Information Notice 2002-25, Challenges to Licensees' Ability to Provide Prompt Public Notification and Information During an Emergency Preparedness Event
| ML022380474 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/26/2002 |
| From: | Beckner W NRC/NRR/DRIP/RORP |
| To: | |
| Petrone C , NRC/NRR/RORP, 415-1027 | |
| References | |
| TAC M4779 IN-02-025 | |
| Download: ML022380474 (9) | |
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001 August 26, 2002 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 2002-25: CHALLENGES TO LICENSEES ABILITY TO
PROVIDE PROMPT PUBLIC NOTIFICATION AND
INFORMATION DURING AN EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS EVENT
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses for nuclear power reactors, except those who have
permanently ceased operations and have certified that fuel has been permanently removed
from the reactor vessel.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information notice (IN) to alert
addressees to licensee problems with the Alert and Notification System (ANS) and the
Emergency Alert System (EAS) and to the effect of call-inhibiting devices such as the
TeleZapper'. This IN is intended to ensure that licensees are able to provide prompt public
notification and information during an emergency preparedness event. The NRC expects
recipients to review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider taking actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, the suggestions contained in this
information notice do not constitute NRC requirements and, therefore, no specific action or
written response is required.
Background
The emergency notification requirements are given in planning standard 10CFR50.47(b)(5):
Procedures have been established for notification, by the licensee, of State and local
response organizations and for notification of emergency response personnel by all
organizations; the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations
and the public has been established; and means to provide early notification and clear
instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning
Zone have been established.
These requirements are amplified in Appendix 3 of NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP-1, Criteria for
Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in
Support of Nuclear Power Plants:
NRC and FEMA recognize that the responsibility for activating the prompt notification
system . . . is properly the responsibility of the State and local governments. NRC and
FEMA also recognize that the responsibility for demonstrating that such a system is in
place rests with the facility licensee.
Appendix 3 also states that the licensees plan shall include the capability for 24-hour a day
alerting and notification and provisions for using the media and/or other methods to
communicate emergency instructions to the public.
Description of Circumstances
and Discussion
ALERT AND NOTIFICATION SYSTEM (ANS)
- Inability To Detect Siren Failures
In September 2000, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station and Limerick Generating
Station reported that jumper wires had been installed in numerous siren boxes which
bypassed the failure detection circuitry. As a result, several sirens tested as operable
when they were not. During its investigation, the licensee determined that siren testing
maintenance records had been falsified by contract technicians. In an actual
emergency, emergency management officials could not have detected the failure of
sirens that had jumpers. The jumpers could have prevented (or delayed) route alerting
for residents in the vicinity of the inoperable sirens. The licensee recalculated its PI data
for the affected period and one of its sites crossed the green-white performance
threshold. Based on the licensees root cause investigation, NRC attributed the
unauthorized jumper wire installation to: (1) poor oversight of contractor and utility
personnel; (2) failure to enforce contractual requirements; (3) over reliance on the failure
detection system; and, (4) inadequate self-assessment. Considering that the contractor
technicians willfully installed the jumper wires and that the licensee identified the issue
and took effective corrective actions, the NRC determined this issue to be a Severity
Level III violation with no civil penalty. The NRC Office of Investigations issued an
inspection report on August 30, 2001 detailing the violation (ADAMS accession number
- Failure To Test and Maintain Personal Home Alert Devices (PHADs)
The original ANS design report submitted by Beaver Valley Power Station to the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) stated that the physical means of alerting the
public were 110 sirens, approximately 1200 PHADs and route alerting. PHADs are
small sirens mounted on residential electric meters. The report stated that the pole- mounted sirens might not attain the required decibel level in blind spots in the EPZ.
Therefore, PHADs and route alerting were planned as supplemental alerting modes.
However, elsewhere in the report, it referred to the PHADs as a complementary
system installed at houses in sparsely populated areas or in blind spots of the pole- mounted sirens. The licensees emergency plan mentions two types of sirens (large
pole-mounted sirens and PHADs). The emergency plan also states: In certain areas of
the EPZ, the terrain makes it impossible to adequately notify everyone by use of the
pole-mounted sirens. Some residents of the EPZ live outside the effective audible
range of the sirens. Therefore, the utility has installed PHADS adjacent to the electric
meter at each of these residents. During an inspection, the NRC identified concerns
with the licensees efforts to maintain the PHADs. Specifically, there were no approved
testing procedures, no test records, no feedback mechanism to identify PHAD
deficiencies, and no evaluation of the current adequacy of the PHADs. The failure to
test and maintain the PHADs was an apparent failure to meet the risk significant planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(5) for ANS coverage since the PHADs are integral
to the ANS function as defined by FEMA. The finding was evaluated as low to moderate
safety significance (white) as described in the final significance determination letter
issued by the NRC on June 24, 2002 (ADAMS accession number ML021760594).
FEMA -REP-10, Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear
Power Plants, provides general acceptance criteria for special alerting methods in
section E.6.2.4.1. Licensees which utilize special alerting methods should review their
current testing and maintenance programs to ensure that commitments made in their
original ANS design report are adhered to. Additionally, licensees should obtain FEMA
acceptance and approval of ANS design changes prior to implementation.
- Inability To Activate Sirens
At Calvert Cliffs, during a well-publicized annual full-sounding siren test on November 5,
2001, none of the sirens in the central risk county activated. The apparent cause was
that a computer contractor hired by the county to simplify the computer screen, removed
the correct icon and incorrectly programmed the icon left on the screen. The licensee
immediately addressed this issue and made the necessary changes. A well-publicized
retest verified that the corrective actions were effective. The licensee investigation
revealed that, despite successful weekly silent tests, the sirens were incapable of being
activated by this county for several months. NRC inspection report IR05000317/2001-
012, IR05000318/2001-012 (ADAMS accession number ML020280505) describes this
event.
These situations show the need for counties to notify licensees before they work on
and/or modify the siren activation system and the need for thorough post-maintenance
testing following any modification.
EMERGENCY ALERT SYSTEM (EAS)
Radio and television stations began implementing the current EAS on January 1, 1997. EAS
equipment at broadcast stations is either in an automatic or manual mode. If the equipment is
in the automatic mode, State and local governments can transmit emergency instructions to the
public through radio, television and cable stations 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day whether or not the station has
staff present. The broadcaster or cable operator must set the EAS equipment to auto-forward
the message.
As a result of an inadvertent siren activation, the risk county called the specified primary EAS
radio station to broadcast an EAS message that there was no emergency. But, the on-duty
technician at the radio station could not activate the system due to a lack of training. During the
event investigation, the county discovered that the radio station had a shortage of personnel
and that it was using an automated broadcasting format during off-hours (e.g., 10 pm to 2 am).
Further, a local area plan had been submitted to the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) for approval (a new requirement stemming from the implementation of the EAS). FCC
approval establishes a commitment by the radio station to provide EAS services. FCC rejected
the local area plan because the backup radio station was in the same building. Since the plan
was disapproved, the station had no commitment to provide the service. This is not an isolated case. In several past instances, the primary EAS radio station was not
manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> a day and did not have auto-forward capability. In these situations, the ability
to promptly broadcast an emergency message is questionable. As stated in 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix E,Section IV.D.3: The design objective of the prompt public notification system shall
be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the
plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. Licensees should confirm that their
EAS station(s) is committed to providing EAS services and the capability exists to broadcast an
emergency message at all times.
CALL-INHIBITING DEVICES
In order to notify emergency workers or members of the public of a declared emergency, numerous licensees have either contracted the services of a high-speed telephone
emergency notification company or installed a predictive dialing computer system (e.g.,
Community Alert Network (CAN) or Dialogics). Utilizing these methods, notification of a
declared emergency event can be automatically made to a large number of people in a
relatively short period of time.
However, another technological application has been devised (e.g., TeleZapper'and Tel-A-
Zap') to inhibit the successful completion of an incoming call from an originator using
predictive dialing computers normally identified by caller ID as out of area or unavailable
(e.g., telemarketers). For these incoming calls, some of the devices emit a tone (the same tone
heard when a number is dialed incorrectly), that acts as an operator intercept, causing the
receiving phone to hang up. Other variations of the device screen calls and request additional
information that the predictive dialing computer is unable to provide. Yet other devices will only
permit pre-programmed numbers and ignore those numbers it does not recognize.
In the situation where an individual has a call-inhibiting device installed, the ability to notify
emergency responders or members of the public using predictive dialing computers may be
impaired. Due to the variety of call inhibiting devices and predictive dialing computers, there is
a myriad of postulated interactions between the systems.
The impact of call inhibiting devices on established notification methodology should be clearly
understood by emergency responders. Additionally, members of the public may not be aware
of the fact that call-inhibiting devices may prevent them from receiving emergency notifications. This information notice does not require any action or written response. If you have any
questions about this information notice, please telephone or e-mail one of the technical
contacts listed below.
/RA/
William D. Beckner, Program Director
Operating Reactor Improvements Program
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: David M. Silk, RI Robert E. Kahler, NRR
(610) 337-5372 (301) 415-2992 E-mail: dms3@nrc.gov E-mail: rek@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices This information notice does not require any action or written response. If you have any
questions about this information notice, please telephone or e-mail one of the technical
contacts listed below.
/RA/
William D. Beckner, Program Director
Operating Reactor Improvements Program
Division of Regulatory Improvement Programs
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: David M. Silk, RI Robert E. Kahler, NRR
(610) 337-5372 (301) 415-2992 E-mail: dms3@nrc.gov E-mail: rek@nrc.gov
Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DISTRIBUTION:
IN Folder
ADAMS ACCESSION NO.: ML022380474 Template: NRR-052 DOCUMENT NAME: G:RORP\OES\Staff Folders\Petrone\ANS, EAS, ZAP IN rev2.wpd
OFFICE RGN-1:DRS TECH EDITOR IOLB:DIPM IOLB:DIPM BC:IOLB:DIPM
NAME Dsilk* REKahler* KHGibson* TRQuay*
DATE 06/28/2002 06/19/2002 07/01/2002 08/21/2002 08/22/2002 OFFICE RSE:OES:RORP:DRIP SC:OES:RORP:DRIP PD:RORP:DRIP
NAME CDPetrone* TReis* WDBeckner*
DATE 06/28/2002 08/22/2002 08/26/2002 OFFICIAL RECORD COPY
Attachment 1 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
_____________________________________________________________________________________
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
_____________________________________________________________________________________
2002-24 Potential Problems With Heat 07/19/2002 All holders of licenses for nuclear
Collectors on Fire Protection power, research, and tests
Sprinklers reactors and fuel cycle facilities.
2002-02, Recent Experience With 07/17/2002 All holders of operating licenses
Supplement 1 Plugged Steam Generator for pressurized-water reactors
Tubes (PWRs), except those who have
permanently ceased operations
and have certified that fuel has
been permanently removed from
the reactor.
2002-23 Unauthorized Administration of 07/16/2002 All Medical Licensees.
Byproduct Material for Medical
Use
2002-22 Degraded Bearing Surfaces in 06/28/2002 All holders of operating licenses
GM/EMD Emergency Diesel for pressurized- or boiling-water
Generators nuclear power reactors, including
those that have ceased
operations but have fuel on site.
2002-21 Axial Outside-Diameter 06/25/2002 All holders of operating licenses
Cracking Affecting Thermally for pressurized-water reactors
Treated Alloy 600 Steam (PWRs), except those who have
Generator Tubing permanently ceased operations
and have certified that fuel has
been permanently removed from
the reactor.
Note: NRC generic communications may be received in electronic format shortly after they are
issued by subscribing to the NRC listserver as follows:
To subscribe send an e-mail to <listproc@nrc.gov >, no subject, and the following
command in the message portion:
subscribe gc-nrr firstname lastname
______________________________________________________________________________________
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit