LD-93-014, Forwards Addl Certified Design Descriptions & ITAAC for Sys 80+
| ML20128D716 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | 05200002 |
| Issue date: | 02/01/1993 |
| From: | Brinkman C ABB ATOM, INC. (FORMERLY ASEA ATOM, INC.), ABB COMBUSTION ENGINEERING NUCLEAR FUEL (FORMERLY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| LD-93-014, LD-93-14, NUDOCS 9302100207 | |
| Download: ML20128D716 (153) | |
Text
_ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _
ABB ASE A BROWN BOVE RI February 1, 1993 LD-93-014 Docket 52-002 Attention:
Document Control Desk U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
SYSTEM 80+ Draft ITAU1 Submittal REFERENCE ABB-CE Letter LD-93-012, C.
B.
Brinkman (ABB-CE) to NRC, dated January 28, 1993 Dear Sirst The Reference provided draft SYSTEM 80+
Certified Design Descriptions and associated ITAAC (Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance criteria) and stated that a package comprising the remainder of the initial submittal would be transmitted on or about February 1,
1993.
Accordingly, additional Certified Design Descriptions and ITAAC are enclosed.
The enclosed packages contain the same elements and reflect the same incorporation of industry guidance as the Reference submittal.
Should you have questions on the enclosed material, please contact me or Mr.
John Rec (203-285-2861) or Mr.
George--
Hess (203-285-5218).
Very truly yours, COMBUSTIO ENGINEERING, INC.
M
- c. B. Brinkman Acting Director Nuclear.. Systems Licensing cc R. Borchardt (NRC)
T. Boyce (NRC)
A.. Heymer (NUMARC) 090042 J. Trotter-(EPRI)
T. Wambach (NRC)
ABB Combustion Engineering Nuclear Power j@81Poggggo 2L TcO %.usem
% % 'is b son 3V l
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F' SYSTI?M 80+"
1.3,6 CORE SUPPORT AND REACTOR VESSEL INTERNAL STRUCTURES Design Description The Reactor Vessel Core Support Structures are safety related systems consisting of the Core Support Barrel assembly and Upper Guide Structure assemblics. He core support structures support the fuel assemb!!cs and provide a flow path within the Reactor Pressure Vessel.
Reactor Veuel Internal Structures are all structures within the reactor pressure vessel except the Core Support Structures, fuel, control element assemblics and instrumentation.
He Core Support Barrel (CSD) assembly is suspended from the reactor vessel flange.
He CSD assembly provides support and location positioning for the fuel assembly lour end fittings. He CSU assembly contains internal structures that provide an instrumentation guide path from the lower vessel and hydraulic flow paths through the vessel from the inlet nozzles to the upper end of the fuel assemblies.
nc Upper Guide Structure (UGS) assembly is supported from the CSD upper flange and extends into the CSD assembly to engage the top of the fuel assemblies. The UGS assembly provides an insertion path for the control cleiaent assemblies. The UOS assembly contains internal structures which provide a guide path and lateral support for the upper portion of the control element assemblics and extension shafts in the reactor vessel upper plenum region. He UGS assembly also provides guide paths for heated junction thermocouple assemblies.
A general conceptual illustration of both structures is shown in Figure 1.3.61.
The Core Support Barrel and Upper Guide Structure assemblics are fabricated in accordance with ASME Code Class NF requirements and the Seismic Category I classification.
The Reactor Vessel Core support structures and internal structures withstand the effects of flow induced vibration.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.3.6-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the Core Support and Reactor Vessel Internal Structures.
1.3.6 1-01 28 93 u
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SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 13.61 I
CORE SUPPORT & REACIVR VESSEL INTERNAL STRUCTURES AND CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE MECHANISMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Accentance Criteria Cestified Desien Cominaitaneet Jespections. Tests. Analyses h^
T Oiteria L
A basic conGguration of the Reae.
L Impeciou of the as-built Reactor L-Tbc as-buik a d g - 4 kis of the tor Vessel Core Support Stradures Vessel Core Support SGM-s will Reactor Vessel Core Support is shown in Figure 13.6-1 be performed.
SL M-w is in accordance with Figure L3.6-1 for the components and equipreent sho=u.
2.
The Reador Vessel Core Support 2.
Tests will be performed to subject 2.
The reactor vessel core support Structures and internal structures the Reador Vessel Core Sapport stradores have no visibic signs of withstand the - effects of flow.
Structure to flow induced ds= =ge, loose parts, or nmh induced vibration.
vibration. Visual inspection wiB be wear.
performed on the Reactor Vessel Core Support structure.
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INSTRUMENT GUIDE PATH FIGURE 1.3.6-1 REACTOR VESSEL CORE SUPPORT STRUCTURES
SYsuMJI9f."
13.6 CORE SUPPORT. AND REACTOR VESSEL INTERNAL STRUCTURES ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amplifyine Information The supporting material would include a description of the CVAP Program which demonstrates compliance with Regulatory Guide 1.20 for a non prototype Category I program.
See CESSAR-DC Sections 3.9.2.4 and 3.9.3 2.
Relationshin of CS and RVIS ITAAC to the Safety Anahsis None 3.
Relationship of CS and RVIS ITAAC to PRA None 4.
CESSAR-DC Chapter 14 Tests Annlicable to CS and RVIS TI'AAC None 1.3.6 01-29-93
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SYSTEM 80+"
1.3.7 IN-CORE INSTRUMENT GUIDE TUBES Design Description 4
The In< ore Instrument guide tubes, supports, seal housing and seal table are classified as safety related. A general conceptual illustration of the ICI guide tubes.
seal housing, supports and seal table is shown in Figure 13.7-1.
l The in-core instrument (ICI) guide tubes serve as a guide path and provide support
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for the self-powered in-core detector assemblics. The ICI guide tubes connect to the bottom of the reactor vessel and terminate in a seal housing assembly, located a: the 4
seal table. The reactor coolant pressure boundaries for the guide tubes and seal housings are along their entire length. Pressure retaining seals are installed between the seal housing and the in-core instrument, at the seal housing.
The ICI supports support the ICI guide tubes while also providing tube to tube 4
i spacing. The seal table supports the guide tubing and seals the ICI chase from water -
-ingress during refueling.
The ICI guide tubes and seal housing are constructed in accordance with ASME '
Code,Section III, Class 1 requirements. The ICI supports and seal table are constructed in accordance with ASME Code,'Section III, Class 1 requirements.
Components designated as ASME Code Class (x) are classified Scismic Category 1.
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Inspection, Test, Analyses and Acceptances Criteria Table 13.7-I specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the ICI guide tubes.
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1.3.7- 01-30 93 Y
SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 13.7-1 IN-CORE INSTRUMENT GUIDE TUBES Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Consmaitancat ImE--;': =_ Tests. Analyses h-#
x Criteria
, 1.
A basic configuration ' for the ICI 1.
1 Inspections of the as-built system
'1.
The as-built configuration of the guide tubes, supports,. seal housing' configuration will be performed.
ICI guide tubes, supports, seal and seal table is shown in Figure housing and seal ' table is in 13.7-1.
accordance with Figure 13.7-1, for the -components and equipment shown.
2.
ASME Code portions ' of the ICI 2.
A pressure test will be conducted 2.
The resuhs of the pressure test of guide tubes and seal housing retain on those portions of the ICI guide ASME Code portions of the ICI their integrity under internal tubes and seal housing required to guide tubes and seal housing pressures that will be experienced.
be pressure. tested by the ASME conform with the requirements in during service.
Code.
the ASME Code, Section IIL '
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ICI TUBES, SUPPORTS, SEAL HOUSING AND SEALTABLE ARE ASME CODE o
CLASS 1 COMPONENTS i
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1.4.4 CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE MECIIANISM PRESSURE i
BOUNDARY i
i Design Description 4
The Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) pressure housings are part of the reactor coolant system pressure boundary and are therefore, safety related.
The CEDM pressure housings are mounted on nozzles located at the top of the reactor vessel closure head. They consist of an upper pressure housing and s motor housing. A general conceptualillustration of the CEDM pressure boundary is shown in Figure 1.4.41, e
nese CEDM housings are fabricated in _accordance with ASME Code,Section III, Class 1 for vessels and are classified Seismic Category I.
De materials in contact with the reactor coolant used in the CEDM are corrosion resistant. Pressure boundary components meet the requirements of Sections II, III 1
and IX of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code and Code Case N 4-11 (for.
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the motor housing assembly).
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Inspections, Tests,itnalyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.4.41 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the Control Element Drive Mechanism pressure housings.
d 1.4.4 01-29 93
SYS'mM 80+
TABLE 1.4.4-1 CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE MECHANISM PRESSURE BOUNDARY Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desima Comunitment Inspections. Tests. Anakses Acceptance Criteria L
A basic configuradon of the L
Inspection of the as-built CEDM L
The as-built configuration of the CEDM pressure boundary is configuration will be performed.
CEDM is in accordance with shown in Figure L4.4-L Figure 1.4. 4 - 1, for the components and equipment shown.
2.
The CEDM pressure retaining 2.
A. pressure test will be 2.
The pressure retaining-components retain their conducted as required by components of the CEDMs meet integrity under internal the ASME Code.
the ASME Code specified physical pressures that will be mmination criteria for ASME experienced. during service.
Code Section III, Class 1 vessel requirements.
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FIGURE 1.4.4-1 CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE MECHANISM PRESSURE BOUNDARY:
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1A,4 CONTROL ELEMENT DRIVE MECHANISM PRESSURE BOUNDARY ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amnlifying Information l
Relationshin of CEDM PRESSURE BOUNDARY ITAAC to the Safety Analysis None 3.
Relationshin_nf CEDM PRESSURE BOUNDA'AY ITAAC1gfBA None 4.
CESSAR.DC Chanter 14 Tests Annlicable to NUCLEAR DESIGN ITAAC
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See CESSAR DC Section 14.2.12.1.37 1.4.4 02-01-93 4
SYSTEM 80+
1.6.2 SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM Design Description he safety depressurization system (SDS) is a safety-related system composed of two subsystems. The reactor coolant gas vent subsystem (RCOVS) provides a means to l
vent non-condensible gases from the pressurizer (PZR) and the reactor vessel (RV).
he rapid depressurization subsystem (RDS) provides a means to rapidly depressurize the RCS by venting the PZR.
The SDS consists of two separate redundant rapid depressurizatiun p' plug trains from -
the pressurizer to the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST), and two I
reactor coolant gas vent piping trains, one from the pressurizer to the reactor drain i
tank (RDT) and one from the RV to the RDT or IRWST. The RCGVS trains each -
have parallel branch lines with isolation valves. Figure 1.6.2-1 shows a simplified system configuration.
The RCGVS venting capacity is at least one-half of the RCS volume in one hour.
he SDS is built to the ASME Code Section III Class requirements shown on Figure i
1.6.21. Components, piping and supports classified as ASME Code Class 1 or 2 are Seismic Category I. Equipment that is designated as safety related is qualified for the environments where located.
Safety-related SDS valves for each division of the SDS are powered from their respective Classs 1E buses. A single failure will not prevent venting or rapid depressurizing of the RCS, nor prevent isolating a vent or rapid depressurization path.
SDS instrumentation indications and alarms shown on Figure 1.6.2-1 are provided in the control room. Controls are available in the control room to open and close SDS power-operated valves.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.6.2-1-specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the SDS.
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1 30-93 4
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SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.6.2-1 SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desimo Commaitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Cdteria L
A basic configuration of the SDSis L
Visual inspections of the as-built L
The as-buih configuration of the shown in Figure 1.6.2-L SDS configuration will be conduct-
. SDS is in accordance with Figure ed.
L6.2-1, for the components and' equipment shown.
2.
ASME Code portions of the SDS 2.
A pressure test will be conducted 2.
He results of the pressure test of retain their integrity. under internal on those. portions of the SDS re-ASME Code portions of th-SDS pressures that will be experienced
- quired to be pressure tested by the conform with the requirements in during senice.
ASME Code.
the ASME Code Section IIL 3.
The SDS provides means to vent 3.
Tests of venting flow paths from 3.
Venting flow paths for ' RV and non-condensible. gases from 'the the RV and PZR will be per-PZR pass flow with valves open.
RV and PZR. '
- formed. Each path will be tested individually.
4.'
The total SDS reactor coolant gas 4.
Tests to determinc reactor coolant 4.
~%e Certified Design Commitment venting capacity is equal to or gas vent subsystem flow rate using is met.
greater. than one half.of the RCS each RCGVS flow path will be volume in one hour.
performed.
Analyses will be performed to comut the test results to a RCS starting pr ssure.
1.6.2 01-30-93.
)
SYSIEM so+
TABLE 1.6.2-1 (Continued)
SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM _
Inspections. Tests. Analyses. sad Acceptance Criteria Certified Desima Consmitanent Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 5.
Safety-related SDSvalves described 5.
A test of the power availability to 5.a) The RCGVS reactor vessel vent in the Design Description for er.ch the safety-related components will valves are powered from separate division - of the. SDS are powered
- be conducted with power supplied Class 1E power system buses.
from their -respective Class 1E -
from the permanently lastalled busses. A single failure will not electrical power buses.
b) The RCGVS pressurizer vent prevent v e n tin'g or rapid valves are powered from separate depressurizing the : RCS, nor Class IE power busses.
prevent isolating a vent or rapid depressurization path.
c) The RDS valves in a RDS line are powered from different Class 1E power buses than other RDS lines.
6.
SDS instrumentation indications 6.
Inspection of the Control Room for 6.
'Ibe instrumentation indications and alarms shown on Figure 1.6.2-the availability of instrumentation and alarms shown on Figure 1.6.2-1 are available-in the Control indicad >ns and alarms identified in 1 exists or can be retrieved in the
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Room. Controls are available in the Certified Design Commitment Control Room. SDS valves can be the control room for SDS remote.
will be performed.- Tests will be opened and closed from the operated valves.
- performed using the SDS controls Control Room.
in the Control Room.
1.6.2 01-30 _. -
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- ALL ITEMS SHOWN EXCEPT INDICATIONS & ALARMS j
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= IRWST: IN CONTAINMENT REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK FIGURE 1.6.2-1 l -.
SYSTEM 80+ SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM
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1.6.2 SAFETY DEPRESSURIZATION SYSTEM ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amplifying Information SDS
Description:
Relationshin of SDS ITAAC to the Safety Anahsis None 3.
Relationshin of SDS ITAAC to PRA 1)
The RCGVS has vent valves to vent the pressurizer and the head of the reactor vessel.
2)
He vent paths from the pressurizer and reactor vessel discharge to the reactor drain tank.
3)
He vent valves are arranged so that a single failure will not prevent venting of the pressurizer or the reactor vessel.
4)
The vent valves are powered from the Class 1E power system.-
4 5)
Venting of the pressurizer and the reactor vessel can be initiated from the control room.
6)
The Rapid Depressurization System (RDS) or Bleed System has two separate and redundant trains.
7)
Each train of the RDS has two bleed valves in series.
8)
The bleed valves are powered from separate Class 1E buses.
- 9) -
The RDS discharges to the In-Containment Refueling _ Water Storage Tank (IRWST).
10)
The RDS is manually initiated from the control room.
4.
CESSAR-DC Chanter 14 Tests Annlicable to SDS ITAAC Test
Description:
CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1.39
- 1.6.2 01-30-93
J 4
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SYSTEM 80+"
1.6.5 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Design Description The safety injection system (SIS) is a safety related system which injects borated water into the reactor vessel to provide core cooling and reactivity control in response to a loss-of coolant-accident (LOCA) and other events which reduce RCS coolant inventory.
The SIS consists of active and passive injection subsystems, in two separate divisions.
The active portion of the SIS consists of four mechanically separated trains, each consisting of a safety injection (SI) pump and associated valves. Each SI pump is provided with a separate suctica line from the in-containment refueling water storage 1
4 tank (IRWST) and a separate discharge line to a direct vessel injection (DVI) nozzle j
on the reactor vessel. The passive portion consists of four identical pressurized safety injection tanks (SITS), described below. Each SIT discharge line is connected to its associated SI pump discharge line. Figure 1.6.5-1 shows basic system components and their configuration.
The SIS is automatically initiated by a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS). An SIAS starts all four SI pumps and opens all four SI header isolation valves. The SIS can also be manually initiated from the Control Room. SIS indications are provided in the control room to monitor system actuation and operation. Iamg-term cooling-for LOCAs is accomplished by manually realigning the SI pumps for simultaneous hot leg injection and DVI nozzle injection.
5 The SITS contain borated water pressurized by a nitrogen cover gas. When RCS pressure falls below SIT pressure, water flows from the SIT into the reactor vessel.
A remotely operated isolation valve in each SIT discharge line is administratively controlled open. Each SITisolation valve receives an open signal upon a SIAS. Two remotely operated vent valves are connected to each SIT to lower SIT pressure.
The SIS fluid volumes, flow rates and delivery times provide the SIS with the capacity to deliver coolant to the reactor vessel to cool the core during design basis events.
The SIS arrangement provides net positive suction head (NPSH) greater than the pump's required NPSH for the expected fluid temperature conditions during SIS operation.' Each SIS pump has a minimum flow recirculation line to the IRWST.
Each SIS division is powered from its associated Class IE bus.
Power is supplied to the SIS' hot leg injection valves such that a single electrical' failure cannot cause spurious initiation of hot leg injection flow, nor can a single electrical failure prevent initiation of flow through at least one hot leg injection line.
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I The SIS is built to the ASME Code Section III (ASME Code) requirements shown in Figure 1.6.5-1, Components, piping and supports ' classified as ASME Code Class-1,2, or 3 are Seismic Category I.
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SIS equipment that _is designated as safety related is qualified for the em>ironment
. here located.
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4 Outside of containment, piping trains and contsinment penetrations for redundant SIS lines (IRWST to pump suction, pump discharge to RCS, SIT discharge to RCS) are physically separated.
The SIS permits system testing at design flow during reactor power operation.
Inspections, Tests,-Analyses, an'd Acceptance Criteria l
Table 1.6.5-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the SIS.
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SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.6.5-1 SAFETY INJECI' ION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desian Constitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria L
A basic configuration.
for the 1.
Visual inspections of the as-built L
The as-built SIS configuration is in safety injection system (SIS) is system configuration will be accordance with I'igure 1.6.5-1.
shown in Figure 1.6.5-1.
conducted.
2.
The ASME Code portions of the 2.
A pressure test will be conducted 2.
The results of the pressure test of SIS retain' their integrity under on those portions of the SIS the ASME Code portions of the SIS internal pressures that will be required to be hyrdostatically conform with the requirements in experienced under service..
tested by the ASME Code.
the ASME Code, Section IIL 3.a) A safety injection actuation signal 3.a) Testing will be performed by-3.a) A SIAS starts the SI pumps and (SIAS) actuates the SIS.
generating a simulated SIAS.
opens the SI header isolation vahrs and safety inje.: tion tank (SIT)-
isolation valves.
b) __ The SIS can be manually actuated F) Tests will Lbe performed to b) The SI pumps can be started and from the control room.
manually operate the SIpumps and stopped froe the Control Room.
remote-operated injection valves The SI header isolation valves and from the control room.
the SIT isolation valves. can be opened and closed from the Control Room.
4.
Safety-related components des-4.
A test of the power availability to 4.
Safety-related components des-cribed in the. Design Description the safety related components of cribed in the Design Description for the SIS are powered from Class the SIS will be ' conducted with for the SIS recchr. electrical power IE busses.
power supplied from the per-from Class IE busses.
manently installed electric power busses.
i 1.6.5 1-30-93
- i SYSTEM 802 TABLE 1.6.5-1 (Continued)
SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desima Cosamitument Inspections. Tests. Anakses Acceptsece Criteria 4.a) Each 55 division receives power from the Class IE bus for that division.
b) Each SIS pump motor receives Class 1E power from a separate Class 1E bus.
c) ' The SIS pump coetro! circuits and electrically powered valves for a given train are powered - from tiie same Class IE bus which provides motive power to the puc p motor.
d) The two SIS pumps in each disision are cooled by the, associated CCWS; division.
5.
SIS fluid ' volumes, flow rates and 5.a) SIS functional. testing will be a) Each SI division has a pump-delivery. times provides the SIS -
performed.
Analysis will be developed pressure differential of '
with the capacity - to deliver coolant performed.to convert the test 1600 to 2040 psid at the vendor's to the reactor vessel to cool the results from the test conditions to specified. minimum flow rate, and core during design basis events.
the design condition.
injects 980 to 1232 gpm of borated -
s water into the reactor vessel' at atmospheric pressure.
b) SIS testing will be performed using b) The SIS initiates - and begins to a simulated safety injection a:t-deliver. flow.to the reactor vessel within 40 seconds following. receipt uation signal of a SIAS.
1.6.5 1-30-93
SYSTEM 80+
TABLE L6.5-1 (Continued)
SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desima Commitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acce=*==ce Criteria 5.c) SIS functional tests will be 5.c) SIT isolation valves open on SIAS performed to open the SIT isolation and the pressurized SITS discharge valves
'ing a simulated SIAS with water to the depressurized RCS.
the STIs pressurized and the RCS depressurized.
Analysis will be K of the discharge line from the performed to convert the test SIT to the reactor vessel = [later]
resuhs from the test conditions to (based on a cross-sectional area of 2
the design conditions.
[later]ft )
d) Tests will. be performed with the d) The SIS injects 980 to 1232 gpm system - manually aligned for through a hot leg injection line simuhaneous DVI and hot Icg with the RCS at 0 psig by manually injection.
re=Ugnkg one or more SI pumps for hot leg injection.
6.
Available NPSH meets or exceeds 6.
Tests to measure SIS pump suction 6.
Minimum pump NPSH available, as required pump NPSH for con-pressure will be performed.
An determined by the analysis, ditions under which the pump must analysis to determine NPSH exceeds the pump vendor's NPSH operate.
available to each SI pump will be requirements.
prepared based on as-built data.
7.
Outside of containment,. piping 7.
Walkdown inspections will be.
7.
Outside containment, four quad-trains and containment penetrations performed to venfy physical rant building s~ alls separate the SIS for redundant SIS lines (IRWST to separation - of piping. trains. and piping trains and piping lines pump suction, pump discharge to containment penetrations for the (IRWST to pump suction, ' pump RCS,' and SIT discharge to ' RCS).
. SIS redundant lines (IRWST to discharge to RC3, and SIT. dis-are physically separated.
pump suction,. pump discharge to charge to RCS).
Containment RCS, and SIT discharge to RCS).
gAbations of a SIS train are not located in the same quadrant as any.
other SIS train.
1.6.5 1-30-93
SYSTEM ' 80+
TABLE 1.6.5-1 (Continued)
SAFE 1Y INJFCITON SYSTEM Inspections. Tests.- Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Cestified Desies Comunitiment laspections. Tests. Ansivses 4ccestarce Criteria 8.-
The S15 permits flow system testing 8.
Functional tests with the SIS at 8.
Each SIS pump develops a head of and ' design ' flow during plant design flow will be performed by
_at least { ] feet when tested at a operation.
man ully aligning SI flow to the design flow of at least 815 gpm to IRWST and manually starting each the IRWST through each test line.
SI pump.
9.
Each SIS' pump has a minimum 9.
The as-built systeta coufiguation 9.
Minimum ikra recirculation rate flow recirculation path to the and installation will be inspected meets or exceeds the pump IRWST.
and minimum flow recirculation rmier's reqrirements.
measured.
- 10. - The safety injection tanks can be 10.
Tests will be performed with the 10.
The SIT vent valves can be opened depressurized by venting.
SITS pressuriud : aad the associated from the control room and the SIT SIT isolation valve shut. Each SIT pressure decreases while the. SIT is vent valve will be opened from the being wated.
cor. trol room. This test will be performed for 4 SITS and 8 vent v.ht:s.
k 1.6.5 1-30-93 I
l
NOTE:
ONE OF TWO DIVISIONS SHOWN.
IASME CODE CLASSI W
TM M']
m REAOTOR l
VESSEL.
b h.
ATM DIRECT INJECTION SIAS
'h S"
]
E OP S
I SIAS N
MJ l
Y OPENS p
M, CSS
- 4l SIAS---
3m STARTS
. IN-CONTAINMENT s CSS /SCSO REFUELING WATER W
STORAGE TANK CONTAINMENT BUILDING CONTAINMENT SUBSPHERE I
FIGURE 1.6.5-1 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM
SYS'IT,M 80+"
1.6.5 SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION i
1.
Amolifyine Information The ITAAC test to confirm SIS actuation on a SIAS will be conducted with the SIS in the normal standby lineup, except that the four SIT isolation valves will be closed -
prior to generating a manual SIAS. The test may be conducted by sequentially testing individual component actuation when the SIAS output relays are energized (i.e., the signal and/or power leads to the other components may be lifted).
The ITAAC test to determine system flow will be conducted by operating one SI pump at a time. Each pump will be tested in two flow configurations: First, flow will be aligned to the IRWST through the recirculation line and the associated SI header-isolation and hot leg injection valves will be shut. Second, flow will be aligned to the reactor vessel with the vessel head removed and the hot leg injection valves shut. For both tests, the minimum flow line will be open. The analysis to convert the test results will correct for inaccuracy of the instruments used to measure flow, and the' difference between reactor vessel backpressure during the test and atmospheric pressure.
The ITAAC test to confirm SIT discharge to the reactor vessel will be conducted for each SIT. The SIT will be pressurized to at least._ psi greater than reactor vessel -
pressure. The associated SITisolation valve will be opened and the time to discharge the contents of the SIT to the reactor vessel will be measured. The_ rate of SIT discharge and the pressure differential between the SIT and the reactor vessel will be used in an analysis to calculate the effective flow resistance of the line between the SIT and RV then convert the results to the K-factor assumed in the safety analysis.
The ITAAC to confirm SIS component arrangement and sizing will include the following: a) IRWST volume above the SI pump suction penetrations in containment is not less than 495,000 gallons; b) SIT internal volume is not less than 2406 cubic feet per tank; c) SIT discharge nozzle outlet elevation above the reactor vessel direct vessel injection nozzle centerline is 0 to 25 feet.
The ITAAC to confirm hot leg injection flow rate will be conducted for the two SI pumps which can inject to the hot leg.
The ITAAC to confirm adequate pump NPSH will include a test with the following conditions: suction will be taken from the IRWST (with the containment spray pump which shares the suction line with the SI pumps also running, recirculating to the -
IRWST) Correct the measured suction head for the IRWST minimum level and the maximum IRWST fluid temperature following a design basis event, and containment at atmospheric pressure.
1.6.5.
01-30-93 w
~.
SYSTEM 80+"
^
The ITAAC for SI pump minimum flow will include a test of operation at minimum flow until the temperature of the recirculation fluid stabilizes, i
See CESSAR DC Section 6.3 for a discussion of the SIS.
2.
Relationshin of SIS ITAAC to the Safety Anahsis 1.
Basis Flow rate to a reactor vessel direct vessel injection nozzle from one SI pump, with RCS at 0 psig = 980 gpm to 1232 gpm.
ITAAC: ITAAC 5 confirms the safety injection flow rate with the RCS at 0
' psig.
i 2.
Basis: Each SI division has a pump <leveloped ditTerential pressure of 1600 to 2040 psid at the pump vendor's specified minimum recirculation flow r te.
4 ITAAC: ITAAC 5 confirms the differential pressure developed by each SI.
pump at minimum rec lrculation flow, i
3.
Basis: Maximum delay time for safety injection actuation following SIAS =
40 seconds.
' ITAAC: ITAAC 5 confirms the safety injection actuation time.
4.
Basis: Total number of safety injection tanks.= 4.
ITAAC: ITAAC 1 confirms the SIS configuration with 4 SITS.
5.
Basis: SIT discharge line K factor to Reactor Vessel = 4.5 to 30 (based on a reference area of 0.6827 square feet).
J ITAAC: ITAAC 5 confirms the K factor of the SIT discharge line to the reactor vessel.
3.
Relationshin of SIS ITAAC to PRA..
1).
The Safety Injection Sptem (SIS) has four redundant trains arranged in two independent divisions.
2)
The two SIS divisions are completely physically separated from each other-outside containment.
3)
Each SIS train consists of one SIS pump and its associated valves, piping, and instrumentation.
- 1 1.6.5 01-36 93
~
1
.. ~.
j.
SYS1EM 80+"
~
4)
Each SIS division receives Cass 1E power from the Class 1E bus for that division.
5)
. Each SIS pump motor receives Cass 1E power from a separate Cass 1E bus.
]
- 6) =
The SIS pump control circuits for a given train are powered from the Cass
.1E bus associated with the Gass 1B bus which provides motive power to the pump motor.
7)
De motor operated valves associated with a given SIS train receive Class 1E
' power from Motor Control Centers powered from the Cass 1E bus'which 1
4 provides power to the SIS pump motor n that train.
i
- 8)
Each SIS pump train has an independent suction line connection to the i-IRWST.
9)-
He two SIS pumps in each division are cooled by the associated CCWS-division.
j-10)
De Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS) sends a Safety.-
-Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) to start the SIS pumps and open the SIS
- valves. -
i'
- 11)
Installed instrumentation provides the capability to monitor the performance.
of the system and the major components from the control room.
g
[
4.
CESSAR-DC Chapter 14 Tests Applicable' to SIS ITAAC l
See CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1.22,'.23,.61.
1 t..
1.6.5 - 01-30 i-2.
._.--,2....
SYSTEM 80+"'
1.6.6 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Design Description ne Containment Isolation System is a safety-related system that provides the means to close valves in fluid system piping that passes through Containment penetrations.
He Containment Isolation System provides a double barrier at the containment penetrations.
Those valves required to close for containment integrity following a design basis event are closed automatically by an enginected safety features (ESP) actuation signal.
Fluid system lines which must remain open subsequent to a design basis event do not have containment isolation valves that are automatically closed by an ESF actuation signal. Each of these penetrations has a minimum of one manual remotely operated isolation valve outside containment.
Valves that receive an ESF actuation signal close within the time allocated to the function performed.
Redundant containment isolation devices which require electrical power are provided electrical power from different Class 1E buses. Redundant containment isolation device controls which require electrical power receive power from different Class 1E buses. Pneumatie valve operators for containment isolation valves have a failure position assigned by their required safety function.
A means to leak test containment is provided. He containment pressurization penetration used for leak rate testing consists of an inside containment blind flange and an outside containment manual isolation valve.
Containment isolation valves perform their safety related function in the environmental conditions in the areas in which they are located. Containment isolation valves and interconnecting piping are designed and constructed to ASME Code Class 2 and Seismic Category I requirements.
Isolation valves inside the containment are located between the crane wall and the inside containment wall. Structural steel and/or concrete structures or walls are provided as barriers for containment isolation devices outside containment.
The isolation arrangement of the fuel transfer tube consists of a transfer tube closure and a blind flange enclosing the transfer tube. The transfer tube closure and the blind flange provide the containment boundary.
1-64 02-01-93
SYSTEM.80+"
The equipment hatch has a double seal arrangement which provides the containment boundary.
Electrical penetrations consist of sealed electrical penetration assemblics. Electrical penetrations are tested when containment is pressurized.
Instrumentation and control sensing lines which penetrate the containment are provided with containment isolation provisions.
Remotely operated containment isolation valves can be controlled and have position 1
- indication available in the Control Room.
4 Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria i
Table 1.6.61 specifies the inspections, tests, and/or associated acceptance criteria of 2
the Containment Isolation System.
4 4
a
}
1-6-6 02-01-93
SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.6.6 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria
' Certined Desima Commituneat Ima-#: =_ Tests. Analyses A--- J ne Criteria 1.
The Containment Isolation System 1.
An inspectice of as-built con-L Each containment gmaation is provides a double barrier at the
. tainment islation and piping will provided with at least two isoution containment ' penetrations.
be performed.
devices; one device
~
con-mside tainment and onc outside Con-f minment.
2.-
Rose valves required to close for 2.
A test of the isolation function will 2.
Valves close automaticaDy upon containment integrity following a be performed using an actual or a receipt of an ESF actuation signal design basis event are closed simulated ESF signal (actual or simulated).
automatically by an engineered i
safety features (ESP) actuation signal 3.
Fluid. system lines which must 3.
An inspection of as-built 3.
Fluid system lines which must remain open subsequent to a design containment isolation vahes and rem.in open:
basis event:
interconneding piping will be performed.
a) do not have containment isolation '
a)' do not have contain.nent isolation devices that receive an ESF valves aat receive an' ESF actuation signal actuation signal.
b) are provided with..a m;nimum of b) have penetrations with a minimum one manual. remotely operated of one manual remotely operated isolation vahr outside containment.
Isolation valve outside Containment.
4.
Valves that receive an ESF' 4.
Testing of ' the closure times of 4.
Each valve closes within its allotted actuation signal close within the automatically actuated containment time upon receipt of an adual or time allocated to the function isolation vahes will be performed simulated ESF actuation signal performed. -
nsing actual or simulated ESF actuadon signals.
1-64 02-41-93
L sys1EM 80+
TABLE 1.6.6-1 (Continued) t i
l CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM
~
Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria l
Certified Desima Commitament Insper*ia== Tests. Analyses h-_
--+ Criteria 5.
Pneumatic valve operators for con-5.
Testing will be conducted to simu-5.
Each pneumatic vahe operator tainment isolation : valves have late loss of pneumatic ' conditions to positions its vahr to its fail safe '
L
- failure position auigned by their observe the response of valves position.
required safety function.
having an instrument air supply.
6.
Redundant containment isolation 6.
A test of power availability to the 6.
He Certified Design Commitment devices which require elestrical containment.. isolation devices will is met.
power are provided electrical be conducted with pour supplied power from different Class IE from the permanently installed buses.
Redundant contair. ment electric power buses.
isolation device controls which. re-l t
quire electrical power - receive power from different Class IE buses.
7.a) Containment isolation valves and 7.a). An inspection of as-built contain- -
7.a) The pressure retaining components interconnecting piping aredesigned ment isolation valves and inter-'
of the Containment Isoladon Sys-and constructed to ASME Code cannecting piping ' will be per-tem meet the ASME Code specified
. Class 2.
formed.
physical examinatina criteria for ASME Code Class 2 components.
b) ASME Code portions of the CIS '
b)
A' pressure test will be conducted b) %e results of the pressure test of retairi their integrity under internal '
on those portions of the CIS re-ASME code portions of the CIS pressures that will be experienced quired to be pressure tested by the conform with the requirements in during service.
ASME code.
the ASME Code Section IIL 1-6-6 02-01-93
SYS'IEM 80+
TABLE I.6.6-1 (Castinued)
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM Inspect:-s. Tests. A==hses. and Acceptance Criteria Certi5ed Desigy Ch I-7 = Tests. Anaksen hJ
+ Criiteria 8.
Isolation valves inside the con-8.
A.a i=nertian of as-buik con-8.
The CertiGed Design Commitment rain = cat are located between the rainment isolation valves and inter-is mer_
crane war and the inside con-
_ _---- :;-; piping wiil be per-tamment wall formed.
~
9.
Structural steel and/or concrete 9.
An inspection of atbuilt con-9.
Structural stecI and/or concrete structures or walls 'are p.m'.id as rain = cat isolation valves and inter-structures or walls exist as barriers barriers for marainment isolation c.i-g piping win be per-for containment isolation devias devices outside containment.
formed.
outside contmimacnt.
10.
The isolation
=t of the 10.
An inspection of the as-buik feel 10.
The fuel transfer tube consists of a fuel tra isfer tube comiot of a transfer tube components wiR be transfer the closure valw: and a transfer tube closure and a blind performed.
bend fiange.
flange enclosing the treusfer tube.
l IL The c @ zit batch has a double IL An inspection of the as-buik II.
Tu p.-
seals are provided in
[
seal mi---
--- =
which provides egir iit batch w-yum.m.
will each equipment hatch.
the containment boundary.
be perform-d.
12.-
Eledrical H alvos casist of 12.
An inspection of the as-built elec-12.
Gas-scaled or double W scaled scaled ' electrical penutation trical penetrations will be per-duaJ penetration assembGes are i=tshi assembGes.-
formed.
13.
Instrumentation _ and control seming 13.
An inspection of the as-buik in-13.
Instrumentation and control sensing lines which penetrate the conta'm-strumentation and c warol sensing lines which gie tk contain-ment are provioed with matain-Ene M 41uus will be per-ment have a minimum of two
(
ment isolation provisions.
formed.
isolation devices i=t=ht-l 144 92 41-93
' SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.6.6-1 (Continued) i l
CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM
~
Insocelions. Tests. Analyses. and Accestance Criteria Certi5ed Dreim en--it--t In:_;_-_-:'
- Tests. Anakses Accas-Criscria 14.
Remotely - operated containment 14.
Tests of ennt =mment isolation 14 Remotely operated containment
~
isolation valves can be controlled valve controls aa.1 position isolation valves can be opened and and have position "de=rian indications mill be performed.
closed firont the control room. Pos-available is the control room.
ition ~ &e=rion for these valves
=
exist or can be acui,md in the control room.
i l
i
\\
1-64 92 41-93
SYSTEM 80+"'
1.6.6 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amnlifyine Information Amplifying information on acceptance testing for containment isolation valves and actuators is provided in CESSAR DC Table 6.2.41, - Containment isolation valve arrangements are presented in more detail in CESSAR DC Figure 6.2.41.
2.
Bdalkmshin of Containment Isolation ITAAC to the Safety Anahsis Although the safety analyses described in CESSAR DC Chapter 15 make no direct '
tcierence to the Containment Isolation System, system function is an integral pari of the SYSTEM 80+"' engineered safety features described in CESSAR DC Chapter
- 6. The Containment Isolation Sysicm provides the means of isolating fluid systems that pass through containment penetrations such that any radioactivity that may be released into the containment following a postulated design basis accident wiu be confined. %c safety related functions of the Containment Isolation System arc fully described in CESSAR DC Section 6.2.4; the safety cynluation of the system is presented in CESSAR DC Section 6.2.4.3.
3.
Relationship of Containment Isolation ITAAC to PRi Containment Isolation System configuration is as identified in CESSAR DC Table 6.2.41, including signal, nonnal valvo position, and fall position. Assume leak tightness of electrical penetrations will be at least as good as current industry electrical penetrations. For all penetrations, the scalant material will be chosen to have good high temperature stability. Assume containment equipment hatch, personnel alth>cks, and fuel transfer tube flange will be of the seal under pressure design.
4.
CESSAR DC Chanter 14 Tests Annlicable to SSWS ITAAC The following pre-operational tests are required ot'the Contalmnent Isolation System:
Test Description CESSAR DC Sectio.D.
Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs) Test '
14.2.12.1.135 Containment isolation valves are tested for leakage in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J. His test is designed to verify that the measured leakage through each containment penetration isolation valve, when summed with the total of all other.
_ Type B-and C Izak Rate Tests, is within the limits' stated in the Technical Specifications. In addition, cach containment isolation valve test leakage is compared 1-
~ 02 41 93 144 me. revs s'
e 4
m a:-+. - - -w---+e
?rc-r$*+-
ipyw's w1'_7dem-*p,.ispaser.y
-->we-33e
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SYS'IEM_89f_"
against the leakage acceptance criteria for the particular valve, which is based on valve seat diameter in accordance with ASME Code OM Part 10.
In addition, each Containment Isolation Valve test leakage is compared against the leakage acceptance criteria for the particular valve, which is based on valve seat diameter in accordance with ASME Code OM Part 10.
Containment Isolation Valves Test 14.2.12.1.140 This test is designed to demonstrate that containment isolation valves can be operated manually and operate in response to automatic actuation, to verify that upon loss of actuating power, the valves fall as designed, and to verify that all valves operate in less than the time specified in the plant technical specification.
144 2-02-01-93
SYSTEM 80+"
1.6.7 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Design Description 1he Containment Spray System (CSS) is a safety-related system which removes heat and lodine from the containment atmosphere and transfers the heat to the component cooling water system, following events which increase containment temperature and pressure. 'lhe CSS can also remove heat from the in-containment refueling water storage tank (IRWS1). The CSS has two separate and redundant divisions. Each CSS division has the heat removal capacity to cool and depressurize the containment atmosphere, such that containment design temperature and pressure are not exceeded following a loss of coolant accident or main steam line break.
Each CSS division has a CSS pump, a CSS heat exchanger, valves, and connecting piping. Figure 1.6.71 shows a simplified systern configuration.
The CSS is built to the ASME Code Section 111 class requirements shown on Figure 1.6.71. Components, piping, and supports classified as ASME Code Class 2 are Scismic Category 1. Equipment that is designated as safety-related is qualified for the environments where kxated.
CSS instrumentation indications and alarms shown on Figure 1.6.71 are available in the control room. The CSS pumps are started upon receipt of a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS). The isolation valve to the CSS spray header and nozzles is opened upon receipt of a containment spray actuation signal (CSAS). Controls are available in the control room to start and stop the CSS pumps and open and close the remote-operated valves shown on Figure 1.6.71. Flow to the spray nozzles begins within [later] seconds after receipt of a CSAS.
The CSS header isolation valves are capab!c of opening against a differential pressure at least equal to the maximum CSS pump discharge pressure, Watar is supplied to each CSS pump at a pressure greater than the net positive suction head (NPS11) required.
The CSS pump and the Shutdown Cooling Systern (SCS) pump in a division are connected by piping and valves such that one pump can perform the other's function.
The piping and valves in the CSS /SCS pump suction cross connect line permit flow in either direction.
Safetyaelmed CSS components for cach division are powered from their respective Class 18 bus.
1,6.7 01 30-93 i
I
SYSTEM 80+"
A Dow recirculation line around each CSS pump provides a minimum now recirculation path. A piping line frorn downstream of the heat exchangers to the IRWST allows testing of the pumps at design now during plant operation. The CSS limits maximum now in cach division.
Outside containment, the two mechanical divisions of the CSS are separated by the divisional barrier wall.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.6.71 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and as!.ociated acceptance criteria for the CSS.
I P
l-1.6,7 2
01 30 93 l
l l
i
~
i L-I i
GYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.6.7-1 b
t' CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Aance Criteria -
l r
Certi5ed Desies Conanskenest I= -- :~- =_ Tests. Analyses Accestance Criteria i
L A basic configuration for the CSS L
Visual mspections of the as-buih L
The as-buik conEguration of the f
is shown in Figure. L6.7-L CSS configuration wiH be per-CSS is in accordance with Figure formed.
L6.7-1 for the components and equipment shown.
2.
Water is supplied to each CSS pump 2.
Tests to measure CSS pump hTSH 2.
The calculated available NTSH at a r-e greater than the net wiH be performed. An analysis to -
exceeds CSS pump hTSH required i'
positive suction head (STSH) determine NTSH available to each by the vendor for the pump.
required.
pump wiH be r w d based on test data, and as.buik data.-
3.
Safety-related CSS components for 3.
. A test of the power availability to
- 32) The CSS pump motor in each 7
each dhision are. p-md from the components described in the division is swud from one of i
their wdive Class 1E busses.
Design Description for the CSS mill the two Cass 1E buses for that be conducted with power supp5cd dhbina. Each CSS pump derhrs from the permanently instaHed its critrol poutr from the same electrical power buses.
Cass IE bus that provides mothe i
power to the CSS pumps.
b) The CSS pump motor in each dhision is not ;-ua from the same Cass 1E bus as the SCS pump motor in that dhision.
i c) The motor power for CSS vahrs in a dhision is deriwd from the same i
Oass IE bus that provides power to the CSS pump motor for that dhision.
1.6.7 1-30-93 i
SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.6.7-1 (Continned)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Am=Ivses. and A---
^-=ce Criteria cestined Desies Cammsie-=r I- -_ :--- _ Teses. Amakses Accessamee Criseria 4
CSS instrumentation indications 4.
Inspection of the Control Room for 4
Tne instrumentation indications and alarms shown on Fgure 1.6.7-the availabihty of the CSS instra-and alarms shown on Fgure 1.6.7-I are available in the Centrol mentation irufications and alarms 1 exist or can be niud in the Room. Controls ~ are available in will be performed. Tests wiR be Control Room.
CSS controls the control room to start and stop performed using the CSS controls operate as speedied in the the pumps, and open and close the in the Control Room.
Certified Design Commitment.
CSS remotely. operated vahn shown in Fgure 1.6.7-L 5.a) Each CSS division has the heat re-5.a) Tests of as-built CiS uaQ-. tion 5.a) Each CSS pump develops at least moral capacity to cool the con-to measure the cont =inment spray
[ } feet of head when the CSS Cow t=inment atWm.cc.
such that flow at the & charge of the CSS through the CSS beat t. 5--- cr is containment design temperature pump wiH be performed.
at least 5000 gpm.
and pressure are not exceeded fol-lowing a LOCA or MSIE.
b) Fnar*ianal tests of the CSS wiH be b) Flow to the spray nozzles begins performed using asinialated CSAS.
within [ ] seconds after receipt of He test resuhs will be converted a CSAS.
by analysis to a delay time for spray imtiatim.
6.
ASME Code portions of the CSS 6.
Ap-6 test will be conducted 6.
De resnits of the test of r-u
, retain their integrity under internal on those portions of the CSS te -
ASME Code portions of the CSS p - 6.
that will be sydsccd quired to be pressure tested by the cer. form with the sc@unents in during. service.
ASME Code.
the ASME Code Section IIL 7.
' A piping line from du.&- of 7.
Tests of the as-instaHed CSS will 7
He CSS pumps can be tested at the CSS heat ex%es to the be performed by manuaDy 3rwning flow rates up to 5000 gpm each.
IRWST allows testing of the CSS suction and discharge vahes to the pumps at deQm flow during plant IR%3T and starting the CSS pumps operatim.
manuaHy.
1.6.7 1-30-93
-- ~
h SYS1EM 80+
TABLE 1.6.7-1 (Continued)
CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Aa-_rx Criteria Catined Desien e---ie-e I --- - r = Tests. Anakses Acrees-Criteria 8.
The CSS pump and the SCS pump 8.
An inspection of the as-buik 8.
The CSS and SCS pumps suctkus
. in a division are connected by piping will be performed.
Func-and discharges are cross-connected t
piping and vahes such that one tional testing mine the CSS /SCS by lines.
The valve (s) in the 4
t pump can perform the others suction cross-connect line and the SCS/ CSS peep suction cross-con-the CSS /SCS pump suction cross performed.
function. The piping and vahes in did-se cross connect line will be nect lines ay; not check vahts.
connect line permit flow in either direction.
9.
A flow recirculation line. around 9.
The as-buik system configuration 9.
Minimum flow recirculation rate i
cach CSS pump. provides a niini-will be inspected and minimum meets or exceeds the pump ven-i mum flow recirculation path.
flow recirculation rate verified. by do(s rc@h a minimum flow measurement test.
1 10.
& CSS limits the matimum flow 10.:
Functional tests will be performed 10.
& CSS maximum flow is less than in each division.
with flow aligned to the IR%3T.
or equal to 6500 gpm in each Records of the as-buik spray division.
header will be reviewed. Analyses will convert the test flow rates to the maximum expected flow rate.
IL
& CSS header isolation vahrs are IL Test to open the CSS beader IL
& CSS beader isolation valves capable of opening against a dif-isolation vahe with the CSS pump open with the CSS pump vmhug.
ferential pressure at least equal to.
operating will be performed. Each the maximum CSS pump discharge dhision will be tested.
t pressure.
12.
& CSS pumps are started upon 12.
Test will be performed ming a 12.
The CSS pumps start upon receipt of a SIAS.
simulated SIAS.
Miug a simulated SIAS.
1.6.7 1-30-93
SYSTEM 90+
TABLE 1.6.7-1 (Contimmed)
CONTAINP.ENT SPRAY SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Ar=w=*=m Criteria Certined Desien C- -- '
I- - - -: - - - Tests. Analyses Ace==a==r* Criteria a
11 The CSS isolation vahr to the CSS D.
- The CSS isolation vahr in each 13.
Test will be gf._cd using dhision to the CSS spray header simulated SIAS.
spray header and nozzles opens and nozzles is opened upon receipt upon receipt of a simulated CSAS.
of a CSAS.
1.6.7 1-30-93
~
k I
Notes:
l t
- Shown is One Of Two identical Divisions I
- All items Shown Are ASME Code Class 2 Except gNSIDE OUTSIDE Instrumentation & Valve Operators CONTAMMENTl CONTAINMENT i
OOOOOO
+E f
4 CSAS SPRAY NOZZLES OPEN SG TO SIS F
SCS h
k A
A I
J L
[
SIAS h
E A
U L
W START N'
CSS Hx
\\
I
+
W M
I N
l IRWST A 4r 1 f 5
L CCW l
g MINIFLOW Hx INSIDE OUTSIDE I
CONTAINMENTE CONTAINMENT I
t t
I nCCW p I
l 5
!RWST INCONTAINMENT REFUEUNG WATER STORAGETANK I
CCW COMPONENT COOUNG WATER I
SIAS SAFETY INJECTION ACTUATION SIGNAL.
INSIDE g OUTSIDE
.Hx HEAT EXCHANGER CONTAMMEET CONTAMMEhT l
CSAS CONTAINEENTSPRAY ACTUATION SIGNAL I
SIS SAFETYINJECTION SYSTEM g
SCS SHUTDOWN COOUNG SYSTEM
/
sy gg IRWST
+
FIGURE 1.6.7-1 SYSTEM 80+ CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM i
SYSTEM 80+"
1.6.7 CONTAINMENT SPRAY SYSTEM ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amplifyinn Information CSS
Description:
Relationshin of CSS ITAAC to the Safety Anah51s Basis: De CSS pumps are started on receipt of a SIAS 3
ITAAC: ITAAC 12 confirms that the CSS pumps are started on reccipt of a SIAS.
i Basis: De CSS isolation vahe in each division to the spray header opens on receipt of a CSAS.
ITAAC: ITAAC 13 confirms that the CSS isolation valve in cach division to the spray header opens on receipt of a CSAS.
3.
Relationship of CSS ITAAC to PRA 1)
He Containment Spray System (CSS) has two independent redundant divisions for supplying containment spray flow.
2)
Each CSS division has one CSS pump and one CSS heat exchanger.
3)
He CSS pump in each division is normally aligned to deliver flow from the IRWST to the Spray header for that division.
4)
He CSS pump in each division can be manually aligned to back up the SCS pump in that division for shutdown cooling operation.
5)
The crossover valve between the inlet to the CSS heat exchanger and the SCS heat exchanger in a given division is capable of passing flow in either direction.
6)
He CSS pump and heat exchanger in each division can be aligned _to discharge back to the IRWST to provide IRWST inventory cooling.
7)
The CSS pump's NPSII is adequate to prevent pump cavitation and failure if the IRWST inventony is curated.
1.6.7 01-30 93
i SLSTFM 80+"
8)
Installed instrumentation provides the ca;. ability to monitor CSS flow rates and the performance of major componcats. This instrumentation provides positive indication that pumps have star'ed and valves have actuated properly.
9)
%c CSS pump discharge line in each division has a mini flow line back to the CSS suction to prevent damaging the CSS pump in that division by operating it against a closed line. He valves in this line are normally open.
10)
The CSS interfaces with the CCWS to remove energy from the IRWST inventory, s
11) ne CSS pumps are automatically started by an SIAS from the ESFAS on high containment pressure or low PZR pressure. The CSAS is initiated by a coincident two-out-of four high-high containment pressure condition. The CSS valves are automatically actuated by the same CSAS.
12)
The CSS can be manually started for spray operation from the control room.
13)
Installed instrumentation provides the capability to monitor the performance of the system and the major components from the control room.
4.
Cl?SSAR.DC Chapter 14 Tests Annlicable to CSS ITAAC Pre-operational Tests: CESSAR DC Section 14.2.12.1.40 4
8 1.6.7 01.4 93
j L
SYSTEM 80 +"
- 1.9.1.3 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP SYSTEM i
Design Description ne pool cooling and purification system (PCPS) removes heat generated by the s't>;cd spent fuel assemblics in the spent fuel pool water, and pumps spent fuel pool, refueling pool, and fuel transfer canal water through filters and ion exchangers.
ne PCPS consists of a safety rei.:ted spent fuel pool cooling subsystem (SFPCS) and a non safety related pool purificat%n subsystem. De spent fuel pool cooling subsystem includes two redundant divisions, cach with a pump, a heat exchanger, and I
associated valves, piping, controls, and instrumentation. Each division is provided with a separate suction line from, and a separate return line to, the spent fuel pool. A
+
l cross-connect line with manual isolation valves between the pump discharge lines is j
provided to alk)w cither pump to be used with either heat exchanger. De pool purification subsystem is connected to suction lines from the refueling pool, spent fuel pool, and fuel transfer canal, and to return lines to the refueling pool and spent fuel pool. A makeup line from tbc chemical and volume control system (CVCS) supplies makeup water to the spent fuel pool. Figure 1.9.1.3-1 shows a simplified system configuration.
nc PCPS has at least the capacity to remove heat generated in the spent fuel pool by the fuel assemblics of a full core offload plus ten years ofirradiated fuel. For this heat load, the PCPS can maintain pool bulk temperature at or below 140 F with two cooling trains operating, and at or below 180 F with one train operating. IIcat from the spent fuel pool is transferred to the component cooling water system (CCWS) in the spent fuel cooling heat exchangers.
De PCPS includes provisions to prevent gravity draining of the spent fuel pool and refueling pool: the spent fuel pool cooling suction connections are located at least 10 feet ab:ve the stored spent fuel, and anti-siphon devices are provided in the lines for spent fuel pool cooling return, spent fuel pool purification suction and return, and j
refueling pool purification suction and return.
Water is supplied to cach spent fuct pool cooling pump at a pressure greater than the net positive suction head (NPSH) required.
He PCPS is built to ASME Code Section III Class requirements shown on Figure 1.9.1.31. Components, piping and supports classified as ASME Code Class 2 or 3 are Scismic Category I.
PCPS instrumentation indications and alarms shown on Figure 1.9.1.31 are available as noted on the figure. Controls are available in the control room to start and stop
. the spent fuel pool cooling pumps.
1.9.1.3 01 30 93
i 1
i 1
i j
SYSTEM 80+"
- the spent fuel pool cooling pumps are supplied from the Class 1B clectrical 1
distribution busses.
J The two mechanical divisions of the spent fuel pool cooling subsplem are physically separated except for the cross-connect line between divisional pump discharge lines.
j Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria I
Table 1.9.1.3 1 specifics the inspections, tests, and analyses and associated acceptance i
criteria for the PCPS.
1 i
i s
a A -
4
- l I
i 4
i 1
p
- q-i' r
2.-
- 01 30 93-
- 1.9.1.3 rL.
.5,',-
,ay-f - e, e _ +,,.,. -,,.
y y-,,n.r-,,,y.p-y.m..,p
,,,yy..--
,o.m,w-p y
. = - -
L SYS1EM se+=
TABLE I.9.13-1 4
SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Accentance Criteria l
Certified Desien Counmitaneet inspections. Tests. Analyses Am ;ance Criteria L
A basic configuration of the PCPS L
Visual inspections of the as-built L
He as-buih PCPS confis;uration is is shown in Figure L9.13.L PCPS configuration mill be per-in accordance with Figure formed.
L9.13-1, for the components and equipment shown.
' 2.
'ASME Code portions of the PCPS 2.
A pressure test will be conducted 2.
De results of the p ommo test of retain their integrdy under internal on those portions of the PCPS ASME Code portions of the PCPS pressures that will be cryciiceced regaod to be pressure tested by conform with the reyaments in during service.
the ASME Code.
the ASME Code Scaion IIL 3.
Water is supplied to each spent fuel 3.
Tests to measure spent fuel pool 3.
De calculated available hTSH pool cooling pump at a pcomo cocling penp hTSH will be nrmk spent fuel pool cooling greater than the net positive performed.
An analysis to pump hTSH icgaod by the suction head (NPSH) required.
determine hTSH available to each vendor for the pump.
pump will - be prepared based on test data and as-bout - data.
4 He spent fuel pool coohng pumps 4.
A test of the power availability to 4.a) Each SEPC pump is supplied are powered from their regde the SFPC pumps will be conducted cIcctrical poser from a Class IE Class 1E busses.
with power supplied from the bus.
permanently installed electrical power buses.
b) The SFPC pump are powered from separate Class IE disisions.
5.
The PCPS has the capacity to 5.
Inspect the d s g @ te ans for 5.
The PCPS will remove at least remen heat generated in the spent the as-buik spent fuel pool cooling
[later) million btu /hr from the fuel pool by the fuel assemblies of heat - ' =7m and vendor pump spent fuel pool with both spent fuel s'
a full core ofBoad pins ten years of performance data.
Perform an pool cooling trains esdag,.
irradiated fuel.
- nalysis of heat removal capability using ac built data.
r 1.9.1.3 01-30-93
TABLE L9.13-1 (Contioned)
SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING AND CLEANUP SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and A-=_ *==ce Criteria Certified Desien Communitment Inspections. Tests. Annivses Acceptance Criteria fuel pool cooling suction
- 6. -
The PCPS inondes provisions to 6.
Inspect the PCFS suction and 6.
Sp.cf ~
are located at least 10 prevent gravity dr=ining of the return line connections to the co e ums spent fuel pool and the re'eling refueling pool and spent fuel pool ft.ct above the top of the spent fact Anti-siphon desices are pool presided in the lines for spent fuel pool coormg return, spent fuel pool pmification suction and return, and refueEng pool suction and return.
7.
PCPS instrumentation indicat ons 7.
Inspections for the availability of 7.
Tbc instrumentation indications and alarms shown on Figure instrumentation indications and and afarms shown on Figure 13.13-1 are available as noted on alarms identified in the Certified 1.9.13-1 exist or can be retrieved the figure. Controls are available Design Commitment win be per-as noted on the l'q;ure.
KPS in the control room to start and formed. Tests will be performed controls operate as specified in the stop the spent fuel pool cooling using the PCPS controls in the Certified Design Commitment.
Control Room.
pumps. -
8.
The two merk=ahl divisions of 8.
Inspections of PCPS divisional 8.
A struciarai waH separates the two
=~h=nb1 separations will be per-spcut fuel pool cooling subsystem the spent fuel pool cooling sub-system are physically separated formed.
mechanical divisions.
except for the cross-connect line between divisional pump dieharge lines.
I.9.1.3 01-30-93
_-.=
.. =.. --.
1' INSIDE I OUTSIDE I
CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT g
'80TE 3 NOTE 2 H
l ASME CODE CLASS)
FUELTRANSFER CANAL g
g j
x W
"O, S 3
dote,e I
bb:
-Te I
REFUELING
=
W POOL g
SUBSYSTEM MAKE-Lo -
I X
SPENT FUEL I
3 POOL 3
NOTE 1 b
E.
,m, NOTE 1
+
i i
M il V
i NOTE 2
(,Oe8PO eENT l
NOTE 1 WATER MOTE 1 i
]N T+
i 1
l NOTES:
l f
- 1. LOCALINDICATION ONLY, NOTIN CONTROL ROOM l
- 2. PRESSURE OR LEVEL SWITCH WITH ALARM IN CONTROL ROOM; NO CONTROL ROOM INDICATION I
- 3. LOCALINDICATION CONTROL ROOM ALARM i
i I
FIGURE 1.9.1.0-1 POOL COOLING AND PURIFICATION SYSTEM
~
.-~
l SYSTEM 80+"
1.9.1.3 SPENT FUEL POOL COOLING and CLEANUP SYSTEM ITAAC SUPPORTIVF JNFORMATION 2
1 1.
Amplifyine informatlan PCPS
Description:
Relationshin of PCPS ITAAC to the Safety Analysis l
None 3.
Relationshin of PCPS ITAAC to PRA 1
Nonc 4.
CESSAR DC Chapter 14 Tests Applicable to PCPS ITAAC j
Test
Description:
CESSAR DC Section 14.2.12.1.80 1
i 4
1.9.1.3 1-36 93 4
J SYS'lV.M 80+"
i 1.9.1.4 FUEL llANDLING SYSTEM i
Design Description The Fuelllandling System (FilS)is an Integrated non safety system of equipment and tools that handles anJ provides storage for fuct assemblies and control element assemblics.
The fuel handling system is comprised of a refueling machine (RM), a spent fuel
. handling machine (SFIIM), a CEA change platform (CEACP), a fuel transfer system s
(1713), a CEA clevator (CEAU), a new fuel clevator (NFE), a fuel building overhead crane (FBOC) and a containment polar crane (CPC).
He RM, SFilM, and CEACP holsts are provided with load measuring devices and j
interlocks to interrupt hoisting if the load increases above an ovciload limit and to i
interrupt lowering if the load decreases below an underload limit. Interk)cks are provided to limit travel. Positive mechanical stops are provided to limit upward movement of the holsts.
j in the event of loss of electrical power, the RM re.d SFilM will not drop the fuel assembly. Manual drive mechanism are provided to permit completion of the handling cycles without power.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.9.1.41 specifics the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the Fuel llandling System.
1 1
1.9.1.4 - 01 30-93 i
r SYSTEM SS+
TABLE 1.9.1A FUEL HANDLING SYSTEM j
Imenections. Tests. Analyses. and Amatance Criteria I
l Certi5ed Desien Ch I _ #---- Tests. Amakses A- -- _ ^ - e Crieeria L
The Fuel Handling System cWest<
L 1%u.Goa of the Fuel Handling L
The irems idenufied in the of a RM, SFHM, CEACP, FTS, System wiH be performed.
Certified Design Commitment CEAE, NFE, FBOC and CPC.
riist 2.
The RM, SFHM and CEACP hoists 2.
WA of the RM, SFHM and 2.
The load-mQ devices and i
em'.dcd with load-measuring CEACP hoists will be performed.
interlocks identified in the are devices and interlocks" to interrupt Certdied Design Commitment hoisting and lowering if load E=its exist.
are reached.
l P
The RM, SFHM and CEt.CP hoists 3.
Inspection of the RM, SFHM and 3.
The travel limit interlocks 3.
are e v/.".c4 with interlocks to CEACP Inists will be performed.
- &
- :Ged in the Certdied Design
[
7 Iimit upward Im,;st travel.
C(.--. J.:--- : exist.
' 4.'
The RM, SFHM and CEACP hoists 4
Inspection of the RM, SFHM and 4.
The =ech A l stops M =rified in are provided with mech==ir=1 staps CEACP hoists wiH be performed.
the CertiSed Desiga Commitment to limit upward hoist travel.
exist.
5.
In the event of loss of electrical i
The RM and SFHM will be tested i
The grapple does not open.
]'
. power, the RM and SFHM will not by removing ckdinel power.
l daop a inh assen bly.
l 6.'
The RM and SFHM have manual 6.
The RM and SFHM hoists will be 6.
The hoists operate and the drive me4 h s to aBow hoist operated and the machines will be
==--?'= m vr 4;uu and==ch'~ transtarian moved without electrical power.
without electrical power.
i 1.9.1A 01-3D.93
SYS1EM 80+"
1.9.1.4 FUEL liANDLING SYSTEMS ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amplifyine Information Sec CESSAR DC Section 9.1.4 for a FilS description.
j 2.
Relationship of FIIS ITAAC to the Safety Analysis None 3.
Egjationship of FilS ITAAC to PRA e
Nonc 4.
CESSAR DC Chanter 14 Tests Applicable to FIIS ITAAC l
CESSAR DC Section 14.2.12.1.35 1.9.1.4 1-01-30-93
SYS'IEM 80+"
1.93 CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM
]
Design Description
'the Condensate Storage System is a non safety system that provides a source of degasilled condensate for makeup to the main condenser and is a source of startup i
feedwater used as makeup to the steam generators. A basic system configuration is shown in Figure 1.9.31.
The Condensate Storage System provides makeup or receives excess condensate aa necessary via control valves modulated by the main condenser llotwc!! I. cycl Ccmtrol System. 'Ihc Condensate Storage System also serves to collect and store plant drains.
The system consists of a condensate storage tank, a condensate drain tank, and associated valves, piping, and controls. Pumps are provided for recycling water from the condensate storage tank back to the vacuum degasiller.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.9.31 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Condensato Storage System, i
1 0
1 5
5 i
s t'
d 1.9.3 1-01 29 93 4
SYS1EM se+
TABLE 1.93 CONDENSNm S1DRAGE SYSTEM Ins-etions. Tests. Amah and Accretance Criteria I---- c~: -- Tests. Analyses Accestance Criteria Certi5ed Desies C_
L A basic system 4 dion for L
Inspection of the as-buik system L
The as-built coaGguration of the the Condensate Storage System is configuration will be conducted.
C- +'- - ae Storage System is in s'acwn in Figure L93-L accordance with Fgere L9}1 for the components and equipment shown.
1.9.3 01-29-93
FROM l
VACUUM DEGASIFIER I f
{
EXCESS CONDENSATE FROM CONDENSER CONDENSATE PLANT CONDENSATE -
N STNGETM RECYCLE PUMPS i f i f l
CONDENSATE V CUUM c E
T T
DEoASIFleR CONDENSATE DRAIN TANK PUMP i
FIGURE 1.9.3-1 CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM
.. =. --.. _....
SYSTEM 80+"
1.9.3 CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amplifvine Information CESSAR.DC Section 9.2.6 2.
Relationshlo of CONDENS ATE S'lVR AGE SYSTEM ITAAc to the Safetv Annivsli None 3.
Estationshin of CONDENSATE STORAGE SYSTEM ITAAC to PRA None 4.
CESSAR DC Chapter 14 Tests Applicable to CONDENSATI! STORAGE SvcTilhi ITAAC CESSAR.DC Section 14.2.12.1.82 1.9.3 01-29-93
i i
j SYS'IV.M 80+"
1.9.4 REFUELING WATER SYSTEM Design Description
]
1 nere is no unique system designated the Refueling Water System. Components of other systems are used to fill and drain the refueling pool and to purify the refueling pool water as described below. Filling and draining the refueling pool and purifying l
the refueling pool water are not accident mitigation or safety functions.
He containment spray pumps fill the refueling pool by pumping water from the in.
containment refueling water storage tank (IRWST) to the refueling pml.
I ne shutdown cooling pumps drain the refueling pool to the level of the reactor vessel flunge by taking suction on the refueling pool via the operating shutdown cooling suction lines and discharging to the IRWST. Water in the refueling pool below the Hevation of the reactor vessel flange is transferred to the IRWST by the l
Pool Cooling and Purification System.
The refueling pool water is purified by the Pool Cooling and Purification System.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria i
I There are no inspections, tests, analyses or acceptance criteria associated with filling
{-
and draining the refueling pool. Inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance criteria for purification of refueling pool water by the Pool Cooling and Purification System are provided in Section 1.9.1.3.
1-l l
4 1.9A 01 30-93
~~.
l SWIY,M 80+"
1.M REFUELING WATER SYSTEM ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 2
i 1.
Amplifyine Information RWS Descriplian CESSAR.DC Section 9.2.7 r
i 2.
Relationshin of RWS ITAAC to the Safety Analnis, f
None 1
3.
Relationshin of RWS ITAAC to PRA I
None 4
4.
QMSAR DC Chanter 14 Tcfts Applicable to RWS ITAAC Test
Description:
Nenc J
l h
i 1
)
.f 6,
t 1-01-30 93 1.9A
-.~.e s
y
- .,n.x v
SYSTEM 80+"
1.9.5 PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM Design Description ne process sampling system (PSS) is a non. safety system and does not perform accident mitigation or safety functions. Portions of the system form part of the 3
reactor coolant pressure boundary. He PSS collects and delivers samples from process systems to sample stations for analysis.
The PSS includes piping, heat exchangers, sample vessels, sample sinks or racks, 4
analysis equipment and instrumentation. Figure 1.9.51 shows a simplified system configuration.
The PSS is built to the ASME Code Section III classifications shown on Figure 1.9.5-
- 1. All piping and components classified ASME Code Class 2, or 3 are Seismic Category I.
Sample lines penetrating the containment boundary are provided with isolation valves whici. -lose on receipt of a containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS).
PPS instrumentation indications and alarms shown on Figure 1.9.51 are available in the Control Roont. Controls are available in the Control Room to open and close the remotely-operated valves shown on Figure 1.9.5-1.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.9.5-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the PSS.
1.9.5 01-29-93
SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.9.5-1 PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Certirned Desien Coswitanent I= ---#- : Tests. Anakses A-_s- '- :e Criteria L
A basic configuration for the PSS is L
Inspections of the as-built PSS L
He as-buik PSSconfiguration is in shown in Figure L95L configuration will be performed.
accordance with Figure L951, for the components and equipment shown.
2.
ASME Code portions of the PSS 2.
A pressure test will be conducted He resuks of the pmm test of retain their integrity under internal on those portions of the PSS' ASME Code portions of the PSS pressures that will be experienced required to be pressure testeo by conform with the requirements in during service.
Ge ASME Code.
tl.c ASME Code Section IIL 3.
Sample : ' lines penetrating.
the 3.
Insped as-built PSS configuradon.
3.
The as-built PSS configuration in-containment are provided. with Perform. tests simulating a CIAS cludes isolation vahrs in the isolation valves widch close on and observe the PSS containment sample lines penetrating contain-receipt of a containment isolation isolation valves response.
ment and the isolation valves close actuation signal (CIAS).
on receipt of a CIAS.
4.
He PSS collects and delivers fluid -
4 Tests will be performed to obtain 41 Fluid samples can be obtained.
samples from process ' systems to fluid samples from the sample sample stations-for analyses.
points shown on Figure L95L 5.
PSS instrumentation indications 5.
Inspection of the Control Room for 5.
The instrumentation
~ dications m
and alarms shown on Fig;ure L95 the availability of instrumentation -
and alarms shown on Figure L95' 1 are available in the Control indications and i. ms identified in 1 exist or can be retreived in the Room. Controls are available in the Certified ' I7 s a Commitment Control Room.
PSS controls the Control Room to open. and will be performeo.
Tests will be operate as speafied in the close the remotely-operated valves performed using the PSS controls in Certified fx: sign Commitment.
snown on Figure L951.
the Control Room.
1.9.5 01-29-93
- ~
[ASME CODE CLASS l L
L2.li.l PROCESS V
RADIATION g
MONITOR
-)[
CVCS PURIFICATION
~
FILTER INLET r.r h
DEtAY Coil lI BORONOMETER
_ _ q_ONTAsCMwr
]
comanesENT C i
i r
f_-
SAMPLE RCS HOT
/ /
VESSE LEG 1
( r i
8 I
l CIAS *
==
' CLOSES h4 0
l M
E
}cnts*
HOLDUPV LUME L
h h
UNE1 ctas g
E POST ACCIDENT
~~
g I
UQUID SAMPLE gmyST POST SSEL HOLDUP VOLUME l
ACCIDENT UNE2 SAMPLE gg!_ _
PUMP E
I s-SAMPLE Y
SINK I
am.
J os[s POSTACCIDENT
~ ~
g y
UQUID SAMPLE l.
{
VESSEL RM N E
~{
STEAMSPACE l
Qg mMARv SAMPLE m
yg m l
COCtER ASSEMBLY RAM l
CVCS CHEMICAL AND VOLUME CONTROLSYSTEM CIAS CONTAINMENT ISOLATION ACTUATION SIGNAL j L q p l
CCWS COMPONENT COCUNG WATER SYSTEM CCWS i
. HEAT EXCHANGER i
'"*S' M ST#""R FIGURE 1.9.5-1
""'""**""*^'""S'"""
RCS REACTOR CMLANT SWEM PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM-l
SYSTEM 80+"
1.9,5 PROCESS SAMPLING SYSTEM ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
AmaliMnr Informaiton PSS Descriptions CESSAR-DC Section 9.3.2 2.
J3elationshjo ot PSS ITAAC to the Safety Analysis None 3.
B3elajonship of PSS ITAAC to PRA None -
4.
CESSAR-DC Chanter 14 Tests Annlicable to PSS ITAAC Test
Description:
CESSAR DC Section 14.2.12.1.90 I
i
'1
't 1.9.5 01-29-93
.8MiTEM 80t" 1.9,6 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS Design Description The Compressed Air Systems (CAS) are non. safety related systems consisting of the Instrument Air System (IAS), the Station Air System (SAS), and the Breathing AirL System (BAS). The Instrument Air System supplies compressed air to air. operated instrumentatic,n, air-operated controls, and air-operated valves. The Station Air 4
System supplies compressed air for air-operated tools,'and for general use in' the plant. The Breathing Air System supplies compressed air for breathing protection.
3 The IAS 'has four trains. Each train has an air intake filter / silencer, an air compressor, an air receiver, a dryer / filter train, and associated piping and valves. A basic ccmliguration for the IAS is shown in Figure 1.9.G1.
ne SAS has two trains. Each SAS train has an air intake filter / silencer, and air compressor, an air receiver, an air dryer / filter, and associated piping and valves. A basic configuration for the SAS is shown in Figure 1.9.42.
The BAS has two trains. Each BAS train has an air intake filter / silencer, a breathing air compressor, an air receiver, a breathing air purifier, and associated piping and valves. A basic configuration for the BAS is shown in Figure 1.9.G3.
Instrumentation is provided to monitor compressed air systems pressure and indications and alarms are available in the control room. Controls are provided to -
start and stop each CAS from the control room. The IAS is controlled automatically.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.9 G1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acccptance
~
criteria for the CAS.
1.91
-1e il-300 -
u
SYs'IEM 80+
TABLE I.9.6 COMPRESSED AIR' SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desian Commitanent Inspections. Tests. Annivses Acceptance Criteria L
A basic configuration for the IAS L
. Inspections of the as-built system 1.
The as-built configuration of the is shown in Figure L9f>-L configuration will be performed.
IAS is in accordance with Figure 3.9.6-1 for the components and equipment shown.
2.
A basic configuration for the SAS 2.
Inspections of the as-built system 2.
The.as-built configuration of the is shown in Figure L9.6-2. -
configuration - will be performed.
SAS is in accordance with Figures L9fr2 for the components and equipment shown.
3.
A basic configuration for the BAS 3.
Inspections. of the as-built system 3.
. 'Ibe as-buik configuration os the is shown in Figure L9.6-3.
configuration will be performed.
BAS is in accordance with Fgures L9fr3 for the components and equipment shown.
4.
CAS instrumentation indications 4.
Inspection of the Control Room for
- 4..
'N instr =nentath n_
indications and alarms shown in Figures 'L9.6-the avaihbility. of instrumentation and alarms shown in Figures L9fr 1,- L9fr2, ' and 1.9.6-3 are available indications and alarms identified in 1, 13I>-2, and L9.6-3 crist in the in the Control. Room. - Controls are the Certified ' D-Agn Commitment Control Room.
-CAS controis available -_ in ther control room to will be performed.. Tests will be operate as specified in the start and. atop each CAS The IAS
. performed using the CAS controls Certified Design Commitment.
is automatically. controlled.
in the Control Room.
l L
1.9.6 1-30-93
.m.e.m_.._.,m.
m._...
.m..
........_m....~...---.-..._._.m.
m.
.m.
4 r
Apt MLTIDI t
f k
Afft CoasMteSSOR DRyestetTER
.[
V g
coerrAccesewyl messoe oursee cowrsesem I as coxcu wj u.
In2.I Li..8J g
m t
l
~~
44sTm:ssRWr Aan SUPPLY -
i g
C *dCLO.C.A.T.aress e, Side
+
ca.r
.y
- Ast COedPneSSOJC f OftfeR'PILTW81 g
=
v M
l-g#4 l
Ast P!L125t m
g r -
I 7
l g
+
+
- Al* Coserneseost OnYeRMLTen
)
6 Q
Tyggpg t
rr n a m A.,
necemet hsese comn ca.Ang,J g Ianase cooe ca.assi E
,,,,,L,e,t ans.oe ri mi co r co r-D*
(
O 10PLAf,h sulLoefses SIST9k3* *
- SUPPLY our.oeconr r
p L..
A co P a,,,,
m.
i-ngCSfifeR i
b.
f.
FIGURE 1.9.6-1 i
INSTRUMENTAIR SYSTEM
= n.m m
(.
N W
l
^
=an" o co esso.
v.
A
,ae am AIR FILTER -
m N
X M
AIRCat' PRESSOR -
V
- coo. - i i
m- - - i ao am-ewe i.
STAllo,e AM SUPPLY A
i C><]
l Towca=
=
- co r-l i,
I ev==
co rana,ent co rAnnent j
II l-FIGURE 1.9.6-2 mre
=mv -
STATION AIR SYSTEM "ou%"'c"o"r'"*-r
- ___i,
_ _ ~
k AIR FR.TeR X
o N
i><3 W
. Rom.
AM COMPReSSCR R
V -
ReceNeR i
J r
N b
X m
. N C><3 X
r
=aug =-
Am co - ReSSoR v
i i e coo _
L Am' Imid.
- l11lij ReceweR
[
7 BREATHING AM SUPPLY T.O. LOC.ATI.ONS C
g me r-
==ce I
oursee conrAnmewr conrAn ewr
. u saur"== = $vw FIGURE 1.9.6-3 TO PLANT 3rWLDHeG BREATHING AIR SYSTEM.
r==e c=
\\
4 SYSTEM _80+"
l 1.9.6 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEMS ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amnlifyine Information Not Applicable 4
2.
Relationship of CAS ITAAC to the Safety Anahsis E
Not Applicable 3.
- Relationshin of CAS ITAAC to PRA 1)
The Instrument Air System (IAS) has four parallel trains.
2)
Each train consists of an instrument air compressor, an air receiver, and an instrument air dryer connected in series.
3)
Sufficient instrumentation is provided in the control room to monitor and control the IAS.
4) ne instrument air compressors can be actuated automatically or manually.
2 Not Applicable to Breathing Air System Not Applicable to Station Air System 4.
CESSAR-DC Chanter 14 Tests Applicable to CAS ITAAC See CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1.88 1.9A 1-36-93
SYSTEM 80+"
1.9.7 TURBINE BUILDING COOLING WATER SYSTEM Design Description The Turbine Building Cooling Water System (TDCWS) is a non-safety system that provides cooling water to the non safety related turbine plant auxiliary system components.
The TBCWS is a single closed loop cooling water system. A basic system configuration of the TBCWS is shown in Figure 1.9.7-1. The TBCWS has two heat exchangers, two pumps, one surge tank, piping, valves, and controls.-
The TBCWS transfers heat from turbine building auxiliary system components to the Turbine Building Service Water System (TBSWS).
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Tat:'a 1.9.7-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Turbine Building Cooling Water System.
1-9-7 01-30-93
SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.9.7 TURBINE BUEDING COOLING WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Co==hment IESpections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.
A basic system configuration for 1.
Inspection of the as-buih system L
The as-built configuration ~ of the the Turbine Building Cooling configuration mill be conducted.
Turbine Building Cooling Water Water System is shown in Figure System is in accordance with 1.9.7-1.
Figure 1.9.7-1 for the com-ponents and equipment shown.
1-9-7 01-3693
i i
e b
1 r i
t TURBINE BUILDING COOLING WATER SURGE TANK -
F 7
TURBINE BUILDING -
L I L i
COOLING WATER 3 r q
PUMPS f
i
'J L L
TURBINE BUILDING
[
COOLING WATER -
HEAT EXCHANGERS 1 I
. HEAT LOADS l
4 C
FIGURE 1.9.7-1 TURBINE BUILDING COOLING WATER SYSTEM
l SYSTEM f0+" -
1.9.7 TBCWS ITAAC 1
- SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION
~
1.
Amplifyine Information CESSAR-DC Section 9.2.8 2.
Relationshin of TBCWS ITAAC to the Safety Analysis None i
3.
Relationshin of TBCWS ITAAC to PRA t
j None-4.
CESSAR-DC Chanter 14 Tests Annlicable to TBCWS ITAAC i -
CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.12.1.81 1
1 i
3 1-01-30-93 i--
1-9-7.
J w
e y
SYSTEM 80+=
1.9.9 TURHINE BUILDING SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Design Description The Turbine Building Service Water System (TBSWS) it a non safety system that removes heat from the Turbine Building Cooling Water System (TBCWS) and transfers heat to the Condenser Circulating Water System.
The TBSWS consists of two pumps, with associated piping, valves, and controls. A basic configuration of the TBSWS is shown in Figure 1.9.9-1. The TBSWS pumps provide cooling water to the TBCWS heat exchangers.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.9.91 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Turbine Building Service Water System, i
2 6
g 1
2 1-9-9 01-30-93
]
SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.9.9-1 TURBINE BUILDING SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desis!n Conn.iltament Inspections. Tests. Analyses AchJ m Criteria L
A basic system configuration for L
Inspection of the as-built system L
. The as-built configuration of the the Turbine Building Service Water configuration will be conducted.
Turbine Building Senice Water System is shown in Figure L9.9-L System := in accordance with Figure L95-1 for the components and equipment shown.
1-9-9 01-30-93
f (h
FROM NORMAL _
i HEAT SINK
= TO NORMAL HEAT SINK i.
FROM NORMAL HEAT SINK l TURBINE BUILDING i
COOLING WATER i
TURBINE BUILDING HEAT EXCHANGER SERVICE PUMP i
i t
FIGURE 1.9.9-1 TURBINE BUILDING SERVICE WATER SYSTEM a
7
.,r-'
SY!rmM 80+"
1.9.9 Tl]RBINE BUILDING SERVICE WATER SYSTEM ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amnlifyine Information
- CESSAR-DC Section 9.2.10 2.
Relationshin of TBSWS ITAAC to the Safety Anahsis None 3.
Relationshin of TBSWS ITAAC to PRA None 4.
CESSAR DC Chanter 14 Tests Annlicable to TBSWS ITAAC CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.1.12.83 1
1-9-9 01-30-93
4 SYS'IEM 80+"
1.9.23 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEMS Design Description The compressed gas systems (CGS) are non. safety related and supply gases for equipment and instrumentation cooling, purging, diluting, inerting, and welding. The major items of equipment are 'he high pressure gas cylinders and pressure regulators 4
to control the pressure and distribution of the various gases used in the plant.
l The compressed gas systems are arranged into the following separate and isolated j
subsystems:
I A.
N System B.
H System 2
C.
O System l
D.
CO System j
E.
Argon / Methane System F.
Acetylene System G.
Argon System Bulk storage of gas cylinders is located in areas which contain no safety-related equipment.
Hazardous gases are not stored in close proximity to HVAC system fresh air in-takes, the control room, or the compressed air system in-takes.
Bulk stoiage of gas cylinders is outside the low trajectory turbine missile path.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.9.231 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the compressed gas systems.
E
.1.9.23 ;1-36 93
SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.9.23-1 COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acce=*=nce Criteria Certified Desies Communituneat Inspections. Tests. Anaines A-J m Criteria 1.
Bulk storage of gas cylinders is L
Visual inspection of the as-built L
The bulk gas storage area contains located in areas which contain no plant arrangement will be no safety-related stru ctures, safety-related structures, systems, performed.
systems, or components.
and components.
2.
Hazardous gases are not stored in 2.
Visaal inspection of the as-built 2.
Hazardous gases are not in close proximity. to a HVAC system arrangement will be performed to proximity to the specified fresh air in-take, the control room, verify locations.
locations.
or the compressed - air system in-takes.
3.
Bulk storage of gas cylinders is 3.
Visual inspection of the as-built 3.
Storage locations of high pressure outside the low trajectory turbine location of the high pr-wre gas gas cylinders are outside the low missile path.
cylinders will be performed.
trajectory. turbine mksile path.
1.9.23. 01-30-93
SYS'IEM 80+"
1.9.23-COMPRESSED GAS SYSTEM ITAAC-SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amplifyine Information None 2.
Relationship of COS ITAAC to the Safety Analysis None 3.
Relationshin of COS ITAAC to PRA 4
None 4.
CESSAR-DC Chapter 14 Tests Annlicable to COS ITAAC 4
Refer to CESSAR DC Section 14.2.12.1.89 l
4 1.9.23 1-30-93 e
-,-'Y-
SYS'IV,M 80+"
1.9.25 POTABLE AND SANITARY WATER SYSTEMS Design Description De Potable and Sanitary Water Systems (PSWS) provide process water for general plant use.
The Potable and Sanitary Water Systems are not within the scope of the certified design. De site specific Potable and Sanitary Water Systems will meet the interface requirements defined below.
Interface Requirements There are no interconnections between the Potable and Sanitary Water Systems and systems having the potential for containing radioactive material, Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.9.251 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the Potable and Sanitary Water Systems.
1.9.25 1-30-93
SYS'IEM 80+
TABLE 1.9.25-1 POTABLE AND SANITARY WATER SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desima Commitunent Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria L
There - are no interconnections L
Inspections of the as-lmilt system L
The Certified Design Commitment between the Potabic - and Sanitary configuration will be performed.
is met.
Water Systems and systems having the potential for containing.
radioactive material I
4 1.9.25 1-30-93
~---- J
SYSTEM 80+"
1.9.25 POTABLE AND SANITARY WATER SYSTEMS SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amplifyine Information N/A 2.
Relationship of PSWS ITAAC to the Safety Analysis N/A 3.
Relationship of PSWS ITAAC to PRA N/A 4.
CESSAR-DC Chapter 14 Tests Applicable to PSWS ITAAC N/A 1.9.25 1-30-93
r
[
SYSTEM 80+"
1.10.1.1 TURBINE GENERATOR Design Description The turbine generator is a non-safety system that converts the energy of the steam produced in the steam generators into mechanical shaft power and then into electrical
]
energy.
Figure 1.10.1.1 1 shows the basic systcm configuration for the turbine generator. The flow of main steam is directed from the steam generators to the turbine through stop valves and controlvalves. After expanding through the turbine, which drives the main generator, exhaust steam is admitted to the main condenser.
Turbine generator functions are monitored and controlled automatically by the turbine control system. The Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) System-provides overspeed protection, speed and load control, and trip of the turbine generator. The main steam stop and control valves close on receipt of a high first stage turbine pressure signal, a turbine trip signal, or overspeed trip.
The turbine generator has an c!cctrical overspeed trip device and a diverse mechanical overspeed trip device.
The turbine generator placement and orientation ensures that the turbine missile low trajectory strike zones do not include safety re'ated structures, systems, and i
i components.
The Turbine Gland Scaling System (TOSS) is a non-safety subsystem that provides scaling steam at the annular openings where the turbine shaft emerges from the turbine shell casings and at various steam valve stems.
)
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.10.1.1 1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the turbine generator.
i 1-10 1-1 '01-30-93
JYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.10.1.1-1 TURBINE GENERATOR Inspections. Tests. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desian Communitsment Inspections. Tests. Analyses.
Acceptance Criteria L
A basic system configuration for 1.
Inspection - of the as-built con-L The as-built configuration of the the turbine generator is shown in figuration will be conducted.
turbine generator is in accordance Figure 1.10.L1-L.
with Figure L10.L1-1 for the components and equipment shows.
~ 2.
The turbine generator has an elec-2.
Tests of the tur b e generator 2.
The resuhs of the" tests of the tur-trical overspeed trip device and a' overspeed trip devices will be con-We generator overspeed trip de-diverse - mechanical.' overspeed trip ducted.
vices show actuation occurs.
device.
3.
The placement afid orientation of 3.
Inspection of the turbine generdor 3.
Safety-related structures, systems, the turbine generator within the placemest and orientation, - the as-'
and compocents are not within the turbe generator building excludes built turbe buikling arrangement calculated low trajectory missile safety-related structures,. systems,-
and the facility l lay-out will be strike zenes.
and components. from the calcu -
conducted to compare the location
' lated low trajectory turbine missile
- of safety-related structures, sys-strike zones.
tems,. and compon-ents with re-
. spect. to calculated ' iow trajectory missile strike zones.
4 L
i 1-10-1-1 01-36-93
... -.... -. ~....... - -. -... _. - -... - _.....
. ~,.
i I
(
FROM~
J.
MAIN STEAM SUPPLY
/
MAIN
-)~
GENERATOR STOP CONTROL MAIN O
VALVES VALVES I
TURBINE fG 1
FROM (INCLUDES TESS)
V
)
MAIN STEAM SUPPLY 7
r---I
~
/
I N
/
TO MAIN CONDENSER N'-
I-
' ll FIGURE-1.10.1.1-1 TURBINE GENERATOR t
3
+y-a
=.
b 1
SYS'IV.M 80+"
1.10.1.1 TURHINE GENERATOR ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amnlifyinn Information CESSAR DC Section 10.2 l
2.
Relationship of TG ITAAC to the Safety Anahsis H
j None 3.
Relationship of TG ITAAC to PRA None 4.
CESSAR-DC Chanter 14 Tests Applicable to TG ITAAC CESSAR-DC Section 14.2.1.12.72 I
I 1
i 10-1-1 01.% 93 f
.SYSTF.M 80+"
1.10.1.3 MAIN CONDENSER Design Description
'the Main Condenser System it a non. safety system that converts the turbine exhaust steam to condensate so it can be pumped back through the Condensate and Feedwater systems to the steam generators. The main condenser also serves as a collection point for the following:
1.
Feedwater heater drains and vents.
2.
Condensato and Feedwater System makeup.
3.
Miscellaneous auxiliary equipment vents and drains.
Figure 1.10.1.3 1 shows the basta system configuration for the main tendenser.
'The Condenser Circulating Water l1ystem and the exhaust team path from the turbine interface with the main condenser.
The main condenser rece!ves steam during the initial part of plant shutdown when main steam in bypassed to the condenser by the Turbine Dypass System.
The control equiptr.ent for this system is operating equipment, and is not required for safe shutdown of the reactor.
Inspections, Terts, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.10.1.31 specifics the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the main condenser.
r 4
i 1.10.1.3 1-Ol-28-93
I
?
i l
1 SYSTEM 30+
TABLE 1.10.13 4
MAIN CONDENSER Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and A-: __ ^
x Criteria Certified Desigs C+
Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceqstance Criteria i
i t
L De basic system con 6guration for L
laspection of the as-built config-L He as-built configuration of the
[
the m A condenser is shown in aration wiH be conducied.
main a
- w is in accordance Figure L10.13.L with Figure 1.10.13-1, for the wM and w-..a shown.
2.
A turbine trip signal is generated 2.
Tests of the turbine trip < p =I 2.
A turbine trip signal froma the mA 1
by _ signals. froma. the n="=m froes the mA Mw pressure ccosr=rr wessure instranents is l
pressure instruments on loss of instruments wing sininiated loss of activated on a simulated loss of l
condenser vacount.
cr.='-sw vacumet <p=I= wiB be condenser wcuuma signal c W ed I
i h
NOTE:
ITAAC for the Main Condenser Evacuation System are separately addressed.
t
[
t 4
i_
s t
4 t.
- 1.10.1.3 -
01-28-93 6
i i
i 2
.m.
EXHAUST l
MAKEUP N
FROM
/N
+TO MAIN CONDENSER CONDENSATE N
l h
l Lr EVACUATION SYSTEM STORAGE SYSTEM
/
N
\\
lf gl
, - - 'JJJJJ_fTO TURBINE FROM
-- ATRIP SIGNAL 1
I TURBINE p
A BYPASS SYSTEM 1f U V
FROM CONDENSER TO CONDENS CIRCULATING 2,
MAIN
= C RCULATINC WATER SYSTEM CONDENSER WATER SYST TO CONDENSATE SYSTEM
EXEly.M 30+"
1.10.1 3 MAIN CONDENSER ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
AmpliMnn Information CESSAR DC Section 1Q.4.1 2.
Relationshln of MAIN CONDENSER ITAAC to the Safety Analnla None 3.
Edoflonship of MAIN CONDENSER ITAAC to PRA None 4.
CESSAR DC Chanter 14 Tests Applicable to MAIN CONDENSER ITAAC, CESSAR DC Section 14.2.12.1.69 1.10.1.3 1-01-28 93-
---_a__.--.-_____m-.-_______---_a_m.__
SYS1EM 80+"
1.10.1.4 MAIN CONDENSER EVACUATION SYSTEM Design Description
%c Malo Condenser Evacuation System is a non.sarcty systere that removes air and other noncondensable gases from the condenser,
%c system aho maintains condenser vacuum for turbine operation during startup and normal operation.
%c Maln Condenser Evacuation System basic configuratior;is shown in Figure 1,10.
1,41, %c system conshts of four skid mounted v.cuum pumps and associated piping and instrumentation. %c vacuum pump air discharge is routed to the unit vent and monitored for radiation tu detect steam generator primary-to-secondary tubo leaks.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria q
l
- Table 1,10.1.41 specifics the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Main Condenser Evacuation System.
1.10.1A 1-e128-93
=
-1
~
}
SYSTEM 98+
TABLE 1.10.1.4
[
t MAIN CONDENSER EVACUATI6N SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Amalvses. and Accestance Criteria i
i t
Cer*M Design Ch InnsectiveL_ Tests _Amalysty W Crikria f
L A basic system configuration for L
Inspection of the as w mtem L
The as-built um.4 A and the Mair. Coad-~
Evacuation configuration will be w_ted.
radiation monitor W in the S -aem and radiation mocitor Main Condenser Evacuation System 3
pt - is depicted in Figure is in.
with Fgure L101&L L10141 for the components and equipment shown.
i I
l i
a 4
i J
k
! 'i L10.L4 91-25 93
f T
r TO UNIT h
MT r
i i
gg RADIATION i
MONITOR (S) i l
VACOUM PUMPS f
l i
s (MAIN CONDENSER) e i
FIGURE 1.10.1.4-1 MAIN CONDENSER EVACUATION SYSTEM i
sy s 80+=
1.10.1.4 MAIN CONDENSER EVACUATION SYSTEM ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Ampilfdne Informg11gn CESSAR DC Section 10.4.2 2.
Relationshin of CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM ITAAC to the Safety Analysis None 3.
Eglglonship of CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM ITA AC to PR A None 4.
CESSAR DC Chnnter 14 Tests Applicable to CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM ITAAC CESSAR DC Section 14.2.12.1.69 1.10.1.4 01-28-93 j
j a
\\
?
SYSTEM 30+"
1.10.1.5 TURillNE IlYPASS SYSTEM 5
Design Description f
f
%c Turbine Bypass System is a non. safety system. For startup, shutdown, and during load shedding, the Turbine Bypass System provides the capability to take steam from the main steam header and discharge it directly to the main condenser, bypassing the turbine generator.
i 1
}
A basic system configuration is shown in Figure 1.10.1.51. %c Turbine Bypass System consists of at least cight turbine bypass valves, and associated piping and controls.
%c turbine bypass valves can be controlled automatically by the controls or remotely--
j using controls in the control room.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.10.1.5-1 specifics the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance I
criteria for the Turbine Bypass System.
d Y
)
i
(
1 1.10.1.5 01 28-93
~
SYS1EM se+
TABLE 1.10.1.5-1 1URBINE BYPASS SYSTEM Insmediens. Tests. A-Ivses. rad Accestance Crkeria Catined Desien Ch
-- Tests. Anahsen A- - _ ^- - + Criseria L
A basic system umG
. tion for L
Inspection d the as-built system L
The as-built u=Gs-.Guo of the 5
the rubine bypass system is shown configuration s,iHto W M tabiac bypass system is in accor-in Figwe L10.1SL d-with F~gure L10.151 for the conspear=ts and equipment shown.
2.
~ne air operated tubine bypass 2.
A test win be conducted using a 2.
The turbine bypass ralves open on velves opea on receipt of a tubine simulated tubine bypass 4n=1 and receipt of a simulated tubine by-bypass signal and close upon loss of by causing loss of air pressure to pass 4==I and cku with loss of air p-e to their operators.
the turbier. bypass valve operators.
air to the op rators.
r-6 L19.1.5. 01-28-93
MAIN STEAM MAIN STEAM FROM FROM SG 1 SG 2 I f I I
-l r-I i
m I
I
~
-l TBV "OPER" l
~~
~' ~ '
~~
~
l SIGNAL
=
TO TO i
CONDENSER I
CONDENSER l-I I
I I
i l
FIGURE 1.10.1.5 SIMPLIFIED SCHEMATIC OF THE TRUBINE BYPASS SYSTEM
f i
i I
SYS'IEM 30+"
j 1.10.1.5 TURHINE BYPASS SYSTEM ITAAC i
SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amnlifying Information i
f l
2.
Relationshin of CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM ITAAC to the Safety Anahsis None 3.
Relationshin of CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM ITAAC to PRA None 1
4.
CESSAR DC. Chanter 14 Tests Annlicable to CONDENSER CIRCULATING WATER SYSTEM ITAAC CESSAR DC Section 14.2.12.131 I
i I
t 1
1.10.1.5 01-28.
fiYRIV.M 80+'"
1.10.2 CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS Design Description The Condensate and Feedwater Systems return condensate from the main condenser hotwells to the steam generators.
The basic system configuration is shown in Figure 1.10.21. Safety.rclated portions of the Feedwater System are built to the ASME Code Section III class requirements shown on Figure 1.10.21 and is qualified for the environment where located, Components, piping, and supports classilled as ASME Code Class 2 are classified Selsmic Category I.
The entire Condensate System is non. safety related. The Condensate System consists of three motor driven condensate pumps, a gland seal condenser, low-pressure heaters, associated piping, valves, and controls.
The Feedwater System consists of three motor driven feedwater booster pumps, three motor driven main feedwater pumps, high pressure feedwater heaters, associated piping, valves and controls.
Redundant feedwater isolation valves are provided. The feedwater isolation valves close automatically on receipt of a main steam isolation signal or when remotely actuated from the control room.
Feedwater control valves are provided to regulate the feedwater flow to each steam generator and to maintain steam generator level.
Feedwater flow does not exceed a specified maximum value.
Electrically powered safety related components are powered from the class 1E buses.
Controls are available in the control room to start and stop the Condensate and Feedwater pumps, automatically and remotely control the feedwater control valves, and either automatically or remotely actuate the feedwater isolation valves.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.10.21 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and associated acceptance criteria for the Condensate and Feedwater Systems.
1.10.2 1-30 93
r SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.10.2-1 CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. An=Ivsen= and Ac&.4rmace Criteria Certified Desien Commsitament I=:_
- 'm Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria L
A basic configuration for the L
Inspections of the as-buih system L
The as-built configuration of the safety-related portions of the configuration mill be condaded.
safety related portions of the Feed-Feedwater System is shown in water System is in accordance with Figure L10.2-L for the compon-Figure L10.2-L ents and equipment shoun.
2.
ASME Code portions of the Feed-2.
A pressure test will be conducted 2.
The resuhs of the pressure test of water System retain their integrity on those portions of the Feedwater
. ASME Code portions of the Fced-under internal pressures that will System required to be e m ure water System conform with the re-be exp.dcscca during senice.
tested by the ASME Code-quirements in the ASME Code, Sedian III.
' 3.
Main feedwater isolation valves 3.
Preoperational tests of feedwater 3.
The main feedwater isolation close on receipt of a main steam isolation vahrs will be conducted v.hes close within 5 seconds of isolation signal.
using a simulated main steam receipt of a simulated main steam isolation signal isolation signal 4.
Safety-related electrical compon-4.
Inspection will be performed to 4
The as b @
configuration for ents are powered from the class IE verify the as-built configuration safety-related electrical compon-buses.
for power supply.
ents shows power supplied from class IE buses.
5.
Feedwater flow does not exceed a 5.
An analysis will be performed
. 5.
The analyzed mahum feedwater l
specified maximum value.
using as4 milt feedwater pump flow under two pump runout con-performance data to show that the ditions at 1000 psig steam generator specified maximum feedwater flow pressure shall not exceed [laterj l
will not be exceeded.
l l
l 1.10.2 1-30-93 J
SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.10.2-1 (Continued)
CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS Inspections. Tests. Anaines. and Acceptance Criteria Certi5ed Desies Commitiment Im_- :'--- Tests. Amadyses Accendance Criteria 6.
The. main feedwater isolation 6.
Tests will be performed to demon-6.
The main feedwater isolation valves shut in the event of aloss of strate that the main feedwater vahrs shut when a simulated loss offsite power.
isolation vahrs shut upon a sima-of offsite pourt is applied.
lated loss of offsite power.
-7.
Caatrols are available in the control 7.
Tests will be performed using the 7.
The main feedwater isolation room to open and close the main main feedwater isolation valve vahrs open and close in resomse feedwater isolation valves.
controls in the control room.
to control signals from the control room.
i 4
1.10.2 1-30-93 1
l ASME CODE CLASS l CONTAINMENT a 2_l l
X I
I T
O
--C> G-C><]
X%
N caEron FEEDWATER REGULATING MAIN FEEDWATER
=
=
VALVES IISOLATION VALVES I
i h
M-C><]
>G-C><]
Nh-
-W 97 l9 9 m
--C><3-C)<3 N
N o E " Ton FEEDWATER REGULATING MAIN FEEDWATER VALVES IISOLATION VALVES 6
i I
-m N= u
=
-(j l
~
SYSTEM (REMAINDER I
f CONDENSATE 1
SYSTEM FIGURE 1.10.2-1 CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS
)
i i
SYS1EM 80+'"
1.10.2 CONDENSATE AND FEEDWATER SYSTEMS ITAAC 2
l SUPPORT!VE INFORMATION j
1.
Amnlifyinc informatloa I
2.
Relationshin of CAFS ITAAC to the Safety Annivsis llASIS: Feedwater flow shall not exceed [later]
ITAAC: ITAAC 5 acceptance criterion requires that feedwater flow not execed
[later]
HASIS: %c main feedwater isolation valves close within 5 seconds of receipt of a j
MSIS.
ITAAC: ITAAC 3 confirms that the main feedwater isolation valves close within 5 seconds of receipt of a MSIS.
3.
Relationshin of C&FS ITAAC to PRA i'
None 4.
CESSAR DC Chanter 14 Tests Applicable to C&FS ITAAC l
1 CESSAR.DC Section 14.2.12.1.70,.71 i.
+
4 4
'1.10.2 130.?1L
f I
1 SYSTEM 80+"
l l.10.3 STEAM GENERATOR HLOWDOWN SYSTEM Design Description ne steam generator blowdown system (SOBS) is a non. safety related system and is not required to perform accident mitigation or safety functions. He SOBS removes secondary coolant water containing non volatile impuritles from the steam generator and processes the blowdown fluid for re use as condensate.
i
%c SOBS consists of two blowdown lines from the secondary lde of each steam j
generator. %e blowdown fluid is directed to a flash tank from which steam is returned to the condenser or km pressure feedwater heaters. %c liquid portion of J
the blowdown fluid passes to chemical processing equipment or the condensate system. Figure 1.1031 shows a simplified system configuration.
j Remote manual valves in the flash tank inlet piping control the blowdown flow rate.
%c normal rate control valve, the abnormal rate control valve, and the high capacity i
control valve are used to control the flow rates of blowdown fluid removed from the Sos.
)
%c SOBS la built to the ASME Code Section III class requirements shown in Figure 1.1031. ASME Code Class 2 components, piping, and supports are Scismic Category I.
i SOBS blowdown lines penetrating containment are provided with two isolation valvea which close upon reccipt of a containment isolation actuation signal (CIAS), a main steam isolation signal (MSIS), an emergency feedwater actuation signal (EFAS), an alternate feedwater actuation signal (AFAS) or a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS).
Inspections, Tesu, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.1031 specifics the inspections, tests, analyses and associated acceptance criteria for the SOBS.
4
(
1.10.3-1-
12993
SYSTEM 80+"
TABLE 1.10.3-1 SITAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Amakses. and Amh Criteria 4
Certised Design Ch J h Te A Amalyses Accessance Criteria L
A basic configuration of the SGBS 1.
I+c; mis of the as-built SGBS L
The as-built SGBS configuration is is shown in Figure L103-L configuration wiH be perforemed.
in ad rme with Figure L103-1, foe the compoecats and equipment shown.
2.
ASME Code portions of the SGBS 2.
A pressure test wiu be condue:ed 2.
The resuks of the pwe test of retain their integrity under internal on those portions of the SGES re-ASME Code portions of the SGBS p-s that win be mirad quired to be p-e tested by the conform with the r@w in during service.
ASME Code.
the ASME Code Section IIL 3.
SGBS Iines iem^ 4 containment 3.
Tests win be ge-fmad Wa 3.
SGBS cn=th isolation valves contain valves which close upon simulated CIAS, MSIS, EFAS, close upon receipt of a CIAS, receipt of a coata== cat isolation AFAS, and SIAS in individual rests.
actuation signal (CIAS), a main The SGBS containment isolation steam isolation signal (MSIS), an valves response to each signal win emergency feau actuation sig-be observed.
nal (EFAS), an ahernate feedwater actuation signal (AFAS), or a safety injection actuation signal (SIAS).
4 Remote manual valves in the flash 4.
Tests will be performed to blow 4
Blowdown Daid from each SG tank inlet piping control SG blow-down the steam generator usine the passes through the normal, ab-down flow rates.
normal, abnormal, and high capa-normal, and high capacity control city controt valves.
ulves.
L10.3 01-29-93
SYSTEM 99+=
TABLE L193-1 (Contimmed) 1 STEAM GENERA *IDR BIDWDOWN SYSTEM Insocctions. Tests. Analyses. and A-
_ ^ = Criteria Certi5ed Design Osammihment Immettions. Tests. Amakses Acceptance Crieeris 5.
SGBS instrument =rke I '--4-+
5.
Inspection of the Control Room for 5.
The instrumentation indications and alarms shown on Figure the availability of "mstrumentation and alarms shown on f~gure 1.103-1' are available in the indications and alarms Llentined in 1.10 3-1 exist or can be retriemi Control Room.
Controls are the Certified Design n==It-est in the Control Roosi.
SGBS as h m the control room and will be performed. Tests wit be controls operate as specified in the apen and close the remote-operated performed using the SGBS controis Certdied Design Cc==ir--=e valves shown on Figure 1.103-L in the Control Rooms.
t i
1.103 01-29-93
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1 i
j SYSTEM 80+"
1.10.3 STEAM GENERATOR BLOWDOWN SYSTEM ITAAC I
SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION l
1.
AmplifyingJnformation SGilS
Description:
Relationshin of SOBS ITAAC to the Safety Anahsis 1.
liasis: The steam generator blowdown system (SOllS) is isolated on receipt of an emergency feedwater actuation signal (EFAS), main steam isolation j
signal (MSIS), or safety injection actuation signal (SIAS).
i ITAAC: ITAAC 3 confirms isolation of the blowdown lines on receipt of the signals listed above.
l 3.
Relationship of SODS ITAAC to PRA None CESSAR DC Chapter 14 Tests Applicable to SOBS ITAAC 4.
i Test
Description:
CESSAR DC Section 14.2.12.1.68 1
I i
1.10.3 1-01 29-93 4
--..7.-
y
+,,
,.n y,
y r-,y
SYSTEM 80+"
1.11.1 LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Design Description ne Liquid Waste Management System (LWMS) is a non safety system which provides the capability to collect, segregate, store, process, sample, and monitor radioactive liquid waste. Piping from the containment condensate cooler to the LWMS penetrates containment and is provided with containment isolation valves.
%e LWMS consists of subsystems which process radioactive liquid waste which is segregated into the following categories:
1.
Equipment drain waste which includes, for example, degassed reactor grade radioactive liquid waste 2.
Floor drain waste which includes, for example, non. reactor grade radioactive 1.iquid waste 3.
Detergent waste which includes, for example, laundry and hot shower waste liquids 4.
Chemical waste which includes, for example, non-detergent liquid waste The waste streams are not interconnected prior to collection and processing. %c LWMS is not intended to process post. accident sources of liquid wastes. %erefore, valves on the LWMS radioactive inlet flow streams can be closed in post accident conditions by manual action.
He equipment drain waste subsystern provides for filtration, decontamination, batch sampling, and recirculation capability for further processing. A general conceptual illustration of the equipment drain waste subsystem is shown in Figure 1.11.1-1 ne floor drain waste subsystem provides for filtration, decontamination, batch sampling, and recirculation capability for further processing. A general conceptual illustration of the floor drain waste subsystem is shown in Figure 1,11.12.
He floor drain wastu subsystem has the additional capability for oil / crud removal, flocculent addition to collection tanks, and pil adjustment of liquid waste systems.
He enemical waste subsystem has the capability for pil adjustment through chemical addition to the collection tank, filtration, batch sampling, and recirculation to the floor drain waste subsystem for further pmcessing. A general conceptualillustration of the chemical waste subsystem is shown in Figure 1.11.13.
1.11.1 1-13093 4
i SYSTEM 80+"
The detergent waste subsystem has the capability for filtration, decontamination by demineralizes, batch sampling, and recirculation to the floor drain subsystem for further processing. A general conceptualillustration of the detergent waste subsystem is shown in Figure 1.11.1-4.
This LWMS has collection and storage capacity to process the maximum expected liquid waste volumes, based on anticipated peak daily inputs produced during plant operation, refueling, plant shutdowns, maintenance, and startup operations.
LWhiS sample or waste monitor tanks have volumes equivalent or greater than their associated collection tanks. The steam generator drain tank provides surge capacity only and has no associated sample tank or waste monitor tank. In addition, condensate collected in the containment cooler condensate tank is not radioactive, therefore no sample or dedicated waste monitor tank is provided. The LWMS has the capability to divert flows within the LWMS for additional pmcessing. The LWMS has the provision to batch sample cach collection tank prior to processing. The LWMS has the capability to connect additional dm!ncratizers, by the provision of mobile disconnects.
The LWMS processes radioactive liquid waste so that the concentration of the liquid elliuents at the unrestricted discharge point is within the limits specified in 10CFR20, Appendix B, Table II.
He release of processed liquid waste from the LWMS to unrestricted areas can only be initiated by manual action. Instrumentation and controls to monitor and control LWMS parameters and discharge are provided in the control room ns depicted in Figures 1.11.1 1 through 1.11.1-6.
His LWMS can batch. sample and monitor processed liquid waste prior to release to the environment. A radiation monitor is located upstream of the plant discharge. Liquid effluents discharge to untestricted areas is terminated automatically when the limits of 10CFR20, Appendix B, Table 11 will be exceeded, inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria l
Table 1.11.11 specifies the inspections, tests and/or analyses and their associated acceptance criteria for the LWMS.
1.11.1 2-13093
SYSTEM 80+ -
TABLE 1.11.1-1 l
l LIOUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Accentance Criteria Certined Desien Ch InsLections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteris L
Basic configurations of the LWMS L
Inspection of the as-built LWMS L
The as-built LWMS subsystem l
I subsyste.ms. are shewn in Figures mof;3-. tion will be performed.
wJgm. tion for the contponents L1L1-1 through LIL14-shown are in accordance with Figures L1LI-1 through LIL14 for the components and equipment shown.
a) ne LWMS has the capability to a) Mobac discormects are preided.
connect additional demineralizers, by the-provision
.of mobile i
& c = =erts b) The LWMS has the provision to b) A batch sample point is provided
. batch sample each enIW tank for each collection tank.
prior to processing.
2.
Each LWMS subsystem. described 1
An analysis will be performed 1
De L%MS subsystems process
}
in the Design Description has based on as-buik plant data and ihms and storage capacities can process flow and storage capacity site specific infctmation (i.e,
process the anticipated daDy inpc:
to process the anticipated daily dilution flow available) to gcsid during plant operation, input produced during plant deterndne the flow and system refueling, plant sh utd owns, operation, refueling, plant component capacity iq:Acd to m ain t en a n c e, and startup shutdowns, maintenance, and process anticipated daily inputs.
operations.
i startup operations.
Based on the results of the analysis, inspections and pre,w.tivual tests of process ihms and storage capacties of as-built L%NS subsystems will be performed.
i t
h LIL1 I-36-93 I
i
1 1
SYSIEM 88+
TABLE 1.11.1-1 (Continued)
LIOUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Accestance Criteria Certised Desies en--ie--e I- ; en-Tests. Analyses Accestance Criteria 3.
'ne LWMS processes radioadive 3.
Analpis of as-built LWMS per-3.
Tbc Certified Design ra==k=ent
.Iiquid waste so that the for=ance data wiH be performed.
is met.
concentration of radioactive isotopes in liquid effluents ate the j
discharge point is within the limits
'specified in 10CFR20, Appendix B, Table IL 4
The LWMS can batch sample and 4
Inspectxm of aM LWMS sub-4.s) Sampling capabilities exist for-monitor processed liquid waste systems will be performed.
3 '
effluent batches prior to release to
- 1) Each couectica tank prior to the emironment.
pe%
I
- 2) Each waste monitor and sample tank upL w of the plant un-restrided discharge point.
b) Radiation monitoring equipment is located upb w of the plant unrestncred Jh-h-e point.
i 5.a) Radioactive liquid wastes are 5.
Insi-O of aM sptems.will 5.a) Radioactive wastes are segregated segregated into:
be performed.
into four waste stre=e
- 1).. Equipment drain waste
- 1) EqiW drain waste
- 2) -Floor drain wastes
- 2) Floor drain waste
- 3) Detergent wastes
- 3) Detergent waste
- 4) Chemical wastes
- 4) Chemical waste i
1.1L1 1-38-93
SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.11.1-1 (Continued)
LIOUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Ac Aance Criteria j
Certified Desirs Counnitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria S.b) The equipment drain, the floor i
- drain, the detergent, and the 5.b) The four waste creams are not chemical ur.te streams are not interconnected prior to coIIection interconnected prior to coIIcction and processing.
and processhig.
6.
The instrument indications and 6.
Inspecion of the control room 6.a) The L%315 instrumentation indi-alarms shown in Figures LILI.1 instrumentation inEatbs and cations and coctrols shomu in through LIL14 are available in alarms in the Certified Design Figures LIL1-1 through LILI4 the control room. Control to close Commitment will be performed.
exist or can be retrieved in the vahrs on the L%31S inlet waste flows are provided.
Test will be performed using the coctrol room.
L%31S controls in the control room.
b) Valves en the L%}tS subsystems inlet waste fkras can be ckred with controls located in the control room.
7.
Release of processed liquid w::ste 7.
Tests of L%3tS subsystem controls 7.
Release of liquid emuents to un-to unrestriced areas can be initiated only by manual action.
mill be performed.
restricted areas can be imtiated only by manual acion.
8.
Liquid efIluest discharge to 8.
Test of the as-buik L%31S 8.
Liquid wastes discharge to unr:stricted areas is terminated subsystems using signals that unrestricted areas is termmated automatically when the limits of simulate exceedence of limits 39.1 10CFR20, Appendix B, Table II will be exceeded.
be performed.
automatically in response to signals that simulate exceedence cf limits.
1.1LI
-S-I-30-93
f.
l E
i SYSTEM 80+
TABLE I.11.1-1 (Contimmed)
LIOUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM l
Insocctions. Tests. Anakses. and Accestance Criteria Cati 5ed Delien Ch I--->~ -- Tests. Anakses Accestance Criteria t
5.b) The equipment drain, the Door ib) The four waste stre= = s are not drain, the detergent, and the interconnected prior to conection che -ie=1 waste streams are not and pi+
a.g interconnected. prior to coHection and pr.: w d.g 6.~
'Ibe ' instrument indications and 6.
Inspection of 'the control room 6.a) "Ihe L%NS instrumentation indi-alarms shown in Figures LILI.1 instra:nentation indications and cations and controls shown in through LIL14. are available in alarms in the Certdied Design Figures LIL1-1 through LIL1-6 the control room. Control to close Cn==h-ent will be performed.
exist or can be nLa in the vahes on the. LwNS inlet waste Test wiH be perfonned using the control room.
flows are provided.
L%NS controls in the control room.
b) Vahes on the L%NS subsystems inlet waste flows can be ckw:d t
with controls located in the control room.
7.
Release of processed Equid waste 7.
Tests of L%NS subsystem controls 7.
Release of liquid ef!Inents to un-to unrestricted u can. be wiR be performed.
restricted areas can be initiated i
initiated only by m.
4 action.
only by manual action.
8.
Liquid effluent discharge to 8.
Test of the aA milt L%NS 8.
Liquid wastes discharge to unrestricted areas is terminated subsystems nting signals that unrestricted areas is terminated matematicaDy = ben the Emits of simulate -_6 of Emits will automaticaDy in response to signals 10CFR20, Appendix B, Table II be performed.
that simulate - -, -/- --- of Emits.
i-will be - - - -- A-- ?
L1L1 1-30 73
EQUIPMENT DRAlH WASTE HEADER r1 AEACTOR ORADE II LAB ORAINS
"""'M II r
T,
(
3 NUCLEAR ANNEX Eo'llPMENT EQUIP.
EQUIP.
WASTE WASTE RADCASTE BLDQ (g
(EWT)
EoulPMENT(POWDdp >
SLUICE WATER)
+
L J
L J
TURBINE BUILDING aoVFMENT jr y
or RAoCAcnvE) --->
c
=
50 SLOWDOWN SAMP EWT POMPS WASTES 6.e VALVE.-->
p)
& PUMP LEAKAGE)
BORC ActD I'
l'
[F]4 CARBON BED FILTERS
= [F]
BORC ACID M
DEMINET.AllIERS
/
fg fg fg f/ PQ5 ION EXCHANGER HOLDUPTAHK ANT CASTE GA5 COOLE&->
CONDENSER
,,,,/%_/\\
/1._fi RS H RS H
--E]*--- EWF POST FILTERS z [@
swMs
_wMS SWMS +
WASTE 8T SGDT
- ' ->' 8WM8 MONITOR e
MONITOR TANK TANK 5WMS SWM5 WMT PUMPS LS
+
1' 1r A
R NOTE:
[
ALL COMPONENTS AND DISC RGE PIPING ARE SAFETY CLASS NNS.
FIGURE 1.11.1-1 LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM l
)
a.
l m-
FLOOR DRAIN WASTE HEADER fl f-" **
t F" "*"
RucioR cAvnv +
r 3
AND CONTAINMENT r
3 suur (NOTE N FLOUR FLOOR DRAIN DRAIN NUCLEAR ANNEX TANK TANK floor DRAINS (FDT)
(FDT) 4 FUEL BUILDING p
Floor DRAINS 1r e
4 lI"4-pg7pggpg TURBINE BLDQ FLOOR DRAINS 1r 1r h) 4 ON BED #1LTERS W-k) sGDT W
W DEMINERAUZERS W fW cwt l
m 1.J V4
'UN RSSH SWMS RS H
.-@)j FDT POST FILTERS E
SWMS I
'l
^T
- swus swus w-WASTE SGDT M N TOR MONITOR 4- --
TANK 4--
+
TANK t
swus WNT PUMPS U
+
+
p h.
NOTES:
H A
A. CONTAINMENT ISOLATION g
VALVES AND ASSOCIATED PIPING ARE SAFETY CLASS 2.
B. ALL COMPONENTS AND PIPLHG y
ARE SAFETY CLASS NNS UNLESS DISCHARGE OTHERWISE NOTED.
FIGURE 1.11.1-2 LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
DETERGENT WASTE HEADER n
1
> QWMS y
p.owMS LAUNDRY w.
F 7
r 7
& HOT SHOWER SHOWER REQULATED TANK TANK O
SHOP DRAIN g ---
L J
L J
CASK CLEAN4 1P LS
- U PERSONNEL LS
- DECON
=~~ >
(SHOWERS) f f
f ASTPUMPS DETERGENT %
1f SAMPLE U
MISCELLANEOU S
EQUIP DHAING-->
LHST FILTER LHST Lj FILTER fN fM LHST MB DEMIN LHST MB DEMIN n =: r = '
LSWMS
.1 mrw zOwMs R S S H ---->-
BSSH -- ->-
A-P-
f 3
Y DETERGENT r
3 DETERGENT SAMPLE TANK 4
SAMPLE TANK L
A L
J
->- [
DST D
t PUMPS If If NOTE:
A R
A. ALL COMPONENTS AND PlPING ARE SAFETY CLASS NNS.
Y FIGURE 1.11.1-3 LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
CHEMICAL WASTE HEADER fl CHeulC L CHEMICAWDmON n ASTE 1r 1r
=
FDT-L pH 4-CHEMICAL SA E
WASTE e
DRAINS TANK (CWT)
CHEMICAL t
m LAD DRAINS U
>SWMS i
if CWT PUMP LS 1r CARBON FILTER CHEMICAL SAMPLE TANK (CST) l-t LS 4---
1 If CST SWMS 4---
l PUMP e'
If 4 -
A R)
NOTE:
A ALL COMPONENTS AND PIPING ARE SAFETY CLASS NNS.
17 FIGURE 1.11.1-4 LIQUID. WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM i
INSIDE
'I OUTSIDE CONTAINMENT-l CONTAINMENT i
l E3 I
14 2]
I 12 4l SG #1 j
I j
BLOWDOWN r, r,
jD l
D r_
Ll; L a m
rm u
r7 12 4l I-S/G i
DRAIN I
SG #2 L2 L2 PUMP I
BLOWDOWN rT rT EWDT-2 l
STEAM GENERATOR-I FDT
=
DRAIN f
I TANK (SGDT) l LHST
?
A-I (APPROXIMATELY.
i I
FLASH TANK
~
l CONDENSATE i
l CONDENSATE g
m 1
BACKFLASH I
J l
I 1
I I
y I
r SGDT I
A
- PUMP I
U l
I A
l NOTE:
-Q ALL COMPONENTS AND
+ FDT-PIPING ARE SAFETY CLASS -
NNS UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED.
U CONDENSATE INDUSTRIAL -
SYSTEM WASTE DISCHARGE FIGURE 1.11.1-5 LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM-
g l
l 1
4 I
f I
r1 I
->GWMS
- >GWMS l
U r
m c
m CONTAINMENT VENTILATION -
l CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT CONDENSATE COOLER COOLER g
y CONDENSATE CONDENSATE y
TANK TANK A
g l
e (APPAOXIMATELY (APPROXIMATELY e
4000 GAL.S) 4000 GALS) 1 l
t
(
)
L1 g
i I
U CCCT U
U U
CCCT I
r PUMPS
[
PUMPS I
2 1
2 i
i i
y y
y y
i I
I I
I INSIDE OUTSIDE g
CONTAINMENT CONTAINMENT
___I A
y R
NOTE:
FDT =
ALL COMPONENTS AND PIPING ARE SAFETY U
- U CLASS NNS UNLESS WMT INDUSTRIAL OTHERWISE NOTED.
WASTE l
DISCHARGE -
FIGURE 1.11.1-6 LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
d SYSTEM 80+"
1.11.1 LIQUID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
AmnliMnc Information ITAAC 2 The process flow and storage capacity depends on the waste generated in the as-built plant. %is can not be estimated until detailed design is complete. Plant specific information, such as the following, is required to verify the Liquid Waste Management System is designed with sufficient storage and process flow capacity:
1 a)
Typical characteristic leakage rates for as-built components in plant, such as pumps and valves, b)
Number of components which may contribute to total liquid waste generated
- due to leakage, c)
Operating procedures, developed by the COL Applicant, for decontamination of equipment during ali modes of operations.
d)
Maintenance procedures, developed by the COL Applicant, for flushing of components.
An analysis will be performed based om a) as-built expected flow inputs to each Liquid. Waste Management System subsystem, b) radionuclide concentrations of each influent flow stream, c) dilution flow (a site specific parameter) available a the liquid plant discharge point -
to determine the flow and component capacity required to process anticipated daily _
inputs and demonstrate compliance with 10CFR20, Appendix B, Table II limits.
ITAAC 3 CESSAR-DC, Section 11.2 revised per DSER open item 11.2-1, provides a description of the methodology to v;rify compliance with 10 CFR 20, Appendix B limits. Included in the analysis are the following assumptions:
1.11.1 1-28-93
l SYSTEM 80+"
a)
Minimum decontamination factor for all radioisotopes, except noble gases and tritiam, is 1000. His assumes the LWMS demineralizers are connected in
]
series and the system is designed - ith the capability to provide additional w
decontamination capability per ITAAC 1.b.
b)
Minimum dilution flow is 100 scfs.
1 ITAACs 4. 7. and 8 This criteria ensures compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix A (General Design Criteria 60 and 64) which specify the requirement for a controlled monitored release pathway.
In addition 10CFR50, Appendix I, which specifies maintaining general public exposure ALARA due to radioactive liquid elliuents, is an important design objective _which must be met to verify compliance with 40CFR190 (an acceptance criteria in the Radiation Protection ITAAC). 40CFR190 specifies a limit for exposure.to the general public (i.e.,25 mrem whole body,75 mrem thyroid,25 mrem any other organ) due to direct and scattered radiation, as well as radioactive effluents from a uranium fuel cycle. Although a failure to comply with 10CFR50, Appendix I would not result in automatic shutdown of a facility, a detailed report describing why the limits were exceeded and action to be taken would be _ required. However, a pattern of noncompliance could result in a civil penalty based on failure to control radioactive effluent releases in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix A (GDC 60) and would reflect unfavorably on the bilgn of a radioactive waste management system.
To verify compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix I, an analysis using Regulatory Guide 1.109 methodology would be performed. Re following site specific information:
would be required to perform the analysis:
a) land-use survey, such a location of nearest food pathways (e.g., nearest potable water source, garden, cow, goat, etc.)
b)
Dilution flow or volume available.
2.
Relationshin of the Llauid Waste Manacement System ITAAC to the Safety Analysis
_ Section 15.7.2,
" Liquid _ Waste Management System Leak or Failure", of the CESSAR DC is addressed in Section 11.2. It is assumed that the Radwaste Facility,
is physically connected to the Nuclear Annex; therefore, a LWMS leak or failure would be contained 'and there would not be an uncontrolled release to the environment.
5 d
1.11.1 1-28-93
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SYSTEM 80+"
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Relationshin of Lioubt Waste Manancment Svstem ITAAC to PRA i
^
4.
CESSAR DC Chanter 14 Tests Applicable to Llauid Waste Mananement System ITAAC J
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SYS'lVM 80+"
1.11.3 SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Design Description -
ne Solid Waste Management System (SWMS) is a non safety system which provides the capability to collect, segregate, store, process, sample, and monitor radioactive solid waste.
Solid waste is segregated into the following categories:
a.
Wet solid waste (WSW) which is a mixture of water and suspended solids or slurries (e.g., spent bead, filter sludge, tank backwash) b.
Dry solid waste (DSW) which is wild waste containing no free liquid (i.e., compactible and non-compactible waste)
Each category of waste is processed by an independent subsystem.
He WSW subsystem has collection and storage capacity to process at least two batches from the maximum expected solid waste inputs during normal and anticipated operational occurrences, which include refueling, plant shutdowns, maintenance, and startup activities.
The wet solid waste (WSW) subsystem has the provision for solidification by dewatering or binding agents in the shipping container.
The WSW subsystem is provided with low and high activity spent resin storage tanks.
These tanks are provided with station air for the pneumatic transfer of resin from the tanks to the shipping container for dewatering. A general conceptual illustration of the WSW subsystem is shown in Figure 1.11.3-1.
The dry solid waste (DSW) subsystem has the provisions for sorting and compaction of compactible waste, as well as placement of non.compactible waste, such as spent filters, into shipping containers for disposal, ne compactor has an air filtration system. This filtration system is exhausted to the Radwaste Ventilation System, which is a monitored release pathway. A general conceptual illustration of the DSW subsystem is shown in Figure 1.11.3-2.
Radioactive liquid waste, removed during the dewatering process, and radioactive gaseous waste from SWMS components are routed back to the Liquid Waste Management System (LWMS) and the Gaseous Waste Management System (GWMS), respectively. The spent resin storage tanks are provided with screens, and filters are provided downstream of the spent resin tanks to minimize inadvertent discharge of resin beads to the Liquid Waste Management System (LWMS),
1.11.3 01-31-93
SYSTEM 80+"
Inspections, Tests, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.113-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance criteria for the SWMS.
~
1.11.3 01-31-931
=___-______:____
SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.113-1 SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desien Commitanent Inspections. Tests. Analyses hJ--* Criteria 1.
A basic configurat on for the L
Inspection of the DSW System will L
The as-built configuration of the i
SWMSis shown in Figures L113-1 be performed.
SWMS is in accordance with and 1.113-2.
Figures L113-1 and 1333-2 for the components and equipment shown.
2.a) The WSWhas collection and storage 2.a)
Inspection of the as-built WSWand 2.a) The %3W volumes provide capacity to process at least' two the DSW sy stems will be collection and storage capacity for batches of WSW from the maxi-performed.
An analysis will be at least two days of calculated wet mum anticipated source during performed to calculate systems waste generation.
normal operation. and refueling, volumes based on anticipated peak plant shutdowns, maintenance, inputs.
startup activities.
b) The DSW has prodsions for stor-b) An inspection of the DSW system b) DSW storage, sorting, and ing, sorting, and compacting as will be performed.
compaction equipment is provided.
well as placement of non-compac-table waste in shipping containers.
3.
The SWMS provides for controlled 3.
Inspection of the as-built SWMS 3.a) An air filtration _ system is prmided monitored releases by the fol-configuration will be performed.
on the DSW compactor.
lowing:
a) Provision of an air filtration system-on ' DSW compactor - exhausted. to the Radwaste Building Ventilation System.
1.11.3 01-31-93
SYSTEM 80+
' TABLE 1.113-1 (Continued)
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria i
Certified Desian Comunitament Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 3_b) Provision of connections to GWMS 3.b) Connections to GWMS and LWMS and LWMS to route liquid and is provided to route liquid and
. gaseous waste for further gaseous waste for further pro-processing.
cessing.
c)
Provision of screens in the spent c)
Non-clogging wire screens in the resin storage tanks.
spent resin storage tanks are provided.
d) Prodsion of filters downstream of d) Filters are provided downstream of the spent resin storage tanh the spent resin storage tanks.
1.11.3 01-31-93
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FIGURE 1.11.3-2 L DRY STORAGE WASTE SUBSYSTEM F
SYS'IV.M 80+"
1.11.3-SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amplifyine Informatioq ne Slid Waste Management System (SWMS) storage and processing capacity will be evaluated based on as. built plant component characteristics; as well as, operational 1
industry data such as:
a)
Frequency that plart ion exchangers are sluiced to the SWMS for processing.
b)
Volume of filter and ion exchanger media in plant to be processed in the SWMS prior to disposal.
c)
Number of filters in the as-built plant to be processed in the SWMS for disposal.
d)
Number of ion exchangers in the as built plant to be pros.essed in the SWMS
- for disposal.
c)
Plant operating procedures developed by the COL Applicant that may minimize the production of solid waste in the as-built plant.
The WSW subsysten must hav : sufficient storage and process capacity to process at 4
least two batches in accordance with ANSIiANS-55.1-1979 recommendations. This ensures that the spent resin tanks are sufficiently sized to permit at least a 30-day decay of short lived radionuclides prior to processing.
The SWMS is designed to meet the regulatory requirements in accordance with 10CFR 61 for the classification and characterization of solid waste. To achieve this,
' the COL Applicant will develop boundary conditions for process parameters (such as, settling time, drying time, etc.) to ensure regulatory requirements specified in 10CFR61, such as maximum allowable percent free liquid by volume, are met.
Processed radioactive solid waste will be packaged and shipped to a licensed burial site in accordance with regulatoiy requirements specified in 10 CFR 71 and by the U.S. Department of Transporation (DOT) 49 CFR 170 through 189. The COL Applicant will develop a program to ensure these requirements are niet.
He SWMS. is designed, to provide for a = contr - J monitored release to the.
environment in accordance with 10CFR50, Appen% A (General Design Criteria 60 and 64) by the provision system features specified in' the SWMS ITAAC.
documentation.
1.11 01-29-93
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Relationshio of Solid Waste Mananement Sntem ITAAC to the Safety Analais -
I N/A 4.:
3.
Relationshin of Solid Waste Mananement Swtem ITAAC to Pld i
N/A L
4.
CESSAR DC Chanter 14 Tests -Anolicable to Solid Waste Manacement Sntem j
.i 14.2.12.1.115 s-4 4
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SYS1EM 80+"
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1.13
-Technical Support Center-p
_ Design Description -
The Technical Support Center (TSC) is an onsite facilityLlocated adjacent to the i
control room which provides the capability for_ plant management and technical support to the reactor operating penonnel located in the control room during 4
emergency conditions. Plant administration, technical support functions, and contact 4
with offsite activities to assist the control room operators are performed in the TSC' j,
throughout the course of an accident. He TSC:
is located $_2 minutes walking time from control room, -
i provides an unobstructed view into the control room, a
provides working space of at least 75 square feet per person for a minimum of 25 persons,
~
a provides storage of and/or access to plant records.
The UC is monitored for radiation.
j.
l The UC houses communications equipment.
i J
He TSC Technical Data System provides access to plant process instrumentation indications.
Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria
- Table 1.13-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analysis and associated acceptance criteria for the Technical Support Center.
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.1-01/30/93-1 y
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SYS1EM 80+
TABLE 1.13-1 TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and ' Acceptance Criteria
' Certified Desien Commitment Inspect *ums. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.
Technical Support Center:
L An inspection of the TSC will be L
The TSC:
performed.
a) is located.<2 minutes walking time a) can be reached in S 2 minutes from control room, wWng time from control room, b) has an unobstructed view into b) there are no phpical obstructions control room, to vicuing the control room, c) provides working space _ of at least c) An open space of at least 1875 sq.
75 square feet per person for a ft. is prmided, minimum of 25 persons, d) provides storage of and/or access to d) Plant records and historical data plant records, can be m ed
- 2.
The TSC is monitored for radi-2.
An inspedian of radioactivity 2.
Radiation detectors are installed.
ation.
monitoring equipment will be per-formed.
3.
The TSC houses ' communications 3.
An inspection of the 'ISC will be 3.
Communications '
equipment is equipment.
' performed.
installed. -
4.
TSC Technical Data System pro-4.
An inspection of the TSC will be 4
Instrumentation indications exist or vides access: to plant process performed.
can be retrieved in the TSC.
instrumentation indications.
1.13 01-36 93
^
SYSTEM 80+
TABLE 1.13-1 (Continued)
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Acceptance Criteria Certified Desima Comunitment Inspections. Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 5.
Tl'c TSC Technical Data System is 5.
Inspections of plant records and 5.
Plant records along with tests of independent of control room data tests of TSC Technical Data System TSC Technical Data System strify procusing, miC be performed.
independence of the TSC Technical Data System from control room data processing.
1.73' 01-3493
SYSTEM 80+"
1,13 TECHNICAL liUPPORT CENTER ITAAC 1
SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION j
1.
Amplifyin.,glaformation
]
1 j
Noac i
2.
Relationship of13C ITAAC to the Safety Anahsis, None 3.
Relationship of TSC ITAAC to PRA PRA assumes existence of Technical Support Center (TSC), and that 'ISC can be manned when necessary 4
4.
CESSAR-DC Chapter 14 Testa Annlicable to 'ISC ITA AC.
]
None e
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J 4
1.13 101-30 93
-s-e 6
a
j SYSTEM 80+"'
q l
1.18.1
- MAIN CONTROL ROOM j
Design Description 1
i ne Main Control Room (MCR) makes available the annunciators, d! splays, and controls to 1) operate the plant and 2) maintain plant safety.
%.e MCR provides workspace and facilities for continuouA occupancy and use by a l
minimum of 2 staff members.
ne general configuration of the MCR is shown in Figure.1.18.1-1. The MCR -
[
contains the Master Control Console, the Auxillary Control Console, the Safety Console, the Integrated Process Status Overview,-un Control Room Supervisor Console and operations and administration offices.-
MCR panels are organized according to the following plant' operating functiens:
l Reactor Coolant System (M1) _
l Charging & Volume Control System (M2).
Plant Monitoring & Control (M3)
Feedwater & Condensate Systems (M4) -
Turbine Control (MS)
Heating, Ventilation, & Air Conditioning (A1).
Cooling Water Systems (A2)
Engineered Sufety Features (A3)
Safety Monitoring (A4)
Fire Protection (AS) i i
Secondary Cycle (A6)
Switchyard (A7)
Electrical DistAbution (A8) i De MCR pennits execution of tasks to 1) operate the plantpad 2) maintain plant l
^
safety.-
Inspection, Test, Ana. lyses, and Acceptance' Criterls-t
[
Table.1.18.1 1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria for the i
MCR.
L18.1 1 4 93 u
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SYSTEM 80+=
TABLE 1.18.1-1 I
MAIN CONTROL ROOM Inspections. Tests. Analyses. and Am.,: mace Criteria Certified Desian Co==itanent In f--- Tests. Analyses Accestmace Criteria L
& basic configuration for the L
Inspections of the as-built MCR L
The as-built. urlguration of the Main Control Room facility ' is configuration will be performed.
MCR is in a J.sce with Fg' ure shown in Figure L18.1-L L18.1-1 for the components and equipment shown.
2.
The MCR-makes available 2.
Verification analysis of MCR 2.
W results of the.,.il.b;1ity annunciators, displays and controls annunciators, displays and controls, venfication analysis and ' spedion m
to 1). operate the plant and.2) and availability inspection of the conform subdamsinny with the maintain plant safety.
as-built MCR will be performed.
availabilty verification criteria.
3.
He MCR provides. suitable work 3.
Verification analysis of MCR 3.
He results of the suitability space for continuous occupancy work space ' suitability, and' verification analysis and inspedian -
and tse by a minimum. of 2 staff ia< pia = of the as-built MCR conform substansi=Hy ~ with the members..
will be performed.
suitabihty verifirmainn criteria.
-4
%e MCR permits execution of the 4.
VaEdation tests using a full scale,
' 4.
%c resuks of the validation tests 1 MCR tasks to 1) operate the plant dynamic simulation (mockup) of conform'. substantiaRy to the and 2) maintain plant. safety.
'the certified MCR-will ' be '
validation criteria.
performed.
A I
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1.18.1 MAIN CONTROL ROOM ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amnlifyine Information 1.
The following documents are the bases for the MCR design:
4 a.
HUMAN FACTORS STANDARDS OUIDELINES AND BASES (NPX80-1C DR791-02) (DRAFT) b.
NUPLEX 80+ DESIGN BASES (NPX80 IC-DB-790-01) c.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION FOR CONTROL COMPLEX l
INFORMATION SYSTEM (NPX80-IC-SD79101) d.
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION FOR CRn. CAL FUNCTION AND SUCCESS PATH MONITORING (NPX80-IC-SD790-02)
~
c.
FUNCTIONAL TASK ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY (CESSAR-DC SECTION 18.5) f.
OPERATING EXPERIENCE REVIEW FOR SYSTEM 80+ MMI DESIGN (NPX80 IC RR790-01) g.
HUMAN FACTORS PROGRAM PLAN FOR THE SYSTEM 80+
STANDARD PLANT DESIGN (NPX80.IC-DP790-01)'-
4 h.
HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING VERIFICATION - AND VALIDATION PLAN FOR NUPLEX 80+ (NPX80-IC-DP790-03) i.
NUPLEX 80+ VERIFICATION ANALYSIS REPORT (NPX80-TE790-01) j.
NUPLEX 80+ FUNCTION ANALYSIS AND ALLOCATION i
REPORT 2.
See CESSAR DC Section 18.6 for a discussion of the MCR configuration.
2.
Relationship of MCR ITAAC to the Safety Anahsis None 1.18.1 01-30-93
SYSTEM 80+"
3.
Relationship of MCR ITAAC to PRA Nonc 4.
CESSAR DC Clapter 14 Tests Applicable to MCR ITAAC None t
)
1.18.1
.2 01 30-93
a i
SYSI1CM 80+"
1.18.2 REMOTE SIIUTDOWN ROOM Design Description 3
The Remote Shutdown Room (RSR) is located in an area physically separate from the Main Coatrol Room.
4 The RSR provirles work space and tacilities for continuous occupancy by at least 3 staff members.
The work space of the RSR contains the Remote Shutdown Panel (RSP). The RSP makes available the annunciators, displays and controls to achieve and maintain hot shutdown of the plant.'
The RSP permits execution of tasks to achieve and maintain hot shutdown of the plant.
Inspection, Test. Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria Table 1.18.2-1 specifies the inspections, tests, analyses and acceptance criteria for the RSR.
1 -
4 i
1 8
e 1.18.2 1-1-31-93 4
4
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~
SYSIEM 80+=
TABLE 1.18.2-1 REMOTE SHUTDOWN ROOM Inspections. Tests. An=Ivses. and A-: --A=ce Criteria Certified Desien Com=~dament I= --:#-
- Tests. Analyses Acceptance Criteria 1.
The RSR is located in an area 1.
Inspection - of. the location of the L
He certified des
- ps commitment is q
physically. separate. from the Main as-built RSR will be performed.
m et.
Control Room.
2.
The RSR provides work space and 2.
VeriGcation analysis of the RSR 2.
The results of the smiability facilities for continuous occupancy work space suitability and venfication analysis and inspection by at least 3 staff unembers.
inspection _ of the as-built RSR will conform suboantially with the l
be performed.
verification criteria.
i i
3.
%c RSR _ makes available the 3.
Verification analysis of the RSR 3.
He results of the availability annunciators,' displays and controls annunciator, display and control verification analysis and inspection to~ achieve and maintain hot availability and availability conform subo=ntinny with the shutdown of the plant inspection of the as-built RSR will venfication criteria.
be performed.
4.
The RSR permits the crecution of 4.
WIidation tests using full-scale, 4
He results of the val'darian tests
'the RSR tasks to-achieve and dynamic simulation (mock:ip) of conform substanti=11y with the maintain hot shutdown.
the certified RSR will be validation criteria.
performed. 1-31-93 1.18.2
SYS'MM 80+"
1.18.2 REMOTE SilVTDOWN ROOM ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
A!pnlirvine Infortn3 fica See the " Amplifying Informatk*t" for fl AAC UM foi docu q'.s which are the basca for the RSR # sign.
Sco CESSAR.DC Section 18,8 for a discussion of the RSR.
2.
,Belationddaof R5R ITAAC toto safety Analysin None 3.
Relationshhnof RSR ITA),Q to Ph None 4.
.CHSAR-DC Chanter 14 Tests Anolicable to RSR ITAAQ Nonc p
1.18.2 1-
. 01 31 93
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.SYS'[EM 80+"
I 1.18.3 CONTROL PANELS i
Design Description Control Pancia pmvide the annunciators, displays and copeols for tasks conducted' from the Maln Control Room or the Remote Shutdown Room to 1) operate the plant, and/or 2) maintain plant safety, q
%c Control Panel Iluman System laterface (IISI) features use operating conventions that meet human factors design criterria. The followin 11S1 features are used in the l
contrci panel design: -
DPS Display Illerarch -
DIAS Alarm 'Ille Displays i
DIAS Dedicated Parameter Disp'iays DIAS Multiple Parameter Displays CCS Process Controller Displays CCS Switch Con!1gurations
~
Local control panels provide annunciators, displays, and controls to support tasks controlled from the Main Control Room or Renote Shutdown Room.
Loc 91 control pancis llSI meet human factors design criteria.
Inspection, Test, Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria -
Table 1.lb.s1 specifica the mspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria that will he aglied to cach Control Panel.
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TABLE 1.183-1 4
l CONTROL PANELS i
Insocctions. Tests. Analyses. and Accestance Criteria i
i r
Certi5cd Desien CW Inspections. Tests. Anakses Accestance Criteria i
?
l.
1.
The Control Panels corenia annus-L Task analysis of the Comaol Panel L
The resaks of the task analysis
[
ciators, displays and controh for annunciator, display and contrat a a ny conform with the task tasks conducted from the Main inventory wi!! be performed.
analysis critena.
Control Room or Remote Shut-down Room to-3
- 1) operate the plant and/or
- 2) maintain plant safety.
I 2.'
The Control Panel Human System 2.
Suitability
-mh inspection 2-The resaks of the suitability
~
conform Interface features use. Ops.Gug of the as-buik Control Panels will
-mR conventions that meet human be performed.
sakrantiany with the smtability factors design r:iteria.
The verification inspection ai:eriat following HSI are used in the con-
{
trol panel - design:
DPS Display Hi-4,. DIAS Alarm Tile. Dis-plays; DIAS Dedicated Parameter Displays; DIAS Makiple Parameter.
i Displays; CCS Process ContrcIler
. Displays; and CCS Switch Con-figura*ns.
3.
local. control panels contain an-3.
Task analysis of the local Control 3.
The resuks of the task analysis I
nunciators, displays, L and controls Panel annunciator, display and conform wJa LT!y with the task to support tasks controlled fmn the countrol inventory. will. be analysis criteria.
Main' Control Room or Remote performed.
~
Shutdown Room.
i
- 4..
local control panel Human System 4.
Suitability verification %s;un
- 4..
The results of the smtability Interface features meet human of the as-buiik ' local control panels verification QGima conform factors design uiteria.
will be performed.
suboanti=Dy with the suitability F
t L18.1 1-31-93 r
l' G
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SYSTEM 80+"
1.18.3 CONTROL PANELS ITAAC SUPPORTIVE INFORMATION 1.
Amnlifyine Information Sco Ocction 1.18.1 amplifying information for t'ocuments which are the bases for the Contiel Panel design.
The following applications are standardized lluman System Interface (1151) features that utilize consistent operating conventions at Nuplex 80+ control panels:
DPS Dispisy lilerarchy DIAS Alarm Tile Displays DIAS Dedicated Parameter Displays DIAS Multiple Parameter Displays CCS Process Controller Displays CCS Switch Configurations STANDARD FEATURE: DPS Display liierarchy The DPS Display Illerarchy is a standard lluman-System Interface (1151) feature of the Nuplex 80+ Data Processing System (DPS). The DPS Display liierarchy subm'tted for final design approval is described in CESSAR DC (Chapter 18).
The major characteristics of the DPS Display liierarchy are as follows:
1.
The DPS Display liierarchy is an Integrated presentation of Nuplex 80+
process information.
2.
De DPS Display literarchy provides selectable annunciators and displays of system status and process parameters.
3.
Touch screen VDU devices are utilized.
4.
On each disp!ay page in the DPS Display liierarchy, a spatially dedicated message area and main menu are provided.
5.
The DPS Display llierarchy permits selectable access to any of its.
display pages from any DPS terminal.
6.
He DPS Display liierarchy permits acknowledgment of Nuplex 80+
1.18.3.
1
'01 31 93
SYSTEM 80+"
7.
He DPS Display liierarchy automatically provides specifle alarm condition messages at the time of alarm acknowledgment.
8.
%c DPS Display liierarchy is configured to conform to the System 80+
lluman Factors Standards, Guidelines, & Bases, 9.
The DPS Display Illerarchy indications are read at the panel.
10.
%c DPS VDU devices are located on the vertical panel sections, 11.
He DPS Display liierarchy is diverse and independent of the Discrete-Indication and Alarm System (DIAS).
STANDARD FEATURE: DIAS Alarm Tile Display ne DIAS Alarm Tile Display is a standard lluman System Interface (IISI) feature of the Nuplex 80+ Discrete Indication and Alarm System (DIAS), %c DIAS Alarm Tile Display submitted for final design approval is described in CESSAR DC (Chapter 18). The major characteristics of the DIAS Alarm Tile Displays are as folkms:
1.
Softwarc generated alarm tiles present groups of functionally related alarm status messages.
2.
Touch-screen VDU devices are utilized.
3.
On cach DIAS Alarm Tile Display device, the_ status of alarm tiles is presented on a single alarm tile display page; for each tile, an associated alarm list page is available to present the status of the individual alarm conditions, 4.
Unacknowledged alarms on a single tile are acknowledged through the display as a group.
5.
Alarm condition mecsages are automatically provided upon alarm tile acknowledgment.
6.
Alarm tiles are assigned to control panels by corresponding plant systems, 7.
Alarm tile display devices are located on the vertical panel sections.
8.
- Alarm tiles on the alarm tile display page are spatially dedicated.
9, DIAS Alarm Tile Displays are configured to conform to the System 80+
lluman Factors Standards, Ouldelines, & Bases, 1.18.3 2-01 31 93:
SYSTEM 80+"
10.
Tile details are read at its pancl; tile status is visible across the controlling work space.
11.
Alarm tiles are established for process parameters that provide direct indication of:
Critical Safety Punctions a.
b.
Critical Power Production Functions c.
Success Path performance d.
Success Path availability Damage to major equiprnent e.
f.
Personnel hazard 12.
Alarms are presented in one of four states: new, existing, cleared, reset.
13.
He highest priority of a new or cleared alarm state with the hi; hest priority existing alarm state is provided within a single tile.
14.
A tile "stop/ resume 11 ash' feature is provided for Priority 2 and 3 alarms.
15.
A momentary tone provides an initial audible alert of the transition of one or more alarms to new or cleared states for priority 1 or 2 alarms.
16.
A momentary reminder tone provides a recurring audible alert if Prbrity I or 2 alarms remain unacknowledged.
17.
Alarm tones emit from the console where the alarming display is located.
STANDARD FEATURE: DIAS Dedicated Parameter Display The DIAS Dedicated Parameter Display is a standard lluman System Interface (llSI) feature of the Nuplex 80+ Discrete Indication and Alarm System (DIAS). The DIAS Dedicated Parameter Display submitted for final design approval is described in CESSAR DC (Chapter 18). The major characteristics of the DIAS Dedicated Parameter Displays are as follows:
1.
DIAS Dedicated Parameter Displays are softwarc-generated display representations of process parameters. Each dedicated parameter display presents a single value based on redundant sensor data.
2.
DIAS Dedicated Parameter Displays present validated information based on redundant sensor data. %1idation failures are indicated on the displays.
3.
DIAS Dedicated Parameter Displays present spatially dedicated information.
1.18.3 3-01 31 93
SYSTEM. 80 +"
4.
A DIAS Dedicated Parameter Display permits continuous display of the individual data points.
5.
DIAS Dedicated Parameter Displays incorporate automatic range change features.
6.
Touch screen VDU devices are utilized.
7.
DIAS Dedicated Parameter Displays are assigned to control panels by corresponding plant systems.
8.
DIAS Dedicated Parameter Display devices are located on the vertical control panel sections.
9.
DIAS Dedicated Parameter Displays are configured to conform to the System 80+ lluman Factors Standards, Guidelines, & 11ases.
10.
DIAS Dedicated Parameter Display values are read from across the hiain Q)ntrol Console; the Display details are read at the panel.
11.
DIAS Dedicated Parameter Displays are provided for the following:
a.
Critical Safety Functions b.
Success Path performance c.
PARI indication d.
Reg. Guide 1.97 12.
DIAS Dedicated Parameter Displays are diverse and independent of the DPS display system.
STANDARD FEATURE: DIAS Multiple Parameter Displar The DIAS Multiple Parameter Display is a standard lluman-System Interface (IISI) feature of the Nuplex 80+ Discrete Indication and Alarm System (DIAS). The DIAS Multiple Parameter Display submitted for final design approval is described in CESSAR DC (Chapter 18). The major characteristics of the DIAS Multiple Parameter Displays are as follows:
1.
DIAS Multiple Parameter Displays are software. generated display representations of process parameters.
2.
DIAS Multiple Parameter Displays present validated information based on redundant sensor data. Validation failurcs are indicated on the displays.
1.18.3 01 31 93
SYSTEM 80+"
3.
DIAS Multiple Parameter Displays are digital and analog representations of process parameters.
4.
A DIAS Multiple Parameter Display permits continuous display of its individual data points.
5.
Touch-screen VDU devices are utilfred.
6.
Multiple parameters are assigned to control panels and combined into common DIAS Multiple Parameter Display devices based on plant systems relationships.
7.
DIAS Multiple Parameter Display devices are located on the vertical control panel sections.
8.
DIAS Multiple Parameter Displays are configured to conform to the System 80+ llutnan Factors Standards, Ouldelines, & Bases.
9.
DIAS Multiple Parameter Display values are read at the panel.
10.
DIAS Multiple Parameter Displays are diverse and independent of the DPS display system.
STANDARD FEATURE: CCS Process Controller Display The CCS Process Controller Display is a standard lluman-System Interface (11S1) feature of the Nuplex 80+ Component Control Systems (CCS). He CCS Process Controller Display submitted for final design approval is described in CESSAR DC (Chapter 18). The major characteristics of the CCS Process Controller Displays are as follows:
1.
CCS Process Controller Displays are softwarc-generated representations of process control devices and their controlled variables.
2.
Touch-screen VDU devices are utilized.
3.
CCS Process Controller Display devices are lovated on the control panel bench board sections.
4.
CCS Process Controller Displays conform to the System 80+ Iluman Factors Standards, Guidelines, & Bases.
5.
CCS Process Controller Displays are read at the panel.
1.18.3 5-01 31 93
-____-_A
SYSTEM 80+"
6.
Controls are assigned to control panels based on plant systems, and are combined into Process Controller Display devices based on shared functional relationships.
7.
CCS Process Controller Display is divided into static and dynamic sections for master loop and sub loop control and monitoring.
8.
CCS Process Controller Displays permits selection of operating modes, loop control signal, and loop setpoints.
9.
CCS Process Controller is a man machine interface device only. All control loop electronics are kicated outside the main control room.
i STANDARD FEATURE: CCS Switch Configuration The CCS Switch Configurations are a standard lluman-System Interface (IISI) feature of the Nuplex 80+ Component Control Systems (CCS).
The CCS Switch Configurations submitted for final design approval are described in CESSAR DC (Chapter 18). The major characteristics of the CCS Switch Configurations are as follows:
1.
CCS Switch Configurations utilize physical push buttons with backlit legend status indicators.
2.
CCS Switch Configurations permit on-line replacement and bumpless transfer.
3.
CCS Switch Configurations are assigned to control panels based on plant systems, and combined into multiple component units based on functional relationships.
4.
CCS Switch Configuration devices are located on the control panel bench board sections.
S.
CCS Switch Configurations conform to the System 80+ Iluman Factors Standards, Guidelines, & Bases.
6.
CCS Switch Configurution details are read at the panel.
See CESSAR DC Section 18.7 for discussion ofinformation presentation and panel layout.
2.
Relationshin of Control Panels ITAAC to the Safety Anahsis None 1.18.3 6-01 31 93 am-g
FYSTEM 80+'*
3.
Itelationship of Control Panels ITAAC to Pila None 4.
CIISSAR DC Chanter 14 Tests Applienble to Control Panels ITAAC None 1.18.3 7-01 31 93