Information Notice 1992-75, Unplanned Intakes of Airborne Radioactive Material by Individuals at Nuclear Power Plants
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555 November 12, 1992 NRC INFORMATION NOTICE 92-75: UNPLANNED INTAKES OF AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVE
MATERIAL BY INDIVIDUALS AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
Addressees
All holders of operating licenses or construction permits for nuclear power
reactors.
Purpose
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is issuing this information
notice to alert licensees to unplanned personnel intakes of radioactive
materials because of inadequate radiological, engineering, and procedural
controls regarding radiologically contaminated materials. It is expected that
recipients will review the 'information for applicability to their facilities
and consider actions, as appropriate, to avoid similar problems. However, suggestions contained in this information notice are not 'NRC requirements;
therefore, no specific action or written response is required.
Description of Circumstances
During two events in 1991 at nuclear reactor facilities, licensee employees
received unplanned intakes of-radioactive material while performing work in
radiologically controlled areas. The following discussions of these events
suggest inadequate licensee control in certain areas.
Fitzpatrick
On May 23, 1991, four workers signed a radiation work permit (RWP) to enter
the torus room to remove insulation from a section of pipe. One was a health
physics technician (HPT) who was to provide continuous job coverage. All were
dressed in accordance with the RWP requirements, which included double
protective clothing (PC) and a negative pressure'(particulate) respirator.
The HPT took an air sample just before removing the outer metal casing around
the insulation. When the casing was removed, parts of the insulation crumbled
into powder and formed a "cloud" of radioactive material in the air. The HPT
then surveyed the insulation and obtained a survey meter reading that was much
higher than expected, greater than 10 mSv/h (in the R/h range). The HPT
promptly ordered the workers to stop work and leave the area. All four of the
workers were contaminated, some in the chest area and some on the face. They
all had inhaled small amounts of radioactive material. The licensee estimated
that the intakes ranged between two and four maximum permissible
9211050202 eV J\
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K
kJ IN 92-75 November 12, 1992 hours0.0231 days <br />0.553 hours <br />0.00329 weeks <br />7.57956e-4 months <br /> (MPC-hrs). An air sample taken in the worker's breathing zone in the
torus room while the insulation was being removed showed airborne radioactive
concentrations of approximately 97 times MPC.
About 10,minuteseafter the four workers entered the torus:room, two other- workers'signed the same.RWP tp erect"scaffoldinj in a room adjoining the torus
room.-These workers did n6t wear respirator's since the RWP did not require
respirators for use in the adjoining room. Consequently, after exiting the
area upon completing their work, both workers were found to be contaminated.
One was contaminated on the face and the other on the chest. The workers were
then decontaminated and sent to obtain a whole body count (WBC). The WBC
result's for these two workers indicated much higher intakes than any of the
members of the first group (approximately 27 MPC-hrs). The airborne
radioactive material from the torus room was the source of their intakes; this
material entered the room through a gap in a sleeve around a pipe passing
between the two rooms. Natural convection. between these two areas caused
contaminated airto flow rapidly into fh'e room where the two, workers were the.
erecting scaffolding. ' " ' ' . '
Du'ring 'the aS low as' is reasonably achievable (ALARA) pre-job,review.meeting
that'was conducted td,'di'scuss.the torus-room scope-of work, the li~censee's
ALARA grouporecommended'using' a hi-gh efficiency particulate air (HEPA) ,
filtration system while removing: insulation.' However, the licensee did not
use a HEPA filter sy-st'em. 'Use of the HEPA system would have required removing
a heavy concrete floor plug to gain access to the torus room., To remove the
plug, the licensee needed to use a crane; maintenance personnel were requested
to remove the plug, but could not support.the job in a timely manner.
Therefore', faced with' a delay of several:'hours, the chief.HPT and the, radiological 's'upervisor' (RS). decided to disregard the;recommendation from the
ALARA'group 'and deleted the HEPA system.requirement-fromthe RWP. However, -
the chief HPT and the RS had riot attended the pre-j6b ALARA 1briefing, where
workers stated that more insulation would need to be removed than originally-,
indicated and that health physics (HP) personnel had not surveyed this
additional larger area of insulation. As a result of.missing the ALARA
briefing;,th6 chief HPT and'RS-'used incompTeteinformation and inadequate pre- job'surveys in-their decision to dMelte theHEPA systema recommendation.,
The decision to remove lhe~insulatiodn without using the HEPA system did not
prompt the licensee to reevaluate theiadequacy of the respiratory protection
required by the RWP. For example, a-negative pressure respirator has a
maximum protection factor of 50,, while apositive~pressure (continuous
respirator hasa maximum protecti6n fad't'or o'f, flow)
2000. Therefore, a positive.- ,-
pressure' respfrator Would havebetter protected the workers.
Th6'lidnsee' evaluated thi's evYent and" fou'nd Iinadequate communication between
the insulation remoVe'rs,"th6'ILARA 'group,.and.HP personnel, and reached the
folldwing conclusions. The 'scq'ejof work was' not communicated, adequately- to -
radiation protection personhel. Also, the ALARA group did not adequately
consider the information presented by insulation removers regarding the
condition of the insulation and the amount of insulation to be removed. , ,,
IN 92-75 November 12, 1992 Further, the change in job scope did not prompt the licensee to reevaluate the
adequacy of the initial planning and job requirements.
Limerick
On March 25, 1991, a group of maintenance workers entered the reactor cavity
for
to perform general inspections and housekeeping activities in preparationposted
flooding of the cavity. Access to the transfer canal was roped off and
with a sign stating "Caution: Do Not Enter." [The transfer canal is a narrow
and
passageway that connects the reactor cavity to the spent fuel pool (SFP)
is used to transfer fuel between the two areas.] The RWP specified "Entry
had
Into The Transfer Canal Prohibited Under This RWP." The reactor cavity the
been decontaminated, but the transfer canal had not; personnel conducting
last transfer canal survey had found loose contamination levels of 0.24 mGy/h
(24 mrad/h), smearable.
the
The licensee job leader (JL) and his crew entered the cavity after signing
RWP. They inspected the reactor vessel flange and started general
housekeeping activities, including vacuum cleaning of the cavity area. During
these activities, the crew found indications of a surface defect in the vessel
flange. As a result, the JL summoned assistance from Reactor Services Section the
(RSS) personnel. The RSS superintendent and another RSS engineer entered the
cavity to inspect the flange. After the engineers inspected the flange, crew removed the service platform and completed its housekeeping. The JL then
the
removed the rope and the "Caution: Do Not Enter" sign at the entrance to gate
transfer canal. The work crew then removed a "stop log gate," (a large
installed between the transfer canal and the SFP), at the end of the transfer
canal near the SFP. While the gate was being lifted, the JL noted that some
sealant material had broken off and fallen on the floor of the transfer canal.a
Since the vacuum cleaner had been removed from the cavity, the JL asked 7that
brush and dustpan be sent down.
The JL then entered the transfer canal. Even though he had just removed the
rope barrier and sign, the RWP prohibiting such entry was still in effect.
Therefore, he was in violation of the RWP. While cleaning the transfer canal, he noticed some damage to the stop log gate guides, and exited the canal to
summon the RSS engineers to inspect the guides. The JL then escorted the two
engineers into the transfer canal to perform the inspection, again in
violation of the RWP.
On leaving the cavity, the JL removed his protective clothi'ng and went to the
whole body contamination monitor on the refueling floor to check for
contamination. The monitor alarmed, and a later survey indicated
contamination around his neck and upper torso. HP personnel escorted the JL
to a decontamination facility where extensive decontamination efforts were
performed. However, no change in count rate was noted, indicating a possible
intake of radioactive material. The licensee final estimate of the intake was
less than 50 MPC-hr.
III
IN 92-75 November 12, 1992 The region held an enforcement conference with
the licensee to discuss NRC
staff concerns with programmatic weaknesses, including
inadequate HP controls, poor communication between procedure violations, inadequate understanding of the hazards that can the JL and HP, and an
and brush in a highly contaminated area. result from using a dustpan
Discussion
Section 20.103(b) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal
(10 CFR 20.103), "Exposure of individuals to concentrationsRegulations
materials in air in restricted areas," requires of radioactive
engineering controls, to the extent practicable, the use of process or other
airborne radioactive material.' In the Fitzpatrick to limit concentrations of
system was an available engineering control. case, the HEPA filtration
is not practicable, the licensee is required toWhen the use of these controls
use other precautionary
procedures, such as increased surveillance, limitation
provision of respiratory protective equipment to of working times, or
radioactive material to~as low as is reasonably limit personnel intakes of
achievable.
Worker intakes of radioactive-material at nuclear
far below the limits of 10 CFR Part 20.. During power plants are generally
airborne radioactive, material is of little concern.normal/plant operation, discussed herein demonstrate-the need for vigilance However, the events
activities that could significantly increase in conducting maintenance
These examples indicate that some licensees have airborne radioactive material.
certain radiological control requirements. In not adequately implemented
both of these events, process
or other engineering controls,. (e.g., HEPA filtration
and pre-work ALARA briefings) were available to systems, roped-off areas
help
airborne radioactive material, but were not effectively control the intake of
used.
This information notice requires no specific action
you have any questions about this matter, please or written response. If
listed below or the appropriate Nuclear Reactor call the technical contact
manager. Regulation (NRR) project
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Jack M. Bell, NRR
(301) 504-1083
,Daniel R. Carter, NRR
(301) 504-1848 Ronald L. Nimitz, RI
(215) 337-5267 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
K-attachment
IN 92-75 November 12, 1992 LIST OF RECENTLY ISSUED
NRC INFORMATION NOTICES
Information Date of
Notice No. Subject Issuance Issued to
92-74 Power Oscillations at 11/10/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Washington Nuclear for nuclear power reactors.
Power Unit 2
92-61, Loss of High Head 11/06/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Supp. 1 Safety Injection for nuclear power reactors.
92-73 Removal of A Fuel 11-04/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Element from A Re- for nuclear power reactors.
search Reactor Core
While Critical
92-59, Horizontally-Installed 11/04/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Rev. 1 Motor-Operated Gate for nuclear power reactors.
Valves
92-72 Employee Training and 10/28/92 All U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Shipper Registration Commission Licensees.
Requirements for Trans- porting Radioactive
Materials
91-64, Site Area Emergency 10/07/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Supp. 1 Resulting from A Loss for nuclear power reactors.
of Non-Class IE
Uninterruptible Power
Supplies
92-71 Partial Plugging of 09/30/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Suppression Pool for nuclear power reactors.
Strainers At A
Foreign BWR
92-70 Westinghouse Motor-Operated 09/25/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Valve Performance Data for nuclear power reactors.
Supplied to Nuclear Power
Plant Licensees
92-69 Water Leakage from Yard 09/22/92 All holders of OLs or CPs
Area Through Conduits for nuclear power reactors.
Into Buildings
OL = Operating License
CP = Construction Permit
IN 92-75 K<J November 12, 1992 The region held an enforcement conference with the licensee to discuss NRC
staff concerns with programmatic weaknesses, including procedure violations, inadequate HP controls, poor communication between the JL and HP, and an
inadequate understanding of the hazards that can result from using a dustpan
and brush in a highly contaminated area.
Discussion
Section 20.103(b) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(10 CFR 20.103), "Exposure of individuals to concentrations of radioactive
materials in air in restricted areas," requires the use of process or other
engineering controls, to the extent practicable, to limit concentrations of
airborne radioactive material. In the Fitzpatrick case, the HEPA filtration
system was an available engineering control. When the use of these controls
is not practicable, the licensee is required to use other precautionary
procedures, such as increased surveillance, limitation of working times, or
provision of respiratory protective equipment to limit personnel intakes of
radioactive material to as low as is reasonably achievable.
Worker intakes of radioactive material at nuclear power plants are generally
far below the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. During normal plant operation, airborne radioactive material is of little concern. However, the events
discussed herein demonstrate the need for vigilance in conducting maintenance
activities that could significantly increase airborne radioactive material.
These examples indicate that some licensees have not adequately implemented
certain radiological control requirements. In both of these events, process
or other engineering controls, (e.g., HEPA filtration systems, roped-off areas
and pre-work ALARA briefings) were available to help control the intake of
airborne radioactive material, but were not effectively used.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about this matter, please call the technical contact
listed below or the appropriate Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project
manager. Original signed bY
Brian K.Grimes
Brian K. Grimes, Director
- Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Jack M. Bell, NRR
(301) 504-1083 Daniel R. Carter, NRR
(301) 504-1848 Ronald L. Nimitz, RI -
(215) 337-5267 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices v
DOCUMENT NAME: 92-75.IN
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.
OFC PRPB:DREP SC:PREP:DREP TECHED BC:PRPB:DREP D:DREP/NRR
NAME DCarter JWigginton JK, in LCunningham FCongel
DATE 8/25/92* 8/25/92* 30/92* 8/25/92* 8/27/92*
OFC BC:OGCB:DORS OGCB:DORS
NAME GHMarcus JPetrosino
10/16/92* 1//2// 10/14/92*
IN 92-XX
October XX, 1992 Discussion
Section 20.103(b) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR
20.103), "Exposure of individuals to concentrations of radioactive materials
in air in restricted areas," requires the use of process or other engineering
controls, to the extent practicable, to limit concentrations of airborne
radioactive material. In the Fitzpatrick case, the HEPA filtration system was
an available engineering control. When the use of these controls is not
practicable, the licensee is required to use other precautionary procedures, such as increased surveillance, limitation of working times, or provision of
respiratory protective equipment to limit personnel intakes of radioactive
material to as low as is reasonably achievable.
Worker intakes of radioactive material at nuclear power plants are generally
far below the limits of 10 CFR Part 20. During normal plant operation, airborne radioactive material is of little concern. However, the events
discussed herein demonstrate the need for vigilance in conducting maintenance
activities that could significantly increase airborne radioactive material.
These examples indicate that some licensees have not adequately implemented
radiological control requirements. In both of these events, process or other
engineering controls, (e.g., HEPA filtration systems, roped-off areas and pre- work ALARA briefings) were available to help control the intake of airborne
radioactive material, but were not effectively used.
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about this matter, please call the technical contact
listed below or the appropriate Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project
manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contacts: Jack M. Bell, NRR
(301) 504-1083 Daniel R. Carter, NRR
(301) 504-1848 Ronald L. Nimitz, RI
(215) 337-5267 Attachment: List of Recently Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: AIRRADIO.IN
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.
OFC PRPB:DREP SC:PREP:DREP TECHED BC:PRPB:DREP D:DREP/NRR
NAME DCarter JWigginton JMain LCunningham FCongel
DATE 8/25/92* 8/25/92* 9/30/92* 8/25/92* 8/27/92*
OFC BC:OGCB:DORS DIR:DORS OGCB:DORS
NAME GHMarcus BKGrime JPetrosino
DATE 10/16/92 XQ10/ /92 10/14/92*
- < IN 92-XX
October XX, 1992 Page 4 of
Discussion
Section 20.103(b)(1) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Requla ons (10 CFR
20.103), "Exposure of individuals to concentrations of radio tive materials
in air in restricted areas," requires, the use of process other engineering
controls to the extent practicable,to limit airborne radi ctivity. When the
use of these controls is not practicable, the licensee i required to use
other precautionary procedures, such as increased surv lance, limitation of
working times, or provision of respiratory protectiv equipment to limit
personnel intakes of radioactive material to as low/as is reasonably
achievable.
Worker intakes of radioactive material at nucl r power plants are generally
below the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 by several orders of magnitude. During
normal plant operation, occupational airborn hazards are normally of little
concern. However, the events discussed ab ve demonstrate the need for
increased vigilance in conducting mainte nce activities that could
significantly increase the amount of ai borne radioactive material. These
examples suggest that some licensees e not adequately implementing their own
radiological control requirements. n both of these events, process or other
engineering controls, (e.g., HEPA ltration systems, roped-off areas and pre- work ALARA briefings) were avail le or in place to help control the intake of
airborne radioactive material, t were not adequately utilized.
This information notice requ es no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions abou this matter, please call the technical contact
listed below or the appro iate Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project
manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical co tacts: Jack M. Bell, NRR
(301) 504-1083 Daniel R. Carter, NRR
(301) 504-1848 Ronald L. Nimitz, RI
(215) 337-5267 OCUMENT NAME: AIRRADIO.IN f
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.
OFC PRPB:DREP SC:PREP:DREP TECHED BC:PRPB:DREP D:DREP/NRR
NAME DCarter JWigginton JMain LCunningham FCongel
DATE 8/25/92* 8/25/92* 9/30/92* 8/25/92* 8/27/92*
OFC BC:OGCB: DIR:DORS OGCB:DORS
NAME GHMarcups6 BKGrimefik JPetrosino
DATE 10/1L(/92 10/ /92 10/14/92*
- S ' V IN 92-XX
October XX, 1992 Discussion
Section 20.103(b)(1) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Re ulati ns (10 CFR
20.103), "Exposure of individuals to concentrations of radioac ive materials
in air in restricted areas," requires, the use of process or ther engineering
controls to the extent practicable,to limit airborne radio tivity. When the
use of these controls is not practicable, the licensee is equired to use
other precautionary procedures, such as increased surveij ance, limitation of
working times, or provision of respiratory protective quipment to limit
personnel intakes of radioactive material to as low a is reasonably
achievable.
Worker intakes of radioactive material at nuclear power plants are generally
below the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 by several o ders of magnitude. During
normal plant operation, occupational airborne azards are normally of little
concern. However, the events discussed abov demonstrate the need for
increased vigilance in conducting maintenan e activities that could
significantly increase the amount of airb ne radioactive material. These
examples suggest that some licensees are ot adequately implementing their own
radiological control requirements. In oth of these events, process or other
engineering controls, (e.g., HEPA fil ation systems, roped-off areas and pre- work ALARA briefings) were available/or in place to help control the intake of
airborne radioactive material, but ere not adequately utilized.
This information notice requires o specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about th~s matter, please call the technical contact
listed below or the appropria Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project
manager.
nran K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical contact Jack M. Bell, NRR
(301) 504-1083 Daniel R. Carter, NRR
(301) 504-1848 Ronald L. Nimitz, RI
(215) 337-5267 DOCU NT NAME: AIRRADIO.IN
- E PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.
OFC PRPB:DREP SC:PREP:DREP TECHED BC:PRPB:DREP D:DREP/NRR
NAME DCarter JWigginton JMain LCunningham FCongel
DATE 8/25/92* 8/25/92* 9/30/92* 8/25/92* 8/27/92*
OFC BC:OGCB:DORS DIR:DORS OGCB:Di S
NAME GHMarcus BKGrimes JPetron
DATE 10/ /92 10/ /92 10/07/92*\"0'
IN 92-XX
October XX, 199 Discussion
Section 20.103(b)(1) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Re ulativ (10 CFR
20.103), "Exposure of individuals to concentrations of radioacti e materials
in air in restricted areas," requires, the use of process or her
engineering controls to the extent practicable,to limit airbo ne
radioactivity. When the use of these controls is not practiable, the
licensee is required to use other precautionary procedures such as increased
surveillance, limitation of working times, or provision respiratory
protective equipment to limit personnel intakes of rad active material to as
low as is reasonably achievable.
Worker intakes of radioactive material at nuclear ower plants are generally
below the limits of 10 CFR Part 20 by several or rs of magnitude. During
normal plant operation, occupational airborne h ards are normally of little
concern. However, the events discussed above emonstrate the need for
increased vigilance in conducting maintenanc activities that could
significantly increase the amount of airbor e radioactive material. These
examples suggest that some licensees are ot adequately implementing their own
radiological control requirements. In bth of these events, process or other
engineering controls, ( e.g., HEPA fil ation systems, roped-off areas and
pre-work ALARA briefings) were avail e or in place to help control the
intake of airborne radioactive mate al, but were not adequately utilized.
This information notice requires o specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about ths matter, please call the technical contact
listed below or the appropria Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project
manager.
Brian K. Grimes, Director
Division of Operating Reactor Support
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Technical conta s: Jack M. Bell, NRR
(301) 504-1083 Daniel R. Carter, NRR
(301) 504-1848 Ronald L. Nimitz, RI
(215) 337-5267 DCUMENT NAME: AIRRADIO.IN
- SEE PREVOUS CON R CE.
OFC R . REP E:DREP TECHED B1::PRPB:DREP D:DREP/NRR
NAME Do r nton JMain LiCunningham FCongel
DATE 9/30/92*1 8, 125/92* 8/27/92*
OFC C: GCB DORS DIR:DORS OG. RS
NAME GHMarcus BKGrimes JPe tidsino
DATE 10/ /92 10/ /92 10/7 /92
- IN
-> j 92-XX
September XX, 1992 Page 5 of X
This information notice requires no specific action or written response. If
you have any questions about this matter, please contact the technical contact
listed below, one of the Board representatives listed on the attachments or
the appropriate Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) project manager.
Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events A sessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regu ation
Technical contact: Daniel R. Carter, NRR
(301) 504-1848 Jack M. Bell, NRR
(301) 504-1083 Ronald L. Nimitz, RI
(215) 337-5267 Attachment: List of Recen ly Issued NRC Information Notices
DOCUMENT NAME: 92-68.IN
- SEE PREVIOUS CONCURRENCE.
OFC PRPB:DREP SC:PREP:DREP TECHED BC:PRPB:DREP D:DREP/NRR
NAME DCar r JWigginton Jmain 9A LCunningham FCongel
DATE 8/ /92* 8/ /92* 813D/92* 8/25/92* 8/27/92*
OFC BC:OGCB:DOEA DIR:DOEA OGCB
NAME GHMarcus CERossi JPetrosino
DATE 9/ /92 9/ /92 9/ /92
K>
Atm 2 7 1992 MEMORANDUM FOR: Charles E. Rossi, Director
Division of Operational Events Assessment
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
FROM: Frank J. Congel, Director
Division of Radiation Protection
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR ISSUANCE OF INFORMATION NOTICE 92-XX, "UNPLANNED
INTAKES OF AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVE MATER AL AT NUCLEAR POWER
PLANTS/
Enclosed is the subject draft information notice N), describing personnel
intakes of radioactive materials as a result of i adequate radiological
controls associated with working with contaminated materials. This draft IN
has benefitted from the review, comment; and Spport of all Regions.
Please issue this IN to emphasize the impor ance of using proper radiological, engineering, and procedural controls. To0 btain additional information, please contact Dan Carter at 504-1848.
figinal signed by Frank J.Congel
Frank J. Congel, Director
Division of Radiation Protection
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Enclosure: Draft Information Notice
Disk containing/draft IN
DISTRIRUTION- ' . ' .
GMarcus, 8D22 FCongel JCunningham
JWigginton DCav'ter JBell
RNimitz, RI P78B R/F Central File
TEssig / r
OFC PRPB:NRR/ PRPB:NRR:SC ADM DREP:NRR: /
NAME *DCART/ER *JWIGGINTON *JMAIN FCONGEL k /
9 08/ /92 08/ /92 08 92 082Z7/92'
- See Previ p'us Concurrence so::
OFFICIAL/RECORD COPY '
Docume Name:INAIRB