ML020990581

Part 1 of 2, Revision 8 to WVNS-SAR-002, Safety Analysis Report for Low-Level Waste Processing & Support Activities

ML020990581
Person / Time
Site:	West Valley Demonstration Project
Issue date:	03/01/2002
From:	Chilson L, Little J, Savage E West Valley Nuclear Services Co
To:	NRC/FSME, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
References
-nr, 1428 WVNS-SAR-002, Rev 8
Download: ML020990581 (212)

Text

West Valley Doc. ID Number WVNS-SAR-002 Demonstration Project Revision Number 8 Revision Date 03/01/2002 Controlled Copy No. 4 7 Engineering Release #1428 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR LOW-LEVEL WASTE PROCESSING AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES URS CORPORATION FOR WVNS ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, QUALITY ASSURANCE AND LABORATORY OPERATIONS HIGHEST PROPOSED HAZARD CATEGORIZATION: 2 (Facilities within the scope of this SAR have been segmented per the guidance of DOE 5480.23)

REFERENCED DOCUM-ENT: WD:93:1167 APPROVALS:

L. J. Chilson, Manager Safety Analysis and egration

• /** 4. z,*

E. D. Savye, Manager /

Environment, Safejt Quality Assurance and Laboratory Operations J.L. Lit Chairman ioe, WVNS Radiation and Safety Co nittee Westinghouse Government Services Group west Valley Nuclear Services Co.

10282 Rock Springs Road West Valley, NY 14171-9799

) .'

WV-1816, Rev. 3

SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR LOW-LEVEL WASTE PAGE: 1 DATE: 03/01/2002 TIME: 15:09 PROCESSING AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES WVNS-SAR-002 INDEX ISSUE PERCID REV Fr PROCEDURE TITLE STATUS DATE COGNIZANT MANAGER WVNS-SAR-O02 SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT FOR LOW-LEVEL WASTE ACTIVE 03/01/2002 CHILSON,L.J.

PROCESSING AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES ADDENDUM 4 WVNS-SAR-002 ADDENDUM 4 SAFETY ANALYSIS ACTIVE 03/01/2002 CHILSON,L.J.

REPORT FOR HEAD END CELL DECONTAMINATION AND WASTE PACKAGING

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 2 of 393 TABLE OF CONTENTS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 LIST OF TABLES 14 LIST OF FIGURES .......................... ..............................

16 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS ........................

.... 30 B.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE IRTS/MAIN PLANT 30 B.1.1 Introduction ........................ ............................

Descriptions .... ........ 32 B.l.2 IRTS, Main Plant and Support Facilities

...................... 34 B.1.3 IRTS Process Description ................

.............. 36 B.1.4 Identification of Agents and Contractors ........

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 B.1.5 Hazard Categorization . . . .

.............. 36 B.l.6 Structure of the Safety Analysis Report

. ...... . .. . . . . . . . . . 38 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.1.0 . .. .

................. ..... 45 B.2.0

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 B.2.1 Site Analysis . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 B.2.1.1 Natural Phenomena . . . .

........ 46 B.2.1.2 Site Characteristics Affecting the Safety Analysis ....

and Military Facilities 46 B.2.1.3 Effect of Nearby Industrial, Transportation

................... 47 B.2.2 Impacts from Normal Operations ..............

.................. 47 B.2.3 Impacts from Abnormal Operations ............

....................... 47 B.2.4 Radiological Accidents ..................

.. ....... 48 B.2.5 Nonradiological Accidents ............

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 B.2.6 Conclusions . . . .

....... 50 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.2.0 ................

........................ 52 B.3.0 SITE CHARACTERISTICS ....................

52 B.3.1 Geography and Demography of WVDP Environs and Military Facilities ........ 52 B.3.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation,

. . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 B.3.3 Meteorology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 B.3.4 Surface Hydrology . . . .

........................ 53 B.3.5 Subsurface Hydrology ....................

....................... 53 B.3.6 Geology and Seismology.. .................

............ 54 B.3.7 Validity of Existing Environmental Analyses SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 3 of 393 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.3.0 .................. S. . . . . .. . 55 B.4.0 PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA ................ S. . . . . .. . 57 B.4.1 Purpose of the IRTS/Main Plant .......... .............. S. . . . . .. . 57 B.4.1.1 Integrated Radwaste Treatment System Feed ....... S. . . . . .. . 57 B.4.1.2 IRTS Products and By-products ............. S. . . . . .. . 57 B.4.1.3 IRTS/Main Plant Facility Functions . . ......... S. . . . . .. . 58 B.4.1.4 IRTS and Main Plant Interfaces With the Vitrification Faccility .. ..... .. 59 B.4.2 Structural and Mechanical Safety Criteria ........ S. . . . . .. . 60 B.4.2.1 Wind Loadings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S. . . . . .. . 60 B.4.2.2 Tornado Loadings ........ ... ..... S. . . . . .. . 60 B.4.2.3 Flood Design ........ ............. S. . . . . .. . 61 B.4.2.4 Missile Protection ............. S. . . . . .. . 61 B.4.2.5 Seismic Design ...... ............ S. . . . . .. . 61 B.4.2.6 Snow Loading ........ ............. S. . . . . .. . 62 B.4.2.7 Process- and Equipment-Derived Loads S. . . . . .. . 62 B.4.2.8 Combined Load Criteria . ...... S. . . . . .. . 62 B.4.2.9 Subsurface Hydrostatic Loadings . . S. . . . . .. . 62 B.4.2.10 Temperature Design Loadings . ... S. . . . . .. . 62 B.4.3 Safety Protection Systems ...... . . . . .. . 63 B.4.3.1 General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 63 B.4.3.2 Protection Through Defense-in-Depth . . . . .. . 63 B.4.3.2.1 Passive Confinement Barriers . . . . . . . .. . 63 B.4.3.2.2 Waste Form and Inventory ........ .. . . . . .. . 65 B.4.3.2.3 Active Confinement Barriers . . . . . . . .. . 65 B.4.3.2.4 Alarms .......... .............. . . . . .. . 65 B.4.3.2.5 Personnel Training ............. . . . . .. . 66 B. 4.3.2. Administrative Planning and Controls . . . .. . . . 66 B.4.3.3 Protection by Equipment and Instrumentation Selection . . . . .. . 67 B.4.3.4 Nuclear Criticality Safety .............. . . . . .. . 67 B.4.3.5 Radiological Protection ............... . . . . .. . 68 B.4.3.6 Fire and Explosion Protection S. . . . . . . . .. . 68 SAR: 0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 4 of 393 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued) 69 B.4.3.7 Radioactive Waste Handling and Storage .

69 B.4.3.8 Industrial and Chemical Safety ...... ............

69 B.4.4 Classification of Systems, Structures, and Components

. . . . 70 B.4.5 Decommissioning . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..

71 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.4.0 ................

77 B.5.0 FACILITY DESIGN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77 B.5.1 Summary Description .................

77 B.5.1.1 Location and Facility Layout ........ .............

77 B.5.1.2 Principal Features ............ ..................

77 B.5.1.2.1 Site Boundary . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . .

77 B.5.1.2.2 Property Protection Area ........ ..............

77 B.5.1.2.3 Site Utility Supplies and Systems ........

78 B.5.1.2.4 Surface Impoundments and Storage Tanks .........

78 B.5.1.2.5 Atmospheric Release Points ........ .............

78 B.5.2 IRTS and Main Plant Buildings ............

78 B.5.2.1 Structural Specifications .............

78 B.5.2.2 Layout of IRTS and Main Plant Buildings ......

79 B.5.2.3 STS/SMWS and HLWTS Facility Descriptions .........

79 B.5.2.3.1 Tank 8D-1 .

81 B.5.2.3.2 Tank 8D-2 . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83 B.5.2.3.3 Associated STS/SMWS Facilities . . .

84 B.5.2.4 LWTS/Main Plant Facility Descriptions 85 B.5.2.4.1 Chemical Process Cell .......

86 B.5.2.4.2 Equipment Decontamination Room . . .

87 B.5.2.4.3 Extraction Cell 3 .........

88 B.5.2.4.4 Product Purification Cell .....

89 B.5.2.4.5 Uranium Product Cell .............

90 B.5.2.4.6 Uranium Load Out ...... ...........

90 B.5.2.4.7 Liquid Waste Cell .........

91 B.5.2.4.8 Off-Gas Cell ........ .............

91 B.5.2.4.9 Head End Cells ...... ............

B.5.2.4.10 Inactive Cells and Rooms 94 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 5 of 393 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B.5.2.5 Cement Solidification System 01-14 Buildinq * . 96 B.5.2.5.1 Function .... .......... * . 96 B.5.2.5.2 Components ............. * . 97 B.5.2.6 Drum Cell . . . . . . . . . . . 97 B.5.2.6.1 Firl-nctin . . .

• . 97 B.5.2.7 Warehouse Facilities .......... ................ * . 97 B.5.3 Support Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * . 98 B.5.3.1 Fire Protection System ........ ............... * . 98 B.5.3.1.1 Water Supply ............ ................... * . 98 B.5.3.1.2 Water Distribution .......... ................ 98 B.5.3.1.3 Halon Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * . 100 B.5.3.1.4 Dry Chemical Systems .......... .............. * . 100 B.5.3.1.5 Wet Chemical System .......... ................ * . 101 B.5.3.1.6 Foam Suppression System ............ * . 101 B.5.3.1.7 Portable Fire Extinguishers .......... * . 101 B.5.3.1.8 Fire Alarm System ............... * . 101 B.5.3.1.9 Lightning Protection .......... .............. * . 101 B.5.3.2 Leak Detection Systems .......... .............. . . 102 B.5.3.3 Containment Metal Corrosion ........... * . 103 B.5.3.4 NDA Interceptor Trench Liquid Pretreatment System * . 104 B.5.3.5 North Plateau Groundwater Recovery System . ... * . 105 B.5.3.6 Vitrification Test Facility ........... * . 106 B.5.3.6.1 Feed Preparation ............ ................ 107 B.5.3.6.2 Melter Operations ............... . . 108 B.5.3.6.3 Off-gas Treatment ............... * . 108 B.5.3.6.4 Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 B.5.4 Description of Service and Utility Systems

. [ [ * . 109 B.5.4.1 IRTS and Main Plant Building Ventilation Systems * . 109 B.5.4.1.1 Major Components and Operating Characteristics * . 110 B.5.4.1.2 Safety Considerations and Controls ........... * . 117 B.5.4.2 Electrical .............. ..................... * . 119 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR- 002 Rev. 8 Page 6 of 393 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B.5.4.3 Compressed Air .............. .................... ... . . . 120 B.5.4.4 Steam Generation and Distribution ......... ... . . . 120 B.5.4.5 Water Supply .............. ..................... ... . . . 121 B.5.4.6 Natural Gas Supply and Distribution ........ ... . . . 122 B.5.4.7 Waste Water Treatment Facility ...... ............ ... . . . 122 B.5.4.8 Safety Communications and Alarms ...... ........... ... . . . 123 B.5.4.8.1 Safety Communications .............. ... . . . 123 B.5.4.8.2 Alarms .................. ...................... .. . . . . 123 B.5.4.9 Maintenance Systems ................ .. . . . . 124 B.5.4.10 Cold Chemical Systems .......... ................ .. . . . . 125 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.5.0 ................ ... . . . 126 B.6.0 IRTS PROCESS SYSTEMS .......... ................... ... . . . 182 B.6.1 Process Description ................. ... . . . 182 B.6.1.1 Narrative Description ............... ... . . . 182 B.6.1.2 Flowsheets ................ ..................... ... . . . 183 B.6.1.3 Identification of Items for Safety Analysis Concern ... . . . 183 B.6.1.3.1 Radiation Protection .......... ................ ... . . . 184 B.6.1.3.2 Criticality Prevention .......... .............. ... . . . 184 B.6.1.3.3 Prevention of High-Level Waste Tank Corrosion . . ... . . . 184 B.6.1.3.4 Hazardous Material Protection .......... ... . . . 185 B.6.1.3.5 Management, Organization, and Institutional Safety Provisions .. . 185 B.6.2 STS Process Chemistry and Physical Chemical Principles ... . . . 185 B.6.3 High-Level Waste Mobilization, Treatment, and Transfer ... . . . 186 B.6.3.1 Sludge Mobilization ................ ... . . . 186 B.6.3.2 Radioactive Liguid Treatment ........ ............ ... . . . 187 B.6.3.2.1 Prefiltration and Cooling ............ ... . . . 187 B.6.3.2.2 Ion Exchange .............. .................... ... . . . 187 B.6.3.2.3 Final Filtration ............ .................. ... . . . 188 B.6.3.2.4 Decontaminated Solution Collection and Transfer . ... . . . 188 B.6.3.3 High-level Waste Transfer ............. ... . . . 189 B.6.3.3.1 Zeolite Mobilization and Transfer ........ ... . . . 189 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 7 of 393 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B.6.4 Waste Concentration and Solidification . . H n . n. . . . . . . ... . . . 190 B.6.4.1 IRTS Liquid Waste Treatment ...... . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . 190 B.6.4.1.1 Feed Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . 190 B.6.4.1.2 Evaporator Concentrates and Distillate Handling . .. .. .

... . . . 191 B. 6. 4. 1.3 Evaporator Acid Wash . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . 192 B.6.4.2 Cement Solidification System ....... ... . . . 192 B.6.4.2.1 Feed Preparation and Mixing .... ... . . . 193 B.6.4.2.2 Drum Handling and Positioning . . . ... . . . 193 B.6.4.2.3 Mixer Flush System .... .......... ... . . . 194 B.6.4.2.4 Dry Cement Storage and Transfer . . ... . . . 194 B.6.5 Process Support Systems ........ ... . . . 194 B.6.5.1 Instrumentation and Control Systems ... . . . 194 B.6.5.2 System and Component Spares ..... .. . . . . 196 B.6.6 IRTS and Main Plant Control Rooms . . . .. . . . . 196 B.6.7 Sampling-Analytical .......... .. . . . . 197 B.6.7.1 Samplinq. ......... ................ .. . . . . 197 B.6.7.2 WVDP Analytical Capabilities ........ ... . . . 198 B.6.8 Product Handling ........ ............. ... . . . 198 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.6.0 ......... ... . . . 200 B.7.0 WASTE CONFINEMENT AND MANAGEMENT .... ... . . . 212 B.7.1 Waste Management Criteria ....... .

c.t.e.Mixe Wast ... . . . 212 B.7.2 Low-Level Radioactive and Low-Level Radi(oactive Mixed Wastes .. . . . . 212 B.7.3 Nonradioloaical Wastes ... ........... ... . . . 214 B.7.4 Off-Gas Treatment and Ventilation . . . ... . . . 214 B.7.4.1 Operatinq Characteristics ...... ... . . . 215 B.7.4.2 Safety Criteria and Assurance . ... ... . . . 217 B.7.5 Liquid Waste Treatment and Retention . . ... . . . 217 B.7.5.1 Design Objectives .......... ... . . . 218 B.7.5.2 Equipment and Systems Description . . . ... . . . 219 B.7.5.2.1 Neutralization Pit and Interceptors ... . . . 219 B.7.5.2.2 Lagoon System ... . . . 219 B.7.5.2.3 Low-Level Waste Treatment Replacement Facility (LLW2) . . . ....... 220 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 8 of 393 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B.7.6 Liquid Waste Solidification ................ . . . 224 B.7.7 Solid Low-Level Radioactive Wastes ........ .............. . . . 224 B.7.7.1 Desiqn Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 B.7.7.2 Equipment and Systems Description ............ . . . 225 B.7.7.2.1 Waste Reduction and Packaging Area Compactor ......... . . . 225 B.7.7.2.2 Contact Size Reduction Facility ............ .. . . . 225 B.7.7.2.3 Container Sorting and Packaging Facility ............. . . . 226 B.7.7.3 Operating Procedures .............. .................... . . . 228 B.7.7.4 Characteristics, Concentrations, and Volumes of Solid Waste . . 228 B.7.7.5 Packaging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229 B.7.7.6 Storage and Disposal Facilities ............. S.... . . . 229 B.7.8 Hazardous and Mixed Wastes ............ .................. S.... . . . 235 B.7.8.1 Characteristics and Volumes of Hazardous and Mixed Wastes S.... . . . 235 B.7.8.1.1 Hazardous Wastes .............. ..................... S.... . . . 235 B.7.8.1.2 Low-Level Radioactive Mixed Wastes ...... ............ S.... . . . 235 B.7.8.2 Storage Facilities .............. ..................... S.... . . . 235 B.7.8.3 Operatinq Procedures .............. .................... S.... . . . 239 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.7.0 ................... S.... . . . 240 B.8.0 HAZARDS PROTECTION ................ ..................... S.... . . . 255 B.8.1 Assurinq that Occupational Hazards Exposures Are ALARA . . . S.-.. . . . 255 B.8.1.1 Policy Considerations .................. S.... . . . 255 B.8.1.2 Design Considerations .................. S.... . . . 255 B.8.1.3 Operational Considerations ............ ................ S.... . . . 256 B.8.2 Sources of Hazards ................ ..................... S.... . . . 257 B.8.2.1 Contained Sources .................... S.... . . . 257 B.8.2.1.1 Contained Radioactive Material Sources .... .......... S.... . . . 257 B.8.2.1.2 Contained Hazardous Material Sources ...... ........... S.... . . . 258 B.8.2.2 Airborne Hazards Sources ............ .................. S.... . . . 259 B.8.2.2.1 Airborne Radioactive Material Sources ......... S.... . . . 259 B.8.2.2.2 Airborne Hazardous Material Sources .......... S.... . . . 260 B.8.3 Hazard Protection Design Features ............. S.... . . . 261 SAR:0000877.01

--L WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 9 of 393 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B.8.3.1 Radiation Protection Design Features ............ .................. .. 261 B.8.3.1.1 IRTS and Main Plant Design Features ........... ................. 261 B.8.3.1.2 Shielding ....................... .............................. 261 B.8.3.1.3 Ventilation ....................... ............................. 263 B.8.3.1.4 Radiation and Airborne Radioactivity Monitoring Instrumentation . 264 B.8.3.2 Hazardous Material Protection Design Features S.... . . . . . . . . 265 B.8.4 Estimated Collective On-site Dose Assessment . S.... . . . . . . . . 266 B.8.5 WVDP Hazards Protection Programs ... ........... S.... . . . . . . . . 267 B.8.5.1 WVDP Health Physics Program .......... S.... . . . . . . . . 267 B.8.5.2 WVDP Industrial Hygiene and Safety Program . . . S.... . . . . . . . . 267 B.8.6 Estimated Collective Off-site Dose Assessment S.... . . . . . . . . 268 B.8.6.1 Effluent and Environmental Monitoring Program S.... . . . . . . . . 268 B.8.6.1.1 Gas Effluent Monitoring ........... S.... . . . . . . . . 268 B.8.6.1.2 Liquid Effluent Monitoring ...... ........... S.... . . . . . . . . 269 B.8.6.2 Analysis of Multiple Contribution ....... S.... . . . . . . . . 269 B.8.6.3 Estimated Exposures from Airborne Releases . . . S.... . . . . . . . . 269 B.8.6.4 Estimated Exposures from Liquid Releases .... S.... . . . . . . . . 270 B.8.7.1 Introduction ............ ................... S.... . . . . . . . . 270 B.8.7.2 Requirements ............ ................... S.... . . . . . . . . 270 B.8.7.3 Criticality Concerns .......... .............. S.... . . . . . . . . 272 B.8.7.3.1 STS/SMWS Criticality Concerns ........ S.... . . . . . . . . 272 B.8.7.3.2 LWTS Criticality Concerns .......... S.... . . . . . . . . 275 B.8.7.3.3 Main Plant Criticality Concerns ....... S.... . . . . . . . . 275 B.8.7.3.4 Lag Storage Facility Criticality Concerns . . S.... . . . . . . . . 276 B.8.7.4 Criticality Controls .......... .............. S.... . . . . . . . . 278 B.8.7.4.1 Engineering Controls ........ .............. S.... . . . . . . . . 278 B.8.7.4.2 Administrative Controls ........... S.... . . . . . . . . 278 B.8.7.4.3 Application of Double Contingency ...... S.... . . . . . . . . 279 B.8.7.5 Criticality Protection Program .... .......... S.... . . . . . . . . 279 B.8.7.5.1 Criticality Safety Organization ....... S.... . . . . . . . . 279 B.8.7.5.2 Criticality Safety Plans and Procedures . . . S.... . . . . . . . . 280 B.8.7.5.3 Criticality Safety Training ......... 280 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 10 of 393 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B.8.7.5.4 Determination of Operational Nuclear Criticality Limits S.... . . 280 B.8.7.5.5 Criticality Safety Inspection/Audits S.... . . 281 B.8.7.5.6 Criticality Infraction Reporting and Follow-Up . .. .. . . . 281 B.8.7.6 Criticality Instrumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282 B.8.8 Fire Protection ...... ................. S. . . . . . . . . . . . . 283 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.8.0 ......... * . . . . . . . . . . . . 284 B.9.0 HAZARD AND ACCIDENT ANALYSES ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 313 B.9.1 Hazard Analysis ............ . . 313 B.9.1.1 Methodoloqy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S.... . . 313 B.9.1.1.1 Hazard Identification ....... S.... . . 313 S. . . . . . . . . . .

B.9.1.1.2 Hazard Evaluation ......... S.... . . 314 B.9.1.2 Hazard Analysis Results ....... S.... . . 315 B.9.1.2.1 Hazard Identification ....... S.... . . 315 B.9.1.2.2 Hazard Classification ....... . . . . . . . . . . . S.... . . 315 B.9.1.2.3 Hazard Evaluation ......... S. . . . . . . . . . . S.... . . 315 B.9.1.3 WVDP Evaluation Guidelines (EGs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S.... . . 316 B.9.2 Accident Analyses ........... . . . . . . . . . . . S.... . . 318 B.9.2.1 Methodology . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S.... . . 318 B.9.2.1.1 Initiating Event Summary ......... . . . . . . . . . . . S.... . . 320 B.9.2.1.2 Scenario Development ............. . . . . . . . . . . . S.... . . 321 B.9.2.1.3 Source Term Analysis ............. * . . . . . . . . . . S.... . . 321 B.9.2.1.4 Consequence Analysis ............. * . . . . . . . . . . S.... . . 321 B.9.2.1.5 Comparison to Guidelines ......... . . . . . . . . . . . S.... . . 322 B.9.2.2 Operational Accidents ........ . . . . . . . . . . . S.... . . 322 B.9.2.2.1 Ventilation System Filter Failure . . . . . . . . . . . . S.... . . 322 B.9.2.2.2 Hydrogen Peroxide Spill ...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 324 B.9.2.2.3 Main Plant Transformer Rupture . . . . . 326 B.9.2.2.4 Fire In Lag Storage Facility . . . . . 327 B.9.2.3 Natural Phenomena Events ........... . . 328 B. 9.2.3.1 Earthquake Induced Failure of Tank 8D-2 Roof and Vault . . . 328 B.9.2.3.2 Earthquake Induced Failure of LLWTS Storage Lagoon 2 S.... . . . . 330 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 11 of 393 TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

B.9.2.4 Accident Analysis Summary ................. . 331 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.9.0 .................... . 332 B.10.0 CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS ................ .................... . 382 B.10.1 Management, Orqanization, and Institutional Safety Provisions . 382 B.10.1.1 Organizational Structure ............ ................... . 382 B.10.1.2 Organizational Responsibilities .............. . 382 B.10.1.3 Staffing and Oualifications ................ . 382 B.10.1.4 Safety Management Policies and Programs ...... ........... . 382 B.10.2 Procedures and Training .............. .................... . 383 B.10.2.1 Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383 B.10.2.2 Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383 B.10.3 Initial Testing, In-Service Surveillance, and Maintenance . . . 383 B.10.3.1 Initial Testing Program ............ ................... . 383 B.10.3.2 In-Service Surveillance and Maintenance Program ......... . 383 B.10.4 Operational Safety .................. ...................... . 383 B.10.4.1 Conduct of Operations .............. .................... S.... . 383 B.10.4.2 Fire Protection .................. ...................... S.... . 383 B.10.5 Emergency Preparedness Program ............... S.... . 384 B.10.6 Decontamination and Decommissioning ........ .............. S.... . 384 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.10.0 ................ .................... S.... . 385 B.11.0 TECHNICAL SAFETY REQUIREMENTS ............ ................ S.... . 389 B.11.1 Introduction . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S.... . 389 B.11.2 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S.... . 389 B.11.3 TSR Input .................... .......................... S.... . 389 B.11.3.1 Safety Limits and Limiting Conditions for Operation . ... S.... . 389 B.11.3.2 Design Features .................. ...................... S.... . 390 B.11.3.3 Administrative C6ntrols ............ ................... S.... . 390 B.11.4 Interface With TSRs From Other Facilities ...... ........... S.... . 390 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.11.0 ................ .................... S.... . 391 B.12.0 QUALITY ASSURANCE .................. ...................... S.... . 392 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.12.0 .............. ..................... S.... . 393 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 12 of 393 LIST OF TABLES Table Number Page Table B.1.6-1 Location of DOE Order 5480.23 Required Information in WVNS-SAR-002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Table B.2.6-1 Summary of Consequences of IRTS, Main Plant and Support Facility Accidents ................... . . . 51 Table B.4.1-1 Tank 8D-2 Total Activity .......... ................... .. 74 Table B.4.1-2 WVDP Low-Level Radioactive Waste Summary ..... ........... .. 75 Table B.4.2-1 Summary of Reprocessing Building Seismic Analysis Results ... 76 Table B.5.1-1 Non-Radioactive Water Outside Storage Tanks and Surface Impoundments ................... ......................... 129 Table B.5.2-1 IRTS Equipment Design Codes and Standards .... ........... .. 130 Table B.5.2-2 Design Codes and Standards for Key IRTS Equipment ... ....... .. 131 Table B.5.2-3 Original Design Codes and Standards for the Main Plant .... 132 Table B.5.2-4 Summary of Major Equipment in the WTF and STS .... ......... .. 133 Table B.5.2-5 Summary of Major Equipment in LWTS Cells of the Main Plant . . 134 Table B.5.2-6 Summary of Major Equipment in General Main Plant cells . ... 135 Table B.5.2-7 Summary of Major CSS Equipment in the 01-14 Building ....... .. 136 Table B.5.3-1 High Level Waste Leak Detection Systems ...... ............ .. 137 Table B.5.4-1 Summary of Filter Monitoring Instrumentation ... ......... .. 138 Table B.5.4-2 Summary of Utility Supply Capabilities ....... ............ 139 Table B.5.4-3 IRTS Utility Requirements ............ ................... .. 140 Table B.6.5-1 STS Process Instrumentation ............ .................. 202 Table B.7.1-1 Waste Management Plans, Codes and Regulations Employed at the WVDP ................ ........................ . . . 242 Table B.7.4-1 Summary of Off-Gas Filter Monitoring Instrumentation . . . . . 243 Table B.7.4-2 Vessels Ventilated by the Vessel Off-Gas System ........ . . . 244 Table B.7.5-1 Comparison of 1998 LLWTS Effluent Isotopic Concentrations to Eight Year Average Isotopic Concentrations .......... . . . 245 Table B.7.7-1 Typical Inventory of Waste Stored at the WVDP ......... . . . 246 Table B.7.7-2 Typical Radiological Inventory of Lag Storage Waste Containers ... . . . . . . . . 247 Table B.7.7-3 Waste Type and Available Storage Locations in WVDP Lag Storage Facilities ................. 248 Table B.7.7-4 Contents, Activity, and Fissile Mass in the Twenty-two Waste Storage Boxes stored in the CPC-WSA .... ........ . . . 249 Table B.7.7-5 NDA Waste Disposal Summary Profile ........... . . . 251 Table B.8.2-1 Design Basis Cs-137 Concentrations for IRTS Facilities .... 289 Table B.8.2-2 Gamma Curies of Design Fuel for the Main Plant Building .... 290 Table B.8.3-1 Summary of STS Shielding Calculations ........ ............. .. 291 Table B.8.3-2 Results of LWTS Shielding Analyses ......... .............. 293 Table B.8.3-3 Shielding Summary for Source Area - Process Mechanical Cell 294 Table B.8.3-4 Shielding Summary for Source Area - General Purpose Cell 295 Table B.8.3-5 Shielding Summary for Source Area - Chemical Process Cell . 296 Table B.8.3-6 Shielding Summary for Source Area - Extraction Cell No. 3 . 297 Table B.8.3-7 Shielding Summary for Source Area - Analytical Cells ....... .. 298 Table B.8.3-8 Specifications of Monitoring Instruments ..... ........... .. 299 Table B.8.3-9 Process and Effluent Radiation Monitors ...... ............ .. 300 Table B.8.3-10 Continuous Airborne Radioactivity Monitors ..... .......... .. 301 Table B.8.4-1 Typical Annual Occupational Exposures Due to Main Plant and IRTS Operations, and Support Activities ........... ............... 303 Table B.8.6-1 Airborne Radionuclide Emissions for the Year 1998 Reported in the 1998 Annual Site Environmental Report (WVNS, 1999) .. ...... .. 304 Table B.8.6-2 Site Annual (1998) Liquid Effluent Discharges .... ......... .. 305 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 13 of 393 LIST OF TABLES Table Number Page Table B.8.7-1 Fissionable Material Inventory for Tank 8D-2 and Maximum Envelope for Ion Exchange Columns ............... ................... 306 Table B.8.7-2 Material Compositions and Atom Densities for KENO-V Calculations ............... . . . 307 Table B.8.7-3 Summary of Criticality Evaluation for the Zeolite Column of SMWS ............ ......................... . . . 308 Table B.8.7-4 keff For a 1.0 kg Pu-239 Sphere in the Center of the Zeolite Column . . . 309 Table B.8.7-5 keff For a 22.5 cm Pu-239 Sphere in the Center of the Zeolite Column . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 310 Table B.8.7-6 Estimate of Fissile Material in Main Plant Cells for Reference Year 1994 .............. ................... . . . 311 Table B.9.1-1 Process Hazards Analysis for the Main Plant and Waste Processing Facilities ............ ................... . . . 334 Table B.9.2-1 Failure of Main Plant HEPA Filter Bank ......... . . . 374 Table B.9.2-2 Lag Storage Facility Fire .......... ................. . . . 375 Table B.9.2-3 Failure of Tank 8D-2 Vault .... . . . 376 Table B.9.2-4 Low Level Waste Treatment Facility Accident - Earthquake Induced Lagoon Failure ................. . . . 377 Table B.9.2-5 Summary of Consequences of IRTS, Main Plant and Support Facility Accidents ................... . . . 378 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR--002 Rev. 8 Page 14 of 393 LIST OF FIGURES Figure B. 1.1-1 Waste Processing Flow Diagram Figure B.1.1-2 Supernatant Treatment System Process Flow Diagram Figure B.1. 1-3 Liquid Waste Treatment System Process Flow Diagram Figure B.1. 1-4 Cement Solidification System Process Flow Diagram Figure B.5.1-1 Location of Select Facilities Covered in WVNS-SAR-002 Figure B.5.1-2 Location of West Valley Demonstration Project Figure B. 5.2-1 Plan View - HLW Tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2 Figure B. 5.2-la Purex HLW Tank Internal Floor Structure Figure B.5.2-2 STS Process Facilities Section Figure B. 5.2-3 General Arrangement - STS Tank 8D-1 Section Figure B.5.2-4 General Arrangements STS Building and 8D-3 & 4 Tanks - Plan Elevation 92.0' Figure B.5.2-5 General Arrangement STS Building - Plan Elevation 107.0' Figure B.5.2-6 General Arrangement - STS Building Sections Figure B.5.2-7 HLW Tank 8D-3 and Tank 8D-4 Section Figure B.5.2-8 High Level Waste Transfer System Plan Figure B.5.2-9 High Level Waste Transfer System Section Figure B.5.2-10 Main Plant Plan Below Grade Figure B. 5.2-11 Main Plant Plan at Elevation 100.0' Figure B.5.2-12 Main Plant Plan at Elevation 114.5' Figure B.5.2-13 Main Plant Plan at Elevation 131.0' Figure B.5.2-14 Main Plant Plan at Elevation 144.0' Figure B. 5.2-15 Main Plant Plan at Elevation 160.0' Figure B.5.2-16 Equipment Arrangement - Off Gas and Acid Recovery Cells - Plan Elevation 111'-6" to 128'-3" Figure B.5.2-17 Equipment Arrangement - Off Gas Cell, Schematic Elevation Figure B. 5.2-18 Equipment Arrangement - Liquid Waste Cell Plan Figure B.5.2-19 Equipment Arrangement - Liquid Waste Tankage Cell - Section A-A Figure B.5.2-20 LWTS Plan at Elevation 100.0' Figure B.5.2-21 LWTS Plan at Elevation 114.5' Figure B.5.2-22 LWTS Plan at Elevation 131.0' Figure B. 5.2-23 LWTS Plan at Elevation 144.0' Figure B.5.2-24 LWTS Plan at Elevation 160.0' Figure B.5.2-25 LWTS Plan at Elevation 131.0' Figure B. 5. 2-26 General Arrangement - LWTS Sections Figure B.5.2-27 General Arrangement - 01/14 Building Plan Elevatio n 98.0' Figure B. 5.2-28 General Arrangement - 01/14 Building Plan Elevatio n 116.5' Figure B. 5.2-29 General Arrangement - 01/14 Building Plan Elevatiojn 130.0' Figure B. 5. 2-30 General Arrangement - 01/14 Building Plan Elevatio n 144.0' Figure B. 5.2-31 General Arrangement - 01/14 Building Sections Figure B.5.2-32 Drum Cell Layout Plan Figure B. 5.4-1 Building and Off-Gas Treatment Ventilation Systems Figure B. 5.4-2 STS Building Ventilation Flow Figure B.5.4-3 Main Ventilation System Flow Figure B.5.4-4 Head End Ventilation System Flow Figure B.5.4-5 01/14 Building Ventilation Flow Figure B.5.4-6 Natural Gas Distribution System On-site Figure B.6.1-1 IRTS Process Flow Diagram - Supernatant Treatment, Waste Mobilization & Transfer, and Pneumatic Sample Transport Systems Figure B.6.1-2 IRTS Process Flow Diagram - Liquid Waste Treatment System SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 15 of 393 LIST OF FIGURES (concluded)

Figure B.6.1-3 IRTS Process Flow Diagram - Cement Solidification System Figure B.6.6-1 Control Room Locations Figure B.7.5-1 Flow Diagram of Low-level Waste Treatment System Figure B. 7.5-2 Estimated Annual Water Balance for LLWTS for CY98 Figure B. 7.7-1 Location of Waste Storage and Processing Facilities Figure B.8.7-1 STS Ion Exchange Column Figure B.9.1-1 Process Hazards Analysis Risk Bins Figure B.9.1-2 Evaluation Guidelines for the Off-site Evaluation Point for Radiological Accidents Figure B.9.1-3 Evaluation Guidelines for the On-site Evaluation Point for Radiological Accidents Figure B. 10.1-1 Site Operations & Facility Closure Projects Organization Figure B. 10.1-2 HLW Projects Organization Figure B.10.1-3 Waste, Fuel, & Environmental Projects Organization SAR: 0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 16 of 393 ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS A/E Architect/Engineer A Angstrom (108 centimeter)

A&PC Analytical and Process Chemistry AA Atomic Absorption AAC Assembly Area Coordinator AADT Average Annual Daily Traffic ABA Authorization Basis Addendum ACC Ashford Community Center ACFM Absolute Cubic Feet Per Minute ACGIH American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists ACI American Concrete Institute A/E Architect/Engineer AEA Atomic Energy Act AEC Atomic Energy Commission AED Assistant Emergency Director AEDE Annual Effective Dose Equivalent AEOC Alternate Emergency Operations Center AES Atomic Emission Spectrophotometer AIHA American Industrial Hygiene Association AISC American Institute of Steel Construction AISI American Iron and Steel Institute ALARA As Low As Reasonably Achievable ALI Annual Limit of Intake ALS Advanced Life Saving AMCA Air Movement and Control Association AMS Aerial Measurement System AMS Alarm Monitoring Station ANC Analytical Cell ANL Argonne National Laboratory ANS American Nuclear Society ANSI American National Standards Institute AOC Ashford Office Complex APOC Abnormal Pump Operating Condition AR-OG Acid Recovery - Off-Gas ARC Acid Recovery Cell ARF Airborne Release Fraction ARI Air-Conditioning and Refrigeration Institute ARM Area Radiation Monitor ARPR Acid Recovery Pump Room ARR Airborne Release Rate ASCE American Society of Civil Engineers ASER Annual Site Environmental Report ASHRAE American Society of Heating, Refrigeration, and Air-Conditioning Engineers ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASTM American Society for Testing and Materials AU Alfred University AWS American Welding Society B&P Buffalo & Pittsburgh BDAT Best Demonstrated Available Technology BDB Beyond Design Basis BDBE Beyond Design Basis Earthquake SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 17 of 393 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

BNFL British Nuclear Fuels Limited BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory Bq Becquerel BRP Big Rock Point BSW Bulk Storage Warehouse BWR Boiling Water Reactor c Centi, prefix for 10-2 C Coulomb CAM Continuous Air Monitor CAS Criticality Alarm System cc Cubic Centimeter CC Communications Coordinator CCB Cold Chemical Building CCDS Cold Chemical Delivery System CCR Chemical Crane Room CCS Chilled Water System CCSR Cold Chemical Scale Room CCSS Cold Chemical Sump Station CCTV Closed-Circuit Television CDDS Computer Data Display System CDS Criticality Detection System CEC Cation Exchange Capacity CEDE Committed Effective Dose Equivalent cfm Cubic feet per minute CFMT Concentrator Feed Make-up Tank CFR Code of Federal Regulations cfs Cubic feet per second CGA Compressed Gas Association CHT Condensate Hold Tank Ci Curie CLCW Closed-Loop Cooling Water cm Centimeter CMAA Crane Manufacturers Association of America CMP Construction Management Procedure CMR Crane Maintenance Room COA Chemical Operating Aisle CPC Chemical Process Cell CPC-WSA Chemical Process Cell Waste Storage Area cpm Counts per minute CR Control Room CRM Community Relations Manager CRT Cathode Ray Tube Cs Cesium CSDM Cognizant System Design Manager CSE Criticality Safety Engineer CSE Cognizant System Engineer CSER Confined Space Entry Rescue CSPF Container Sorting and Packaging Facility CSR Confined Space Rescue CSRF Contact Size Reduction Facility CSS Cement Solidification System cSv centi-Sievert SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 18 of 393 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

CTS Component Test Stand CUA Catholic University of America CUP Cask Unloading Pool Cv Column Volume CVA Chemical Viewing Aisle CW Cooling Tower Water CWTP Commercial Waste Treatment System CY Calendar Year D&D Decontamination and Decommissioning D&M Dames & Moore DAC Derived Air Concentration DAS Data Acquisition System DB Dry Bulb DBA Design Basis Accident DBE Design Basis Earthquake DBT Design Basis Tornado DBW Design Basis Wind DC Drum Cell DCF Dose Conversion Factor DCG Derived Concentration Guide DCS Distributed Control System DEAR Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation DF Decontamination Factor DGR Diesel Generator Room DOE Department of Energy DOE-EM Department of Energy - Environmental Management DOE-HQ Department of Energy - Headquarters DOE-HQ-EOC Department of Energy - Headquarters - Emergency Operations Center DOE-ID Department of Energy - Idaho DOE-OCRWM Department of Energy - Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management DOE-OH Department of Energy - Ohio Field Office DOE-PD Department of Energy - Project Director DOE-WV Department of Energy - West Valley Area Office DOE-WVDP Department of Energy - West Valley Demonstration Project DOELAP Department of Energy Laboratory Accreditation Program DOP Dioctylphthalate DOSR DOE On-Site Representative DOT Department of Transportation DP Differential Pressure dpm Disintegrations per minute DR Data Recorder DR Damage Ratio DVP Developmental Procedure DWPF Defense Waste Processing Facility DWS Demineralized Water System E-Spec Equipment Specification EA&SRP Engineering Administration & Safety Review Program EBA Evaluation Basis Accident EBE Evaluation Basis Earthquake ECN Engineering Change Notice ECO Environmental Control Officer SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 19 of 393 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

ED Emergency Director EDE Effective Dose Equivalent EDR Equipment Decontamination Room EDRVA Equipment Decontamination Room Viewing Aisle EDS Electrical Power Distribution EG Evaluation Guideline EHS Employee Health Services EID Environmental Information Document EIP Emergency Implementing Procedure EIS Environmental Impact Statement EMC Emergency Management Coordinator EMOA East Mechanical Operating Aisle EMP Emergency Management Procedure EMRT Emergency Medical Response Team EMT Emergency Medical Technician EMT Environmental Monitoring Team EMU Emergency Medical Unit EOC Emergency Operation Center EP Engineering Procedure EPA Environmental Protection Agency EPD Elevation Plant Datum EPI Emergency Prediction Information EPIcode Emergency Protection Information Code EPRI Electric Power Research Institute EPZ Emergency Protection Zone ERO Emergency Response Organization ERPG Emergency Response Planning Guideline ES&H Environmental, Safety, and Health ESA Endangered Species Act ESH&QA Environmental, Safety, Health, and Quality Assurance ESQA&LO Environmental, Safety, Quality Assurance, and Laboratory Operations FACTS Functional and Checklist Testing of Systems FBC Fire Brigade Chief FBR Fluidized Bed Reactor FFCA Federal Facility Compliance Act FHA Fire Hazards Analysis FM Factory Mutual fpm Feet per minute fps Feet per second FRI Feed Reduction Index FRS Fuel Receiving and Storage FSAR Final Safety Analysis Report FSFCA Federal and-State Facility Compliance Act FSP Fuel Storage Pool ft Feet FWCA Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act g Gram g Gravitational Acceleration Constant G Giga, prefix for 101 GAC Granular Activated Carbon gal Gallon SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 20 of 393 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

GC Gas Chromatograph GCR General Purpose Cell Crane Room GCS Gravelly Clayey Soils GE General Electric GET General Employee Training GFE Government Furnished Equipment gM Gravelly mud GM Geometric Mean GM Geiger-Mueller GOA General Purpose Cell Operating Aisle GOALS General Office Automated Logging System GOCO Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated GPC General Purpose Cell GPCCR General Purpose Cell Crane Room GPCCRE General Purpose Cell Crane Room Enclosure gpd Gallons per day GPLT General Purpose LAN Interface gpm Gallons per minute GRS General Record Schedule Gý Specific gravity GTAW Gas Tungsten Arc Welding h Hour ha Hectare HAC Hot Acid Cell HAF Hot Acid Feed HAPR Hot Acid Pump Room HAZMAT Hazardous Materials HAZWOPER Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response HDC High Density Concrete HEC Head End Cells HEME High Efficiency Mist Eliminator HEPA High Efficiency Particulate Air HEV Head End Ventilation HFE Human Factors Engineering HIC High Integrity Container HLDS High-Level Drainage System HLW High-Level Waste HLWIS High-Level Waste Interim Storage HLWISA High-Level Waste Interim Storage Area HLWTS High-Level Waste Transfer System hp Horsepower HPGe Hyperpure Germanium HPLC High Performance Liquid Chromatography HPS High Pressure Sodium HRA Human Reliability Analysis HRM Human Resources Manager HV Heating and Ventilation HVAC Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning HVOS Heating, Ventilation Operating Station HWSF Hazardous Waste Storage Facility SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 21 of 393 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued) i.d. Inner Diameter I&C Instrumentation and Control IA Instrument Air IC Incident Commander ICEA Insulated Cable Engineers Association ICP Inductively Coupled Plasma ICR Instrument Calibration Recall ICRP International Commission on Radiological Protection ID Idaho IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers IES Illuminating Engineering Society IH&S Industrial Hygiene and Safety ILDS Infrared Level Detection System in Inch INEL Idaho National Engineering Laboratory INEEL Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory IRTS Integrated Radwaste Treatment System ISM Integrated Safety Management ISMS Integrated Safety Management System IV&V Independent Validation and Verification IWP Industrial Work Permit IWSF Interim Waste Storage Facility IX Ion Exchange JIC Joint Information Center JTG Joint Test Group k Neutron Multiplication Factor k Kilo, prefix for 101 Kd Partition Coefficient keff Effective Neutron Multiplication Factor kg Kilogram Kh Horizontal hydraulic conductivity kN Kilo-Newton kPa Kilo-Pascal kPag Kilo-Pascal gauge kph Kilometer per hour kV Kilo-Volt K, Vertical hydraulic conductivity kVA Kilovolt-ampere kW kilo-Watt L Liter LAH Level Alarm High LAN Local Area Network LANL Los Alamos National Laboratory LAP Laboratory Accreditation Program LAP Lower Annealing Point LASL Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory lb Pound LCO Limiting Condition for Operation lfpm Linear feet per minute SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 22 of 393 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

LFR Live Fire Range LI Level Indicate LIMS Laboratory Information Management System LITCO Lockheed Idaho Technologies Corporation LLDS Low-Level Drainage System LLL Lawrence Livermore Laboratory LLNL Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory LLRW Low-Level Radioactive Waste LLW Low-Level Waste LLW2 Low-Level Waste Treatment Replacement Facility LLWTF Low-Level Waste Treatment Facility LLWTS Low-Level Waste Treatment System LM Liaison Manager LMITCO Lockheed-Martin Idaho Technologies Corporation LOS Level of Service LOVS Loss of Voltage Signal LPF Leak Path Factor LPG Liquid Propane Gas 1pm Liters per minute LPM Liters per minute LPS Liquid Pretreatment System LR Level Record LSA Lag Storage Area LUNR Land Use and Natural Resources LWA Lower Warm Aisle LWC Liquid Waste Cell LWTS Liquid Waste Treatment System LXA Lower Extraction Aisle m Meter m/s Meters per second m Milli, prefix for 10-1 M Mega, prefix for 106 M&O Maintenance and Operations M&O Management and Operating M&TE Maintenance and Test Equipment MAR Material at Risk Mob Earthquake Magnitude MBtu Mega-British Thermal Units MC Miniature Cell MCC Materials Characterization Center MCC Motor Control Center MCE Maximum Credible Earthquake mCi milli-Curie MEOSI Maximally Exposed Off-Site Individual MeV Mega-electron Volt MFHT Melter Feed Hold Tank mG Muddy gravels mi Mile MMI Modified Mercalli Intensity M&O Management and Operating MOA Mechanical Operating Aisle MOI Maximally Exposed Off-Site Individual SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 23 of 393 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued) mol Mole MOU Memorandum of Understanding MPag Mega-Pascal gauge MPC Maximum Permissible Concentration MPFL Maximum Possible Fire Loss mph Miles per hour MPO Main Plant Operator MPOSS Main Plant Operations Shift Supervisor mR/hr Milli-Roentgen per hour MRC Master Records Center mrem Millirem MRR Manipulator Repair Room MSDS Material Safety Data Sheet msG Muddy Sandy Gravels MSM Master-Slave Manipulator mSv milli-Sievert MT Metric Ton MTIHM Metric Tons Initial Heavy Metal MTU Metric Tons Uranium MUF Material-Unaccounted-For MW Mega-Watt MWD Mega-Watt-Day n Nano, prefix for 10' Na Sodium NAA North Analytical Aisle NAD Nuclear Accident Dosimeter NARA National Archives and Records Administration NDA NRC-Licensed Disposal Area NDA-LPS NRC-Licensed-Disposal Area - Liquid Pretreatment System ne Effective porosity NEC National Electric Code NEMA National Electrical Manufacturers Association NEPA National Environmental Policy Act NESHAP National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants NFPA National Fire Protection Association NFS Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.

NGVD National Geodetic Vertical Datum NIOSH National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology NMC News Media Center NMPC Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NP North Plateau NPH Natural Phenomena Hazard NPPS North Plateau Pump System NPPTS North Plateau Pump and Treatment System NQA Nuclear Quality Assurance NR Nonconformance Report NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRRPT National Registry of Radiation Protection Technology NWS National Weather Service SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 24 of 393 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

NY New York NYCRR New York Code of Rules and Regulations NYS New York State NYSDEC New York State Department of Environmental Conservation NYSDOH New York State Department of Health NYSERDA New York State Energy Research and Development Authority NYSGS New York State Geological Survey o.d. Outer Diameter OAAM Operational Accident Assessment Manager OAM Operational Assessment Manager OB Office Building OBE Operating Basis Earthquake OEP On-Site Evaluation Point OGA Off-Gas Aisle OGBR Off-Gas Blower Room OGC Off-Gas Cell OGMR Off-Gas Monitoring Room OGTS Off Gas Treatment System OH DOE, Ohio Field Office OH/WVDP Ohio Field Office, West Valley Demonstration Project OJT On-the-Job Training OM Operations Manager OOS Out-of-Service ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory ORR Operational Readiness Review ORRB Operational Readiness Review Board ORT Operations Response Team OSC Operations Support Center OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Act OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration OSR Operational Safety-Requirement OZ Ounce p Pico, prefix for 10-12 P Peta, prefix for 101" P&ID Piping and Instrument Diagram Pa Pascal PA Project Appraisals PAG Protective Action Guideline PAH Pressure Alarm High PBT Performance-Based Training PC Partition Coefficient PCB Polychlorinated Biphenyl PCDOCS Personal Computer Document Organization and Control Software pcf Pounds per cubic foot PCH Pressure Control High PCM Personal Contamination Monitor PCR Process Chemical Room PD Project Director PDAH Pressure Differential Alarm High PDAL Pressure Differential Alarm Low PDCH Pressure Differential Control High SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 25 of 393 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

PDCL Pressure Differential Control Low PDR Pressure Differential Record PEL Permissible Exposure Limit PF Personnel Frisker PGA Peak Ground Acceleration PGSC Pasquill-Gifford Stability Class PHA Process Hazards Analysis PHA Product Handling Area PID Public Information Director PLC Programmable Logic Controller PM Preventive Maintenance PMC Process Mechanical Cell PMCR Process Mechanical Cell Crane Room PMCRE Process Mechanical Cell Crane Room Enclosure PMF Probable Maximum Flood PMP Probable Maximum Precipitation PMP Project Management Plan PNL Pacific Northwest Laboratory PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory PPB Parts Per Billion PPC Product Purification Cell ppm Parts Per Million PPM Parts Per Million PPS Product Packaging and Shipping PRC Pressure Record Control PRM Process Radiation Monitor PSAR Preliminary Safety Analysis Report psf Pound per square foot psi Pound per square inch psig Pound per square inch gauge PSO Plant Systems Operations PSO Plant Systems Operator PSR Process Safety Requirement Pu Plutonium PVC Polyvinyl chloride PVS Permanent Ventilation System PVU Portable Ventilation Unit PWR Pressurized Water Reactor PWS Potable Water System QA Quality Assurance QA/QC Quality Assurance/Quality Control QAP Quality Assurance Program QAP Quality Assurance Plan QAPD Quality Assurance Program Description QARD Quality Assurance Requirements Document QCN Qualification Change Notice QM Quality Management R Roentgen R/hr Roentgen per hour R&S Radiation and Safety R&SC Radiation and Safety Committee SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR- 002 Rev. 8 Page 26 of 393 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

RAP Radiological Assistance Plan RCO Radiological Controls Operations RCOS Radiological Controls Operations Supervisor RCRA Resource Conservation and Recovery Act RCT Radiological Control Technician RCTC Radiological Control Team Commander RCTL Radiation Control Team Leader REAAM Radiological and Environmental Accident Assessment Manager REAM Radiological and Environmental Assessment Manager REG Robert E. Ginna rem Roentgen Equivalent Man RER Ram Equipment Room RESL Radiological and Environmental Sciences Laboratory RF Respirable Fraction RID Records Inventory and Disposition Schedule RMW Radioactive Mixed Waste RP Radiation Protection rpm Revolutions per minute RPM Revolutions Per Minute RPM Radiation Protection Manager RPSA Rail Packaging and Staging Area Rt Route RTS Radwaste Treatment System RWI Radiological Worker I RWII Radiological Worker II RWP Radiation Work Permit s Second S&EA Safety and Environmental Assessment SA&I Safety Analysis and Integration SAA Satellite Accumulation Area SAI Science Applications International SAR Safety Analysis Report SBS Submerged Bed Scrubber SCBA Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus scfm Standard cubic feet per minute SCR Selective Catalytic Reduction SCS Soil Conservation Service SCSSCs Safety-Class Structures, Systems, and Components SDA New York State-Licensed Disposal Area SEAM Safety and Environmental Assessment Manager sec Second SER Site Environmental Report SFCM Slurry-Fed Ceramic Melter SFPE Society of Fire Protection Engineers SFR Secondary Filter Room SGN Society Generale pour les Techniques Nouvelles SGR Switch Gear Room SI International System of Units SIP Special Instruction Procedure slpm Standard liter per minute SM Security Manager SMACNA Sheet Metal and Air Conditioning Contractors National Association SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 27 of 393 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

SMS Sludge Mobilization System SMT Slurry Mix Tank SMWS Sludge Mobilization and Wash System SNF Spent Nuclear Fuel SNL Sandia National Lab SNM Special Nuclear Material SO Security Officer SOG Seismic Owner's Group SOP Standard Operating Procedure SPDES State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System SPO Security Police Officer Sr Strontium SR Surveillance Requirement SRE Search and Reentry SRL Savannah River Laboratory SRR Scrap Removal Room SRSS Square-root-of-the-sum-of-the-squares SS Stainless Steel SSC Sample Storage Cell SSCs Structures, Systems, and Components SSE Safe Shutdown Earthquake SSS Security Shift Supervisor SSS Slurry Sample System SSWMU Super Solid Waste Management Unit STC Sample Transfer Cell STD Standard STP Standard Temperature and Pressure STS Supernatant Treatment System Sv Sievert SVS Scale Vitrification System SWC Surge Withstand Capability SWMU Solid Waste Management Unit T Tera, prefix for 1012 TBP Tri-butyl phosphate TE Test Exception TEDE Total Effective Dose Equivalent TEEL Temporary Emergency Exposure Limit Ti Titanium TID Tamper-Indicating Device TIG Tungsten Inert Gas TIP Test Implementation Plan TIP Test In-Place TIP Test Instruction Procedure TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter TLV Threshold Limit Value TN Transnuclear, Inc.

TPC Test Procedure Change TPL Test Plan TR Technical Requirement TRG Technical Review Group TRMS Training Records Management System TRR Test Results Report SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 28 of 393 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Continued)

TRU Transuranic TSB Test and Storage Building TSC Technical Support Center TSCS Technical Support Center Staff TSD Technical Support Document TSR Technical Safety Requirement TVS Temporary Ventilation System UA Utility Air UAP Upper Annealing Point UBC Uniform Building Code UCRL University of California Research Laboratory UDF Unit Dose Factor UL Underwriters Laboratories, Inc.

ULO Uranium Load Out UPC Uranium Product Cell UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply UR Utility Room USDOE U. S. Department of Energy USDOI U. S. Department of the Interior USDOL U. S. Department of Labor USDOT U. S. Department of Transportation USEPA U. S. Environmental Protection Agency USGS U. S. Geological Survey USNRC U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission USQ Unreviewed Safety Question USQD Unreviewed Safety Question Determination UWA Upper Warm Aisle UWS Utility Water Supply UXA Upper Extraction Aisle V Volt VA Volt-Ampere VAC Volt Alternating Current VDC Volt Direct Current V&S Ventilation and Service Building VEC Ventilation Exhaust Cell VF Vitrification Facility VFFCP Vitrification Facility Fire Control Panel VIV Variable Inlet Vane VL Vitrification Liaison VOG Vessel Off-Gas VOSS Vitrification Operations Shift Supervisor VPP Voluntary Protection Program VS Vitrification System VSR Ventilation Supply Room VTF Vitrification Test Facility VWR Ventilation Wash Room W Watt WAPS Waste Acceptance Product Specifications WC Water Column WCC Warning Communications Center SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 29 of 393 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS (Concluded)

WCCC Warning Communications Center Communicator WDC Waste Dispensing Cell WDV Waste Dispensing Vessel WGES Westinghouse Government Environmental Services WHC Westinghouse Hanford Company WHSE Warehouse WIPP Waste Isolation Pilot Plant WMO Waste Management Operations WMO Westinghouse Maintenance Operation WMOA West Mechanical Operating Aisle WNYNSC Western New York Nuclear Service Center WO Work Order WQR Waste Qualification Report WRPA Waste Reduction and Packaging Area wt% Weight percent WTF Waste Tank Farm WTFVS Waste Tank Farm Ventilation System WVDP West Valley Demonstration Project WVNS West Valley Nuclear Services Company WVPP West Valley Policies and Procedures WVVHC West Valley Volunteer Hose Company XC-I Extraction Cell 1 XC-2 Extraction Cell 2 XC-3 Extraction Cell 3 XCR Extraction Chemical Room XSA Extraction Sample Aisle y Year Y, Dry density YOY Young of Year yr Year Y2K Year 2000 OC Degrees Celsius OF Degrees Fahrenheit P Micro, prefix for 10-1 x/Q Relative concentration SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 30 of 393 B.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

AND GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE IRTS/MAIN PLANT B.1.1 Introduction The West Valley Fuel Reprocessing Plant (Main Plant) was originally constructed by Bechtel Corporation from 1963 to 1966 for Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. The reprocessing facility provided for spent fuel storage, mechanical handling, dissolution, chemical extraction, and product and by-product handling with a reprocessing capacity of one ton per day. Fuel receipt began in 1965 and reprocessing began in April, 1966. Operation continued until early 1972 when the plant was shut down for facility expansion. The design, construction and operation of the original facility as a fuel reprocessing plant was the subject of a U.S.

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) approved Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) (Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., 1970).

NFS ceased operation of the plant in 1972 and undertook a program of plant modification and expansion, which subsequently was deemed by the AEC regulatory organization as requiring a construction permit and relicensing. During the processing of information necessary to support the construction permit, new seismic and tornadic criteria for the reprocessing facility were developed. Costs associated with application of these new criteria to the original reprocessing facility were deemed by NFS to make fuel reprocessing at the facility no longer profitable. On September 22, 1976, NFS announced its intention to withdraw from commercial nuclear fuel reprocessing operations and the plant was placed in -standby status.

Under the terms of the contract executed in 1963 between NFS and the New York Atomic Research and Development Agency, New York State was obligated to assume responsibility for perpetual care of the wastes. When the State of New York subsequently indicated its unwillingness to assume this responsibility, the U.S.

Congress ordered a comprehensive study of the West Valley plant to consider the problems likely to be encountered in disposing of the stored waste and decommissioning the plant. In 1980, Congress passed the West Valley Demonstration Project Act (West Valley Nuclear Services Co., October 1, 1980), directing the U.S.

Department of Energy (DOE) to carry out a high-level waste (HLW) management demonstration project at the site (without taking title to the facilities or the wastes) to demonstrate solidification techniques for preparing the HLW for disposal.

Through a contractual agreement with New York State, DOE is operating the Project in conjunction with the New York State Energy Research and Development Authority (NYSERDA). DOE has contracted with West Valley Nuclear Services Company LLC (WVNS) to manage the Project. WVNS is a part of the Westinghouse Government Environmental Services Company, which was formed following the acquisition of WVNS in March 1999 by a joint venture of Washington Group International, Inc., formally known as Morrison Knudsen Corporation, and British Nuclear Fuels, Inc.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 31 of 393 As implemented by the DOE, the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) comprises two primary radioactive material processing components: the Integrated Radwaste Treatment System (IRTS) and the Vitrification Facility. The IRTS was originally designed for supernatant and sludge wash solution processing, solidification and storage, while the Vitrification Facility was designed for the stabilization and storage of radioactive high-level waste sludge and zeolite. The initial objective of the IRTS was successfully completed in 1995, resulting in 19,877 drums of solidified waste placed in safe storage at the WVDP. The current function of the IRTS is to support vitrification operations by treating certain solutions, such as off-gas condensates, that are generated during production of high-level waste glass. A simplified schematic of waste processing at the WVDP is shown in Figure B.1.1-l.

The Integrated Radwaste Treatment System comprises four component systems - the Supernatant Treatment System (STS), which decontaminates solutions from the high-level waste (HLW) tanks through an ion exchange process; the Liquid Waste Treatment System (LWTS), which employs an evaporator to concentrate solutions received from the STS and byproduct solutions received from vitrification operations; the Cement Solidification System (CSS), which can be used to solidify LWTS concentrates; and the Drum Cell, which provides storage for solidified wastes received from the CSS. Schematic representations of these activities are given in Figures B.1.1-2 through B.1.1-4.

The WVDP Vitrification Facility was designed to stabilize in a borosilicate glass matrix: radioactive high-level waste sludge that had been generated during PUREX reprocessing by NFS; contaminated ion exchange resin (zeolite) generated as a byproduct of STS operations; and acidic THOREX waste that resulted from the reprocessing of thorium fuel by NFS. The Vitrification Facility is described in WVNS-SAR-003, Safety Analysis Report for Vitrification Operations and High-Level Waste Interim Storage.

In addition to these primary facilities, several support facilities exist at the WVDP, including facilities to provide interim storage of radioactive and hazardous waste generated during processing and decontamination activities, effluent treatment facilities, warehouses, and maintenance and office areas.

This Safety Analysis Report (SAR) documents the safety assessment of IRTS and associated support activities and facilities and was prepared to meet the requirements of Department of Energy Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, for nuclear facilities, DOE Order 5481.1B, Safety Analysis and Review System, for non-nuclear facilities, and WVNS Policy and Procedure WV-365, Preparation of WVDP Safety Documents. Introductory information relating to the WVDP Act, ancillary tasks, and supporting activities is presented in Section A.1.0 of WVNS-SAR-001, Project Overview and General Information.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 32 of 393 B.1.2 IRTS, Main Plant and Support Facilities Descriptions The WVDP site, shown in Figures B.5.1-1 and B.5.1-2, occupies approximately 220 acres of chain-link fenced area within an approximately 3,345 acre reservation that constitutes the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC), located approximately 55 km (35 mi) south of Buffalo, New York, in rural Cattaraugus County.

The communities of West Valley, Riceville, Ashford Hollow and the village of Springville are located within 8 km (5 mi) of the plant. Several roads and one railway pass through the site, but no human habitation is permitted on the WNYNSC.

The scope of this SAR covers the Integrated Radwaste Treatment System (IRTS) processes and facilities, Main Plant facilities, and associated support facilities and activities.

Facilities within the scope of this SAR include:

• STS Facilities;

- STS Support Building

- Spare high-level waste Tank 8D-1 (in its function as a facility for housing STS radioactive process equipment)

- Permanent Ventilation System Building

• LWTS Facilities (Main Plant cells - see Section B.5.2.4 for a listing)

• CSS 01-14 Building;

• Drum Cell;

• Main Plant (see Section B.5.2.4 for a definition of this facility);

• Waste Management Facilities;

- Low-Level Waste Treatment System (consisting of the North Plateau groundwater extraction wells and associated transfer pumps, the North Plateau Pump System (NPPS), the interceptors and lagoons, and the Low-Level Waste Treatment Replacement Facility (LLW2), which houses the skid-mounted process equipment)

- Lag Storage and Solid Waste Processing Facilities (including the , Contact Size Reduction Facility (CSRF), and Container Sorting and Packaging Facility (CSPF))

- Hazardous Waste Storage Lockers (HWSL)

- Interim Waste Storage Facility (IWSF)

- Chemical Process Cell - Waste Storage Area (CPC-WSA)

- NRC-Licensed Disposal Area (NDA)

- NDA - Liquid Pretreatment System (NDA-LPS)

• Vitrification Test Facility (VTF)

• Warehouse Facilities; and

• Utility Facilities

- Utility Room and Yard

- Waste Water Treatment Facility (WWTF)

SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 33 of 393 Activities within the scope of this SAR include:

0 IRTS processing of solutions in Tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2, and LWTS processing of Vitrification Facility byproduct solutions;

• Transfer of contaminated zeolite in Tank 8D-1 to Tank 8D-2;

• Waste storage and processing; and 0 Utility and miscellaneous facility support.

Processing equipment for IRTS components is contained in independent facility structures. Radioactive processing equipment for the STS is installed in the spare high-level waste Tank 8D-1 located in the Waste Tank Farm, as indicated schematically in Figure B.1.1-2. Additional details are shown in Figures B.5.2-1 through B.5.2-6.

Radioactive components located within Tank 8D-1 include a prefilter, chiller/cooler, ion exchange columns, postfilter, and mobilization and transfer pumps. A summary of equipment installed in the tank is given in Table B.5.2-4. Radioactive processing equipment for the LWTS is entirely contained within the Main Plant. Feed and product tanks for the LWTS are located in the Uranium Product Cell, while equipment to support waste concentration (i.e., evaporation) is located in Extraction Cell 3 (Figure B.1.1-3). A summary of LWTS equipment installed in the Main Plant is given in Table B.5.275. Equipment associated with waste solidification processes (CSS) is located in the 01-14 Building, while solidified waste storage is provided in the Drum Cell.

Liquid and solid low-level waste treatment/processing and storage facilities have also been provided at the WVDP. Liquid low-level waste at the WVDP comprises contaminated waters resulting from area or equipment decontamination, treated solutions from the LWTS, system flushwater, filter backwash, and laundry operations.

Treatment of these waste waters is performed using equipment located in the Low-Level Waste Treatment Replacement Facility (LLW2) shown in Figure B.7.7-1. Temporary storage of these liquid wastes is provided by the four lagoon storage basins.

Interim (lag) storage of solid low-level radioactive wastes (LLRW), nonradioactive hazardous wastes, low-level radioactive mixed wastes, and transuranic (TRU) and suspect TRU waste is provided in the Lag Storage Facility, Hazardous Waste Storage Facility, Satellite Accumulation Areas, and the Interim Waste Storage Facility.

These facility locations are shown in Figure B.7.7-1 with a summary of the corresponding stored waste type given in Table B.7.7-3.

Solid waste at the WVDP is processed to achieve volume reduction. These processing facilities are shown in Figure B.7.7-I and include the Contact Size Reduction Facility (CSRF), Waste Reduction and Packaging Area (WRPA) compactor, and Container Sorting and Packaging Facility (CSPF). The CSRF is located north of the Main Plant building and is connected to it. This area provides facilities for decontamination and size reduction of bulk, contact-handleable equipment including failed process SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 34 of 393 equipment and tanks and vessels removed during Main'Plant decontamination activities.

The WRPA compactor is located in a dock area on the east side of the Main Plant building and is used for size reduction of easily compressed low-level radioactive solid wastes such as disposable anti-contamination clothing. The CSPF, a stand-alone facility located in Lag Storage Annex #4, is used to sort, segregate, and repackage LLRW, low-level radiactive mixed waste, TRU and suspect TRU waste containers into three distinct categories. The three categories are compactables, incinerables, and meltable metals.

B.1.3 IRTS Process Description Waste treatment processes at the WVDP have been developed to decontaminate and stabilize the neutralized high-level PUREX waste contained in Tank 8D-2 and the acidic high-level THOREX waste formerly contained in Tank 8D-4. These wastes were generated during NFS fuel reprocessing operations and together serve as the feed to WVDP process facilities'. Due to the nature of these wastes, the WVDP requires two distinct processing systems: the IRTS and a high-level waste system (Vitrification Facility). The assessment of the IRTS is contained in this SAR, while the assessment of the Vitrification Facility is contained in WVNS-SAR-003, Safety Analysis Report for Vitrification Operations and High-Level Waste Interim Storage.

Originally, wastes contained in Tank 8D-2 partitioned into a supernatant layer and an associated layer of insoluble sludge. Initial STS process operations removed and decontaminated the supernatant layer. Prior to vitrification, the sludge required additional processing to remove excess sulfate salts that would have inhibited production of an acceptable vitrified waste form. Sulfate removal and "sludge washing" were achieved in the Sludge Mobilization and Wash System (SMWS) through the addition of a dilute caustic solution which was mixed with the sludge to dissolve the sulfate salts. Following mobilization and washing, the sludge was allowed to settle and the resulting sludge wash solution was removed for processing in the STS.

Due to the concentration of sulfates in the high level waste sludge, multiple washes were necessary. When the sulfate salts had been sufficiently removed from the sludge, high level THOREX waste in Tank 8D-4 was transferred to Tank 8D-2. Waste in Tank 8D-4 was produced during fuel reprocessing using the THOREX process and was stored in an acidic state. The combined high level waste was washed a final time and the wash solution again processed in the STS.

1 Note: DOE Order 5480.23 requires documentation of safety assessments of nuclear facility operations and facilities as well as waste management activities at these facilities. IRTS and Vitrification systems have been designed and constructed for the processing and solidification of high-level wastes in Tanks 8D-2 and 8D-4.

Consequently, a necessary distinction has been made, for the purposes of this SAR, between the wastes which serve as IRTS feed, process streams and product, and those byproduct streams generated during site operations which are ultimately treated by, or stored in, the LLWTS or Lag Storage facilities.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 35 of 393 Processing of supernatant and sludge wash solutions through the STS was completed in 1995. The STS is currently available on an as-needed basis to support vitrification operations, primarily through processing excess liquid that accumulates in Tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2. Currently, excess liquid in Tank 8D-2 to be processed through STS can be transferred from Tank 8D-2 to Tank 8D-1 by use of the High Level Waste Transfer System transfer pump 55-G-014. (Reference Figure B.5.2-8.) Solutions pumped from Tank 8D-1 are directed to STS process vessels and equipment mounted in Tank 8D-1. In these vessels and components, solutions may be diluted with water as desired, and cooled in a shell-and-tube heat exchanger. Solutions are then directed through up to four columns of ion exchange zeolite for removal of cesium. A titanium-treated zeolite is used to augment or replace the standard zeolite to remove both plutonium and cesium. Decontaminated solutions are then pumped to the Liquid Waste Treatment System for concentration.

The Liquid Waste Treatment System has been designed for the concentration of decontaminated high-level waste tank solution transferred from the STS (high-level waste processed by the STS is sufficiently decontaminated to provide for a reclassification of STS product as low-level waste). Before being sent to the LWTS, decontaminated supernatant liquid is collected in Tank 8D-3. In addition, Tank 8D-3 is also used to collect a second waste stream consisting of off-gas condensates from the vitrification Concentrator Feed Makeup Tank (CFMT). These condensates do not pass through the STS but are transferred directly to Tank 8D-3 for eventual processing through the LWTS. Waste handling and processing activities associated with the LWTS are conducted in Main Plant cells.

Product transferred from Tank 8D-3 is received in Tank 5D-15B (the primary evaporator feed tank) located in the UPC. Alternatively, Tank 5D-15A1 can be used as additional storage for feed to the LWTS. From the feed tank, waste can be transferred to Tank 5D-15AI and/or processed through the high efficiency evaporator which reduces the volume of water in the process solution. Evaporator concentrates are cooled and can be pumped to the LWTS product Tank 5D-15AI or 5D-15A2, and are then recycled to either Tank 8D-1 or 8D-2 or eventually directly to the CFMT. Overheads from the evaporator are processed through an ion exchange column loaded with zeolite for cesium removal. Two additional ion exchange columns have been installed and are being used for mercury removal. This effluent is then further processed in the Low Level Waste Treatment System in preparation for final discharge to the environment.

When it was in operation, the primary function of the CSS was the solidification of concentrates received from the LWTS. LWTS product transferred to the CSS was received in the Waste Dispensing Vessel (WDV) (70D-001) located in the Waste Dispensing Cell of the 01-14 Building. Process solution in the WDV was pumped to one of two high shear mixers in the CSS Process Room, where it was mixed with portland cement and discharged to a 269 L (71 gal) square carbon steel drum. The product drum SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 36 of 393 was then sealed and staged for transport to the Drum Cell for storage. Operation of the CSS to solidify supernatant and sludge wash solutions that had been processed through the LWTS concluded in 1995 and resulted in 19,877 drums of solidified waste stored in the Drum Cell. Though the CSS has not been in operation since completion of supernatant/sludge wash solution solidification, it could be used as part of future IRTS functions.

B.1.4 Identification of AQents and Contractors Section A.1.4 of WVNS-SAR-001, Project Overview and General Information, identifies the agents and contractors responsible for implementing the WVDP. The relationships between WVNS and agents and contractors is illustrated in Figure A.1.4-1 of WVNS-SAR-001.

B.1.5 Hazard Categorization DOE-STD-1027-92, Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, provides a uniform methodology for determining a facility's hazard category. As stated in DOE-STD-1027-92, the hazard category is determined by consideration of the total inventory of radioactive material in a given facility and the consequences of an unmitigated release. Using the hazard category criteria given in the Standard, it has been determined that the highest hazard category facility within the scope of this SAR represents a category 2 hazard. As stated in the Standard, this categorization affects only the review requirements of the SAR. The Standard also states that categorization should be performed on "processes, operation, or activities" and permits facility segmentation when establishing hazard categories to avoid placing excessive requirements on simple or even co-located operations.

Individual facility hazard categories were performed, based on the guidance given in the Standard, for the IRTS, Main Plant, and supporting facilities and are documented in the Consolidated Implementation Plan and Schedule for DOE Orders 5480.22 and 5480.23 (Lazzaro, 1993). Individual facility hazard categories are provided in WVDP-227, WVDP Facility Identification and Classification Matrix.

B.1.6 Structure of the Safety Analysis Report The Department of Energy employs safety analyses of its nuclear and non-nuclear facilities as the principal safety basis for decisions to authorize the design, construction, or operation of these facilities. In support of the development of consistent safety documentation throughout the DOE complex, the Department has issued DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports, to provide the requirements for the development of safety analyses that establish and evaluate the adequacy of the SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 37 of 393 safety bases of the facilities. The requirements of Order 5480.23 apply to all nuclear and nonnuclear hazards associated with DOE non-reactor nuclear facilities.

This Safety Analysis Report has therefore been developed to the requirements of Order 5480.23. Specifically, this SAR has been written to the guidance provided in DOE Standard DOE-STD-3009-94, which was developed by the DOE to provide more detailed direction and thereby assist contractors in providing analyses consistent with the intent of the Order. Because the Order does not require a specific format for nuclear safety analysis reports, the format of this SAR corresponds to the format set forth in NRC Regulatory Guide 3.26, Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Fuel Reprocessing Plants. A listing of DOE-STD-3009-94 sections and the corresponding or equivalent sections of this SAR is provided in Table B.1.6-1.

As stated previously, the safety assessment of high-level waste process operations is contained in WVNS-SAR-003, Safety Analysis Report for Vitrification Operations and High-Level Waste Interim Storage. Together, WVNS-SAR-002 and WVNS-SAR-003 present the assessments of WVDP radioactive waste processing activities. Detailed documentation of site characteristics and Project administrative programs common to both high-level waste vitrification and low-level waste operations is given in WVNS-SAR-001, Project Overview and General Information.

Figures and tables in this SAR are located at the end of the respective chapters.

Dimensions in the SAR are in the SI system of units, followed by the English unit in parentheses. In general, conversions have been made from English to SI units and rounded to two significant digits.

SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 38 of 393 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.1.0 Lazzaro, J. A. September 24, 1993. Consolidated Implementation Plan and Schedule for DOE Orders 5480.22 and 5480.23. Memo to T. J. Rowland. (WD:93:1167.)

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. 1970. Safety Analysis, Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant, AEC Docket No. 50-201. Revision 5.

U.S. Department of Energy Order. April 30, 1992. Change 1 (March 10, 1994.) DOE Order 5480.23: Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.

September 23, 1986. Change 1 (May 19, 1987.) DOE Order 5481.1B:

Safety Analysis and Review System. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.

September 1997. DOE Standard 1027, Change 1: Hazard Categorization and Accident Analysis Techniques for Compliance with DOE Order 5480.23, Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.

July, 1994. DOE Standard 3009: Preparation Guide for U.S. Department of Energy Nonreactor Nuclear Facility Safety Analysis Reports. Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Department of Energy.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. February 1975. Standard Format and Content of Safety Analysis Reports for Fuel Reprocessing Plants. Regulatory Guide 3.26.

West Valley Nuclear Services Co., Inc. October 1, 1980. Public Law 96-368: West Valley Demonstration Project Act. West Valley Nuclear Services Co., Inc.

WVDP-227: WVDP Facility Identification and Classification Matrix.

(Latest Revision.) West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

WV-365: Preparation of WVDP Safety Documents. (Latest Revision.) West Valley Nuclear Services Co;

_ _ Safety Analysis Report WVNS-SAR-001: Project Overview and General Information. (Latest Revision.) West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 39 of 393 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.1.0 (concluded)

Safety Analysis Report WVNS-SAR-003: Safety Analysis Report for Vitrification Operations and High-Level Waste Interim Storage. (Latest Revision.)

West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 40 of 393 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.1.0 (concluded)

TABLE B.1.6-1 LOCATION OF DOE ORDER 5480.23 REQUIRED INFORMATION IN WVNS-SAR-002 DOE 5480.23 - 8.b(3) WVNS-SAR-002--

Topics (Reg. Guide 3.26 Chapes) a) Executive Summary B.1.0 Introduction and General Description

.of the IRTS/Main Plant B.2.0 Summary Safety Analysis b) Applicable statutes, rules, regulations, and Each Chapter, as appropriate departmental orders c) Site characteristics B.3.0 Site Characteristics d) Facility description and operation, including design B.4.0 Principal Design of principal structures, components, all systems, Criteria engineering-safety features, and processes B.5.0 Facility Design B.6.0 IRTS Process Systems e) Hazard analysis and classification of the facility B.I.0 Introduction B.9.0 Hazard and Accident Analysis f) Principal health & safety criteria B.8.0 Hazards Protection g) Radioactive and hazardous material waste management B.7.0 Waste Confinement and Management h) Inadvertent criticality protection B.8.0 Hazards Protection i) Radiation protection B.8.0 Hazards Protection j) Hazardous material protection B.8.0 Hazards Protection k) Analysis of normal, abnormal, and accident B.9.0 Hazard and Accident conditions, including design basis accidents, Analysis assessment of risks, consideration of natural and man-made external events, assessment of contributory and casual events, mechanisms, and phenomena, and evaluation of the need for an analysis of beyond design-basis accidents; however, the SAR is to exclude acts of sabotage and other malevolent acts since these actions are covered under security protection of the facility.

1) Management, organization, and institutional safety B.10.0 Conduct of Operations provisions m) Procedures and training B.10.0 Conduct of Operations n) Human factors Each Chapter, as appropriate o) Initial testing, in-service surveillance, and B.10.0 Conduct of Operations maintenance p) Derivation of TSRs B.11.0 Derivation of Technical Safety Requirements q) Operational Safety B.10.0 Conduct of Operations r) Quality Assurance B.12.0 Quality Assurance s) Emergency Preparedness B.10.0 Conduct of Operations t) Provisions for decontamination and decommissioning B.10.0 Conduct of Operations u) Applicable facility design codes and standards Each Chapter, as appropriate SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR2B11-1.DWC Page 41 of 393

[ WVNS- SAR-002 S-"Tank 8D-2k Tan 8D1-7 269 L Square Drum I

SLUDGE WASH,_......,," SUPERNATANT, <

SOLUTION + MREEAMEN T< DRUM CELL SOLIDIFICATION

_ _ I

+

• Uj

-FINAL DISPOSITION 00 "(Pending EIS)

DJ TRANSPORTATION (Pending EIS)

TERMINAL m,-1 - T 'WASTE 00 OO-O~STORAGE Stainless Steel VITRIFICATION Glass Canister L E SLEGEN PRIMARY FLOW PATH -

• INACTIVE FLOW PATH 1I-WVNS-SAR-003 __SECONDARY FLOW PATH 111',

FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.1.1-1. Waste Processing Flow Diagram

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR2B1 1-2.DWG Page 42 of 393 Radioactive Liquid f- LWTS 8D-2 Tank 8D-1 loating Suction Pump (50-G-004)

"'-High Level Waste Transfer Pump 55-G-014.

Tank 8D-2 Tank 8D-3 FOR REFERENCE ONLY NOT TO SCALE Figure B.1.1-2. Supernatant Treatment System Process Flow Diagram

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 43 of 393 SR2811 -3.DWG Overheads

'f To LLWTS FROM TANK 8D-3

(:WTS .Feed Tank 5D-158 A (15,000 gallons)

• Tank 5D-15A1 Can Serve As 8,000 Gallon Additional Feed Storage For LWTS Extraction Cell 3 to CSS Waste Dispensing Vessel (Inactive)

Recycle to Tank 8D-1 or Tank 8D-2 FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE To Vitrification Concentrator Feed Makeup Tank (Secondary Path)

Figure B.1.1-3. Liquid Waste Treatment System Process Flow Diagram

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 44 of 393 Figure B.1.1-4. Cement Solidification System Process Flow Diagram (System is Inactive)

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 45 of 393 B.2.0

SUMMARY

SAFETY ANALYSIS supporting A summary of the safety analyses performed for the Main Plant, IRTS, and facilities is presented in this chapter. In all of the accidents analyzed in this features to reduce SAR, no credit was taken for any preventative or mitigative design the risk of accidents analyzed to an acceptable level. All consequences from in Section accidents analyzed are well below the evaluation guidelines specified B.9.1.3. Doses from routine operations are well below the occupational radiation Part 835.

protection limits established in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, found in Additional details on these analyses and supporting systems analyses can be Sections B.8.0 and B.9.0 of this Safety Analysis Report (SAR). Evaluation Guidelines for radiological accidents are given in Figures B.9.1-2 and B.9.1-3. Evaluation for Guidelines for nonradiological accidents are defined as ERPG-2 (or TEEL-2) regardless of off-site evaluations, and ERPG-3 (or TEEL-3) for on-site evaluations, the probability of occurrence. For the purposes of evaluating potential Unreviewed risk for Safety Questions, these consequences present the authorization basis activities conducted in facilities within the scope of this SAR.

Planning The American Industrial Hygiene Association prepares the Emergency Response which one Guidelines (ERPG) values to provide estimates of concentration ranges above could reasonably anticipate observing adverse effects. ERPG-I is the maximum be airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could exposed for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> without experiencing any effects other than mild transient ERPG-2 is the adverse effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor.

maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> without experiencing or developing irreversible or to take other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their ability protective action. ERPG-3 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> without Safety experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects (Westinghouse Management Solutions, 1996).

or Temporary Emergency Exposure Limits (TEELs) describe "interim, temporary, Guidelines equivalent exposure limits for which official Emergency Response Planning Energy's have not yet been developed," and have been adopted by the Department of Subcommittee on Consequence Assessment and Protective Actions. TEEL-1, TEEL-2, and TEEL-3 definitions are the same as those for ERPG-I, ERPG-2, and ERPG-3, up to respectively, except that the TEEL definitions do not include the words "for TEELS, one hour." ERPG and TEEL values for hundreds of chemicals are provided in cited in Temporary Exposure Limits (USDOE 10/23/00)and specific ERPG and TEEL values this SAR have been taken from that reference.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 46 of 393 B.2.1 Site Analysis B.2.1.1 Natural Phenomena Natural phenomena that impact new facility design at the WVDP include tornadoes, tornado-generated missiles, earthquakes, and snow loadings. For information on natural phenomena that can affect the safety of operations at the WVDP, see Section A.2.1.1 of WVNS-SAR-001. Information on tornadoes, tornado-generated missiles, earthquakes, and snow loadings at the WVDP is provided in Sections A.4.2.2, A.4.2.4, A.4.2.5, and A.4.2.6 of WVNS-SAR-001.

B.2.1.2 Site Characteristics Affectinq the Safety Analysis This SAR assesses the hazards associated with Main Plant, IRTS, and supporting facilities. Primary activities in the Main Plant include confinement of contamination in plant cells and analytical chemistry operations. Operations of the IRTS include processing of high level waste tank solutions and Vitrification Facility byproducts. All facilities covered in this SAR are located at elevations well above potential flooding.

Accidents analyzed in Section B.9.2 assess the impacts due to severe natural phenomena. The results show that in the event of a design basis earthquake or tornado, no significant quantities of radioactivity or hazardous materials would be released to the environment. Although several supporting facilities are not expected to withstand severe natural phenomena, such as an earthquake or tornado having the characteristics given in Section A.4.2 of WVNS-SAR-001, impacts associated with these failures are bounded by other accidents analyzed in Section B.9.2 of this SAR.

Other site-specific loads (e.g., high winds and snow loading) are bounded by more controlling loads and their associated margins of safety. The site's topographic setting renders the likelihood of major flooding not credible, and local run-off and flooding is adequately accommodated by natural and man-made drainage systems in and around the WVDP.

B.2.1.3 Effect of Nearby Industrial, Transportation and Military Facilities Nearby industrial and transportation facilities are not considered to pose significant risks to WVDP activities due the distance of these facilities from the site and the nature of the operations at these facilities. Section A.2.1.3 of WVNS-SAR-001 presents further discussion of nearby transportation and military facilities.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 47 of 393 B.2.2 Impacts from Normal Operations Chapter B.8.0 of this SAR presents both on-site and off-site dose assessments that have been performed to determine the radiological impact of normal operations at the WVDP. Occupational exposures are minimized at the WVDP through strict adherence to ALARA principles. The annual estimated worker occupational exposure for Main Plant, IRTS, and supporting facilities operations is estimated to be 14 mrem (1.4E-01 mSv),

as discussed in Section B.8.4.

In calculating off-site doses, two pathways were considered: air discharges, which comprise radionuclides exhausted from the Main Plant, STS, CSS, CSPF, and CSRF stacks as well as portable ventilation units (PVUs) during normal operations; and routine liquid releases (as discussed in Section B.8.6). An atmospheric dispersion code (CAP88-PC) was used to calculate the effective dose equivalent due to the airborne transport, deposition, and uptake of radioactive particulates by off-site individuals from routine operations. The dose to the maximally exposed off-site individual for the airborne pathway was estimated to be 1.1E-2 mrem/year (1.1E-4 mSv/year) for combined discharges from the stacks mentioned above. The dose to the maximally exposed off-site individual for the liquid pathway was estimated to be 2.83E-2 mrem/year (2.83E-4 mSv/year) based on discharges from the WVDP in 1999 and site specific dose conversion factors for liquid releases (WVDP-065, West Valley Nuclear Services Co., Inc., October, 1990). Radiological doses from routine operations of the Main Plant and IRTS are presented in Section B.8.6.

B.2.3 Impacts from Abnormal Operations Abnormal operations are events which could occur from malfunctions of systems or operator error. Abnormal events are only of consequence when they affect systems in facilities which process, control, or confine radioactivity or hazardous materials.

Abnormal events considered in this analysis (Section B.9.1) are of little consequence and are not predicted to result in a significant release of radioactive or hazardous material. Qualitative radiological and nonradiological consequences from abnormal operations of the Main Plant, IRTS and supporting facilities are provided in the Process Hazards Analysis (PHA) found in Table B.9.1-1.

B.2.4 Radiological Accidents Doses to an individual result from exposure to radioactively-contaminated material.

The Main Plant, IRTS, and supporting facilities contain sources of radioactivity that have the potential for causing doses to both on-site and off-site individuals. These sources include high-level waste (HLW) stored in Tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2, radiologically-contaminated materials left over from various stages of reprocessing SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 48 of 393 spent nuclear fuel, and effluent from IRTS operations. Four bounding radiological accidents associated with operation of the Main Plant, IRTS and supporting facilities have been analyzed in Section B.9.2.

One operational accident considers the effect of a pressure excursion in the Main Plant ventilation system that causes the rupture and subsequent release of the entire bank of 30 high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters. This accident would result in an off-site total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) of 2.7 rem (2.7E-2 Sv)

Another operational accident assumes that a fire occurs in the Lag Storage Facility, resulting in the combustion of mixed, transuranic, and low-level radioactive waste.

The off-site TEDE for this event is 2.9 rem (2.9E-2 Sv).

The remaining two accidents assume that a severe earthquake occurs at the WVDP. In the first accident, the earthquake causes the roof of the vault and Tank 8D-2 to collapse, exposing the tank contents to the atmosphere. This natural phenomena event would result in an off-site TEDE of 9.9 rem (9.9E-2 Sv). The second accident involves the loss of containment of LLWTS Lagoon 2 due to an earthquake with subsequent discharge to Erdman Brook. The total off-site CEDE to the maximally exposed individual is calculated to be 0.41 rem (4.1E-3 Sv). Additional information on natural phenomena events is provided in Section B.9.2.3.

B.2.5 Nonradiological Accidents Two nonradiological accidents were analyzed for the Main Plant, IRTS, and supporting facilities. The first accident analyzed assumes catastrophic failure of one 1250 L (330 gal) tote of technical grade 35% hydrogen peroxide outside the oxidizer room in the Warehouse. This postulated accident resulted in a maximum concentration of 8.75 ppm of hydrogen peroxide at a distance of 1050 m (3444 ft). The ERPG-2 value for 35%

hydrogen peroxide is 50 ppm.

The second accident analyzed the rupture of a Main Plant transformer containing 2200 L (586 gal) of PCB-contaminated Wemco "C" oil, a suspected carcinogen. As analyzed in Section B.9.2.2.3, this accident involved approximately 0.64 L (0.17 gal) 3 of PCBs, resulting in a maximum concentration of 3.1E-3 mg/m at a distance of 1050 m 3

(3444 ft). The TEEL-2 value for PCBs is 5.0 mg/m .

B.2.6 Conclusions A summary of the consequences of accidents analyzed in this SAR is provided in Table B.2.6-1. Consequences were determined at distances of 640 m (2100 ft) and 1050 m (3444 ft) for various meteorological conditions. These distances correspond to the location of the on-site evaluation point and the site boundary, respectively, for the SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 49 of 393 sector exhibiting the highest hazardous material concentration. Additionally, accident consequences were calculated for the distance yielding the maximum dose or concentration at site-specific 95% meteorology. All accidents analyzed are within the evaluation guidelines provided in Section B.9.1.3.

The failure of the 8D-2 Tank and vault results in a total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) to the maximally exposed off-site individual of 9.9 rem (9.9E-2 Sv). This represents the bounding accident for radiological releases. The spill of technical grade 35% hydrogen peroxide results in a concentration of 8.75 ppm of hydrogen peroxide at 1050 m (3444 ft) and is less than ERPG-2. This represents the bounding accident for nonradiological releases. Historical measurements indicate an average annual worker dose of 22 mrem (0.22 mSv), in keeping with the ALARA philosophy.

Calculated doses to off-site persons were determined for both normal and accident conditions. Routine doses to off-site individuals are well within the requirements of DOE Order 5400.5.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 50 of 393 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.2.0 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. Occupational Radiation Protection, 10 CFR 835.

United States Environmental Protection Agency. March, 1992. User's Guide for CAP88-PC, Version 1.0. EPA/402-B-92-001.

U.S. Department of Energy. February 2, 1990. Change 2 (January 7, 1993). DOE Order 5400.5: Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment. Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Department of Energy.

October 23, 2000. Revision 17m TAELS, Temporary Exposure Limits. USDOE SCAPA, Subcommittee on Consequence Assessment & Protective Actions.

West Valley Nuclear Services Co., Inc. WVDP-065: Radiological Parameters for Assessment of West Valley Demonstration Project Activities. (Latest Revision.) West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

Safety Analysis Report WVNS-SAR-001: Project Overview and General Information. (Latest Revision.) West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 51 of 393 TABLE B.2.6-1

SUMMARY

OF CONSEQUENCES OF IRTS, MAIN PLANT AND SUPPORT FACILITY ACCIDENTS Accident Scenario Maximum Off-Site JMaximum On-Site Evaluation Guideline Level

____ _____ ____I Dose/Dosage Dose/Dosage 1_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

Main Ventilation HEPA Bank Failure 2.7 rem 6.4 rem On-site - 100 rem Off-site - 25 rem Hydrogen Peroxide Spill 8.75 ppm 17.5 ppm On-site - ERPG-3 (100 ppm)

Off-site - ERPG-2 (50 ppm)

Transformer Leak of PCBs 3.1E-3 mg/mn 6.4E-3 mg/mi On-site - TEEL-3 (5 mg/m 3 )

Off-site - TEEL-2 (5 mg/m3 )

8D-2 Tank and Vault Failure 9.9 rem 21 rem On-site - Natural Phenomena, N/A Off-site - 25 rem Fire in Lag Storage Facility 2.9 rem 6.2 rem On-site - 100 rem Off-site - 25 rem LLWTS Lagoon 2 Failure 4.1E-1 rem N/A On-site - Natural Phenomena, N/A Off-site - 25 rem SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 52 of 393 B.3.0 SITE CHARACTERISTICS associated with the WVDP are provided in WVNS-SAR-001, Project Site characteristics Overview and General Information, Section A.3.

B.3.1 Geography and Demography of WVDP Environs The geography and demography of the area surrounding the WVDP site are fully described in Section A.3.1 of WVNS-SAR-001. As all accidents analyzed in Section Section B.9.2 have been found to be below the evaluation guidelines set forth in B.9.1, no significant variations in the details of the geography or demography described in WVNS-SAR-001 would affect the conclusions of this SAR.

B.3.2 Nearby Industrial, Transportation, and Military Facilities near the WVDP Section A.3.2 of WVNS-SAR-001 provides information regarding facilities site, including industries, military installations, and transportation facilities.

Based on the analyses provided in Section B.9.2, no significant impact would result areas.

at these facilities due to accidents within the IRTS, Main Plant or support Furthermore, as concluded in WVNS-SAR-001, no credible accidents or abnormal the operations at off-site facilities were identified which would contribute to potential for an accident at the WVDP. All WVDP facilities are covered under a single, site wide emergency plan in WVDP-022, WVDP Emergency Plan, and no facilities require operators to perform a nuclear safety function.

B.3.3 Meteorology Section A.3.3 of WVNS-SAR-001 provides information regarding meteorological conditions at the WVDP. The effects of severe natural phenomena on operations in facilities within the scope of this SAR have been assessed in the Process Hazards Analysis presented in Section B.9.1.

B.3.4 Surface Hydrology Section A.3.4 of WVNS-SAR-001 provides a general discussion of the surface hydrological conditions at the WVDP. Specific surface hydrological conditions were not found to affect the conclusions of the analyses contained in Section B.9.1.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 53 of 393 B.3.5 Subsurface Hvdroloav Section A.3.4 of WVNS-SAR-001 provides a general discussion of the subsurface hydrological conditions at the WVDP. Specific subsurface hydrological conditions were not found to affect the conclusions of the analyses contained in Section B.9.1.

B.3.6 GeoloQg and Seismolocv Prior to Main Plant construction, soil investigations were conducted by Dames & Moore (Dames & Moore, May 8, 1963) to determine the general soil conditions at the site and to obtain soil data directly relevant to foundation design and construction. Based on its analysis of soil borings taken at the site, Dames & Moore recommended that the main process area be pile supported. Preliminary analysis of boring data indicated that shorter piles could be used if the plant was moved from the originally proposed site to an alternative location due to a significant rise in the elevation of the rock surface in that area.

As part of the characterization program, laboratory tests were conducted on soil borings to determine the shear strength of the compact soil layers and the consolidation characteristics of the silty till layers. Moisture content and dry density of all samples was also determined. A record of moisture content, density and shear strength was included on boring logs provided in the characterization report.

Piles selected for foundation support by Bechtel were 12-BP-53 steel H-piles driven into the compact glacial till soil stratum which underlies the site and consists of a mixture of sand, gravel, silt and clay. In all, 476 piles were driven to elevations between 32 and 42 feet, Plant Datum. (Elevation 100 feet, Plant Datum, corresponds to the northwest corner of the Chemical Process Cell foundation and is approximately ground level). Pile load tests and pile driving criteria developed by Dames & Moore are summarized in a report to Bechtel Corporation (Dames & Moore, July 19, 1963).

Soil conditions and site seismic criteria identified in Section A.3.6 of WVNS-SAR-001 were used in both the original design and structural review evaluations for the STS facility.

Section A.3.6 of WVNS-SAR-001 provides a complete discussion of the geology and seismology of the WVDP. The effects of severe natural phenomena on operations in facilities addressed in this SAR have been assessed in the analyses presented in Chapter B.9.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 54 of 393 B.3.7 Validity of Existing Environmental Analyses Environmental analyses for facilities within the scope of this SAR are contained in the following documents:

Main Plant Supplemental Analysis to the West Valley Final Environmental Impact Statement (U.S. Department of Energy, January, 1993).

STS/SMWS Revised Environmental Checklist for Tank 8D-2 PUREX Sludge Washing (Schiffhauer, August 6, 1990).

LWTS WVDP-049, Environmental Evaluation for the Liquid Waste Treatment System.

CSS WVDP-037, Environmental Evaluation for Operation of the Cement Solidification System.

Drum Cell DOE/EA-0295, Environmental Assessment for Disposal of Project Low-Level Waste West Valley Demonstration Project.

Lag Storage Environmental Checklist for Low-Level Waste Drum Supercompaction in an Addition to the Lag Storage Building and Environmental Checklist for Interim Size Reduction Facility in MSM Shop (Roberts, February, 1986),

and Revised Memo to File for Operation of Site-Wide Mixed and Low Level Radioactive Waste Storage System, Including Construction of Additional, Temporary Waste Storage Facilities (Roberts, October 12, 1989).

CSRF Environmental Checklist for Low-Level Waste Drum Supercompaction in an Addition to the Lag Storage Building and Environmental Checklist for Interim Size Reduction Facility in MSM Shop (Roberts, February 24, 1986).

No significant discrepancies exist between the information provided in these documents and the information provided in WVNS-SAR-001 or in this chapter.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 55 of 393 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.3.0 Dames & Moore. May 8, 1963. Site Investigation: Proposed Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant Near Springville, New York For Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.

_ July 19, 1963. Report of Consultation: Pile Load Tests and Pile Driving Criteria Spent Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant Springville, New York Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.

Roberts, C.J. February 24, 1986. Environmental Checklist for Low-Level Waste Drum Supercompaction in an Addition to the Lag Storage Building and Environmental Checklist for Interim Size Reduction Facility in MSM Shop. Memo to Master Records Center. (Memo HE:86:0021.)

_ October 12, 1989. Revised Memo to File for Operation of Site-Wide Mixed and Low Level Radioactive Waste Storage System, Including Construction of Additional, Temporary Waste Storage Facilities. Memo to Dr. W. W. Bixby. (Memo FB:89:0241.)

Schiffhauer, M.A. August 6, 1990. Revised Environmental Checklist for Tank 8D-2 PUREX Sludge Washing. Memo to C. J. Roberts. (Memo EL:90:0137.)

U.S. Department of Energy. April, 1986. DOE/EA-0295: Environmental Assessment for Disposal of Project Low-Level Waste West Valley Demonstration Project. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.

_ January, 1993. DOE/EIS-0081: Supplemental Analysis to the West Valley Final Environmental Impact Statement. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.

West Valley Nuclear Services Co., Inc. WVDP-022: WVDP Emergency Plan. (Latest Revision.) West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

WVDP-037: Environmental Evaluation for Operation of the Cement Solidification System. (Latest Revision.) West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

_ WVDP-049: Environmental Evaluation for the Liquid Waste Treatment System. (Latest Revision.) West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

_ Safety Analysis Report WVNS-SAR-001: Project Overview and General Information. (Latest Revision.) West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 56 of 393 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.3.0 (concluded)

Safety Analysis Report WVNS-SAR-003: Safety Analysis Report for Vitrification Operations and High-Level Waste Interim Storage. (Latest Revision.)

West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

Wolniewicz, J. C. April 19, 1994. Technical Bases for Consolidated WVNS-SAR-002 Process Hazards Analysis. Memo D&M:OP:0023 to File.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 57 of 393 B.4.0 PRINCIPAL DESIGN CRITERIA Order Current design criteria for non-reactor nuclear facilities are specified in DOE 420.1, which has been in effect since October 24, 1996. Project facilities designed in by the WVDP between project inception and October, 1997, were constructed accordance with a variety of sources. Due to the nature of the Project, a number of the the Project facilities, such as the Main Plant and the HLW Tank Farm pre-date by NFS Project and DOE's presence at the site. These facilities were constructed as according to NRC license CFS-1 and various criteria in effect at the time (1964),

Report documented in a U.S. Atomic Energy Commission approved Final Safety Analysis (FSAR) (Nuclear Fuel Services, 1970). OH/WVDP has concurred that in some cases pre existing facilities, such as the Main Plant, may not meet the current design criteria, but are nonetheless judged to meet the Project's current needs (Bixby, W.W., July 17, 1989). Significant additions or modifications to the facility are references required to comply with DOE Order 420.1 and the associated editions of the therein. Furthermore, the Department of Energy has agreed that evaluating pre pre existing facilities for compliance with DOE Order 420.1 is not required although existing facilities have been evaluated for compliance with the applicable ES&H criteria of DOE 420.1.

B.4.1 Purpose of the IRTS/Main Plant B.4.1.1 Integrated Radwaste Treatment System Feed 8D The IRTS was designed to process supernatant and sludge wash solutions from Tank

2. This was completed in 1995, resulting in 19,877 drums of solidified cement-based waste placed in the Drum Cell. Though the CSS has not been in operation since the LWTS have completion of supernatant/sludge wash solution solidification, the STS and remained in operation to support vitrification processes. Feed to the STS consists of excess liquid in Tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2 that is not required for high-level waste glass production. This liquid is subsequently processed in the LWTS. Additionally, off-gas condensates from the Concentrator Feed Makeup Tank (CFMT) are transferred directly to Tank 8D-3 and treated in the LWTS. The total radionuclide content of Tank 8D-2 to be processed in the Vitrification System is given in Table B.4.1-1.

(Recent analyses have indicated that, because of vitrification activities, Table radionuclide content of tank 8D-2 is currently less than 5% of that given in B.4.1-1 (Winkler, C.J., September 29, 2000)).

B.4.1.2 IRTS Products and By-products waste When the CSS was utilized, the product of the IRTS was solidified cement-based contained in 269 L (71 gallon) steel drums. The solidified product met the waste Table form criteria of 10 CFR Part 61 Sections 61.55 and 61.56 for low-level wastes.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 58 of 393 B.4.1-2 provides a summary of radioactive waste resulting from CSS operations and currently stored in the RTS Drum Cell.

When only the STS and LWTS are used (as is currently the case), the product of the IRTS is concentrated liquid waste which is either recycled back to Tank 8D-2 or Tank 8D-1 or routed to the Concentrator Feed Make-up Tank. Additionally, low-level liquid waste from the overheads is sent to the Low-Level Waste Treatment System (LLWTS) for processing and subsequent release to the environment.

By-products resulting from maintenance and support activities of the Main Plant and IRTS include low-level radioactive liquid and solid wastes. The handling and storage of these by-products is discussed in Chapter B.7.0.

B.4.1.3 IRTS/Main Plant Facility Functions The current function of the IRTS is to support vitrification operations by processing excess liquid in Tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2 as well as off-gas condensates from the CFMT.

Excess liquid (in Tank 8D-2) can be transferred from Tank 8D-2 to Tank 8D-1 by use of the high-level waste transfer pump 55-G-014. Using the floating suction pump 50-G-004, the solution in Tank 8D-1 is cooled and then passed through zeolite-filled ion exchange columns located in Tank 8D-I to remove a majority of cesium and some strontium and plutonium, if present. The solution is then filtered to remove suspended zeolite fines and transferred to holding Tank 8D-3 to await processing in the LWTS (see Figure B.1.1-2). Solutions are concentrated in the LWTS by evaporation. During the original operation of the IRTS, concentrated solutions were transferred to the CSS and mixed with dry portland cement and chemical additives to form a solidified waste form. For the purpose of supporting vitrification operations, concentrated liquid waste produced by the LWTS is recycled to Tank 8D-2 or secondarily to the Concentrator Feed Make-up Tank, while liquid low-level wastes i.e., the overheads, are sent to the LLWTS (see Figure B.1.1-3).

The purpose of the Main Plant is to provide housing for LWTS equipment and interim storage for vitrified high-level waste produced by the Vitrification Facility. Many areas of the Main Plant building have been placed in standby pending final decontamination and decommissioning plans. Utilization of Main Plant areas in support of the WVDP is discussed in Section B.5.2.4.

Main Plant facilities and original NFS utility and ventilation systems provide for contamination confinement and support for site activities. These facilities and support activities include:

0 Housing for the Liquid Waste Treatment System and High Level Waste Interim Storage Area; SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 59 of 393

" Operations associated with the Analytical and Process Chemistry laboratory;

" Supply of utilities, including backup electricity, utility and instrument air, steam, water (including utility water, demineralized water, potable water, and water supplies for fire protection), natural gas distribution, and waste water treatment;

"* Heating, ventilation and cooling for habitable Main Plant spaces;

"* Collection and handling of liquid wastes within the Main Plant;

"* Confinement of contamination within cells in the Main Plant; and

"* Remote monitoring of 01-14 HVAC and Main Plant equipment in the Main Plant control room.

B.4.1.4 IRTS and Main Plant Interfaces With the Vitrification Facility Consistent with the mission of the WVDP discussed in Section B.1.1, IRTS and Main Plant facilities have been utilized to the maximum extent possible. Consequently, interfaces exist between IRTS/Main Plant facilities and systems and Vitrification facilities and systems. These interfaces include:

"* High-level waste preparation and mixing in Tank 8D-2 (Section B.6.3.3);

"* Facility support for transfer of solid, vitrified high-level waste (EDR, CCR, CVA, COA - Section B.5.2.4);

• Interim storage of vitrified HLW in the CPC (Section B.5.2.4);

• Housing for NO, equipment in the 01-14 Building (Section B.5.2.5);

• Ventilation support, including:

- Main Plant Ventilation system (Section B.5.4.1)

- Main Plant Stack (Section B.5.4.1.1.5);

• Utility support, including:

- Fire Protection (Section B.5.3.1)

- Electrical Supply (Section B.5.4.2)

- Utility/Instrument Air (Section B.5.4.3)

- Steam (Section B.5.4.4)

- Cooling Water (Section B.5.4.5);

• Vitrification Facility Concentrator Feed Makeup Tank condensate is returned to Tank 8D-3 and subsequently processed through LWTS (Section B.6.4.1);

• Vitrification Facility Waste Header routes Vitrification Cell Sump and other non routine waste waters back to Tank 8D-4; subsequently transferred to Tank 8D-2 for processing;

• Waste Management support, including:

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 60 of 393

- Processing of low-level liquid wastes in the LLWTS (Section B.7.5);

- Processing of low-level liquid wastes in the IRTS (Section B.6.4.1);

- Solid radioactive waste interim storage (Section B.7.7);

- Hazardous waste storage (Section B.7.8);

0 Analytical chemistry support (Section B.6.7.2).

B.4.2 Structural and Mechanical Safety Criteria Specific design criteria for the IRTS can be found in the appropriate design criteria documents listed below.

"* WVNS-DC-013 Supernatant Treatment System

"* WVNS-DC-046 Sludge Mobilization Waste Removal System

"* WVNS-DC-025 Liquid Waste Treatment System

"* WVNS-DC-020 Cement Solidification System

"* WVNS-DC-037 Radwaste Treatment System (RTS) Drum Cell Specific IRTS design criteria have not been relied upon in Section B.9.2 in demonstrating that the consequences of credible, bounding accidents within the IRTS are below the evaluation guidelines specified in Section B.9.1.3.

B.4.2.1 Wind Loadincis Section A.4.2.1 of WVNS-SAR-001 presents a discussion of the design basis wind loadings in place at the WVDP. Facility-specific design wind loadings for the IRTS can be found in the appropriate design criteria documents listed in Section B.4.2.

B.4.2.2 Tornado Loadincis Following the decision to cease reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, several tornado and wind studies were performed for the NRC to determine a design basis magnitude for a tornado at the NFS site. LLNL sponsored these studies as part of a larger DOE funded study. The LLNL study (Fujita, T.T., 1981) reviewed fastest mile-per-hour wind probabilities for the West Valley site. The results of this study were compared to an earlier study that had been performed for the NRC and the work of Simiu, et al.

Another study was performed by McDonald (McDonald, J.R., July, 1981) for the same LLNL/DOE program. This study examined both tornado and straight wind probabilities.

Characteristics of the WVDP design basis tornado are based on these studies and are given in Section A.4.2.2 of WVNS-SAR-001. Facility specific design tornado loadings for the IRTS can be found in the appropriate design criteria documents listed in Section B.4.2.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 61 of 393 B.4.2.3 Flood DesiQn Section A.4.2.3 of WVNS-SAR-001 presents a discussion of flood protection requirements at the WVDP. Facility-specific design requirements for flood protection for the IRTS can be found in the appropriate design criteria documents listed in Section B.4.2.

B.4.2.4 Missile Protection See Section A.4.2.4 of WVNS-SAR-001 presents a discussion of characteristics of tornado-induced missiles used at the WVDP. Facility specific design requirements for missile protection for the IRTS can be found in the appropriate design criteria documents listed in Section B.4.2.

B.4.2.5 Seismic Desiqn The design basis earthquake employed at the WVDP has been selected based on probabilistic assessments of earthquake exposure (see Sections A.3.6.1 and A.4.2.5 of WVNS-SAR-001). This event corresponds to a peak horizontal ground acceleration of 0.1 g, with a vertical component of two-thirds the horizontal (e.g., 0.067 g) and a recurrence frequency of 1E-3 years, consistent with the guidance of UCRL-15910 for hazard category 2 and 3 facilities. Design review response spectra and associated damping values are in accordance with NRC Regulatory Guides 1.60 (USNRC, 1973a) and 1.61 (USNRC, 1973b).

The current design basis seismic criteria are the same as that which had been applied to the design of IRTS facilities and which will be applied to new facilities and major modifications to existing facilities at the WVDP. These criteria, however, were not used in the design of the original NFS facilities. At the time of Main Plant construction (1964), no specific seismic standards had been established for nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities. In lieu of these standards, the facility was designed to meet requirements of Uniform Building Code (UBC) Seismic Zone III specifications. The UBC is a static method of analysis appropriate for non-critical facilities.

To assess the seismic safety of the then-dormant Nuclear Fuel Service reprocessing plant, structural investigations were undertaken by the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory (LASL) and Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL) in the mid to late 1970's at the request of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (Murray et. al., 1977 and Endebrock et. al., 1978). These studies were performed as independent analyses of an earlier assessment performed by the Chemical Plants Division of Dravo Corporation (Dravo, 1976) for NFS. The results of the LASL and LLL reports, which are summarized in Table B.4.2-1, served as the basis for the NRC conclusion that "Earthquake SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 62 of 393 occurrence at the site is infrequent, and even if one did occur, the building structure itself would remain standing after the earthquake and any likely winds would not remove any significant radioactivity from the cells of the structure" (USNRC, 1982).

B.4.2.6 Snow Loading Section A.4.2.6 of WVNS-SAR-001 presents a discussion of estimated snow loadings used at the WVDP. Facility specific design requirements for snow loadings for the IRTS can be found in the appropriate design criteria documents listed in Section B.4.2.

B.4.2.7 Process- and Equipment-Derived Loads The parameters used to establish process and equipment loads for the Main Plant are not fully specified in the historical record of the site. Design considerations for new facilities and modifications to existing facilities will include all feasible load combinations, including process- and equipment-derived loads, in accordance with applicable building and design codes. Facility specific design requirements for process- and equipment-derived loads for the IRTS can be found in the appropriate design criteria documents listed in Section B.4.2.

B.4.2.8 Combined Load Criteria Parameters used to establish the combined load design of the Main Plant are not fully specified in the historical site record. However, as with process- and equipment derived loads, it may be assumed that conservative values were factored into the original design, based on performance of the systems. Facility specific design requirements for combined loads for the IRTS can be found in the appropriate design criteria documents listed in Section B.4.2.

B.4.2.9 Subsurface Hydrostatic Load+/-ngs Section A.4.2.9 of WVNS-SAR-001 presents a discussion of subsurface hydrostatic loadings for developing design criteria for new facilities at the WVDP.

Facility specific design requirements for subsurface hydrostatic loadings for the IRTS can be found in the appropriate design criteria documents listed in Section B.4.2.

B.4.2.10 Temperature Design Loadings The WVDP has a freeze protection program in place to prevent damage to existing equipment and facilities due to cold weather (WVDP-183, WVDP Freeze Protection Plan).

Requirements for freeze protection are incorporated into new designs.

Facilities are SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 63 of 393 equipped with heating systems and are insulated to maintain inside temperatures above freezing. Main Plant building foundations and buried utilities are placed below the frost line of 1 m (3 ft). Facility specific design requirements for design temperature loadings for the IRTS can be found in the appropriate design criteria documents listed in Section B.4.2.

B.4.3 Safety Protection Systems B.4.3.1 General The Main Plant and the IRTS have been designed for safe operation. Specific safety protection systems are described in the following subsections.

B.4.3.2 Protection Through Defense-in-Depth The design and operation of the IRTS, Main Plant, and Waste Management facilities provide defense-in-depth for public and worker safety during normal, off-normal, and accident conditions. Implementation of the defense-in-depth philosophy ensures that layers of defense are provided against the release of radiological and hazardous materials such that no one layer by itself is completely relied upon. The primary layers of defense are given below:

"* Passive confinement barriers

"* Waste form and inventory

"* Active confinement barriers

"* Alarms and Monitors

"* Personnel training

"* Administrative planning and controls Details of IRTS facility design and process operations are discussed in Chapters B.4, B.5, and B.6 of this SAR while personnel training and administrative controls are discussed in Chapters B.8, B.10, B.11, and B.12. Elements of these design features and administrative controls, as they relate to defense-in-depth, are discussed below.

B.4.3.2.1 Passive Confinement Barriers The primary safety concern in the Main Plant and IRTS is the confinement of radioactivity. Several features of the Main Plant and IRTS provide protection from the uncontrolled spread of contamination. Primary confinement for the LLW process stream in the Main Plant and IRTS is provided by tankage, process vessels, and piping. Secondary confinement is provided by cell linings and sumps, liner pans, and the concrete structures of the trenches, pump pits, tank vaults, and Main Plant cells. Typically, liners are constructed of stainless steel, cover the floor, and SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 64 of 393 extend up the walls of the cells and pump pits. Liquids in these cells are accumulated in sumps and transferred to tanks via jets or pumps.

Confinement and containment barriers are designed to limit potential releases of radioactive material in accordance with ALARA practices outlined in the site Radiological Controls Manual, WVDP-010. Although the barriers are identified as confinement barriers, no credit was taken for their mitigative features in the accident analyses presented in Chapter B.9.

The primary IRTS confinement barriers of highest reliability under earthquake and tornado loading are the reinforced concrete vaults and chambers that enclose the STS process vessels and piping. These buildings and tank vaults have been designed to higher structural safety standards than required for life safety by local building codes used in the design of industrial process plants in New York State. The radiological shielding requirements for these structures generally resulted in greater reserve strength than found in conventional industrial plant building design.

With a safety factor of approximately three, the connecting piping between the valve aisle, pipeway, and shield structure are the most vulnerable under earthquake.

Secondary confinement for spills from underground equipment in the Waste Tank Farm is provided by the silty till. Water is maintained around the outside of the vaults to maintain a piezometric potential greater than the level that would exist if the entire contents of either Tank 8D-1 or 8D-2 were released to their respective vaults.

The head on the outside of the vault would cause the leakage to be from the outside to the inside. The water on the outside of the vaults also keeps the silty till wet and highly impermeable (very low migration rates - 1E-8 cm/s) to water flow.

The primary SMWS confinement barriers have sufficient reserve capacity, due to the inherent safety factors associated with the original construction as well as the conservative design incorporated in new construction, to survive extreme environmental loading (e.g., design basis earthquake and tornado events) without structural failure and leakage of high-level radioactive liquid wastes into the environment.

The margin of safety against failure of the steel tank and concrete vault, which serve as the first and second line of confinement barrier for the HLW, is conservatively estimated at six times the design basis earthquake and more than 10 times the design basis tornado. Thus, there is little potential for leakage of the high-level radioactive liquid waste into the environment even under extreme environmental loading.

The margin of safety against potential vapor released to the environment is on the order of 0.5 to 1.5 times the design basis tornado and 1.5 to 4 times the design SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 65 of 393 basis earthquake, assuming the WTFVS is nonoperational. The most vulnerable link in the systems appears to be the flexible bellows connection that serves to accommodate lateral and vertical movements of the mobilization pump support structure above Tank 8D-2 and the tank access riser.

B.4.3.2.2 Waste Form and Inventory The inventory of liquid radioactive waste in the IRTS is limited by the size of the process vessels in the system. The LWTS evaporator feed tank 5D-15B is the largest vessel in the IRTS process with a volume of 57,000 L (15,000 gal). This tank receives decontaminated solutions processed by the STS. All tanks associated with the IRTS and Main Plant are located in the heavily shielded, monolithic cells of the Main Plant. This substantial passive barrier ensures that the limited quantities of liquid radioactive waste stored in the Main Plant are adequately isolated from the environment.

The IRTS Drum Cell contains the solidified waste produced by the Cement Solidification System. Although a significant quantity of radioacitivity exists in the waste stored in the Drum Cell, this activity is tightly bound within the cement matrix of the qualified waste form received by the Drum Cell.

B.4.3.2.3 Active Confinement Barriers Active confinement barriers in the IRTS and Main Plant have been designed to prevent the release of contamination during normal and off-normal conditions. The primary active confinement systems are building ventilation systems and vessel off-gas systems which include the Main Ventilation System, Head End Ventilation System, Vessel Off-Gas System, Waste Tank Farm Ventilation System, Permanent Ventilation System, Cement Solidification System Ventilation System, and Contact Size Reduction Facility Ventilation System. These systems ensure positive confinement of airborne radioactive material as discussed in Section B.5.4.

B.4.3.2.4 Alarms and Monitors Alarms and monitors have been employed throughout the IRTS and Main Plant to notify operations personnel in the event of abnormal operating conditions. ventilation systems have been provided with filter differential pressure and plenum pressure instrumentation as well as effluent monitoring equipment. These systems, discussed in Section B.6.5.1 and B.8.6, respectively, have also been provided with alarms which annunciate in the appropriate control area.

Liquid releases in areas of the IRTS and Main Plant are detected through the use of cell sump level instrumentation and alarms. The onset of conditions potentially SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 66 of 393 resulting in liquid releases is detected through vessel level monitoring equipment.

The pans associated with high-level waste tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2 have also been provided with leak detection capabilities.

The monitoring and alarm systems for the Main Plant are capable of being supplied with standby power during periods when normal electrical power is interrupted.

The capability for supplying standby power to the monitoring and alarm systems is tested quarterly per an approved procedure.

Continuous Air Monitors (CAMS) are placed at strategic locations throughout the Main Plant to warn operators of elevated airborne contamination levels. Outputs from these monitors are continually recorded to allow identification of process upsets or changes.

Additional discussion of alarms and monitors is presented in Section B.8.3.1.4 of this SAR.

B.4.3.2.5 Personnel Training Qualification standards and training requirements are established for all Main Plant, Waste Management, spent fuel shipping, D&D, Vit, and High-Level Waste Tank Farm operations positions. Operators are qualified in accordance with documented performance-based training programs. Training includes responsibilities and actions during emergency situations. Periodic emergency drills are performed, with follow-on critiques, to gain experience and confidence and to ensure that personnel are ready to respond to accident situations.

B.4.3.2.6 Administrative Planning and Controls IRTS, Main Plant, and Waste Management operations are conducted in accordance with a

protocol that has been established both procedurally and through training.

Operational and maintenance activities are controlled through the use of WVNS procedures that implement applicable DOE Orders.

The WVDP Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual (WVDP-011) establishes the policies used to control chemical and industrial hazards for all West Valley operations.

Safety is ensured through facility and equipment design, protective clothing and equipment selection, personnel training, and administrative controls.

The WVDP Radiological Controls Manual (WVDP-010) establishes the control organization, staffing and training requirements, performance goals, control zones and associated levels, posting and labeling requirements, and other administrative control requirements associated with work in radiation and contamination areas.

SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 67 of 393 Operations within radiologically contaminated areas require the use of work control practices to maintain exposure ALARA. These practices include the use of radiation work permits, pre-job briefings, personnel protective equipment and clothing, and dosimetry.

The WVDP uses Process Safety Requirements (PSRs) to reduce worker risk and focus attention on those systems under the direct control of the operator that are important to the safe operation of IRTS, Main Plant, and Waste Management activities (WVDP-218). These requirements define limiting conditions for operation, surveillance requirements and actions, and provide the associated bases for systems and/or components under the direct control of the operator. Process Safety Requirements are identified per the OH/WVDP -approved radiological, nonradiological, and worker risk-reduction criteria defined in WV-365 and are implemented through standard operating procedures and other documentation. Procedure WV-365 specifies the approval authority for a PSR, which may be WVNS or OH/WVDP, depending upon the criterion which necessitated the requirement.

B.4.3.3 Protection by Equipment and Instrumentation Selection Procurement of new equipment and instrumentation for operation of the Main Plant and IRTS has been done in compliance with WVNS's Quality Assurance Program which is described in Section A.12.0 of WVNS-SAR-001. Existing equipment and instrumentation is subjected to inspection and testing commensurate with its intended use. Safety Class and Quality Level designations of the individual components of the IRTS, Main Plant, and support facilities are given in WVDP-204.

Because the IRTS is a remotely-operated system, it has been designed for minimum personnel access and is heavily instrumented. Most controlled parameters have at least two sensors of dissimilar operating principles or an alternative instrument detection system that can be used in the event of failure of one sensor. Those variables that could affect the safety of operations have both an audible alarm and an illuminated face plate on an alarm panel. STS has sufficient instrumentation and controls such that it can be monitored and shutdown from the centralized control panel.

B.4.3.4 Nuclear Criticality Safety Nuclear criticality safety is addressed in Section B.8.7 of this SAR.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 68 of 393 B.4.3.5 Radiological Protection Maintenance activities at the WVDP are performed in accordance with WVDP-010, Radiological Controls Manual, which is based on occupational radiation protection requirements given in Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 835.

Shield walls, confinement and containment structures as well as administrative controls (procedures, training, etc.) are used as necessary to maintain radiation doses to occupationally-exposed personnel As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA).

Protective clothing (anti-C's, respiratory protection) is worn when required by radiological conditions, as prescribed in WVDP-010. In addition, system decontamination and flushing may be performed when contact maintenance is required.

B.4.3.5.1 Access Control Area access in the Main Plant, IRTS, and supporting facilities is dictated by the requirements of the WVDP Radiological Controls Manual (WVDP-010) and 10 CFR 835.

B.4.3.5.2 Shielding Shielding from the major sources of radioactivity in the Main Plant is provided by the massive concrete structure of plant cells and constructed shield walls as discussed in Section B.8.3. It is expected that the integrity of shield structures will be maintained for these cells in the event of severe natural phenomena, as discussed in Section B.4.2. In light of the structural ability of the shield walls to withstand tornado-induced missiles, it is reasonable to expect that integrity will also be maintained when subjected to explosion-induced missiles. Facility-specific shielding requirements for the IRTS are based on maximum concentrations of Cs-137 in the process stream as specified in the appropriate design criteria documents listed in Section B.4.2.

Routine operations in the plant are primarily associated with analytical laboratory activities. Estimated annual collective doses for this group have been calculated for the site ALARA program and are given in Table B.8.4-1. Shielding required to attenuate radiation from high-activity sources during routine maintenance activities or non-routine operations activities such as filter changeouts is determined prior to work startup.

B.4.3.6 Fire and Explosion Protection The Main Plant, IRTS, and supporting facilities have fire detection, alarm, and suppression systems commensurate with needs as determined by the WVNS Industrial Hygiene and Safety Department and the WVNS Plant Engineering Department. Information SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 69 of 393 relating to fire protection systems for the Main Plant, IRTS and supporting facilities can be found in Sections B.5.3.1. and B.8.8.

B.4.3.7 Radioactive Waste Handling and Storage All radioactive wastes in the Main Plant, IRTS, and supporting facilities are handled per approved procedures. Liquid high level wastes are stored in remotely instrumented and valved tanks. Low-level wastes are handled in the Low-Level Waste Treatment System. Waste minimization is achieved at the WVDP by following principles outlined in the WVDP Waste Minimization Plan (WVDP-087). Solid radioactive wastes generated at the WVDP are stored in the Lag Storage Facilities discussed in Chapter B.7.0.

B.4.3.8 Industrial and Chemical Safety Bulk chemicals at the WVDP are received, stored, and handled per approved procedures.

Administrative controls concerning industrial and chemical safety are found in the WVNS Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual (WVDP-011), which is based on DOE Order 440.1, Worker Protection Management for DOE Federal and Contractor Employees, as discussed in Section B.8.5.2. Consequences of accidents involving hazardous materials are discussed in Section B.9.2. Cold chemical process systems are discussed in Section B.5.4.10.

Recognizing that major or even minor spills could result in hazards to WVDP personnel, the public, and the environment, the WVDP has implemented an Oil, Hazardous Substances, and Hazardous Wastes Spill Prevention, Control and Countermeasures Plan (WVDP-043). This operating plan reviews in detail release flow paths, sources, system design, and the containment of possible spills or releases as well as prevention, preparedness, response, and notification procedures.

B.4.4 Classification of Systems, Structures, and Components Safety Class and Quality Level designations consistent with the classification system of DOE 440.1 are provided in WVDP-204, WVDP Quality List (Q-List), for the individual components of the IRTS, Main Plant, and support facilities. Retrofitting of pre existing equipment to Safety Classes and Quality Levels to meet the requirements of the current Quality Management Manuals is not required. Procurement of existing equipment was done in compliance with the WVNS Quality Assurance Program in place at the time of construction.

Systems, structures, or components required to mitigate the off-site consequences of accidents below the evaluation guidelines given in Section B.9.1.3 are designated as safety class systems, structures or components. As demonstrated in Section B.9.2, no SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 70 of 393 credit has been taken for IRTS, Main Plant, or support facilities in the evaluation of the consequences of facility accidents. All off-site consequences of the evaluated (bounding) accidents are below the evaluation guidelines. Consequently, the IRTS, Main Plant and support facilities contain no systems, structures or components required to be designated as safety class, as defined by DOE 5480.23.

B.4.5 Deconmmissioning The IRTS has been designed in a manner that will facilitate eventual decontamination and decommissioning (D&D). Specific design details include the following:

" System components (such as ion exchange columns, pumps, and filters) installed in original HLW tanks have been designed to permit semi-remote removal and replacement;

"* Installed in the Tank 8D-2 access sleeve are a series of spray nozzles that can be used to flush a mobilization pump as it is removed from the tank;

"* Components in accessible areas (valves and instruments) are subject to either contact maintenance or modular replacement following remote decontamination via flushing of vessels, equipment, and pipes;

"* Pumps, valves, and associated piping connections are designed to minimize "collection pockets" for ease of decontamination, maintenance and replacement;

"* All components and lines are capable of handling a wide range of strong decontamination fluids;

"* The material of construction is 300-series stainless steel to minimize incorporation of contamination into surfaces;

"* Pump volutes are fitted with a volute flush line that allows flushing out the volute, impeller, and pump suction screen;

"* Cell floors slope to sumps to allow for use of liquid decontamination solutions on the cell walls and exterior of vessels;

"* All sumps are lined.

Final decommissioning of WVDP facilities will be addressed in appropriate safety documentation. Decommissioning activities will be performed in accordance with relevant DOE Orders.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 71 of 393 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.4.0 Bixby, W.W. July 17, 1989. DOE Order 6430.1A. Letter to R.A. Thomas CBL:010:89 0902:89:01 (DW:89:0365).

6 Code of Federal Regulations. Title 10, Part 61: Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste.

Code of Federal Regulations. Title 10, Part 835: Occupational Radiation Protection.

Dravo. 1976. Seismic Competence of the Existing Process Building at the West Valley Reprocessing Plant. Chemical Plants Division Report No. 0476.0-15.

Endebrock, E.G, R.J. Bartholomew, J.G. Bennett, R.I. Braiser, and W.F. Corcoran.

March, 1978. Seismic Investigation of the Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., Reprocessing Plant at West Valley, New York. Los Alamos Report LA-7087-MS.

Fujita, T.T. 1981. Tornado and High-Winds Hazards at Western New York Nuclear Service Center, West Valley, New York. Report to Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.

Gates, W. E. September 10, 1992. Report - Wind, Tornado and Seismic Vulnerability Analysis of Reprocessing Plant Guyed Stack - West Valley Demonstration Project For West Valley Nuclear Services. Dames & Moore Report to V. A. DesCamp, WVNS, Contract No. 19-53574-C-VS.

Kennedy, R.P., S.A. Short, J.R. McDonald, M.W. McCann, Jr., R.C. Murray, and J.R.

Hill. June, 1990. Design and Evaluation Guidelines for Department of Energy Facilities Subjected to Natural Phenomena Hazards. UCRL-15910.

McDonald, J.R. July, 1981. Assessment of Tornado and Straight Wind Hazard Probabilitiesat the New York State Nuclear Service Center West Valley, New York.

Murray, R.C., T.A. Nelson, and A.M. Davito. May, 1977. Seismic Analysis of the Nuclear Fuel Services Reprocessing Plant at West Valley, N.Y. LLNL Report UCRL 52266.

Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. 1970. Safety Analysis, Spent Fuel Reprocessing Plant, AEC Docket No. 50-201. Revision 5.

Simiu E., M.J. Cangery, J.L. Filliben. 1979. Extreme Wind Speeds at 129 Stations in the Continental United States. Science 118, National Bureau of Standards. pp. 314.

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WVNS-SAR- 002 Rev. 8 Page 72 of 393 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.4.0 (continued)

U.S. Department of Energy. April 30, 1992. Change 1 (March 10, 1994). DOE Order 5480.23: Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports. Washington, D.C.

_ DOE Order 440.1A: Worker Protection Management for DOE Federal and Contractor Employees. Washington D.C.

. October 24, 1996. DOE Order 420.1: Facility Safety. Washington, D.C.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 1973. Design Response Spectra for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants and Damping Values for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants. Regulatory Guides 1.60 and 1.61.

_ January, 1982. Nuclear Regulatory Staff Safety Evaluation Report on the Dormant West Valley Reprocessing Facility. Docket No. 50-201.

West Valley Nuclear Services Co. WV-365: Preparation of WVDP Safety Documents.

(Latest Revision).

WVDP-010: WVDP Radiological Controls Manual (Latest Revision).

WVDP-011: Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual (Latest Revision).

WVDP-043: West Valley Demonstration Project Oil, Hazardous Substances, and Hazardous Wastes Spill Prevention, Control, and Countermeasures Plan, (Latest Revision).

WVDP-087: WVDP Waste Minimization Plan, (Latest Revision).

WVDP-183: WVDP Freeze Protection Plan, (Latest Revision).

WVDP-204: WVDP Quality List (Q-List) (Latest Revision).

WVDP-218: Process Safety Requirements (Latest Revision).

WVNS-DC-013: Design Criteria Supernatant Treatment System. (Latest Revision).

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 73 of 393 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.4.0 (concluded)

WVNS-DC-020: Design Criteria Cement Solidification System. (Latest Revision).

WVNS-DC-025: Design Criteria Liquid Waste Treatment System. (Latest Revision).

WVNS-DC-037: Design Criteria Radwaste Treatment System (RTS) Drum Cell.

(Latest Revision).

WVNS-DC-046: Design Criteria Sludge Mobilization Waste Removal System.

(Latest Revision).

. WVNS-SAR-001 Safety Analysis Report: Project Overview and General Information. (Latest Revision).

Winkler, C.J. September 29, 2000. Contract DE-AC24-81NE44139: High Level Waste Tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2 Radionuclide Inventory Report. Letter WD:2000:0729.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 74 of 393 TABLE B.4.1-1 TANK 8D-2 TOTAL ACTIVITY Tank 8D-2 Tank 8D-2 Nuclide Inventory Nuclide Inventory 1996 1996 (Ci) (ci)

H-3 1.23E+00 Ac-227 9.46E+00 C-14 5.48E-01 Th-228 7.40E+00 Fe-55 1.47E+02 Th-232 1.64E+00 Ni-59 9.93E+01 Pa-231 1.52E+01 Co-60 3.51E+02 U-232 6.53E+00 Ni-63 7.96E+03 U-233 9.07E+00 Sr-90 5.79E+06 U-234 4 .33E+00 Y-90 5.79E+06 U-235 9. 47E-02 Zr-93 2.72E+02 U-238 7. 97E-01 Nb- 93m 2.26E+02 Np-239 3. 47E+02 Tc-99 1.09E+02 Pu-238 7. 93E+03 Ru-106 2.30E-01 Pu-239 1.63E+03 Cd-113m 1.53E+03 Pu-240 1.19E+03 Sb-125 1.62E+03 Pu-241 6.05E+04 Te-125m 3.96E+02 Pu-242 1.58E+00 1-129 1.84E-01 Am-241 5.37E+04 Cs-134 6,91E+02 Am-242 2.83E+02 Cs-137 6.32E+06 Am-242m 2.85E+02 Ba-137m 5.98E+06 Am-243 3.47E+02 Pm-147 1.80E+04 Cm-242 2.35E+02 Sm-151 8.07E+04 Cm-243 1.16E+02 Eu-154 5.83E+04 Cm-244 6.08E+03 Eu-155 9.82E+02 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 75 6f 393 Table B.4.1-2 WVDP LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE

SUMMARY

Processing volume Processed Cesium-137 Activity Zeolite 1Cement Drums Cesium-137 Activity in Operation (Thousand Liters) I Removed (Ci)

Used (kg) ______(Ci)

Produced Cement Waste J

PUREX Supernatant 2,340 5,300,000 45,100- 10,393 302 Sludge Wash #1 1,550 910,000 11,400 7,279 201 Sludge Wash 42 1,350 130,000 1,600 754 21 PUREX/THOREX Wash 1,190 300,000 4,900 1,451 46 Totals 6,430 6,640,000 65,600 19,877 570

• 2,600 kg from nonradioactive start-up testing SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 76 of 393 TABLE B.4.2-1 SU*MARY OF REPROCESSING BUILDING SEISMIC ANALYSIS RESULTS Cell, I Acceleration Resulting in onset of Failure Area or Lo Alaos LLNL 2

,1truwtu re I_________________ ______

GPC Lateral pile failure at Lateral pile failure at 0.11g.

0.14 g. No other failure Onset of failure of below-grade below 0.2 g sections at 0.09 g.

PMC Lateral pile failure at Lateral pile failure at 0.11g.

0.14 g. No other failure below 0.2 g CPC Lateral pile failure at Lateral pile failure at 0.11g.

0.14 g. No other failure Onset of failure of one wall at below 0.2 g 0.15 g.

LWC Lateral pile failure at Lateral pile failure at 0.11g.

0.14 g. No other failure Onset of failure of below-grade below 0.2 g sections at 0.17 g.

XC-1,-2,- Lateral pile failure at Lateral pile failure at 0.11g.

3, and 0.14 g. No other failure PPC below 0.2 g ARC and Lateral pile failure at Lateral pile failure at 0.11g.

OGC 0.14 g. No other failure Failure of concrete block below 0.2 g sections at 0.07 g.

UPC Lateral pile failure at Lateral pile failure at 0.11g.

0.14 g. No other failure below 0.2 g EDR Lateral pile failure at Lateral pile failure at 0.11g.

0.14 g. No other failure below 0.2 g SRR No failure below 0.2 g. Lateral pile failure at 0.11g.

Anal. No failure below 0.2 g. Not analyzed.

Cells VWR No failure below 0.2 g. Not analyzed.

PMCR Separation from PMC at 0.14 g Not analyzed.

Notes: - Onset of shear wall failure occurs between 0.03 g and 0.07 g'.

- Main stack integrity maintained beyond 0.1 g3 .

1 LASL, 1978 2

LLNL, 1977 3

Gates, 1992 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 77 of 393 B.5.0 FACILITY DESIGN B.5.1 Summary Description B.5.1.1 Location and Facility Layout The IRTS/Main Plant and associated support facilities are located within the Western New York Nuclear Service Center (WNYNSC). These facilities and their relationship to the WVDP are shown in Figure B.5.1-1.

B.5.1.2 Principal Features B.5.1.2.1 Site Boundary The boundary of the WNYNSC is shown in Figure B.5.1-2. This boundary encompasses approximately 3,345 acres and is irregular in shape. The site encloses the entire downstream portion of Buttermilk Creek to its confluence with Cattaraugus Creek. The perimeter of this entire area is enclosed within a 3-strand barbed wire fence.

B.5.1.2.2 Property Protection Area The Property Protection Area comprises approximately 220 acres located near the center of the WNYNSC. This area is enclosed by an eight-foot high chain link fence topped with three strands of barbed wire. Nearly all the Project facilities are located within this area. This area is accessed through gates which are continuously manned by the Project Security Force.

B.5.1.2.3 Site Utility Supplies and Systems Site utilities are located and controlled from a Utility Room (UR) adjacent to the process building as shown on Figure B.5.1-1. Electrical feed to the UR is routed overhead from an on-site substation which is also shown on the figure. Water to the site is provided from two man-made on-site reservoirs located approximately 1.3 km (0.8 mi) southwest of the plant. Water from the northernmost reservoir is pumped via a buried 20 cm (8 in) diameter pipe to the utility room. The southern reservoir is maintained as a backup to the primary supply. Natural gas is provided by National Fuel Gas Co. and is routed to the site via a 15 cm (6 in) high pressure gas line.

This feed is regulated and metered at the Utility Room. The process building cooling tower is approximately 50 m (160 ft) south of the UR and is shown on Figure B.5.1-1.

The Waste Water Treatment Facility is located approximately 50 m (160 ft) south of the cooling tower.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 78 of 393 B.5.1.2.4 Surface Impoundments and Storage Tanks The locations of surface impoundments are shown in Figure B.5.1-1. Primary surface impoundments at the WVDP include the Low-Level Waste Treatment System (LLWTS) lagoons and a nonradiological storage basin. A summary of surface non-radioactive water surface impoundments and outside storage tanks at the WVDP that are not discussed elsewhere in this SAR is given in Table B.5.1-1.

B.5.1.2.5 Atmospheric Release Points The Main Plant off-gas and ventilation stack is located atop the Main Plant Building and is the primary discharge point for airborne releases from the WVDP. Ventilation discharge for the Permanent Ventilation System and 01-14 Ventilation System are to stacks atop the PVS Building and 01-14 building, respectively. Other smaller stacks are associated with existing facility operations; namely, the Laundry Building, Container Sorting and Packaging Facility, Environmental Laboratory fumehoods, and the LLW2. Ventilation exhaust for the Contact Size Reduction Facility ventilation system is to a stack mounted on the Main Plant Building.

B.5.2 IRTS and Main Plant BuildinQs B.5.2.1 Structural Specifications The WVDP is being implemented through the use of existing technology and standard engineering practices. Engineering codes, construction codes, and standards applicable to the general design and operation of IRTS component systems are listed in Table B.5.2-1. Applicable design codes for key IRTS components are provided in Table B.5.2-2.

The Main Plant building was designed and constructed to codes and standards in effect at the time (1963). Original engineering codes, construction codes, and standards applicable to the general design of the Main Plant are listed in Table B.5.2-3.

New facility construction and major modifications to existing facilities at the WVDP conform to the criteria dictated in DOE Order 420.1.

B.5.2.2 Layout of IRTS and Main Plant Buildings Plan and section drawings of the IRTS and Main Plant facilities are given in Figures B.5.2-1 through B.5.2-32. These drawings indicate the layout and configuration of equipment in these areas. Plan and section drawings for the Main Plant are provided only for areas housing active processes equipment.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 79 of 393 B.5.2.3 STS/SMWS and HLWTS Facility Descriptions Modifications have been made to the HLW tanks and their vaults in order to install STS and SMWS equipment. Major processing components that are in radioactive service are installed within Tank 8D-1 and the STS valve aisle. The decontaminated supernatant transfer pump is installed in Tank 8D-3. The sludge mobilization pumps are installed in Tank 8D-2. Zeolite mobilization pumps are installed in Tank 8D-1.

B.5.2.3.1 Tank 8D-1 Detailed discussions of the methods and safety aspects of the necessary modifications to Tank 8D-1 are presented in Brown (1985a). Major process components of the STS are located within Tank 8D-1, and the tank is used for storage of the loaded zeolite (ion exchange material) produced by the STS process. Tank modifications were made for the installation of the zeolite mobilization/removal pumps that slurry the loaded zeolite and supernatant postfilter sand from the tank bottom and transfer it to the Vitrification System.

The modifications to Tank 8D-1 included the following major steps and activities:

"* Excavation to expose a portion of the tank vault concrete roof.

"* Penetration of the vault roof.

"* Removal of rafter sections from the tank roof and installation of cross channel beams.

"* Installation of riser assemblies between the vault and tank roof. These risers are carbon steel and are welded to the tank roof.

"* Penetration of the tank roof within the riser assemblies.

"* Installation of STS components and zeolite mobilization pumps.

Tank 8D-1 is a reinforced carbon steel vessel, approximately 8 m (27 ft) high by 21 m (70 ft) in diameter, fully contained within a 61 cm (2 ft) thick reinforced concrete vault. The tank rests on a 30 cm (12 in) layer of perlite blocks, which in turn rests on an 8 cm (3 in) layer of pea gravel contained in a carbon steel pan. The pan rests on a second 8 cm (3 in) layer of pea gravel on the vault floor. Figures B.5.2 1 and B.5.2-3 depict the locations of STS component and zeolite mobilization pump penetrations made in the STS area of the Tank 8D-1 roof.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 80 of 393 B.5.2.3.1.1 Function Tank 8D-I was originally designed and constructed to serve as a redundant spare for Tank 8D-2. Due to its size, confinement capabilities and proximity to Tank 8D-2, it has subsequently been utilized by the WVDP as a component of the STS, providing housing for major radioactive waste processing equipment and temporary storage of spent zeolite, as well as continuing to act as a spare for Tank 8D-2.

B.5.2.3.1.2 Components Components of the STS located in Tank 8D-1 include the ion exchange columns, filters and coolers. A summary of equipment located in Tank 8D-i is given in Table B.5.2-4.

B.5.2.3.1.3 Design Bases and Safety Assurance The American Concrete Institute (ACI) Standard 318-77, appropriate loads and load combinations from ACI 349, the UBC Zone III, and importance factor 1.0 for seismic load definition were used in the analysis and design of the reinforced concrete portions of the 8D-I tank top modification and vault. The American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC) Code was used in designing the structural steel elements of the structure. The loads considered in the design and/or analysis were dead loads, live loads, thermal loads, seismic loads (applied as horizontal static load to both above ground structures and as part of the dynamic soil pressure loads for below ground structures), static soil pressure, equipment and piping loads, hydrostatic loads, and construction loads.

The analysis performed by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory (LLL, May, 1978) was used to prorate and verify the calculated dynamic soil pressure. The soil pressure established for 0.1 g seismic ground acceleration was translated into an equivalent static force using a Mononobe-Okabe formula.

These loads and load combinations were utilized in the design of the steel and concrete structure. The steel framing system was designed to carry the in-tank components and piping loads and transmit them to the shield structure's concrete walls through embedded plates.

Tank 8D-I Concrete Vault Inteqrity Analysis The Tank 8D-I concrete vault was analyzed for the following purposes:

• Maintenance of the vault integrity as a result of the loads from the shield structure and 8Q-i pump pit; SAR:0000877.01

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"* Verification of vault structure integrity subsequent to the removal of concrete cut-outs for the STS components and;

"* Maintenance of vault integrity under a concrete bucket drop during construction.

The loads delineated above were utilized in the analysis, including the buoyant uplift due to hydrostatic pressure. These loads were applied to the vault in several different combinations and entered into the Stardyne Static Finite Element Analysis computer program. The computer output was reviewed and the most critical stress elements were then used to verify the vault reinforcement and stresses within the concrete.

Based on the assessment, Tank 8D-1 vault integrity is maintained and complies with ACI-318.

Tank 8D-1 Analysis Since the steel roof girders were not cut and loads on the channel rafters after cutting were locally transferred to the roof girders, the steel tank as a whole was not reanalyzed dynamically or statically. The equipment suspended inside Tank 8D-1 is structurally isolated from the carbon steel tank roof. The steel liners (risers) connecting the carbon steel tank with the concrete vault contain a flexible "boot" to maintain tank and vault isolation at all times.

In summary, this structural modification approach did not cause additional stress on the original steel tank.

B.5.2.3.2 Tank 8D-2 Tank 8D-2 was originally designed for, and currently serves as, the storage vessel for high-level waste produced during NFS reprocessing operations. Modifications to the Tank 8D-2 vault and tank include:

"* Coring of the vault roof.

"* Removal of rafter sections from the tank roof and grinding of the roof top.

"* Installation of riser assemblies between the vault and tank roof. These risers are carbon steel and are welded to the tank roof.

"* Penetration of the tank roof.

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• Installation of a shield plug or SMWS mobilization pumps.

Tank 8D-2 is a reinforced carbon steel vessel, approximately 8 m (27 ft) high by 21 m (70 ft) in diameter, fully contained within a 61 cm (2 ft) thick reinforced concrete vault. The tank rests on a 30 cm (12 in) layer of perlite blocks, which in turn rests on an 8 cm (3 in) layer of pea gravel contained in a carbon steel pan. The pan rests on a second 8 cm (3 in) layer of pea gravel on the vault floor. Figure B.5.2-1 provides a plan view of Tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2.

B.5.2.3.2.1 Function Tank 8D-2 provides storage for the high-level waste generated during NFS fuel reprocessing activities, and act as a spare for waste stored in Tank 8D-1.

B.5.2.3.2.2 Components Tank 8D-2 currently provides housing for the sludge mobilization pumps mounted in the tank risers as well as the high-level waste transfer pump 55-G-014.

B.5.2.3.2.3 Design Bases and Safety Assurance Tank 8D-2 Concrete Vault Integrity Analysis The Tank 8D-2 concrete vault was analyzed to verify that vault integrity would be maintained with the loads from the new access risers and subsequent to the removal of concrete cutouts for the SMWS pump components (Rockwell, August, 1985).

Detailed documentation of the concrete tank vault flotation during construction along with mitigative action has been documented by Barnstein (1965 and 1966) and Gates (1991). An extensive program of soil investigation was carried out using a series of shafts under the tank vaults to identify the state of cracking in the vault slabs as well as the voids that had developed under it.

The loads used in the analysis included the buoyant uplift due to hydrostatic pressure. These loads were applied to the vault in several different combinations and entered into the Stardyne Static Finite Element Analysis computer program. The computer output was then reviewed and the most critical stress elements used in verifying vault reinforcement and stresses within the concrete (Ebasco Services, Inc., 1986). Soil properties used in the analysis were verified by additional borings and sample testing (Gates, 1986).

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 83 of 393 In summary, based on the assessment under the load conditions and combinations discussed above, the Tank 8D-2 vault integrity has been maintained (Ebasco, 1990, 1986a).

Tank 8D-2 Analysis The top of Tank 8D-2 was analyzed assuming the steel roof girders had not been cut and a maximum of two channel rafters had been cut. The steel tank as a whole was reanalyzed statically. The steel risers connecting the carbon steel tank were pulled in tension and supported on the vault, this results in the same roof loads as existed before modifications. In summary, this structural modification approach does not cause additional stress on the original steel tank roof (Rockwell, 1984).

B.5.2.3.3 Associated STS/SMWS Facilities STS/SMWS Pioeway A concrete and steel shield structure (pipeway) was erected on top of the Tank 8D-1 vault. The outer walls of the pipeway are formed by a curb with support columns to allow for piping runs. These retaining walls and columns support the structural members that span between them and support the STS equipment. The walls and columns also support the concrete roof and structural beams. Figure B.5.2-2 shows the pipeway above the 8D-I vault with the STS components suspended from the vault roof/pipeway floor into the tank.

STS Valve Aisle A shielded valve aisle constructed at the northwest perimeter of Tank 8D-1 contains remotely operated valves and associated instrumentation. Shield windows and manipulators permit remote operation and replacement of components. The shielded walls and roof of the valve aisle are constructed with 30 cm (12 in) of steel. The valve aisle provides secondary containment of HLW piping and valves between the operating aisle in the STS support building and Tank 8D-1. Leakage into the valve aisle or the pipeway behind the valve aisle back wall is collected in a common sump located near the back wall of the valve aisle. Sump contents are transferred to Tank 8D-2.

STS Support Building Attached to the valve aisle is the STS support building, which contains auxiliary support systems and equipment for operation of the STS. This structure houses the demineralized water and zeolite storage tanks, associated delivery systems, control room, HVAC equipment, and utility services. The building is maintained as a SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 84 of 393 radiologically "cold" area. The orientation/layout of the pipeway, valve aisle, and STS support building relative to Tank 8D-1 is shown in Figure B.5.2-2.

B.5.2.3.3.1 Function The STS pipeway, valve aisle and support building provide maintenance access and operating areas for STS operations.

B.5.2.3.3.2 Components The STS Support Building houses the STS control room and contains the batch tanks which supply resin for the ion exchange columns in Tank 8D-1.

B.5.2.4 LWTS/Main Plant Facility Descriptions The Main Plant building was designed and constructed to house the equipment used by NFS for reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. Following cessation of reprocessing activities several areas of the plant were placed in standby pending final decontamination and decommissioning. In 1981 the Department of Energy assumed control of the facility and the decision was made to utilize areas of existing facilities to the greatest extent possible. As a result several areas of the Main Plant were decontaminated and original equipment was removed. These areas were then fitted with new equipment and returned to service in support of WVDP activities.

Details of facility utilization are documented in Skillern, 1986.

Areas of the Main Plant supporting WVDP activities include:

High-Level Waste Interim Storage Area (HLWISA)

The HLWISA provides support for transfer and interim storage of vitrified high-level waste processed in the Vitrification Facility. The HLWISA utilizes the following areas of the Main Plant: (1) the Chemical Process Cell (CPC), (2) the Equipment Decontamination Room (EDR), (3) the Chemical Crane Room (CCR), (4) the Chemical Viewing Aisle (CVA) and (5) the Chemical Operating Aisle (COA). The safety analysis for interim storage of HLW is documented in WVNS-SAR-003.

Liquid Waste Treatment System (LWTS)

The LWTS utilizes the following areas of the Main Plant: (1) Extraction Cell 3 (XC-3), (2) Product Purification Cell (PPC), (3) Uranium Product Cell (UPC), (4)

Uranium Loadout (ULO), (5) Extraction Chemical Room (XCR), (6) Lower Warm Aisle (LWA), (7) Upper Warm Aisle (UWA), (8) Lower Extraction Aisle (LXA) and (9) Upper Extraction Aisle (UXA).

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 85 of 393 Cells within the Main Plant which directly support WVDP activities are described in the following sections.

B.5.2.4.1 Chemical Process Cell The Chemical Process Cell (CPC) is located on the northwest side of the Main Plant building at 100 feet EPD (elevation plant datum). The cell is 28.3 m (93 ft) long north to south, 6.7 m (22 ft) wide, and 13 m (43 ft) high. The walls are of reinforced concrete 1.8 m (69 in) thick. The cell floor and the walls 0.46 (1 ft 6 in) up from the floor are lined with 304 stainless steel. Above the stainless steel, the interior surface is Amerlock-coated concrete.

B.5.2.4'.1.1 Function The function of equipment originally located in the Chemical Process Cell (CPC) was the dissolution and handling of fuel received from the General Purpose Cell (GPC).

Additional cell vessels supported concentration and adjustment of process solutions.

In support of the WVDP, the CPC has been designated to serve as part of the High Level Waste Interim Storage Area (HLWISA), and as such has been utilized for the storage of canistered, solidified high-level waste received from the Vitrification Facility.

B.5.2.4.1.2 Components Four shielded viewing windows support operations in the CPC. Three windows are located along the west wall in the Chemical. Viewing Aisle (CVA) . The fourth window, located in the north wall, permits viewing along the length of the cell. Shielding is provided by separated slabs of lead glass filled with mineral oil.

Equipment currently remaining in the cell includes three cranes and a power manipulator. A transfer cart housed in the EDR is available for transfers of equipment into and out of the CPC. This cart is electrically driven and can be sent into the CPC on a set of hinged rails which must be lowered into position after the CPC-EDR door is open. These hinged rails must be raised before the CPC-EDR door can be closed.

Any liquid in the CPC is collected in either the south or north sump. Liquids that accumulate in these sumps are transferred to Tank 7D-2 in the LWC and ultimately to Tank 8D-2.

Equipment installed in support of the HLWISF includes storage racks for the product waste canisters and the canister transfer cart. Equipment removed from service in SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 86 of 393 the vitrification cell may also be stored in this cell until it can be removed for disposal.

B.5.2.4.1.3 Design Bases and Safety Assurance As stated, the CPC provides storage for the solidified high level waste produced by the Vitrification Facility. Once the waste is processed from the liquid slurry form into the glass waste form and confined within stainless steel canisters, it is considerably more stable and, therefore, less mobile during accident conditions.

Section C.9.6 of WVNS-SAR-003 establishes the fact that once the HLW is processed into this containerized glass waste form, substantial release to the public will not occur, even if the concrete structure confining the stored waste is damaged. For this reason, the HLWISA need not have as much structural integrity as cells containing highly dispersible radioactive materials, such as the vitrification cell.

The CPC has been decontaminated and has been fitted with canister storage racks to accommodate the filled borosilicate canisters.

The CPC, EDR, and CCR were built to seismic requirements of the 1961 UBC edition which imposed requirements for a Seismic Zone III design of structures. The current edition of the UBC has lessened the seismic requirements for the WVDP site, which is now a Seismic Zone 1. Any modifications in the use of the facility which change the facility design loads, such as the addition of heavy canister storage, requires reanalysis and design in conformance with current UBC and New York building codes.

The CPC has not been analyzed for its ability to withstand DBE conditions. As explained above, the stable borosilicate glass waste form present in this structure makes failure acceptable under natural phenomena accident conditions.

B.5.2.4.2 Equipment Decontamination Room The Equipment Decontamination Room (EDR) is located at the northwest corner of the process building at elevation 100 feet EPD. The room is 13.3 m long x 9.8 m wide x 7.6 m high (43 ft 9 in x 32 ft x 25 ft). A shield door on the west side of the EDR provides an opening from the outside. Another shield door at the southeast end of the room slides west to provide access to the CPC.

B.5.2.4.2.1 Function WVNS utilizes the EDR to serve as the transfer interface between the Vitrification Facility (VF) and the former reprocessing building. Transfer of material from the VF is through a shielded tunnel which has been connected to the room.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 87 of 393 B.5.2.4.2.2 Components The EDR is serviced by two 9 metric ton cranes on a single bridge with rails at elevation 121 feet 6 inches. Bridge travel is east-west. A motor-driven transfer cart runs on rails into the CPC. The transfer cart is controlled from either the EDR Viewing Aisle (EDRVA) or the north CVA. Operation of the transfer cart is described in WVNS-SAR-003.

A 15.6 m2 (168 ft 2 ) section of the north EDR shield wall has been removed to permit the transfer of vitrified high level waste from the vitrification facility through the EDR. Cutting and disposition of cement block sections removed from the north EDR wall is discussed in Tundo, 1988. Additional discussion of decontamination activities in the EDR is presented in Meigs, 1985.

B.5.2.4.2.3 Design Bases and Safety Assurance The EDR was built to seismic requirements of the 1961 UBC edition which imposed requirements for a Seismic Zone III design of structures. The current edition of the UBC has lessened the seismic requirements for the WVDP site, which is now a Seismic Zone 1. Any modifications in the use of the facility which change the facility design loads will require reanalysis and design in conformance with current UBC and New York building codes. The EDR has not been analyzed for its ability to withstand DBE conditions. As explained in Section B.5.2.4.1, the stable borosilicate glass waste form present in this structure makes failure acceptable under natural phenomena accident conditions.

B.5.2.4.3 Extraction Cell 3 Extraction Cell 3 (XC-3) measures 4.6 m x 6.5 m x 17.4 m (15 ft x 21 ft 3 in x 57 ft). Entry to the cell is via a personnel door from the Cell Access Aisle at ground level or through the 1.8 m (6 ft) square hatch plug in the floor of XCR. The floor is stainless steel lined to a height of 46 cm (18 in), providing a volume of 13,500 L (3,600 gal) for spill protection. Walls and ceilings are carboline-coated concrete.

B.5.2.4.3.1 Function Extraction Cell 3 currently serves as the primary location for vessels associated with the Liquid Waste Treatment System. Equipment in this cell provides for waste concentration, overheads ion exchange and collection and concentrates cooling.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 88 of 393 B.5.2.4.3.2 Components Equipment in XC-3 includes the LWTS evaporator, reboiler and other tanks and vessels associated with low-level waste concentration. A summary of equipment in XC-3 is given in Table B.5.2-5.

B.5.2.4.3.3 Design Bases and Safety Assurance The original design bases for XC-3 are not contained in the historical record.

Original criteria for the Main Plant is given in Table B.5.2-3. The monolithic construction of XC-3 provides assurance of confinement of radioactivity under normal and expected abnormal conditions.

B.5.2.4.4 Product Purification Cell The Product Purification Cell (PPC) measures 6.5 m x 4.9 m (21 ft 4 in x 16 ft) and is 17.4 m (57 ft) high. Entry to the PPC is via a north wall personnel door from the Uranium Product Cell (UPC) and through an access hatch from the Extraction Chemical Room (XCR). A stainless steel liner covers the floor of the cell and extends 46 cm (18 in) up the walls, providing a volume of 14,500 L (3,800 gal) for spill protection. The remainder of the cell is carboline-coated concrete. A 3.8 L (I gal) sump, located midway along the east wall of the cell, collects liquids to be transferred to waste holding tank 13D-8. There are no cranes, manipulators, or windows in the cell.

A concrete partition parallel to the north and south wall divides the PPC. The area south of the partition is accessible only from the floor of the PPC in the cell's present configuration.

B.5.2.4.4.1 Function The PPC provides housing for the LWTS valve gallery located in the area of the PPC north of the shield partition.

B.5.2.4.4.2 Components No LWTS components other than valves and equipment associated with the valve gallery are located in the PPC. The area south of the shield partition contains 28 vessels, piping and beams not required for LWTS operations. The area is highly contaminated and is currently isolated from the remainder of the PPC.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 89 of 393 B.5.2.4.4.3 Design Bases and Safety Assurance The original design bases for the PPC are not contained in the historical record.

Original criteria for the Main Plant is given in Table B.5.2-3. The monolithic construction of the PPC provides assurance for confinement of radioactivity under normal and expected abnormal conditions.

B.5.2.4.5 Uranium Product Cell The Uranium Product Cell (UPC) is 3.9 m (12 ft 9 in) high, 14 m (46 ft) along the east wall and 8 m (26 ft 3 in) along the north wall. The southeast corner of the cell is reduced 2.8 m (9 ft 3 in) along the south wall and 3.3 m (10 ft 9 in) along the west wall to permit access to Extraction Cell 3 from the cell access aisle.

Entry to the cell is via a door in the south end of the west wall, from the cell access aisle. The lower entry to the Product Purification Cell is through a door in the south wall of the Uranium Product Cell.

The cell floor is covered with a stainless steel liner that extends up the walls to a height of 46 cm (18 in). The remainder of the cell is carboline-coated concrete.

Liquids from the floor of the cell are accumulated in a sump located approximately in the center of the cell floor. This sump drains to the interceptor. The drain is closed with a remotely-operated valve.

B.5.2.4.5.1 Function The UPC provides storage and spill containment for the LWTS feed and product vessels.

B.5.2.4.5.2 Components There are two vessels in the Uranium Product Cell, each having a volume of 57,000 liters (15,000 gallons). The LWTS Concentrates Storage Tank 5D-15A has two compartments: 5D-15AI with a capacity of 38,000 liters (10,000 gallons) and 5D-15A2 with a capacity of 19,000 liters (5,000 gallons). Tank 5D-15B serves as the LWTS feed tank. Tank 5D-15A1 also can serve as a product feed tank.

B.5.2.4.5.3 Design Bases and Safety Assurance The original design bases for the UPC are not contained in the historical record.

Original criteria for the Main Plant is given in Table B.5.2-3.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 90 of 393 B.5.2.4.6 Uranium Load Out The Uranium Load Out (ULO) is situated at the northeast corner of the UPC with a floor at elevation 95 feet. The ULO is 5.8 m (19 ft) high, with a length of 8.6 m (28 ft 4 in) along the north wall and 6.6 m (21 ft 10 in) along the east wall. The southwest corner of the cell is inset 2.7 m (9 ft) along the west wall and 3.3 m (10 ft 8 in) along the south wall. Access to the cell is through a doorway at the west end of the south wall. A pump niche in the ULO provides maintenance access to pumps associated with LWTS tanks in the UPC.

B.5.2.4.7 Liquid Waste Cell The Liquid Waste Cell (LWC) is an "L"-shaped cell located in the south central portion of the Process Building adjacent to the CPC, XC-I and XC-2 at elevation 92 feet. The north-south leg of the LWC is 14.10 meters (46.25 ft) long by 5.18 meters (17 ft) wide, and the east-west leg is 5.79 meters (19 ft) long by 4.80 meters (15.75 ft) wide. The LWC is 5.94 meters (19.5.ft) high across its extent. The floor of the LWC is below grade at a plant elevation of 28 meters (92 ft). Access to the cell is from a door in the cell access aisle. The floor of the cell is lined with stainless steel extending 46 cm (18 in) up the walls, providing a volume of 42,000 L (11,300 gal) for spill protection. The remainder of the cell is carboline-coated concrete.

B.5.2.4.7.1 Function Vessels in the Liquid Waste Cell are general purpose in nature, receiving streams from both IRTS and Main Plant areas. LWTS valving may be configured such that product solution transferred from Tank 8D-3 may be received in Tank 7D-2 in the LWC.

Alternatively, off-spec LWTS solutions may be routed to Tank 8D-2 via Tank 7D-2.

Vessels in this cell also receive sump effluents from several areas of the Main Plant, including LWTS and HLWISA areas.

B.5.2.4.7.2 Components The Liquid Waste Cell contains six in-service vessels. A summary of these vessels is given in Table B.5.2-5.

B.5.2.4.7.3 Design Bases and Safety Assurance The design basis for the LWC is not contained in the historical record. Liquids in the cell are contained within vessels. Spills resulting from a vessel or piping failure would be contained within the cell and collect in the cell sump. Sump solutions may be transferred to Tank 4D-10H.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 91 of 393 B.5.2.4.8 Off-Gas Cell The Off-Gas Cell (OGC) is a reinforced concrete block cell measuring 3.7 m x 9.2 m x 8.8 m high (12 ft x 30 ft 6 in x 29 ft) located at elevation 100 feet EPD south of the CPC. The cell is painted inside with carboline paint and has two floor sumps.

B.5.2.4.8.1 Function The OGC contains the original plant vessel off-gas equipment. This system is primarily used to provide ventilation of vessels associated with the Liquid Waste Treatment System.

B.5.2.4.8.2 Components Vessel Off-Gas equipment in the Off-Gas Cell is summarized in Table B.5.2-6.

B.5.2.4.8.3 Design Bases and Safety Assurance The design basis for the OGC is not contained in the historical record. Scrubber solutions are contained in vessels in the cell. Spills resulting from a vessel or piping failure would be contained within the cell and collect in the cell sump. Sump solutions may be transferred to Tank 13D-8 in the Liquid Waste Cell.

B.5.2.4.9 Head End Cells B.5.2.4.9.1 Description and Function The head end cells (HECs) of the Main Plant are the Process Mechanical Cell (PMC),

the General Purpose Cell (GPC), the Process Mechanical Cell Crane Room (PMCR),the General Purpose Cell Crane Room (GCR), the Miniature Cell (MC), the Manipulator Repair Room (MRR), the Scrap Removal Room (SRR), Chemical Process Cell (CPC),

Chemical Crane Room (CCR), Equipment Decontamination Room (EDR), and the Master Slave Manipulator (MSM). The PMC and the GPC currently contain significant quantities of contamination remaining from spent fuel reprocessing activities. Other areas of the head end contain much lower levels of contamination. The PMC was used for the mechanical preparation of the fuel, which included removal of assembly hardware and the shearing of the fuel into short sections, in preparation for chemical dissolution operations in the CPC. The GPC was used for collection and storage of the sheared fuel prior to dissolution operations and for packaging and transfer of the leached hulls for disposal. The GPC is depicted in Figure B.5.2-10. The PMC is depicted in Figures B.5.2-11 and B.5.2-12.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 92 of 393 Process Mechanical Cell The PMC is located on the ground level of the Main Plant building. It is 16 m (52 ft) long north to south, 4 m (12 ft) wide, and 8 m (25 ft) high. A large rectangular concrete pedestal in the center of the floor serves as the base for the saw table.

The cell is lined with stainless steel 6.3 m (21 in) up from the floor. Above the stainless steel, the interior surface is carboline-coated concrete. The upper half of the north wall is a 0.9 m (3 ft) thick concrete shield door that leads to the PMC Crane Room (PMCR).

The 2.4 m by 2.4 m (8 ft by 8 ft) PMC shielded transfer port and airlock is located on the 100 ft elevation adjacent to the east wall of the PMC. It was installed in the EMOA to permit small cart transfer of mechanical parts into the cell without exposure to personnel. At an elevation of 100 ft, the LWC is located south of the PMC. At an elevation of 114.5 ft, the Ventilation Supply Room lies east, the Ventilation Wash Room (VWR) lies south, and the Chemical Operating Aisle (COA) lies between the CPC and PMC.

The shield walls of the PMC are constructed of ordinary concrete with an average density of 2.36 g/cm3 and a thickness of 1.7 m (5.5 ft). There are six lead glass oil-filled shielded viewing windows. The PMC-A, -B, -C, & -D shield windows are along the west wall; PMC-A being at the south end of the wall. Windows PMC-E and -F are in the northwest and southeast corners respectively. Windows A-D, which are 79 cm by 81 cm (31 in by 32 in) are intended to permit observation into the cell from the West Mechanical Operating Aisle (WMOA). Window PMC-F allows viewing from the East Mechanical Operating Aisle (EMOA). Above each window are two manipulator ports.

The PMC is accessible from the following seven locations:

1) A 0.91m (3 ft) thick vertical lift shield door that connects with the Process Mechanical Crane Room;

2) A 53 cm (21 in) diameter floor hatch in the southeast corner that connects with the FRS;

3) A 56 cm (22 in) square hatch in the east wall that connects to the shuttle room within the EMOA;

4) A ceiling hatch in the.southwest corner that connects with the analytical Sample Storage Cell;

5) A 51 cm (20 in) diameter chute in the floor at the northeastern end that connects with the Miniature Cell (MC);

6) A 0.91 m by 1.2 m (3 ft by 4 ft) floor hatch at the north end that connects with the GPC; and

7) A 20 cm (8 in) diameter shear discharge chute that connects with the GPC.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 93 of 393 A screened floor drain is located in the middle of the cell at its north end and another at the south end. These drain by gravity via a 7.6 cm (3 in) diameter drain line embedded within the concrete floor of the cell to the GPC sump.

The PMC contains two crane bridges of 2 ton capacity, each traveling on rails 6.5 m (21 ft) above the cell floor. Another set of rails 5.6 m (18.25 ft) above the floor carries a 1 ton power manipulator. The crane bridges travel in a north-south direction on the upper of two sets of rails. Each bridge is equipped with a trolley mounted hoist capable of lifting two tons. Mechanical stops limit the travel of the bridges and trolleys. Limit switches are provided for the fully retracted and fully extended cable and for slack line on the hoist.

General Purpose Cell The GPC is located below grade beneath the north ends of the CPC and PMC, the south end of the Scrap Removal Room (SRR) and under the MOA. The GPC measures 13.9 m long by 3.2 m wide and is 5.9 m high (45 ft 7 in x 10 ft 5 in x 19 ft 6 in). The north wall is constructed of high density concrete. All other walls, ceiling and floor are constructed of ordinary concrete. The GPC north and south walls are 1.2 m (4 ft) thick, the east wall is 1.3 m (4 ft) thick, and the west wall is 1.1 m (4 ft) thick.

The floor is 0.91 m (3 ft) thick at the east end, tapering to 0.45 m (2 ft) at the west end. The ceiling is 1.7 m (6 ft) thick.

The floor is sloped to capture liquid run-off into a stainless steel-lined sump. The floor from the west wall to the sump, 2.4 m (8 ft) from the west wall, is sloped from an elevation of 75 ft to an elevation of 74 ft 3 in near the east wall. Around the sump is the pan area of the cell where the floor drops 18 cm (7 in) to an elevation of 73 ft 6 in and levels out to the east wall. The floor and 4.9 m (16 ft) up the walls are lined with stainless steel. The sump receives liquids from the GPC as well as liquids from the floor drains and hatch in the PMC.

The sump is equipped with a level indicator and both high and low-level alarms.

Modifications have been made for the sump level-indicating equipment since the original equipment is nonfunctional. The sump contents would be transferred by two steam eductors via a 5.1 cm (2 in) diameter line to the hold side of tank 4D-10, located in the Liquid Waste Cell (LWC), but these eductors are currently nonfunctional. There is no underground piping in the GPC.

There are three oil-filled lead glass radiation shielding windows, 2M-6A to C, on the north wall, each with two manipulator ports over them. Shield windows have dimensions of 1.2 m by 1.2 m (4 ft by 4 ft) and contain five lead glass panes. A 1.2 m by 1.2 m (4 ft by 4 ft) carbon steel shutter, 2M-7A to C; covers each shielding SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 94 of 393 window. In addition to the manipulator ports/plugs, there is a periscope and maintenance port in the north wall.

The GPC has three ceiling hatches: a one-ton stainless steel hatch measuring 1.2 m by 0.91 m (4 ft by 3 ft) located at the east end of the GPC and shared with the PMC; a hatch measuring 0.76 m by 1.6 m (2.5 ft by 5.25 ft) located in the GPC southwest corner and shared with the CPC; and, a carbon steel hydraulic operated hatch with dimensions of 0.99 m by 1.2 m (3.25 ft by 4 ft) located at the GPC northwest corner and shared with the SRR. There is also an 20 cm (8 in) diameter stainless steel chute leading from the bundle shear in the PMC to the Fuel Basket Loading Station in the GPC.

Ventilation flow into the GPC is through the floor hatches in the SRR, PMC and CPC.

Air flow from the PMC is approximately 0.94 m3 /s (2,000 cfm) . A smaller volume of air enters the GPC through the shear discharge chute. Air is exhausted from the GPC to the HEV exhaust filter inlet plenum via a 0.91 m (36 in) duct. A more detailed discussion of the Head End Ventilation system is provided in Section B.5.4.1.

B.5.2.4.9.2 Components The PMC contains the following equipment: shielded viewing windows, in-cell lighting, crane room shield door, bridge cranes, power manipulator, master-slave manipulators, and a fire protection system. The GPC contains the following equipment: shielded viewing windows, in-cell lighting, crane room shield door, bridge crane, power manipulator, master-slave manipulators, sump eductors, and a fire suppression system.

Most, if not all, of the equipment in the PMC and the GPC is out of service (Vance, 1986.)

B.5.2.4.9.3 Design Bases and Safety Assurance The structural design basis for the Head End Cells is not contained in the historical record.

B.5.2.4.10 Inactive Cells and Rooms The following subsections address cells and rooms in the Main Plant that do not currently support WVDP activities.

B.5.2.4.10.1 Extraction Cells 1 and 2 Extraction Cell 1 (XC-1) and Extraction Cell 2 (XC-2), along with XC-3 which is discussed in Section B.5.2.4.3, are aligned perpendicularly to the south end of the CPC. Roof plugs provide access to all three of these cells which were originally SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 95 of 393 designated as contact maintained cells. XC-2 and XC-3 can also be entered through doors from the Cell Access Aisle. XC-1 measures 4.9 m x 5.0 m x 16.8 m high (16 ft x 16 ft 6 in x 55 ft high), and XC-2 measures 6.4 m x 6.3 m x 17.5 m high (21 ft x 20 ft 9 in x 57 ft 6 in high). The floors and walls in XC-1 and XC-2 are stainless steel lined and carboline coated in a manner similar to that described for XC-3.

Estimation of Activity in the Former Nuclear Fuel Services Reprocessing Plant (Wolniewicz, J.C., March 1993) estimates that as of 1993, XC-l contains 570 Ci of Cs-137, 20.1 g of U-233, 953 g of U-235, 125 g of Pu-239, and 9.02 Ci of Am-241, and that XC-2 contains 4.30 Ci of Cs-137, 15.1 g of U-233, 717 g of U-235, 94.6 g of Pu 239, and 0.0681 Ci of Am-241.

After dissolution of fuel in the CPC to form a process fuel solution, the solution was put through a Purex solvent extraction process which separated and recovered uranium and plutonium as nitrate solutions. This was accomplished in a series of perforated-plate pulse columns that had the associated equipment necessary for metering, transferring, and intermediately storing solutions. Continuous solvent extraction was achieved by 10 pulse columns with various functions. All of these columns are fabricated from 304-L stainless steel. Seven columns remain in the Main Plant, with three located in XC-I and four located in XC-2. Three columns which were originally located in XC-3 were removed to accommodate equipment for the LWTS. Seven of the 10 columns have an overall length of approximately 12.8 m (42 ft), and a "barrel" inside diameter of 26 cm (10.25 in), which comprises most of the columns' length. Generally, vessels (e.g., columns, tanks, pots) in XC-1 and XC-2 are empty.

History of Decontamination, (Riethmiller, G.E., June 1981') states that the "vessels are empty," referring to the vessels that supported the partition cycle, uranium cycles, plutonium cycle, solvent systems, acid recovery system, uranium purification system, and the plutonium purification system.

B.5.2.4.10.2 Acid Recovery Cell and Acid Recovery Pump Room Acid recovery was accomplished through the use of two waste evaporators, following which the acid was subjected to acid fractionation that concentrated the acid to a reusable molarity. The Acid Recovery Cell (ARC) is shown on Figure B.5.2-16, and measures 8.8 m x 9.3 m (28 ft 9 in x 30 ft 6 in) to the ceiling beneath the Off-Gas Aisle at elevation 39.0 m (128 ft). A section, 3.4 m x 3.2 m (11 ft 3 in x 10 ft 6 in), extends up to elevation 43.6 m (143 ft). This extension houses the upper part of the acid fractionator (7C-3). Access to the ARC is via a man door from the south stairs at elevation 34.0 m (111 ft 6 in) or through a 1.1 m (3 ft 6 in) hatch in the Off-Gas Acid Recovery Aisle at elevation 39.9 m (131 ft). There is a manway on the north side of the ARC that is open to the Off-Gas Cell. History of Decontamination states that ARC decontamination efforts did not involve the use of chemicals, and that all vessels are empty except for the general purpose evaporator (7C-5), which indicated a level of 24.5% in 1981, and has a total capacity of approximately 17 m3 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 96 of 393 (600 ft3). The makeup of the solution in the general purpose evaporator is unknown, but "is probably water that entered the ARC sump from the Off-Gas Aisle."

The Acid Recovery Pump Room (ARPR), at elevation 30.5 m (100 ft), measures 4.9 m x 6.9 m x 3.3 m high (16 ft x 22 ft 10 in x 11 ft high) . A pump niche, approximately 0.9 m x 0.9 m x 0.9 m high (3 ft x 3 ft x 3 ft high), is located in the northeast corner of the ARPR. Entry to the ARPR is via a door in the east wall, from the south stairway. Some equipment originally in the room, including 7E-11 cooler and 7E-12 cooler, and some of the auto valves, have been removed from the ARPR to waste burial.

B.5.2.4.10.3 Hot Acid Cell The Hot Acid Cell (HAC) is shown on Figure B.5.2-14, and measures approximately 6.6 m x 6.6 m (21 ft 6 in x 21 ft 6 in). The main components located in the HAC are the hot acid storage tank (7D-11) and the hot acid batch tank (7D-12). History of Decontamination indicates that these tanks are empty, and that they were extensively flushed during decontamination activities.

B.5.2.5 Cement Solidification System 01-14 Building The CSS facilities located in the 01-14 building include the Waste Dispensing Cell (WDC), the Process Cell, and the Drum Loadout Area. The Waste Dispensing Cell contains the Waste Dispensing Vessel. The Process Cell contains the equipment for mixing waste received from the WDC and equipment for handling filled cement drums.

The Drum Loadout Area is used to store full cement drums prior to shipout for transport to the Drum Cell.

A separate cell in the 01-14 Building contains equipment for the treatment of Vitrification Facility process off-gas.

B.5.2.5.1 Function The purpose of the 01-14 building is to provide housing for the equipment in radioactive service in the CSS. The CSS feed vessel is located in the Waste Dispensing Cell. Equipment for cement/waste mixing and drum handling are contained in the Process Cell. Other areas provide housing for dry cement storage and ventilation system equipment.

The 01-14 building also provides housing for Vitrification off-gas treatment equipment including a heater, HEPA filters, blowers and NO. abatement removal equipment. Anhydrous ammonia, used for NO, abatement, is stored in a 3,200 L (850 gallons) above-ground Ammonia Storage Tank (64-D-004) located adjacent to the 01-14 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 97 of 393 Building. Safety issues associated with this equipment ate addressed in WVNS-SAR-003.

B.5.2.5.2 Components The Waste Dispensing Cell contains Tank 70D-001 (the CSS Waste Dispensing Vessel)

Process Cell equipment includes the waste dispensing pump, two high-shear mixers, the drum fill head, the decant pump, the empty drum air lock, the drum lid crimper, and the drum robot smear station. This equipment is designed to mix low-level radioactive waste with cement, fill 269 L (71 gal) drums, cap the drums, survey the drums for contamination, and weigh drums and overpack drums (if necessary) . A summary of CSS components in the 01-14 Building are given in Table B.5.2-7.

B.5.2.6 Drum Cell The Drum Cell is located approximately 500 meters to the southeast of the Main Plant.

The purpose of the Drum Cell is to provide a shielded secure area for placement of not greater than Class C solid waste. The temporary weather structure is a Butler type building that encloses the Drum Cell and waste handling equipment.

Approximately 19,877 drums of cemented waste are stored in the Drum Cell. The square, steel drums have a volume of 269 L (71 gal). There are approximately 570 curies (2.1 x 1013 Bq) of Cesium-137 contained in the 19,877 drums. The curies are spread among the drums in a generally uniform manner. On average, the drums contain approximately 9.7 nCi (3.6 x 1011 nBq) of alpha activity per gram of cement.

B.5.2.6.1 Function The function of the Drum Cell is to provide storage of cement drums produced by CSS operations.

B.5.2.7 Warehouse Facilities The WVDP operates three warehouse storage facilities. The Receiving Warehouse (Main) is a large metal building located approximately 100 m (330 ft) south of the Main Plant. This facility is the central shipping and receiving area for the WVDP.

A New Warehouse (Main 2) is located approximately 100 m (330 ft) west of the Receiving Warehouse. The facility is a metal structure on a concrete pad and is used for storage of large equipment and bulk chemicals. The main portion of the new warehouse contains nonreactive chemicals and other equipment and supplies for the site. The south end of the warehouse is divided into five individual, concrete block rooms for separate storage of acids, caustics, flammables, oxidizers, and "health SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 98 of 393 hazard" materials. All of these storage rooms have grated floors set on top of berms to control spills, and individual ventilation and fire suppression systems. The vent systems discharge directly to the atmosphere. One-gallon containers are stored on reinforced shelves and 55-gallon drums are stored on pallets. Entry to each storage room is controlled by the Site Material & Receipt Manager.

The third facility is the Bulk Storage Warehouse (BSW). This building is located approximately 2.2 km (1.4 miles) southeast of the Main Plant. It is presently used by the Project for long term storage of large items such as old office equipment.

Although located within the WNYNSC, there is no direct on-site route to this building. Access is by way of public roads.

B.5.3 Support Systems B.5.3.1 Fire Protection System Several fire hazards analysis (FHA) documents have been developed for various WVDP facilities within the scope of this SAR. These documents contain extensive fire protection system design and installation-related information. The subject FHA documents are identified in Section B.8.8 of this SAR. Fire suppression systems at the WVDP consist of water, halon, dry chemical, high expansion foam and clean agent systems. These systems are discussed below.

B.5.3.1.1 Water Supply Water supplies for the fire protection system are provided by two on-site reservoirs containing approximately 2,100,000 m3 (560,000,000 gal). Water is pumped from the reservoir by one of two pumps to the clarifier system and to the water storage Tank 32D-1. The capacity of the tank is 1,800,000 L (475,000 gal) with 1,100,000 L (300,000 gal) reserved for fire fighting. An electric-driven pump provided with a diesel backup is used to pump water from the storage tank through the system. Both pumps are rated at 63 L/s (1,000 gpm) at 690 kPa (100 psi). The electric motor driven fire pump is arranged to start automatically. The diesel pump subsequently starts automatically if the system water pressure continues to drop. Both fire pumps are located in the fire pump house located at the base of the water storage Tank 32D-1. A jockey pump is connected between Tank 32D-1 and the fire service main to maintain system pressure at greater than the fire pump starting pressure.

B.5.3.1.2 Water Distribution Water is distributed throughout the site through a system of underground water mains.

Dry barrel fire hydrants are provided to allow access to water for use in fire fighting. Fire water service mains also provide water to building sprinkler systems.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 99 of 393 B.5.3.1.2.1 Wet Pipe Sprinkler Systems Wet pipe sprinklers have their piping filled with water under pressure. When heat from a fire activates an individual sprinkler head, water is released from the system. Each sprinkler head activates individually when it is heated to its design temperature.

Wet pipe sprinklers are used only in heated facilities, where freeze protection is not a concern. These areas include: the Vitrification Facility, Main I and II Warehouses, Annex north, Annex south, Annex conference rooms, Test and Storage Building, PVS Building, 01-14 Building, CSS/LWTS Control Room, Fire Pump House, OB-I, Expanded Laboratory, Utility Room, Utility Room Expansion, Laundry, and the Main Plant Office Building. In cases where there is a need to provide sprinkler protection in an unheated area a non-freezing system is used.

B.5.3.1.2.2 Dry Pipe Sprinkler Systems Dry pipe sprinkler system piping is maintained under air pressure which keeps the dry pipe valve closed. Air pressure is controlled automatically by an air maintenance device such as a dedicated air compressor, or the plant air system. Dry pipe sprinklers systems'are installed where freezing temperatures may make wet pipe sprinkler systems inappropriate. Valves for dry pipe sprinkler systems are installed in a heated enclosure.

Areas provided with dry pipe sprinkler systems include: Receiving Warehouse, STS Building, Vitrification Test Facility, 01-14 Building, Trailer City, and Trailer T.

B.5.3.1.2.3 Deluge Systems The arrangement of deluge system piping is similar to that of a wet pipe system with one primary difference: open sprinkler heads (or nozzles) are used so that when the deluge valve controlling the system operates, water will flow from all the sprinkler heads.

The deluge valve is activated by a loss of supervisory air in a pilot line, or the activation of an initiating device. When the heat from a fire reaches the pilot line, it will operate a valve or will melt the link in the closed heads on the pilot line and allow the supervisory air to escape. This creates a difference in pressure in the release device, causing the deluge valve to trip.

Areas protected by deluge systems include: Cooling Tower, Expanded Lab, UR Transformer, Vit Diesel Generator Room, and the 01-14 Ammonia Tank.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 100 of 393 B.5.3.1.2.4 Preaction Systems Preaction systems are employed in areas where it is particularly important to prevent the accidental discharge of water. The detection system chosen to activate the preaction valve has high reliability and a separate alarm/supervisory signal to indicate status. The detection system is also designed to be more sensitive than the closed sprinklers in the preaction system, but should not cause false alarms and unnecessary activation of the preaction valve. Preaction systems are employed in the Vitrification Control Room and the Instrument and MCC rooms of the 01-14 Building.

B.5.3.1.2.5 Wet Standpipe Hose Stations Standpipe systems provide fire hose connections within a building. The hose connections are supplied with water from the underground water main. The hose connections on site are equipped for use with 3.8 cm (1.5 in) fire hoses.

B.5.3.1.3 Halon Systems Halon extinguishing systems consist of pressurized gas cylinders, a means for automatic and manual actuation, discharge piping and nozzles, a system control panel, and local and remote alarms. Operation of an actuating device initiates an alarm condition at the system control panel. The control panel activates local and remote alarms, and also operates the control head on the halon cylinders. Once the control head on the cylinder has fired the halon is discharged through the discharge piping and the nozzle to extinguish a fire.

Halon systems currently on-site are in the Vitrification Control Room and the Heating and Ventilation Operator Station.

In addition to halon, systems utilizing FM-200, a CFC-free extinguishing agent are also in use. These systems are provided in the Dosimetry Computer Room (Trailer 61), Main Computer Room, URE Switchgear Room, and the Container Sorting and Packaging Facility.

B.5.3.1.4 Dry Chemical Systems Dry chemical extinguishing systems at the WVDP have a fixed supply of dry chemical agent connected to fixed piping. Nozzles are arranged to discharge the extinguishing agent onto the burning surface. The extinguishing agent is discharged under pressure by a discharge gas. Actuation of the system can be either manual or automatic.

Automatic operation of fixed dry chemical systems is by a bi-metallic fusible link or a heat detector located above the hazard.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 101 of 393 Dry chemical systems are typically used in lab hoods and are located in facilities such as the Expanded Analytical Lab and the A&PC Labs. Dry chemical systems are also located in HAZMAT and in bulk oil storage lockers.

B.5.3.1.5 Wet Chemical System A wet chemical extinguishing system, which has a fixed supply of wet chemical agent connected to fixed piping, is located in the site cafeteria at Trailer City. Nozzles are arranged above cooking equipment to discharge the extinguishing agent onto the burning surface. The extinguishing agent is discharged under pressure by a discharge gas. Actuation of the system can be either manual or automatic. Automatic actuation of the fixed wet chemical system is by fusible links located above the hazard.

B.5.3.1.6 Foam Suppression System The Interim Waste Storage Facility (see Section B.7.8) is provided with a high expansion foam system with one 3,304 L/s (7000 cfm) foam generator. Foam is generated at a rate sufficient to produce a 2.7 m (9.0 ft) deep layer of fire suppressing foam across the floor of the IWSF in one minute.

B.5.3.1.7 Portable Fire Extinguishers Dry chemical, pressurized water, and C0 2-type portable fire extinguishers are located throughout the site to provide for incipient stage fire fighting.

B.5.3.1.8 Fire Alarm System Fire detection alarms (smoke or heat detectors) are located in various areas throughout the site and water flow alarms are provided on each sprinkler system.

Manual pull stations have also been provided in some areas of the site. These alarms annunciate at the alarm monitoring station located in the main security gate house.

In addition to fire alarms, the Alarm Monitoring Station also is capable of monitoring low building temperature, air supervision on dry pipe systems, and valve supervision.

B.5.3.1.9 Lightning Protection The electrical specifications for the construction of the Main Plant (Bechtel, 1964) invoke the applicable rules and regulations of the American Standards Association (known as the American National Standards Institute [ANSI] since 1969), the National Electrical Manufacturer's Association, and the "National Electrical Code," currently published by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The subject electrical specifications also stipulate that (1) non-current-carrying metal parts of electrical SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 102 of 393 apparatus, metallic conduit, transformer secondaries, structural steel, and storage tanks shall be grounded; (2) the conduit system shall form a tight complete metallic continuous ground system for all non-current-carrying metal parts connected to it, and these parts shall be considered grounded; and (3) all ground conductors shall be soft drawn, stranded, bare copper wire or flat copper bushbar, with a minimum size of

1. 4 American Wire Gage (AWG) (0.20 inch diameter wire).

NFPA 780, "Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems," (NFPA 1997), states that "Strike termination devices shall not be required for those parts of a structure located within a zone of protection." A strike termination device is "a component of a lightning protection system that is intended to intercept lightning flashes and connect them to a path to ground." Strike termination devices include air terminals (i.e., lightning rods), metal masts, permanent metal parts of structures in some instances, and overhead ground wires installed in catenary lightning protection systems. A zone of protection is "the space adjacent to a lightning protection system that is substantially immune to direct lightning flashes." The Main Plant stack is considered to serve as a strike termination device, and to provide a zone of protection for several of the facilities addressed in this SAR and in other WVNS SARs. NFPA 780 states that "The zone of protection shall form a cone having an apex at the highest point of the strike termination device, with walls forming approximately a 45-degree or 63-degree angle from the vertical." Hence, the Main Plant, 01-14 Building, Utility Room and Utility Room Expansion, Fire Pump House, Fuel Receiving and Storage Facility, Vitrification Facility, and most of the Waste Tank Farm are within the Main Plant stack's zone of protection and therefore do not require strike termination devices. NFPA 780 also states that "Metal guy wires and cables used to support stacks shall be grounded at their lower ends." The guy wires used on the Main Plant stack satisfy this requirement.

WVNS-FHA-013, "Fire Hazard Analysis Cross-Reference STS/PVS Facilities," notes that the Main Plant stack substantially reduces the likelihood of a direct lightning strike at the STS and PVS facilities (as these facilities are only slightly beyond the NFPA 780 defined cone of protection provided by the Main Plant stack), and that "The facilities, systems, and equipment are grounded to ground grid." WVNS-FHA-013 cites several drawings for more detailed information in this regard.

B.5.3.2 Leak Detection Systems A liquid level detection system exists in the pans of Tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2 to indicate a leak of high level waste from the HLW tanks or the introduction of groundwater into the vault. (An examination of the vault/pan/tank design has revealed that the primary function of the pans is leak detection rather than secondary containment.

Secondary containment of high level waste is provided by the combination of the pan, SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 103 of 393 concrete vaults, and the surrounding silty till.) Pumps are provided to return leaked liquids to the tanks. Groundwater may be pumped to Lagoon 2 for treatment at the LLWTS.

The carbon steel pan in the 8D-2 vault has been tested, and it is apparent that a leak exists that allows water to pass between the pan and vault. The pan therefore cannot be considered as either sole containment or as a fully functional component of the leak detection system. The pan level detection system may, however, provide indication for a leak with a rate of outflow which exceeds the rate of outflow from the pan.

Leakage in the valve aisle/pipeway areas will be collected in a sump. Actuation of a pump will return fluids to Tank 8D-2. A level alarm in this sump identifies the leakage condition. Additionally, a leak detection system is installed within the annular space between the double walls of the STS transfer piping. Leaked fluids will be returned by gravity to Tank 8D-2. The transfer conduit between Tank 8D-2 and STS is connected by a drain to Tank 8D-2 in the event that the double-walled pipe leaks into the conduit. A summary of leak detection and mitigation capabilities for the major structures/barriers of the STS is presented in Table B.5.3-1.

Leak detection equipment is installed within the annular space between each of the High Level Waste Transfer System primary and secondary pipe segments residing in the transfer trench. The leak detection equipment is installed at the low point of each continuous pipe segment. Each pump pit also has a leak detection probe installed at its drain.

B.5.3.3 Containment Metal Corrosion WVNS has a program in place for monitoring and control of corrosion in carbon steel HLW Tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2. The design corrosion allowance for these HLW tanks is 6.4 mm (0.25 in), except for the top plate, which has a design corrosion allowance of 4.8 mm (0.188 in).

Tank 8D-1 internal corrosion coupon data show that between 1988 and 1994, the uniform corrosion rate observed in the vapor region was 0.53 mils per year, 0.05 mils per year in the liquid region, and 0.62 mils per year in the zeolite region. Between 1994 and 1997, only the vapor region indicated an increase in corrosion rates. In this region, the observed corrosion rate is in the range of 1.0 - 3.0 mils per year.

The internal general corrosion rate for Tank 8D-2 between 1966 and 1976 was reported by NFS to be 0.53 mils per year in the vapor region and 0.03 mils per year in the liquid region. Internal corrosion of the carbon steel HLW tanks is controlled through the addition of corrosion inhibitors (e.g., caustic and sodium nitrate).

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 104 of 393 Since August 1996, external corrosion of the tanks has been monitored using corrosion coupons placed in the vaults of the tanks. Visual inspection indicated loose surface scale and pitting on the internal tank surfaces and a heavy deposit of corrosion products on the external surfaces. External corrosion of the tanks, which is significantly higher than internal corrosion, is controlled through the use of a nitrogen inerting system which has been in operation since 1996.

Tank 8D-3 is a stainless steel tank used as a temporary hold tank for decontaminated STS process solutions and has never been used to contain HLW. Therefore, it has never been inspected.

Tank 8D-4 is also a stainless steel tank. Inspection of corrosion coupons, which were removed in 1987, indicated minimal thinning (i.e., at least an order of magnitude less than that in Tank 8D 0.003 mm [0.12 mils] total of corrosion over a 7.5 year time span). The design corrosion allowance for the stainless steel HLW tanks is 1.8 mm (0.07 in).

The corrosion-resistant stainless steel tank is relied upon as a passive means of controlling corrosion in Tank 8D-4. The low corrosion rates observed support this approach.

B.5.3.4 NDA Interceptor Trench Licquid Pretreatment System An interceptor trench (270 meters long) was constructed in order to intercept the subsurface migration of solvent from the NDA towards Erdman Brook and thereby prevent its entry into the surface water system which drains the site. The Liquid Pretreatment System (LPS) is designed to reduce solvent and radionuclide (1-129 in particular) content in the trench water for efficient treatment by the Low-Level Waste Treatment System (LLWTS). Operation of the LPS is determined by the results of the sample analyses taken from Manhole 4. If solvent is detected in the sample, the effluent will be processed through the LPS. If no solvent is detected, the effluent is processed through the lagoon system. Since construction of the NDA Interceptor Trench was completed, no solvent has been detected and all effluent collected in the trench has been processed through the lagoon system.

The LPS structure houses a-particulate removal filter unit connected in series with two Granular Activated Carbon (GAC) units. The LPS is housed inside a rigid metal weather structure located approximately 100 m (330 ft) north of the Drum Cell (Figure B.5.1-1). All vessels and associated piping inside this structure are bermed to contain any leaks or spills. Detailed discussions of the design features of this facility are contained in the Design Objectives for the LPS (Blickwedehl, 1990).

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 105 of 393 Once approximately 380 L (100 gal) of solvent have accumulated in Tanks D-01 and D 02, this solvent will be pumped from the top of the tanks and transferred to 208 L (55 gal) drums. These drums will be stored in the LPS weather structure or in the Interim Waste Storage Facility (IWSF). Secondary containment in the form of two 24' x 24' fixed berms with 60 mil liners is provided for all tanks, GAC units, and associated pumps and pipes. In the event of a leak, each berm is of sufficient capacity to contain 23,000 (6100 gal, equal to 120% of the maximum capacity of the largest vessel inside each bermed area).

The pipe from the Manhole 4 to the LPS is placed inside a PVC conduit buried below the frost line. The slope is such that any leaks in the primary pipe will flow back to the manhole. Tanks are vented to the atmosphere after HEPA filtration.

Each tank is equipped with liquid-level sensors. The pumps that fill and empty the tanks will shut down automatically upon receiving a high- or low-level signal from the floats inside the tanks. If the level in any of the tanks deviates from normal operating range, indicating a possible pump or sensor malfunction or system leak, local alarms will be activated at preset alarm-high and alarm-low levels, and power to the pumps will be shut off automatically. A loss of power to any of the level controllers will activate the alarm. In addition to automatic controls, power to the pumps can also be shut off manually by the operator.

The weather structure has two space heaters that prevent freezing in winter months.

B.5.3.5 North Plateau Groundwater Recovery System In November, 1995, the WVDP installed a groundwater pump-and-treat system on the North Plateau (northeast of the Main Plant) to mitigate the movement of Sr-90 near the leading edge of the groundwater contamination. The pump-and-treat system was upgraded in September, 1996, and now consists of three 15-foot recovery wells equipped with transfer pumps, which collect contaminated groundwater from the underlying sand and gravel unit. The groundwater is treated by ion-exchange columns housed in the Low-Level Waste Treatment Replacement Facility (LLW2). The ion exchange columns are used to reduce the gross beta concentration of the groundwater.

The treated groundwater is then transferred to Lagoons 4 or 5 or, as needed to Lagoon

2. The treated groundwater is ultimately discharged from Lagoon 3 in accordance with the State Pollution Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) permit.

In addition, a permeable treatment wall has been constructed to provide in-situ treatment of Sr-90-contaminated groundwater across the eastern lobe of the north plateau beta plume. This passive treatment process, which consists of treatment media in an excavated trench, relies on the natural flow of the contaminated groundwater and is intended to intercept and remove Sr-90 from it.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 106 of 393 B.5.3.6 Vitrification Test Facility The Vitrification Test Facility houses the Scale Vitrification System (SVS). The SVS (also referred to as the "mini-melter") is a complete processing system that uses nonradioactive chemicals to test parameters and process steps. It is the third version of the WVDP vitrification pilot plant and is therefore referred to as SVS III. The VTF also houses several mock-up stations where workers can practice performing a job. Though the SVS-III is currently inactive, it is available for testing as warranted by future activities.

The SVS-III consists of a joule-heated ceramic melter which has its own feed preparation and off-gas treatment facilities. Its design is approximately one-sixth of the capacity and 15 percent of the melt capability of the Vitrification Facility melter. There are three main subsystems involved: feed preparation, melter operations, and off-gas treatment.

Feed preparation includes:

"* the addition of dry chemicals to the Slurry Mix Tank (SMT) using a pneumatic conveying system

"* the addition of liquids to the SMT including waste simulant and nitric acid

• the ventilation system for the SMT

• inter- and intra-tank slurry transfers

• volume reduction through boildown in the Feed Hold Tank (FHT)

• the addition of sugar in the FHT to control the redox ratio

• the measurement of gas generation during these steps Melter operation includes:

"* feed handling

"* power control

"* glass discharge to drums on a conveyor The off-gas system includes:

"* collecting vapors from the FHT, Melter Feed Tank (MFT), and melter

"* quenching the vapors by sending them through a venturi scrubber

"* removing the moisture in a High Efficiency Mist Eliminator (HEME)

"* handling of the scrubber water that is used by the venturi and is collected from the HEME

"* operation of the off-gas blower that collects these vapors SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 107 of 393

"* reducing the Oxides of Nitrogen (NOx) concentration of these vapors in a Fluidized Bed Reactor (FBR)

"* controlling the flow of ammonia (NH3) to the FBR

"* monitoring the effectiveness of the treatment process using the NOx analyzers Several safety features have been built into the SVS-III. The VTF floor slopes down to the North wall where a 15 cm (6 in) berm is located. This provides volume to contain the entire contents of all vessels that are used in the SVS-III. The feed pump to the melter will automatically shut down in the event of high melter pressure, low scrubber water flow, or failure of the off-gas treatment system. Emergency vents are located on the FHT, MFT and melter to exhaust vapors outside the VTF if excess pressure should develop in them. Separate enclosures for the NO. analyzers and ammonia storage are used to provide the proper environment for equipment, human health, and building safety concerns.

B.5.3.6.1 Feed Preparation All free-flowing powders are typically handled using the Vac-U-Max. Powders are typically delivered in 208 L (55 gal) drums. Those drums are positioned on a calibrated scale that is used to control the amount of feed to the SMT based on a loss in weight. A pneumatic conveyor pickup wand placed in the drums provides the means of transport. The powder is picked up by the vacuum in the wand and discharged by a solid separator stationed immediately above the SMT. The exhaust air is filtered before being discharged to the atmosphere. The collection hopper, transfer lines, and filter are made of stainless steel to ensure chemical purity and to make cleaning easier. The flexible portion of the wand is made of polyethylene.

Liquid chemicals are handled using a similar drum and wand system set on calibrated weigh scales. The mode of transport is by various pumps designed to have wetted parts compatible with the liquid that they will contact. The SMT and FHT have high level alarms with local annunciators to alert the operators before they overfill.

The SMT is a 2270 L (600 gal) (working capacity 470 gallons), agitated, jacketed stainless steel vessel, ventilated by a 5 hp fan capable of pushing 200 SCFM of air.

The SMT ventilation system is skid mounted and includes a filter and a slidegate damper to control air flow. The SMT fan maintains a slight vacuum on the SMT to aid in filling and to keep dust and nuisance vapors in the area to a minimum. The feed preparation cycle is designed so that the only chemical reaction that takes place in this tank is acid/base neutralization. Chilled water runs through the jacket to absorb the heat produced in the neutralization process.

Feed maybe transferred from the SMT to the FHT after going through a grinder that keeps particle diameter below 50 microns. The FHT is an agitated, 3600 L (950 gal)

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 108 of 393 (working capacity 600 gallons), semi-jacketed stainless steel vessel. The feed is boiled down here to reduce the volume of water before it is transferred to the MFT.

Sugar is added during the boildown process to obtain the desired carbon to nitrate ratio.

B.5.3.6.2 Melter Operations The MFT is used as a supply reservoir for the melter feed pump. This pump has a manually adjusted variable speed motor which gives it the ability to control the feed rate to the melter. The melter feed pump sends the feed into the melter through a water-cooled feed nozzle. The SVS-III melter is capable of simulating the operations of the VF melter. This allows the SVS-III melter to reach steady state much faster and have a quicker volume changeout. An added feature is the plenum heaters, which allow for the investigation of higher feed temperatures and the effect of temperature on the plenum area. The off-gas line is short with flanged connections to facilitate manual cleaning of the plugs.

There are two sources of power in the main melter cavity. The major source is a pair of paddle-shaped electrodes. The secondary source is four radiant-type plenum heaters made of silicon carbide. Both sources are controlled by thermocouples. The plenum heaters are used during startup to raise the temperature of the glass surface until it becomes conductive enough for the electrodes to become productive. After the glass reaches the melt temperature, 7000C (1292 0 F), an electric current is passed through the electrodes. The resistance to electric flow by the contents of the melter creates the heat required to melt the glass. The molten glass is discharged from the melter using an air lift. A small stream of glass flows into a 113 L (30 gal) stainless steel drum sitting on a powered roller conveyor. A bellow type seal is placed over the drums to maintain the vacuum integrity of the melter. A hand controlled reversible motor allows the conveyor to be used to move the drums under and out from the melter.

B.5.3.6.3 Off-gas Treatment The off-gas system is operated in two distinctive modes of operation depending on whether feed is being prepared or the melter is operating. The equipment is sized such that it will not support simultaneous operation. During feed preparation the off-gas will be warm and very humid because of boil down. During melter operations the off-gas will be very hot and dry. The volume of air flow will be constant for both modes. An air in-bleed in the melter off-gas line will be used to control the pressure in the melter and FHT while the off-gas treatment system is operating.

Off-gas treatment is available to mitigate the effects of temperature, oxides of nitrogen (NO.) formation, and particulate generation. A venturi scrubber quenches SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 109 of 393 the off-gas to remove large particulate. The off-gas is then sent through the HEME to remove mist and particulates greater than submicron size before going to the FBR.

The water from the scrubber is collected in the Condensate Hold Tank (CHT). It is cooled in a heat exchanger reused in the scrubber. This water is either used in the SMT during feed preparation activities or disposed of off-site.

A skid-mounted off-gas blower (OGB) provides the vacuum necessary to pull the vapors from their origin to the NO, reactor. The blower is a 7350 W (10 hp), rotary, positive displacement type made with stainless steel wetted parts. It is designed for outdoor use and comes equipped with an in-line air filter, intake and discharge silencers, and an external lubrication system.

The selective catalytic reduction process that is used in the FBR reduces NO, in the off-gas to nitrogen and water. The off-gas is first heated to at least 315'C (600'F) using natural gas in a combustion chamber. Ammonia is stored in 68 kg (150 lb) cylinders and distributed from the Ammonia Storage Room (ASR) located northeast of the VTF. The off-gas is sampled for NO,, concentration before and after usage. The NO. analyzers are located in the Off-gas Monitoring Room (OGMR) located east of the VTF.

B.5.3.6.4 Utilities The majority of the operations in SVS-III (including the melter) are controlled, or at least monitored, by a Programable Logic Controller (PLC). Soft water, potable water, natural gas, and utility air are provided from VTF utility headers. The cooling medium is water chilled by a chiller that uses an air-cooled condenser. This chiller is also the source of chilled water for the SMT, FHT and melter feed nozzle.

A total energy controller maximizes the cooling capacity of the chiller during cooling operations.

B.5.4 Description of Service and Utility Systems B.5.4.1 IRTS and Main Plant Building Ventilation Systems Airborne contamination control in the IRTS and Main Plant is maintained through the use of building ventilation systems, shown in Figure B.5.4-1 through B.5.4-5. These systems have also been designed to satisfy building temperature control requirements.

Ventilation for the STS building is provided by the STS Permanent Ventilation System (PVS). This system provides a minimum differential pressure of 15 mm (0.6 in) water column between routinely occupied areas and potentially contaminated areas.

Ventilation in the Main Plant building is provided by two independent ventilation SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 110 of 393 systems, namely the Head End Ventilation (HEV) system and the Main Plant ventilation system. The HEV system ventilates areas in the head end of the Main Plant, including those areas identified to provide support for storage of vitrified high level waste produced in the Vitrification Facility. The Main Plant ventilation system ventilates all other areas of the Main Plant including those areas housing equipment associated with the LWTS. Ventilation for the CSS is provided by the 01-14 building heating and ventilation system.

Building ventilation systems have been designed to ensure contamination confinement during normal operations and to minimize the spread of contamination during abnormal operations. Ventilation filters and blowers are provided with redundant spares to ensure that confinement is maintained in the event of a failure in the on-line system. Airflow during normal and abnormal operations is from uncontaminated areas such as stairwells and operating aisles to areas of increasing contamination such as cell service areas and airlocks to process cells.

Although filter configurations vary between facilities, the final filter in site ventilation systems is a HEPA filter or bank of HEPA filters capable of removing 99.95 percent of aerosol particles having a mean aerodynamic diameters greater than 0.3 microns. Adequate ventilation system performance is assured through effluent stack monitoring. Operation of stack monitoring systems is described in Section B.8.6.1.I.

In addition to building ventilation systems, airborne radioactivity confinement is also provided by off-gas treatment and ventilation systems. IRTS and Main Plant off gas and treatment systems, which include the Vessel Off-Gas system and the Waste Tank Farm Ventilation System, are described in Section B.7.4, "Off-Gas Treatment and Ventilation."

B.5.4.1.1 Major Components and Operating Characteristics B.5.4.1.1.1 Permanent Ventilation System The Permanent Ventilation System provides contamination and temperature control to the STS support building, valve aisle, and pipeway. Ventilation flow in the STS is shown in Figure B.5.4-2. During normal operations, air flows from the supply fan through a filter to the demineralized water/zeolite area from which air is directed to the operating area in front of the Valve Aisle. The control room has a separate HVAC system that draws from the outside air. Operating areas are protected by fire dampers between floors.

Approximately 1.9 m3 /s (4,000 cfm) of ventilation air is directed from the operating aisle to the valve aisle and into the pipeway. Air leaving the operating aisle SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 111 of 393 passes through a roughing filter, HEPA filter, and tornado damper. Air is then routed directly to a train consisting of roughing and HEPA filters (two) in series.

One of two trains (parallel, redundant) are always operational. The ventilation air then flows to exhaust blowers; both are powered by electricity. One is maintained as a backup designed to start automatically if the primary blower fails. An auxiliary power supply (electric) is provided to these blowers.

Permanent Ventilation System Supply and Distribution System Outside air is supplied to the operating areas of the STS support building from separate supply fans. Approximately 0.7 m3 /s (1500 cfm) of recirculation air is provided to the control room while 2.3 m3 /s (4900 cfm) of air is supplied to the fresh zeolite and water tank area on the second floor. Inleakage is expected from the control room and from the fresh zeolite and water area. The operating area in front of the valve aisle receives approximately 1.8 m3 /s (3800 cfm) from the zeolite area. This air is then directed to the valve aisle or into the pipeway/shield structure on top of the Tank 8D-1 vault. An infiltration of 0.09 m3 /s (190 cfm) enters the pipeway from the tank farm piping trenches. The resulting 1.9 m3/s (4000 cfm) is then exhausted to the STS PVS air treatment system.

Exhaust air from Tank 8D-1 and Tank 8D-2 may be handled through the PVS.

Approximately 0.3 m3/s (640 cfm) of air is ventilated through Tank 8D-1 or 8D-2 to the PVS during operations requiring access to Tank 8D-1 or 8D-2 through the riser openings. It is required that air flow be through a riser access opening in order to comply with the minimum capture velocity across any opening in the waste tank farm high level waste tanks. The minimum capture velocity is 0.64 m/s (1400 cfm).

Permanent Ventilation System Exhaust System The exhaust fans (PVS blowers) provide the system draft and are rated for 100% flow capacity of the HV system with all the filters at the changeout pressure drop. Both exhaust blowers are electrically operated. The backup will automatically activate if the primary blower fails. A diesel generator provides back-up in the event of power failure.

Ventilation air flows from the pipeway and HLW pipe conduit and is exhausted through a bank of roughing filter and two banks of HEPA filters in series (see Figure B.5.4 1). The filters are housed within the air treatment system and are connected with a heater and mist eliminator. HEPA filters are contained by a housing constructed of stainless steel. The differential pressure is measured across each filter holder in the HV system. The primary filter holder has local low/high pressure alarms that sound a trouble annunciator in the control room. A remote trouble alarm in the STS control room would alert operators of a problem with the PVS.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 112 of 393 Following off-gas treatment, the ventilation air passes through the blower and discharges to the STS PVS stack. Air is continuously sampled to assess radioactive material releases (see Section B.8.6.1).

B.5.4.1.1.2 Main Plant Ventilation System Air in the Main Plant ventilation system is filtered (in the warmer months only),

conditioned and distributed on a once-through basis from uncontaminated areas to areas containing a progressively greater degree of radioactivity. These more contaminated areas are maintained at a minimum lower relative pressure of approximately -0.075 kPa (-0.30 inches W.C.). Air from these areas exhausts to the Main Plant ventilation exhaust system where it passes through roughing and HEPA filters before being exhausted to the atmosphere through the Main Plant stack. The 3

exhaust rate of gas through the stack by this system is approximately 14.2 m /s (30,000 cfm). Primary components of the Main Plant ventilation system are described below. Main ventilation system flow is shown in Figure B.5.4-3.

Main Plant Ventilation Supply and Distribution System Fresh air entering the Main Plant ventilation system is filtered, conditioned for temperature control, and distributed to normally occupied spaces. Distribution of air from the Main Plant ventilation supply system is to the Control Room, North Analytical Aisle, East Stairs and North Stairs. Air flows from these areas to adjacent operating aisles and stairways and into process cells.

From the Control Room air flows to the East Stairs, South Stairs and Upper Extraction Aisle. Air from the East Stairs and Upper Extraction Aisle is drawn into subsequent operating areas and process cells to the Main Plant ventilation plenum. Air from the South Stairs flows to the Off-Gas Aisle, Acid Recovery Cell and Off-Gas Cell and exhausts to the Main Plant ventilation plenum. Air from the Off-Gas Aisle flows into the Analytical Cell Decontamination Area where it is filtered and cooled and subsequently drawn into the analytical cells. It is then exhausted to the Ventilation Washer plenum.

Makeup air for the Analytical Aisle is filtered, and conditioned for temperature control through an air handling unit mounted on the lab roof. Air handlers are installed in the Analytical Aisle and provide filtered and cooled air to the individual labs.

Air from the North Stairs flows into operating aisles to the Extraction Cells, Liquid Waste Cell and Process Mechanical Cell. Air from the Extraction Cells and Liquid Waste Cell is exhausted to the Ventilation Wash Cell plenum.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 113 of 393 Main Plant Ventilation Exhaust System Equipment for the Main Plant ventilation exhaust system is contained in the Ventilation Exhaust Cell. Air flow in the Main Plant ventilation exhaust plenum is directed to either of two filter trains and an associated blower. Each train is comprised of a bank of roughing filters and HEPA filters in series. Filter banks are each composed of an array of filters six filters wide and five filters high. The electric-driven primary blower is provided with a redundant electric-driven spare, which can be powered by the 1250 kW diesel generator located in the Utility Room Extension. The operating capacity of the blower is regulated by inlet vortex dampers on each blower which are controlled by a pressure recorder-controller in the Control Room. Other instrumentation includes recorders and alarms on filter train differential pressures and the automatic switchover controls. The configuration of Main Plant ventilation system equipment is shown in Figure B.5.4-1.

Controls are arranged such that the primary train is isolated and the secondary train is placed on line upon: (a) high filter differential pressure, (b) low filter differential pressure, (c) loss of electric power, or (d) loss of control air pressure.

B.5.4.1.1.3 Head End Ventilation System Supply air in the HEV system is filtered, conditioned and distributed on a once through basis from uncontaminated areas to areas containing a progressively greater degree of radioactivity. Figure B.5.4-4 presents the ventilation flow in the head end of the Main Plant. The system was designed and constructed after initiation of fuel reprocessing activities to supplement the Main Plant ventilation system.

Consequently, areas currently ventilated by the HEV may be ventilated by either the HEV system or the Main Plant ventilation system through positioning of a damper in the CPC and/or PMC. Dampers in the CPC and PMC currently isolate the HEV from the Main Plant ventilation system.

The Head End Ventilation system provides contamination confinement for areas in the Main Plant formerly associated with mechanical processing activities as well as areas identified to provide storage for vitrified high level waste (i.e., the HLWISA),

namely the Equipment Decontamination Room, Chemical Process Cell and Chemical Process Cell Crane Room. Air from these areas exhausts to the HEV exhaust system where it passes through prefilters, roughing filters, and two banks of HEPA filters in series before being exhausted to the atmosphere through the Main Plant stack. The exhaust rate of gas through the stack by this system is approximately 6.8 m3 /s (14,000 cfm).

The Vitrification Building interfaces with the Head End Ventilation System through limited areas. The interface area is the Transfer Tunnel from the Vitrification Cell SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 114 of 393 to the EDR. The Head End Ventilation System fresh 'air inlet damper (EDR roof damper) allows the differential pressure between the EDR and the atmosphere, as well as the differential pressure between the EDR and the vit transfer tunnel, to be controlled (Reference Figure B.5.4-4). It also provides a source for air in-leakage, resulting in additional air flow through the CPC and thereby providing additional cooling for the high-level waste canisters. An expanded discussion of this interface with the Vitrification Facility is provided in WVNS-SAR-003.

Head End Ventilation Supply and Distribution System Supply air in the HEV system is filtered, conditioned and distributed on a once through basis to areas in the head end of the Main Plant. Distribution of air in the HEV is from the North Stairway and Chemical Operating Aisle (COA). From the North Stairway air is distributed to the General Purpose Cell Operating Aisle (GOA), the Process Mechanical Crane Room (PMCR) air lock, and the Chemical Process Cell Crane Room (CCR) via the North Analytical Aisle. From the COA air flows to the Equipment Decontamination Room Viewing Aisle and Scrap Removal Room (SRR).

From these areas air flows via cell dampers and inleakage into contaminated process cells. Air flow in the process cells is from the SRR, PMC and CPC, through floor hatches, to the GPC. Air is exhausted from the GPC to the HEV exhaust filter inlet plenum via a 90 cm (36 in) duct.

Head End Ventilation Exhaust System The HEV system exhaust treatment equipment is comprised of two parallel primary blowers, a backup blower and redundant filter trains each consisting of prefilters, roughing filters, and two stages of HEPA filters. This equipment is depicted schematically in Figure B.5.4-1. The HEV exhausts 6.8 m3 /s (14,000 cfm) of air directly to the Main Plant stack where it is discharged to the atmosphere.

The redundant HEV filter trains each contain four filter banks. The first two banks are comprised of a prefilter and roughing filter in series. The roughing filters exhibit a removal efficiency of approximately 90 percent and therefore the majority of particulate contamination is removed at this point. Following the bank of roughing filters are two banks of HEPA filters in series. The second bank of HEPA filters provides assurance of particulate removal and protection from a release of radioactive material in the event of a malfunction in the upstream HEPA filters.

There are three blowers in the HEV system. The two primary blowers are each rated at 3

3.4 m /s (7,200 cfm). They are parallel mounted and powered by electric motors.

3 There is also a 6.8 m /s (14,000 cfm) backup blower. The backup blower system ensures continuous operation of the HEV system in the event of loss of electrical SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 115 of 393 line power. The backup blower is a single 6.8 m3/s (14,000 cfm) blower and is powered by the WVDP backup electrical power system. Dampers control the flow of air to the blower(s) in use.

Controls are arranged such that the primary train is isolated and the backup train is placed on-line upon: (a) high filter differential pressure, (b) low filter differential pressure, or (c) loss of electric power.

Air exiting the HEV system exhaust blowers enter the stack at a 30 degree angle through a stainless steel duct that is welded to a reinforcing plate in the stack.

This effluent is then sufficiently mixed with other effluent discharge streams in the stack prior to reaching the stack gas sampling and monitoring probes.

B.5.4.1.1.4 01-14 Building Heating and Ventilation System The 01-14 Building HV System is designed to provide at least seven air changes per hour in potentially contaminated areas of the building. Ventilation flow in the 01 14 Building is shown in Figure B.5.4-5. A minimum differential pressure of 0.125 kPa (0.5 inches w.c.) is maintained between routinely occupied areas and potentially contaminated cell areas. Except for air infiltration, inlet air is filtered and, if necessary, heated for personnel comfort.

All HV system components are designed to be maintained in areas free of airborne or surface contamination. Permanent or temporary air locks maintain proper air flow during maintenance operations involving the pump niche, Waste Dispensing Cell, or the Process Cell. During shutdown of the supply air system for regular maintenance or because of failure, gravity dampers in the clean drum storage area open and allow outside air to enter the area and the Process Cell. Air infiltration and induced air flow through the air supply unit provide air for the Off-Gas Cell.

01-14 Building Ventilation Supply and Distribution System The 01-14 building heating and ventilation system supplies outside air to the 01-14 building operating aisles from the second floor supply fan and through infiltration.

A portion of this air vents the operating aisles and is ultimately processed through a roughing and HEPA filter to a blower to be vented from a stack on the 01-14 Building. The remainder of the inflow is directed to: the CSS Process Cell, the Waste Dispensing Cell, and directly to two HEPA filters. Air exiting the Process Cell is directed to the Waste Dispensing Cell. Air exiting the Waste Dispensing Cell is combined with air from the vitrification off-gas trench, ammonia valve gallery, and 01-cell and exits through a series of two HEPA filters to be vented from a stack on top of the 01-14 Building.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 116 of 393 01-14 Building Ventilation Exhaust System The 01-14 building ventilation exhaust system maintains two filtration systems both located on the third floor of the 01-14 building. The first system is comprised of two parallel trains consisting of a roughing filter and HEPA filter in series. Air originating in operating aisles and the filter change room is exhausted through these filters.

The second system provides filtration for air ventilated from other areas of the 01-14 building, including the CSS Process Cell and Waste Dispensing Cell, the vitrification ammonia valve gallery, and the 01-cell. Air in this system is exhausted through six parallel sets of two HEPA filters in series. The first stage of HEPA filters is located in a glove box constructed of 1.3 cm (0.51 in) stainless steel and provides for both confinement of contamination and shielding to reduce radiation levels in the filter room. The second stage of filters is located in individual filter housings.

The primary 01-14 building HVAC blower is driven by an electric motor. The backup HVAC blower is driven by an electric motor that is tied into a standby power source.

Air exhausting from the ventilation system blower is routed to a stack on top of the 01-14 building. The configuration of 01-14 building ventilation exhaust equipment is shown in Figure B.5.4-1.

B.5.4.1.1.5 Ventilation System Stacks Main Plant Stack Effluents from ventilation and off-gas systems that discharge to the Main Plant stack are shown in Figure B.5.4-1. The ventilation stack extends to an elevation of 202 feet, approximately 62 meters above building grade. The stack is a self-supporting, guy wire stabilized gunnite cement reinforced stainless steel structure. The three guy anchor assemblies are connected to the 40.5 m and 56.1 m (133 ft and 184 ft) level holding collars by 2.22 cm (7/8 in) cables. The stack base, from roof level to 15 m (50 ft) above the roof, was reinforced by application of gunnite cement over steel dowels and holding bolts. There are two platforms on the stack, one at the top and one at the 24.4 m (80 ft) level where the stack sampling ports penetrate the stack.

PVS and 01-14 Stacks Effluents from the STS HVAC and 01-14 building discharge to small stainless steel stacks atop the PVS and 01-14 buildings, respectively. The PVS stack is approximately 4.9 m (16 ft) in height and is 48 cm (19 in) in diameter. The 01-14 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 117 of 393 Building ventilation stack is 4.7 m (15 ft 4 in) in height and is 61 cm (24 in) in diameter. Influents to these stacks have been indicated in Figure B.5.4-1.

B.5.4.1.2 Safety Considerations and Controls IRTS and Main Plant ventilation systems have been designed to ensure confinement of radioactivity and to minimize discharges of radioactivity off-site. Key ventilation system components such as blowers and filter trains have been provided with installed spares. These systems and the associated redundant spares are provided with standby or backup power. In the event of power loss, ventilation systems are designed so that operation will be restored either automatically or manually. The standby exhausters can be started and brought on line manually, thus overriding automatic system operation.

Airborne radioactive discharges from facilities at the WVDP are maintained within DOE guidelines by ventilating effluent through high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter systems. These filter systems provide the primary barrier to airborne radioactivity release to the environment. Filter system efficiency at the WVDP is determined through an in-place leak test prior to new filter operation and through subsequent annual tests. HEPA filters used at the WVDP must meet requirements prescribed by the Department of Energy (U.S. Department of Energy, October, 1988).

Instrumentation has been provided to monitor the integrity of ventilation system filters. A summary of filter monitoring instrumentation is given in Table B.5.4-1.

Permanent Ventilation System Differential pressure is measured across each filter holder in the PVS system. The primary filter holder has local low-and high-pressure alarms that sound a general trouble annunciator in the STS control room.

In response to low/high differential alarms, the parallel and redundant filtering train will be automatically activated. This redundancy ensures continuous and adequate air filtration and treatment should filter failures occur. The PVS dampers are designed to fail safe in the event of loss of utility air pressure. The backup blower will automatically come on-line should primary electrical power be lost or the primary PVS blower fail.

Main Plant Ventilation System The two Main Plant ventilation system filter trains (primary and back-up) each consist of a roughing filter and a final HEPA filter in series. There are two differential pressure sensing systems for the filters in each train. One system SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 118 of 393 senses the pressure across the filter train, the other senses the pressure across the HEPA filter bank. The train system contains high and low differential pressure alarms that annunciate in the Control Room to signal a plugged or ruptured filter(s).

In addition to the alarms, there are high and low differential pressure controllers that will cause the operating filter/exhauster train to switch should the differential pressure become too high or too low. The differential pressure sensing system for the HEPA filter bank consists of a differential pressure recorder and high and low alarms that annunciate in the Control Room.

Head End Ventilation System The controls for the HEV system are similar to the controls for the Main Plant ventilation system. The HEV filter train controls consist of isolation dampers and differential pressure monitoring. When this pressure exceeds the set point for high differential pressure the filter train isolation dampers are automatically activated such that the standby train is brought on line and the operating train is taken off line. It should be noted that in the HEV system the filter trains can be switched without switching blowers, an operation which cannot be done in the Main Plant ventilation system. The differential pressure across the HEPA filter is also monitored. Should the differential pressure get so low as to drop below the low differential pressure set point (indicating a ruptured filter) the filter trains are switched. In addition to filter train switching, there is a high and low differential pressure alarm for the HEPA filters and a high differential pressure alarm for the filter train. These alarms annunciate in the East Mechanical Operating Aisle.

In the event that both the primary and backup blowers in the HEV system fail, approximately 3.2 m3/s (6,800 cfm) air may be drawn out of the head end cells through the bypass valves in the CPC and PMC into the Main Plant ventilation system to maintain some negative pressures in the cells (0.025 kPa [0.1 inches W.C.]). The ventilation system in this configuration is the original Main Plant ventilation system configuration and therefore the direction of air flow would continue to be from areas of lower contamination to areas of higher contamination.

01-14 Building Ventilation System The standby electric motor-driven blower will automatically start should electrical power be lost or the electric fan fail. The differential pressure is measured across each filter compartment. Each filter compartment also has a local pressure alarm which will, upon sensing a low or high pressure, activate an annunciator in the CSS/LWTS Control Room.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 119 of 393 If a first-stage HEPA filter fails, the activity and media will be caught on the second stage HEPA filters. Single failure of a second-stage filter would not be expected to result in a significant release of activity as the bulk of the entrained activity will be on the first-stage filters.

The exhaust fans are controllable both from a locally mounted panel on the fourth floor, from the CSS Control Room, and from the Main Plant Control Room. Each fan is rated at 100 percent system capacity.

B.5.4.2 Electrical Electric power for the WVDP is supplied from a 34.5 kV Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation loop system. A feeder line from a 34.5 kV switching station transmits power to the site substations where it is stepped down to 480V. The lake pumps, which supply water to the site, the RTS Drum Cell and the NDA facilities obtain power from a separate Niagara-Mohawk 4,800V - 480V rural system. Site perimeter monitoring stations receive power from this same rural system through individual 4,800V - 120V transformers.

Electricity from the 34.5 kV line is routed through fused disconnect switches to the two 2500 kVA transformer at the Process Building and the Utility Room Extension (URE)

Building, which deliver standby power to 480V, three phase buses via a 4,000 amp main breaker in the Switchgear Room and at the URE substation switchgear. From the 480V, three phase buses, power flows to main circuit breakers Which, in turn, supply motor control centers through underground cables, conduits, and cable trays. The motor control centers are located throughout the site facilities and supply power to motors, lighting transformers and other electrical loads.

The substation switchgears are interconnected through cables to provide backfeed capabilities in the event that any 34.5 kV - 480 V substitution transformer fails.

Three phase, 60 Hz backup power is produced at 480V by a 625 kVA standby diesel driven generator (30-P-1) located in the Utility Room (UR), a 1560 kVA standby diesel-driven generator (30-P-2) located in the URE, and a 750 kVA standby diesel driven generator (50-P-1) located in the PVS mechanical room. Diesel fuel for the 625 kVA generator is supplied from a 1,000 liter (275 gallon) day tank in the Utility Room, while a 400 gal day tank supplies fuel for the 1560 kVA generator diesel engine. This fuel supply is sufficient for eight hours of operation. Additional fuel is supplied to the diesel generators from a 38,000 liter (10,000 gallon) above ground tank sufficient for a period of at least five days. The diesel fuel for the 750 kVA generator is supplied from a. 380 L (100 gal) day tank and is automatically filled from a 2000 L (550 gal) underground tank.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 120 of 393 A summary of WVDP utility supply capabilities and IRTS use requirements is given in Tables B.5.4-2 and B.5.4-3.

Backup power is required only for IRTS and Main Plant equipment for which power failure could result in a reduction in the degree of confinement. This equipment is grouped on motor control centers (MCC) E located in the Switchgear Room, E-1 located in the Waste Tank Farm Shelter, generator switchgear P-2/SG located in the URE, MCC 21 which is also located in the URE, and the PVS MCC-A located in the PVS MCC room.

Backup power is supplied by three standby generators that have the capacity to supply power to additional equipment beyond those on the MCCs and switchgear and these would be connected at the discretion of the Shift Supervisor. In the event of failure of the 34.5 kV power supply, all diesel generators will start automatically and then associated switchgears will: disconnect the utility company line; disconnect noncritical loads; and supply power to MCC E, MCC E-l, MCC 21, and to the PVS MCC-A.

Additional loads can be connected to the line as required. Backup power for the STS may also be provided by automatic switching to a diesel generator with sufficient stored fuel for eight hours of continuous operations.

B.5.4.3 Compressed Air Three compressors are supplied for plant air systems: a 350 hp electric centrifugal compressor; and two 200 hp screw compressors. The centrifugal compressor is normally operated, with the screw compressors configured to start automatically on loss of air pressure (either from equipment or power failure). All compressors are of non lubricated design. A carbon monoxide monitor is installed to ensure air is of suitable quality for breathing to support manned entry to areas of elevated airborne radioactive contamination.

Instrument air is. provided from the utility air system using an air dryer and a pressure reducing valve to reduce the air pressure to 380 kPa (55 psi).

IRTS and Main Plant equipment is designed to fail-safe during loss of air pressure.

B.5.4.4 Steam Generation and Distribution The steam generation and distribution system is comprised of two natural gas fueled fire-tube boilers with a 15,658 kg/hr (34,520 lb/hr) combined steam generating capacity. Number 2 diesel fuel oil can be used as an alternate fuel source in the event of an interruption in the gas supply. Each boiler is designed to provide the full steady-state steam demand requirements. Therefore, one boiler is normally in standby. Intermittent batch demand will be satisfied in all instances except for the simultaneous operation of the Concentrator Feed Make-up Tank in the Vitrification SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 121 of 393 Facility and the LWTS evaporator in the peak winter months. At these times, the intermittent steam demand is met by operating the standby boiler unit.

Return condensate is collected in a condensate receiver where it is sampled for radioactivity. It may then be returned to the boiler water makeup system, or pumped to the interceptor. A radiation monitor is provided on the condensate return lines to the receivers.

B.5.4.5 Water Supply The plant water supply is taken from two man-made, interconnected lakes created by the construction of two dams near the south end of the site. The two lakes receive runoff from approximately 3,100 acres of land and contain approximately 1,200,000 m3 (317,000,000 gal) of water. The lakes have a combined surface area of 25 acres. The pump house, which contains two 25 L/s (400 gpm) pumps, is located just inside the northern-most dam and is connected to the plant by 1,800 m (5,900 ft) of 20 cm (8 in) pipe which runs along the railroad spur.

A clarifier/filter system is installed for raw water treatment. Treated water is transferred to a 1,800,000 L (475,000 gal) tank for storage. Utility water pressure is furnished by two 16 L/s (250 gpm) pumps which supply water at a minimum pressure of 520 kPag (75 psi).

The domestic water system is allocated on demand from the plant system and is chlorinated for potability (utilizing sodium hypochlorite) as the water is delivered to a 3,800 liter (1,000 gal) accumulator tank. Cooling tower makeup is taken from the plant system. The demineralized water system will normally produce 1 L/s (16 gpm) of demineralized water and may produce 2 L/s (32 gpm) maximum makeup to the 6,800 L (1,800 gal) demineralized water storage tank.

The cooling water system is an open cooling tower rated at 140 L/s (2,200 gpm),

making approximately 24'C (75'F) cooled water available from approximately 29°C (85'F) water returned to the tower. Chemical feed equipment is installed to support this system.

Water demand for IRTS process operations is indicated in Table B.5.4-3. Original vessels and heat exchangers in the Main Plant which were supplied with cooling water are still connected to the cooling water system. In order to prevent the migration of radionuclides into the cooling system, these cooling coils are maintained under positive pressure, but without circulation, by keeping supply valves open and return valves closed. Should a leak develop from the cooling system into a cell, it would be detected by rising level in the cell sump. Operating personnel would then take action to isolate the leaking component.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 122 of 393 As indicated in Table B.8.3-9, radioactivity alarms are provided in the cooling water and condensate returns from the process facilities, in order to detect any contamination which might enter these systems. The primary barrier against such contamination is the positive pressure differential which exists between the systems and the contaminated process areas. Monitors are located in the main condensate and cooling water return headers from the Main Plant.

No water is to contact personnel by these systems without sample analysis, so that in the unlikely event that contamination occurs, the opportunity exists to research the source of the problem by other means, such as grab samples from individual suspect equipment.

In order to maintain compliance with SPDES-permitted limits, water from the reservoirs is also used to augment stream flows during discharges from Lagoon 3. The WVDP is continuing to work with NYSDEC to prevent exceedances of TDS limits.

B.5.4.6 Natural Gas Supply and Distribution Natural gas service for the WVDP is supplied from a 15cm (6 in) diameter 414 kPa (60 psi) National Fuel Gas Corporation supply line. The National Fuel Gas Supply is regulated from 414 kPa (60 psi) to 170 kPa (25 psi) at a pressure regulator station located south of the Utility Room. From the pressure regulator station natural gas is distributed to supply the plant boilers and meet area heating requirements on-site.

Several areas on-site are supplied natural gas for localized heating purposes. Gas is distributed to these locations at 170 kPa (25 psi) and regulated at usage points as required. The locations of natural gas lines on site are shown in Figure B.5.4-6.

Natural gas is not routed through areas containing radioactive materials.

B.5.4.7 Waste Water Treatment Facility The wastewater treatment facility at WVNS treats sanitary sewage and non-radioactive industrial wastewater from the Utility Room.

The sanitary sewage handling system at WVDP is a dedicated system of piping, pumps and distribution. The treatment system consists of a 151,000 L/day (40,000 gpd) extended aeration system with sludge handling in the form of wasting and off-site shipment for disposal.

There are no entry points into the sewage system other than the toilet facilities, washroom and kitchen sinks and shower facilities. No process building, or office SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 123 of 393 building floor drains are connected to the sanitary' sewer system other than the floor drains in the facility shower rooms and lavatory facilities.

The industrial wastewater from the Utility Room enters the system through a dedicated system of pipes, tanks, and pumps. It is collected and pumped into the wastewater treatment facility, where it is mixed with the sanitary sewage and treated.

The entries to the system are dedicated lines from the Utility Room water treatment equipment, boilers, and floor drains in the Utility Room Expansion area.

The Waste Water Treatment Facility liquid discharge is one of four WVDP outfalls where liquid effluents are released to Erdman Brook. These four outfalls are identified in the WVDP State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (SPDES) permit, which specifies sampling and analytical requirements for each outfall.

B.5.4.8 Safety Communications and Alarms B.5.4.8.1 Safety Communications Access to a paging system is available from all site telephones to notify WVDP personnel of an abnormal or emergency condition. When the extension "812" is dialed, a distinct tone is annunciated through the site paging system speakers. The alarm is then followed by an announcement of the type and location of the emergency.

On-site communications systems include telephones, beepers, and hand-held radios.

The WVDP radio network consists of nets A and B. Net A is assigned to Security and net B is assigned to Operations, Radiation Protection, the Emergency Operation Center, and Security. The Project also maintains a radio link with the Cattaraugus County Sheriff's Department which can be used to request assistance or as a source of information.

B.5.4.8.2 Alarms Integrated Radwaste Treatment Systems are provided with instrumentation to monitor flow, pressure, fluid levels, temperature, and radiation levels to ensure system operations are controlled and system limitations are not exceeded. Major equipment is operated remotely from control panels located in the system control room. In the event of abnormal conditions, the process equipment can be manually shut off. Safety related systems (e.g., ventilation system) are designed to achieve a safe condition automatically should off-normal conditions occur (i.e., dampers close, backup fan starts, etc.) or redundant systems are activated. Automatic controls for subsystems are provided with manual override capabilities.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 124 of 393 IRTS has instrumentation and controls to allow the system to be started, operated, monitored, and shut down from the control room. The control panels are equipped with dynamic graphic displays to reduce the likelihood of operator error. The instrumentation indicates or alarms (or both) abnormal and undesirable conditions that could adversely affect system or equipment performance or inadvertently affect interfaces with other systems. During emergency conditions, external communications can be through the plant telephone system.

Operations safety related systems that provide control room alarm indications in IRTS facilities include:

"* Ventilation System differential pressures

"* Radiation Monitoring Systems

"* Effluent Monitoring Systems

"* Leak Detection Systems

"* Fire Protection System.

Alarms in the Main Plant indicate abnormal conditions in plant ventilation systems, facility vessels and cell sumps. Due to the shutdown of reprocessing activities, the Main Plant Control Room is no longer continuously manned. A video camera in the Control Room allows remote viewing of Control Room alarm panels from closed-circuit monitors in the Main Plant shift office and the utility room. An audible alarm in these areas indicates an alarm in the Control Room. The shift office and utility room are not continuously manned areas and therefore an additional audible alarm is provided in the main security guard house which is a continuously manned area. Upon receipt of a Control Room alarm, a security inspector notifies the shift supervisor of the alarm condition.

Airborne effluents are discharged through the Main Plant ventilation stack, the PVS stack, and the 01-14 Building stack. There are two continuous air monitors (CAMs) for each stack: one that records beta/gamma-emitting radioactivity and another for alpha-emitting radioactivity. High airborne radioactivity of either type (beta/gamma, or alpha) will, as appropriate, activate the Main Plant stack alarms in the Main Plant Control Room, or the PVS stack alarms in the STS Control Room, or the 01-14 Building stack alarms in the CSS/LWTS control room.

B.5.4.9 Maintenance Systems Integrated Radwaste Treatment Systems have been designed for remote operation.

Equipment not required to be located in radioactive process areas is located in "cold" areas to permit contact maintenance. Contact maintenance is performed on contaminated equipment only after sufficient decontamination in accordance with SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 125 of 393 existing WVNS procedures (WVDP-010, "Radiological Controls Manual"). Where this is not feasible, equipment is remotely repaired or replaced.

Equipment and piping in radioactive service is drained and flushed to reduce radiation levels before personnel enter the process area. Instruments are designed to permit isolation for periodic maintenance. IRTS equipment and components are arranged, located, and shielded to minimize radiation exposure to plant personnel should maintenance be necessary.

B.5.4.10 Cold Chemical Systems All components of the IRTS, with the exception of the Drum Cell, maintain a cold chemical system. The cold chemical systems for the STS/SMWS, LWTS and CSS are described below.

The SMWS Chemical Addition System provides for bulk chemical addition to Tank 8D-2 from a federal/NYS DOT-authorized truck tank trailer having a capacity of approximately 19,000 L (5,000 gals.) or smaller sized tote tanks having a capacity of approximately 2,100 L (550 gals.). If the truck tank trailer is to be emptied over an extended period of time, it is positioned within a designated area of the WTF that consists of a graded base, concrete traffic barriers, and secondary spill containment within the traffic barriers.

The chemical solution is discharged from storage by pumping from the tank trailer.

The solution is volumetrically batch-metered into Tank 8D-2 through an existing spare 5 cm (2 in.) pipe in riser N12 where it free falls from the top of the tank/riser into the tank.

A chemical feed system located in the Lower Extraction Aisle of the Main Plant building provides for chemical additions in the LWTS. The feed system consists of an acid (HN0 3 ) and caustic (NaOH) storage tank with positive displacement pumps which reside in berms sufficient to contain potential leaks. Demineralized water is available to flush process lines of residual acid or caustic. The system is not currently used for routine operations, but does provide the ability to add acid or caustic to Tanks 5D-15Al, 5D-15A2 and 5D-15B, if necessary.

The CSS cold chemical system provides for the addition of cement recipe enhancers to waste in the high shear mixers. A 5,700 L (1,500 gal) bulk storage tank, 1,160 L (300 gal) day tank, along with pumps located in the CSS Change Room are used for the delivery of sodium silicate. Antifoaming agents, used to minimize void spaces in the waste/cement mixture, are provided from polyethylene bottles located in the Clean Drum Room via electric diaphragm metering pumps.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 126 of 393 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.5.0 Barnstein, L.S. 1965. Investigation of Atomic Waste Disposal Vaults at the Atomic Waste Disposal Plant, at Ashford, New York, for the New York State Atomic and Space Development and Authority.

Bechtel Associates. 1964. Spent Fuel Processing Plant Electrical Specifications Process Building. Specification P-13. Rev. 1 dated June 18, 1964.

_ _ January, 1966. Report on Restoration of Atomic Waste Vaults at Ashford, New York, for the New York State Atomic and Space Development Authority.

Brown, S.H. December 19, 1985. Safety Analysis Report For Modifications To Tank 8D-1 and Installation of STS Components and Zeolite Removal Pumps. Memo to R.

R. Borisch. (HE:85:0258.)

Ebasco Services, Inc. 1986. Design Review Calculations for Zeolite Mobilization 8D-I and Sludge Mobilization 8D-2 Pump Support Structure for West Valley Demonstration Project. WVNS/W60.

1989a. Vault 8D-4 Finite Element Analysis. WVNS/W56, EBAR-1348 and 1348a.

1989b. SMS-Transfer Trench and Pit to 8Q-5 Analysis. WVNS/W57c, EBAR 1349 and 1349a.

1989c. SMS-Pit 8Q-5 Finite Element Analysis. WVNS/W58, EBAR-1350 and 1358.

May 1992. Civil Design Criteria Sludge Mobilization Transfer System.

Revision 2. EBAR-1665.

1992a. SMS Trench Pipe Supports. WVNS/W59R, EBAR-1667.

1992b. HLW Transfer Piping Stress Analysis. WVT-IA, WV4-1, WV38-1, WV6-2T, WV14-A, WV08-1, WV-0292-1 and WV-0592. EBAR-1662, 1662A, 1664 and 1670.

_ 1990. Vault 8D-I/8D-2 Finite Element Analysis - Rebar Verification.

WVNS/W55, EBAR-1324 and 1324a.

Gates, W.E. April, 1991. 8D-2 Sludge Mobilization System Confinement Barrier Integrity Review. Subcontract No. 19-CWV-21511, Task 10.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 127 of 393 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.5.0 (continued)

March 1993. HLWTS Confinement Barrier Integrity Review. Subcontract WV-19-CWV-L1511, Task 10.

Lawrence Livermore Laboratory. May 1978. Seismic Analysis of High-Level Neutralized Liquid Waste Tanks at the Western New York State Nuclear Service Center, West Valley, New York. UCRL-52485.

Meigs, R.A. December, 1985. Initial Decontamination of the Equipment Decontamination Room at the West Valley Demonstration Project. DOE/NE/44139-2.

NFPA. 1997. NFPA 780: Standard for the Installation of Lightning Protection Systems. National Fire Protection Association.

Riethmiller, G.E. June 12, 1981. History of Decontamination.

Rockwell. 1984. Tank 8D-2 New Risers 12,24, and 36 Inch Diameter, Stress Analysis, Evaluation. SD-RE-TA-003. Revision 0.

August, 1985. West Valley Tank Riser Installation. 65620-WWS-85-161 (ZW:86:0020). Letter from W. W. Smith to D. W. Scott.

Skillern, C.G. May, 1986. West Valley Demonstration Project Facilities Utilization Plan for the Existing Facilities at the Western New York Nuclear Service Center.

DOE/NE/44139-12.

Tundo, D., R. F. Gessner, and R. E. Lawrence. November, 1988. Lessons Learned at West Valley During Facility Decontamination for Re-use. November, 1988.

Vance, R.F. November 1986. Topical Report prepared for DOE, Characterizationof the Head End Cells at the West Valley Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing Plant.

U.S. Department of Energy. October, 1988. Nuclear Standard NE F 2-45:

Specifications for HEPA filters used by DOE Contractors. Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Department of Energy.

October 24, 1996. DOE Order 420.1: Facility Safety. Washington, D.C.:

U.S. Department of Energy.

SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 128 of 393 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.5.0 (concluded)

West Valley Nuclear Services Co. WVDP-010: WVDP Radiological Control Manual.

(Latest Revision).

Safety Analysis Report WVNS-SAR-003: Safety Analysis Report for the Vitrification Operations and High-Level Waste Interim Storage. (Latest Revision).

WVNS-FHA-013: Fire Hazard Analysis Cross-Reference STS/PVS Facilities.

(Latest Revision).

Wolniewicz, J.C. March 1993. Estimation of Activity in the Former Nuclear Fuel Services Reprocessing Plant.

SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 129 of 393 TABLE B.5.1-1 NON-RADIOACTIVE WATER OUTSIDE STORAGE TANKS AND IMPOUNDMENTS VESSEL/IMPOUNDMENT II LOCATION VOLUME I1 j STORED MATERIA.L CONSTRUCTION IDENTIFICATION 31D-4A, 31D-4B Yard - southwest 66,200 L Steam condensate Stainless Steel Condensate Receivers of utility room 17,500 Gal 32D-1 Yard - southwest Total Cap. [Fire Plant utility Coated Carbon Clarified Water/Fire of utility room Cap.) water/fire water Steel Water Storage Tank 1,800,000

[1,140,000] L 475,00.0

[300,000] Gal 32D-2 Yard - south of 68,000 L Demineralized Aluminum Demineralized Water utility room 18,000 Gal process makeup water Storage Tank 32V-2 Yard - south of 45,000 L Clarified water Coated Carbon Clarifier utility room 11,900 Gal Steel Equalization Basin East of old 470,000 L Waste Water Synthetic liner (34D-14) warehouse 220,000 Gal Treatment Facility influent Equalization Tank North of 37,900 L Waste Water Concrete (34D-20) Equalization 10,000 Gal Treatment Facility Basin influent SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 130 of 393 TABLE B.5.2-1 IRTS EQUIPMENT DESIGN CODES AND STANDARDS Design and I Qualification J Welder Inspection Equipment Fabrication Materials [1] Jand Procedures and Testing Pressure Vessels ASME Code Section II ASME Code ASME Code Section VIII, Div 1 Section IX Section VIII, Div 1 Atmospheric Tanks ASME Code Section II ASME Code ASME Code Section VIII, Div 1 Section IX Section VIII, Div 1 Heat Exchangers ASME Code ASME Code ASME Code ASME Code Section VIII, and Section II Section IX Section VIII, Div 1 TEMA "C" Piping ANSI B31.3 ASTM and ASME ASME Code ANSI B31.3 Code Section II Section IX Valves ANSI B16.34 ASTM and ASME ASME Code ANSI B16.34 ANSI B16.11 Code Section II Section IX Pumps Manufacturer's ASME Code ASME Code Hydraulic Institute Standards [2) Section II or Section IX Manufacturer's (as required)

Standard I I

[1] - Manufacturers' material certificates of compliance with material specifications may be provided in lieu of certified material.

(2] - Manufacturers' standard for the intended service. Hydrotesting should be 1.5 times the design pressure.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 131 of 393 TABLE B.5.2-2 DESIGN CODES AND STANDARDS FOR KEY IRTS EQUIPMENT IRTS Component Design Code or Standard Seismic Factor Tank 8D-1 Carbon Steel Tank API 650 (1961 version) None Reinforced 1961 UBC Zone ITT Concrete Vault 1956 ACI, Building Code Requirements for R/C, 318-56 Tank 8D-2 Carbon Steel Tank API 650 (1961 version) None Reinforced 1961 UBC Zone III Concrete Vault 1956 ACI, Building Code Requirements for R/C, 318-56 Tanks 8D-3/8D-4 Stainless Steel ASME, Sect. VIII None Tanks Reinforced 1961 UBC Zone III Concrete Vault Tanks 5D-15A/ ASME, Sect. VIII None 5D-15B LWTS Evaporator ASME, Sect. VIII & TEMA C None 31017 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 132 of 393 TABLE B.5.2-3 ORIGINAL DESIGN CODES AND STANDARDS FOR THE MAIN PLANT

- AISC Specification for the Design, Fabrication and Erection of Structural Steel for Buildings, 1961, 5 th Edition.

- Pacific Coast Building Officials Conference, Uniform Building Code, 1961 Edition.

- American Concrete Institute Building Code Requirements for Reinforced Concrete, 318-56.

- American Standard Building Code Requirements for Minimum Design Loads in Buildings and Other Structures, A 58.1-1955.

- American Welding Society - Standard Code for Arc and Gas Welding in Building Construction, AWS DI.0-46.

- New York State Building Construction Code - Prefix C, 1961 Edition.

Codes and specifications for steel structures is given:

- All structural steel and steel plate conform to ASTM Specification A-36, of latest adoption, Steel for Bridges and Buildings.

- All standard bolts conform to ASTM A 307, Grade B.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 133 of 393 TABLE B.5.2-4

SUMMARY

OF MAJOR EQUIPMENT IN THE WTF AND STS vessel/Component I Volume (L) Construction Equipment in WTF Yard 8D-1 PUREX HLW Tank 2,800,000 Carbon Steel 8D-2 PUREX HLW Tank 2,800,000 Carbon Steel 8D-3 THOREX HLW Tank 57,000 Stainless Steel 8D-4 THOREX HLW Tank 57,000 Stainless Steel 8E-l/IA WTFVS Off-Gas Condensers N/A N/A Equipment in WTFVS Building 8C-1 Off-Gas Caustic Scrubber 2,700 Carbon Steel 8E-3 Off-Gas Heater N/A N/A 8D-6 WTF Off-Gas Knockout Pot 1,900 Carbon Steel 8D-7 WTF Off-Gas Relief Tank 950 Carbon Steel Equipment in Tank 8D-1 50C-001 STS Ion Exchange Column 7,200 Stainless Steel 50C-002 STS Ion Exchange Column 7,200 Stainless Steel 50C-003 STS Ion Exchange Column 7,200 Stainless Steel 50C-004 STS Ion Exchange Column 7,200 Stainless Steel 50D-001 STS Supernatant Feed Tank 6,535 Stainless Steel 50D-004 STS Sluice Feed Tank 8,110 Stainless Steel 50E-001 STS Supernatant Cooler N/A Stainless Steel 50F-001 STS Prefilter N/A Stainless Steel 50F-002 STS Postfilter N/A Stainless Steel 50G-004 Sluice Lift Water Pump N/A N/A Zeolite Pumps (in risers M-2 thru M-7) N/A N/A SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 134 of 393 TABLE B.5.2-5

SUMMARY

OF MAJOR EQUIPMENT IN LWTS CELLS OF THE MAIN PLANT Vessel/Component Volume (L) jiConstruction Equipment in Extraction Cell 3 71C-001 Organic IX Column 535 Stainless Steel 71C-002 Zeolite IX Column 1,820 Stainless Steel 71C-003 Zeolite IX Column 1,820 Stainless Steel 71C-004 Evaporator (31017) 5,680 Stainless Steel 71D-005 Distillate Surge Tank 3,785 Stainless Steel 71D-006 Spent Resin Tank 4,650 Stainless Steel 71D-007 Spent Zeolite Tank 4,650 Stainless Steel 71D-008 Filter Backwash Tank 2,950 Stainless Steel 71D-009 Sample Tank 380 Stainless Steel 71D-011 Low TDS Feed Tank 380 Stainless Steel 71E-001 Reboiler N/A Stainless Steel 71E-005 Concentrates Cooler N/A Stainless Steel Equipment in the General Purpose Cell Crane Room Extension 35104 LLW Collection Tank T 22,000 Stainless Steel Equipment in the Uranium Product Cell 5D-15A1/A2 Evaporator Concentrates Tank I 38,150 I Stainless Steel 18,990 5D-15B Evaporator Feed Tank 56,950 Stainless Steel Equipment in the Liquid Waste Cell 3D-2 Sample Collection Tank 3,785 Stainless Steel 4D-10 First U Cycle Waste C/H Tank 11,360 Stainless Steel (GPC/LWC Sump Receiver) 7D-2 LLW Collection Tank 32,220 Stainless Steel 7D-8 Rework Eva porator Feed Tank (Tank 11,360 Stainless Steel 6D-3 Overflow Receiver) 7D-14 Hot Analytical Cell Drain Catch Tank 1,900 Hastelloy "C" 13D-8 Cell Sump Receiver 2,570 Stainless Steel Equipment in the Lower Extraction Aisle 14D-7 HNO 3 Addition Tank I375 Stainless Steel 14D-18 NaOH Addition Tank 375 Stainless Steel SAR: 0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 135 of 393 TABLE B.5.2-6

SUMMARY

OF MAJOR EQUIPMENT IN GENERAL MAIN PLANT CELLS"'1 Vessel /Component Construction Equipment in the Off-Gas Cell 6C-3 VOG Scrubber 1,500 Stainless Steel 6D-3 VOG Condensate Catch Tank 860 Stainless Steel 6D-6 VOG Knockout Pot 240 Stainless Steel 6E-3 VOG Cooler N/A Stainless Steel 6E-4 VOG Heater N/A Stainless Steel Equipment in Extraction Cell 1 4D-2 Partition Cycle Waste C/H Tank 4,160 Stainless Steel (XCl Sump Receiver)

Notes

[1] - Only currently in-service equipment in these areas is given.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 136 of 393 TABLE B.5.2-7 SLM4ARY OF MAJOR CSS EQUIPMENT IN THE 01-14 BUILDING Vessel/Component Volume (L) Construction Equipment in the CSS Waste Dispensing Cell 70D-001 Waste Dispensing Vessel 1,890 Stainless Steel Equipment in the CSS Process Room 70K-002 High Shear Mixer 114 Stainless Steel 70K-004 High Shear Mixer 114 Stainless Steel Equipment in the CSS Change Room 70V-001 Additive Day Tank 1,160 Carbon Steel 70V-001 Additive Bulk Storage Tank 5,700 Polyethylene Yard, west of Main Plant 7D-13 Lab Drains Catch Tank (CSS 7,710 Stainless Steel Sump Receiver) (Out of Service) I SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 137 of 393 TABLE B.5.3-1 HIGH LEVEL WASTE LEAK DETECTION SYSTEMS

. Stut re Barrier J. Nature of Leak [ Detected By' I Mitigat7ion Tanks 8D-l and 8D-2 Tank leaks into vault Leak detection system Vault fluids may be in vault pan jetted to pan. Pan fluids may be pumped to tank; can pump fluids to other identical tank/vault system Supernatant Pump Pit, Leak from transfer Major leak detected Gravity drain into Top of Tank 8D- piping (single wall by low pressure/low Tank 8D-2 in pit) into pit flow alarms in STS control room HLW Transfer Conduit HLW transfer piping Leak detection system Drain pipe in (double walled within in annular space conduit; gravity conduit) leaks into between pipe walls drain back to Tank conduit 8D-2 Vapor detected by STS Off-Gas Treatment system effluent monitoring system Pipeway/Valve Aisle Transfer piping or Valve aisle sump has Pump actuates in valves leak into high fluid level response to high pipeway or valve alarm fluid level in sump aisle returns fluids to Vapor detected by STS Tank 8D-2 Off-Gas Treatment System effluent monitoring system Components in Tank Fluids leak from Laboratory analysis Return fluids to Tank 8D-I components into tank of sluice lift water 8D-2 for rework by STS DF across IX system On-line radiation less than adequate; monitors supernatant transferred to Tank 8D-3 LLW Transfer Conduit LLW transfer within Leak detection system Pump to Tank 8D-2, if conduit in annular space needed HLWTS pump pits Leak from transfer Leak detected by Gravity drain into (umper (single wall conductivity probe, Tanks through pit in pit) into pit alarms at HLWTS drains control station HLWTS components in Liquid leak from Leak detected by Gravity drain into pits components into pit conductivity probe, Tanks through pit alarms at HLWTS drains control station HLWTS utility pits HLW transfer leaks On-line radiation Block and bleed into utility flush monitors valving drains into feed line pump pit, gravity drain into Tanks through pump pit drains SAR: 0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 138 of 393 TABLE B.5.4-1

SUMMARY

OF FILTER MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION Plenum Ventilation System ____ FilterInstrumentation ____ or

.. PDH ... DDCL PR .Header

___ PDCH PDA-L -DC.. PR PAR Permanent X X X Ventilation System Main Ventilation X X X X X X X Head End X X X X X X X Ventilation 01-14 Building X X X Vessel Off-Gas X X (Upstream)

Vessel Off-Gas X X (Downstream)

Waste Tank Farm X X PDR Pressure Differential Recorder PDAH Pressure Differential Alarm High PDCH Pressure Differential Control High PDAL Pressure Differential Alarm Low PDCL Pressure Differential Control Low PR Pressure Recorder PAH = Pressure Alarm High SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 139 of 393 TABLE B.5.4-2

SUMMARY

OF UTILITY SUPPLY CAPABILITIES ility* Supply*

Ut System Un

{

________I Peak Demand in <!Installediiii~iiiii i !its Normal Operation __________

Capacity 400 Raw Water Supply and gpm 75 Treatment Demineralized Water gpm 16 20 Cooling Water - Open gpm 1,785 2,250 System Cooling Water - Heat MBTU 5 31 Transfer Steam Generation - lb/h 150 psig 15,000 35,000 25 psig Fuel Gas MBTU/hr 20 110 Fuel Oil gpm 0 15 Compressed Air scfm 1,500 3,500 Instrument Air scfm 550 800 Electric Power kVA 2,700 11,500 SAR:0000877.01

I .

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 140 of 393 TABLE B.5.4-3 IRTS UTILITY REQUIREMENTS utility Flow or Power jPressure or Voltage]

Electricity STS 190 to 200 kW 480 V, 3 phase LWTS 45 kW 480 V, 3 phase 120 V, single phase CSS 190 to 200 kW 480V, 3 phase DC Not Specified 480 V, 3 phase 120 V, single phase Utility Air STS 1,400 L/m 690 kPa LWTS 560 L/m 690 kPa CSS 3,800 L/m 690 kPa Instrument Air STS 8,500 L/m 725 kPa LWTS 1,200 L/m 345 kPa CSS 710 L/m 345 kPa Steam Supply STS Intermittent 1050 kPa LWTS 545 kg 170 kPa 1050 kPa CSS Intermittent 170 kPa Utility Water STS I 95 L/m 350 kPa CSS [ (130 L/m)

Demineralized Water STS 150 L/m 275 kPa LWTS 20 L/m CSS (1.9 L/m)

Cooling Water LWTS 950 L/m ---

Notes

[I] - Values in parentheses are intermittent values SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR2B51- 1.DWG Page 141 of 393 Figure B.5.1-1 Location of Select Facilities Covered in WVNS-SAR-002

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR2B51-2.DWG Page 142 of 393 Figure B.5.1-2 Location of West Valley Demonstration Project

WVNS-SAR-OU.

Rev. 8 SR2B52-I.DWG Page 143 of 393

-Zeolite Mobilization Pump Support Truss Foundations LEGEND TANK 8D-1 LEGEND TANK 8D-2

-I Risers With Operable Mobilization Pumps (M1, 2, 3, 5. 6) Risers With Operable Mobilization Pumps (M1, Riser with Mast and Camera (M7)

M2, M3, M5, M6) 0 Riser With Operable Transfer Pump (M8) 0 Riser With Operable Transfer Pump (M9)

© Riser With Most, Camera, & Sluice Arm (M7)

Riser With Inoperable Decant Pump (M8)

Riser With Column Dump Arm & Camera (M4)

Operable Decant Pump FO R REFERENCE ONLY 0 Riser With Inoperable Mobilization Pump (M4)

NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-1 Plan View - HLW Tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR252-1A.DWG Page 144 of 393 Figure B.5.2-1a. Purex HLW Tank Internal Floor Structure (Typ.) (Tank 8D-1 Shown)

WVNS-SAR- 002 Rev. 8 Page 145 of 393 FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-2. STS Process Facilities Section

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 146 of 393 5R2852-3. DWG SIR2B52-3 DWG FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-3 General Arrangement - STS Tank 8D-1 Section

\

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 147 of 393 SR2B52- 4.DWG III I Tank \ I 8D-4 177I11

-.Tank 8D-3 Pump --.

Enclosure L---

50D-006 50D-005 Tank 8D-1 FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-4. General Arrangements STS Building and 8D-3 & 4 Tanks - Plan Elevation 92.0'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR2B52- 5.DWG Page 148 of 393 TANK 8D-1 FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure 1.5.2-5. General Arrangement STS Building - Plan Elevation 107.0'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 149 of 393 F;R2R52- 6.DWG SR2B52-6 DWG FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-6. General Arrangement - STS Building Sections

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 150 of 393 SR2B52 7.DWG FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-7. HLW Tank 8D-3 and Tank 8D-4 Section

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 151 of 393 SR2852-8.DWG r4i HLWTS Control Station Trench Transfer Pump 55-G-014 Vitrification

.- 4 Building 8D-2 Vault and Tank Pit 8Q-ý Transfer Pump 8D-1 55-G-012 Vault and Tank Equipment Shelter Transfer Pump.

50-G-007 FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-8. High Level Waste Transfer System Plan

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 152 of 393 SR2B52-9.DWG El. 85'-4" Liner Pon Carbon TanksSteel FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-9. High Level Waste Transfer System Section

WVNS-SAR-Rev.0028 Page 153 of 393 qRR521Il fWC.

SR2B5210 DWG FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-10. Main Plant Plan Below Grade

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 154 of 393 SR285211 .DWG FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-11. Main Plant Plan at Elevation 100.0'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 155 of 393 SR2RS2I 2.DWG SR2B5212 DWG PmflPR1*RNCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-12. Main Plant Plan at Elevation 114.5'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 156 of 393 SR2B5213.DWG FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-13. Main Plant Plan at Elevation 131.0'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 157 of 393 SR2852T14.DWG SR2B5214.DWG FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-14. Main Plant Plan at Elevation 144.0'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 158 of 393 SR28521 5.DWG SR2B5215.DWG FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-15. Main Plant Plan at Elevation 160.0'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 159 of 393 SR2B5216. DWG

. I

• A* . 4.

4 A A

-i A. 6C-1 S4 "

4:

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A 0 6C-3 4 At 6E-3 A4.' A OFF GAS CELL A A 4 " *A.'

1.4 *A

.4 '

UPPER WARM AISLE ON CELL"A

.4d EXTRACTI(

NO. 1 (XC-1) 1 FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-16 Equipment Arrangement - Off Gas and Acid Recovery Cells Plan Elevation 111'-6" to 128'-3"

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR2B521 7.DWG Page 160 of 393 SR2B5217 DWG EL. 144'-0" EL. 131'-0"

.4 . 4" . . . . .... * . . *-.

• 44 . .

EL. 126'-1 3/4"

]] 7E EL. 124'-0" w

EL. 114'-6 3/8'

[E- Reference Drawing 15A-A-154, Rev. 4 EL. 101'-3" EL. 99'-6' EL. 96'-0" FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE FIGURE B.5.2-17. Equipment Arrangement - Off Gas Cell, Schematic Elevation

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 161 of 393 FIGURE B.5.2-18. Equipment Arrangement - Liquid Waste Cell Plan

WVNS-SAR--002 Page 162 of Rev.3938 SR2B5219.DWG SR2B521 9.DWG Page 162 of 393 4, .. .

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 163 of 393 SR285220.DWG REF. DWG.:

901D-041, Rev. 2 FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-20. LWTS Plan at Elevation 100.0'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR285221.DWG Page 164 of 393 REF. DWG.:

901D-042, Rev. 0 I

FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-21. LWTS Plan at Elevation 114.5'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 165 of 393 SR285222.DWG REF. DWG.:

901D-043, Rev. 2 FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-22. LWTS Plan at Elevation 131 .0'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 166 of 393 SR2B5223.DWG REF. DWG.:

901D-044, Rev. 0 Upper Extraction Aisle (UXA)

FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-23. LWTS Plan at Elevation 144.0'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 167 of 393 SR285224.DWG REF. DWG.:

901D-045, Rev. 0 Extraction Chemical Room Extraction Cell O 71 -D-004 No. 3 (XC-3)

=71-V-010 Product Purification Cell (PPC)

FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-24. LWTS Plan at Elevation 160.0'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR285225.DWG Page 168 of 393 Distillate Surge -- /

Tank Pump 71-P-15 FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-25. LWTS Plan at Elevation 131.0'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 169 of 393 SR 2R 526.DflWG SR2B5226 DWG FLR EL 160.00'

- FILTER 71-D-010 ZEOLITE ION

- EXCHANGER 71-C-002 ZEOLITE ION

- EXCHANGER 71 -C-003

- FILTER BACKWASH TRANSFER TANK 71 -D-008

- SPENT ZEOLITE TANK 71-D-007

- LOW TDS FEED TANK 71 -D-011

-VALVE GALLERY & PIPE CHASE FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-26. General Arrangement - LWTS Sections

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR2835227ýDWG Page 170 of 393 SR285227LDWG REF. 9O6-D-03O 9nre DECANT PUMP S64-MDC-1 64-MPC-14 HIGHSHEAR -

MIXER70K-002 F MIXER 70K-004 HIGH SHEAR 01/14 BLDG K 14* CELL " SUMPO:rZ lA*.. _*'__lr, KEY PLAN 14CLL PUMP LADDERU 0 AIRLOCK UNIT SUMPQ SUM S P U PUMP VACUUM 9060- 156 HEATER PUMP sm PM TRANSFER 47-F-1 PUM

• 14 CELLAI NH3 MONITOR UNIT HEATER 64-AE/AI-8203 47-F 001 LOCK LADDER LD r EQUIP SD.OISPENSING

• WASTE L RACK

--,--VIEWING E AE N-- /VESSEL PUMP PU WINDOW

"-- ... " . / SWIPEJ; n O0 CEMEN NOx TRENCH

. ,'. CHASE "' ';'"  :* 7 CSs STATION 2 o o UNLOADING AREA RECESS 5

,4-f/ E-O00A 01 CELL PROCESS SLENOID AJMMONWh-- * *Fit. ROOM o o STORAGE TANK 64-D-004 ,'. PREHERA CME

u. HCUT SPANEL 64-C-003A ANTIFOAM AMLOCK AIRDRYER 2,E

1 AIR PREHEA- CATALYTIC ADDTmON HANDLING4--- REACTOR SYSTEM UNIT 64-C-003B E]Ff 42-V-M0 PREHE R I'! "UNIT HEATE -. PR.-EATE*SUMP .

HYDRAUUC FEED CONVEYOR UNIT CLEAN W/HYDRAULIC LIFT I

,47-F-002 L DRUM I 01 AJRLOCK FLOOR ATJ1 LH LDRUM ELEV. S, LOADOUT I *-----.-- HSCSS 9800' l 4--0 4/ M-45 M-45 -1

II CONTROL 64-V-002C SLIFT UIFT ICEMENT ISILO II CABINET

._PANEL C

IBRA CYUNDER TION ENCLOSURES ll

\I S, NMJ MONITOR ACRISON CONTROL ROOM 64-V--002AS PANEL

- . .A. . ..  ; . . . . . . .

64-V-002B FIRE PROTECTION L-PNEUMATIC SOLENOID BOX EQUIPMENT FOR HANTEX CONVEYOR FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE FigureB.5.2-27. General Arrangement - 01/14 Building Plan Elevation 98.0'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR285228.DWG Page 171 of 393 REF. 906-D-031 IR-013 FINSTRUMENTRACKS 8* DIA.SLEEVE THRU FLOOR-"F

• . , . . " " V 403-1-905 CELLw T14 / _

'LADDER DISPENSING VESSEL 70D-001PLNMCET 471-100 CONTROL 4710 PANEL (EXIST)

PREHEATER CAO 6b-"---479-100 E5 ELEV. 114.25' 64-E-OO5A

[* bSUPPLY BLOWER SUPPLY

.5 H&V UNIT ROUGHING

-- C*..

1. 5 471-100H5--

A FILTERS L. 71-Ti-0145A FILTER HVAC DUCT TEMP MONITOR RACK 47 T 004 PROCESS EAVE 47-1-001 ...

• ELEV. 114.25' AREA FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-28. General Arrangement - 01/14 Building Plan Elevation 116.5'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 172 of 393 SR2B5229.DWG FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE FigureB.5.2-29. General Arrangement - 01/14 Building Plan Elevation 130.0'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR2B5230.DWC Page 173 of 393 MyPLA 906-D-033 PLATFORM HVAC BLOWER ( 4 7 5 - 1 0 1 )REF' CONTROL PANEL 47-8-006 HVAC BLOWER (475-100)

CONTROL PANEL 47-8-007 NOX MONITOR #6 -- 475-101 HVAC B 01-14-IBLDG ELEV. 144.00' FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-30. General Arrangement - 01/14 Building Plan Elevation 144.0'

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR285231 .DWG Page 174 of 393 SR285231 .DWG REF. 906-D-034 AIR DUCT

-INLET DOOR HYDRAULIC CYLINDER

.REMOTE MANIPULATOR EMPTY DRUM FEED CONVEYOR (GRAVnIYTYPE)

FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE FigureB.5.2-31. General Arrangement - 01/14 Building Sections

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR2B5232.DWG Page 175 of 393 KEY:

1. Control Room

2. Crane Maintenance Area

3. Waste Unloading Area

4. Storage Area

5. Gas Fired Heating Unit Roof Line FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.5.2-32. Drum Cell Layout Plan

WVNS-SAR--002 Rev. 8 Page 176 of 393 SR2854-1.DWG r BU-LDIN(F VENTIATION SYSTEM F MI'ST HEI:ATER'I R U

• STS l l -ELIMINATORI * - * ", , E 4000 cfm

' d MIST RAT 1 H* H SELIMINATORI *J"* P***

i,,,R, H,^,I STACK I

IVENT PLENUM MAIN PLANT STACK VENT PLENuMcfm 9700 cfm 01-14 BLDG.

STACK 01-14 OPERATINGH AISLES AND FILTER -- 24 CHANGE ROOM H H 2400 cfm KEY:

L------------------- ------- =----------

F--------------------------- ---------------- BLOWERS:

OFF-GAS TREATMENT AND VENTILATION SYSTEM R E - ELECTRIC C KOECYCLONE`STEAM RH E FILTERS:

P - PREFILTER R - ROUGHING FILTER H - HEPA FILTER 8D-1 CONDENSER 8D-~3 K.O. STEAM L-*LjJLJ POT SCRUBBER 8D-4 L------------------------------------

Figure B.5.4-1. Building and Off-gas Treatment Ventilation Systems

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 177 of 393 SR2854-2.DWG VENTILATION SUPPLY TO FILTRATION & EXHAUST (SEE FIG B.5.4-1)

Figure B.5.4-2. STS Building Ventilation Flow

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SH21354 --. DWG Page 178 of 393 STORAGE -- I

_ VENT SUPPLY I ICONTROL ROOM , *CO- --

LXA-- ,SOUTH STAIRS - -'. , , NORTH' STAIRSI- . .", ,- -". A A Y , 'AL AISLE

-' ir UNTING J',,

ROOM rEAST STAIRS - CVA I . .

PREP I ',

B-4UWA L  : GKXSA C:CORDS

ýRýEP.  :

AR AI--- I:

I - ---- -- I-l-- I SC- 3 I A I i I I II

,.. - ,F- PSI -- 1-~ . - *, I

• i II - H k SEE'FIG.l 0--111-SEECR LAB I i Ii NC I E SE FIG.

ANALYTCALI._

LAB F ANALYTICAL CELL DECON AREA Ir SAMPLE ANC ANC TORAGE P I CL TRACSFER REF. DWGS,

/U:XC-ý _,j VENT WASH CELL GENERAL EXHAUST 15R-A-74, REV. 17 15R-A-75, REV. 18 ANL INFILTRATION NICHE PLENUM -I DIRECT FLOW

• HL-LA-J * *-I MAIN VENT l: SUPPLY/EXHAUST L*_ir CA*-] CONTINUED ELSEWHERE

• I PLENUMI* ON DRAWING L ---- J L-.TO FILTRATION & EXHAI,UST (SEE FIG. B.5.4-1)

Figure B.5.4-3. Main Ventilation System Flow

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 179 of 393 SR2B54-4.DWG LEGEND DUCTED LINES INLEAKAGE TO FILTRATION & EXHAUST (SEE FIG. B.5.4-1)

Figure B.5.4-4. Head End Ventilation System Flow

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR2B54-5.DWG Page 180 of 393 TO FILTRATION & EXHAUST (SEE FIG. B.5.4-1)

Figure B.5.4-5 01/14 Building Ventilation Flow

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR2B54-6.DWG Page 181 of 393 0 100 200 400 FT GRAPHIC SCALE Figure B.5.4-6 Natural Gas Distribution System On-site

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 182 of 393 B.6.0 IRTS PROCESS SYSTEMS B.6.1 Process Description B.6.1.1 Narrative Description The Integrated Radwaste Treatment System, comprised of the Supernatant Treatment System, Liquid Waste Treatment System, Cement Solidification System, and Drum Cell, has been designed for the decontamination, concentration, solidification, and storage of liquid high-level waste (see Figure B.6.1-1). The IRTS operates in a batch, or campaign mode; that is, the Cement Solidification System may be placed in standby while a batch of solution is processed in the Supernatant Treatment System and Liquid Waste Treatment System. Conversely, the STS and LWTS may be placed in standby while the CSS processes a batch received from the LWTS.

The initial objective of the IRTS was to process supernatant and sludge wash solutions generated during preparation of the high-level waste sludge in tank 8D-2 for vitrification. This was completed in 1995, resulting in 19,877 drums of cement stabilized waste placed in the Drum Cell for safe storage. Prior to the start of vitrification in July 1996, the high-level waste sludge in tank 8D-2 required additional processing to remove excess sulfate salts that would have inhibited production of an acceptable vitrified waste form. Sulfate removal and "sludge washing" was effected in the SMWS through the addition of a dilute caustic solution which was mixed with the sludge to dissolve the sulfate salts.

Due to the concentration of sulfates in the high-level waste sludge, three separate washes were necessary. Two washes were required to sufficiently remove the sulfate salts from the sludge initially present in Tank 8D-2, then high-level THOREX waste in Tank 8D-4 was transferred to Tank 8D-2 for the third and final wash. Waste in Tank 8D-4 was produced during fuel reprocessing using the THOREX process and was stored in an acidic state. Wash solutions were processed through the STS and LWTS, stabilized in the CSS, and transferred to the Drum Cell for storage.

Currently, liquids to be processed in the STS are pumped from Tank 8D-1 or 8D-2 to STS process vessels mounted in Tank 8D-I. In these vessels the solution may be filtered, diluted with water as desired, and cooled in a shell-and-tube heat exchanger. The solution is then pumped through up to four columns of ion exchange zeolite for cesium removal. Titanium-treated zeolite is used as needed to augment or replace the standard zeolite to remove both plutonium and cesium. Decontaminated solution produced by the STS is pumped from the STS product tank 8D-3 to the Liquid Waste Treatment System for concentration.

SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 183 of 393 All waste handling and processing activities associated with the LWTS are conducted in cells located in the Main Plant. Product transferred from Tank 8D-3 in the STS is received in primary LWTS feed tank 5D-15B located in the Uranium Product Cell (UPC).

Alternatively, waste may be received in Tank 7D-2 in the Liquid Waste Cell (LWC) (via Tank 5D-15B). (High-level waste processed by the STS is sufficiently decontaminated to provide for a reclassification of STS product as low-level waste.) Tank 5D-15A1 can also be as an on-line feed tank. From the on-line feed tank, waste is processed through a high efficiency evaporator that reduces the volume of water in the process solution. Evaporator concentrates are cooled and pumped to the LWTS product tank 5D 15A1 or 5D-15A2. From here, concentrates can be recycled to Tank 8D-2 and incorporated into the vitrification feed slurry or serve as feed to the Cement Solidification System (CSS).

During operation of the Vitrification Facility, overheads from the Concentrator Feed Makeup Tank (CFMT) are condensed and transferred to Tank 8D-3 for subsequent processing by the LWTS evaporator. These concentrates are returned to Tank 8D-2 and are not solidified in the CSS.

The CSS was designed to solidify concentrates received from the LWTS. Since the completion of supernatant/sludge wash solution treatment, however, the CSS has been inactive. When the CSS was in use, LWTS product transferred to the CSS was received in Tank 70D-001 located in the Waste Dispensing Cell of the 01-14 Building. Process solution in the tank is pumped to one of two high shear mixers in the CSS Process Cell, where it is mixed with Portland cement and discharged to a 269 L (71 gal) square carbon steel drum. The product drum is then sealed, evaluated for surface contamination and staged for transport to the Drum Cell for storage.

B.6.1.2 Flowsheets The IRTS process flow diagram is shown in Figures B.6.1-1 through B.6.1-3.

B.6.1.3 Identification of Items for Safety Analysis Concern The concentration of activity in IRTS process solutions requires that waste processing be conducted in a manner which minimizes doses to both occupational personnel and off-site individuals. Furthermore, the hazards associated with the handling and storage of bulk chemicals and hazardous materials requires that these activities be conducted in a manner which prevents the release of hazardous materials. The major items of safety analysis concern therefore are:

0 Worker protection from direct radiation and confinement of radioactivity; SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 184 of 393

• Avoiding nuclear criticality accidents; Avoiding high-level waste tank corrosion; Hazardous material protection; and Minimizing the risk of accidents through adherence to established policies and procedures.

B.6.1.3.1 Radiation Protection Protection from direct radiation is achieved through shielding, work planning, and decontamination. Confinement barriers and systems in the IRTS and Main Plant preclude the uncontrolled release of radioactive contamination. These systems and barriers are summarized in Section B.4.3.2. The primary confinement systems for airborne radioactivity are the IRTS and Main Plant building ventilation systems.

These systems have been described in detail in Section B.5.4.1. Radioactively contaminated liquid is collected in facility sumps and drains for transfer to the LLWTS, which is described in Section B.7.5. Effluent radioactive releases are maintained well within the limits specified in DOE Order 5400.5.

B.6.1.3.2 Criticality Prevention The occurrence of an inadvertent criticality during IRTS processing activities is prevented through system design and adherence to strict administrative controls. All components of the IRTS have been evaluated for criticality safety during normal and abnormal operating conditions; no credible critical condition has been identified.

The potential for criticality in the General Purpose Cell of the Main Plant has been identified. A comprehensive assessment of criticality controls in place at the WVDP for IRTS and Main Plant operations and facilities is given in Section B.8.7.

B.6.1.3.3 Prevention of High-Level Waste Tank Corrosion Wastes in high level waste tank 8D-2 are kept at a high pH to minimize the corrosion of the carbon steel tank. A chemical addition system, which is described in Section B.5.4.10, has been provided to ensure that excess caustic is available to neutralize low pH additions to the tank. Section B.5.3.3 describes the program that WVNS has in place for the monitoring and control of corrosion in both tanks 8D-1 and 8D-2.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 185 of 393 B.6.1.3.4 Hazardous Material Protection Nonradiological hazardous materials at the WVDP are stored in special facilities in the New Warehouse (described in Section B.5.2.7). Hazardous wastes are stored in facilities described in Section B.7.7 and B.7.8. Operations associated with these materials are conducted per the guidance of the WVDP Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual (WVDP-011) and the Hazardous Waste Management Plan (WVDP-073).

B.6.1.3.5 Management, Organization, and Institutional Safety Provisions All personnel at the WVDP receive extensive training in safety aspects associated with their responsibilities. Operations involving radioactive or hazardous materials are conducted in a manner consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 835 and DOE Order 420.1, respectively. Incorporation of the requirements of these Orders into WVDP operating procedures is discussed in Section B.8.5. Additionally, an overall safety culture has been developed at the WVDP through a comprehensive implementation of the principles of the DOE Conduct of Operations philosophy as given in DOE Order 5480.19. The implementation of DOE 5480.19 at the WVDP, as given in WVDP-106, is summarized in Section B.10.1.2. Training of operations personnel is conducted per the requirements of 5480.20A, as outlined in Section B.10.3.2.

B.6.2 STS Process Chemistry and Physical Chemical Principles STS processes have been designed for the dissolution and removal of soluble salts present in Tank 8D-2 HLW sludge and the decontamination of the resulting wash solutions to a level acceptable for subsequent processing in the LWTS and CSS.

The principle of sludge washing is the dissolution of sodium sulfate crystals present in HLW sludge through the addition of water. This process, however, also drives other soluble salts into solution, including salts of uranium and plutonium.

Laboratory testing has shown that the solubility of uranium and plutonium salts may be suppressed through the addition of caustic to the wash water (Bray, L.A.,

December, 1990). A program for caustic addition to Tank 8D-2 has therefore been developed that is based on routine sampling and measurement of the Pu concentration in Tank 8D-2 wash solution.

If excess plutonium is present in the sludge wash solution, the primary ion exchange material (Ionsiv IE-96-) is replaced partially or in full with titanium-treated IE 961. The Battelle-Pacific Northwest Laboratory proprietary coating produces an ion exchange media that retains plutonium and strontium while maintaining most of the cesium affinity of the original IE zeolite.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 186 of 393 B.6.3 High-Level Waste Mobilization, Treatment, and Transfer B.6.3.1 Sludge Mobilization The Chemical Addition System provides the equipment to add various solutions to Tank 8D-2. Following the additions, mobilization pumps agitate tank contents and suspend settled solids.

The solutions are volumetrically batch-metered into Tank 8D-2 from a storage tank trailer located near the Waste Tank Farm. The solution enters Tank 8D-2 through an existing spare 5 cm (2 in) pipe in riser N12 and free falls from the top of the tank/riser into the tank.

Mobilization of solution in Tank 8D-2 is accomplished through the use of a series of 15 m (50 ft) long mobilization pumps which have been installed at strategic locations within Tank 8D-2 through tank access sleeves (risers). The pumps discharge a nominal 2,300 L/m (600 gpm) up to a maximum of 2,680 L/m (700 gpm) from each of the two nozzles, which spray in opposite directions while the entire pump assembly rotates about the vertical support column at rates up to 1.5 rpm. The mobilization pumps do not remove material from the tank, but serve to resuspend the settled sludge from the bottom of the tank.

The mobilization pump motor is located on the external truss above Tank 8D-2. All pump, column, drive shaft, and motor loads are carried by the independent external trusses. The trusses were designed to support a total of seven mobilization pumps.

There are six pumps currently installed in risers as shown on Figure B.5.2-1. Since all the electrical and mechanical rotating equipment requiring service are external to the tank, pump maintenance (i.e., greasing bearings, oiling motors) is performed by conventional means. Calculations have determined that pump operation will not compromise structural integrity through damage to tank internals (Gates, W.E., 1987 and 1991).

Provisions have been made to allow for remote flushing and removal in case of pump failure. Tank 8D-2 solution is pumped at temperatures as high as 90'C (194°F) to the prefilter (50-F-001) in Tank 8D-I.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 187 of 393 B.6.3.2 Radioactive Liquid Treatment B.6.3.2.1 Prefiltration and Cooling Process solution contained in Tank 8D-2 may be filtered through a sintered metal filter, depending on suspended solids loading, and must be cooled prior to processing. Filtration is performed to prevent process contamination due to carry over of sludge particulates suspended in the process solution. Figure B.5.2-1 provides the location and arrangement of this equipment. Additionally, filtration removes some insoluble strontium and plutonium present in the suspended solids contained in the process solution. The filter currently provides for a flow forward rate of 23 L/m (6 gpm) and 1.0 pm particle retention with recirculation of excess flow back to Tank 8D-2. Instrumentation to measure the pressure differential across the filter is provided. Provisions have been made for remotely backpulsing the prefilter. The 6,400 L (1,700 gal) supernatant feed tank (50-D-001) installed in Tank 8D-1 serves as an intermediate collection and feed tank for filtered process solution for the ion exchange process. Tank 50-D-001 also receives unfiltered hlw tank liquids from within Tank 8D-1.

The stored filtered process solution provides about five hours of hold-up based on a 23 L/m (6 gpm) undiluted solution feed processing rate through the ion exchange columns. A water line and static mixer have been provided for process solution dilution. The supernatant feed tank is also attached to a chemical addition line that may be used to add decontamination or pH adjustment chemicals; however, no chemical additions via this port are planned at this time.

Solution ready for ion exchange processing is cooled to temperatures as low as 6'C (43°F) with chilled coolant (salt solution). The isolation chiller which supplies the chilled coolant to the cooler in Tank 8D-1 is located in the STS building. The process solution is pumped through the cooler (50-E-001) to the ion exchange columns (50-C-001, 50-C-002, 50-C-003, 50-C-004). Pump capacity is 98 L/m (26 gpm) with a nominal net forward flow of 23 1pm (6 gpm).

B.6.3.2.2 Ion Exchange Following filtration, dilution (if desired), and cooling, the solution passes downward through one to four ion-exchange columns in series. The columns, are 1 m (3.4 ft) in diameter x 4.4 m (14.5 ft) in height and utilize IE-96T zeolite for cesium removal. Titanium-treated zeolite may be used in place of some or all of the usual IE-96ý4 zeolite if warranted by the concentration of Pu in the solution.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 188 of 393 The configuration of the STS ion exchange columns principally depends on the concentration of cesium, plutonium, and sodium salts in the feed solution, the number of fully functional columns available, and the zeolite consumption goals. The STS process has been designed to operate continuously using three ion exchange columns; however, it has been routinely operated as a batch system with one to four columns in use.

Continuous on-stream activity monitoring is provided to detect bed exhaustion and final product activity. Samples of the decontaminated solution are collected to ensure that an adequate process decontamination factor (DF) is achieved.

When it is determined that an ion exchange column requires media replacement (as confirmed high cesium concentrations in the lead column effluent or by reaching allowable throughput dictated by criticality control), the process solution at the top of the column is flushed back to Tank 8D-2 with water. A remotely-placed plug on the column is then removed and the zeolite is dumped with process water to the bottom of Tank 8D-1. Alternatively, zeolite may be sluiced through a dip tube located inside the column to Tank 8D-I. Any column in the series may be placed off-line and its zeolite discharged and replaced.

Following a final rinse, the column is recharged with approximately 3,600 pounds of fresh zeolite. The zeolite is loaded into a water-filled batching tank, backwashed to remove fines, and charged into the columns as a water slurry.

B.6.3.2.3 Final Filtration Decontaminated solution exiting the last column in series is filtered to remove zeolite fines that could recontaminate the process. This filter is a sand bed type that may require periodic changeout of the filter medium. Instrumentation and valving are provided to ensure a clear decontaminated process solution. Sand bed removal and flushing is performed remotely. Spent sand is discharged to the bottom of Tank 8D-I in the same manner as the ion exchange columns.

B.6.3.2.4 Decontaminated Solution Collection and Transfer Filtered and decontaminated solution is fed to the original spare THOREX high-level waste storage tank 8D-3 from the STS postfilter. This 57,000 L (15,000 gal) tank serves as both intermediate storage and as a sampling tank. Continuous on-stream activity monitoring and periodic sampling ensures that decontaminated solution transferred to the CSS meets waste form specifications. A recycle line to Tank 8D-2 allows additional decontamination of the solution if required. Decontaminated SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 189 of 393 solution is batch-transferred to the LWTS from Tank 8D-3 via a doubly-contained stainless steel pipe which passes from the tank vault through the STS. From the STS the pipe is routed in a transfer trench which passes in front of the Main Plant and into the Liquid Waste Cell, through a shielded pipe chase in the PPC and into the UPC to Tank 5D-15B.

B.6.3.3 High-level Waste Transfer The High-Level Waste Transfer System is designed to transfer liquid waste in Tank 8D 4 and spent zeolite in Tank 8D-1 to Tank 8D-2. The combined wastes, which were transferred to Tank 8D-2 prior to the startup of vitrification operations, are mixed to achieve homogeneity and transferred to the vitrification system to serve as vit feed material. Slurry transfer to the Vitrification Facility and subsequent vitrification processes are described in WVNS-SAR-003.

Wastes contained in Tank 8D-4 are transferred to Tank 8D-2 through the use of transfer pump (55-G-013), which is inserted in the Tank 8D-4 riser. From Tank 8D-4, waste is transferred to Tank 8D-2 through the 8Q-4 pump pit to the 8Q-1 pump pit via the transfer trench, and through the 8Q-1 pump pit to the 8Q-2 pump pit to the tank, again via the transfer trench. The routing of this transfer trench through the WTF is shown in Figure B.5.2-8.

B.6.3.3.1 Zeolite Mobilization and Transfer Prior to Vitrification startup operations, approximately 60,000 - 65,000 kg of spent zeolite resin remaining in the bottom of Tank 8D-1 following completion of supernatant and sludge wash treatment was mobilized and transferred to Tank 8D-2 to be mixed with the PUREX sludge and THOREX waste already in the tank. Mobilization of zeolite in Tank 8D-I is effected through the use of up to five zeolite mobilization pumps shown in Figure B.5.2-1. The trusses spanning Tank 8D-1 were designed to support seven pumps. Mobilization pumps are mounted in risers that extend into the tank. Pumps and nozzles (which are located just above the bottom of Tank 8D-1 as shown in Figure B.5.2-3), are similar in design and operation to the SMWS mobilization pumps located in Tank 8D-2 (see Section B.6.3.1).

Under normal operating conditions, the pump and its supporting elements (e.g.,

column, drive shaft, and motor) do not produce added vertical loads on the original tank vault roof or internal steel tank, nor does the jet impingement load from pump nozzle under normal operation compromise the structural integrity of the tank internal support structure (column supports) or breach the tank wall or bottom barriers (Gates, W.E., December, 1987).

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 190 of 393 Zeolite removal is accomplished in batch transfers through the'use of the vertical turbine pump 55-G-012. Zeolite slurry is pumped at a nominal flow rate of 75 gpm (110 gpm maximum) to in-line size reduction grinding equipment located in pit 8Q-2.

(Grinding is necessary due to the difference in optimum zeolite size for STS processing and that for vitrification.)

A permanent transfer line flush system is provided for each of the three pump pits to permit prompt flushing of the HLW transfer lines. This flush system includes a (500 gal) break tank and a discharge pump to supply demineralized flush water to each of the pits for flushing the transfer lines in the trench or the pit jumpers. The utility flush system is connected to the STS utility air supply for air drying jumpers after flushing and prior to jumper removal. In the event of plugging or suspected plugging, this independent system supplies utility water to clear the line.

However, each transfer line can be flushed with utility water to keep the transfer lines clean, thereby reducing the potential for line plugging. A minimum of two line volumes at a design flow rate of 80 gpm may be used in the flush.

B.6.4 Waste Concentration and Solidification B.6.4.1 IRTS Liquid Waste Treatment The Liquid Waste Treatment System has been designed to concentrate process solutions received from the STS and byproduct solutions from vitrification operations, such as CFMT off-gas condensates, that are sent directly to LWTS feed Tank 8D-3.

Concentrates produced in the LWTS then are recycled to Tank 8D-2 or serve as feed to the Cement Solidification System where they are solidified in cement for storage.

B.6.4.1.1 Feed Handling The LWTS has been designed to receive product solution transferred from Tank 8D-3, which serves as the STS product tank, in any of three vessels all located in the Main Plant building. The primary evaporator feed tank, 5D-15B, is located in the Uranium Product Cell and has a capacity of 57,000 L (15,000 gal).

During vitrification operations the LWTS processes condensates received from the Vitrification Facility. Condensate from the Vessel Vent Header condenser in the Vitrification Facility flows by gravity to Tank 8D-3, is processed by the LWTS, then is returned to Tank 8D-2.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 191 of 393 A series of valves and piping in the Uranium Loadout Pump Niche in the Main Plant allow the contents of Tank 5D-15B to be pumped directly to the evaporator or to Tank 5D-15AI.

B.6.4.1.2 Evaporator Concentrates and Distillate Handling Operation of the LWTS evaporator generates two separate streams: a concentrates stream which is pumped to Tank 5D-15A2 and an overheads stream which is decontaminated and transferred to the LLWTS for processing.

Evaporator Startup Feed in the LWTS is processed on a campaign basis. Process solution is fed to the evaporator from Tank 5D-15B at a nominal rate of 6-8 gpm (see Figure B.6.1-1). In start-up mode, evaporator condensates flow to the start-up side of the evaporator distillate surge tank. The evaporator remains in the recirculation mode while an overheads sample is analyzed to ensure that alpha/beta levels are acceptable for discharge to interceptors, at which point the distillate is sent to the run side of the distillate surge tank. The evaporation rate in the evaporator is regulated by a flow valve which controls steam supply to the evaporator. A constant concentrates level in the evaporator is maintained through the use of a specific gravity controller which controls operation of the evaporator concentrates pump.

Distillate Handling Evaporator overheads pass through three reflux-inactive bubble cap trays and a high efficiency deentrainer wire mesh to extract liquid mists. An internal water spray is available to wash down the wire mesh to prevent a high differential pressure from developing across the mesh. Collected distillate is sent to the run side of the distillate surge tank where it is pumped to the zeolite ion exchanger (71-D-003).

This ion exchanger is equipped with a differential pressure transmitter and an effluent radiation monitor. Instrument readout and alarms are located on the LWTS Control Panel. The distillate continues to the mercury abatement system (see Figure B.6.1-2). The system consists of two mercury-specific ion exchange columns downstream of the Zeolite ion exchanger. The typical operational mode will be to have the two columns operating in series in a lead/polishing configuration.

Installation of these two columns is a system refinement needed to meet anticipated environmental release limits. Following monitoring, the liquid is routed to the LLWTS interceptors for treatment at the LLWTS and subsequent release to the environment.

Off-spec solutions (solutions having gross beta concentrations greater than 5E-03 gCi/mL) are diverted to Tank 5D-15B.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 192 of 393 Concentrates Handling When the specific gravity set point is reached, concentrate flow from the evaporator to the collection tank is established. Evaporator concentrates leave the evaporator at approximately 105'C (220 'F). Concentrates are cooled to approximately 35 0 C (95

'F) by a concentrates cooler (71-E-005) before being pumped to Tank 5D-15AI or Tank 5D-15A2 for storage prior to transfer to Tank 8D-1, Tank 8D-2, CSS, or Vitrification.

B.6.4.1.3 Evaporator Acid Wash After extended periods of evaporator operation it may be necessary to perform a cleaning operation to remove accumulated solids. The solids increase radiation background near the evaporator, lower its boiling capacity and accumulate fissile isotopes in the evaporator scale or sludge in the bottom head. Solids form as a result of chemical changes to dissolved salts as they are heated. Removal of these salts requires dissolution through the use of up to 2M nitric acid (<12%).

As indicated in Section B.8.7, criticality is not a concern during evaporator cleaning. However, approximately one gram per liter of boron (as boric acid) may be added to the nitric acid to act as a neutron poison for fissile isotopes should calculations of fissile material concentration indicate the potential for high concentrations. The cleaning solution is placed in the evaporator and heated until sampling results reflect limited effectiveness of further scale dissolution.

Condensate is returned to the evaporator to maintain a constant liquid level. The dissolved solids solution is cooled and transferred to a holding tank for sampling.

This solution is routed to Tank 8D-2 following pH adjustment, or Vit.

During evaporator cleaning, airborne concentrations of NO, and nitric acid fumes discharged from the Main Plant stack are less than 36 ppm and 5 ppb, respectively, over a four-hour period (Burn, P, April 26, 1991). No impact on the integrity of the HEPA filters is expected at such low nitric acid vapor concentrations.

B.6.4.2 Cement Solidification System The Cement Solidification System (CSS) provides for the solidification of liquid low level radioactive wastes. The CSS has not been in active operation since the completion of Tank 8D-2 supernatant/sludge wash solution processing in 1995; however, it is available for solidification of future IRTS waste streams, if required. When the CSS is operational, waste received in Tank 70D-001 is metered into one of two high-shear mixers where it is combined with dry Portland cement and additives necessary to aid in producing an acceptable solidified waste form. The waste is then SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 193 of 393 mixed at high speed and discharged to a 269 L (71 gal) square steel drum. Filled drums are evaluated for surface contamination and staged for loadout.

B.6.4.2.1 Feed Preparation and Mixing When the CSS is used to solidify concentrated liquid waste produced by the LWTS, concentrates transferred from Tank 5D-15A1 or 5D-15A2 in the LWTS are received in Tank 70D-001, located in the Waste Dispensing Cell of the 01-14 building. The CSS maintains two high-shear mixers in the CSS Process Cell for the processing of low level waste concentrates. At the initiation of a mix cycle, concentrates are transferred by a metering pump from Tank 70D-001 to the on-line mixer operating on high speed. When the appropriate amount of waste has been transferred to the mixer the metering pump is placed in recirculation mode to maintain an homogenous mixture in the feed tank. The mixer is then placed on low speed and dry Portland cement is added to the mixer via a gravimetric feeder which feeds cement from a day bin located on the second floor of the 01-14 Building.

Process parameters are determined by the type of waste to be solidified and are controlled automatically. Process solution and cement are metered into the on-line mixer, which runs continuously after the process solution has been added. The batch is mixed for a duration which depends upon the type of waste and discharged into the drum. The process is then repeated, filling the drum with two batches.

Approximately 125 L (33 gal) of waste/cement mixture are processed per batch.

The CSS cold chemical system provides for the addition of cement recipe enhancers to waste in the high shear mixers. A 5,700 L (1,500 gal) bulk storage tank, 1,160 L (300 gal) day tank, and an air-operated diaphragm pump located in the CSS Change Room are used for the delivery of sodium silicate. Antifoaming agents, used to minimize void spaces in the waste/cement mixture, are provided from polyethylene bottles located in the Clean Drum Room via electric diaphragm metering pumps.

B.6.4.2.2 Drum Handling and Positioning Empty 269 L (71 gal) square drums are manually loaded onto gravity conveyors located in the Clean Drum Room east of the CSS/LWTS Control Room. Drums on the gravity conveyors are automatically pulled onto a north-south oriented conveyor by a pneumatic/hydraulic drum grabber, and passed through an airlock onto the drum staging conveyor in the Process Cell, and on to the fill station conveyor. At the fill station the drum lid is removed and a fill head descends into the drum for drum filling. After the drum is filled, the fill nozzle is removed, the lid is replaced SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 194 of 393 and the drum is transferred to the lid crimp station. (The fill station is also capable of receiving and returning drums from the flush drum station conveyor.)

Full drums are sealed at the lid crimp station and the drum is then transferred to the smear station for evaluation of external drum contamination. Drums with unacceptable levels of contamination may be manually decontaminated. Acceptable drums are transferred through an airlock to a staging conveyor for transfer to a loadout conveyor. At the loadout conveyor drums are transferred to a shielded cask truck for transport to the Drum Cell for storage (see Section B.6.8).

B.6.4.2.3 Mixer Flush System Provisions have been made in the CSS for mixer flushing to prevent the accumulation of cement in the mixers. Flushing is achieved through the addition of utility water to the mixers which are then operated at high speed. Flush solutions are then either returned to the mixer for solidification in cement or sent to a conventional 208 L (55 gal) flush drum for settling with free water decanted to Tank 7D-13. The flush drum is reused until it is approximately half full, at which time it is sampled and the contents stabilized through the addition of dry cement.

B.6.4.2.4 Dry Cement Storage and Transfer 3

The CSS Silo, located east of the CSS Control Room, provides bulk storage for 70 m (1.4E5 ft 3 ) of dry cement. Dry cement delivered to the site by truck is transferred pneumatically to the bulk storage silo. Transfer air exits the silo through a dust filter on the top of the silo. A dense phase transmitter (pressure pot) located directly under the silo is gravity filled from the silo and provides transfer of dry 3 3 cement from the silo to the 0.42 m (8.9E2 ft ) day bin in the 01-14 Building through the use of dried, pressurized air.

B.6.5 Process Support Systems B.6.5.1 Instrumentation and Control Systems STS Instrumentation and Control The STS control panel provides the principle method of process control for the STS.

A laboratory information management system (LIMS) provides control system support.

The STS control panel and LIMS are designed to operate independently without loss of function if the other panel fails. There are no interconnections between the STS and the LIMS.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 195 of 393 From the STS control panel the operator can remotely monitor the major aspects of the system through panel mounted instrumentation. This includes a panel- mounted graphic display flow diagram. The control panel allows for safe operation with an alarm system that alerts the operators to any abnormal condition. A summary of major process instrumentation for the STS/SMWS is found in Table B.6.5-1.

HLWTS Instrument and Control Instrumentation is provided for the HLWTS to monitor process variables and provide both automatic and manual control of the processing equipment. The majority of instruments are connected to a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) to provide local read-out and automatic control of key process variables at the HLWTS control station.

Valve position switches indicating open or closed provide electrical signals to the PLC for interlock controls. Removal pumps may be operated with variable speed motor controllers to control the waste transfer. In-line pressure switches and flow meters are used to monitor the transfer.

At the control station, the operator can remotely monitor the major aspects of the transfer operation. The control station provides an alarm system which that alerts operators to an abnormal condition. Process conditions are monitored from panel mounted instrumentation including a panel-mounted graphic display flow diagram which indicates the position of valves and the status of motors and storage tanks. Various electrical interlocks additionally ensure safe operation during any transfer operation.

Monitoring of the zeolite and sludge mobilization pumps occurs at the Motor Control Center (MCC) in the PVS building within the WTF. The mobilization pumps are operated using variable speed controllers to allow gradual starting of the pumps. Appropriate interlocks have been supplied to stop the pump on loss of utility water, high seal water leakage, or high pump amperage.

LWTS Instrumentation and Control LWTS process instrumentation and control systems are designed to provide the primary indications of off-standard operating conditions. Instruments used for process control are designed to fail safe. LWTS instrumentation and controls have been designed to ensure that:

• The LWTS can be started, operated, monitored, and shut down from a single, centralized remote control area.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 196 of 393

"* Remotely operated valves have position indicators on the control panel when the panel is energized.

"* System instrumentation provides indications and/or annunciation (alarm) of abnormal conditions.

"* Process signals, alarms, interlocks, automatic process control, specific access, redundancy, and means for calibration (e.g., pressure taps, or procedures for instrument removal) have been provided for.

CSS Instrumentation and Controls From the CSS control panel, operators can remotely monitor and control the major aspects of the system. The panel alarm system alerts operators to an abnormal condition. A panel-mounted graphic display flow diagram indicates the positions of solenoid-activated valves and the status of motors.

In addition to the primary panel, two smaller wall-mounted panels are used to control flow of cement to the gravimetric feed system and to control bulk cement filling and transfers. These panels allow for manual control of these operations.

B.6.5.2 System and Component Spares Due to the relatively short duration of the IRTS process (<15 years), problems associated with major component failure due to factors such as fatigue and corrosion are expected to be minimal. Therefore, on-site storage of spares for most major IRTS processing components is not provided. However, spares for selected components particularly susceptible to failure such as pumps, valves, and jumpers are maintained on-site as backups.

B.6.6 IRTS and Main Plant Control Rooms IRTS and Main Plant operations are conducted from several individual control rooms located throughout the site, as shown in Figure B.6.6-1. Control of the STS is from a control room located in the STS Support Building. SMWS and HLWTS operations are conducted from a shared control room located in the PVS Building. In a like manner, operation of the LWTS and CSS is from a shared control room in the CSS 01-14 Building addition. Drum Cell operations are conducted from a control room on the east side of the Drum Cell building as shown in Figure B.5.2.32. Vessel, sump and ventilation operations associated with the Main Plant are conducted from a control room located on the fourth floor of the Main Plant building.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 197 of 393 All control rooms have been designed for continuous occupancy and are provided with operation and alarm panels that are clearly labelled. Programmatic and human factors considerations associated with control room operations are discussed in Section B.10.1.2.

B.6.7 Sampling-Analytical B.6.7.1 Samplinq STS Sampling Capabilities Routine samples of various process solutions are remotely extracted from sampling ports in the valve aisle for radiochemical analysis. Up to a 50 mL sample is collected in a sample vial which is then remotely placed into a transfer "rabbit" for pneumatic transfer to the Analytical Laboratory sample cell via the Pneumatic Transfer System. The Pneumatic Transfer System is also used to transfer vitrification feed and product samples, as discussed in WVNS-SAR-003.

LWTS Samplina Capabilities Samples of LWTS feed may be collected from Tank 8D-3 in the Waste Tank Farm or 5D-15B in the Uranium Product Cell in the Main Plant building. Though LWTS product (concentrates) were formerly sampled from Tank 5D-15AI or 5D-15A2, Tank 5D-15AI is currently configured as a feed tank.

CSS Sampling Capabilities Though the CSS is currently deactivated, analytical requirements for CSS feed were formerly satisfied through analyses of samples collected from the LWTS product Tank 5D-15AI or 5D-15A2.

Nonroutine Sampling Activities In support of WVDP mission goals, nonroutine sampling is periodically required for waste or site characterization purposes. These activities are performed per approved work procedures which incorporate worker health and safety requirements given in WVDP-010 and WVDP-011.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 198 of 393 B.6.7.2 WVDP Analytical Capabilities WVNS has a well-equipped analytical laboratory to support IRTS, Vitrification, and general operations at the WVDP site. The facilities are located on the third floor of the Main Plant Building, the east side of the Main Warehouse, and the east side of the Environmental Analytical Annex and include six analytical hot cells for the preparation of radioactive samples; two analytical hot laboratories, equipped with fourteen fume hoods, for the preparation or separation of radioactive samples; five gloveboxes for the transfer of samples; and several nonradiological laboratories and hoods used for the storage, preparation, and analysis of nonradiological samples.

Analytical equipment in the laboratory facilities includes the following: two inductively-coupled plasma atomic emission spectrophotometers (ICP-AES); four high purity intrinsic germanium photon detectors; a planar high purity intrinsic germanium photon detector; two single chamber, low background, alpha/beta counter; sixteen silicon charged particle detectors; liquid scintillation counter, ion chromatograph, and other general analytical equipment required for elemental, ionic, and physical characteristic analysis (e.g. densitometer, pH meter).

All aqueous radioactive laboratory wastes are routed to Tank 8D-2 or the LLWTS interceptors (depending on activity) via drains in the hoods of the radiochemistry laboratories and the floors of the hot cells. Hazardous organic radioactive laboratory wastes are collected in approved satellite accumulation areas prior to disposal. Solid radioactive wastes are double-bagged and turned over to Waste Management for disposal.

B.6.8 Product Handlinq The final component of the Integrated Radwaste Treatment System, the Drum Cell, provides storage for the 269 L (71-gal) square drums of Class-C low-level cemented waste produced in the Cement Solidification System. Currently, approximately 19,877 drums of low-level waste are stored in the Drum Cell.

As discussed in Section B.6.4.2.2, full 269 L (71-gal) drums produced by the CSS are passed through the Process Cell airlock to a shuttle table which places drums in an array for transfer to the lift table. When an 8-drum array has accumulated on the loadout conveyor, the drums are transferred to a shielded cask truck for transport to the Drum Cell.

At the Drum Cell, the cask truck engages a conveyor and transfers the drums from the shielded cask to the Drum Cell conveyor. Following loadout, a bridge-mounted crane SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 199 of 393 is used to lift the drums from the conveyor and transport them to their stacking location. At the stacking location the drum identification number is recorded and the corresponding bridge, trolley, and hoist storage coordinates for each drum are recorded.

Operations in the Drum Cell are conducted remotely from a control room located on the east end of the Drum Cell building. Operations within the Drum Cell are indicated on a control panel and are visually verified through the use of a closed circuit television system.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 200 of 393 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.6.0 Bray, L. A. December, 1990. Evaluation and Selection of a Process to Remove Plutonium from West Valley High-Level Waste Sludge Wash Water. Draft C.

Burn, P. April 26, 1991. NYSDEC Stack Release Permit Modification for LWTS Evaporator Cleaning. Memo EQ:91:0055 to G. G. Baker.

Gates, W.E. December, 1987. 8D-I Waste Mobilization Pump Confinement Barrier Integrity Review.

April, 1991. 8D-2 Sludge Mobilization System Confinement Barrier Integrity Review. Subcontract No. 19-CWV-21511, Task 10.

U.S. Department of Energy. Occupational Radiation Protection, 10 CFR 835.

_ February 8, 1990. Change 2 (January 7, 1993.) DOE Order 5400.5:

Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment. Washington, D.C.: U.S.

Department of Energy.

_ July 9, 1990. Change 1 (May 18, 1992.) DOE Order 5480.19: Conduct of Operations Requirements for DOE Facilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.

November 15, 1994. DOE Order 5480.20A: Personnel Selection, Qualification, and Training Requirements for DOE Nuclear Facilities. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.

_ DOE Order 440.1: Worker Protection Management for DOE Federal and Contractor Employees. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Energy.

West Valley Nuclear Services Co. WVDP-010: WVDP Radiological Controls Manual.

(Latest Revision.) West Valley Nuclear Services Co., Inc.

_ WVDP-011: Industrial Hygiene and Safety Manual. (Latest Revision.)

West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

_ WVDP-019: Annual Waste Management Plan. (Latest Revision.) West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 201 of 393 REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER B.6.0 (concluded)

WVDP-073: WVDP Hazardous Waste Management Plan. (Latest Revision.)

West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

_ WVDP-106: Westinghouse Conduct of Operations. (Latest Revision.) West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

Safety Analysis Report WVNS-SAR-003: Safety Analysis Report for Vitrification Operations and High-Level Waste Interim Storage. (Latest Revision.)

West Valley Nuclear Services Co.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 202 of 393 TABLE B.6.5-1 STS PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM: Supernatant Treatment System (STS)

SECTION: Supernatant Filtration and Cooling INDICATOR LOCATION FUNCTION/FEATURES Liquid HLW tank 8D-2 Monitor liquid level for process control.

Level Supernatant feed All instruments equipped with high level tank 50-D-001 alarms except tank 8D-2.

Valve aisle sump The valve aisle sump level instruments have low level alarms.

Process line secondary Tank 50-D-001 high-high level alarm is containment interlocked with supernatant feed pump 50 G-001 to shut off the pump and prevent overfilling D-001.

Temperature Supernatant cooler Monitor and control temperature of 50-E-001 inlet and supernatant and brine cooling medium for outlet proper process operation.

Brine chiller There are high and low temperature alarms 50-E-002 inlet and on the brine chiller effluent and on the outlet supernatant cooler effluent.

Flow Supernatant line The supernatant and water flow instruments tank 50-D-001 are an integral part of process control.

Demineralized water The dilution of supernatant with water line to tank controls the salt and cesium concentration.

50-D-001 Bubbler probe lines The water flow instrument and the 50-D-001 to tank 50-D-001 bubbler probe flow instrument are equipped with low flow alarms.

Pressure Inlet and effluent These instruments serve process control to Supernatant functions such as monitoring differential filter 50-F-001 pressure across the supernatant filter 50 F-001, pump operation and tank pressure.

Discharge of feed pump Alarms of high differential pressure across 50-G-002 the filter and low pressure on pump 50-G 002 discharge are provided.

Tank 50-D-001 SAR:0000877.01

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 203 of 393 TABLE B.6.5-1 (continued)

STS PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM: Supernatant Treatment System (STS)

SECTION: Ion Exchange INDICATOR LOCAT ION FUNCTION! FEATURES Liquid Level Column vent/air These conductivity level pressurization line on instruments indicate the jumper in STS valve aisle columns are full of liquid; no variable level reading.

Temperature Upper, middle and lower Monitor column temperatures area of the ion exchange at three levels.

columns High temperature alarms are provided as warning signals to take steps to prevent the zeolite from becoming excessively hot due to radioactive decay heat.

Pressure Inlet feed line to the Monitors column pressure columns on a valve aisle which can indicate fouling jumper of the zeolite.

Radiation Detection Column bottom outlet Used for control of the effluent line process by monitoring and limiting the radioactivity of the column effluent liquid in the line.

These instruments are equipped with a high radiation alarm and a warning alarm normally preset at a lower level.

Flow Sluice/liftwater header Monitors the flow of sluice to all columns water to the columns during regeneration of the column.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 204 of 393 TABLE B.6.5-1 (continued)

STS PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM: Supernatant Treatment System (STS)

SECTION: Final Filtration and Storage INDICATOR LOCATION FUNCTION! FEATURE Liquid Decontaminated Monitor tank liquid level, also provide Level supernatant collection secondary method of determining flow rate tank 8D-3 through STS system.

Instrument equipped with high and low level alarms.

Pressure Inlet and outlet lines Monitor inlet, outlet, and differential to the decontaminated pressure across the filter to indicate supernatant-filter 50- fouling or plugging.

F-002 on jumpers in the STS valve aisle - inlet and outlet linked to read differential across filter.

Flow Outlet of the filter on Monitor and control the flow rate through a jumper in the STS the ion exchange columns and valve aisle. decontaminated supernatant filter.

This instrument is connected to a flow totalizer, which measures the total flow.

Radiation Outlet line of filter Monitor radiation levels of the lines.

Detection 50-F-002 on jumper in STS valve aisle. Both instruments are equipped with a high radiation alarm and a warning alarm Discharge line of normally preset at a lower Level.

decontaminated supernatant pump 50-G- The high radiation alarms are interlocked 007 on jumper in STS with auto valves to redirect or stop flow valve aisle. in the event of alarm.

The high alarm on filter 50-F-002 effluent changes the position of a three way valve which delivers flow to tank 8D 3 to deliver flow back to tank 50-D-001.

The high alarm on the discharge of pump 50-G-007 closes the discharge valve to the liquid waste treatment system (LWTS).

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 205 of 393 TABLE B.6.5-1 (continued)

STS PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM: Sludge Mobilization and Wash System (SMWS)

INDICATOR LOCAT ION FUNCTION /FEATURES Pump Speed Pump motor control panel Measures frequency to indicate in PVS building pump speed during sludge mobilization.

Amperage Pump motor control panel Monitors amperage to indicate in PVS building relative pump operating conditions.

Time Pump motor control panel Indicates the time the pump in PVS building has been operated.

Radiation Individual pump enclosure Monitors the pump column for Detection radioactive contamination.

High radiation activates the external pump enclosure visual alarm and horn.

Temperature Individual pump enclosure Monitors pump enclosure temperature to detect abnormal conditions.

High and low temperature activates the external visual alarm and horn.

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 206 of 393 TABLE B.6.5-1 (continued)

STS PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM: Supernatant Treatment System (STS)

SECTION: Final Filtration and Storage INiDICATOR LOCATION FUNCTION/FEATURE Liquid Decontaminated Monitor tank liquid level, also provide Level supernatant collection secondary method of determining flow rate tank 8D-3 through STS system.

Instrument equipped with high and low level alarms.

Pressure Inlet and outlet lines Monitor inlet, outlet, and differential to the decontaminated pressure across the filter to indicate supernatant filter 50- fouling or plugging.

F-002 on jumpers in the STS valve aisle - inlet and outlet linked to read differential across filter.

Flow Outlet of the filter on Monitor and control the flow rate through a jumper in the STS the ion exchange columns and valve aisle. decontaminated supernatant filter.

This instrument is connected to a flow totalizer, which measures the total flow.

Radiation Outlet line of filter Monitor radiation levels of the lines.

Detection 50-F-002 on jumper in STS valve aisle. Both instruments are equipped with a high radiation alarm and a warning alarm Discharge line of normally preset at a lower level.

decontaminated supernatant pump 50-G- The high radiation alarms are interlocked 007 on jumper in STS with auto valves to redirect or stop flow valve aisle. in the event of alarm.

The high alarm on filter 50-F-002 effluent changes the position of a three way valve which delivers flow to tank 8D 3 to deliver flow back to tank 50-D-001.

The high alarm on the discharge of pump 50-G-007 closes the discharge valve to the liquid waste treatment system (LWTS).

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 Page 207 of 393 TABLE B.6.5-1 (concluded)

STS PROCESS INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM: Zeolite Transfer System INDICATOR LOCAT ION FUNCTION/FEATURES Pump Speed Monitor on pump shaft in Measure frequency to indicate pump pit. pump speed during zeolite transfer.

Pump Flow Monitor on jumper in pump Monitors the flow rate from pit. Tank 8D-1 to Tank 8D-2.

The instrument is connected to a flow totalizer which measures the total flow.

Pump Pressure Monitor on jumper in pump Monitors pump discharge pit. pressure to detect abnormal conditions.

Pump Temperature Monitor on pump motor in Monitors pump enclosure pump pit. temperature to detect abnormal conditions.

Amperage Instrument at pump motor Monitors amperage to indicate control center in PVS relative pump operating building, conditions.

Radiation Utility pits adjacent to Monitors contamination Detection pump pits 8Q-1 and 8Q-2. potentially backing up into high level waste transfer flush line.

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WVNS-SAR--002 Rev. 8 Page 208 of 393 SR2861 -1 DWG REF.9OWJ-1363 SUPERNATANT TREATMENT SYSTEM -i2861TI

.DWG; WASTE MOBILIZATION & TRANSFER SEDE OUIPLED C ANAL ~CAL "HT LAS DRAINS SYSTEM Ii\

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STS & N6J15 USE THE SAME NAPL OT TAP -\. TRANSPORT SYSTEM COMPONENTSON A TIME SEQUENCINGBASS. (069)

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Transfer, and Pneumatic Sample Transport Systems

WVNS- SAR- 002 Rev. 8 SR2B61-2.DWG Page 209 of 393 REF. 900J-1363 LIQUID WASTE TREATMENT SYSTEM (071)

FOR REFERENCE ONLY - NOT TO SCALE Figure B.6.1-2. IRTS Process Flow Diagram - Liquid Waste Treatment System L

/

WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR2B61-3.[DWG Page 210 of 393 REF. 900J-1363 PORTLAND CEMENT CEMENT SOLIDIFICATION SYSTEM (070) (l* IINSTRUMN 200/070-001 070/031-001 031/070-005 031/070-001 t 03/7-004 EMINERAUZED

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WVNS-SAR-002 Rev. 8 SR2B66-I.DWG Page 211 of 393

-SMWS/HLWTS CONTROL ROOM

..........+

FRS IL 0

.. ROQM .....

0 50 100 200 FT

"-* GRAPHIC SCALE Figure B.6.6-1. Control Room Locations