Information Notice 1999-31, Operational Controls to Guard Against Inadventent Nuclear Criticality

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Operational Controls to Guard Against Inadventent Nuclear Criticality
ML993140347
Person / Time
Issue date: 11/17/1999
From: Teneyck E
NRC/NMSS/FCSS
To:
Ten-Eyck E
References
IN-99-031
Download: ML993140347 (4)


UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

November 1 7, 1999

NRC INFORMATION NOTICE NO. 99-31 : OPERATIONAL CONTROLS TO GUARD

AGAINST INADVERTENT NUCLEAR

CRITICALITY

Addressees

All NRC licensed fuel cycle conversion, enrichment and fabrication facilities.

Purpose

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this Inf~rmation Notice (IN) to alert

addressees to a recent nuclear criticality accident at a foreign fuel fabrication facility that

resulted in a significant radiation exposure to workers and members of the public. Although an

evaluation of the impact of this accident is ongoing, the NRC expects that recipients of this IN

will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as appropriate, to protect against a similar occurrence. However, suggestions contained in this IN are not

NRC requirements. Therefore, no specific action nor written response to this notice is required.

Descri~tion of Circumstances

On September 30, 1999, a nuclear criticality accident occurred at a facility in Japan that

preliminary information indicates resulted in the exposure of three operators to extremely high

levels of radiation, the extensive contamination of process areas, exposure of emergency

responders and members of the public, and contamination of the environment. Preliminary

indications are that the accident involved the dissolution of about 5 times the safe mass of

uranium oxide (enriched to about 18%) by nitric acid in an "unfavorable" geometry vessel (i.e.,

the vessel was not designed to preclude a criticality for the enrichments involved). The 18%

enriched process was just restarted after a several year shutdown.

Discussion

The Government of Japan has initiated a formal task force headed by the Prime Minister to

thoroughly investigate the causes of the accident and determine any potential criminal liability.

As information becomes available from the Government of Japan, NRC plans to conduct an in- depth review of the details surrounding the event to determine whether further improvements in

the NRC regulatory program would be prudent. In the interim, a Temporary Instruction has

been issued to NRC Resident Inspectors at the two high enriched uranium (HEU) facilities and

the two gaseous diffusion plants regulated by NRC to focus inspection resources on criticality

safety implementation at these facilities. NRC also plans to review the results of an industry

initiative to assess their criticality programs. In view of the above accident, licensees are

encouraged to review their policies and procedures and the results of safety assessments to

assure that:

IN 99-31 November 17,1999 Page 2 of 2

1. The possibility of commingling HEU and low enriched uranium (LEU) has been

considered, where applicable, and appropriately rigorous controls are established to

prevent the inadvertent introduction of HEU material into LEU plant areas and

processes.

2. Operators who are authorized to handle special nuclear material (SNM) have received

proper traininglretraining with regard to the criticality safety rules and postings and that

they understand the significance of the operating limits and what their expected

response should be if any operating limit is exceeded.

3. Operations are conducted and administrative safety controls are implemented only in

accordance with approved operating procedures and postings.

4. New processes and restart of processes that have been shut down for an extended .

period of time are covered by current safety assessments and an administrative process

confirms that all applicable controls are established and implemented and operator

traininglretraining is completed prior to the introduction of SNM into the process.

5. Emergency plans contain appropriate provisions to ensure that both onsite and offsite

emergency response personnel are made aware of criticality safety aspects of the

facility, and receive proper health physics coverage and protection when responding to

plant events.

6. Management provides an appropriate level of oversight of high risk operations to ensure

that plant safety programs are effectively implemented and management expectations

are being met.

Any further information developed as a result of the Japanese investigation will be reviewed by

NRC to determine whether further action may be warranted.

This IN requires no specific action nor written response. If you have any questions about the

information in this notice, please contact the technical contact listed below, or the appropriate

NRC regional office.

Elizabeth Ten Eyck, Director

Division of Fuel Cycle Safety

and Safeguards

Office of Nuclear Material Safety

and Safeguards

Technical contact: William Troskoski, NMSS

30 1 -4 1 5-8076 E-mail:wmt@nrc.qov

Attachments:

1. List of Recently Issued NMSS lnformation Notices

2. List of Recently Issued NRC lnformation Notices

Attachment 1 IN 99-31 November 17, 1999 Page 1 of 1

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NMSS INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

99-30 Failure of Double Contingency 11/8/99 All fuel cycle licensees and

Based on Administrative certificates performing laboratory

Controls Involving Laboratory analysis to determine uranium

Sampling and Spectroscopic content, in support of

Analysis of Wet Uranium administrative criticality safety

Waste controls

Authorized Contents of Spent I 0/28/99 All power reactor licensees and

Fuel Casks spent fuel storage licensees and

applicants

Recall of Star Brand Fire 9/30/99 All holders of licenses for nuclear

Protection Sprinkler Heads power, research and test

reactors, and fuel cycle facilities

Malfunction of Source All medical licensees authorized

Retraction Mechanism in to conduct teletherapy treatments

Cobalt-60 Teletherapy

Treatment Units

Safety and Economic 8/24/99 All Distributors andlor

Consequences of Misleading Manufacturers of Generally

Marketing lnformation Licensed Products

Broad-Scope Licensees' 711 2/99 All medical licensees' of broad- Responsibilities for Reviewing scope and master materials.

and Approving Unregistered licensees

Sealed Sources and Devices

Safety Concerns Related to 7/6/99 All U. S. NRC medical licensees

Related Control Unit Failures authorized to use brachytherapy

of the Nucletron Classic Model sources in Nucletron Classic

High-Dose-Rate Remote Model high-dose-rate remote

Afterloading Brachytherapy afterloaders

Devices

99-22 10 CFR 34.43(a)(I ); Effective 6/25/99 Industrial Radiography Licensees

Date for Radiographer

Certification and Plans for

Enforcement Discretion

Contingency Planning for the 6/25/99 All material and fuel cycle

Year 200 Computer Problem licensees and certificate holders

Attachment 2 IN 99-31 November 17,1999 Page 1 of 1

LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED

NRC INFORMATION NOTICES

lnformation Date of

Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to

99-30 Failure of Double Contingency 1 1 18/99 All fuel cycle licensees and

Based on Administrative Controls certificates performing laboratory

Involving Laboratory Sampling and analysis to determine uranium

Spectroscopic Analysis of Wet content, in support of

Uranium Waste administrative criticality safety

controls

Authorized Contents of Spent 10128199 All power reactor licensees and

.Fuel Casks spent fuel storage licensees and

applicants

Recall of Star Brand Fire 9130199 All holders of licenses for nuclear

Protection Sprinkler Heads power, research, and test

reactors, and fuel cycle facilities

Malfunction of Source Retraction 912199 All medical licensees authorized

Mechanism in Cobalt-60 Teletherapy to conduct teletherapy treatments

Treatment Units

Safety and Economic 8124199 All Distributors andlor

Consequences of Misleading Manufacturers of Generally

Marketing lnformation Licensed Products

Year 2000 Contingency Planning 811 0199 All holders of operating licenses

Activities for nuclear power plants and fuel

cycle facilities

Broad-Scope Licensees' 711 2/99 All medical licensees of broad- Responsibilities for Reviewing scope and master materials

and Approving Unregistered licensees

Sealed Sources and Devices

OL = Operating License

CP = Construction Permit