillance Test, Rev. 18
MST-076.11, Fire Barrier Penetration Functional Integrity Surveillance Test, Rev. 12, 13 & 15
ST-16J1, Control Room and Relay Room Emergency Light Test, Rev. 7
ST-16J2, Turbine Bldg., Heater Bay and Electric Bay Emergency Lighting Test, Completed
2/18/02 and 3/18/02
ST-16J3, EDG Bldg., Screen Well and Warehouse #2 Emergency Lighting Test
ST-16J4, Administration Bldg. Emergency Lighting Test, Rev. 7
ST-16J5, Reactor Building Emergency Lighting Test, Completed 2/17/02 and 3/17/02
ST-16J6, General Egress 125 VDC Emergency Lighting Test, Rev. 0
ST-28, Portable Diesel Generator Operability Test, Completed 9/10/01 and 3/31/02
ST-76AC, East Diesel Fire Pump 76P-4 Operational Check, Completed 2/5/02 and 3/8/02
ST-76AD, East Diesel Fire Pump 76P-4 Performance Test, Completed 1/24/00, 2/13/01, &
3/14/02
ST-76B, Electric Fire Pump 76P-2 Operational Check, Completed 2/20/02 and 3/22/02
ST-76C, West Diesel Fire Pump 76P-1 Operational Check, Completed 2/13/02 and 3/15/02
ST-76K, Fire Header Integrity & Nozzle Inspection, Completed 8/30/99 and 8/4/01
ST-76U, Fire Flow Test, Completed 9/12/97
ST-76X, Nozzle Air Flow Test for Water Curtain Spray Boundaries Number 1 - 8, Completed
3/20/97 and 12/1/99
ST-76Y, Fire Door Inspection and Operability Test, Rev. 16
ST-76J4, West Cable Tunnel Smoke Detector and Sprinkler Test, Completed 11/2/99,
12/1/99, 12/3/99, & 3/1/00
ST-76J16, Smoke/Heat Detector Functional & CO2 Simulated Automatic/Manual Initiation
Tests - Cable Spreading Room, Completed 11/4/99 and 9/11/01
West Diesel Fire Pump 76P-1 Performance Test, Completed 2/10/00 & 5/3/01
ST-76J24, Electric Fire Pump 76P-2 Performance Test, Completed 4/22/99, 4/20/00, &
5/12/01
ST-76J26, Smoke Detector Functional Test - Reactor Building 300' - North, Completed
8/30/98 and 11/30/00
ST-76J28, Smoke Detector Functional Test - Reactor Building 300' - South, Completed
8/23/98 and 8/23/00
ST-76J31, Smoke Detector Functional Test - Reactor Building 272' - West, Completed
1/21/98 and 8/19/00
ST-76J40, Smoke Detector Functional Test - Station Battery Rooms, Completed 5/13/98 and
5/13/00
ST-76J46, Heat Detector Functional Test - Water Spray Curtain Boundary #2, Competed
5/20/98 and 3/27/02
ST-76J47, Heat Detector Functional Test - Water Spray Curtain Boundary #3, Completed
4/3/98 and 3/28/02
ST-76J50, Heat Detector Functional Test - Stairwell Water Spray Boundaries #6 & #8,
Completed 3/17/98, 3/17/98, & 4/17/00
ST-76J52, Fire Area 1E Ultraviolet Flame Detector Test, Completed 3/18/00, 3/18/01, and
3/18/02
ST-99C, Safe Shutdown Equipment Inventory and Panel Operability Verification, Completed
9/29/01 and 3/24/02
TST-13, High Pressure Water Fire Protection System Hydraulic Gradient Analysis, Completed
9/20/92
F1-85-065-IP-E1, Appendix R Fire Wrapping of Selected Electrical Raceways
Training Documents
Fire Brigade Qualifications, April 8, 2002
Fire Training Attendance Report, April 8, 2002
Fire Drill Attendance Report, 4/11/02
Fire Brigade Training Drill Matrix, 2000-2002
Fire Drills and Critiques:
Battery Room Corridor, 4/24/01
Cable Spreading Room, 11/13/01
Reactor Building, 272', 11/8/01, 6/20/01, 7/13/01, 3/12/02
Reactor Building, 300', 5/2/01
West Cable Tunnel, 2/26/02
Fire Brigade Training Material:
FP-13-1.1,
Fire Training Program Overview, Rev. 4
FP-13-1.2,
Fire Protection Responsibilities and Make-up, Rev. 5
FP-13-1.3,
Personal Protective Equipment, Rev. 8
FP-13-2.1,
Fire Areas & Equipment, Rev. 2
FP-13-2.2,
Fire Chemistry/Fire Behavior, Rev. 8
FP-13-2.3,
Portable Extinguishers & Extinguishing Techniques, Rev. 5
FP-13-3.1,
Interior Structural & Confined Spaces Fire Attack, Rev. 8
FP-13-4.1,
Self Contained Breathing Apparatus, Rev. 5
FP-13-14.2,
Emergency Communication & Lighting, Rev. 6
FP-13-5.1,
Fire Streams & Fire Attacks, Rev. 8
FP-13-5.2,
Ventilation, Rev. 7
FP-13-6.1,
Fire Brigade Leadership, Rev. 4
FP-13-6.2,
Hoseline, Hydrants & Standpipe Systems, Rev. 3
Operator Training Job Performance Measures:
20004205A, Rev. 5, Plant Shutdown from Outside the Control Room - NCO1 Actions
20004205B1, Rev. 3, Plant Shutdown from Outside the Control Room, SNO/CRS -
10600 Bus Energized form Only EDG B and D
20004205B4, Rev. 4, Plant Shutdown from Outside the Control Room, SNO/CRS -
10600 Bus Energized from Only B EDG
20004205H1, Rev. 1, Plant Shutdown from Outside the Control Room - SM Actions
20004205H, Rev. 1, Plant Shutdown from Outside the Control Room - SM/NCO1
20004205E, Rev. 3, Plant Shutdown from Outside the Control Room - Subsequent
Action to Preclude Loss of Nitrogen to the SRVs
Course Description Listing, LP Code: RO1-6.5
Required Reading List for Licensed Operators, issued July 25, 2001
Licensed Operator Training Lesson Plan: LP-AOP, Rev. 2
Audits and Self-Assessments
A01-10J, Annual & Biennial Fire Protection Program Audit, 8/14/01
Fire Protection Self Assessment Report, 3/8/02
Third Quarter 2001 Fire Protection and Industrial Safety Review
Fourth Quarter 2001 Fire Protection & Safety Performance Assessment, 1/30/02
Self-Assessment AP-14.03, Hot Work Permits, 12/31/01
Self-Assessment AP-14.02, Control of Combustible and Flammable Materials, Rev. 9
Surveillance Report 2277, Fire Protection Program Audit (A01-10J) Corrective Action Status
and Follow up, 2/7/02
Corrective Action Program Documents
DER-01-04298
DER-02-01601*
DER-01-01939
DER-02-01552*
DER-01-02484
DER-02-00396
DER-02-00413
DER-02-01513*
DER-01-03492
DER-02-01516*
OER 010058
DER-02-01605*
- Denotes DERs initiated during the inspection
Miscellaneous Documents
21285-1, 319 ALV U.L. Designs 3 Hour Fire Dampers, Rev. 1
21285-5, Fire Damper Schedule, Rev. 2
Combustible Control Permit Log 2001& 2002
Combustible Control Permit #01-016, 3/13/01
Combustible Control Permit #02-005, 2/26/02
Combustible Control Permit #02-004, 2/27/02
Fire Protection Impairment Log for 1/15/02 - 3/29/02
Hot Work Permits Log
Hot Work Permit #056737, 4/8/02
Hot Work Permit #056739, 4/9/02
Hot Work Permit #060466, 4/3/02
JAF Fire Hazards Analysis (FHA), Rev. 1
NRC Letter dated May 29, 2001, Exemption From Certain Requirements of Section III.G.2.c of
Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50
NRC Letter dated October 3, 1980, Review of Fire Protection SE Supplementary Items
NRC Letter dated February 13, 1981, Review of Fire Protection SE Supplementary Items
NRC Letter dated February 24, 1981, Fire Protection Schedular Relief
NRC Letter dated July 1, 1983, Exemption Requests -10CFR 50.48 Fire Protection and
Appendix R to 10CFR Part 50"
NRC Letter dated 2/1/84, Exemption Requests - 10CFR50.48 Fire Protection & Appendix R to
CFR Part 50"
NRC Letter dated May 22, 1984, Amendment No. 80 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-59
for JAF
NRC Letter dated 1/11/85, Exemption Requests - 10CFR50.48 Fire Protection & Appendix R to
CFR Part 50"
NRC Letter dated October 23, 1989, Issuance of Amendment
NRC Letter dated August 10, 1990, Issuance of Amendment
NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated 8/1/79
NYPA Letter dated 9/16/92, JAF Fire Barrier Analysis - Thermal Ceramics FP-60 Electrical
Circuit Protective System - Evaluation No. JAF-ANAL-FPS-00636"
NYPA Memorandum dated9/3/93, JAF Nuclear Power Plant Fire Protection Improvement
Program Assessment of Communications Between the Control Room and the Fire
Brigade
Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, section 9.8, Rev. 7
Vendor Manual E353-0051, Exide Electronics Emergency Lighting Unit (F-100) Equipment
GEH-1753J
Time Over-Current Relays Type IAC51A
GEH-44233B
Time Over-Current Relays Type IAC66K