IR 05000282/2002002
| ML021090403 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
| Issue date: | 04/19/2002 |
| From: | Lanksbury R Division Reactor Projects III |
| To: | Nazar M Nuclear Management Co |
| References | |
| IR-02-002 | |
| Download: ML021090403 (25) | |
Text
April 19, 2002
SUBJECT:
PRAIRIE ISLAND NUCLEAR GENERATING PLANT NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-282/02-02; 50-306/02-02
Dear Mr. Nazar:
On March 31, 2002, the NRC completed an inspection at your Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant. The enclosed report documents the inspection findings which were discussed on March 28, 2002, with you and members of your staff.
This inspection examined activities conducted under your license as they relate to safety and compliance with the Commissions rules and regulations and with the conditions of your license.
The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.
No findings of significance were identified.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's Rules of Practice, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records (PARS) component of NRC's document system (ADAMS). ADAMS is accessible from the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html (the Public Electronic Reading Room).
Sincerely,
/RA/
Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects Docket Nos. 50-282; 50-306 License Nos. DPR-42; DPR-60
Enclosure:
Inspection Report 50-282/02-02; 50-306/02-02 See Attached Distribution
DOCUMENT NAME: G:\\PRAI\\PRA2002002DRP.WPD To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE RIII RIII RIII NAME MCastanedo:dtp Mkunowski RLanksbury DATE 04/19/02 04/19/02 04/19/02 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
REGION III==
Docket Nos:
50-282; 50-306 License Nos:
50-282/02-02; 50-306/02-02 Licensee:
Nuclear Management Company, LLC Facility:
Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant Location:
1717 Wakonade Drive East Welch, MN 55089 Dates:
February 15 through March 31, 2002 Inspectors:
S. Ray, Senior Resident Inspector D. Karjala, Resident Inspector Z. Dunham, Resident Inspector, Kewaunee M. Kunowski, Project Engineer J. Adams, Resident Inspector, Quad Cities Approved by:
Roger D. Lanksbury, Chief Branch 5 Division of Reactor Projects
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS IR 05000282-02-02; IR 05000306-02-02, on 2/15-3/31/2002; Nuclear Management Company, Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 & 2, Resident Inspector Report.
This report covers a 6-week routine resident inspection. The inspection was conducted by resident inspectors and a regional project engineer. No findings of significance were identified.
The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process (SDP). The NRCs program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described at its Reactor Oversight Process website at http://www.nrc.gov/NRR/OVERSIGHT/ASSESS/index.html. Findings for which the SDP does not apply are indicated by No Color or by the severity level of the applicable violation.
A.
Inspector-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
B.
Licensee-Identified Findings No findings of significance were identified.
Report Details Summary of Plant Status Unit 1 was operated at or near full power for the entire inspection period. Unit 2 was in a refueling outage until the reactor was brought critical on March 1, 2002. The Unit 2 generator was placed online on March 2 and reached full power on March 4, 2002. Unit 2 operated at or near full power for the remainder of the inspection period.
1.
REACTOR SAFETY Cornerstones: Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barrier Integrity 1R01 Adverse Weather Protection (71111.01)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed operator actions and plant response during icing conditions that caused instabilities on the transmission grid. The inspection was conducted because the adverse weather conditions created the potential for a loss of offsite power and/or a reactor trip transient. Circuit breakers 8H7 and 8H8 opened in response to transmission line icing conditions, which isolated a Red Rock transmission line from the Prairie Island switchyard. The inspectors observed control room activities to verify that equipment responded as expected and that operator actions addressed the alarms and conditions in accordance with the procedures listed at the end of this report.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R04 Equipment Alignment (71111.04)
.1 Train Walkdown a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors performed a partial walkdown of the D1 diesel generator while the D2 diesel generator was unavailable because of surveillance testing. The inspectors utilized the valve and electrical breaker status checklists listed at the end of the report to verify that components were properly positioned and that support systems were lined up to support diesel generator operation. The inspectors also examined the material condition of diesel generator components and valves and evaluated the general housekeeping of the D1 diesel generator room. The inspectors reviewed outstanding work orders (WOs) and condition reports (CRs) associated with the diesel to verify that these documents did not reveal issues that could affect train function. The inspectors used the information in the sections of the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) and Technical Specifications (TSs) listed at the end of this report to determine the functional requirements of the system.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
.2 System Walkdown a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors walked down the accessible portions of the cooling water system in the turbine and auxiliary buildings. The inspectors utilized the system checklists and flow diagrams listed at the end of the report to verify that components were properly positioned. The inspectors also examined the material condition of the components.
The inspectors reviewed outstanding WOs and CRs associated with the system to verify that these documents did not reveal issues that could affect system function. The inspectors used the information in the sections of the USAR and TSs listed at the end of this report to determine the functional requirements of the system. The inspectors reviewed licensee records to verify that minor deficiencies identified during this inspection were entered into the corrective action system.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors conducted fire protection walkdowns which were focused on availability, accessibility, and the condition of fire fighting equipment, the control of transient combustibles, and on the condition and operating status of installed fire barriers. The inspectors selected fire areas for inspection based on their overall contribution to internal fire risk, as documented in the Individual Plant Examination of External Events (IPEEE), their potential to impact equipment which could initiate a plant transient, or their impact on the plants ability to respond to a security event. The inspectors used the documents listed at the end of this report to verify that fire hoses and extinguishers were in their designated locations and available for immediate use; that fire detectors and sprinklers were unobstructed; that transient material loading was within the analyzed limits; and that fire doors, dampers, and penetration seals appeared to be in satisfactory condition.
The following areas were inspected:
Fire Area 41A, Screenhouse Safeguards Area;
Fire Area 41B, Screenhouse Basement;
Fire Area 58, Auxiliary Building 695-foot elevation, Unit 1; and
Fire Area 73, Auxiliary Building 695-foot elevation, Unit 2.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R11 Licensed Operator Requalification Program (71111.11)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed an operating crew during an as found requalification examination on the simulator. The inspectors evaluated crew performance in the areas of:
clarity and formality of communications;
ability to take timely actions in the safe direction;
prioritization, interpretation, and verification of alarms;
procedure use;
control board manipulations;
oversight and direction from supervisors; and
group dynamics.
Crew performance in these areas was compared to licensee management expectations and guidelines as presented in the operations section work instructions (SWIs) listed at the end of this report and to the critical tasks listed in the exercise guide at the end of this report. The inspectors also compared simulator configurations with actual control room board configurations. For any weaknesses identified, the inspectors observed the licensee evaluators to verify that they also noted the issues and discussed them in the critique at the end of the session. For this examination, the licensee evaluators determined that the crew had failed because they did not properly perform one of the critical tasks, so the inspectors interviewed personnel and reviewed records to verify that actions were initiated to remediate the crew before they returned to duty.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R12 Maintenance Rule Implementation (71111.12)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed systems to verify that the licensee properly implemented the maintenance rule for structures, systems, or components (SSCs) with performance problems. This evaluation included the following aspects:
whether the SSC was scoped in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65;
whether the performance problems constituted maintenance rule functional failures;
the proper safety significance classification;
the proper 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) or (a)(2) classification for the SSC; and
the appropriateness of the performance criteria for SSCs classified as (a)(2) or the appropriateness of goals and corrective actions for SSCs classified as (a)(1).
The above aspects were evaluated by using the maintenance rule scoping and report documents listed at the end of this report. For each SSC reviewed, the inspectors also reviewed significant WOs and CRs listed at the end of this report to verify that failures were properly identified, classified, and corrected and that unavailable time had been properly calculated. The inspectors reviewed documents to verify that minor discrepancies in the licensees maintenance rule reports were corrected.
The inspectors reviewed the licensees implementation of the maintenance rule requirements for the following SSCs:
Unit 2 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system;
Unit 1 and Unit 2 cooling water system; and
Unit 2 condenser air removal system.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R13 Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control (71111.13)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the licensees management of plant risk during emergent maintenance activities or during activities where more than one significant system or train was unavailable. The activities were chosen based on their potential impact on increasing the probability of an initiating event or impacting the operation of safety significant equipment. The inspection was conducted to verify that evaluation, planning, control, and performance of the work were done in a manner to reduce the risk and minimize the duration where practical, and that contingency plans were in place where appropriate. The licensees daily configuration risk assessment records, observations of shift turnover meetings, observations of daily plant status meetings, observations of shiftly outage meetings, and the documents listed at the end of this report were used by the inspectors to verify that the equipment configurations had been properly listed, that protected equipment had been identified and was being controlled where appropriate, and that significant aspects of plant risk were being communicated to the necessary personnel.
The inspectors reviewed the following emergent maintenance activities:
failure of the 22 containment spray (CS) pump breaker to close during the integrated safety injection test;
reduced seal return flow on the 22 reactor coolant pump (RCP); and
steam leak on high pressure turbine drain piping on Unit 2.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R15 Operability Evaluations (71111.15)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors evaluated plant conditions, selected CRs, and corrective action process (CAP) documents for risk significant components and systems in which operability issues were questioned. These conditions were evaluated to determine whether the operability of the components and systems was justified. The inspectors compared the operability and design criteria in the appropriate sections of the TS and USAR to the licensees evaluations presented in the CRs and documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the components or systems were operable. Where compensatory measures were necessary to maintain operability, the inspectors reviewed the documents listed at the end of the report to verify that the measures were in place, would work as intended, and were properly controlled.
The conditions evaluated were:
the licensees evaluation of steam generator level setpoint issues identified by Westinghouse Nuclear Safety Advisory Letters (NSALs); and
whether the liquid radwaste discharge monitor, R-18, could be considered operable when its ability to discriminate low level signals was questionable.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R19 Post-Maintenance Testing (71111.19)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed post-maintenance testing activities associated with maintenance on important mitigating, barrier integrity, and support systems to ensure that the testing adequately verified system operability and functional capability with consideration of the actual maintenance performed. The inspectors used the appropriate sections of the TSs and the USAR, as well as the documents listed at the end of this report, to evaluate the scope of the maintenance and to verify that the post-maintenance testing was performed adequately, demonstrated that the maintenance was successful, and that operability was restored. In addition, the inspectors reviewed CAPs to verify that minor deficiencies identified during these inspections were entered into the licensees corrective action system.
Testing subsequent to the following activities was observed and evaluated:
the 12 diesel cooling water pump annual inspection;
decontamination of the sample chamber of the liquid radwaste discharge monitor R-18; and
draining and refilling the D5 diesel generator fuel oil day tank.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R20 Refueling and Other Outage Activities (71111.20)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed and/or observed activities associated with a Unit 2 refueling outage. The inspectors reviewed the outage plan and schedule to verify that risk had been appropriately considered, and evaluated how emergent work and changing plant conditions were handled from a risk control perspective. Among the significant outage activities the inspectors observed were the reactor coolant system (RCS) draindown to reduced inventory conditions for removal of the steam generator nozzle dams; and preparation for, and accomplishment of, mode changes from refueling through power operation; including heatup, securing of residual heat removal (RHR) cooling, reactor startup preparations, physics testing, and power ascension. Documents and procedures used in these reviews are listed at the end of this report. For each mode change, the inspectors reviewed the completed prerequisite checklists to ensure that TS requirements were met. The inspectors also conducted a containment cleanliness inspection near the end of the outage with emphasis on ensuring that no material was left in containment that could affect the flow to the containment recirculation sump. The inspectors also observed and/or reviewed several other miscellaneous outage activities.
The inspectors regularly reviewed the licensees shutdown risk assessment classification and its control of protected equipment when defense-in-depth equipment was unavailable, especially electrical power sources.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R22 Surveillance Testing (71111.22)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors witnessed selected surveillance testing and/or reviewed test data to verify that the equipment tested using the surveillance procedures (SPs) met the TSs, the USAR, and licensee procedural requirements, and demonstrated that the equipment was capable of performing its intended safety functions. The activities were selected based on their importance in verifying mitigating systems capability and barrier integrity.
The inspectors used the documents listed at the end of this report to verify that the
testing met the TS frequency requirements; that the tests were conducted in accordance with the procedures, including establishing the proper plant conditions and prerequisites; that the test acceptance criteria were met; and that the results of the tests were properly reviewed and recorded.
The following tests were observed and evaluated:
SP 2083, Unit 2 Integrated SI [safety injection] Test With a Simulated Loss of Offsite Power;
SP 2750, Post Outage Containment Close-Out Inspection; and
SP 2093, D5 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start Test and Coincident Opacity Testing.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
1R23 Temporary Modifications (71111.23)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed a temporary modification to remove one of the overspeed trip mechanisms on the D5 diesel generator. The inspectors reviewed the temporary modification description and the 10 CFR 50.59 screening form listed at the end of the report to ensure they were completed in accordance with the licensee administrative work instruction (AWI) guidance listed at the end of the report. In addition, the inspectors reviewed the listed section of the USAR and TSs to verify that the installation did not affect the specified design function or operability of the system. The inspectors also reviewed the installation and removal work orders listed at the end of the report and walked down the installation to insure the temporary equipment was installed in accordance with the plan. The inspectors also reviewed the control room transitional drawing file to ensure that the appropriate drawing had been updated to show the temporary modification.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4.
OTHER ACTIVITIES 4OA1 Performance Indicator (PI) Verification (71151)
a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors reviewed the PI data submitted by the licensee for completeness and accuracy of the Safety System Unavailability PI for the RHR System in the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. The inspectors compared the data reported by the licensee to the definitions and guidance contained in the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance
listed at the end of this report. The inspectors reviewed electronic control room logs and limiting condition for operations logs for the first through fourth quarters of 2001 to verify the reported unavailable times. The inspectors also reviewed the CRs and WOs listed at the end of this report to identify any unavailability times that the licensee might have missed.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA3 Event Followup (71153)
Inadvertent Train B SI Actuation on Unit 2 a.
Inspection Scope The inspectors observed control room personnel respond to an inadvertent Train B SI actuation on February 26, 2002, on Unit 2. Unit 2 was in the process of heatup and startup, and was at approximately 340 degrees Fahrenheit at the end of its refueling outage when the actuation occurred. The inspectors responded to the control room and conducted control panel walkdowns to verify that all Train B engineered safeguards equipment had responded as expected. The inspectors also observed operator response actions to diagnose the event, stabilize the plant, and recover. The event resulted in the operators tripping the only operating decay heat removal system. There was no RCS heatup, at the time, due to the injection of relatively cool water by the 22 SI pump. The operators terminated the injection before the pressurizer was filled so pressure control was never lost. Because the event did not result in any adverse reactor conditions and all mitigating equipment responded as expected, this event was considered to be of minor safety significance.
Several issues were raised by both the inspectors and licensee personnel regarding TS interpretation and compliance, the adequacy of the emergency procedures for the unusual plant conditions, and reporting requirements. Each of the issues was entered into the licensees corrective action system using the CRs listed at the end of this report.
The licensee concluded that the actuation was invalid and was caused by an electrical maintenance technician accidently shorting two contacts with a test equipment lead.
The inspectors reviewed the electrical drawings listed at the end of the report with licensee engineering personnel to verify that the licensees conclusions regarding the cause of the actuation were reasonable and would have led to the plant response experienced. The licensee intended to report the event as either a written Licensee Event Report (LER) or optional 60-day telephone report to the NRC.
b.
Findings No findings of significance were identified.
4OA6 Meeting(s)
Exit Meeting The resident inspectors presented the inspection results to Mr. and other members of licensee management at the conclusion of the inspection on March 28, 2002. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented. No proprietary information was identified.
KEY POINTS OF CONTACT Licensee T. Breene, Manager Nuclear Performance Assessment B. Jefferson, Director Site Operations A. Johnson, General Superintendent Radiation Protection and Chemistry R. Lingle, Operations Manager J. Maki, Production Planning Manager L. Meyer, General Superintendent Plant Maintenance M. Nazar, Site Vice President J. Waddell, Superintendent Security M. Werner, Plant Manager L. Williams, Director of Engineering LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED Opened None Closed None Discussed None
LIST OF ACRONYMS USES ADAMS Agencywide Documents Access and Management System AFW Auxiliary Feedwater ARP Alarm Response Procedure AWI Administrative Work Instruction CAP Corrective Action Process CFR Code of Federal Regulations CR Condition Report CS Containment Spray IMC Inspection Manual Chapter IPEEE Individual Plant Examination of External Events IR
Inspection Report
KV
Kilovolt
LER
Licensee Event Report
NEI
Nuclear Energy Institute
NRC
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter
Nuclear Steam Supply System
Publicly Available Records
Performance Indicator
Preventive Maintenance
Reactor Coolant Pump
Significance Determination Process
Safety Injection
Surveillance Procedure
Structure, System, or Component
SWI
Section Work Instruction
TS
Technical Specification
Updated Safety Analysis Report
Work Order
LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
1R01
Adverse Weather Protection
CR 200202426
Received Undervoltage Alarms on Bus 11 &
Bus 12
Alarm Response
Procedure (ARP) C47005-
0201
Bus 11 4.16KV [kilovolts] Undervoltage
Revision 11
ARP C47005-0202
Bus 12 4.16KV Undervoltage
Revision 11
ARP C47022-0610
Fire Detection Panel FP121 Trouble Alarm
Revision 29
ARP C47023-0601
Substation Local Alarm
Revision 31
ARP C47024-0704
Bus 16 Sequencer Channel Alert
Revision 34
ARP C47507-0303
Hydrogen and Seal Oil Local Alarm
Revision 20
ARP C47508-0509
NSSS [Nuclear Steam Supply System]
Annunciator System Power Failure
Revision 22
ARP C47524-0701
Bus 25 Sequencer Channel Alert
Revision 34
ARP C47524-0704
Bus 26 Load Sequencer Channel Alert
Revision 34
1R04
Equipment Alignment
D1 Diesel Generator
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-1
D1 Diesel Generator Valve Status
Revision 17W
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-2
D1 Diesel Generator Auxiliaries and Room
Cooling Local Panels
Revision 8W
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-3
Diesel Generator D1 Main Control Room
Switch and Indicating Light Status
Revision 13
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.20.7-4
D1 Diesel Generator Circuit Breakers and
Panel Switches
Revision 11
USAR Section 8.4
Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems
Revision 23
Auxiliary Electrical System
Revision 160
Periodic Testing of Emergency Power
System
Revision 147
Cooling Water System
CR 20005789
Flow Element FE-27024 Was Removed
Prior to Design Change Approval
CR 20015676
Obtain Approval for Design Change and
Implement Modification
Remove Flow Element and Plug Fitting
Valve Is Hard To Operate
USAR Section 10.4.1
Cooling Water System
Revision 22
Cooling Water System
Revision 131
Abnormal Operating
Procedure C35 AOP4
Cooling Water Leakage in Containment
Revision 8
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.35-1
Cooling Water System Unit One
Revision 8
Integrated Checklist
C1.1.35-2
Cooling Water System Unit 2
Revision 8
Drawing NF-39216-1
Flow Diagram Unit 1 & 2 Cooling Water -
Screenhouse
Revision AD
Drawing NF-39216-2
Flow Diagram Unit 1 Cooling Water -
Turbine Building
Revision X
Drawing NF-39216-3
Flow Diagram - Unit 1 Cooling Water -
Auxiliary Building
Revision R
Drawing NF-39216-4
Flow Diagram Unit 1 Cooling Water -
Containment
Revision F
Drawing NF-39217-1
Flow Diagram Unit 2 Cooling Water -
Turbine Building
Revision X
Drawing NF-39217-2
Flow Diagram Unit 2 Cooling Water -
Auxiliary Building
Revision S
Drawing NF-39217-3
Flow Diagram Unit 2 Cooling Water -
Containment
Revision C
Drawing NF-39255-1
Diesel Generators D1 & D2 Units 1 and 2
Flow Diagram
Revision Z
CAP000090
Work Request Sticker Was Not Removed
When Work Order 0110644 Was Canceled
1R05
Fire Protection
Plant Safety Procedure F5
Fire Fighting
Revision 27
Plant Safety Procedure F5
Appendix F
Fire Hazard Analysis
Revision 12
Plant Safety Procedure F5
Appendix D
Impact of Fire Outside Control/Relay Room
Revision 8
Plant Safety Procedure F5
Appendix A
Fire Strategies
Revision 7
IPEEE NSPLMI-96001
Appendix B
Internal Fires Analysis
Revision 2
1R011 Licensed Operator Requalification Program
Lesson Plan P9160S-001
Simulator Cycle Quiz #35
Revision 1
SWI O-0
Conduct of Operations
Revision 1
SWI O-2
Shift Organization, Operations, and
Turnover
Revision 46
SWI O-10
Operation Manual Usage
Revision 41
SWI O-25
Periodic Data Acquisition and Logkeeping
Revision 29
1R12
Maintenance Rule Implementation
General
2000 Equipment Performance Annual
Report
April 20, 2001
Maintenance Rule System Basis Document,
Volume 1A
Revision 3
Maintenance Rule System Basis Document,
Volume 1B, Cooling Water Section
Revision 3
Quarterly Equipment Performance Report -
4th Quarter 2001 (draft)
February 2002
Nuclear Energy Institute Industry Guideline
for Monitoring the Effectiveness of
Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants
Revision 2
Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance
at Nuclear Power Plants
Revision 2
Unit 2 AFW System
CR 20014863
Control Valve CV-31419 Did Not Open
Within Reference Range
CR 20017083
Entered Unplanned Limiting Condition for
Operation Action Due to 22 Turbine-Driven
AFW Pump Recirculation Control Valve CV-
31419 Failure to Open During SP-2102
CR 20017776
Replace AFW Pump
Recirulation/Lubricating Oil Solenoid Valves
With Models Having Elastomers Rated for
Higher Temperature
CR 20017971
Modify AFW Systems to Remove the
Recirulation/Lubricating Oil Cooling Control
Valves
CR 200186464
Implement Periodic Inspection and/or
Replacement of AFW Recirculation
Solenoid Valve Elastomeric Seats
CR 200200675
Develop an Action Plan for Returning the
AFW System to Maintenance Rule a(2)
Status
Solenoid Valve SV-33493 Did Not Vent
Completely Off
Fail Open AFW Recirculation Control Valve
CV-31418
Fail Open AFW Recirculation Control Valve
CV-31419
Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cooling Water
CR 20004776
Cooling Water Vertical Cooling Water Pump
Bearing Lubricating Supply Downgrade to
Non Quality
CR 200186350
Re-examine the Revised Root Cause
Evaluation for the Cooling Water White
Finding
CR 200200677
Develop Action Plan to Return the Cooling
Water System to a(2)
Unit 2 Air Removal System
CR 20014153
At 24 Megawatts During Performance of
2C1.3, Unit 2 Turbine Was Manually
Tripped Due to High Condenser Differential
Pressure of 2.5 Inches With Vacuum
Decreasing
CR 200185657
Manual Reactor Trip Due to Condenser
Vacuum Differential Greater Than 2.5
Inches
LER 2-01-04
Manual Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Due to
High Differential Condenser Backpressure
Original
LER 2-01-05
Manual Reactor Trip on Unit 2, Initiated in
Response to a High Differential Pressure
Between the Turbine Steam Condensers,
Caused by an Inadvertent Venting of One
Condenser While Isolating a Steam Leak
Original
1R13
Maintenance Risk Assessments and Emergent Work Control
CS Breaker Issue
Perform PM [Preventive Maintenance] on
Breaker 26-9 CS Pump
Troubleshoot Cause of 22 CS Pump Not
Starting
CR 200201895
During Preparations for SP 2083 Breaker
26-9 22 CS Pump Failed to Close from
Relay 2CS-20X and from CS-46561
Electrical Maintenance
Procedure PE 0007
5HK250/350 Breaker Testing Maintenance
& Repair - Minor
Revision 1
22 RCP Seal Issue
CR 200202073
22 RCP Number 1 Seal Leak-Off Flow Rate
Decreased Below 0.8 Gallons Per Minute
During Startup on 2/27/02 - Evaluate Low
Leak-Off Flow Rate
Start 22 RCP With Enhanced Monitoring
Provide a 2nd Balance Shot for 22 RCP
Start/Stop the 22 RCP Oil Lift Pump
22 RCP Seal Replacement Per D15.1 [this
WO was written as a contingency]
Abnormal Operating
Procedure 2C3 AOP3
Failure of a Reactor Coolant Pump Seal
Revision 8
Temporary Change Notice
2002-0901 to 2C3 AOP3
Failure of a Reactor Coolant Pump Seal
Project Plan
22 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Leak-Off
Issues
March 1, 2002
P. Huffman Memorandum
Low Leak-Off RCP Seal Concern
March 5, 2002
High Pressure Steam Leak Issue
D. Herling Memorandum
Contingency Actions for Unit 2 High
Pressure Steam Leak
March 4, 2002
P. Huffman Memorandum
Unit 2 Turbine Drain Steam Leak
March 4, 2002
J. Loesch Memorandum
Steam Leak Safety Requirements
March 4, 2002
02T122
Furmanite Repair on Turbine CV-3 Drain
Loop
Install Furmanite Box on Turbine CV-3 Drain
Loop
Maintenance Procedure
D93
On-Line Leak Sealing
Revision 9
1R15
Operability Evaluations
Steam Generator Level Issues
CR 200201616
NSAL 02-3 Steam Generator Narrow Range
Level Offset Due to Mid-Deck Plate
Pressure Loss
CR 200201692
Steam Generator Mid-Deck Plate Pressure
Loss Issue
CR 200201822
Maximum Reliable Indicated Steam
Generator Water Level
CR 200201823
Steam Generator Water Level Control
System Uncertainty Issue
Westinghouse NSAL-02-3
Steam Generator Mid-Deck Plate Pressure
Loss Issue
February 18, 2002
Westinghouse NSAL-02-4
Maximum Reliable Indicated Steam
Generator Water Level
February 19, 2002
Westinghouse NSAL-2-5
Steam Generator Water Level Control
System Uncertainty Issue
February 19, 2002
SP 1002A
Analog Protection System Calibration
Revision 26
Limiting Safety System Setting, Protective
Instrumentation
Revision 91
USAR Section 7.4.1
Revision 23
R-18 Radiation Monitor
CAP000026
Evaluate Low End Bug Point Check for R-18
USAR Section 7.5.2.12
Waste Disposal System Liquid Effluent
Monitor (R-18)
Revision 23
Operating Procedure C11
Radiation Monitoring System
Revision 20
Operations Manual B11
Radiation Monitoring System
Revision 5
H Procedures H4
Offsite Dose Calculation Manual, Section
2.0, Liquid Effluents
Revision 16
USAR Section 9.2
Liquid Radwaste System
Revision 23
Radioactive Effluent Controls Program
Revision 147
1R19
Post Maintenance Testing
Cooling Water System
Revision 131
USAR Section 10.4.1
Cooling Water System
Revision 22
PM 3002-2-12
12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Annual
Inspection
Revision 19
SP 1106A
12 Diesel Cooling Water Pump Monthly Test Revision 59
R-18 Sample Chamber Decontamination
PM 3155-3
R-18 Sample Chamber Decontamination
Revision 4W
USAR Section 7.5.2.12
Waste Disposal System Liquid Effluent
Monitor (R-18)
Revision 23
USAR Section 9.2
Liquid Radwaste System
Revision 23
Radioactive Effluent Controls Program
Revision 147
SP 2093
D5 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start
Test
Revision 69
Perform D5 Opacity Test
5AWI 15.4.0
Minor Maintenance Program
Revision 0
Maintenance Procedure
D18
Equipment Lubrication
Revision 54
Auxiliary Electrical Systems
Revision 160
Periodic Testing of Emergency Power
Systems
Revision 147
USAR Section 8.4
Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems
Revision 23
CAP000100
Level in D5 Turbocharger Lowered Without
Proper Documentation or Work Control
1R20
Refueling and Other Outage Activities
Operating Procedure
2C1.6
Shutdown Operations - Unit 2
Revision 13
Operating Procedure
2C4.2
RCS Inventory Control - Post Refueling
Revision 13
Operating Procedure
2C1.4
Unit 2 Power Operation
Revision 27
Operating Procedure
2C1.2
Unit 2 Startup Procedure
Revision 25
Special Operating
Procedure 2D2
RCS Reduced Inventory Operation
Revision 13
PM 3132-1-22
22 Turbine-Driven Aux Feed Pump
Refueling Inspection
Revision 33
SP 2102
22 Turbine-Driven AFW Pump Monthly Test
Revision 68
SP 2330
22 Turbine-Driven AFW Turbine/Pump
Bearing Temperature Test
Revision 7
Maintenance Procedure
D30
Post Refueling Startup Testing
Revision 34
Maintenance Procedure
D32
Temperature Coefficient Measurement at
Hot Zero Power
Revision 10
Maintenance Procedure
D34
Boron Endpoint Measurement
Revision 8
1R22
Surveillance Testing
SP 2083
Unit 2 Integrated SI Test With a Simulated
Revision 24
Test SP 2083 Exceptions 22 Fan Cooler
Unit and Containment Cooling System
Valves
Test SP 2083 Exceptions 22 Fan Cooler
Unit Load Reject/Restore
Engineered Safety Features System Tests
Revision 161
SP 2750
Post Outage Containment Close-Out
Inspection
Revision 22
SP 2093
D5 Diesel Generator Monthly Slow Start
Test
Revision 69
Add Fuel Additive for Opacity Testing on D5
Safety Evaluation
Screening 1164
WO #0201925 to Perform Additive Test
Revision 0
Periodic Testing of Emergency Power
Systems
Revision 147
1R23
5AWI 6.5.0
Revision 11
02T113
Bypass and Isolate the Function of a Failed
Field Flash Speed Switch or a Failed
Overspeed Switch
Isolate Overspeed Trip Device or Field
Flash Speed Switch
Remove Overspeed Trip Device or Field
Flash Speed Switch Temporary Modification
Controlled Transitional
File Drawing NE 118250
Flow Diagram Unit 2 Starting Air Diesel
Generator D5
Revision B
USAR Section 8.4
Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems
Revision 23
Auxiliary Electrical Systems
Revision 160
Periodic Testing of Emergency Power
Systems
Revision 147
USAR Section 8.4
Plant Standby Diesel Generator Systems
Revision 23
4OA1 Performance Indicator Verification
Regulatory Assessment Performance
Indicator Guideline
Revision 2
Electronic Control Room Logs
1/1/2001-
12/31/2001
Electronic Limiting Conditions for
Operations Logs
1/1/2001-
12/31/2001
Replace 22 RHR Pump Seal - Inspect and
Replace Studs and Nuts
CR 20014785
22 RHR Pump Seal Leaking
4OA3 Event Followup
USAR Section 6
Engineered Safety Features
Revision 23
CR 200202010
Manual Trip of 21 RCP Due to Loss of Seal
Water Return Following Train B SI Signal
While 22 RCP Isolated
CR 200202013
During SP 2373 Reactor Trip and Bypass
Breaker Contacts Inadvertent SI Occurred
During Step 7.6.1 - Worker Brushed Wrong
Contacts
CR 20020216
Review Application of TS 3.1.A.1.c on
2/26/02 With 21 RCP On, 22 RCP Out of
Service, and RHR Aligned for Injection
CR 20020217
TS 3.1.A.1.c Is Not Clear Regarding
Required Actions When One RCP Is
Stopped (Operable) With One RCP
CR 200202015
Operators Deviated from E-0 and ES-0.2
Following Inadvertent SI Due to Plant
Conditions Not Meeting SI Termination
Criteria
Emergency Operating
Procedure 2E-0
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
Revision 19
Emergency Subprocedure
2ES-0.2
SI Termination
Revision 18
Drawing X-HIAW-1001-
885-10
Feedwater Isolation Safeguards System
Unit 1 & 2
Revision E
Drawing X-HIAW-1001-
885-7
Safety Injection Scheme
Revision J
Drawing X-HIAW-1001-
885-16
Safeguards Logic Cabinets
Revision B
Drawing X-HIAW-1-242
Safeguards Actuation Signals Logic
Diagrams
Revision E