|
|---|
Category:Memoranda
MONTHYEARML23129A6062023-05-0404 May 2023
Special Inspection Team Charters to Evaluate the Circumstances Surrounding the Ground Settling at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
ML23044A3662023-02-15015 February 2023
Calendar Year 2022 Reactor Oversight Process Baseline Inspection Program Completion - Region III
ML21096A2282021-03-30030 March 2021
FEMA Disapproval of Davis-Besse Exercise Exemption
ML19182A3562019-07-23023 July 2019
Quarterly Report on the Status of Public Petitions Under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Section 2.206 - April 1 to June 30, 2019
ML19162A0102019-06-0707 June 2019
Memorandum to File Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact for Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company'S Decommissioning Funding Plan Submitted in Accordance with 10 CFR 72.30(B) and 72.30(C) for Davis Besse ISFSI
ML16088A2052016-03-28028 March 2016
Enclosure 1 - (72.30 DFP Reviews to Be Completed 2015) - Memo T Bowers from s Ruffin, Technial Assistance Requests - Review 2015 Tri-Annual Decommissioning Funding Plans for Multiple Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations
ML16088A2042016-03-28028 March 2016
Memo T Bowers from s Ruffin, Technical Assistance Requests - Review 2015 Tri-Annual Decommissioning Funding Plans for Multiple Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installations W/ Encl 2 (Template)
ML15205A1692015-08-0707 August 2015
ACRS Review of the Davis Besse Nuclear Plant LRA - Transmittal of the Sser
ML15182A1912015-07-16016 July 2015
Annual Financial Test for a Parent Company Guarantee Given by Firstenergy Solutions Corporation and Firstenergy Corporation
ML15089A1642015-04-27027 April 2015
Summary of February 25, 2015, Partially Closed Meeting with Industry Stakeholders Regarding the Babcock and Wilcox Loss of Coolant Accident Evaluation Model Analysis
IR 05000334/20004122014-07-0808 July 2014
NRC Staff'S Spot-Check Review of First Energy Nuclear Operating Company'S Ownership Interest in Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2, Perry, and Davis-Besse, Docket No. 05000334, 05000412, 05000440, and 05000346, on June 10, 2014-Finding of No Pote
ML14099A4642014-05-0606 May 2014
Summary of Public Meetings to Discuss Draft Supplement 52 to the Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants Regarding Davis-Besse Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 1
ML13280A9062013-10-21021 October 2013
Forthcoming Meeting with Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) to Discuss Voluntary Risk Informed Fire Protection Amendment for Davis-Besse
ML13142A5122013-07-0202 July 2013
Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on May 21, 2013, Between NRC and Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company, Concerning RAI Pertaining to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, LRA
ML13171A2922013-06-13013 June 2013
LTR-13-0540 - Bill Hawkins and Vinod Arora Email San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) Lessons Learn for Davis-Besse
ML13154A4442013-06-0404 June 2013
Rai'S Following Ifib Analysis of Fenoc'S 2013 Decommissioning Funding Status Report for Davis-Besse and Perry
ML12199A2072012-07-17017 July 2012
Public Meeting Notice to Discuss the 2011 End-of-Cycle Performance Assessment
ML12158A4002012-06-0808 June 2012
6/26/2012 Forthcoming Meeting Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC)
ML1206901652012-03-0909 March 2012
Memo - Summary of Public Meeting with Industry Regarding Pwrog'S Boric Acid Corrosion Test Program
ML12018A1652012-01-27027 January 2012
Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on November 9, 2011, Between the NRC and Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company, Concerning RAI Pertaining to the Davis-Besse, LRA
ML14028A5462012-01-25025 January 2012
NRC Telecon Regarding Davis-Besse License Renewal Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis Questions
ML11363A1712012-01-23023 January 2012
Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on December 12, 2011 Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company, Concerning Request for Additional Information
ML11355A0952011-12-29029 December 2011
Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on December 8, 2011, Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company, Concerning RAIs Pertaining to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, LRA
ML11348A0212011-12-21021 December 2011
Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on November 1, 2011 Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company, Concerning Requests for Additional Information Pertaining to the Davis Besse Nuclear Pow
ML11341A1182011-12-14014 December 2011
Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on June 15, 2011 Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company, Concerning Requests for Additional Information Pertaining to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power
ML11339A0862011-12-13013 December 2011
Summary of Telephone Conference Call Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company, Concerning RAIs Pertaining to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station LRA
ML11327A0082011-12-0202 December 2011
Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on September 29, 2011, Between the NRC and Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company, Concerning RAI Pertaining to the Davis-Besse, LRA
ML11327A0792011-12-0202 December 2011
Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on Between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company, Concerning Requests for Additional Information Pertaining to the Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station
ML11327A0872011-12-0202 December 2011
Summary of Telephone Conference Call Held on July 27, 2011, Between the NRC and Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company Concerning RAI Pertaining to the Davis-Besse, LRA
ML11279A2182011-10-0606 October 2011
Memo - Task Interface Agreement - Evaluation of Compliance with Code for Examination of Flange Stud Holes on the Replacement Vessel Head at the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (TIA 2011-015)
ML11242A0032011-09-12012 September 2011
Summary of Conference Call Held on August 4, 2011, Between the NRC and FENOC Concerning Requests for Additional Information Pertaining to the Davis-Besse License Renewal Application
ML1122701392011-08-15015 August 2011
Request for Additional Information Response Clarification from Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station in Support of License Renewal Application Review
ML11173A2002011-08-0101 August 2011
Summary of Public Scoping Meetingsconducted Related to the Review of the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, LRA
ML11193A2032011-07-26026 July 2011
Final Response to TIA 2011-001, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Safety-Related Batteries Electrical Separation Design and Licensing Bases
ML11174A2322011-06-21021 June 2011
for the Record-06-21-2011: NRC Ensures Public Safety Through Rigorous Oversight of Nuclear Power Plant Safety Standards
ML1108202762011-06-0303 June 2011
Summary of Site Audit Related to the Review of the License Renewal Application for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1
ML11174A2472011-05-31031 May 2011
for the Record-05-31-2011: NRC Chairman Gregory B. Jaczko'S Statement on Nrc'S Commitment to Safety
ML1110806902011-04-20020 April 2011
Notice of Meeting with First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) to Discuss a Proposed LAR to Delete Technical Specification 5.5.8g, Steam Generator (SG) Program Auxiliary Feedwater Header Inspections
ML1028702612010-10-22022 October 2010
11/04/10 Notice of Meeting to Discuss the License Renewal Process and Environmental Scoping for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station License Renewal Application Review
ML1029106182010-10-14014 October 2010
Documentation of Telephone Conversation Between Mr. David Lochbaum Regarding Follow-Up Questions Related to NRC Letter Dated July 28, 2010 (ML102040807)
ML1028503032010-10-12012 October 2010
Acceptance of License Renewal Application, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
ML0935101922009-12-14014 December 2009
Completion of Davis-Besse Lessons Learned Task Force Recommendation 3.3.4(8)
ML0825606772008-09-15015 September 2008
Presentation Disc
ML0814207532008-05-20020 May 2008
Summary of Public Meeting with Firstenergy Nuclear Operating Company to Discuss the 2008 Davis-Besse End-of-Cycle Performance Assessment
ML0807400842008-03-14014 March 2008
Draft Regulatory Guide for Comment
ML0723302222007-08-28028 August 2007
09/12/2007 Notice of Meeting with Firstenergy to Discuss the August 3, 2007 License Amendment Request for Conversion to Improved Technical Specifications for Davis-Besse, Unit 1
ML0722108432007-08-0707 August 2007
Request for Renewal of Deviation to the Reactor Oversight Process Action Matrix for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
ML0717103462007-06-21021 June 2007
Revised Notice of Meeting with Firstenergy to Discuss Response to Nrc'S 05/14/2007, Demand for Information Regarding Fenoc'S Re-analysis of the Timeline and Root Causes for the 2002 Davis-Besse Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Degradation Event
ML0716202122007-06-13013 June 2007
Notice of Meeting with Firstenergy Regarding May 14, 2007 Demand for Information Davis-Besse
ML0712803322007-05-18018 May 2007
April 2007 Report on the Status of Public Petitions Under Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 Cfr), Section 2.206
2023-05-04
[Table view] |
Text
March 12, 2002 MEMORANDUM TO: Ronald N. Gardner, Chief Electrical Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety FROM: J. E. Dyer /RA/
Regional Administrator
SUBJECT:
AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM CHARTER -
DAVIS BESSE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD MATERIAL LOSS In response to preliminary information provided by the licensee on March 10, 2002, regarding the significant loss of pressure boundary material from the reactor vessel head, an augmented inspection team (AIT) is being sent to the Davis-Besse Plant. You are hereby designated as the AIT leader.
A. Basis On March 6, 2002, during repair activities to control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles, the licensee identified an area of wastage in the reactor pressure vessel head surrounding the No. 3 CRDM nozzle. The licensee initially identified five CRDM nozzles that required repairs due to cracking in the J-groove welds found during the nozzle examinations required by Bulletin 2001-01. Wastage area in the head was discovered when the licensee removed the No. 3 CRDM nozzle, after the penetration tube unexpectedly moved during repair activities.
Because this was a significant unplanned degraded condition having potential generic safety implications, an AIT was initiated in accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation Program." The purpose of the AIT is to better understand the facts and circumstances related to the degradation of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary material. It is also to identify any precursor indications of this condition so that appropriate followup actions can be taken. All followup actions associated with the extent of condition, repairs/replacements, or corrective actions related to plant restart will be covered through other inspection activities.
CONTACT: John A. Grobe, Director, DRS (630) 829-9700
R. Gardner B. Scope Specifically, the augmented inspection team is expected to collect, analyze, and document factual information and evidence sufficiently to address the following:
- 1. The plant history of reactor coolant system operational leakage indications, including trends in unidentified leakage, containment air cooler fouling, containment radiation monitor readings, etc.
- 2. The plant history of reactor vessel head material condition issues, including control rod drive flange leakage or other sources of corrosive substances.
- 3. The plant history of reactor vessel head inspection, including visual inspections, ultrasonic testing, prior video-records of head examinations, reactor vessel head cleaning activities, and licensee action in response to generic correspondence for leakage and degradation of the reactor coolant system.
- 4. Characterization of all reactor vessel head wastage areas, including the best available geometric details of cavity volumes, surface conditions, surface contaminants, etc.
- 5. The probable cause(s) for the vessel head wastage.
C. Guidance This memorandum designates you as the AIT leader. Your duties will be as described in Inspection Procedure 93800, "Augmented Inspection Team." The team composition has been discussed with you directly. During performance of the augmented inspection, designated team members are separated from their normal duties and report directly to you. The team is to emphasize fact-finding in its review of the circumstances surrounding the event, and it is not the responsibility of the team to examine the regulatory process, to determine whether NRC requirements were violated, to address licensee actions related to plant restart, or to address the applicability of generic safety concerns to other facilities. Safety concerns identified that are not directly related to the event should be reported to the Region III office for appropriate action.
The team will report to the site, conduct an entrance meeting, and begin inspection on Tuesday, March 12, 2002. Tentatively, the inspection should be completed by close of business March 22, 2002, with a report documenting the results of the inspection, including findings and conclusions, issued within 30 days of the public exit meeting.
While the team is on site, you will provide daily status briefings to Region III management.
This Charter may be modified should the team develop significant new information that warrants review.
March 12, 2002 MEMORANDUM TO: Ronald N. Gardner, Chief Electrical Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety FROM: J. E. Dyer /RA/
Regional Administrator
SUBJECT:
AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM CHARTER -
DAVIS BESSE REACTOR VESSEL HEAD MATERIAL LOSS In response to preliminary information provided by the licensee on March 10, 2002, regarding the significant loss of pressure boundary material from the reactor vessel head, an augmented inspection team (AIT) is being sent to the Davis-Besse Plant. You are hereby designated as the AIT leader.
A. Basis On March 6, 2002, during repair activities to control rod drive mechanism (CRDM) nozzles, the licensee identified an area of wastage in the reactor pressure vessel head surrounding the No. 3 CRDM nozzle. The licensee initially identified five CRDM nozzles that required repairs due to cracking in the J-groove welds found during the nozzle examinations required by Bulletin 2001-01. Wastage area in the head was discovered when the licensee removed the No. 3 CRDM nozzle, after the penetration tube unexpectedly moved during repair activities.
Because this was a significant unplanned degraded condition having potential generic safety implications, an AIT was initiated in accordance with NRC Management Directive 8.3, "NRC Incident Investigation Program." The purpose of the AIT is to better understand the facts and circumstances related to the degradation of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary material. It is also to identify any precursor indications of this condition so that appropriate followup actions can be taken. All followup actions associated with the extent of condition, repairs/replacements, or corrective actions related to plant restart will be covered through other inspection activities.
CONTACT: John A. Grobe, Director, DRS (630) 829-9700 DOCUMENT NAME: G:DRS\Davis-Besse Augmented Inspe~.wpd To receive a copy of this document, indicate in the box: "C" = Copy without attachment/enclosure "E" = Copy with attachment/enclosure "N" = No copy OFFICE RIII RIII RIII RIII NAME JGavula:sd CLipa JGrobe JDyer DATE 3/12/02 3/12/02 3/12/02 3/12/02 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
