L-16-323, Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-inchi Accident

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Spent Fuel Pool Evaluation Supplemental Report, Response to NRC Request for Information Pursuant to CFR 50.54(f) Regarding Recommendation 2.1 of the Near Term Task Force Review of Insights from Fukushima Dai-inchi Accident
ML16344A010
Person / Time
Site: Davis Besse Cleveland Electric icon.png
Issue date: 12/09/2016
From: Tony Brown
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Co
To:
Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CAC MF3728, CAC MF5238, L-16-323
Download: ML16344A010 (7)


Text

FENOC- Davis-8esseNuclear Pawer Station 5501N. StateRautaZ FirctErreryy NuclearOpnting hmpany Qak Harboc Ohio 43449 December9, 2016 L-16-323 10cFR50.54(D ATTN: DocumentControlDesk U.S,NuclearRegulatory Commission 11555Rockville Pike Rockville,MD 2ABS?

SUBJECT:

Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation DocketNo.50-346,LicenseNo. NpF-3 ear-I=e[q Iisk Force(NTTH Reviewof tnsiontstrq (CACNos.MF3728and MF523g)

On March12,2A12,the NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC)issueda Requestfor lformation per 10 CFR 50,54(0(Reference1) to all powerreactorlicensees.

Enclosure1, ltem (9) of the 50.54(f)letterrequestedaddresseesto providelimited sgoPespentfuel pool(SFP)evaluations.By letterdatedOc'tober 27,2015 (Refepnce2), the NRCtransmittedfinalseismicinfonnationrequesttables,which identified thatFirstEnergy NuclearOperatingGompany{FENOC)is to conducta limited scopeSFPevaluationfor Davis-BesseNuclearPowerStation(DBNPS).By Reference3, NuclearEnergyInstitute(NEl)submittedan ElectricPowerResearch fnstitute(EPRf)reportentitled,SerbmicEvaluationGuidanceSpenf Fuel PaolIntegrity Evaluation(EPRI3002007148) (Reference4), for NRCreviewand endo6ement.ltnC endorsement was provided by ReferenceS.

EPRI3002007148 providescriteriafor evaluatingthe seismicadequacyof a SFPto the reevaluated groundmotionresponsespectrum(GMRS)hazardlevels. Thisreport suppfementsthe guidancein the SeismicEvatuationGuidance,Screening,Prioritization and lmplementatianDefals (SPID)for the Resolutionof FukushimaNear-TermTask Force Recammendation 2.1: Ser.smic(Reference8) reportfor plantswherethe GMRS peakspectralacceleration is lessthanor equalto 0.8g. Section3.3of EPRl 3002007148lists the parametersto be verifiedto confirmthatthe resultsof the report are applicable to DBNPS,andthatthe DBNPSSFP is seismically adequatein accordance withNTTF2.1 Seismicevaluation criteria.

Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation L-16-323 Page2 The attachmentto this letterprovidesthe datafor DBNPSthat confirmsapplicabilityof the EPRI3002007148 criteria,confirmsthatthe SFP is seismically adequate,and providesthe requestedinformationin responseto ltem (9) of the 50.54(f)letter associated with NTTFRecommendation 2.1 Seismicevaluation criteria.

Thereare no new regulatory commitments containedin this letterandno revisionsto existingregulatory commitments.lf thereare any questionsor if additionalinfonnation is Pquired,pleasecontactMr.ThomasA. LenE,-Manager - FleetLicensing, at 330-315S810.

I declareunderpenaltyof perjurythatthe foregoingis trueandcorrect.Executedon Decemberq , 2016.

Perfornance lmprovement Attachment Site-SpecificSpentFuelPoofCriteriafor Davis-BesseNuclearPowerStation

References:

1. NRC Lefter,Requestfor Information Pursuantto Title10 of the Codeof Federal Regulations 50.54(f)RegardingRecommendations 2.1, 2.3,and 9.3,of the Near-TermTaskForceReviewof Insightsfromthe FukushimaDalichiAccident,dated March12,2A12,Agencywide Documents Accessand Management System (ADAMS)AccessionNumberML12053A940.
2. NRCLetter,FinalDetermination of LicenseeSeismicProbabilistic Risk Assessments Underthe Requestfor Information Pursuantto Title10 of the Code of FederalRegulations 50.54(0RegardingRecommendation 2.1 "seisrnic"of the Near-TermTask ForceReviewof Insightsfromthe Fukushima Dai-ichiAccident, datedOctober27,2015,ADAMSAccessionNumberMLl5194A015.
3. NEI Letter,Requestfor Endorsement of Seismic Evaluation Guidance:SpenfFuel PoolIntegrityEvaluation(EPRI 3002007148), datedFebruary23,2A16,ADAMS AccessionNumberMLIO05SA01 7.
4. EPRf Report3002007148,SelsmicEvaluatianGuidanceSpanfFuetPool Integrity Evaluation,February2016,ADAMSAccessionNumberML16055A021.

Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation L-16-323 Page3

5. NRCLetter,Endorsement of ElectricPowerResearchInstituteReport 3002007148, "SeismicEvaluationGuidance:SpentFuelPoolIntegrity Evaluation,"datedMarch17, 2016,ADAMSAccession NumberML15350A158.

6 . FENOCLetter,FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Company (FENOC)SeismicHazard andScreening Report(CEUSSites),Response to NRCRequestfor Information Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.54(0 Regarding Recommendation 2.1of the Near-Term TaskForce(NTTF)Reviewof Insightsfromthe Fukushima Dai-ichiAccident, datedMarch31,2014,ADAMSAccessionNumberML14092A203.

7 . NRCLetter,Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation,Unit1 - StaffAssessment of lnformation ProvidedPursuantto Title10 of the Codeof FederalRegulations Part 50, Section50.54(0,SeismicHazardReevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term TaskForceReviewof Insightsfromthe Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident(TACNo.MF3728), datedAugust25,2015,ADAMSAccessionNumber M115230A289.

8 . EPRIReport1025287,SeismicEvaluationGuidance,Screening,Prioritization and lmplementationDetailsISPID]for the Resolution of FukushimaNear-TermTask ForceRecommendation 2.1: Seismic,November2012,ADAMSAccession NumberM112333A170.

9 . FENOCLetter,FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Company(FENOC)Expedited SeismicEvaluation Process(ESEP)Reports,Response to NRCRequestfor Information Pursuantto 10 CFR50.54(f)Regarding Recommendation 2.1of the Near-Term TaskForce(NTTF)Reviewof Insightsfromthe Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident,datedDecember 19,2014,ADAMS Accession Number ML14353A059.

1 0 . NRCLetter,Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation,Unit1 - StaffReviewof Interim EvafuationAssociated withReevaluated SeismicHazardlmplementing Near-Term TaskForceRecommendation2.l (TACNo.MF5238), datedOctober19,2015, ADAMSAccessionNumberML15273A237.

cc: Director, Officeof NuclearReactorRegulation (NRR)

NRCRegionlll Administrator NRCResidentInspector NRRProjectManager UtilityRadiological SafetyBoard

ATTACHMENT FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Company NuclearPowerStation Davis-Besse DocketNo.50-346 LicenseNo.NPF-3 Nuclear SpentFuelPoolCriteriafor Davis-Besse Site-Specific PowerStation

Attachment L-16-323 Page1 of 3 The 50.54(f)letter(Reference 1) requested that,in conjunction withthe response to NTTF Recommendation 2.1,a seismicevaluation be madeof the SFP. Morespecifically, plants wereaskedto consider"allseismically inducedfailuresthatcan lead to draining of the SFP."Suchan evaluation wouldbe neededfor anyplantin whichthegroundmotion responsespectrum(GMRS)exceedsthe safeshutdownearthquake (SSE)in the 1 to 10 Hz frequencyrange.Thestaffconfirmed throughReferences 2 and7 thatthe GMRS exceedsthe SSEandconcluded thata SFPevaluation is meritedfor the FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Company(FENOC,the licensee) Davis-Besse NuclearPowerStation (DBNPS).By letterdatedMarch17,2016(Reference 5),the staffdetermined thatEPRI 3002007148 was an acceptable approach for performing SFPevaluations for plants wherethe peakspectralacceleration is lessthanor equalto 0.89.

Thetablebelowliststhe criteriafromSection3.3of EPRI3002007148 alongwithdatafor DBNPSthatconfirmsapplicability of the EPRI3002007148 criteriaandconfirmsthatthe SFPis seismically adequateandcan retainadequatewaterinventory for 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />sin accordance withNTTF2.1 Seismicevaluation criteria.

SFPCriteriafrom EPRl3O02007t48 Sitepecific Data,,,

Site Parameters GMRSpeak 1 . Thesite-specific TheGMRSpeakspectralacceleration in NTTF2.1 spectralacceleration at any SeismicHazardandScreeningReportDavis-Besse frequencyshouldbe lessthanor NuclearPowerStationOttawaCounty,Ohio(Reference equalto 0.89. 6), as acceptedby the NRCin Davis-Besse NuclearPower Station,Unit1 StaffAssessment of Information Provided Pursuantto Title10 of the Codeof FederalRegulations Part50,Section50.54(f), SeismicHazardReevaluations for Recommendation 2.1 of the Near-Term TaskForce Reviewof InsightsFromthe Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident (TACNo. MF3728)(Referen ce 7), hasbeensuperseded by the FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Company(FENOC)

Expedited SeismicEvaluation Process(ESEP)Reports, Response to NRCRequestfor Information Pursuant to 10 CFR50.54(0Regarding Recommendation2.l of the Near-Term TaskForce(NTTF)Reviewof Insightsfromthe Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident(Reference 9), as accepted by the NRCin letterDavis-Besse NuclearPowerStation, Unit1 - StaffReviewof InterimEvaluation Associated with Reevaluated SeismicHazardlmplementing Near-Term TaskForceRecommendation 2.1 (Reference 10),is 0.549, whichis 0.89;therefore, this criterion is met.

StructuralParameters

2. Thestructure housingthe SFP TheSFPis housedin theauxiliary building, whichis shouldbe designed usingan SSE seismically designed to the siteSSEwitha PGAof 0.159 witha peak ground acceleration perUSARSection3.2.1.TheDBNPSPGAis greaterthan (PGA)of at least0.19. 0.1g;therefore, thiscriterionis met.

Attachment L-16-323 Page2 of 3 SFPGriteriafrom EPRI3002007148 Sitepecific Data

3. Thestructural loadpathto the SFP TheSFPis housedin Auxiliary Building, Area8, whichis shouldconsistof somecombination constructed of steelframing,reinforced concrete(RC) of reinforced concreteshearwall walls,roofsandfloors[Ref.Drawings C-202andC-230].

elements,reinforced concreteframe Theexteriorwallsof the SFPare5 ft. 6 in.thickRCwalls.

elements, post-tensioned concrete TheSFPflooris a 5 ft. thickRCslab. Thestructural load elementsand/orstructural steel pathfromthe SFPto the foundationconsistsof 5 ft 6 in.

frameelements. thickRCwallsat the boundary of the poolandalsoby several2 ft. to 3 ft. thickintermediate bearingwallsof 13ft. 6 in. height.Thefoundation is a 3 ft. thickRC mat slabthatbearson bedrock.Therefore, thiscriterionis met for DBNPS.

4. TheSFPstructure shouldbe TheSFPstructure is includedin the DBNPSStructures included in theCivillnspection Monitoring Programin accordance with10 CFR50.65, Programperformed in accordance whichmonitors the performance or condition of structures, withMaintenance Rule. systems, or components (SSCs)in a mannersufficient to providereasonable assurance that these SSCs are capableof fulfilling theirintended functions [Ref.

Procedure EN-DP-O15111. Therefore, thiscriterionis met for DBNPS.

Non-StructuralParameters

5. To confirmapplicability of the piping All pipingattached to the SFPis seismically qualifiedto evaluation in Section3.2of EPRI SSEin accordance withUSARSection9.1.3.11, except 3002007148, pipingattached to the fivesmallborelinesandan overfillline. Theselinesare SFPup to thefirstvalveshouldhave locatedapproximately 20 ft. abovethe top of activefuel beenevaluated for the SSE. and provideapproximately 147hoursbeforeuncovering the spentfuelandapproximately 178hoursbeforethetop 113of the spentfuelpoolis uncovered perABSConsulting calculation 2734296-C-1 34, Revision 0.

Section3.2of EPRI3002007148 is focusedon the rapid drainingof the SFPsuchthatthereis an uncovering of morethan 113of the spentfuelheightwithin72 hours.

Withgreaterthan72 hoursavailable, thereis no concern of rapiddraindown;therefore, the intent of thiscriterion is metfor DBNPS.

Attachment L-16-323 Page3 of 3 SFPCriteriafrom',EPRI3002007148 Sitepecific Data

6. Anti-siphoning devicesshouldbe No anti-siphoning devicesareused. Pipingdesignis such installedon anypipingthatcould to siphonthe spentfuelpoolwater thatit is not possible leadto siphoning waterfromthe leveldownas the resultof a failedpipeor component to a SFP. In addition, for anycases waterlevelbelowI ft. 6 in. abovethetop of the spent fuel whereactiveanti-siphoning devices rack[Ref.USARSection9.1.2.3].Thislevelprovides areattached to 2-inchor smaller adequate shieldingandcoolingof the spentfuelsystem.

pipingandhaveextremely large Sincethe pipingof the SFPcoolingsystemcannotleadto extendedoperators, the valves rapiddraindowndueto siphoning; thiscriterionis metfor shouldbe walkeddownto confirm DBNPS.

adequatelateralsupport. devicesareattached to As described, no anti-siphoning Z-in.or smaller pipingwith extremely large extended operators; thiscriterionis satisfiedfor DBNPS.

therefore,

7. To confirmapplicability of the The DBNPSSFPis partof multipleinterconnected pools, sloshingevaluation in Section3.2of alongwiththefueltransfer pool andthe cask pit.

EPRI3002007148, themaximum Combined, thesepoolshavea lengthof lessthan20 ft.,a SFPhorizontal dimension (lengthor widthlessthan53 ft.,anda depthof 39ft. 6 in. basedon width)shouldbe lessthan 125ft., drawingC-0247;therefore, thiscriterionis met.

the SFPdepthshouldbe greater The DBNPSGMRSmaximumspectralacceleration in the than36 ft, andthe GMRSpeakSa frequency rangelessthan0.3 Hz is 0.029fromthe shouldbe <0.19at frequencies equal FirstEnergy NuclearOperating Company(FENOC) to or lessthan0.3 Hz. Expedited SeismicEvaluation Process(ESEP)Reports, Response to NRCRequestfor Information pursuant to 10 CFR50.54(0Regarding Recommendation 2.1of the Near-TermTaskForce(NTTF)Reviewof Insightsfromthe Fukushima Accident(Reference Dai-ichi 9),whichis less than0.19;therefore, thiscriterionis met.

8. To confirmapplicability of the Thesurfaceareaof the DBNPSSFPproperis 1,056.96ft2 evaporation lossevaluation in basedon drawingC-0247andUSARSection9.1.3.3, Section3.2of EPRI3002007148, whichis greaterthan500ft2;andlicensedreactorthermal the SFPsurfaceareashouldbe powerfor DBNPSis 2,817MWt[Ref.USARSection1] per greaterthan500ft2andthe licensed unit,whichis lessthan4,000MWtperunit;therefore, reactorcorethermalpowershould thesecriteriaare met.

be lessthan4,000MWtperunit.